

The New World Order under the New Balance of Power between the United States, China and Russia in the Post-Cold War Era

Suraphol Srivithaya

Siam University,
Thailand

iamsuraphol@hotmail.com

ABSTRACT

This paper is a part of the research on “The Changing New World Order from Unipolar to Multipolar Balance of Power in the Post-Cold War Era”. The study applied a documentary qualitative research. All information and document data were collected from related academic books, papers, and research reports, as well as media information and reports international organizations that were studied by content analysis and logical analysis. The results of this research found that since the end of cold war in 1989 and the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the new world order was shifted from a bipolar balance of powers between the United States and the Soviet Union to a unipolar new world order under the American hegemony for many decades. The emerging of China as a rival superpower of the United States together with China and Russia alliance has transforming the unipolar to the multipolar new world order. The American Indo-Pacific strategy was trying to contain and counterbalance the expansion of the Chinese New Silk Road or Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI). The United States and the NATO Western alliance are confronting with Russia in Russian war of aggression in Ukraine. How can we build up a ruled-based multipolar new world order for world peace and security under the United Nations and international law?

Keywords: New World Order, New Balance of Power, Post-Cold War Era

INTRODUCTION

“Before the barbarism of killing children and innocent and defenceless citizens, no strategic reasons hold: the only thing to be done is to cease the unacceptable armed aggression before cities are reduced to cemeteries.”

Pope Francis, 2022

The new world order is a concept that emerged prominently three times in the 20th century. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson sought to create a new world order after the World War I only to find that the world of peace, as well as the Senate, was not ready for his brand of idealism of the League of Nations. During the World War II, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt envisaged further a new world order that would ensure greater stability and peace the creation of the United Nations (UN), although he saw it as a world body that would be based on great power cooperation. Later in this century, during the Gulf War crisis (1990-

1991), U.S. President George Bush revisited the abstract concept of new world order in line with effort to reverse Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990. (Miller & Yetiv, 2001). After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, Bush introduced for the first time his notion of new world order to the U.S. Congress in September 1990 by outlining five simple principles. These five principles provide a framework for the international system to America (Motaharnia & Salehi, 2017). Regarding the fifth objective, he said (Bush, 1990): "We stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment. The crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move toward an historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled times; our fifth objective - a new world order - can emerge: a new era - freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony. A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavor. Today that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we've known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respects the rights of the weak".

The collapse of the Berlin Wall at the end of the cold war in December 1989 put an end to the traditional system of international relations and war in the Persian Gulf draw a line between the new system and the old system. (Motaharnia & Salehi, 2017). Although the collapse of the Berlin Wall was the beginning of an end, but the beginning of Bush's Iraq to Kuwait is coming after the stroke of apparent or obvious than in the past on the future literary fellowship to draw images of the New World Order. Do not forget that former world leaders also sought to establish "new world order" respectively from Monroe to Lenin and from Hitler to Bush. Bush feared that America's response to rape Iraq should not be unilateral reaction. It should re-emergence of collective security in the post-Cold War era (Bull, 1995). The scope of the new world order is consistent pattern of great power arrangements that meet each of structure and functional dimensions. For the United States, the best condition in the future of new world order is that it remains as a dominant power at military, economic, political, culture and technology areas in place. In this scenario, great powers such as China, Russia, Europe Union and India have no longer ability and desire to challenge new world order by hegemony of America leadership.

