

**PROACTIVE TRANSPARENCY AND OUTWARD
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR:
THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE FRONTLINE
PUBLIC BUREAUCRATS
IN BANGLADESH**

Md. Morshed Alom

**A Dissertation Submitted in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
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ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation	Proactive Transparency and Outward Accountability in the Public Sector: The Perspective of the Frontline Public Bureaucrats in Bangladesh
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Transparency laws are argued to bring accountability to organizational activities. This dissertation aimed at answering the general research question of how organizational factors such as organizational culture, structure (discretion), and endowment (resources) affect the proactive transparency behavior and outward (citizen-centered) accountability orientation of the frontline public bureaucrats in the context of Bangladesh. Proactive transparency behavior is a tendency to disclose information about organizational activities for citizens' audit without being requested by anyone. Outward accountability is the attitude of the frontline public bureaucrats in terms of being answerable to the citizens. The objective was to develop a conceptual model for understanding the proactive transparency behavior and outward accountability orientation of the frontline bureaucrats. The study followed a mixed methods research design consisting of a quantitative survey and in-depth qualitative interviews and observations. Survey data were analyzed using standard multiple regression and interview data were analyzed using a basic thematic framework. The research participants were 326 sub-district level frontline public officials that directly distribute government benefits and sanctions to the citizens.

A conceptual model was developed based on a literature review having four cultural dimensions, discretion, and resources as the factors influencing proactive transparency behavior, which, in turn, was assumed to affect outward accountability.

Principal component analyses produced ten components leading to modifications of the proposed variables. Thus, in the proposed revised model, three cultural dimensions, i.e. “power distance”, “risk avoidance”, and “citizen orientation” were hypothesized to affect “proactive transparency behavior” through the mediating role of “value for proactive transparency” having “value generic” and “value specific” as the two dimensions. “Discretion” as organizational structure, and “IT skills” and ‘resources’ as the two dimensions of organizational endowment, were also hypothesized to affect “proactive transparency behavior”. “Proactive transparency behavior” was hypothesized to have a relationship with “outward accountability”.

The regression findings revealed citizen orientation as an important factor that significantly and positively influences proactive transparency behavior as well as outward accountability. Value generic and value specific were found to play a mediating role between citizen orientation and proactive transparency behavior. IT skills as organizational endowment also were found to significantly and positively predict proactive transparency behavior. Risk avoidance was found to significantly and negatively predict outward accountability. Further, one demographic variable “age” was found to significantly and negatively affect proactive transparency behavior, and another demographic variable, “experience in current position”, was found to be significantly and negatively related to outward accountability. It was interpreted that younger frontline bureaucrats take more proactive transparency measures and are more willing to be accountable to the citizens than older ones. The interview and observation data also support these findings. Moreover, the interview and observation data also supported the idea that power distance, risk avoidance, discretion, and resources affected the proactive transparency behavior of the frontline bureaucrats.

This dissertation, therefore, contributes to the understanding of transparency and accountability literature in highlighting the importance of the organizational factors in these issues. Policy makers must address cultural, structural, and endowment issues in the formulation and implementation of transparency laws.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations

Equivalence

ACC	Accountability
ATI	Access To Information
BCS	Bangladesh Civil Service
BG	Bangladesh Gazette
CO	Citizen Orientation
CSP	Civil Service of Pakistan
DN	Discretion
FOI	Freedom Of Information
GOB	Government of Bangladesh
ICS	Indian Civil Service
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IT	Information Technology
KMO	Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin
PD	Power Distance
PTB	Proactive Transparency Behavior
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ITS	IT Skills
NPM	New Public Management
OGI	Open Government Information
OIA	Official Information Act
PA	Principal Agent
PIO	Public Information Officer
RA	Risks Avoidance
RS	Resources
RTI	Right To Information
SD	Standard Deviation
SIM	Subscriber Identity Module
SMS	Short Message Service

SPSS	Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
TO	Team Orientation
UA	Uncertainty Avoidance
UK	United Kingdom
UNO	Upazila Nirbahi Officer (sub-district executive officer)
USA	United States of America
VG	Value Generic
VIF	Variance Inflation Factor
VPT	Value for Proactive Transparency
VS	Value Specific

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Governments around the world are under consistent pressure from their citizens to improve governance mechanisms by means of visible transparency and accountability measures. Citizens' demand for transparency and accountability originates in their mistrust over the use of tax revenues (Halachmi, 2003). They want to be sure that their tax money is not misused through mismanagement or corruption. The traditional numeric approach to transparency through auditing and third-party certifications is precarious and does not address citizen skepticism (Press and Arnould, 2014). Citizens want governance mechanisms to be less corrupt, more streamlined, and more ready to serve their needs (Rosenau, 2005). They want more participation in the governance process, lack of which results in corrupt practices by the public bureaucracies (Asaduzzaman, 2008). They also want to know how decisions are made and implemented by the public bureaucrats. In recent years, these demands from the citizens are reflected in the transition from governing to governance, accommodating greater accountability and responsiveness of the citizens' demands (Halachmi and Greiling, 2013). Therefore, transparency and accountability have been major characteristics of good governance initiatives (da Cruz, Tavares, Marques, Jorge and Sousa 2016; Grimmelikhuijsen, Porumbescu, Hong and Im, 2013; Kim, 2008; Meijer, 2015). Transparency is seen as a solution to many complex problems such as fighting corruption, promoting trust in government, and fostering accountability (Birchall, 2014), while others suggest socialization and collective moral awareness as a solution (Vries and Sobis, 2016). The concept of transparency is rarely defined beyond common-sense understandings as "openness", "insight" or "clarity". This dissertation uses the concept in the context of frontline bureaucracy as

the tendency of frontline bureaucrats to make available all of the information about their activities for citizens' inspection in accordance with the legal provisions of the transparency laws. Activities here include policies and the results thereof. This definition excludes any activity that is legally not publishable for various reasons, including state security. Proactive transparency is defined as self-disclosure of information by a frontline bureaucracy about its activities, procedures, and results without being requested by the citizens. Frontline accountability here refers to answerability of the frontline public bureaucrats to the citizens for their organizational activities. This study addresses the question of how organizational factors such as organizational culture, organizational structure, and organizational endowment affect the behavior pertaining to proactive transparency, and attitudes toward the citizen-centric accountability of the frontline public bureaucrats in the context of Bangladesh.

Transparency is institutionalized in freedom of information legislation (O'Neill, 2009). Countries are giving a legal basis to their transparency and accountability mechanisms through transparency laws. Right of access to information, which is an indicator of transparency (Islam, 2006), is not only a consistent demand but also is considered an important democratic norm, the bedrock democratic principle (Hoch, 2009), in strong and weak democracies alike. Although the Swedish people received this right in 1766, it took two hundred years for other nations to follow Sweden (Meijer, 2015). However, during the 1990s and 2000s many countries around the world adopted laws granting their citizens the right to access government information. The law has different names in different countries. The commonly-found names are the freedom of information (FOI) act, the access to information (ATI) act, and the right to information (RTI) act. Less common names are open government information (OGI) in China and the official information act (OIA) in Thailand. The global network of freedom of information advocates (www.freedominfo.org) reported that as of 5 April 2016, 109 nations had adopted freedom of information laws or similar administrative regulation. This dissertation interchangeably uses the concepts of freedom of information, accesses to information, and right to information.

The importance of transparency is gradually increasing as a basic right. Access to information is increasingly being recognized as a fundamental democratic right (da Cruz et al., 2016; Florini, 1998; Fox, 2007). Democracy is comprised of the consent

of the governed and consent, in turn, is meaningless unless the governed are informed (Florini, 1998). Some authors consider access to information as a fundamental human right because it is a necessary concomitant of the realization of all other rights (Florini, 2007; Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013; Hazell and Worthy, 2010). It makes social and economic justice possible. Other authors, although they do not consider it as a human right, argue that it is an “indispensible adjunct to making human rights effective” (O’Neill, 2009: 170). O’Neill (2009) argues that information law could be used to obtain information to be used to expose or deter human rights violations. Therefore, transparency is spreading as part and parcel of democratization as well as globalization. As part of democratic norms, state and corporations are being held accountable for their behavior. Influential global actors such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) also play an important role in putting pressure on the governments of the third world countries to adopt transparency measures as tools for curbing corruption.

Transparency and accountability are argued to be associated with access to information rights. Right to information laws facilitate transparency provisions. Transparency provisions, in turn, strengthen accountability. Conventional wisdom says that the right to information increases transparency. Hazell and Glover (2011), after reviewing academic works on transparency laws, found that supporters of RTI laws argue that these laws can bring increased transparency and accountability to institutions. RTI is critical because it bolsters alternative mechanisms of accountability (Flinders, 2000). As has been mentioned earlier, RTI provisions are thought to address complex governance problems of corruption and accountability. Corruption happens in secret, and transparency removes secrecy. Thus, transparency is the opposite of secrecy, and an antidote to it (O’Neill, 2009). Secrecy is deliberately hiding while transparency is deliberately revealing. If the decisions and the process of decision making are exposed to the citizens, committing corruption by officials becomes difficult. Therefore, transparency becomes regulation by revelation. It creates alternative mechanisms of accountability by changing the distribution of power in a society (Flinders, 2000). Transparency laws empower citizens to monitor governmental activities. The traditional approach to accountability through audits and third-party certifications gets support from this alternative mechanism of citizens’

audits. In this way, both the concepts—transparency and accountability—are relational (Fox, 2007).

The demand for transparency and its rapid expansion have been supported by the factor of immense technological development around the world. New technologies such as information and communication technologies (ICTs), the Internet, and computers support storing huge volumes of data in electronic form and making them readily accessible by millions of people simultaneously. The use of ICTs in transparency measures have led authors to call it “mediated transparency” (Meijer, 2009; Meijer, 2013). Meijer (2009: 257) argues that “the present-day attention for transparency is directly related to the use of ICTs.” Use of ICTs in transparency is cost-effective. Large volume of information and data are accessible by many at a relatively lower cost. Hence, the Internet and ICTs have increased new possibilities of transparency (Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013). Birchall (2014) argues that the implementation of transparency policies is reliant on and mediated by ICTs. One can instantly get a lot of information using ICTs. Thus, ICTs are becoming indispensable parts of transparency.

Transparency’s progression is not smooth however. It has been discussed above that transparency lives in democracy; it progresses as an institution of democracy, and institutions develop in wider societal and political contexts. Therefore, transparency develops along with the transformation of the social and political system in a nation (Meijer, 2015). In other words, transparency goes with the modernization of a nation as a whole. Transparency may also be problematic in a democratic society. The locus of power in a democratic system lies with the citizens. Not all performances of governments are positive all the time. There are negative performances as well. Revelation of true information about the performance of the government may make citizens discontented and discontented citizens, in turn, may question the legitimacy of a government. Moreover, transparency requires changes in the culture of behavior with regard to information. It influences social behavior (Christensen and Cheney, 2015), and therefore transparency has opponents as well. Meijer (2015) found opponents of transparency throughout history. The arguments of the opponents to transparency in all periods have been that transparency empowers

citizens and nurtures discontent among them, which undermines the legitimacy of a government.

Can granting citizens the right to access government-held information through information laws bring about transparency and accountability when the bureaucrats maintain a culture of secrecy? This is a valid question in the sense that all policies of a government, including transparency laws, are implemented by bureaucrats. Lindstedt and Naurin (2010) argue that just making information available is not sufficient. Development of citizens' capacity in terms of making them aware should accompany the efforts for increasing transparency. Strong publicity of transparency mechanisms will enhance the use of the information made available by transparency measures. However, just making citizens aware will not work if the bureaucrats do not cooperate. Paarlberg and Perry (2007), noted in Monila (2015), argue that public bureaucrats are influenced by organizational values which reflect the wider social and cultural values. Transparency is a new democratic value which establishes citizens' oversight of bureaucratic activities—it contradicts the bureaucratic value of secrecy. Bureaucracy has developed organizational values that fortify its own interests. Morrissey (1994) in his Ph.D. dissertation found that while bureaucracy manages problems and programs efficiently, they are not free from their own interests, of which survival is the most important. Bureaucracy sees citizen-based oversight mechanism as an outside interference in bureaucratic actions which threatens bureaucratic values. The bureaucratic values or bureaucratic cultures develop over a long period of time. Bureaucrats have developed the culture of secrecy over ages and it is a daunting task to change it to transparency. The House Government Information Subcommittee, in the U.S.A., in its oversight hearings on the FOI act in 1971, encountered bureaucracy's resistance in implementing the FOI policy (Morrissey, 1994). Joseph Stiglitz in his foreword to the book *Right to Know: Transparency in an Open World*, edited by Ann Florini (2007), argues that provision of transparency enables citizens to scrutinize how their money is spent. Government officials are aware of it and that is why they often work hard to limit the availability of information. So, how bureaucratic culture responds to FOI policy is an important issue in the study of transparency and accountability.

Frontline public bureaucracy has some distinct characteristics that have implications for transparency and accountability provisions. Frontline public bureaucrats are defined in this dissertation as the public officials that have an interface with the citizens in their daily activities. The concept of street-level bureaucracy is interchangeably used with the concept of frontline public bureaucracy here. Two important factors—resources and discretion—particularly affect street-level bureaucracy. Every activity incurs money, and adoption of transparency measures also does. Just adopting transparency laws is not sufficient to establish transparency in bureaucratic organizations. These organizations must be supported by additional resources to perform additional jobs. These resources will include a sufficient number of office staff, required skills of the staff, and adequacy of time and funding. Another important characteristic of frontline public bureaucracy is that it enjoys discretionary power. The public administration literature says that discretion is an essential concomitant of the street-level bureaucracy (Lipsky, 2010). Therefore, adequacy of resources and the issue of discretion also demand attention along with cultural factors in an enquiry into transparency and accountability in street-level bureaucracy.

1.2 Problem Statement

The government of Bangladesh (GOB) enacted a right to information (RTI) law in 2009. The purpose of the law is “to make provisions for ensuring transparency and accountability in all public, autonomous and statutory organizations and in other private institutions constituted or run by government or foreign financing” (BG, 2009: 7138). Ensuring citizens’ unhindered access to government and privately-held information is thought to be an important tool for making officials transparent in their activities and to hold them accountable to the citizens. Privately-held information, under the RTI law, refers to the information held by private bodies that are run by the GOB or foreign funds, in partial or in full. Enactment of transparency laws is comparatively a new initiative and most countries have adopted such laws as a part of the new public management (NPM) mechanism. Bangladesh also has introduced the transparency law as part of its introduction of NPM mechanisms.

The hope for ensuring transparency and accountability in all public organizations as set forth in the transparency law of Bangladesh is conditioned by many things. We have seen in the previous section that transparency lives in democracy; it is considered as a democratic value. Transparency laws work in a participatory democratic society. Bangladesh's democratic practice is not as strong as in countries where transparency laws are functioning well. In fact, as an independent country, Bangladesh is comparatively new. Its territory was a part of British India for nearly two hundred years. When the British colonial rule was over in 1947, the present day Bangladesh territory became a part of Pakistan in the name of East Pakistan. East Pakistan fought a liberation war of nine months against West Pakistani tyrannical rule and became an independent sovereign nation in 1971. Therefore, Bangladesh's administrative cultures are greatly influenced by the British colonial values. Moreover, soon after the independence of the country, the military took power through a coup in 1975. Military rule continued until 1990 when a people's uprising took place and democracy was reintroduced. Since then some form of democratic rule has been in place. Therefore, how the expectations of ensuring transparency and accountability through enacting transparency provisions are met in a weak democracy can be of great interest.

Research work on the contribution of FOI policy in bringing transparency and accountability to public sector organizations is happening slowly. The few works that have been conducted by scholars in the broad field of transparency are mostly from the Western perspective where democracy has a strong hold, and these studies focus on varied aspects of the phenomenon. A recent study by Ruijer (2013), a Ph.D. dissertation on proactive transparency in the U.S. and in the Netherlands using mixed methods, focuses on proactive transparency in the two countries from a communication perspective. She studied how the government communicators perceive and implement proactive transparency in these two countries. Hoch (2009) in her Ph.D. dissertation explores how the federal judiciary in the U.S. has been exempted from the modern expectation of transparency. Hawes (2010) studied city government transparency in the U.S. by developing and testing a three-dimensional model for government communications.

The journal articles on the issue of transparency are mostly thought and review papers. Some of them are based on empirical studies. One aspect of transparency that has drawn the attention of scholars is how transparency affects trust in government. Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer (2014) and Grimmelikhuijsen et al. (2013) explored this issue in their studies. Pandey, Sehgal, Ribound, Levine and Goyal (2007) conducted a study following mixed methods in one of the states in India to see the effect of informing resource poor citizens about their service entitlement. One important characteristic of the journal articles is that they are mostly qualitative studies. Hazell and Glover (2011) studied the impact of FOI on the U.K. Parliament. This is a qualitative study based on interviews, review of documents and newspaper reports. Another empirical study was conducted by John (2011) in Scotland, following an ethnographic design, to look for the meaning of “transparency” in the context of the FOI law of the country. It appears that no study is currently available examining the relationship between bureaucratic/organizational culture and transparency behavior and attitude towards citizen-centric accountability of the frontline public bureaucrats either in strong democracies or in the weaker ones.

This study addresses this gap. It examines how organizational factors such as organizational culture, organizational structure, and organizational endowment in the frontline public bureaucracies in Bangladesh affect proactive transparency behavior and attitudes toward the outward (citizen-centric) accountability of the frontline bureaucrats. It focuses on the micro level (frontline) perspective of the relationships between organizational factors and proactive transparency behavior and outward accountability. Ruijter (2013), who studied proactive transparency from the government communicator’s perspective, recommended studying the effects of culture on transparency perception and behavior. An online search produced no results on the findings any article on the relationship between organizational factors (culture dimensions, structure, endowment) and proactive transparency behavior and outward accountability in the street-level bureaucracies, not only from the developing country perspective but either from the developed world perspective. Therefore, this study focuses especially on how organizational factors such as culture dimensions, structure (discretion), and endowment (resources) are associated with the proactive

transparency behavior and attitude towards outward accountability of the frontline public bureaucrats in Bangladesh.

1.3 Research Objectives

The general objective of the study is to develop a conceptual model for understanding the proactive transparency behavior and outward (citizen-centered) accountability orientation of frontline public bureaucracy. The specific objectives of the study are the following:

- 1) To examine the relationship between bureaucratic culture dimensions and the value the frontline public bureaucrats in Bangladesh attached to proactive transparency;
- 2) To know the effects of the value for proactive transparency on the actual proactive transparency behavior of the frontline public bureaucrats in Bangladesh;
- 3) To determine the relationship between organizational structure (discretion) and proactive transparency behavior of the frontline public bureaucrats in Bangladesh;
- 4) To examine the effect of organizational endowment (resources) on the proactive transparency behavior of the frontline public bureaucrats in Bangladesh;
- 5) To assess the relationship between proactive transparency behavior and outward (citizen-centered) accountability orientation of the frontline public bureaucrats in Bangladesh; and
- 6) To examine the mediating effects of the value for proactive transparency between bureaucratic culture dimensions and the proactive transparency behavior of the frontline public bureaucrats in Bangladesh.

1.4 Research Questions

This study looks for an answer to the general research question of how organizational factors such as organizational culture, structure, and endowment affect

the proactive transparency behavior and outward (citizen-centered) accountability orientation of the frontline public bureaucrats in the context of Bangladesh. The specific research questions are the following:

- 1) How do the dimensions of organizational culture affect the value for proactive transparency?
- 2) How do the organizational culture, organizational structure, and organizational endowment of the frontline public bureaucrats in Bangladesh affect their proactive transparency behavior?
- 3) How does the proactive transparency behavior of the frontline public bureaucrats in Bangladesh affect their attitude towards outward accountability?
- 4) Does the value for proactive transparency play any mediating role between the organizational culture dimensions and proactive transparency behavior of the frontline public bureaucrats in Bangladesh?

1.5 Scope of the Study

This dissertation takes a micro perspective on the issues of transparency and accountability. It is a micro perspective because these two issues are studied in their narrow sense as applicable to frontline bureaucracy. Transparency and accountability are vast terms and are used to mean their application to macro level organizations. The scope of these two terms at the macro and micro levels differs in the sense that the ways in which transparency and accountability can be implemented at the central level (in macro level organizations) become limited when they are implemented at the micro level (frontline offices).

This study investigates how organizational factors such as bureaucratic culture, structure (discretion), and endowment (resources) relate to the behavior pertaining to the proactive transparency and attitude towards outward (citizen-centric) accountability of the frontline public bureaucrats in the context of Bangladesh using a pragmatic approach to research. Such an approach employs multiple methods of data collection and the focus is on the practical implication of the research (Creswell, 2013). Therefore, this study uses mixed methods, including a quantitative survey, qualitative interviews, and observation. Transparency is a very wide term. This study

looks at proactive transparency behavior at street-level bureaucracy. Proactive transparency is the tendency of bureaucratic organizations to make information available for the citizens' scrutiny without being requested to do so by the citizens. The dissertation investigates how the behavior pertaining to proactive transparency and the attitudes towards outward accountability of the frontline bureaucrats are influenced by organizational factors such as bureaucratic culture, structure (discretion), and endowment (resources). Bureaucratic culture has many dimensions. This study focuses on only four dimensions; i.e. power distance, uncertainty avoidance, guiding decisions, and team orientation. Two other organizational factors—structure (discretion) and endowment (resources)—are included in the study to see their effects on proactive transparency behavior. Proactive transparency behavior refers to the activities that the frontline public bureaucrats actually adopt to disclose information, which is related to their organizational activities, to the citizens. Often transparency is argued to enhance accountability. Therefore, the dissertation includes accountability for an examination of its association with proactive transparency behavior. Here accountability uses the citizen's perspective; i.e. the tendency of the frontline public bureaucrats to be answerable to the citizens with regard to their organizational activities. This is termed outward accountability.

