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EFFECTS OF FAMILY CONTROL ON FIRM VALUE AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM NON-FINANCIAL SECTOR OF PAKISTAN |
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| รหัสดีโอไอ | |
| Creator | Muhammad Zulfiqar, Muhammad Tayyab Kashif, Muhammad Kashif Khurshid, Shahid Mahmood, and Shahnawaz Saqib |
| Title | EFFECTS OF FAMILY CONTROL ON FIRM VALUE AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM NON-FINANCIAL SECTOR OF PAKISTAN |
| Contributor | - |
| Publisher | TuEngr Group |
| Publication Year | 2563 |
| Journal Title | International Transaction Journal of Engineering, Management, & Applied Sciences & Technologies |
| Journal Vol. | 11 |
| Journal No. | 1 |
| Page no. | 11A01O: 1-14 |
| Keyword | Family Firms, ROA, Non-Family Firms, Family Control, Tobin's Q, Firm Value. |
| URL Website | http://TuEngr.com/Vol11_1.html |
| Website title | ITJEMAST V11(1) 2020 |
| ISSN | 2228-9860 |
| Abstract | This study examines the influence of ownership structure on the firm's financial performance and value in non-financial companies listed at the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) during 2010-2015. The basic focus is the performance of family firms as compared to non-family firms. The distinction between both types has been considered. The PSX non-financial firms are a population for this study and sampling 120 firms are randomly extracted. Tobin's Q and ROA have been used to explore the firm value and a firm's financial performance. This study has incorporated three independent variables, i.e. firm type (family firm/ non-family firm), ownership concentration and family firm type (founder firm/ descendent firm). The data analysis techniques include descriptive, correlational, panel data regression analysis. Panel data techniques detect the significant relationships among the variables. This study finds that family firms are negatively correlated and non-family firms give better performance. Whereas concentrated ownership has presented significant relationship but negative correlation with ROA and Tobin's Q. On the origin of results, it is explored the performance of firm censoriously depends on managerial ownership. Panel data analysis shown that firm leverage and size have no relationship with proxy variables while remaining independent variables have a significant relationship with performance variables. Agency problems arise when managerial shareholdings enlarged in Pakistani perspective, which eventually affects firm performance. |