In special condition, some major areas of instability in the world of democratic peace in 2025 will be as the northern part of Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and some parts of Asia. The emergence of competitor more or less adversary with the United States were China and Russia with significant capabilities and strategic nuclear capability, having the additional troops and space military equipment. In particular, in the world of the emergence of a major competitor we can refer to China-Russia alliance in the years 2018-2015 with the aim of undermining America's global position and its key allies (Motaharnia & Salehi, 2017). Multi-polarity of world competition is the second middle-good world in the prediction of the report. In the future world, we witness two big powers that having more or less capability to battle USA. Each of three powers (two emerging powers and USA) attempt make a coalition of friends and allies to overcome two other powers. In this world, instead of witness flaring great wars in key part of world, we will witness constant and comprehensive among various systems of defensive ally including combination of enticing and threat to bring the small and influential powers with aim of persuading them to change present political ally or maintain the status quo. In the world of multipolar completion world, America, Russia and China, each one as a powerful polar take responsibility of guiding different alliances.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The concept of “new world order” refers to a new period of diplomatic history evidencing dramatic change in world political thought and the balance of power in international relations. Despite varied conceptual interpretations, it is associated with the ideological notion of world governance only in the sense of new collective efforts to identify, understand, or address global problems that go beyond the capacity of individual nation-states to solve. At the end of the First World War, American President Woodrow Wilson called for vision of world peace and the creation of the League of Nations to prevent any aggression war and armed conflicts. After the League of Nations failed, neither Franklin Roosevelt nor Harry Truman, both the U.S. Presidents used the idea of “new world order” when speaking publicly on world peace and international cooperation. Indeed, when Roosevelt used the phrase “new world order” or “new order in the world” it was to refer to Axis powers plans for world domination. Truman speeches have phrases such as, “better world order, “peaceful world order”, “moral world order” and “world order based on law” but not so much “new world order” (Dalio, 2021). Although Roosevelt and Truman may have been hesitant to use the phrase commentators have applied the term retroactively to the order put in place by the second World War victors including the United Nations and the Bretton Woods system as a “new world order”.

The most widely discussed application of the phrase of recent times came at the end of the Cold War in 1989. Presidents Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush used the term to try to define the nature of the post-Cold War era and the spirit of great power cooperation that they hoped might materialize. Gorbachev's initial formulation was wide-ranging and idealistic, but his ability to press for it was severely limited by the internal crisis of the Soviet system. In comparison, Bush's vision was not less circumscribed: “A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavor. Today that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we've known”. However, given the new unipolar status of the United States, Bush's vision was realistic in saying that “there is no substitute for American leadership” (Holloway & Tomlinson, 1995). The Gulf War of 1991 was regarded as the first test of the new world order: “Now, we can see a new world coming into view. A world in which there is the very real prospect of a new world order. ... The Gulf War put this new world to its first test”.

The concept of “new world order” as used to celebrate and herald in the post-Cold War era had no developed or substantive definition. There appear to have been three distinct periods in which it was progressively redefined, first by the Soviet Union and later by the United States before the Malta Conference and again after President George Bush's speech of September 11, 1990. Firstly, the new world order dealt almost exclusively with nuclear disarmament and East-West security arrangements. President Mikhail Gorbachev would then expand the phrase to include United Nations strengthening and great power cooperation on a range of North-South economic, and security problems. Secondly, implications for NATO of Atlantic Alliance, the Warsaw Pact of Eastern Europe, and European integration of Western Europe were subsequently included by the United States. Thirdly, the Malta Conference collected these various expectations and they were fleshed out in more detail by the press. German reunification, human rights and the polarity of the international system were then included. The Gulf War crisis refocused the term on superpower cooperation and regional crises. Economic North-South Dialogue problems between developed and developing countries, the integration of the Soviets into the international system and the changes in economic and military polarity received greater attention.

The demise of the Cold War and greater world cooperation among the UN Security Council's permanent members has created a situation frequently characterized as a New World Order at the United Nations System. This characterization can also be applied to the politics of the UN General Assembly. The roll-call votes in recent sessions, and in particular the 46th session, witnessed the end of a fairly stable decade of voting blocs in the UN General Assembly. An indicator of vote changing is developed which documents the rapid movement of the former Warsaw Pact members and Baltic States towards more western European positions to identify the emerging voting alliances of bloc politics of members' states inside the United Nations (Holloway & Tomlinson, 1995). The accommodation between bloc politics has not been as widespread in the UN General Assembly. The longstanding conceptualizations of east-west relations and north-south dialogue polarizations are in need of revision of the new balance of powers in world politics and multilateral diplomacy in international relations.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study applied qualitative research by using a documentary research method. All documentary data was collected from related research reports, academic books and papers, as well as official documents and information of the United Nations and other international organizations concerned. All collected documentary data were studied by content analysis, critical analysis and logical analysis throughout the data triangulation process in order to achieve comprehensive research results and discussion, conclusion and recommendations.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The results of this research found that the new world order was mostly depended on the transformation of multipolar balance of powers between the United States, China and Russia in the Post-Cold War era. To what extent and how these three great powers can play major roles in rebalancing in the changing multipolar new world order in 4 scenarios: (1) the rivalry between the United States, China and Russia in the multipolar world balance of powers; (2) the roles of China-Russia Alliance in rebalancing the United States' hegemony in dominance of new world order; (3) the confrontation between Chinese new silk road or Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and American Indo-Pacific Strategy; and (4) The rules-based new world order in the changing balance of powers between the United States, China and Russia.