Frontline bureaucrats in this dissertation are the Upazila (sub-district) level heads of government offices. Each Upazila in Bangladesh has on average around 25 government offices. Out of these offices 16 are included in the study. Those offices are thought to have greater citizen interface. The study covers 29 Upazilas from the similar number of districts representing all the administrative divisions of the country.

1.6 Rationale of the Study

Transparency and accountability in the public sector is a big concern for public administration literature. A better understanding of these phenomena is required for developing and implementing appropriate policies to deal with organizational transparency and accountability problems. The rise in the demand for democratic rule has been followed by a concomitant rise in the demand for transparency and accountability in organizations, particularly in the public sector.

More and more citizens now want to know how the government and its organizations spend their tax money. This has been true in the strong democracies as well as in the nascent ones. There is a need to understand transparency and accountability from a nascent democracy perspective. Public administration literature lacks empirical studies on these issues, although a large body of thought and opinion papers is available. This study empirically examines some aspects of transparency and accountability. It looks at some relationships between organizational factors and bureaucratic behavior and attitudes pertaining to the two phenomena. It studies how the dimensions of bureaucratic culture affect the value for proactive transparency; how the value for proactive transparency, along with organizational structure (discretion) and organizational endowment (resources), affect proactive transparency behavior; and how proactive transparency behavior affects the attitudes towards outward accountability. The study results contribute to the understanding of these governance issues from an organizational factors perspective in a nascent democratic country. Justification of this study lies in exploring transparency and accountability issues in a third world country where democratic culture is new and the adoption of transparency law is very recent. The study is new in its type and exciting in the sense that its context had been under a culture of secrecy for more than two hundred years. The context of the study had gone under colonial rule at the similar time (in 1757) when (in 1766) the world's first transparency law was introduced in Europe. These two historical events symbolize the beginning of official secrecy and people's subjugation in the subcontinent, and the beginning of people's freedom in Europe. Some 243 years after 1766, the study's context saw a similar transparency law (in 2009). Knowing how transparency and accountability behave in a cultural context which is quite different from the cultural context where they were given legal footing for the first time is important from an empirical point of view.

1.7 Benefits of the Study

This study benefits the literature on transparency and accountability in two ways. First, it brings the organizational factors perspective into the understanding of these two phenomena. Secondly, it enhances our understanding of frontline public

bureaucracy's transparency and accountability by developing a conceptual model. Demand for organizational transparency and accountability in the public sector is getting more voice all over the world. Democratic reforms are a consistent demand from the citizens, allowing for more participation in the governance process. However, there is a knowledge gap in the literature with regard to how transparency and accountability work in new democracies in general and in frontline public bureaucracies in particular. How bureaucratic culture and other organizational factors contribute to transparency and accountability in frontline public organizations is not clear in the existing literature. This study explores how organizational factors such as bureaucratic culture, organizational structure (discretion) and organizational endowment (resources) affect the proactive transparency behavior and citizen-centric accountability attitudes of the frontline public bureaucracies in a context which had been subject to a culture of secrecy for more than two hundred years. Therefore, the study expands our understanding with regard to transparency and accountability in general and from a frontline public bureaucracy in a nascent democratic perspective in particular. A conceptual model for understanding the drivers of transparency and accountability in third world countries is necessary because these countries are plagued by many governance problems. This study may contribute to undertaking the appropriate policy measures for addressing such problems.

1.8 Organization of this Dissertation

The first chapter gives an overview of the study. It discusses the background of the two concepts of transparency and accountability. Then it introduces the topic and the context of this dissertation. Thereafter, it sets the objectives to be attained and the research questions to be answered in the study. Finally, the first chapter outlines its scope and states the rationale and benefits of the study.

The second chapter discusses related literature concerning the concepts used in the dissertation. The second section of this chapter reviews the bureaucratic culture in Bangladesh. The third section of the literature review introduces the concept of frontline public bureaucracy. The fourth section discusses two organizational factors—discretion and resources. The fifth section discusses various aspects of the concept of

transparency. The sixth section discusses how transparency is argued to bring in accountability. The seventh section of the second chapter discusses the different dimensions of organizational culture. The eighth section of the chapter discusses the theories that are used in the explanation of the relationships among the variables of the study. The ninth section of this chapter develops hypotheses for the dissertation based on the arguments found in the literature. The last section summarizes the chapter.

The third chapter describes the methodological issues related to the study. The chapter first discusses the design of the research. It follows a mixed methods design where a field survey is supplemented by qualitative interviews and observation. The chapter outlines the measurement of the variables, and discusses the issues related to the data screening of the collected data. Then it evaluates the assumptions of multivariate techniques. In terms of data analysis techniques, this research has used factor analysis, standard multiple regression analysis, and mediation analysis for the quantitative data. For the qualitative data it has used the thematic analysis technique. Details of the findings from the factor analysis are presented in this third chapter where validity and reliability issues are discussed. Finally, this chapter presents the revised proposed model based on the results of the factor analysis. Additional discussions on data screening, evaluation of assumptions, validity and reliability, and factor analysis are added to appendix A.

The fourth chapter of the report presents the findings of the study. In doing so, it provides the descriptive statistics first where the demographic characteristics of the respondents are discussed. In presenting the findings of the opinions, the chapter segments them into proactive transparency behavior, outward accountability, and mediation analysis in accordance with the research questions of the study. The results of the regression analyses on proactive transparency behavior are followed by an analysis of the interviews and observational data. Similarly, the results of the regression analyses on outward accountability are followed by an analysis of the interviews and observational data. The mediation analysis presents the regression results only. Additional tables and figures from the data analysis are attached to appendix B.

The fifth and last chapter of this report offers a discussion of the findings, the implications of the findings, limitations of this study, and guidance for future studies.

1.9 Chapter Summary

There has been growing demand from citizens around the world for greater transparency and accountability in public sector organizations. To meet this demand more and more nations have enacted freedom of information laws to give legal footing to transparency and accountability regimes. The government of Bangladesh has also enacted a right to information act to ensure transparency and accountability in public sector organizations. However, the public administration literature lacks empirical studies on how information laws can affect the transparency and accountability behavior of bureaucrats when culture, structure, and resources vary across organizations. Therefore, this research aims to examine how organizational factors such as culture, structure, and endowment relate to the proactive transparency behavior and outward (citizen-centric) accountability attitude of the frontline public bureaucrats in Bangladesh.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the literature related to the different concepts of this dissertation topic. While reviewing the relevant literature, attention is focused on understanding the concepts and their dimensionality. The review of the literature does not distinguish between review or thought papers and empirical works. All available related papers come under its purview. This dissertation is interested in understanding how organizational factors such as bureaucratic culture, structure (discretion), and endowment (resources) affect frontline public bureaucrats' behavior concerning proactive transparency and attitudes towards citizen-centric accountability. The study involves a number of concepts such as frontline bureaucracy, organizational structure and endowment, transparency, proactive transparency, accountability, and bureaucratic culture. The presentation of the literature review below follows a logical order of the priority of the concepts so that they can be best understood. This means that the review of a particular concept, understanding of which is logically helpful for understanding others, is presented first. After reviewing the concepts a section is devoted to understanding the theoretical perspective or the use of theories in the explanation of the relationships among the concepts. The final section develops the hypotheses of the dissertation, showing their theoretical support based on the literature.

2.2 Bureaucratic Culture in Bangladesh

The present nature of Bangladesh's bureaucratic culture is credited to the British colonial tradition (Haque and Mohammad, 2005; Islam, 2005; Jamil, 2002;

Siddiquee, 1999; Zafarullah, 2013). Until 1947, the territory presently known as Bangladesh was a part of British India for nearly two hundred years. The British divided the Indian subcontinent into the two nation states of India and Pakistan before their departure. Pakistan consisted of two wings to the west and the east sides of India. The western wing was known as West Pakistan and the eastern wing was known as East Pakistan. In 1971, East Pakistan fought a liberation war against West Pakistan and emerged as an independent nation called Bangladesh. Before liberation, East Pakistan was treated as a colony of West Pakistan.

The British colonial tradition and the post-colonial tradition in Pakistan's administration have significantly influenced the formation of the cultural makeup of the Bangladeshi bureaucracy (Zafarullah, 2013). The British colonial administration was dominated by the Indian Civil Service (ICS). The ICS was completely alienated from the common masses (Islam, 2005). It enjoyed more power, authority and status than those of the politicians (Siddiquee, 1999). This trend did not change during the Pakistani rule of Bangladesh. Pakistan's administration was dominated by the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP). It was an elitist-generalist corps. In absence of effective political institutions, the CSP took full control of the governmental process in Pakistan (Zafarullah, 2013).

After independence, the Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS) could not abandon the attitude and values of the ICS or the CSP. The BCS continued its elitist nature. It remained impervious to public sensitiveness, and was self-serving and obsessed with the preservation of status and privileges (Siddiquee, 1999). Because of their superiority in terms of education, training and experience, the bureaucrats not only have an influence on ministers but also enjoy ministerial control. They are allowed to have discretion, and lack job descriptions, and performance standards. This is true at the frontline level as well. Theoretically, the frontline bureaucrats were put under local political control but, in practice, the bureaucrats remained free from this control. In the BCS, the generalist administrative cadre maintains itself as a subsystem and enjoys more autonomy (Zafarullah, 2007).

One important characteristic of the Bangladesh bureaucracy is that it is influenced by social norms. In the society, in general, usually, no one goes against the social norms. One has to show obedience and deference to seniors. The bureaucracy

places extra emphasis on hierarchy, obedience, and deference (Jamil, 2002). The following comments from the authors best describe the hierarchical social norms in the Indian culture, which are not different from those of Bangladesh: “The juniors would offer their seat to a senior in a crowded bus or train, stand up when he comes in the office, open the door for him, refrain from smoking or taking drinks in his presence even on social occasions, speak humbly, would not retort or disagree strongly, and would rather withdraw from a situation which is likely to force a confrontation” (Sinha and Sinha, 1995: 167). This hierarchical relationship encourages conservatism and the kinship-based social structure accommodates corruption (Haque and Mohammad, 2005).

Therefore, transparency and accountability in the bureaucracy are constrained by cultural values and practices. Until the RTI act was enacted in 2009, the bureaucrats would categorize government documents as “secret,” “top secret,” “strictly for official use,” etc. (Siddiquee, 1999). Citizens or the media had very limited access to government information. One has to consider one fact—that the RTI act was first promulgated as an ordinance by the military-backed caretaker administration in Bangladesh on 20 October 2008 (Annual Report 2014 of the Information Commission of Bangladesh). The demand for a transparency law was pushed by human rights activists, media professionals, academicians, legal activists, civil society, nongovernmental organizations, and citizens (Sobhan, 2011). Although, the law commission drafted a bill on access to information in 2002, it was not enacted. These facts indicate the degree of willingness of the bureaucracy and the political leaders to enact the transparency law, although the ninth parliament enacted the law in its first session based on the ordinance of the caretaker administration.

2.3 Frontline Public Bureaucracy

In the public administration literature the concept of “frontline bureaucracy” is more known as street-level bureaucracy. According to Lipsky (2010) street-level bureaucrats are the officials of the government that are at the bottom of the governmental pyramid, making daily interactions with the public, and delivering them government benefits and sanctions. Citizens, through the street-level bureaucrats,

directly experience their government. In the context of Bangladesh, the frontline officials having daily interface with the citizens are located at the Upazila level. At the time of conducting this research, the administrative structure of Bangladesh had 488 Upazilas. An average of around twenty-five offices representing different ministries of the government are located at the Upazila level.

Street-level bureaucracy has distinct characteristics. Through his seminal work on street-level bureaucracy, Lipsky (2010) theorizes that street-level bureaucracy and discretion go together. These bureaucrats enjoy discretion in the execution of their work but also suffer from limitation of resources. In order to cope with uncertainties and work pressure, the street-level bureaucrats establish routines and invent devices which become their public policies. However, there are mixed arguments about the effect of discretion on bureaucratic behavior. Henderson and Pandey (2013) argue that the street-level bureaucrats work in a relatively supervision-free world exercising discretionary abilities. In their study of emergency medical services, Henderson and Pandey (2013) found that paramedics deviated from managerial directives when they considered their patients' positive outcomes to be dependent on ignoring orders. These paramedics complied with the orders that they considered reasonably in line with their ideas of appropriate actions. Although Henderson and Pandey's (2013) work involves frontline bureaucrats' emergency activities, it signifies that these bureaucrats' activities lack supervision and they can adopt measures in accordance with what they think appropriate.

There are debates over granting discretion to frontline bureaucrats. However, Loyens and Maesschalch (2010) have found contradictory arguments in the literature on the discretion of street-level bureaucracy. Some scholars argue that it is a necessary evil and suggest restricting it as much as possible. These scholars consider discretion as a major source of injustice. Brodtkin (2008) argues that too often discretion of the street-level bureaucrats is the nemesis of accountability. Other scholars think that it is inevitable for efficient and effective policy implementation. However, these scholars also express concerns that discretion can be abused. Therefore, some management techniques such as standardization of work procedures, a performance-oriented reward system, change in organizational culture, and supervision are suggested to manage discretion of the street-level bureaucrats. The

logic for discretionary arguments includes the idea that street-level bureaucrats face problems that are complex in nature and cannot be reduced to standard operating procedures. In addition, they have limited resources that are not sufficient to meet the demands. They also need to address the human dimension of the situations. Therefore, these bureaucrats should be left to manage situations on their own.

Although the research findings indicate support in favor of frontline bureaucrats' discretion, researchers at the same time recommend supervision of the activities of these bureaucrats. Discretion is seen from top-down and bottom-up perspectives (Tummers and Bekkers, 2014). The top-down perspective sees discretion as an opportunity for the street-level bureaucrats to pursue their own, private goals. Therefore, there should be a control mechanism to enforce compliance. On the other hand, the bottom-up perspective looks at discretion as a necessity to mould general rules, regulations, and norms into specific situations. It helps them to prioritize their choices among huge demands facing limited resources like time and money. These authors studied the relationships among the variables of "discretion," "client meaningfulness," and "willingness to implement." Their study found that discretion positively affected client meaningfulness and the willingness to implement. Client meaningfulness also was seen to positively affect the willingness to implement.

2.4 Discretion and Resources

Two important factors emerge from the foregoing discussion on frontline public bureaucracy. One is discretion and the other is resource endowment. The research findings suggest that frontline bureaucrats apply discretionary power in their daily activities. However, they suffer from limitation of resources allocated for carrying out their jobs. In fact, the limitation of resources at the disposal of the frontline bureaucrats supports their discretion. Scott (1997) looked at discretion from two perspectives: the macro perspective and the micro perspective. From the macro perspective, discretion refers to the latitude of a public agency in implementing its policy mandates. From the micro perspective, discretion is the range of choices that street-level bureaucrats have in their activities as the individual service providers. However, their choices can move within a set of parameters that circumscribes their

discretionary behavior. The parameters can exist in the form of organizational rules that place limits around what is considered acceptable or appropriate action. Resources are the fuel of an organization; they help keep organizational activities running. Resources include the appropriate amount of time, staffers, and money (Hawes, 2010). Without resources transparency cannot be attained. Morley (1992) suggested that the training of staff is crucial for achieving their full potential to serve the customers with better quality and more responsive public services.

2.5 Transparency

No agreed definition of the concept of transparency exists. The term is often equated with ‘publicity’ and ‘open government’ (Fenster, 2015). Some authors have mentioned the concept of accountability while defining transparency. They also typified the concepts when defining them. Fox (2007) commented that both the terms transparency and accountability are malleable and can mean anything to anybody. He typified transparency as clear and opaque and accountability as soft and hard. Almost all definitions of transparency equate it with access to government-held information by the citizens of a country. Authors also differ in adding adjectives such as “timely,” “accurate,” “clear,” “standardized,” “comparable” etc. to the information accessible by citizens. Florini (2007), as mentioned in Hale (2013: 32), understands transparency as “enabling citizens to gather information on the policies and behaviors of their government.” Citizens’ access to government-held information constitutes the basic component of a transparency definition. Absence of this access to information is understood as a lack of transparency (Hale, 2013). Sometimes, transparency is defined as a means to achieve an end. Ruijer (2013) argues that these ends are accountability and trust. Democracy requires the political leaders to win elections by conquering the trust of the people. Transparency thus makes the political leaders and their bureaucracies accountable to the public. The concept of transparency usually refers to disclosure of information concerning government activities but it also includes non-governmental organizations’ activities. Hale (2013) studied transparency in nonprofit organizations in the U.S. and compared it with that of the public sector organizations. While transparency in the public sector is regulated by formal regulatory schemes,

that of nonprofits depends on normative sector values, including trust and collaboration.

Press and Arnould (2014) argued that there are traditional and alternative approaches to transparency. While the traditional approach involves auditing and third-party certification, the alternative approach, which they term narrative transparency, provides access, disclosure, and dialogue that meet the stakeholders' demands. They further argued that the traditional approach is monological, arcane, and creates skepticism and mistrust. Narrative transparency is accessible to stakeholders, addresses disclosure and accountability interactively, and establishes a dialogue to help stakeholders make informed decisions.

Rawlins (2009: 75) found no efforts to measure the concept of transparency but he did find some guidelines regarding how an organization can practice transparency. He defines transparency as "the deliberate attempt to make available all legally releasable information—whether positive or negative in nature—in a manner that is accurate, timely, balanced, and unequivocal, for the purpose of enhancing the reasoning ability of publics and holding organizations accountable for their actions, policies, and practices." In his study he identifies three dimensions of transparency measurement from the stakeholder's perspective: integrity, respect, and openness. From an organization's efforts of becoming transparent he identifies four dimensions: participation, substantial information, and being accountable and secretive. These dimensions reflect the organization's communication perspective.

Welch (2012) has studied the relationship between the transparency and participation of the local governments in the United States. The findings of the study reveal that participation is positively associated with transparency; however, transparency does not lead to participation. He operationalizes transparency as the dissemination of information to the public using different means such as webpage, hardcopy newsletters, social networking, text messaging (SMS), etc. His study signifies transparency as proactively disclosing information to the public. The author argues that provision of more information (proactive transparency) may provide citizens with opportunities to observe the work process and outcomes of the government but such provisions are not indicative of participation. The study further

argues that transparency is a means of demonstrating to citizens that the government is working within the parameters acceptable to them.

In a recent article, Michener (2015) investigated governments' tendency to take strong or weak transparency measures. Studying transparency laws and related actions in different countries, including developed and developing ones, he found that strong transparency measures are adopted by governments that are divided or are coalitions of a number of parties (multiparty coalitions). Strong governments that have a single party domination resist strong transparency measures. The underlying causal mechanism for having strong transparency measures in the case of multiparty coalitions is, he argues, avoiding "the high political and economic costs of "shadowing ministers" or traceable leaks" (Michener, 2015: 91). Multiparty coalition governments tend to shift monitoring responsibilities to the citizens. As autocratic governments tend to tighten controls over accountability mechanisms (Zaloznaya, 2015), they prefer weak or no transparency measures.

Meijer (2015) studied the historical perspective of transparency. He found that transparency measures vary in accordance with the societal and political development of nations. Transparency as an institution regulates social behavior related to information (Flyverbom, 2015; Meijer, 2015). Meijer (2015) argues that development of institutions, in general, happens within the context of the power relations, value patterns, and cognitions of a particular time. Therefore, transparency measures are contextual and progress with the long-term social and political transformation or modernization of a state. Like other scholars he considered transparency as the timely availability of information for potential usage by others. In the context of the Netherlands, he found that transparency has developed with the practice of democracy. Meijer (2015) concluded that transparency has developed in two phases. In the first phase it was linked with the elected representatives of the people. This phase he terms transparency in a represented democracy. Here people are concerned with the openness of the representatives with regard to the conduct of their business so that they can monitor their activities. The second phase he terms transparency in a participatory democracy. Here the citizens monitor the activities not only of elected representatives but also of government officials. Transparency not only exists in a democratic environment; it also fosters democratic governance (Meijer, 2013). He

defines transparency as “the availability of information about an actor that allows other actors to monitor the workings of or performance of the first actor” Meijer (2013: 430). He argues that there is no uniform pattern of transparency among governments, but rather there is a huge diversity in the pattern.

As has been stated before, transparency is often equaled to open government. The open government literature often associates the concept with the Obama administration’s commitment in the U.S. to be the most transparent government (Coglianese, 2009; Ellington, 2013; Wirtz and Birkmeyer, 2015). However, Meijer, Curtin and Hillebrandt (2012) argue that the concept of open government is wider than the concept of transparency. Their argument is that the use of the term transparency in the sense of open government is too restrictive. The concept of open government not only includes open access to information (transparency) but also includes participation. Participation here refers to interactions between the government and its citizens. Therefore, in their arguments, the term open government has two dimensions: transparency and participation. In the open government concept the citizens first need to see what the government is doing and then they express their voice about the government’s activities. The vision (transparency) connects with the voice (participation). Open government, thus, strengthens participatory democracy through the active participation of the citizens.