1. The Rivalry between the United States, China and Russia in the Multipolar World Balance of Powers

By the end of World War II, the multi-polar world system characterized by the pursuit of the balance of power among superpowers, in a way that none of them was strong enough to predominate over others, transformed in bipolarity of new world order. The bipolar world was dominated by two opposite superpowers with strong economic, political, military, and cultural influence on their allied countries. Since the beginning of the Cold War, great power interactions among the United States, the Soviet Union and China, have always played a predominant role in the confrontation of the capitalism and communism world (Hoang & Nguyen, 2021). This nearly equal distribution of power between the United States and the Soviet Union (USSR) created a new world order system with no peripheries and with two different spheres of influence which resulted in stability for more than 40 years and assured peace between the two superpowers and limited wars in the rest of the world (Varisco, 2013). Since the end of cold war in 1989 and the Soviet Union collapsed in 1992, the new world

order was shifted from the bipolar balance of powers between the United States and the Soviet Union to the unipolar new world order under the American hegemony for many decades. The emerging of China as a rival superpower of the United States together with China and Russia alliance has transforming the unipolar to the multipolar new world order.

After the rise of China as world economic superpower, the confrontation and competition between the United States and China had started with the Sino-American trade war. As the China-United States relationship locks itself into an irreversible trajectory of global strategic competition, the new cold war has become reemerging in world stage once again. However, while certain characteristics of modern strategic competition do bear some resemblance to those of the former Soviet Union-United States cold war, this era of globalization means that a long-term global showdown between the United States and China is likely to transpire not in a bipolar world order, but a multipolar one, in which complex, intertwined interests among nations will factor into almost every aspect of strategic competition. In this multipolar new world order, while more evenly distributed with the rise of the European Union, India, and Japan, among others, world power remains heavily concentrated in the hands of a so-called “triangle,” of which the United States and China command two sides, with the third occupied by Russia (Hoang & Nguyen, 2021). Therefore, the structure of new world order was now based on the tri-multipolar balance of powers between the United States, China and Russia.

Since the end of the cold war, the concept of multipolarity has gained prominence around the world. The United States, China and Russia have agreed on this ill-defined term and included it in nearly all of their joint declarations, statements, and treaties dating from the mid-1990s to the present. When American hegemony is declining and speculation abounds as to which among the world’s burgeoning nations will rise to power, the renewed Sino-Russian relations and one of its foundational pillars - the promotion of multipolarity (Turner, 2009). The concept of multipolarity as it applies to China and Russia in an effort to determine the depth of the two countries’ agreement. Though these two great powers may agree upon the same solution to the next new world order, China and Russia employ very different strategies to achieve it (Financial Times, 2022). That why it still a question that the competition of great powers, especially triangular relations between the United States, China and Russia in the era of 21st century new cold war shall be a bi-multipolar or tri-multipolar new world order. In the context of sustained globalization, the United States and China, superior in total power and locked in a long-term strategic competition, will serve as constant factor. Russia will assume the role of variable factor, seeking not to go toe-to-toe with the other two, but rather to utilize its leverage and manipulate the balance of power to its advantage (Hoang & Nguyen, 2021). The key is to maintain its place at the triangle balance of powers, will continue to limit the scope of future strategic cooperation of three great powers, as it pertains to areas within Russia’s perceived influence such as Central Asia or Eastern Europe.