The literature mostly talks about the benefits of transparency. However, there are authors that point out the negative aspects of transparency. Teurlings and Stauff (2014) comment that the value of transparency is paradoxical; it has both negative and positive values. They see, in practice, struggles over which practices and procedures are to be made public and to whom. O’Neill (2009) argues that transparency with only informational content is less beneficial. For the comprehensive benefits of a transparency regime, it should have communicative action. Documents and information about government activities may be disclosed or disseminated on the Internet or government webpages without being read or noticed by anyone. Even the audiences that hear or read about that information may not understand it. She also argues that transparency may even maintain secrecy in that information without communication could be released with no fanfare. The same author elsewhere (O’Neill, 2002 as mentioned in Meijer, 2009) argues that transparency will erode

trust. Unsorted information or misinformation may confuse the audiences—audiences may get lost in the forest of misinformation and ultimately loose trust. This may end up as a “culture of suspicion” (O’Neill, 2002 quoted in Meijer, 2009: 257). ICT-based transparency relies on citizen auditors and “it matters a great deal how good their skills of analysis and interpretation are” (Birchall, 2014). Etzioni (2010) thinks that transparency is overvalued because it cannot fulfill the functions that its advocates assign to it. He wonders that despite its high ideological currency and scholarly attention, few empirical works have been done on the effects of transparency. He expresses doubt that the receivers of information neither can process it properly because of congenital and systematic cognitive biases nor can act on it. In a tone similar to that of Etzioni (2010), Flyverbom (2015: 169) comments that the literature on transparency “rarely probes dipper into concrete governance practices.” Criticizing transparency, he argues that though it provides insight and clarity of an organization, it also contributes to organizational control and societal governance. Transparency ideals, he argues, “guide employees’ and stakeholders’ conduct, they create (a)symmetries of visibility so that only selected parts of organizational processes are made visible” (Flyverbom, 2015: 174). Thus, transparency ideals keep parts of the organizational and socio-political life inaccessible and out of sight. Therefore, transparency ideals position organizations to create enthusiasm about them, and make them more agile and inclusive than others. Sparling (2013) argues that there can be two models on transparency—transparency through mutual surveillance and transparency through mutual friendship. He argues that people are truly transparent with each other when they are friends. However, he concludes that no country can be based on total surveillance or total friendship; transparency should strike a balance between the two psychological dispositions.

Sharma (2013) indicates the alteration of bureaucratic language and procedures in order to avert scrutiny by citizens. Studying the Indian transparency law (right to information act) she found that disclosure of notings in the filing system of the country is exempted under the law. The noting system refers to a sheet of paper attached to each file where bureaucrats from different layers add their opinions in the process of taking a decision. She found that bureaucrats sometimes avoid putting their opinions in the note sheet and rather prefer writing “see me” or “discuss with me,” or

“seen, discussed, deliberated,” and thus keep out of records what is discussed or deliberated (Sharma, 2013: 318). She argues that these forms of writing and oral discussions keep state power arbitrary and opaque. These ideas are also found in the arguments of Pasquier and Villeneuve (2007). They argue that government organizations try to conceal information in a number of ways. Organizations deliberately develop forms of behavior limiting transparency. They avoid being subject to the law, advance a false transparency without providing the means for analyzing and understanding the released information, and use all legal and illegal means of concealing information. They emphasize that mere commitment to transparency is not enough—governments need to effect a profound cultural change for making transparency effective. Mere disclosure of information does not automatically translate into transparency (Ofori and Lujala, 2015).

In his discussion on transparency, Fox (2007) distinguishes between opaque and clear transparency. Through this classification of transparency, he accommodates both pessimistic and optimistic arguments. Opaque transparency is less than clear or fuzzy. This type of disclosure of information does not reveal the actual behavior of organizations, how they make decisions, or what are the results of their actions. What they disclose is divulged only nominally and is unreliable. Fox (2007) cites an example of such disclosures. Data on who gets what of the U.S. firm subsidies are considered to be in the public domain, but in practice to make the data publicly accessible a public-interest watchdog had to invest US\$ 12 million in six years. Thus, he concludes, “an enormous civil-society investment may be required to translate nominally public data into clearly transparent information” (Fox, 2007: 667). On the other hand, clear transparency discloses “reliable information about institutional performance, specifying officials’ responsibilities as well as where public fund goes” (Fox, 2007: 667). In other words, clear transparency sheds light on the behavior of an organization. The goal of transparency should be to transform organizational behavior to clear transparency. Piotrowski (2014) cautions not to take transparency as a panacea. She argues that overemphasis on transparency amplifies the known benefits of it and overlooks the need to train employees to practise organizational ethics. She considers transparency as a regime value that is a part of the larger value system in the governance mechanism.

Defusing the pessimistic arguments of losing trust amid transparency, Grimmelikhuijsen et al. (2013) argue that the effect of transparency measures on the citizens' trust is contingent upon the cultural values of the society. In a cross-cultural study they found that the cultural values of a country influence how people will perceive and appreciate transparency. In a cultural context where people do not have a track record of an open government system, they may be more sensitive to information made available to them through transparency measures. Transparency fits less in the cultures that have high power distance and are oriented toward the long term than those that have low power distance and are short-term oriented. The normative relationship between transparency and trust should be that when people come to know more about their governments, their trust in the government should increase. In other words, when people do not know about their government's activities, they will not easily trust the government (Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer, 2014). These authors in an experimental study found that prior knowledge about policy outcomes and predisposition to trust affects the relationship between transparency and trust. Transparency can influence trust when the trust is based on affection and is thereby not based on prior knowledge. People that have high prior knowledge are not influenced by the new knowledge gained from the transparency measures. On the other hand, people that have low prior knowledge are persuaded by transparency and they change their attitude. People with a low predisposition to trust show an increase in their trust when they are provided with highly-usable policy-outcome information.

2.5.1 Proactive Transparency

In most writings transparency is equated with disclosure of information. Freedom of information laws empower citizens to access government information. When citizens demand specific information from any organization, it meets such demands in accordance with information laws. This type of information disclosure is reactive. Fox (2007) calls it demand-driven access. Freedom of information laws also require organizations to disclose certain information on their own, i.e., without being requested by citizens. These disclosures are proactive. According to Fox (2007) the government lets the public know about its activities and performance through

proactive dissemination (disclosure) of information, but the demand-driven information is of specific kinds which otherwise are not accessible. Thus, the passive notions of organizational openness and information provision are giving way to proactive disclosure (transparency) practices (Christensen and Cornelissen, 2015). Darbshire (2010) calls the results of proactive disclosure proactive transparency. She finds four major driving forces behind proactive transparency. First, the government feels a need to inform citizens about certain laws and decisions. Second, citizens demand information in order to hold the government accountable. Third, citizens' participation in the governance process requires information about the activities of the government. Fourth, citizens need to know about the services and the processes thereof in order to access them in any government organization. The rapid spread of proactive transparency is thought to be spurred by New Public Management (NPM)-led reforms (Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer, 2014). Taylor (1999) argues that the NPM philosophy has led to the establishment of citizens' charters through which public service providers are required to display service provisions. The citizen charter requires the street-level offices to display even the names of the officers that are responsible for providing the services. The citizen charter provision is taken as an important means of proactive disclosure. The RTI laws in India and Bangladesh require public agencies to proactively disclose information about service provisions. According to Taylor (1999) citizen charter provision has established a more direct and personal responsibility for delivering services by street-level bureaucrats. Therefore, the NPM philosophy has promoted the idea of a quasi market for public services (Taylor, 1999). The market mechanism works on the basis of a contract between suppliers and consumers. The citizen charter provides this contract between public service providers and their consumers. It places an obligation on the public offices to proactively disclose necessary information about the entitlements of consumers regarding public services. Such proactive disclosure enables citizens to challenge the service if there is a mismatch between the substance of the service, its presentation as displayed in the charter, and what they actually experience. If public officials do not value transparency, they will not practise proactive transparency. Ruijter (2013) defines proactive transparency as making information public at the initiative of a public body without being requested by citizens. She finds that government

communicators in the U.S. and the Netherlands that value proactive transparency are likely to be more inclined to proactively disclose information in their daily practices. Her study also reveals that government communicators sometimes leave out important details, providing only partial information and highlighting only positive things. Ruijter's study is based on the opinion of government communicators, but the communicators in the bureaucratic practices normally cannot decide on their own what should be made public and what to hide. The head of an organization "gives the final nod" about the disclosure of information. Therefore, her study suffers from this setback.

2.6 Accountability

It is a widely held assumption that transparency leads to accountability (Ruijter, 2013). Flyverbom (2015: 169) reading Schneiberg and Bartley (2008) found that the majority of literature on transparency takes the concept of "a regulatory norm seeking to ensure accountability through (often mandatory) requirements about the timely and public disclosure of information." Fox (2007) argued that transparency mobilizes the power of shame although he also fears, at the same time, that the shameless may not be vulnerable to public disclosure. Transparency is expressed as a symbol for accountability (Hale, 2013). Dumont (2013) argues that the two concepts are intrinsically connected. To be accountable an organization must be transparent. In this way, transparency is a component of accountability, but transparency does not equate accountability. An organization may disclose information about its programs and services yet that information may not tell the stakeholders about their effectiveness. The quality of accountability of an organization depends on how much information it discloses. Dumont (2013) further argues that at the most basic level of accountability, there exists a relationship between an organization and its stakeholders where the organization is answerable to the stakeholders. This requires a dialogic communication between the two parties. Mere disclosure of information cannot make an organization accountable. In an increasing trend of citizen-centered collaborative governance mechanisms, the interaction between organizations and their stakeholders is a necessary concomitant. Welch (2012) argues that this transparency-based

accountability is reactive. If transgressions occur, citizens may resort to established institutions to address their concerns and thereby force change.

Regarding the question of measuring accountability, Dumont (2013) emphasizes two basic questions: to whom does the organization need to be answerable and for what should it be answerable? In this regard she mentions four components of accountability, as noted by Ebrahim and Weisband (2007): transparency, answerability, compliance, and enforcement and sanctions. Although Bovens (2007) sees the concept of accountability as appealing and illusive, he defines the concept using components that are similar to the components of Ebrahim and Weisband (2007). According to Bovens (2007: 13) “accountability is a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgment, and the actor may face consequences.” Bovens’ (2007) definition does not include transparency but it includes answerability, compliance, and enforcement and sanctions. In another article, Bovens (2010) discusses accountability as a virtue and as a mechanism. Accountability as a virtue is a normative concept which involves the behavior of public actors. Accountability as a mechanism is used in a descriptive sense and refers to institutional arrangement or mechanisms. Wood and Winston (2007) have developed three scales to measure three dimensions of leadership accountability: responsiveness, openness, and answerability: These three dimensions can be found in the four components of Ebrahim and Weisband (2007).

Fox (2007), in his efforts to link transparency with accountability, introduced the typologies of soft and hard accountability. He thinks that accountability refers to making those in authority justify their actions. This he calls answerability, and answerability can be soft or hard. Merely calling for justifications for actions is soft answerability. It lacks the imposition of sanctions for anything done that is unjustified. On the other hand, when answerability is accompanied by sanctions it becomes hard accountability. Opaque transparency does not result in accountability. In other words, merely disclosing information is not accountability; accountability needs answerability. The type of accountability—soft or hard—depends on the degree of answerability, i.e., with or without sanctions.

However, Jantz and Jann (2013) note that the number of actors in accountability mechanisms is increasing. Although public organizations are adopting more sophisticated accountability mechanisms, citizens do not consider them enough. This judgment of citizens gives rise to newer accountability structures with more actors and information requirements. These accountability reforms are expected to generate better organizational output and outcomes. At the same time, with the spread of accountability structures, they noted, there is a growing concern that the new shared and fragmented accountability structures may lead to contradictory accountability relationships and finally to “multi accountability disorder” (Jantz and Jann, 2013: 229).

Brodkin (2008) argues that NPM strategies such as performance measurement, performance-based contracting, product specification, and incentives for performance may give the illusion of accountability in street-level bureaucratic management. These strategies may show “the appearance of accountability than accountability-in-fact” (Brodkin, 2008: 318). Brodkin’s (2008) study results show that reliance on imperfect and flawed performance measurement has damaged the accountability of the street-level bureaucracy. Performance measurements have taxed organizational resources, eroded responsiveness to clients, distorted performance, and have become subject to political manipulation. Pursuance of NPM strategies has emphasized rule following rather than citizens’ interests. This has happened so because of the difficulty in measuring performance, especially in the case of social service provision. She argues for improvement in the technologies of accountability. The traditional upward accountability through hierarchy is not sufficient. She urges that outward accountability includes citizens in the accountability mechanism.

Wood and Winston (2007) singled out the biggest challenge in an effective accountability mechanism as leaders’ unwillingness to be accountable. An effective accountability mechanism can pressure leaders to behave appropriately and comply with norms. These authors define accountability as being willing to accept responsibility, the expectation to be publicly linked to performed actions, and the expectation to be called on by constituents to explain actions. They argue that the degree of leader accountability can be known by looking at their positions regarding these three constructs. Connors, Smith and Hickman (1994), as discussed in Wood

and Winston (2007: 168), outlined accountability as “making, keeping, and answering for personal commitments.” Wood and Winston (2007) argued that the construct of accountability is different from obligation or responsibility. Obligation refers to legal or moral binding, and responsibility refers to the liability to be called to account for given results. In the authority structure in organizational life, responsibility may be assigned or imposed mistakenly by external forces. Therefore, responsibility may be possible without accountability. Wood and Winston (2007) reported Markman and Tetlock (2000) that when people believe that their decisions will be made public, the expectation of accountability puts constraints on their actions.

2.6.1 Outward Accountability

Outward accountability is citizen-centric and depends on disclosure of information. It happens when frontline bureaucrats become answerable to citizens. It falls in the soft accountability category of Fox (2007) which lacks sanctions. However, outward accountability can become hard accountability if formal institutions of accountability come forward to address problems identified by citizens. Brodtkin (2008) disapproved of NPM-based accountability (hierarchical accountability) through performance measurements; it distorts performance and erodes responsiveness to citizens. Thus, the traditional upward accountability through hierarchy is considered inadequate, and outward accountability is needed in order to include citizens in the accountability mechanism. Outward accountability works when bureaucrats know that their decisions will be made public (Markman and Tetlock, 2000). This expectation regarding accountability places constraints on their actions.

2.7 Organizational Culture

Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) describe culture as a “mental programming” or “software of the mind.” It is shared patterns of thinking, feeling, and acting. Therefore, it is always a collective phenomenon. The patterns of thinking, feeling, and acting differentiate one group of people from others. Thus, culture is “the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or

category of people from others” (Hofstede et al., 2010: 6). The patterns of thinking, feeling, and acting come from the unwritten rules of the social game. The understanding of culture given by Hofstede et al. (2010) is similar to that of Pettigrew (1979: 574), who defines it as a “system of such publicly and collectively accepted meanings operating for a given group at a given time” and provides “a general sense of orientation” to the group.

O’Reilly, Chatman and Caldwell (1991) have argued that organizational culture as a concept has a long history and goes back to early sociological studies of the early 1950s. It received prominence in the 1980s. Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohayv and Sanders (1990) found the article of Pettigrew (1979) as the first one that carried the concept to the U.S. academic literature and they found no consensus on the definition of the concept. However, they identified several characteristics of organizational culture. Organizational culture is: 1) holistic, 2) historically determined, 3) related to anthropological concepts, 4) socially constructed, 5) soft, and 6) difficult to change. Schein (1990: 111) published an article defining organizational culture as “1) a pattern of basic assumptions, 2) invented, discovered, developed by a given group, 3) as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, 4) that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore 5) is to be taught to new members as the 6) correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to these problems.” Schein (1990) identified three levels of organizational culture: 1) artifacts, 2) values, and 3) assumptions. However, Hofstede et al. (1990) in their study found that shared perceptions of daily practices rather than shared values represent the core of an organization’s culture.

Organizational culture has also been described as an administrative culture or bureaucratic culture or corporate culture. Jamil (2002) argues that there is something additional in administrative culture than can be found in organizational culture. This additional item is politics. Most culture studies focus on private organization where politics is not an issue of interest. These studies look at the internal context of an organization. Any framework for understanding administrative culture has to incorporate politics, i.e., how bureaucrats interact with politics and the society as a whole. Jamil’s arguments obtain strength from the fact that the mission of public sector organizations significantly differs from that of private sector organizations.

Most public sector organizations are not profit making and do not rely on profits for their existence, while private sector organizations are profit oriented and rely on profits for their existence. Public sector organizations cannot avoid politics because they execute the government's policies. There is a subtle nuance between the usages of the concepts of "bureaucratic culture" and "corporate culture." The concept of bureaucratic culture refers to the values and practices in public sector organizations while corporate culture usually refers to private sector organizations. Whatever the characteristics or levels of organizational culture are, it is a "powerful force" in an organization (Harrison and Baird, 2014) and immensely affects the well-being and success of an organization. It is described as the glue that holds the organization together (Banerjee, 2014). Culture encourages the members in the organization to behave in a similar manner. It impacts how well the organization will function. Rong and Hongwei (2012) argue that organizational culture stems from the social culture and works as an "invisible hand" in public sector management. This hand is relatively stable but transforms itself in the long run in line with social change.

Lloyd (2013) found that there are debates about what organizational culture is. Some believe it as what an organization "is" and others believe that it is what an organization "has". However, both arguments converge in the belief that culture is something to be made up of such concepts as beliefs, assumptions, and values. Values have received prominence in the definitions of organizational culture. Values are defined as a criterion using which one tends to prefer certain states of affairs over others. Beliefs are something that one considers as truth. The learned linkage between beliefs and values becomes attitudes. When the values, beliefs, and attitudes become so entrenched in an organization that they are no longer doubted or debated, they become assumptions. These values, beliefs, and assumptions are shared among the members of the organizations. Hofstede et al. (1990) in a cross-organization study of twenty organizations in two countries found that practices rather than values play a major role. Organizational cultures are acquired on the job and are exchangeable when one takes a new job. While social cultures reside in values, organizational cultures reside in practices. These practices are visible and consciously carried out.

2.7.1 Cultural Dimensions

Organizational culture is not a one-dimensional concept. Culture researchers have found different dimensions in organizational culture. Hofstede et al. (1990) in their cross-organization study have identified six dimensions of organizational culture with respect to the practices where organizations differ. These dimensions are: 1) process orientation vs. results orientation, 2) employee orientation vs. job orientation, 3) parochialism vs. professionalism, 4) open system vs. closed system, 5) loose control vs. tight control, and 6) normative vs. pragmatic. They argue that these dimensions may not be universally valid or sufficient. Organizational cultures in different contexts may require additional dimensions or some of the identified six dimensions may seem less useful. Along with these six practice dimensions of organizational culture they also identified three value dimensions, which are 1) the need for security (uncertainty avoidance), 2) work centrality (job involvement), and 3) the need for authority (power distance).

The first practice dimension of organizational culture in Hofstede et al.'s (1990) study opposes a concern for means to a concern for goals. They equate this contrast with the distinction made between the mechanistic and organic management systems of Burns and Stalker (1961). With a process or mechanistic orientation, an organization tends to focus on technical improvements of means rather than the accomplishment of ends. An organic system tends to focus on concern as a whole. The second practice dimension opposes concern for the employees to concern for the job to be done. In the third practice dimension a contrast is made between identification of the employees deriving from the organization (parochial) and the type of job (professionalism). The fourth dimension focuses on the tendency of the organization to respond to its environment. The fifth practice dimension shows the contrasts in the internal structuring of an organization. The sixth practice dimension shows how an organization is oriented toward its customers. A normative organization looks at its task towards its customers as implementation of inviolable rules. A pragmatic organization tends to stay close to its customers. The authors distinguish results orientation from customer orientation in that "trying to serve the customer does not automatically imply a results orientation" (Hofstede et al., 1990: 304).

Ghosh and Srivastava (2014) noted that the concept of organizational culture has been interpreted differently and not all complement or converge. After reviewing a sample of the literature on the instruments used in survey studies of organizational culture, the authors concluded that no two instruments were alike and no two instruments shared a common theoretical basis. These authors reported that Ashkanasy, Wilderom and Peterson (2000) and Wilderom, Glunk and Maslowski (2000) had studied 18 culture measure questionnaires published between 1975 and 1992 and 10 empirical culture research studies respectively. Both studies found great variation in the definition and operationalization of organizational culture and its dimensions.

Ghosh and Srivastava (2014), based on Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck's (1961) model, identified seven dimensions of organizational culture: 1) participation, 2) respect for individual, 3) attitude to risk, 4) attention orientation, 5) trust, 6) openness, and 7) power distance. Schein (1990) in attempting to understand the content of a culture identifies some of its dimensions and presents questions to be asked regarding each dimension. Answers to these questions will identify the content of that culture, but he cautions about the danger of overgeneralizing the dimensions. The dimensions and questions are presented in table 2.1.

Harrison and Baird (2014) compared the organizational culture of public sector organizations in Australia with that of private sector organizations using O'Reilly et al.'s (1991) organizational culture profile (OCP) and by focusing on five dimensions: 1) outcome orientation, 2) respect for people, 3) attention to detail, 4) team orientation, and 5) innovation. O'Reilly et al. (1991) developed the OCP in order to quantitatively assess organizational culture in their study examining the person-culture fit and its implications for work attitudes and behaviors. These researchers carried out two types of factor analyses—for the individual and as organizational profiles. The first analysis produced eight dimensions of an organization's culture: 1) innovation and risk taking, 2) attention to detail, 3) orientation towards outcome or results, 4) aggressiveness and competitiveness, 5) supportiveness, 6) emphasis on growth and rewards, 7) a collaborative and team orientation, and 8) decisiveness. The second analysis produced seven dimensions: 1) innovation, 2) stability, 3) respect for people, 4) outcome orientation, 5) attention to detail, 6) team orientation, and 7)

aggressiveness. Denison and Mishra (1995) used four organizational traits—1) involvement, 2) adaptability, 3) consistency, and 4) mission—in their research to determine relationship between organizational culture and organizational performance.

Table 2.1 Some Underlying Dimensions of Organizational Culture

Dimension	Questions to be answered
1. The organization's relationship to its environment	Does the organization perceive itself to be dominant, submissive, harmonizing, searching out a niche?
2. The nature of human activity	Is the "correct" way for humans to behave to be dominant / pro-active, harmonizing, or passive / fatalistic?
3. The nature of reality and truth	How do we define what is true and what is not true; and how is truth ultimately determined both in the physical and social world? By pragmatic test, reliance on wisdom, or social consensus?
4. The nature of time	What is our basic orientation in terms of past, present, and future, and what kinds of time units are most relevant for the conduct of daily affairs?
5. The nature of human nature	Are humans basically good, neutral, or evil, and is human nature perfectible or fixed?
6. The nature of human relationships	What is the "correct" way for people to relate to each other, to distribute power and affection? Is life competitive or cooperative? Is the best way to organize society on the basis of individualism or groupism? Is the best authority system autocratic / paternalistic or collegial / participative?
7. Homogeneity vs. diversity	Is the group best off if it is highly diverse or if it is highly homogeneous, and should individuals in a group be encouraged to innovate or conform?