This dynamic of great power competition presents both opportunities and challenges to the world’s small and middle-sized countries. If it is properly managed a more predictable path with limited confrontation, this triangle should provide a favorable environment for countries outside of it to simultaneously pursue cooperation with each side without having to always look over their shoulders in fear of provoking the others. If tension escalates and recent drumbeats regarding a so-called contest of “democracies versus autocracies” continue to take hold, thus breaking the core essence of the triangle and turning competition into an ideological battle, then other countries will be forced into picking sides. Globalization will more than likely prevent this undesirable outcome, but the risks should not be taken lightly

(Hoang & Nguyen, 2021). Among regions, while Europe, Middle East and Southeast Asia will continue to be highly importance to policymakers in the United States, China and Russia, the Indo-Pacific should emerge as the main theater of great power competition.

2. The Roles of China-Russia Alliance in Rebalancing the United States' Hegemony in Dominance of New World Order

Since the end of World War I, former Soviet Union and China were communist revolutionary alliance at the beginning of cold war; they were the rivalry for third world leader in Asia and Africa. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, China and Russia are becoming a closed alliance to counterbalance the United States in the new world order. In recent years, as the United States has ratcheted up pressure against each of its perceived strategic competitors, China and Russia have been stepping up closed cooperation across multiple domains, while working together to offset all American pressures and reduce American influences in the multilateral new world order. This China-Russia alignment should not be written off merely as a temporary “marriage of convenience” filled with unresolved distrusts that can easily crumble from within. The comprehensive strategic partnership between China and Russia is based on long-standing framework of closed friendly cooperation, with a clear strategic objective set out in their 1997 “Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order” and 2001 “Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation” (Hoang & Nguyen, 2021). As long as China-Russia alliance are still remain difficult to counterbalance with the United States hegemony and NATO western alliance, they will likely maintain enough incentive to overcome global security issues of the past and jointly push toward a more favorable the multipolar new world order.

The China-Russia alliance does have its fair share of limitations. Despite sharing a deep disdain for American hegemony and the Western alliance-led new world order, China and Russia lack symmetrical interests for natural and sustained cooperation, especially as the disparity between Russia’s low economic complexity and dependence on natural resources relative to China’s diverse and modern economy becomes more competitive status of world economic power with the United States. The majority of China and Russia’s overlapping economic interests are in food, energy and technology, due to Russia’s need for more stable market to offset Western sanctions, coupled with China’s growing food, energy and technology demand and a desire to diversify its food, energy and technology sources in response to prolonged trade war tension with the United States. While China-Russia alliance does enjoy an enduring and extensive relationship, the strength of their alignment still hinges quite heavily upon U.S. policies. In fact, the *Global Times*, a Chinese state-owned newspaper, went as far as to attribute closer China-Russian ties to “the U.S. and its main allies’ suppression of the two countries (Hoang & Nguyen, 2021)”. Therefore, China-Russia alliance plays very important roles in rebalancing the United States’ hegemony and Western alliance in dominance of the new world order.

The crisis of Russia aggression war in Ukraine was a part of the struggle to reduce American hegemony power and make the new world order safe for the autocrats of Russia and China. When President Vladimir Putin traveled to Beijing for the beginning of the Winter Olympics on February 4, 2022, the Russian President Putin has met Chinese President Xi Jinping who has become his most important ally. In a phone call between Putin and Xi in December 2021, the Chinese leader supported Russia’s demand that Ukraine must never join NATO. A decade ago, such a relationship seemed unlikely: China and Russia were as much rivals as partners.

But after a period when both countries have sparred persistently with the United States, Xi's support for Putin reflects a growing identity between the interests and world views of Russia and China. According to the Chinese media, President Xi told President Putin that "certain international forces are arbitrarily interfering in the internal affairs of China and Russia, under the guise of democracy and human rights" (Financial Times, 2022). The United States and NATO western alliance has taken strong actions against Putin's government with "massive" and "unprecedented" sanctions when Russia attacked Ukraine on February 24, 2022. But, as the Ukraine crisis reaches boiling point, western efforts to isolate and punish Russia were likely to be undermined by the support of China – Russia alliance. As President Xi's remarks to President Putin made clear, the China and Russia are united by a belief that the United States is plotting to undermine and overthrow their governments. In the heyday of communism, former Soviet Union and China supported revolutionary forces around the world. But today Russia and China have embraced the rhetoric of counter-revolution. When unrest broke out in Kazakhstan recently, President Putin accused the United States of attempting to sponsor a "colour revolution" - a term given to protest movements that seek to change the government - in a country that borders both Russia and China.

3. The Confrontation between Chinese New Silk Road or Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and American Indo-Pacific Strategy

The Chinese New Silk Road or Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), comprising the Overland Silk Road and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, was launched by President Xi Jinping in 2013, with the aim of building trade and infrastructure network connecting Asia with Europe and Africa along the ancient Silk Road routes. The vision will directly benefit 4.4 billion people (or about 63%) of the global population So far, over 60 countries and international organizations have expressed interest in active involvement in the construction of the Belt and the Road infrastructure; while a number of major bilateral and multilateral projects have been under way. (Sun Ruijun, Wang Haiqing, Jiang Li, 2015). As many of China's neighbors are located along the routes, they will be not only primary partners of cooperation, but also major beneficiaries of the initiative, which fully embodies the basic principles of Chinese neighborhood diplomacy: amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness.



Figure 1: Map of Overland Silk Road & Maritime Silk Road (From Map Data@2015 Google)

According to the map, the overland New Silk Road will begin from Xi'an in central China before stretching west through Lanzhou (Gansu province), Urumqi (Xinjiang), and Khorgas (Xinjiang), which is near the border with Kazakhstan. The Silk Road then runs southwest from Central Asia to northern Iran before swinging west through Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. From Istanbul, the Silk Road crosses the Bosphorus Strait and heads northwest through Europe, including Bulgaria, Romania, the Czech Republic, and Germany. Reaching Duisburg in Germany, it swings north to Rotterdam in the Netherlands. From Rotterdam, the path runs south to Venice, Italy - where it meets up with the equally ambitious maritime Silk Road. The maritime Silk Road will begin in Quanzhou in Fujian province, and also hit Guangzhou (Guangdong province), Beihai (Guangxi), Haikou (Hainan) and Hanoi in Vietnam before heading south to the Malacca Strait. From Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia, the maritime Silk Road heads to Kolkata in India and Colombo in Sri Lanka then crosses the rest of the Indian Ocean to Nairobi in Kenya. From Nairobi, the maritime Silk Road goes north around the Horn of Africa and moves through the Red Sea into the Mediterranean Sea, with a stop in Athens, Greece, before meeting the Overland Silk Road in Venice, Italy. The map drives home the enormous scale of the projects: the two Silk Roads combined will create a massive loop linking three continents (Asia-Europe-Africa) and two oceans (Pacific Ocean-Indian Ocean). If any single image conveys China's ambitions to reclaim its place as new "Middle Kingdom," linked to the world by trade, economic and cultural exchanges (Miksic, John N: 2013). Even the name of the project, the Silk Road, is inextricably linked to China's past as a source of goods and information for the rest of the world. China's economic vision is no less expansive than the geographic vision (Ralph Kauz, 2010). The New Silk Road will bring new opportunities to China and every country along the road that is seeking to develop economic cooperation area that stretches from the Western Pacific, Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean and Baltic Sea. China has multiple reasons for pursuing the New Silk Road. Chinese President Xi Jinping has promoted a vision of a more assertive China, while the new normal of slowing growth puts pressure on the country's leadership to open new markets for its consumer goods and excess industrial capacity. Promoting economic development in the troubled western province of Xinjiang, where separatist violence has been on the upswing, is another major concern, as is securing long-term energy supplies to China (McBride, 2015). China's strategy is conceived as a two-pronged effort. The first focuses infrastructure development through Central Asia and Eurasia - transcontinental "Silk Road Economic Belt" - while the second foresees the expansion of maritime shipping routes through the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea - the maritime Silk Road.