Source: Schein, 1990: 114.

Jamil (2002) studied bureaucratic culture in the context of Bangladesh in order to determine the dominant type of culture and its consequences and also to identify the bearers of administrative subcultures. He noted that most studies on organizational culture have dealt with private sector organizations. He argued that public sector organizations are different from the private sector ones in that politics play a major role in the public sector organizations. Any study about public sector organizational culture has to take into account its external context, i.e. its relationship with politics and the society in general.

Jamil (2002) argued that bureaucrats' attitudes in the external context can be typified in terms of their relationships to politics and relationships to citizens and civil society. In the case of the first typology, Jamil (2002) argued, borrowing from Putnam (1975), that bureaucrats can be classified into classical or political. Classical bureaucrats are procedure-oriented or rule-oriented whereas political bureaucrats are problem-oriented or program-oriented. In the case of the second typology, bureaucrats can be universal or clientelistic. Universal bureaucrats believe in impartial applications of rules, which in Weberian terms are called the rational-legal type. Clientelism, on the other hand, serves in return for patronage and a powerbase. Recent development in the bureaucrat-citizen relationship has revealed that citizens are considered as customers in Western nations and as subjects in developing nations.

In the internal context, bureaucrats' attitudes, Jamil (2002) continued, can vary in certain characteristics such as power distance, uncertainty avoidance, guiding decision making, and preferred employees. Power distance is a character that affects the decision making behavior of bureaucrats. Where power distance is high, top bureaucrats take decisions and lower bureaucrats carry out them. Where power distance is low, superiors and subordinates make consultations to take decisions.

According to Jamil (2002), uncertainty avoidance is another character that affects decision making behavior as well. Bureaucrats with a high tendency toward uncertainty avoidance tend to follow rules and regulations strictly and do not take risks. Contrarily, a low tendency toward uncertainty avoidance encourages them to take risks in terms of bending or breaking rules.

Bureaucrats need information for making decisions. Jamil (2002) argued that the nature of the decision-making structure affects information search behavior. A

top-down or hierarchic type of decision-making structure leads bureaucrats to limit their information search within its boundaries, i.e. superiors, colleagues, or juniors. However, a collegial structure of decision-making leads bureaucrats to search beyond its boundaries, i.e. politicians, citizens, academic, economic and voluntary organizations.

Another characteristic of bureaucratic decision-making, where bureaucrats differ in their attitudes, Jamil (2002) argued, is preferred employees. The attribute of preferred employees argues that the employees for an organization should be chosen considering their social values and cultural characteristics. The social values and the cultural characteristics of the chosen employees should benefit the organization.

A comparison of the dimensions of the organizational culture identified by the different studies is presented in table 2.2. It reveals that scholars do not agree in identifying common cultural dimensions. However, some of them agree with some of the dimensions. Some other dimensions are given different names by different authors. Not all of these dimensions have relationships with transparency and accountability. The cultural dimensions having relationships with the value for proactive transparency are identified and discussed in the relevant section in this chapter.

Table 2.2 Comparison of Dimensions of Organizational Culture

	Hofstede et al. (1990)	Ghosh & Srivastava (2014)	Harrison & Baird (2014)	O'Reilly et al. (1991)	Denison & Mishra (1995)	Jamil (2002)
1. Process vs. results orientation	√		√	√		
2. Employee vs. job orientation	√					
3. Parochialism vs. professionalism	√					
4. Open vs. closed system	√					
5. Loose vs. tight control	√					
6. Normative vs. pragmatic	√					
7. Power distance	√	√				√
8. Work centrality/Involvement/Job involvement	√				√	
9. Uncertainty avoidance/attitude to risk	√	√				√
10. Participation (external)/Adaptability/guiding decisions					√	√
11. Respect for individual/people		√	√	√		
12. Participation (internal)		√				
13. Action orientation		√				
14. Trust		√				
15. Openness		√				
16. Attention to detail			√	√		
17. Innovation			√	√		
18. Aggressiveness and competition				√		
19. Supportiveness				√		
20. Emphasis on growth and reward				√		
21. Collaborative and team orientation			√	√		
22. Stability				√		
23. Tolerance for politics						√
24. Attitude towards citizens						√
25. Attitude towards NGOs						√
26. Preferred employees						√
27. Mission					√	
28. Consistency					√	

2.8 Theoretical Perspective

This section discusses the theories that are used in the explanation of the phenomena related to frontline bureaucratic transparency and accountability. One such theory used in the explanatory framework of transparency and accountability is the principal agent (PA) theory or the agency theory. This theory forms the basis of the explanatory arguments of this research. The theory involves an actor (the principal) that authorizes another actor (the agent) to perform some activities directed to the achievement of outcomes desired by the principal. The principal delegates works to the agent because he is not able to perform that work by himself. The theory describes this delegation of works as a contract between the agent and the principal. Eisenhardt (1989) has studied the origin and use of this theory. She found its origin in the field of economics. Economists in the 1960s and 1970s studied the risk-sharing problems which arose from different attitudes towards the risks of cooperating parties. Eisenhardt (1989) reported that the principal-agent relationship generates two problems: the agency problem and the problem of risk sharing. The first problem arises because the principal and the agent differ in their desired goals and the principal cannot verify the actual behavior of the agent. The second problem arises because the principal and the agent possess different attitudes toward risk. Therefore, the focus of the theory is to determine the best contract, either behavior-based or outcome-based. Eisenhardt (1989) discussed two streams of the agency theory—positivist agency theory and principal-agent theory. While the former focuses on finding the right governance mechanism to contain the agent's shirking (agency opportunism), the latter emphasizes finding the optimal contract between the agent and the principal. The theory assumes that both the agent and the principal are motivated by self-interest (Gormley and Balla, 2004).

Similar to the agency problem of Eisenhardt (1989) is Gormley and Balla's (2004) agency loss problem. They suggested that the principal faces two main problems with regard to the behavior of the agents—adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection happens when the principal fails to select the right agents. Therefore, the principal runs the risk of selecting bad agents that are not fit to accomplish the outcomes desired by the principal. The problem of moral hazard refers

to the situation when the principal cannot evaluate the agents' activities in their workplace. The principal runs into difficulty because the agents may shirk their duties. These problems are known as an agency loss problem because the principal becomes unable to materialize his or her desired goals efficiently due to the problems. According to Gormley and Balla (2004) the agency loss problem can be addressed in two ways. One is to select the right agents using a screening mechanism so that the adverse selection does not happen. The other is to use an appropriate institutional design where the agents receive incentives for achieving the desired goals of the principal (outcome-based contract as suggested by Eisenhardt, 1989) or the agents' activities are monitored using an oversight mechanism (behavior-based governance mechanism as suggested by Eisenhardt, 1989). Gormley and Balla (2004) argue that there can be two types of oversight—police petrol oversight and fire alarm oversight. In police petrol oversight the legislature (formal accountability institution) searches for bureaucratic actions that fail to meet the requirements while in the fire alarm oversight the monitoring burden is shifted to citizens and interest groups (informal accountability institution). When someone “alarms the bell,” the formal accountability institutions move to start “firefighting activities.” This fire alarm oversight requires the citizens and interest groups be empowered to keep a watchful eye on the activities of the bureaucrats.

The importance of the PA theory with regard to the transparency and accountability phenomena lies in the use of information systems. In the case of bureaucratic transparency and accountability, the bureaucrats are the agents and the citizens are the principals. The bureaucrats must be transparent and accountable to the citizens. Eisenhardt (1989: 60) hypothesizes that “when the principal has information to verify agent behavior, the agent is more likely to behave in the interests of the principal.” Therefore, the governance mechanism has to address the problem of information asymmetries that exists between the agent and the principal. By virtue of their positions, the agent has more information than the principal. A well designed information system can curb the problem of agency opportunism. When the information systems are designed in a way that break the problem of information asymmetries and inform the principal about what the agent is actually doing, then the agent cannot deceive the principal. Lindstedt and Naurin (2010) view transparency as

one of the means of reducing the information asymmetry between the agent and the principal. A reduction in information asymmetry also reduces the agent's shirking. Therefore, following the PA logic, the corruption literature emphasizes transparency.

Other theories used in the explanatory frameworks of transparency and accountability, but that do not constitute the focus of this research, include communication theory and NPM theory. Ruijer (2013) in her proactive transparency research uses communication theory to explain the behavior of government communicators. Dumont (2013) refers to communication theory as a dialogic theory that has two variants. One model says that an organization can disclose information for citizens and obtain citizens' feedback. However, after receiving feedback, the organization may arrange its disclosure in a way that induces the citizens to act in the preferred ways of the organization. This model is called the two-way asymmetrical communication model. Alternatively, the organization can act upon the feedback it receives from the stakeholders and can redesign its programs in the preferred ways of the stakeholders. This second model is called the two-way symmetrical communication model.

Still another theory, which influences the transparency and accountability literature but is less frequently mentioned, is the new public management (NPM) theory. According to Simonet (2013) the NPM promotes the view of looking at the receivers of public services as customers rather than as passive service recipients. The NPM ideas also promote accountability in public sector service delivery through establishing service standards. The establishment of citizen's charters originated in the NPM ideas. These charters enhance the awareness of the consumers of public services through displaying their service entitlements. Taylor (1999) argues that citizens can expect an explanation and an apology if the services they receive do not meet the entitlements as agreed upon in the citizens' charter. In this way, the NPM is argued to have contributed to the establishment of the accountability of public service providers (agents) to the consumers of the services (principals).

2.9 Hypothesis Development

A search in the public administration literature did not produce any literature on the relationship between transparency and culture dimensions directly. However, the literature on transparency issues and freedom of information issues brought out some cultural issues that showed an indication of some relationships between bureaucratic transparency and culture. This section looks at these relationships.

2.9.1 Power Distance and Value for Transparency

Power distance is the tendency to accept inequality among ranks in the system (Hofstede et al., 1990). Flinders (2000: 429) argues that the introduction of transparency laws causes redistribution of power in a society: “it removes, or at least reduces, the discretionary powers of ministers and officials.” The transfer of power from officials to the citizens has evolved from the perception that the officials (elected or appointed) have failed to enforce accountability in the governance process. Transparency is “essentially a power-reducing mechanism” because it makes the persons that hold power accountable (Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013: 583). Redistribution of power in a social structure that has traditionally practiced a patron-client relationship among its members is particularly problematic.

The introduction of the RTI act in India challenged this long practiced patron-client relationship. The patron expects loyalty, compliance, and total submission by the clients. This relationship is characterized by *sneh* (affection) for the clients, in a positive sense, and *shradha* (deference) for the patron (Sinha and Sinha, 1995). Officials used to enjoy the patron-client prerogatives “wonder why people from respectable families would stoop to asking about his work” (Roberts, 2010: 928). These officials do not want to be treated like a “vegetable vendor”. Bureaucrats that are used to practicing a patron-client relationship do not accept a legal-rational relationship. The transparency measure “augurs such important changes in governance and a shift in the balance of power between citizens and the state” (Sharma, 2013: 308).

Bureaucrats that possess power distance in relation to their clients will also possess the same in their organizational structure. The organizational culture reflects

the social culture. Rong and Hongwei (2012) suggested that organizational culture stems from social cultures. Jamil's (2002) study supports this argument. He found that the traditions from the samaj (society as a whole) and the British colonial administration dominate bureaucratic culture in Bangladesh. The samaj and the colonial traditions maintain a hierarchical or patron-client social structure. The influence of these traditions is reflected in the bureaucracy in the form of high power distance. Therefore, high power distance supports a hierarchical power structure in the organization as well as in the society.

Thus, it can be argued that bureaucratic attitudes with high power distance will not support empowerment of people through reforms such as the adoption of transparency laws. This literature suggests a relationship between transparency and power distance, and this relationship is negative. An increased feeling for power distance will lower the value for proactive disclosure and a decreased feeling for power distance will increase the value for proactive disclosure. Therefore, the following proposition is postulated:

H1a: Frontline bureaucrats having high power distance are likely to value proactive transparency less than the frontline bureaucrats having low power distance.

2.9.2 Uncertainty Avoidance and Value for Transparency

Bureaucrats do not want to be in uncomfortable situations. In other words, they like to avoid situations or avoid anything that may create situations putting them in trouble or discomfort. They want to be certain that any action committed by them will not bring them discomfort. Transparency laws compel bureaucrats to disclose any information except that under the exemption category covered by such laws. Brobbey et al. (2012: 3) argue that bureaucrats are not willing to disclose information or grant access to information that "may be embarrassing" or "may reveal unreasonable decision-making, maladministration or corruption."

According to Zafarullah (2013: 936), "The civil service in Bangladesh has shown an extraordinary predilection to hang on to the established rather than readily accepting change in its status, structure, functions, and norms of engagement with extra-bureaucratic instruments." The bureaucrats are "more at ease operating in a

familiar environment employing conventional practices than embracing anything new or different” (Zafarullah, 2013: 936).

Therefore, a transparency mechanism is an embarrassing instrument for the bureaucrats, which brings them uncertainty, which they usually attempt to avoid. This fact suggests that a higher tendency on the part of bureaucrats to avoid uncertainty will lower the value for proactive transparency and vice versa. The following proposition then is postulated:

H1b: Frontline bureaucrats that tend to avoid uncertainty are likely to value proactive transparency less than the frontline bureaucrats that do not tend to avoid uncertainty.

2.9.3 Guiding Decisions and Value for Transparency

Welch (2012) in his study of the relationship between transparent and participative government at the local level in the United States found that participation was positively associated with transparency, but transparency did not lead to participation. He defines participation as the quality, quantity, and diversity of input from the stakeholders in government decisions. Organizations that are under stronger influence from external stakeholders are likely to exhibit a higher level of participation. In Jamil’s (2002) language this type of participation is guiding decisions, i.e. how the decisions of the bureaucrats are guided.

Do the bureaucrats consult with their stakeholders, i.e. politicians, citizens, business and voluntary organizations? It is the attitude of a bureaucrat towards the level of interaction with a stakeholder with regard to the decision-making process. The introduction of transparency laws is argued to enhance democratic participation in governmental decision making. Meijer (2015) found that in the first phase of transparency history it was transparency in a representative democracy. In the second phase, it was in a participatory democracy. During this second phase, citizens are to engage not only with their representatives but also with the bureaucrats on the basis of the right to participate. Citizens’ right to information allows them to participate in decision making through voicing their opinion (Meijer et al., 2012).

Therefore, it could be assumed here that a tendency of the bureaucrats to allow external stakeholders to participate in the decision-making process is associated with

an increase in the extent to which they value the proactive disclosure of information and vice versa. The following proposition is postulated:

H1c: Frontline bureaucrats that allow external stakeholders to participate in decision-making are likely to value proactive transparency more than the frontline bureaucrats that do not allow external stakeholders to participate in decision-making.

2.9.4 Team Orientation and Value for Transparency

John (2011) argues that retrieval of information for meeting the demands of stakeholders is very much team work. Good understanding and relations among the colleagues of an organization help retrieve information without loss of time. Information, sometimes, lies in the network of persons and resides in the shared network of relations. John (2011) equates transparency with “the successful sharing of an institution’s knowledge with the outsiders” and it depends on the social relations that the FOI officers see embedded within information (John, 2011: 22).

Roberts (2010) found in India that Indian organizations do not have proper planning to implement transparency provisions. The Public Information Officers (PIOs) are left alone to face information applicants and face difficulties in cases of noncompliance. The implementation of transparency laws requires team work in organizations. Fairbanks, Plowman and Rawlins (2007) found that the good personal relationships of the communicator in an organization with other members as well as established protocol and tools used to inform and communicate with staff members are important for transparency: “Interpersonal relationships play a role in increasing transparency because communicators know who to turn to in order to get information” (Fairbanks et al., 2007: 31). Lovell (1992: 403) argues that the “machine bureaucracy” needs to change the hierarchically-controlled managerial culture into “a coaching environment with greater appreciation of interpersonal needs and the benefits of intuition and creativity.”

Team orientation is a dimension of organizational culture identified by Schein (1990) and O’Reilly et al. (1991) and has been used by Harrison and Baird (2014) in their research. Therefore, it can be argued that a team-oriented bureaucrat will have

higher value regarding proactive disclosure. The following proposition then is postulated about the relationship:

H1d: Frontline bureaucrats that are team-oriented are likely to value proactive transparency more than the frontline bureaucrats that are not team-oriented.

2.9.5 Value for Transparency and Transparency Behavior

The motivation for taking the necessary steps to disclose information proactively comes from the self-realization of its value. Ruijer (2013) found that government communicators that considered the proactive disclosure of information about the internal workings of their offices as valuable were actually involved in disclosing information proactively. Fairbanks et al. (2007) found in their study that some personal factors influence the motivational level of government communicators. One personal factor that positively affects transparency behavior is the belief that transparency benefits the society and is essential for a democratic society. A second personal factor that affects transparency behavior negatively is the fear of uncertainty that may accrue from the release of information. Based on these arguments the following proposition is postulated:

H2a: Frontline bureaucrats that value proactive transparency more are likely to adopt more proactive transparency measures than the frontline bureaucrats that value proactive transparency less.

2.9.6 Discretion and Transparency Behavior

The authoritative Weberian bureaucracy gives discretion to the public administrators. Bureaucrats have enjoyed this discretionary power for long and it has been ingrained in their culture. This power is more exercised in the case of resisting change to the culture of secrecy. Such resistance includes doing anything that ensures the effective working of transparency laws, and continues the non-implementation of critical components of the laws (Brobbe et al., 2012). The culture of secrecy places barriers on the disclosure of, or access to, information. To this effect, Brobbey et al. (2012) argue that the application process is made complex or costly or no assistance is given to information seekers as to how to make requests for information.

In a society where official secrecy had been a long bureaucratic tradition, bureaucrats continue to practice this culture even after the enactment of transparency laws (Holsen and Pasquier, 2011). Roberts (2006) reported that bureaucrats in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand had manipulated government records before they reached to the public in order to avoid revealing corrupt practices. He argues that elected officials and career public servants are highly skilled at finding ways to hide information. He postulates that they may hide information on two grounds: “with a clear conscience, believing that secrecy is essential to the public interest, or because they wish to hide evidence of corruption or mismanagement” (Roberts, 2006: 5).

Hazell and Glover (2011) have reported that secrecy has been a cardinal value and a dominant characteristic of the British system, which dates at least from the year 1250. They found in their study that bureaucrats build a boundary between what can be disclosed and what cannot be: “Requests which fall within the boundary are disclosed relatively painlessly” and “which fall outside this boundary are subject to delay or friction” (Hazell and Glover, 2011: 1669). This bifurcation of decisions into what can be done and what cannot be done is based on discretion.

Holsen and Pasquier (2011: 295) argues that the culture of official secrecy in Germany had “a detrimental effect on the willingness of the administration to disclose information.” This attitude of disclosure has come from the administration’s discretion in divulging information. Brodtkin (2008) explains how discretion affects transparency. She argues that discretion is a characteristic of the NPM, which emphasizes specifying what organizations are to produce without detailing how to do it. Organizations are to be evaluated on the basis of their performance in producing specified products. There will be “pay for performance” incentives in contracting arrangements. However, in practice, Brodtkin (2008) fears that there may be flaws in performance measurement, which may lead to distorting or even undermining organizational performance. They may obscure, rather than reveal, significant aspects of maladministration that affect transparency and accountability. This literature suggests a relationship between discretion and transparency. The following proposition is postulated:

H2b: Frontline bureaucrats that have more discretionary power are likely to adopt proactive transparency measures less than the frontline bureaucrats that have less discretionary power.

2.9.7 Resources and Transparency Behavior

Resources are a means to achieve an outcome. Here the outcome is transparency. Acting in a transparent way requires money. Fairbanks et al. (2007) found in their study that besides money, transparency also requires time and sufficient manpower. Developing web materials, press releases, and other tools for keeping the public informed require money and a skilled workforce. Roberts (2010) found that poor allocation of resources hinders the implementation of transparency laws in India. Lovell (1992: 403) feels the need for “greater appreciation of the skills available from the right side of the brain.” Implementation of transparency puts bureaucrats under pressure from the public service customers. Bureaucrats need innovations in order to satisfy their customers. Along with a sufficient number of staff and a requisite amount of money, they also need to be equipped with the necessary skills through proper training. Therefore, transparency has a relationship with resources. The following proposition then is postulated:

H2c: Frontline bureaucrats that are endowed with more resources are likely to adopt more proactive transparency measures than the frontline bureaucrats that are endowed with fewer resources.

2.9.8 Transparency Behavior and Outward Accountability

Transparency and accountability have a close association. Holsen and Pasquier (2011) argue that a transparency mechanism must be in place in order to achieve bureaucratic accountability to the public. Dumont (2013) argues for a dialogic relationship between an organization and its stakeholders where the organization is answerable to the stakeholders. Mere disclosure of information cannot make an organization accountable. Welch (2012) argues that transparency-based accountability is reactive. Transparency is a means to achieve an end. Ruijer (2013) argues that these ends are accountability and trust. This discussion signifies that transparency and

accountability are positively correlated. Transparency is a precondition for accountability. Based on these arguments the following proposition is postulated:

H3: Frontline bureaucrats that adopt more proactive transparency measures are likely to be more accountable to citizens than the frontline bureaucrats that adopt fewer proactive transparency measures.

2.9.9 An Integrated Model

All of the concepts and their relationships discussed above culminate in an integrated model, which explains proactive transparency and accountability on the part of frontline bureaucracies from a bureaucratic cultural perspective. This model is depicted in figure 2.1.