In 2013, President Xi told an audience in Kazakhstan that he wants to create a vast network of railways, energy pipelines, highways, and streamlined border crossings, both westwards - through the former Soviet republics - and southward, toward Pakistan, India, and Southeast Asia. Such a network would also expand the use of Chinese currency, the renminbi, in transactions throughout the whole region, while new infrastructure could break the bottleneck in Asian connectivity. The Asian Development Bank, highlighting the need for more such investments, estimates that the region faces a yearly infrastructure financing shortfall of nearly \$800 billion. President Xi subsequently announced plans for the maritime Silk Road at the 2013 ASEAN in Indonesia. To accommodate expanding maritime trade traffic, China will invest in port development throughout the Indian Ocean, in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Pakistan. In 2014, President Xi concluded deals worth \$30 billion with Kazakhstan, \$15 billion with Uzbekistan, and \$3 billion with Kyrgyzstan, in addition to spending \$1.4 billion to help revamp the port of Colombo, in Sri Lanka. By November 2014, China had announced the creation of a \$40 billion Silk Road Fund (Suwatchai Songwanich,

2015). In 2015 China finalized plans for the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which aims for \$100 billion in initial capital (McBride, 2015). Despite opposition from the United States, the AIIB attracted fifty-seven founding members, including American allies such as the United Kingdom, Germany, and Australia. The negative American reaction to the AIIB underscores the extent to which some American policymakers fear that China's efforts will undercut Western institutions like the World Bank and expand the influence of the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a regional security and economic pact. The AIIB will make those countries less dependent and less vulnerable to Russia, which has been a central focus of American policy for decades. It will bring an enormous amount of capital into this region and others at a time when it seems to be pretty scarce.

In June 2021, the OECD Advanced Industrialized countries (G7), leveraging the support of the US government with Indo-Pacific Strategy, launched the Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative, an attempt by the United States and its allies to counterbalance the Chinese New Silk Road or Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). President Biden has emphasized that the United States is engaged in “long-term strategic competition” with China, which he characterized as “extreme competition”. Undoubtedly, the B3W initiative is a crucial strategic step by the United States in its strategic competition with China. With the continuous advancement of Belt and Road construction projects, the United States has become increasingly worried that China will challenge and undermine American interests worldwide. The Belt and Road Initiative, part of China's grand strategy, is an important factor that propels the American perception of China as being a “growing threat” (Blumenthal 2018; Rolland 2017). To better understand the strategic competition between the United States and China in the new world order of digital economy, the United States and the OECD countries (G7) used the Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative to counterbalance Chinese BRI and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), as an alternative channel for aiding lower income countries with infrastructure development. Through in-depth analysis of competitive interactions between the United States and China over the Belt and Road Initiative and Indo-Pacific Strategy, the nuanced dynamics and characteristics of US-China strategic competition in the context of the of new world order should not be a zero-sum game in which developing countries facing urgent infrastructure and growth concerns must choose between China and the United States.

The United States did not compete with the BRI over scale and capital, but instead focused on four areas: digital economy, cyber security, energy, and infrastructure development. It announced \$113 million down payment in US economic commitment to peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region so as to mobilize more private investment to participate in concrete action plans, such as the Enhancing Development and Growth through Energy (EDGE). The United States also deepened coordination with countries including Japan, Australia, and India to offer states in the Indo-Pacific region more low-interest loans for the construction of power stations, roads, bridges, ports and other infrastructure. The United States, Japan and India launched mechanisms of Indo-Pacific trilateral infrastructure forum to mobilize private enterprises to engage in competition with China. In security sector, the Indo-Pacific Strategy focuses on 4 maritime security areas: humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, peacekeeping capacity and combatting transnational crime. It adopts Southeast Asian and Pacific Island countries as focal points and increased input in countries along the Bay of Bengal, Sri Lanka in particular. The Indo-Pacific Strategy also identifies issues related to democracy and governance. Speaking at APEC summit in November 2018, former US vice president Mike Pence announced \$400 million Indo-Pacific transparency program (Minghao, 2021).

4. The Rules-Based New World Order in the Changing Balance of Powers between the United States, China and Russia

The new world order established by the victorious allies after the World War II has been remarkably established enduring rules of international law. The framework of liberal political and economic rules, embodied in the network of the United Nations and other international organizations, enforced by the most powerful nations: United States, Soviet Union and China, both fixed the problems that had caused the war and proved resilient enough to guide the world into an entirely new balance of powers era. However, the danger today is that the hegemony of US global leadership and the expansion of China on Spratly and Paracel Islands in South China Sea, has opened the space for other countries to pursue a “might is right” strategy to their own foreign policy priorities. Russia has annexed Crimea in violation of commitments to the Budapest Memorandum, has intervened directly in the conflict in Ukraine, and has laid out a doctrine that brazenly demands recognition of a Russian sphere of influence around its neighbourhood. The expansion of Chinese leadership is taking steps to turn its contested claims over islands in the South China and East China seas into a fait accompli (Chatham House, 2015). Regional powers in the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Indo-Pacific regions are taking the preservation of their security into their own hands. The question arises, therefore, whether the post-World War II institutions and rule-based new world order can survive these challenges to the hegemony of US global leadership and the expansion of China-Russia influences around the world.

The American Indo-Pacific strategy was trying to contain and counterbalance the expansion of the Chinese New Silk Road or Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI). The United States and the NATO Western alliance are confronting with Russia in the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine. How can we build up a rules-based multipolar new world order for world peace and security under the United Nations Charter and international law? The answer to this question is that the new world order was mostly depended on the transformation of multipolar balance of powers between the United States, China and Russia in the Post-Cold War era. Therefore, the rules-based world order concept may have a negative impact on the existing international legal order under the United Nations Charter and international law insofar as it washes out the established legitimate procedures of international law-making, thus rejecting traditional global values of legal stability and diminishing the role of international law in diplomacy international relations. Such scenario would not only multiply legal uncertainty and even unreasonable expectations among the participants of the international processes, but also might lead to undermining the very fundamentals of modern international law based on the United Nations Charter. The latter in its turn will inevitably lead to the global legal instability and will dramatically increase the risks of World War III (Magomedova and others, 2021). At the moment, the frequent abuse of the term “rules-based world order” by the representatives of the NATO countries in support of their politically motivated statements, agreed upon only among them, impedes achievement of accepted understanding of the concept at the universal level, that might be consistent with the United Nations Charter and international law.

The rise of new non-Western great powers such as China and India is more likely to see an evolution than a degradation of the current rules-based new world order that many great powers beyond the United States invested in current multilateral global institutions, giving it considerable resilience. All great powers are periodically transgressors of international law, and some who currently are seen as revisionist are actually strongly supportive of norms such as sovereign territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs of sovereign States.

While welcoming continued United States leadership, policymakers should not see continued hegemony of United States dominance as indispensable for order and justice in world affairs (Raymond, 2017). While many Asian nations, especially ASEAN Community, advocate the need for a rules-based regional order, there are different visions of the rules-based regional order within or beyond the existing legal framework of the United Nations Charter and international law. The success to the development of a rules-based order in the Asia-Pacific region depends on the extent to which regional states can find a common ground to negotiate between the United States, China and Russia through the shifting balance of power politics.

CONCLUSION

In brief, the unipolar new world order under the U.S. hegemony during the cold war era should not be transformed into the new world order under the China-Russia dominance. We should not escape from “tiger’s new world order under American hegemony” to live with the “future of crocodile’s new world order under the dominance of Sino-Russian alliance. If the launching of Russian war of aggression in Ukraine on 24 March 2022 is the beginning of the second cold war, we hope that this new cold war should be ended by the victory of world peace, democracy and the rule of law. In the long world history, all authoritarian leaders had never won in the great war of aggression. We can say in conclusion that “in the multipolar balance of powers, no country can win in the war of aggression, accept peace, friendships and humanity in the future rule-based new world order after the end of the new cold war”.

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