Figure 2.1 Proposed Model for Explaining Proactive Transparency Behavior and Outward Accountability on the part of Frontline Public Bureaucracy

2.10 Chapter Summary

Transparency and accountability are two ubiquitous concepts in the public administration literature. However, empirical works on these issues are very scanty. Proactive transparency, on the other hand, is a newer concept. Thus, less clear definitions of these concepts are available. From the literature it can be hypothesized that some dimensions of bureaucratic culture have an influence on the proactive transparency behavior of frontline public bureaucrats. Organizational structure (discretion) and organizational endowment (resources) also affect proactive transparency behavior. Proactive transparency behavior, in turn, affects outward accountability in the sense of the principal agent theory, which argues that bureaucrats (agents) are answerable to citizens (principal) by revealing information about the agents' activities to the principal.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the methodological issues followed in this research for answering the research questions stated in the first chapter. As has been discussed in the first chapter, this dissertation looks for answers to the broad research question of how organizational factors such as organizational culture, structure (discretion), and endowment (resources) affect behavior pertaining to proactive transparency and attitudes towards the citizen-centered accountability of the frontline public bureaucrats in the context of Bangladesh. Thus, this chapter first describes the research design. Then it discusses the other issues such as sampling, research instrument, data collection, data analysis, measurement techniques of the variables, screening of the collected data, evaluation of the assumptions of multivariate techniques, and validity and reliability. It also briefly discusses the results of the factor analysis details of that are provided in appendix A. Lastly, a revised model is proposed based on the results of the factor analysis.

3.2 Research Design

Research design tells “what,” “why,” and “how” aspects of a study. The “what” and “why” aspects have been dealt with in the first chapter. This section discusses the “how” aspect of this study. This research has an explanatory purpose. An explanation aims at setting out some relationships about aspects of a phenomenon and examines those relationships. Explanatory research can be nomothetic or idiographic. This study follows a nomothetic model of explanation. A nomothetic explanation explains the relationships among variables in general. This type of

explanation is partial compared to an idiographic explanation, which looks for a comprehensive understanding of a single or a limited number of cases. According to Babbie (2013), a nomothetic explanation tries to find few factors responsible for producing a social phenomenon, which is opposed to an ideographic explanation that looks for an exhaustive understanding the causes of a phenomenon. It follows a cross-sectional study design. In a cross-sectional study, data are collected at one point in time. Babbie (2013) argues that an explanatory cross-sectional study design has an inherent weakness: this type of study draws conclusions about phenomena based on observations made only at one point in time, while the conclusion aims at understanding the phenomena that happen over time.

This dissertation falls in the postpositivist paradigm of inquiry. The postpositivist paradigm subscribes to the ontological position of the positivist paradigm in that it believes in objectivist reality. However, the epistemological view of the postpositivist paradigm “concedes that emic viewpoints collected through qualitative research can be valuable” (Annells, 1996: 384). Thus, this research uses a mixed methods design. A quantitative questionnaire survey is supported by in-depth qualitative interview data conducted with the sample respondents at the same time. It follows a convergent parallel mixed methods procedure. A convergent parallel mixed methods procedure provides a comprehensive analysis of the research problem collecting both forms of data at the same time and integrating the information in the interpretation of the overall results (Creswell, 2014). According to Creswell (2014) this type of research design falls within the pragmatic worldview paradigm. In this paradigm, the researcher focuses on the research problem and uses all approaches available to understand the problem.

The quantitative data for this dissertation were collected using a survey questionnaire. There are some issues involved in survey methods that need to be mentioned here. Survey research is one of the most popular methods for data collection. The survey method includes a questionnaire that can be filled-in either by self-administering (by the respondents) or interviewing (by the interviewer). There are different types of surveys. They can be face-to-face, or with the telephone, or online. This method is appropriate where the units of analysis are individuals. It is used to collect original data from a large population. Babbie (2013) argues that the survey

method is excellent for measuring the attitudes and orientations of a larger population. However, he also informs researchers that this method has some known weaknesses. It may appear superficial in the coverage of complex issues; it can hardly deal with complex social life; and it may produce artificial results, meaning what the participants say may not represent what they actually believe or do. The respondents may give answers to survey questions without thinking about them. Therefore, survey research is weak on validity but strong on reliability.

This dissertation also uses qualitative data collected through in-depth interviews and observations. Interview data are aimed at having a comprehensive understanding of the research problem. The interviews with the research participants were unstructured, only a checklist was prepared following the themes of the study so that no theme remained unattended while interviewing the respondents. Further, the interviews with the respondents were conducted in the form of a conversation. Therefore, the interviews did not follow a definite structure. The use of qualitative data in this dissertation falls in the interpretive approach and follows a critical realist perspective. This perspective subscribes to the realist ontology in that behavior and experiences are generated by underlying structures or mechanisms. These structures or mechanisms do not directly determine human actions but they may have an impact on human lives. Therefore, the critical realist ontology does not subscribe to hard determinism but believes that people can shape their lives by having insight into their own contextual existence (King and Horrocks, 2010).

3.3 Study Area and Target Population

The research was implemented with the sub-district level public bureaucracies in Bangladesh. A sub-district is called an Upazila. Bangladesh has a unitary government system. The central government conducts the affairs of the state from the capital city. The country has local government systems at different tiers. In addition to the city corporations and municipalities, the country has local government bodies at the district, sub-district, and union (a small geographical area composed of several villages) levels. However, these local government bodies have not yet emerged as effectively as they are depicted in their respective laws. At the time of implementation

of this study, there were 488 sub-districts in the country. Each of these sub-districts has representations of around 25 ministries or departments or agencies of the government. Out of these offices, 16 were selected to be covered by this study. The criterion for selecting these offices was the heads of the offices having daily interfaces with their service recipients. Therefore, the target population comprises the heads of the selected offices at the sub-district level that have frequent interactions with citizens for the purpose of service delivery. The sub-district level offices having frequent interactions with citizens were determined systematically. A few bureaucrats that had work experience at the sub-district level were given a list of the sub-district level offices and were asked to put tick marks for the offices that have a daily interface with citizens. The researcher also talked to these experienced officials to know about how they thought that these offices had daily interfaces with citizens. Although there were differences in opinions with regard to the degree of the citizen interfaces of the offices, finally, 16 offices were found to have greater daily interfaces with service seekers. Table 3.1 presents the names of these 16 sub-district level offices and the designations of the heads of these offices. Thus, the total number of the population of the study stood at (16 offices * 488 sub-districts) 7,808 office heads.

3.4 Sampling Technique

The sample officials for this study were chosen from 29 sub-districts. As mentioned in the previous section, 16 officials were selected from each sub-district. The respondent officials were the heads of their respective offices at the sub-district level. The same set of officials was selected from each of the selected sub-districts. The sub-districts were selected using the multistage cluster sampling technique. It is useful to know about the administrative structure of the country at this point. The highest administrative unit in Bangladesh is a division. The country is divided into several administrative divisions. Each division is divided into districts and the districts are divided into sub-districts. At the time that this study was conducted, there were 8 divisions, 64 districts, and 488 sub-districts in Bangladesh. Each division is headed by a divisional commissioner, who is a joint secretary to the government. Each district is headed by a deputy commissioner, who is a deputy secretary to the government. A

sub-district is headed by an Upazila Nirbahi Officer (sub-district executive officer), who is a senior assistant secretary to the government.

Table 3.1 Selected Offices and Their Heads' Designations

Office	Office Head's Designation
1. Office of the Upazila Nirbahi Officer	Upazila Nirbahi Officer or UNO (sub-district executive officer)
2. Upazila Health Complex	Upazila Health and Family Planning Officer
3. Upazila Family Planning Office	Upazila Family Planning Officer
4. Upazila Land Office	Assistant Commissioner (Land)
5. Upazila Sub-Registrar Office	Upazila Sub-Registrar
6. Upazila Accounts Office	Upazila Accounts Officer
7. Upazila Agriculture Office	Upazila Agriculture Officer
8. Upazila Fisheries Office	Upazila Fisheries Officer
9. Upazila Livestock Office	Upazila Livestock Officer
10. Upazila Project Implementation Office	Upazila Project Implementation Officer
11. Upazila Rural Development Office	Upazila Rural Development Officer
12. Upazila Primary Education Office	Upazila Primary Education Officer
13. Upazila Social Service Office	Upazila Social Service Officer
14. Upazila Women Affairs Office	Upazila Women Affairs Officer
15. Upazila Youth Development Office	Upazila Youth Development Officer
16. Office of the Upazila Engineer	Upazila Engineer

The study includes all the administrative divisions. Each division is divided into a number of districts. The study was planned to include half of the districts belonging to each division using the random selection method. The number of districts was estimated to be 32 (half of the 64 districts). However, the actual data collection covered 29 districts. Each district is divided into a number of sub-districts. Only one sub-district from each selected district was chosen randomly. Thus, the actual data covered 29 sub-districts. Therefore, the sample represents all of the divisions but not all of the districts or the sub-districts. Initially, the total sample size conceived of (16 offices * 32 sub-districts) 512 frontline public bureaucrats.

However, as the survey covered 29 sub-districts, the modified sample size was reduced to (16 offices * 29 sub-districts) 464 frontline public bureaucrats. Not all questionnaires were returned from the sample respondents. Out of 464 sample respondents, 329 questionnaires were returned with filled-in data. Three questionnaires were rejected due to valid reasons explained elsewhere. Finally, the data from 326 questionnaires were entered into the computer software program. Table 3.2 describes the divisions, districts, sub-districts, and the number of respondents from each of the sub-districts.

Table 3.2 Study Area and Sample

Name of Division	Name of District	Name of Sub-District	No. of Respondents
1. Chittagong	1. Noakhali	1. Subarnachar	14
	2. Laxmipur	2. Laxmipur Sadar	14
	3. Chandpur	3. Faridganj	16
2. Dhaka	4. Gazipur	4. Kaliakoir	10
	5. Tangail	5. Mirzapur	12
	6. Manikganj	6. Shaturia	15
	7. Madaripur	7. Rajoir	14
	8. Rajbari	8. Rajbari Sadar	11
	9. Narshingdi	9. Polash	10
3. Mymensingh	10. Kishoregonj	10. Itna	9
	11. Jamalpur	11. Sharishabari	1
	12. Sherpur	12. Nalitabari	5
4. Barishal	13. Borguna	13. Amtoli	9
	14. Patuakhali	14. Dumki	9
	15. Bhola	15. Tajumuddin	15
5. Khulna	16. Kushtia	16. Kumarkhali	13
	17. Shatkhira	17. Ashashuni	15

Table 3.2 (Continued)

Name of Division	Name of District	Name of Sub-District	No. of Respondents
	18. Jessore	18. Sharsha	14
	19. Chuadanga	19. Damurhuda	14
	20. Jhenaidah	20. Jhenaidah Sadar	13
6. Sylhet	21. Moulovibazar	21. Srimongol	11
7. Rajshahi	22. Shirajganj	22. Tarash	13
	23. Rajshahi	23. Puthia	7
	24. Naoga	24. Atrai	8
	25. Joypurhat	25. Joypurhat Sadar	12
8. Rangpur	26. Panchagarh	26. Boda	12
	27. Lalmonirhat	27. Kaliganj	11
	28. Gaibandha	28. Sundarganj	14
	29. Nilphamari	29. Domar	5
		Total	326

The researcher travelled to all of the sub-districts to collect the data himself except one. One sub-district he could not travel to because it was located in an island district. The sub-district head did not encourage the researcher to travel there because of turbulent weather prevailing during the data collection period. Going to the island district requires one to cross a mighty river which has a number of records of launch capsizes. However, the sub-district head was sent the questionnaire through email and he collected data from the office heads of the selected offices on behalf of the researcher and sent them back by postal service. The researcher travelled to a sub-district not counted in table 3.2. The survey questionnaires were distributed but none was returned from any respondent of that sub-district. Therefore, the sub-district was removed from the sampling. Outside the 29 sub-district reported in table 3.2, two more were covered by qualitative interviews only and not by the survey.

Multiplying the number of sub-districts (29) with the number of office heads from each sub-district (16) produced a sample size of 464. However, the actual

sample size was 456. Eight samples were subtracted from the figure of 464. This requires a little elaboration. Eight respondents were dropped because the study area included 4 sub-districts that were within the district headquarters where the functions of 2 of the selected 16 offices are carried out by their line district offices. These 2 offices are the Sub-registrar office and the Women Affairs office. In these sub-districts the district Sub-Registrar and the district Women Affairs officer serve the citizens for the related services. Therefore, 8 respondents from 4 sub-districts were excluded from the survey. Thus, the actual sample size stood at 456, and this researcher was able to collect 329 filled in survey questionnaires out of that. This constituted a response rate of 72.15 percent.

3.5 Unit of Analysis

Units of analysis in a study refer to the things that a researcher wants to examine for making summary descriptions about all such things and to explain the differences among them (Babbie, 2013). The unit of analysis in this dissertation was the sub-district level frontline public bureaucrats in Bangladesh. Each office at this level is headed by a class-I officer of the central government and he/she is supported by other officials in the office. The head of each office takes the decisions within his/her jurisdiction. This research was interested in learning about the proactive transparency behavior and accountability perception of the frontline public bureaucrats. The sub-district level offices are at the lowest tier in the administrative system of Bangladesh where a large number of public bureaucrats work. These bureaucrats have daily interfaces with the citizens due to the nature of their work, and along with their other support staff, provide services to the citizens. Although the heads of these sub-district level offices get support from their support colleagues and staff, according to the street-level bureaucracy literature, they enjoy discretion and play a dominant role in local level decision making. As a result, proactive transparency activities largely depend on their discretion. Thus, the individual heads of the sub-district level offices constituted the unit of analysis of this dissertation. It was thought to be interesting to ascertain how these frontline bureaucrats act on proactive transparency and perceive accountability in their daily activities.

3.6 Research Instrument

A survey questionnaire was developed using validated instruments as much as possible. The constructs of the study have been measured and used by other researchers in different contexts. Relevant items representing semantic differential statements were chosen, keeping in view the context of the present study. Where measurement tools for the constructs were not available, they were developed using appropriate items based on theoretical arguments from the literature. The survey questionnaire was developed in English and checked by competent academics and experts. Then the final English version of the questionnaire was translated into the Bangla language for use in the survey. The Bangla version was required because it is the mother tongue of the respondents. The survey questionnaire was pre-tested with frontline public bureaucrats, and it was tested with the target bureaucrats in one sub-district and with some participants in a training program, which was attended by sub-district level bureaucrats. According to the results of the pretest, the questionnaire was modified. The response categories for the items of the concept of “proactive transparency behavior” were changed from dichotomous “yes-no” categories to Likert-scale “always,” “sometimes,” “seldom,” and “never.” This was done because some of the respondents told the researcher that some of the items in the questionnaire could not be answered straight as “yes” or “no.” Some things they did sometimes or seldom, so, the measurement tool was modified. The pre-test respondents also identified the ambiguity in the language of some items. These statements were rephrased using words that were easy to understand for the frontline public bureaucrats.

The qualitative interview was based on a checklist that covered the major concepts of the dissertation. The checklist was used during the interviews so that no major concepts remained unaddressed in the conversation. All of the interviews were conducted in the Bangla language. The interviews with the research participants did not follow any specific structure. Relevant issues “popped up” in the conversation in the natural course of the discussion. The checklist helped to cover the major issues of the research in the discussion.

3.7 Data Collection

Survey data were collected through field survey questionnaires and the qualitative data were collected through face-to-face qualitative interviews conducted by the researcher. It is relevant to elaborate a little on the data-collection procedure. For the data collection the researcher travelled to the respondents, although it was not possible to return with the filled-out questionnaire all the time. Therefore, questionnaires were left with the respondents when they were not available in their offices.

It was noted in section 3.3 that the data for this research were collected from sub-district level bureaucrats. It was also noted that 16 sub-district level office heads from each selected sub-district were selected to fill out the survey questionnaire. It was not possible to contact each of these office heads before going to their offices. Instead, the chief executive officer (UNO) of the sub-district was contacted before going to that particular sub-district. The UNO office in a sub-district carries some importance because it plays a coordinating role among all the offices of the sub-district. After going to a sub-district, help from officials from the UNO office was obtained sometimes in distributing and collecting the questionnaires. Thus, the UNO office was used as the first contact point.

After going to a sub-district, this researcher went to each of the 16 selected offices in the sub-district. Where the office head was present, this researcher requested him or her to fill out the survey questionnaire. Where the office head was not present, his/her contact cell phone number was collected from the other officials of the office. Then the office head was contacted over the phone and requested to fill out the survey questionnaire when he/she was available in the office and was requested either to send the filled out questionnaire to the UNO office or to the postal address of this researcher. In most cases, an envelope (with postage stamp) was left with the postal address of the researcher written on it.

Around 40 percent of the survey questionnaires, on average, were collected directly by the researcher. Some filled out questionnaires came directly from the respondents through the postal service. The remaining questionnaires were either submitted to the UNO office or the officials of the UNO office collected them from

the other offices and then sent them together to the researcher through postal service. Altogether, 329 questionnaires were collected for the study out of the sample of 456. This constituted a response rate of 72.15 percent. However, 3 questionnaires were rejected because 2 of them had more than 50 percent items unanswered and 1 was a duplicate. The duplication happened because one official was in charge of two offices. That official filled out two questionnaires. Thus, one of these two questionnaires was rejected. Finally, data from 326 questionnaires were entered into the SPSS program.

This dissertation also used qualitative data collected using in-depth qualitative interviews and observation methods. For the qualitative interviews, the respondents were contacted and an interview was requested. After obtaining consent, a suitable time and place were decided according to the convenience of the participant. Then the researcher went to the interview participants and conducted the interviews. The interview participants represented the 16 offices covered by the survey. Therefore, all together, 16 heads of the sub-district level offices were interviewed. Notes of the discussions were taken and recorded where permission of the participants was available. The observation method was used to verify the proactive transparency behavior of the 16 offices. For this purpose, an observation sheet was developed to record the physical data about the citizens' charter and the notice boards of the selected offices. Moreover, the conditions of these two proactive transparency behaviors were noted by the researcher.

3.8 Data Analysis

3.8.1 Quantitative Data

The survey data analysis procedure in this dissertation involved data screening,, testing multivariate assumptions, factor analysis (principal component), descriptive statistics, and examining the relationships among the variables using the standard multiple regression technique. The data screening part included missing data and outliers, while the evaluation of assumptions included sample size, normality, linearity, homoscedasticity, and the absence of outliers. The factor analysis technique applied the principal component analysis to see how the proposed items matched their respective components. The descriptive statistics included the demographic

characteristics of the respondents, and the mean and standard deviation of the measurement items.

This research aimed examining the relationships among the variables. Therefore, multiple regression analysis was employed to examine those relationships. Multiple regression analysis is a popular technique in many disciplines for assessing the relationship between one dependent variable and several independent variables (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013). There are three major analytic strategies in the multiple regression analysis technique: standard multiple regression analysis, sequential (hierarchical) regression, and statistical (stepwise) regression. Choosing a strategy depends on what happens to the overlapping variability due to the correlation among the independent variables and who determines the order of the entry of the independent variables into the regression equation. This research used the standard regression strategy. In this strategy all of the independent variables enter into the regression equation together. Then each of the independent variables is assessed as if it had entered into the equation last, i.e. after all other independent variables had entered into the equation. In this way, each independent variable's contribution to the prediction of the dependent variable is assessed in terms of what additional prediction it makes that is different from what all other independent variables have predicted together.

3.8.2 Qualitative Data

Analysis of the qualitative interview data used the basic thematic framework (King and Horrocks, 2010). Verbatim transcriptions were prepared for all of the interviews. A thematic analysis required a thorough reading of the transcripts to develop general understanding of the interview data. In the second step, the first interview transcript needed to be coded using descriptive codes. In the third step the descriptive codes of the first interview transcript were grouped into categories using interpretive codes. In the fourth step, the interpretive codes or categories were arranged into emerging themes. These themes of the first interview transcript were then applied in the rest of the interview transcripts. The qualitative part of the report was then prepared and arranged in accordance with the themes and their categories.

3.9 Ethical Considerations

The study properly followed the ethical issues normally followed in social science research having human participation. Participation in the research was voluntary. There were a couple of instances where the bureaucrats refused to participate in the study when this researcher approached to them with a request for participation. The survey questionnaires were left to the officials. Those that were willing to participate in the research returned their filled-out questionnaires and the unwilling officials did not return them. The survey questionnaire was anonymous. No personal identity of the respondents was collected.

3.10 Measurement of Variables

This research had 9 latent variables. Four of them came from the dimensions of bureaucratic culture. These variables were: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, guiding decisions, and team orientation. Two variables—discretion and resources—were categorized as organizational structure and organizational endowment respectively. There were three other variables: value for proactive transparency, proactive transparency behavior, and outward accountability. The 4 cultural dimensions were assumed to have impact on value for proactive transparency. Therefore, the four culture variables were independent ones, while value for proactive transparency was a dependent one. The relationships among these five variables are presented in figure 3.1. Value for proactive transparency along with discretion and resources were assumed to have an impact on proactive transparency behavior. The relationships among these variables are shown in figure 3.2. The variable proactive transparency behavior was hypothesized as having an impact on the variable outward accountability. This relationship is depicted in figure 3.3. This section discusses the operational definitions of these latent variables and how they were measured.




Figure 3.1 Organizational Culture and Value for Proactive Transparency Relationships




Figure 3.2 Impact of Value for Proactive Transparency, Discretion, and Resources on Proactive Transparency Behavior




Figure 3.3 Impact of Proactive Transparency Behavior on Outward Accountability

3.10.1 Power Distance

Power distance is understood as the tendency to accept unequal distribution of power along social positions. Jamil, (2002) in his study has used 8 items to measure power distance in bureaucratic thinking. The author developed his measurement items based on Putnam (1975) and Hofstede (1991). The answers to the statements varied on a 4-point scale from “completely,” “fairly well,” “partly” to “does not describe at all.” The items were the following:

- 1) A hierarchy reflects differences in quality between employees.
- 2) There exists sound respect for superiors among the employees.
- 3) Subordinates are afraid to express disagreements with their superiors.
- 4) Subordinates are told what to do.
- 5) Subordinates are consulted when decisions are made.
- 6) Senior officers listen to everybody at the workplace before taking a decision.
- 7) Subordinates are concerned more about results than about what the boss might think.
- 8) People cooperate well with one another.

The items used by Jamil (2002) are generic in the sense that they measure power distance in general in an office context. Power distance lies in the mental process and is expressed through the behavior patterns of an individual. This study defines power distance in an office context as the attitude of an official towards accepting others’ opinions or expressing own opinion about office matters irrespective of social positions (hierarchies). Based on the items of Jamil (2002), a five-item scale was constructed contextualizing them for the frontline bureaucrats. In this scale, the behavioral aspects of the office head with regard to power distance were emphasized.

The items were measured using a 4-point Likert scale of “always,” “sometimes,” “seldom,” and “never.” The five items of the scale are the following:

- 1) I seek my subordinates’ opinions before taking a decision.
- 2) My subordinates suggest me ideas about my office work.
- 3) Confident subordinates in my office disagree with my decisions.
- 4) I tell my subordinates what decisions are to be taken.
- 5) When I am confident, I disagree with my higher authority.

3.10.2 Uncertainty Avoidance

Uncertainty is understood as the tendency to take risks in performing activities in conformity with environmental needs. Jamil, (2002) in his study has used 5 items to measure uncertainty avoidance using a 4-point scale. Answer categories were “completely,” “fairly well,” “partly” and “does not describe at all.” The items were the following:

- 1) Employees are more concerned about results than about following routines and regulations.
- 2) There is enough flexibility to adjust goals and procedures as they go along.
- 3) I have enough room to innovate and introduce change.
- 4) I wish my superiors would tell me more directly whether or not I am doing a good job.
- 5) Competition between employees usually does more harm than good.

As in the previous construct, three items in the scale used by Jamil (2002) for measuring uncertainty avoidance were generic. This research was particularly interested in detecting the uncertainty avoidance tendency of the office heads of the frontline bureaucracy. This dissertation defines uncertainty avoidance as the tendency of the frontline bureaucrats to avoid any kind of activities in office work that may make their higher authority dissatisfied with them. In other words, a frontline bureaucrat will always try to satisfy his/her higher authority through fulfilling his/her desires. Based on the items of Jamil (2002), a four-item scale was constructed. All of the items were written in the first person. The items were measured on a 4-point

Likert scale using “always,” “sometimes,” “seldom,” and “never” as answer categories. The items of the scale were the following:

- 1) I emphasize results more than following routines, procedures to the point.
- 2) I feel nervous about satisfying my higher authority with my work.
- 3) I look for the best alternative even if it goes beyond routines, and procedures.
- 4) I expect my higher authority to tell me if I am doing a good job.

3.10.3 Guiding Decision

The guiding decision has been argued to be the bureaucrat’s source of information for taking decisions. Jamil (2002) used 9 sources where the respondents could differ on a 5-point scale varying from “very important” to “not at all important.” The 9 sources of information were the following:

- 1) Superiors
- 2) Colleagues
- 3) Juniors
- 4) Government circulars and gazettes
- 5) Intra- or inter-ministerial meetings
- 6) Politicians
- 7) Direct contact with people
- 8) Travel and visits
- 9) Private organizations like NGOs

The principal-agent theory argues that the service seekers of a government organization are the principals and the service providers are the agents that work on behalf of the principal. Thus, the agents have to seek opinions from their principal as to his or her satisfaction. The decisions of the agents have to be guided by the opinions of the principal. This dissertation defines the guiding decision as the tendency of the frontline bureaucrats to seek or take feedback from the service seekers with regard to the services they provide in order to improve the service seekers’ satisfaction. Therefore, a four-item scale was constructed focusing on the feedback-

seeking aspect only. The 4-point Likert scale had “agree” to “disagree” as answer categories. The items of this scale are the following:

- 1) My office should serve citizens according to their preferences.
- 2) Officers can learn nothing from service seekers.
- 3) My office should seek feedback from service recipients about their satisfaction.
- 4) Service seekers should not advise us on what to do.

3.10.4 Team Orientation

Team orientation is understood as the tendency of the bureaucrats to work on a team. Harrison and Baird (2014) measured team orientation using three items where the respondents varied on a 5-point scale from “not valued at all” to “valued to a very great extent.” The items were the following:

- 1) Being people oriented
- 2) Being team oriented
- 3) Working in collaboration with others

Team orientation is a mentality to cooperate with others in performing activities. In the context of public bureaucracy team work requires listening to and considering the opinions of others irrespective of the social structure of the officials. This mentality requires the realization by the bureaucrats of the benefits of teamwork. Therefore, this dissertation defines team orientation as the mentality of the frontline bureaucrats towards working in collaboration with each other irrespective of their social positions. Thus, based on these items of Harrison and Baird (2014), a four-item scale was constructed. The 4-point Likert scale had “agree” to “disagree” as answer categories. The items of this scale were the following:

- 1) Working in teams can produce better results.
- 2) We should help each other in our office work.
- 3) Sometimes subordinates can give better opinions than superiors.
- 4) Subordinates should not disagree with the superior’s opinion.

3.10.5 Discretion

Scott (1997) has argued that bureaucratic discretion has two perspectives, the—macro and micro. The macro perspective refers to the considerable latitude of a public agency in implementing its broad policy mandates. The micro perspective refers to the range of choices of an individual street-level service provider within a set of parameters that circumscribe his/her behavior. Based on Scott's (1997) arguments Marvel and Resh (2015) measured teacher discretion by developing five survey items covering various areas of teaching and planning. The teachers were asked to rate them using a 4-point scale (no control=1, minor control=2, moderate control=3, major control=4). The five items of Marvel and Resh (2015) were the following:

- 1) Selecting books and other instructional materials
- 2) Selecting the content, topics, and skills to be taught
- 3) Selecting the teaching techniques
- 4) Evaluating and grading students
- 5) Determining the amount of homework to be assigned

The activities of the street-level bureaucrats in the context of this research were different from those of the teachers. These bureaucrats provide various services to the citizens. Thus, the items used in this dissertation for measuring the discretion of the street-level bureaucrats are different from those of Marvel and Resh (2015). This dissertation defines discretion as the scope of the frontline bureaucrats in using their choices in selecting some activities among alternatives in performing official activities. Based on Scott's (1997) arguments and Marvel and Resh's (2015) items, five new items were developed to measure the discretion of the street-level bureaucrats of this study. In the development process of these new items, the street-level bureaucrats were consulted about the nature of their work. These five items were measured using the same Likert scale of Marvel and Resh (2015). The answer categories varied from "no control" to "major control." The five items were the following:

- 1) I have control over forming committees for official purposes.
- 2) I have control over selecting the recipients of our services.
- 3) I have control over designing/redesigning the procedures of service delivery.

4) I have control over adjusting the office budget to targeted goals.

5) I have control over adjusting the office goals to the context.

3.10.6 Resources

Resources usually refer to the money, materials, and manpower of an organization. Ruijer (2013) used two items in her study, which she adapted from Hawes (2010), for the purpose of measuring resources. She used a 5-point scale, where respondents varied on “strongly disagree,” “disagree,” “neither disagree nor agree,” “agree,” “strongly agree.” She placed emphasis on the sufficiency of the staff and funding in measuring resources. The items were the following:

1) There is sufficient staff allocated to ensure proactive transparency activities in this office.

2) There is sufficient funding in this office’s budget allocated to ensure proactive transparency activities.

Morley (1992) suggested that the training of the staff is crucial for achieving their full potential to serve the service seekers with better quality and more responsive public services. This dissertation included this dimension of the skills of the human resources of an organization in the definition of resources. Therefore, resources were defined as the availability of funds, staff, and skills by the frontline public bureaucracies. Thus, a five-item scale was constructed based on Hawes (2010), Morley (1992), and Ruijer (2013). The 4-point Likert scale varied from ‘agree’ to ‘disagree’. The items of the scale were the following:

1) My office gets/has sufficient funds.

2) My office has a sufficient number of staff members.

3) My office gets sufficient time (after doing routine work).

4) The relevant office staff members in my office have sufficient training for preparing the content of our webpage.

5) The relevant office staff members in my office have sufficient training for displaying and updating the information on our webpage.

3.10.7 Value for Proactive Transparency

The value for proactive transparency is understood as the way in which the bureaucrats evaluate the proactive disclosure of information. In other words, it refers to the importance of the proactive disclosure to the bureaucrats. Ruijer (2013) in her study used three components to measure the value for proactive transparency. These three components were – “value generic” (adapted from Darbishire, 2010 and Hawes, 2010), “value specific” (adapted from Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012), and “fear” (adapted from Fairbanks et al., 2007). Value generic had three items and was measured using a 5-point scale having positions of “strongly disagree,” “disagree,” “neither disagree nor agree,” “agree,” and “strongly agree.” “Value specific” had four items and was measured using a 5-point scale having positions of “very unimportant,” “unimportant,” “neither unimportant nor important,” “important,” and “very important.” The “fear” component had two items and was measured using a 5-point scale having positions of “strongly disagree,” “disagree,” “neither disagree nor agree,” “agree,” and “strongly agree.” The items used by Ruijer (2013) are presented below:

Value Generic:

- 1) Making information available proactively ensures that stakeholders are informed about the laws and decisions that affect them.
- 2) Making information available proactively facilitates more accountable spending of public funds.
- 3) Making information available proactively ensures that stakeholders have the information needed to participate in policy and decision-making.

Value Specific:

- 1) The decision-making process
- 2) The implementation of the agency’s policies
- 3) Outcomes or results of agency policies
- 4) Budgets and subsidies

Fear:

- 1) Making information available proactively leads to an information overload among stakeholders.
- 2) Information that is made available proactively can be used by stakeholders to make the agency look bad.

This dissertation defined transparency as the tendency of the frontline bureaucrats to make available all of the information about government activities for the citizens' inspection according to the provisions of the transparency law. Government activities here included policies and the results thereof. This definition excluded any activity that is legally not publishable for various reasons, including state security. Proactive transparency was defined as the self-disclosure of information by a government organization concerning its activities, procedures, and results without being requested by the citizens. Therefore, the value for proactive transparency, in this dissertation, was defined as the importance the frontline bureaucrats attach to displaying certain service-related information in front of the office and on the webpage without being requested by the citizens. Guided by the items used by Ruijer (2013), a five-item scale was constructed. The 4-point Likert scale had answer categories as "completely agree" to "completely disagree." The items of the scale were the following:

If information is displayed (such as a citizens' charter, official decisions and other activities) in front of the office, on the webpage, on notice boards ----

- 1) citizens can become aware of their rights.
- 2) service seekers can give feedback about office activities.
- 3) accountability to citizens can increase.
- 4) it may damage the image of the office.
- 5) it may damage official secrecy.

3.10.8 Proactive Transparency Behavior

Proactive transparency behavior refers to the activities the bureaucrats adopt to promote proactive disclosure of information about their office activities. This research used this definition to measure the concept. Ruijer (2013) in her study measured "involvement in proactive transparency" using two dimensions—reported daily practice and involvement. The items used to measure each dimension were the following:

Daily Practice:

- 1) Contributing to making information available proactively to the public is part of my daily practice.

2) I try to help others within the organization to understand the importance of making information available proactively to the public.

3) I am regularly involved in disclosures in response to FOIA-requests.

Involvement:

1) Making information and documents available to the press

2) The proactive release of high value datasets (Open Data)

3) Proactively placing information and documents on the agency's website

4) Making information available proactively through public information campaigns

5) Making information available proactively through social media, e.g. Facebook, Twitter and blogs

6) Making information available proactively through traditional media, e.g. brochures, radio, television

7) Making information available proactively through open meetings

8) Writing a communication strategy or plan that also concerns making information available proactively

This research involved the frontline bureaucrats in a third world country. Many of the activities in the “involvement” dimension were not applicable to the respondents of this research. Therefore, based on these items, a separate set of items was constructed considering the research context. The proactive transparency behaviors of the frontline bureaucrats limit the publishing of information on the citizens' charter, notice board, or on the internet using webpage or Facebook. Therefore, these means of disclosure were placed in the scale construction. Thus, a seven-item scale was constructed to measure the proactive transparency behaviors. The 4-point Likert scale had answer categories as “always,” “sometimes,” “seldom,” and “never.” The items of the scale were the following:

1) My office displays the citizens' charter in front of the office.

2) My office displays the citizens' charter on our webpage.

3) My office publishes office decisions on notice boards.

4) My office publishes office decisions on its webpage.

5) My office updates its webpage.

6) My office makes citizens aware of their information rights.

7) My office posts office-related information on Facebook.

3.10.9 Outward Accountability

Wood and Winston (2007) developed a measurement tool to measure three dimensions of accountability. These dimensions were “responsibility,” “openness,” and “answerability.” For each of the dimensions they developed 10 items. Answer categories varied from zero to ten with zero as “never” and ten as “always” in a continuum. All of the items related to the behavior of a leader. Therefore, each item (statement) below should be read with “the leader” as the subject of the sentence. The dimensions and their measurement items were the following:

Responsibility:

- 1) Demonstrates a sense of obligation to constituents when making decisions
- 2) Accepts responsibility for his/her actions within the organization
- 3) Clearly defines for constituents where his/her responsibilities end and theirs begin
- 4) Provides constituents with safe ways to address grievances against him/her
- 5) Avoids making excuses for mistakes
- 6) Avoids blaming others for mistakes
- 7) Is willing to face the truth, even when it does not fit his/her personal preferences
- 8) Accepts responsibility for the future direction and accomplishments of the group
- 9) Accepts ownership for the results of his/her decisions and actions
- 10) Looks to himself/herself first when the group’s results are disappointing

Openness:

- 1) Behaves consistently from one person to the next
- 2) Demonstrates consistency in public and private behavior
- 3) Identifies personal actions—popular or not—as his/her own

- 4) Openly listens when people offer perspectives that are different from his/her own
- 5) Avoids isolating him/herself from constituents in performing his or her duties
- 6) Openly explains his/her decisions
- 7) Openly declares his/her values
- 8) Is a role model
- 9) Interacts openly and candidly with constituents
- 10) Keeps records that are accessible to constituents

Answerability:

- 1) Apologizes to constituents for his/her mistakes
- 2) Explains the reasons for his/her decisions
- 3) Answers questions from constituents
- 4) Provides explanations for performance shortfalls without making excuses
- 5) Informs constituents of the process by which he/she arrives at decisions
- 6) Explains to constituents why suggested action was not taken
- 7) Provides regular progress reports about personal commitments he/she has made to constituents
- 8) Welcomes constructive feedback on his/her actions
- 9) Openly admits his/her mistakes to constituents
- 10) Takes quick action to deal with the consequences of a mistake

Outward accountability of the frontline bureaucrats in this study was defined as their answerability to citizens for organizational activities. Therefore, this dissertation used relevant items from the “answerability” dimension of accountability to match them with the research context. Thus, based on these items, a six-item scale was constructed where answer categories varied on a 4-point Likert scale from “agree” to “disagree”. Outward accountability was measured from a normative perspective. The items of the scale were the following:

- 1) My office should welcome constructive criticism from citizens about our services.

2) My office should regret mistakes with service seekers

If citizens want to know, my office should:

3) answer their questions about our services.

4) explain why certain decisions have been taken.

5) tell them how decisions have been taken.

6) explain why certain requests have not been met.

3.11 Data Screening

Data screening is an important step in multivariate data analysis (Hair, Black, Babin and Anderson, 2010; Meyers, Gamst and Guarino, 2013). Data screening looks at some properties of the data so that they accurately represent what they measure and so that they meet the important assumptions of the multivariate data analysis techniques. This section, therefore, checks these properties of the data collected for the research. The techniques of data screening include missing values, outliers, normality, linearity, homoscedasticity, and independence of errors. Details of the data screening are given in appendix A (see section A.1). Twenty-eight missing values were found in the data set and they were substituted using the imputation method. No univariate outlier was detected. The Mahalanobis distance technique produced one multivariate outlier with a chi-square value (30.04) slightly higher than the critical value (27.88). However, the case was retained.

3.12 Evaluation of Assumptions

This research applied multiple regression for analyzing the quantitative data. Multiple regression, like other multivariate data analysis techniques, makes a number of assumptions about the data. Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) mentioned a number of assumptions to be evaluated before conducting multivariate analysis. These assumptions include adequacy of sample size, normality, absence of outliers, absence of multicollinearity, and singularity among others. Details of this evaluation are available in appendix A (see section A.2). The 326 cases of this research met the

assumption of sample size. The number was much higher than the rule of thumb requirements. Univariate normality was measured using skewness and kurtosis values. Three values in each of these categories were found to be above the acceptable range of ± 1.0 , yet no transformation was done as it is not universally recommended and the data set was large enough to offset the demerits of non-normality. Multicollinearity was examined using correlation matrix, tolerance value, and variance inflation factor (VIF) value. There was no indication of violation of this assumption.

3.13 Validity and Reliability

Validity and reliability are two important methodological issues related to any research claims. Any research findings need to justify that the instruments used for the data collection are valid and reliable. Therefore, social scientists pay attention to these two issues when they develop and use measurement tools for their research. This research has attempted to address both concerns appropriately. A detailed discussion is offered in appendix A (see section A.3) about how the validity and reliability of the constructs of this study were addressed. The fact that the measurement tools were based on previously-used ones addresses the concerns for face validity, construct validity, and content validity. Factor analysis and Chronbach's alphas are reported that also validate the tools and their reliability.

3.13.1 Factor Analysis

Factor analyses were done two times. Factor analysis here refers to the principal components analysis using the varimax rotation method. After the initial factor analysis carried out with the 45 items of the study, the second factor analysis was done with a reduced data set of 34 items. For details of the initial factor analysis, see appendix A (section A.3.3). In this subsection, the results from the second factor analysis are presented. Table 3.3 shows the results of this second factor analysis.

Table 3.3 Factor Analysis Results for the Ten-Component Solution with 34 Items

Item and Description	Component									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
DN3: I have control over designing/redesigning the procedures of service delivery	.866	.009	.027	.070	.030	.062	.052	.015	.020	.086
DN2: I have control over selecting the recipients of our services	.806	.096	.004	.063	-.048	-.049	.032	.051	.005	.004
DN5: I have control over adjusting office goals to the context	.760	-.062	.099	-.014	.090	-.053	.002	.000	-.078	.067
DN1: I have control over forming committees for official purposes	.723	.068	-.038	.068	.038	.097	.055	-.036	.057	-.072
DN4: I have control over adjusting the office budget to the targeted goals	.660	-.001	-.003	.008	.217	-.125	.009	-.005	-.151	.011
ACC1: My office should welcome constructive criticisms from citizens about our services)	.017	.767	-.036	-.123	-.008	.018	-.225	.034	-.016	.114
ACC5: My office should tell citizens how decisions have been taken	.054	.741	.073	-.161	.159	.033	.121	.027	-.076	.037
ACC6: My office should explain why certain requests have not been met	.081	.732	.025	-.015	.021	-.039	.270	-.033	-.124	.104
ACC4: My office should explain why certain decisions have been taken	.005	.680	.029	.085	-.077	.170	.100	.095	.173	-.285
ACC2: My office should regret mistakes with service seekers	-.028	.625	-.053	.234	-.125	.048	.027	.160	-.126	-.151
PTB4: My office publishes office decisions on its webpage	.015	-.002	.810	.124	.014	.037	.068	.103	-.079	.037
PTB5: My office updates its webpage	-.024	-.012	.728	.347	.071	.106	-.028	-.068	.088	.024
PTB2: My office displays the citizens' charter on our webpage	-.097	.013	.681	.150	.047	.099	-.068	-.039	.062	-.040
PTB3: My office publishes office decisions on notice boards	.133	-.021	.611	-.079	-.017	-.079	.133	.121	-.026	.040

Table 3.3 (Continued)

Item and Description	Component									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
PTB7: My office posts office-related information on Facebook	-.027	-.007	.540	-.043	-.020	.276	.013	-.045	-.110	-.108
PTB6: My office makes citizens aware of their information rights	.131	.110	.448	.039	.130	-.105	.217	.128	.156	-.004
RS5: The relevant office staff in my office has sufficient training for displaying and updating information on our webpage	.123	-.041	.210	.861	.246	.037	-.004	-.019	-.037	.048
RS4: The relevant office staff in my office has sufficient training for preparing the content of our webpage	.103	-.016	.231	.857	.258	.072	-.003	-.007	-.060	.046
RS2: My office has a sufficient staff	.121	.016	.036	.107	.816	-.006	-.003	.047	-.010	-.001
RS3: My office gets sufficient time	.082	-.054	-.009	.138	.698	.250	.002	.045	-.165	-.038
RS1: My office gets/has sufficient funds	.098	.032	.121	.232	.617	-.116	.063	.035	.080	-.212
CO4: Service seekers should not advise us on what to do (R)	-.030	-.041	.056	.170	-.056	.692	-.022	.211	-.020	-.175
CO2: Officers can learn nothing from service seekers (R)	-.028	.074	.109	-.055	-.043	.628	-.032	.091	.107	-.337
CO3: My office should seek feedback from service recipients about their satisfaction	.040	.047	.055	.102	.095	.606	.092	-.082	-.077	.265
CO1: My office should serve citizens according to their preferences	-.075	.246	.103	-.214	.257	.514	.106	-.169	-.022	.100
VPT2: If information is proactively displayed, service seekers can give feedback about office activities	.010	.090	.048	.061	.025	.249	.759	.109	-.092	-.024

Table 3.3 (Continued)

Item and Description	Component									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
VPT3: If information is proactively displayed, accountability to citizens can increase	.094	.138	.057	-.063	.108	.035	.747	.012	-.037	.074
VPT1: If information is proactively displayed, citizens can become aware of their rights	.018	-.022	.087	-.002	-.077	-.127	.672	.052	.042	-.108
VPT5: The proactive display of information may damage official secrecy (R)	-.032	.093	.076	.040	.042	.030	.000	.851	-.150	.005
VPT4: The proactive display of information may damage the image of my office (R)	.047	.100	.075	-.065	.071	.058	.179	.786	.099	.054
RA3: I look for the best alternative even if it goes beyond routines, and procedures (R)	-.016	-.145	-.002	.004	-.121	-.049	.002	-.007	.832	.060
RA1: I emphasize results more than following routines, procedures to the point (R)	-.110	-.011	.019	-.081	.048	.017	-.076	-.056	.701	.265
PD3: Confident subordinates in my office disagree with my decisions (R)	.069	.036	-.018	.057	-.055	-.149	-.049	.017	.094	.739
PD5: When I am confident, I disagree with my higher authority (R)	.009	-.091	-.002	-.001	-.166	.077	-.009	.070	.299	.673

Note: R = Recoded, Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation converged in 8 iterations.

The second factor analysis produced a KMO value of .709, which indicated a good factor analysis according to Tabachnick and Fidell's (2013) criterion. Bartlett's test also produced significant results. Table A7 (see appendix A) shows the KMO and Bartlett's test results. This time the eigenvalues suggested 10 components. These 10 components having eigenvalues greater than 1 explained 61 percent of the variance of the reduced data set comprising the 34 items. Table A8 (see appendix A) shows the eigenvalues and the amount of variance that the ten components explain. Thus, a principal component analysis was run with varimax rotation, fixing the number of components at 10. These ten components are discussed below in the order in which they appear in the factor analysis table.

3.13.1.1 First Component

The first component in table 3.3 describes "discretion" or DN items with their factor loadings. There were five items in the component. All of these items were proposed to measure "discretion" in the measurement section 3.10.5 of this chapter. Thus, the items correctly loaded to the desired component. The factor loadings were also high and varied from .660 to .866.

3.13.1.2 Second Component

The second component in table 3.3 describes "frontline accountability" or ACC items with their factor loadings. Six items were proposed for measuring accountability in the measurement section. In the 10-component solution, one item was deleted. This item was "ACC3: my office should answer citizens' questions about our services." In the first factor analysis this item was loaded with another construct which did not make any sense. Therefore, it was a candidate for deletion. Finally, five items remained to measure frontline accountability. The factor loadings of these five items varied from .625 to .767.

3.13.1.3 Third Component

The third component in table 3.3 describes "proactive transparency behavior" or PTB items with their factor loadings. This component describes a behavioral aspect of the respondents. It was aimed at capturing the behavior of the frontline bureaucrats with regard to the proactive transparency activities they adopted for proactively disclosing information to the citizens. There were seven items in the measurement scale. One item "PTB1: my office displays citizens' the charter in front

of the office” was deleted based on its negative and very low factor loading (-.261) and its detachment from the rest of the items of the component. The remaining six items loaded together in the 10 component solution. However, one item “PTB6: my office makes citizens aware of their information rights” showed relatively low loading (.448) compared to the other items in the scale. Despite that fact, it was retained in the scale. The factor loadings of the other items varied from .540 to .810.

3.13.1.4 Fourth Component

The fourth component was a new one. It emerged from the five items proposed to measure “resources,” taking two of them. These two items were (a) “RS5: the relevant office staff in my office has sufficient training for displaying and updating information on our webpage”, and (b) “RS4: the relevant office staff in my office has sufficient training for preparing the content of our webpage.” Their factor loadings were .861 and .857 respectively. As in the ten-component solution, these two items formed a separate component, and they deserve a new name: “IT Skills.” Both items were about the training of the office staff with regard to displaying information on the webpage and preparing content for it. They talk about the skills of the office staff in webpage related activities. Therefore, the component was termed “IT Skills.” It is also a part of the resources of an organization.

3.13.1.5 Fifth Component

The fifth component retained the term “resources,” comprising three items out of the five proposed in measurement section 3.10.6. These three items were about the sufficiency of the staff (RS2), the sufficiency of time (RS3), and the sufficiency of funds (RS1). Their factor loadings were .816, .698, and .617 respectively.

3.13.1.6 Sixth Component

In the measurement section 3.10.3 this component was named “guiding decisions” and was proposed to be measured by four items. In the factor analysis, they correctly hang together to form one component. These four items were taken from Jamil (2002), who measured “guiding decisions” with nine items including superiors, colleagues, juniors, government circulars and gazettes, intra- or inter-ministerial meetings, politicians, direct contact with people, travel and visits, and private organizations such as NGOs as possible sources of information. Based on Jamil’s

(2002) ideas, four items were developed to measure the construct in the context of frontline bureaucracy. These four items deal only with citizens. The name of the component, “guiding decision,” does not represent well the theme of the four items I have used. Therefore, it seemed appropriate to rename the component “citizen orientation.” Reading the four items proposed to measure the concept suggested this renaming. Its operational definition will remain the same as proposed in section 3.10.3, i.e., tendency of the frontline bureaucrats to seek or receive feedback from service seekers with regard to the services they provide. From now on, the term “citizen orientation” will be used in lieu of “guiding decisions.” The factor loadings of the items varied from .514 to .692.

3.13.1.7 Seventh Component

The seventh component consisted of three items. These items came from the five items that were proposed to measure the “value for proactive transparency” or VPT. The items for this construct were discussed in measurement section 3.10.7 where it was mentioned that these items were taken from Ruijer (2013). She measured this construct through three components: “value generic,” “value specific,” and “fear.” The seventh component in the factor analysis resembles the construct of “value generic.” Therefore, this construct will be termed “value generic.” These three items (VPT2, VPT3, and VPT1) measure the importance that the frontline bureaucrats attach to the proactive disclosure of information in general without making reference to their offices. The factor loadings of the items varied from .672 to .759.

3.13.1.8 Eighth Component

The eighth component was composed of two items which came from the five items proposed to measure the ‘value for proactive transparency’ or VPT. In Ruijer’s (2013) study the “fear” component had this category of items (see section 3.10.7). However, the items in the present study were not exactly like those of Ruijer (2013). Her study participants were government communicators at the agency level in two Western countries whereas my study participants were frontline bureaucrats in a poor country with a fragile democracy. Therefore, the items were contextualized. The items in the eighth component in table 3.3 look like “fear,” but they are also specific

to the office of the respondents. Therefore, this component will be called “value specific”. The factor loadings of the two items were .851 and .786.

3.13.1.9 Ninth Component

The ninth component had two items. These two items were part of the four items proposed for measuring the culture dimension of “uncertainty avoidance”. The other two items were deleted from the data set used in the second factor analysis based on the findings from the initial factor analysis. The remaining two items were - (a) RA3: I look for the best alternative even if it goes beyond routines, and procedures (.832); and (b) RA1: I emphasize results more than following routines, procedures to the point (.701). A close examination of these two statements revealed that both were related to achieving results. Therefore, the new component can be termed as “results orientation”. However, going “beyond routines and procedures” or not “following routines and procedures to the point” in these statements involved the risks to be taken by the bureaucrats to achieve desired results. Therefore, the component can be named as “risk avoidance.” I have chosen this second name and from now on the component will be called “risk avoidance.”

3.13.1.10 Tenth Component

This is the last and the tenth component of the factor analysis results. This component comprises two items from the five items proposed to measure the “power distance” construct in measurement section 3.10.1. The other three items were deleted from the data set used in the second factor analysis based on the results of the initial factor analysis. The retained two items were - PD3: Confident subordinates in my office disagree with my decisions (.739); and PD5: When I am confident, I disagree with my higher authority (.673). Careful reading of these two items suggested that they indicated power distance in an office. Therefore, the construct will retain the term “power distance” to describe the component.

Table 3.4 Reliability Coefficients of the Components

Component	Cronbach's Alpha	No. of Items
Discretion (DN)	.823	5
Outward Accountability (ACC)	.728	5
Proactive Transparency Behavior (PTB)	.736	6
IT Skills (ITS)	.941	2
Resources (RS)	.665	3
Citizen Orientation (CO)	.541	4
Value Generic (VG)	.610	3
Value Specific (VS)	.635	2
Risks Avoidance (RA)	.562	2
Power Distance (PD)	.502	2

The ten-component solution structured the 34 items in the reduced data set meaningfully. After extracting the components, Cronbach's alpha was tested. The test results are presented in table 3.4. The table does not distinguish dependent and independent variables. The components appear in the table according to the order in which they were arranged in the factor analysis. The first component's (discretion) Cronbach's alpha coefficient was .823 and item number was 5. This component accounted for 12.57 percent of the total variance in the data set. The second component, "outward accountability" was a dependent variable measured with 5 items. Its alpha coefficient was .728 and accounted for 8.94 percent of the total variance of the data set.

The third component in the table is "proactive transparency behavior" measured with 6 items. It was a dependent variable as well. Its alpha coefficient was .736 and it accounted for 8.73 percent of the total variance. The fourth component, "IT Skills" was measured with 2 items and it was a new one. Its alpha coefficient was the highest in the data set, which was .941 and accounted for 6.16 percent of the total variance. The fifth component, "resources" was measured with 3 items and it received an alpha value of .665. It accounted for 5.10 percent of the variance. The sixth

component “citizen orientation” was a new name for “guiding decision.” It was measured with 4 items and its alpha value was .541. It accounted for 4.62 percent of the variance. The seventh and eighth components were “value generic” and “value specific,” respectively. They emerged by splitting the proposed component of the “value for proactive transparency.” Value generic took 3 of the 5 items proposed for measuring the “value for proactive transparency” while value specific took the other two. These two components had got alpha values of .610 and .632, respectively. They accounted for 4.41 percent and 4.06 percent of the total variance, respectively. The ninth component, “risks avoidance,” is a new name and was measured with 2 items. It emerged from the components of uncertainty avoidance. Its alpha value was .562 and accounted for 3.37 percent of the total variance. The tenth and the last component is “power distance,” measured with 2 items. Its alpha coefficient was the lowest, which was .502 and accounted for 3.21 percent of the total variance. All of these ten components had eigenvalues above 1.

Table 3.5 compares the initial variables with the new ones that emerged after the factor analysis. The variables in the table are presented in four groups. The first group (group A) shows the variables that were the same in the initial specification and after the factor analysis. The second group (group B) shows the variables that were renamed after the factor analysis. Two variables were renamed examining the nature of the association of the proposed items. Group C presents the two initial variables that split into two each in the factor analysis. Group D presents the deleted variable. Its proposed items did not receive support in the factor analysis.

Table 3.5 Comparison of Old and New Variables

Group	Variables		Remarks
	Initial Specification (No. of Items)	After Factor Analysis (No. of Items)	
A (Intact variables)	Discretion (5) Outward Accountability (6) Proactive Transparency Behavior (7) Power Distance (5)	Discretion (5) Outward Accountability (5) Proactive Transparency Behavior (6) Power Distance (2)	The four variables in this group were the same after the factor analysis. Only items were reduced.
B (Renamed variables)	Uncertainty Avoidance (4) Guiding Decisions (4)	Risk Avoidance (2) Citizen Orientation (4)	Variables in this group changed their names due to the nature of the association of the items.
C (Split variables)	Resources (5) Value for Proactive Transparency (5)	Resources (3) IT Skills (2) Value Generic (3) Value Specific (2)	The initial variable was split into two variables. The initial variable was split into two variables.
D (Not supported variables)	Team Orientation (4)	-	Proposed items did not support the initial variable in the factor analysis.

3.14 The Revised Proposed Model

The results of the factor analysis necessitated a revision of the conceptual model proposed in the second chapter. In the original proposed model, bureaucratic culture had four dimensions: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, guiding decisions, and team orientation. The first two dimensions were hypothesized to be negatively correlated with the “value for proactive transparency”. The second two dimensions were hypothesized to be positively correlated with the “value for proactive transparency.” The results of the factor analysis have lost the culture dimension of “team orientation” while “value for proactive transparency” has been split into “value generic” and “value specific.” Moreover, two culture dimensions “uncertainty avoidance” and “guiding decisions” got new names, “risk avoidance” and “citizen orientation” respectively. On the other hand, the organizational endowment factor of “resources” has been split into “IT skills” and “resources.” The remaining constructs in the model have remained the same. Based on the results of the factor analysis, the revised proposed model looks like figure 3.4.




Figure 3.4 The Revised Proposed Model

3.15 Chapter Summary

In order to answer the research questions set out in the first chapter, this chapter discussed the research design. It employed a mixed methods approach where a quantitative survey was complemented by qualitative interviews and observation. Quantitative data were analyzed using standard multiple regression and qualitative data were analyzed following a basic thematic approach. The quantitative data received from the 326 survey questionnaires were run through principal component analysis which produced ten constructs. After reviewing the factor analysis results, few of the original nine constructs needed modifications. One construct was lost, two constructs were split into two each, and two other constructs renamed. Based on the factor analysis results, the model was revised and a few hypotheses were reformulated.

CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the findings of the study. This dissertation was interested in looking for an explanation of how organizational factors such as bureaucratic culture, structure (discretion), and endowment (resources) affect frontline public bureaucrats' behavior regarding proactive transparency and attitudes towards citizen-centric accountability. The previous chapter outlined how the study was designed and executed to gather the required information and to analyze them for answering the research questions. It was stated that this research followed a mixed methods strategy for answering the research questions. Therefore, the findings include both quantitative and qualitative ones. The quantitative part employed the standard multiple regression analysis technique to explain the quantitative data. Tabachnick and Fidell (2013) have argued that the multiple regression technique is appropriate when the research goal is to assess the relationship between one dependent variable and a number of independent variables. This chapter presents the findings of the study in five parts. The second section presents the descriptive statistics on the demographic characteristics of the respondents. The third section discusses the frequency distribution of the measurement items. The fourth section deals with the findings from both the regression analyses and the qualitative data in two subsections respectively about proactive transparency behavior. The fifth section presents the findings on outward accountability in two subsections. One subsection presents the regression results and the other presents the interview data. The sixth section presents the finding on mediation analysis. The seventh section presents the final model and the hypotheses of the study. The last section concludes the findings.

4.2 Demographic Characteristics

It was mentioned in the third chapter that 329 filled-in questionnaires were collected from the respondents out of which 326 questionnaires were entered into the computer software called the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). The data from three questionnaires were left out of the SPSS because two of them had more than 50 percent missing data and one was a duplicate copy from the same respondent. The case of duplication occurred because the same respondent was holding two positions in a sub-district and filled out two questionnaires. Therefore, one of these two questionnaires was a candidate for rejection. This section presents the demographic information on the respondents from the 326 questionnaires. Although the data from the 326 questionnaires were entered into the SPSS program, 28 respondents had missing data for different items measuring the constructs. The way that the missing data were dealt with is discussed in the third chapter and also in appendix A. The descriptive analysis presented in this section is based on the cases without missing values.

Table 4.1 presents the demographic characteristics of the respondents. It shows that 91.3 percent of the respondents were male and 8.7 percent were female. It indicates the poor representation of females in the frontline bureaucracies covered by this study. The mean age of the respondents was 42.72 years. As to the age groups of the respondents, there was none in the age group of up to 25 years. The age group of 26-35 years included 24.5 percent of the respondents. Most frontline bureaucrats belonged to the middle-age groups. The age group of 36-45 years included 36.5 percent and the age group of 46-55 years included 30 percent of the respondents. Fewer officials belonged to the age group of 56 and above in the frontline bureaucracies. They constituted 9 percent of the sample. With regard to the highest educational attainment of the respondents, two-thirds of them, 67.2 percent, had a master's degree. The rest, one-third, 32.2 percent, had a bachelor degree as the highest educational attainment. Two participants had a Ph.D. degree as the higher educational attainment.

Table 4.1 Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

Demographic			
Characteristics	Category	Frequency	Percentage
Gender n=326	Male	291	89.3
	Female	35	10.7
Age n=323 Mean=42.72	Up to 25 years	0	0
	26-35 years	79	24.5
	36-45 years	118	36.5
	46-55 years	97	30.0
	56 years and above	29	9.0
Highest Education n=326	Bachelor	105	32.2
	Masters	219	67.2
	Ph.D.	2	0.6
Experience in Current Position n=319 Mean=8.37	Up to 5 years	147	46.1
	6-10 years	87	27.3
	11-15 years	30	9.4
	16-20 years	30	9.4
	21 years and above	25	7.8

Note: n = number of cases without missing values

This research also wanted to know about the experience of the respondents in their current positions, as heads of their respective offices. It should be noted here that the experience in the current position of a respondent does not indicate his/her total length of experience in the service; it expresses only the duration, in terms of years, that he/she was holding the position as an office head. The mean experience of the respondents as office heads was 8.37 years. The majority of them, 46.1 percent, had experience as an office head up to 5 years. The next largest group, who had experience of 6 to 10 years, constituted 27.3 percent. The respondents having 11 to 15 years of experience as office head were 9.4 percent. Another 9.4 percent of the respondents belonged to the group that had 16 to 20 years of experience as office head. Still there were 7.8 percent of the respondents that had experience as office head of 21 years or above.

4.3 Frequency Distribution of Composite Variables

This section presents the frequency distribution and descriptive statistics of the composite variables or constructs of the study. A discussion of the descriptive statistics of the measurement items can be found at appendix B. Table 4.2 (see next page) presents the frequency distribution of the composite variables in percentages. The percentages are based on the mean scores of the composite variables where the lowest to 1.49 were recorded as disagree/never/no control; 1.50 to 2.49 were recorded as somewhat disagree/seldom/minor control; 2.50 to 3.49 were recorded as somewhat agree/sometimes/moderate control; and 3.50 to the highest were recorded as agree/always/major control. The descriptive statistics include some measures such as mean, median, mode, standard deviation (SD), range. However, not all of these measures are presented here because not all of them are useful. Two of these measures, mean and standard deviation, will suffice to understand the tendency of the response from the survey participants with regard to the variables of the study.

Table 4.2 groups the variables in accordance with their answer categories. The items measuring the first group of variables had four answer categories that varied from “agree” to “disagree.” Six variables fell into this group. The highest number of respondents (84 percent) agreed with the five statements measuring the answerability (outward accountability) orientation of the frontline bureaucrats to the citizens. Most of the frontline bureaucrats either agreed (58 percent) or somewhat agreed (36 percent) with the four items measuring citizen orientation. This shows the mentality of receiving citizens’ opinions to reflect them in official decisions. IT skills and resources were measured using two and three items respectively. The majority of the respondents either disagreed (41 percent for IT skills, and 30 percent for resources) or somewhat disagreed (22 percent for IT skills and 42 percent for resources) with the statements. These statistics are an indication of the lack of IT skills and resources of the frontline bureaucrats. Value generic and value specific were measured with 3 and 2 items respectively. Almost all of the respondents either agreed (84 percent) or somewhat agreed (15 percent) to the value generic statements, while 63 percent agreed and 28 percent somewhat agreed with the value specific statements. This shows the high value for proactive transparency of the frontline bureaucrats.

Table 4.2 Frequency Distribution of Composite Variables (Percentages)

Composite Variable	Measurement Items	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Total
Outward Accountability	5 items about becoming answerable to citizens	84.0	14.7	0.6	0.6	100.0
Citizen Orientation	4 items about seeking feedback about services from citizens (2R)	58.3	36.2	5.5	0.0	100.0
Resources	3 items about having sufficient fund, staff, and time for transparency activities	4.3	23.6	42.3	29.8	100.0
IT Skills	2 items about having internet and IT related trainings	15.3	22.1	21.5	41.1	100.0
Value Generic	3 items valuing transparency activities in all public offices	84.4	15.0	0.6	0.0	100.0
Value Specific	2 items describing damages accruing from transparency activities in own office (R)	63.2	27.9	7.7	1.2	100.0
		Always	Sometimes	Seldom	Never	Total
Proactive Transparency Behavior	6 items about practicing transparency activities	40.5	44.2	14.1	1.2	100.0
Risk Avoidance	2 items about strictly following routines and procedures at the cost of results (R)	8.6	25.5	50.9	15.0	100.0
Power Distance	2 items about allowing juniors to disagree with higher authority (R)	15.6	47.2	34.4	2.8	100.0
		Major Control	Moderate Control	Minor Control	No Control	Total
Discretion	5 items measuring degree of control over some official decisions	27.3	44.5	21.2	7.1	100.0

Note: R = Recoded

The items measuring the second group of variables in table 4.2 had four answer categories that varied from “always” to “never.” Three variables had these answer categories. Six items were used to measure the proactive transparency behavior that asked the respondents the extent to which they practiced transparency activities. Most respondents were found on the positive side of the scale (41 percent for always, and 44 percent for sometimes). This is an indication of deficits in the proactive transparency activities of the frontline public bureaucrats because these activities are matters to be practiced always; they are not matters to be practiced sometimes. Risk avoidance and power distance were measured using 2 items each. The risk avoidance items were designed to know the frontline bureaucrats’ tendency to avoid risks in their decision making behavior. Surprisingly, the majority of them (51 percent) answered that they seldom avoided risks. Fifteen percent answered that they never tried to avoid risks. This means that the frontline bureaucrats, sometimes, take risks to get desired results. On the other hand, the majority (47%) of the respondents sometimes, and a significant portion (16%) of them always, use power distance behavior. This may be explained as an indication of the existence of high power distance in the frontline public bureaucrats.

The third group of variable in table 4.2 included discretion only. The answer categories to the items of this variable varied from “major control” to “no control” in five decision making activities. Most of the frontline bureaucrats had moderate control (45 percent) followed by major control (27 percent). This can be explained as the existence of high discretion on the part of the frontline bureaucrats.

Table 4.3 shows the central tendency and dispersion of the opinions of the respondents. On the 4-point Likert scale the average score was 2.5 for all of the composite variables of this research. The constructs in the table are presented in the order in which they appeared in the revised hypothesized model. Three constructs in the table were from the organizational cultural dimensions. These were risk avoidance, power distance, and citizen orientation. The mean score of risk avoidance was 2.08, which was below the average, but that of power distance was above the average (2.56). The respondents were also moderately dispersed in their opinions. On the other hand, the mean score of 3.40 for citizen orientation was much above the

average. These findings are in line with the frequency distribution (table 4.2) and the same interpretations apply to them.

The mean score for discretion was 2.92, which indicated discretionary practices of the respondents. The mean scores for resources (2.04) and IT skills (2.05) were below the average and the opinions about IT skills were highly dispersed. These scores implied poor resource conditions of the frontline offices. The mean scores for value generic (3.81) and value specific (3.42) were high and the respondents were consistent in their opinions about value generic (SD was .33). Therefore, they possessed a high value for proactive transparency. The mean scores for proactive transparency behavior (3.12) and outward accountability (3.79) indicated that the frontline bureaucrats practiced proactive transparency and were willing to be accountable to the citizens. Their opinions were less dispersed concerning outward accountability (SD was .38) than transparency behavior (SD was .66).

Table 4.3 Measures of Central Tendency and Dispersion of Composite Variables

Composite Variable	Mean	SD
Risk Avoidance	2.08	.780
Power Distance	2.56	.694
Citizen Orientation	3.40	.537
Discretion	2.92	.829
Resources	2.04	.766
IT Skills	2.05	1.090
Value Generic	3.81	.334
Value Specific	3.42	.728
Proactive Transparency Behavior	3.12	.656
Outward Accountability	3.79	.381

Note: SD = Standard Deviation

4.4 Proactive Transparency Behavior

4.4.1 Findings from the Regression Analysis

This sub-section of the chapter presents the quantitative findings on the proactive transparency behavior of the frontline public bureaucrats in Bangladesh. Proactive transparency behavior refers to the measures that the frontline bureaucrats adopted in their daily functions for disclosing information on their own initiative. The results from regression analyses predicting the value for proactive transparency are presented first. In these analyses, cultural dimensions were used as the predictor variables. Then the results from the regression analyses predicting proactive transparency behavior are presented. Here the value for proactive transparency, cultural dimensions, organizational structure, and organizational endowment were the predictor variables.

4.4.1.1 Value for Proactive Transparency

It was hypothesized in the proposed revised model (see chapter three) that the cultural dimensions affect proactive transparency behavior through the value for proactive transparency. This means that the cultural factors affect the value for proactive transparency and the value for proactive transparency, in turn, affects proactive transparency behavior. This required an examination of the mediating role of the value for proactive transparency, which is presented at a later section of this chapter. This sub-section examines how the cultural dimensions affected the value for proactive transparency. Therefore, it answers the first research question: “How do the dimensions of organizational culture affect the value for proactive transparency?,” as described in the first chapter. Thus, in order to see the effect of the cultural dimensions on the value for proactive transparency, the standard multiple regression was run. It should be noted here that the value for proactive transparency was split into two factors in the factor analysis—value generic and value specific. On the other hand, through the factor analysis, the cultural dimensions were reduced to three factors from the original four—power distance, risk avoidance, and citizen orientation. Therefore, each of the factors regarding the value for proactive transparency was regressed simultaneously on all three cultural dimensions.

Tables B3 and B4 in appendix B present the regression results. The three cultural dimensions together explained a small amount of the variance in value generic ($R^2 = 0.030$, $p < 0.05$) and value specific ($R^2 = 0.019$, $p < 0.10$). Only one cultural dimension—citizen orientation—was found to be a significant predictor of both value generic (0.137, $p < 0.05$) and value specific (0.119, $p < 0.05$). Although the bivariate correlation between the cultural dimension of risk avoidance and value generic was significant at $p < 0.05$, risk avoidance did not become significant in the regression analysis. See table B2 in appendix B for the bivariate correlations among the variables of the study. The non-significant cultural dimensions were removed from the regression analyses and two fresh analyses were run—one for value generic and the other for value specific—as the dependent variables and citizen orientation as the only independent variable. The new regression results are summarized in table 4.4 below. With the single and only significant predictor in the analyses, the amount of variance explained were reduced in value generic ($R^2 = 0.021$, $p < 0.01$) and value specific ($R^2 = 0.014$, $p < 0.05$). In the second round of regressions, the significance level of value generic improved (from $p < 0.05$ to $p < 0.01$). These findings provide support for hypotheses 1c and 2c as presented in chapter three.

Table 4.4 Multiple Regression Results for the Significant Culture Dimension
Predicting Value Generic and Value Specific

Variable	Value Generic	Value Specific
Constant	3.506	2.871
Citizen Orientation	.144	.118
R^2	.021	.014
F	6.844	4.582
Significance	.01	.05

Note: Values in the table are standardized coefficients (beta)

4.4.1.2 Proactive Transparency Behavior

This sub-section answers the second research question: “How do the organizational culture, organizational structure, and organizational endowment of the frontline public bureaucrats in Bangladesh affect their proactive transparency

behavior?” The three dimensions of organizational culture, the two variables from the value for proactive transparency, one variable from organizational structure, and the two variables from organizational endowment were used as predictors of the proactive transparency behavior in the regression analysis. Moreover, four other variables from the demographic data—age, experience in the current position, training on the right to information, education, and gender—were included in the predictor variables, while age and experience in the current position were continuous variables, training on the right to information, education, and gender were used as dummy variables.

Details on the regression results are presented in table B5 in appendix B. The table shows the regression results for the 13 independent variables predicting the proactive transparency behavior. The thirteen independent variables together explained a significant amount of variance in the proactive transparency behavior ($R^2 = 0.229$, $p < 0.001$). Three variables stood out as significant predictors of proactive transparency behavior. These variables were value generic, IT skills, and age. The standardized coefficient (beta) for value generic was 0.145 and was significant at $p < 0.01$; for IT skills, it was 0.310 and was significant at $p = 0.000$; and for age, it was -0.268 and was significant at $p = 0.000$.

None of the cultural dimensions was found to be significant at $p < 0.05$. However, citizen orientation, a culture dimension, was significant at $p = 0.69$. As we have noticed in the previous sub-section, value generic was significantly predicted by this cultural dimension of citizen orientation. One of the two factors from the value for proactive transparency—value specific—was found to be non-significant. One variable from organizational endowment—resources—was not significant. The lone variable from organizational structure—discretion was not significant either. One demographic variable—age—was found to be significant but others were not. Although the bivariate correlations between proactive transparency behavior and the other three variables of value specific, citizen orientation, and resources were significant at $p < 0.05$, these variables did not become significant in the regression analysis.

After this first round of the regression run, a second regression was run where all non-significant variables were excluded. The results of this second regression analysis are presented in table 4.5. The table shows the unstandardized

regression coefficients (b) and intercept, the standardized regression coefficients (β), t , significance, R , R^2 , adjusted R^2 , and F values. R for regression was significantly different from zero ($F_{3, 322} = 27.522$, $R^2 = 0.204$, $p = 0.000$). With the three significant independent variables, the model explained over 20 percent of the variance ($R^2 = 0.204$, $p = 0.000$). This means that more than a fifth of the variability in the proactive transparency behavior of the frontline bureaucrats was predicted by their IT-related skills, their value for proactive transparency behavior, and their age. IT skills had the highest effect with a standardized coefficient (beta) of 0.335 and $p = 0.000$. Age had a negative effect on proactive transparency behavior with standardized coefficient (beta) of -0.248 and $p = 0.000$. The other variable was value generic with a standardized coefficient (beta) of 0.171 and $p = 0.001$. The beta coefficients for IT skills and value generic increased and that of age decreased in the second regression analysis. The size and the direction of the relationships suggested that more proactive disclosures were made by frontline bureaucrats that had more IT skills, more generic value regarding proactive transparency, and that were younger in age. However, among these three factors, IT skills were more important. These findings provide support to hypotheses 3a and 3e.

Table 4.5 Regression Results for Three Significant Independent Variables Predicting Proactive Transparency Behavior

	Unstandardized Coefficients (b)	Standardized Coefficients (beta)	t	Sig.
Constant	2.241		5.581	.000
IT Skills	.202	.335	6.735	.000
Value Generic	.337	.171	3.434	.001
Age	-.019	-.248	-4.966	.000

Note: $R = .452$ $R^2 = .204$ Adjusted $R^2 = .197$ $F = 27.522$ Sig. = .000

$$\text{Proactive Transparency Behavior} = 2.241 + .335*ITS + .171*VALUGEN - .248*AGE$$

Where:

ITS	:	IT Skills
VALUGEN	:	Generic Value for Proactive Transparency
AGE	:	Age of respondents

4.4.2 Findings from the Interviews and Observation

This sub-section presents the findings on the proactive disclosure behavior based on the data collected mainly through the qualitative interviews conducted with the frontline bureaucrats. Besides these interviews, observation data, and the comments the survey respondents made in the open space of the survey questionnaire supplemented the findings from the qualitative interviews. Moreover, the researcher took notes on the comments made by the survey respondents during the survey and these notes added to the findings of the qualitative analysis. These findings describe the organizational factors, i.e. organizational culture, organizational structure, and organizational endowment, the extent to which the frontline bureaucrats value proactive transparency, and their proactive transparency behavior.

4.4.2.1 Organizational Factors

The first group of organizational factors was organizational culture. Four cultural dimensions were considered in this study. These cultural dimensions were power distance, uncertainty avoidance, guiding decisions, and team orientation. Some of these issues arose in the interviews. They were not presented separately but they intermingled with each other in the discussion. It was understood that power distance exists across the ranks, especially between the respondents and their higher authorities. The interview respondents did mention having a power distance with their bosses but they did not mention having a power distance with their subordinates. This researcher tried to understand the power distance of the frontline bureaucrats with their bosses in terms of how the respondents placed arguments with their bosses and how they disagreed with them (bosses) when needed. It was revealed that the frontline bureaucrats can hardly disagree with their higher authorities. Rather, they place

arguments politely. This behavior of the subordinate reflected also the existence of the uncertainty avoidance tendency of the subordinates because they did not want to be on bad terms with their bosses. Rather, the frontline bureaucrats want to be certain that the higher authority is happy with them. The formal hierarchical relations between the authorities in an organization are influenced by social culture. The boss-subordinate formal relations are not separate from the overall social cultures where seniors are respected by juniors. The following excerpt taken from an interview echoes the opinions of most of the respondents:

It happens [placement of arguments]. Informally opinions are exchanged. We express our opinions where laws are not followed. We do not have the culture of placing arguments openly. There are ranks in jobs. If the ranks are not so distant, strong arguments can be placed. These are considered. But usually the boss-subordinate is an asymmetric relationship. The boss is above me. So, I will keep him in good humor. This is natural. If I disagree on a point, I will say it politely. ... Beyond that there are also cultural contexts. In our society, we do not disobey seniors. We do not argue with them publicly. The same patriarchal social phenomenon impacts our professional services. That is why we do not go for a fierce argument with a boss (Interview 3, November 26, 2015, Interview).

Sometimes, the frontline bureaucrats received results of discussions in their favor by placing logical arguments with the boss. However, most of the time, the results were in the boss's favor. The previous excerpt indicated this. Another respondent told:

Sometimes, the matters come to our favor, and sometimes, not. Then we don't have anything to do. In maximum cases, this happens. I don't have any scope to work going beyond the wish of the higher authority. I have to satisfy him (Interview 2, November 26, 2015, Interview).

The boss-subordinate relationship is influenced by the local context and local politics. Local political leaders may pressure the boss in favor of their interest. These local leaders use their leaders to influence the middle bureaucrats so that the frontline bureaucrats bow to local political leaders. This politics impacts the boss-subordinate relationship because the subordinate directly faces the local situations. Political issues also affect the team work in an organization. Generally, the members of the lower-ranking staff the frontline bureaucracy are recruited from the local community. Political influence in the recruitment process spoils the team work in a service rendering-organization. The family planning office gives door-to-door service. Therefore, this organization has field level staff and need coordinated team works. Political influence regarding staff recruitment negatively affects the teamwork of the organization, as seen in the following passage:

The current field assistants are politicized. They are recruited through influential persons using money. Therefore, doing work using the field workers has become very difficult. We cannot apply rules and regulations to them. If you apply rules to them, you will be removed. If you want to go ahead with a good initiative, it is not possible. Those who join services with political identity will not work [properly] but will take their salary at the end of the month (Interview 11, December 8, 2015, Interview).

There are other examples where politics plays roles. In selecting beneficiaries, politics plays a big role too. In the frontline bureaucracy benefits are distributed through committees where elected representatives of the local council play the decision-making roles. They select beneficiaries based on their connections with the local people. In this way, the most desired persons may drop out. Pointing out weaknesses in the distribution of old age allowance benefits, one frontline bureaucrat stated the following:

Local political persons play a big role also. The local MP [Member of Parliament] sends a list of 10 percent of the total. The Upazila

Chairman and the Woman Vice Chairman send their lists. It is the picture of the whole country. Those who are selected are needy but not rightly prioritized. All beneficiaries are needy but probably the neediest ones are not getting [the old age allowance]. They are selected based on their association with the local representatives. It is a big challenge to rectify the system of the selection process (Interview 7, December 2, 2015, Interview).

Another frontline bureaucracy provides agriculture services to the farmers. This department introduces new varieties to the farmers. All of the services related to the exhibitions of the new varieties are free of cost. Therefore, these are lucrative services. Here also political connection serves as a criterion for selection.

For example, the BRRI [Bangladesh Rice Research Institute] Rice-64 is a new variety. We have 15 displays now on it. Seed, fertilizer, and medicine for this display we provide along with consultation and inspection. All we provide free of cost. We have three types of farmers. Those who are early adopters we normally provide these displays to them. The lagged farmers do not accept these technologies easily. We select the early adopters through some criteria. The farmer should be influential in the locality in the sense that he has land property and has acceptability, has connection with people's representatives. We assess his acceptability ourselves. He listens to us (Interview 2, November 26, 2015, Interview).

There were indications that the frontline bureaucrats had sympathy for the deprived service seekers. This can be argued as their citizen orientation attitude. Despite having limitations in being involved in the beneficiary selection process, the frontline bureaucrats try to influence the process when they see that the most desired recipients are left out. The following excerpt can be considered an indication of citizen orientation.

I found, while doing a survey, a person, nearly 100 years old, who was very needy. I asked him [about old age allowance] and he said that he did not get any allowance. I raised this issue in the selection committee meeting and said that this person should have been given allowance 10 years ago. Why was the man left out? I asked the local member [an elected representative of the local council] “Have not you seen him before? He should have been given an allowance.” The chairman [an elected representative of the local council] took the matter with importance and told the meeting that when the new sanctions are done, he [the old man] will be given it first. I will give reminder to the chairman so that the old man is not left out [out of old age allowance] (Interview 7, December 2, 2015, Interview).

The frontline bureaucrats work for fulfilling the targets set by their higher authorities. If the targets are not reached, then tension grips them because they have to face questions about the targets at the district meetings. Beyond the fear of facing questions from the higher authority, they also feel the prestige issue if performance deficits occur. Each sub-district officer competes with other sub-district officers in the district. One frontline bureaucrat responsible for primary education in a sub-district described the situation in the following way:

For the primary completion exam, we get a target of a cent percent pass. Now we give targets (to schools) of A+ (results). If there are few A+'s, then it becomes a prestige issue. I feel tension, because I am concerned about the rate of the pass in the English subject in my Upazila [sub-district], when I come to know about the good results in my neighboring Upazila. I compete with other colleagues in the district. The issues of admission and dropout create tension. We have to share information about these issues in the district meetings. These things create pressure (Interview 9, December 8, 2015, Interview).

The frontline bureaucrats enjoy discretionary power to some extent. This power is applied within the legal framework but sometimes, they bypass the laws. A frontline bureaucracy, responsible for building infrastructures and maintenance of roads within his jurisdiction, described his discretion in the following sentences:

It depends on the level of the decisions. For example, when I send a maintenance estimate, my Upazila roads are more important. They will get priority. Then I will prefer Union [lower administrative unit] roads. However, in some cases, like one or two, we select [roads] out of these categories. If a new establishment is made on a rural road, then it [the rural road] gets priority. So in that sense I have discretion (Interview 12, December 10, 2015, Interview).

Another frontline bureaucracy works for rural development through forming cooperatives among the rural people, giving them training and providing them with soft loans. These loans are given to the groups (cooperative) repayable in a certain number of installments. After complete repayment of the loan by all members of a cooperative, the members can become eligible for new loans. However, sometimes, one or two members become defaulters. Because of these defaulters, the entire group cannot borrow new money as per the laws. However, new loans are sanctioned in spite of having one or two defaulters. The following excerpt of an interview talks about this discretion:

Unofficially, we can do it. Sometimes, when one member becomes a defaulter, his unpaid money is kept secret by the inspector and new loans are issued. From these new loans the old unpaid money is then deducted. It happens at the inspector level. At my level I don't go beyond the rules and regulations of the government. We know about the unofficial deals and allow it. Otherwise things will not work. In that sense we have discretion (Interview 4, December 2, 2015, Interview).

Sometimes, discretion is suppressed. The sub-district head of the administrative service of a sub-district told this researcher that his district head had asked him to nominate one Union Parishad (council) Chairman as the best in his Upazila to receive some awards as an acknowledgement of good deeds. A Union Parishad is one of the sub-units of an Upazila. Each Union Parishad has a local body elected by people through popular votes. The head of the council is a chairman. If he (the sub-district head of the administrative service) had to do justice, then the candidate (chairman to be selected) would have come from the opposition party because of his good performance. However, this would give him problems. Therefore, he had to choose one from the ruling party although he was not the right candidate. Therefore, the frontline bureaucrats use discretion, taking into consideration the future consequences of the use of it.

The resources of the frontline bureaucrats vary across offices. The first component of the resources of an office is considered to be the manpower. Almost all of the offices whose heads had been interviewed had a shortage of manpower in relation to the sanctioned posts. If all of the sanctioned posts of an office were fulfilled, they could work smoothly. For example, a frontline bureaucracy responsible for providing training and loans to the youth community had 7 positions in its organogram. At the time of the interview there were 5 persons posted in that office. Therefore, the 5 persons had to share the workload of the 2 vacant posts. Another frontline bureaucrat providing account-related services gave a similar account of the manpower of his office:

There are 7 sanctioned posts in this office but we are only 4 persons working. Every day we work beyond the office hours. If all the members of the staff are posted and if we could work even 7 hours a day then the total amount of work would stand at 49 hours a day. This amount of work would have been sufficient to offload the huge workload. Now we 4 persons have to do the total amount of work of 7 persons (Interview 14, December 14, 2015, Interview).

Besides manpower shortages, the frontline bureaucrats also commonly said that they had insufficient budgets. A frontline organization that provides services related to livestock has an office at the Upazila level. People need to bring their cattle for treatment to the Upazila office from a distance. The office head of this bureaucracy felt the need for expanding his services at the Union level. But this was not permitted under the present structure of his office. This shortage of manpower did not arise from vacant positions but arose from the size of the organization. Moreover, this office suffered from a shortage of medicines. The head of the office mentioned the following:

The medicines that we get [for one year] are very insufficient. It is sufficient for a month only. This department is much neglected. ... People come to my office from a distance. We do not have an office at the Union [local government unit] level. We need an office at that level. There are huge demands for services at that level. Our service recipients are the deprived people of the society. It is painful for them to come to the Upazila office (Interview 1, November 26, 2015, Interview).

Another component of the resources of a bureaucracy is the skills of its staff. This study focused on skills that were needed to conduct proactive disclosure activities. Therefore, the respondents were asked about IT-related training. From the interviews, it was understood that generally they lacked the skills needed to do Internet-related activities for their office. Each Upazila has a web portal where every office has its presence. This portal describes the activities of an office, the current staff, and their contact phone numbers among other things. Some bureaucrats do not even know about this web portal. This researcher collected the contact phone numbers of the interviewees from the Upazila web portal for an appointment. In some cases, when this researcher contacted the mobile phone number, the receiver of the call stated that he was transferred a long time ago from the station where the phone number was obtained. This means that after the transfer of the officer the web portal

was not updated. Concerning the web portal-related activities, one interviewee stated the following:

We have not opened a website yet. The Upazila web portal is not operational. We are given a tab [computer device] but line [Internet] is not available. We are given an SIM card. It does not work. It is not a network problem but availability of balance. ... I don't know whether we are given a monthly allowance [for Internet]. They [UNO office] have set up a web portal but have not given connection. I use the Internet in my tab with my personal money. It is not included in the office budget. It is not given to us from the Upazila budget (Interview 1, November 26, 2015, Interview).

When this bureaucrat was asked about uploading information on the web portal he simply said, "We don't do it ... for lack of budget" (Interview 1, November 26, 2015, Interview). When he was asked whether he had ever visited his web portal, he replied, "No." Another bureaucrat said that his office had sufficient manpower. This office, responsible for delivering agriculture-related services to the citizens, had at the time of the interview 41 staff members against the sanctioned posts of 42. However, the members of the staff lacked training. The officer said the following:

We do not have any training on proactive disclosure activities. Whatever skills we have, we have acquired them from our own initiative, efforts. We did not get any training on these matters (like) the web portal, computer from the government initiative. It is very necessary (to have training on these matters). Manpower set up is sufficient but we need training (Interview 2, November 26, 2015, Interview).

4.4.2.2 Value for Proactive Transparency

From the interviews it can be inferred that the frontline bureaucrats possess less value regarding proactive disclosure than was expected. The value for proactive disclosure comes from a realization that citizens can benefit from such disclosure of information. It does not come from legal requirements but from realization. About the proactive disclosure of information, a bureaucrat stated the following:

There is no need to display. You need a mentality, sincerity. In the hospital [health complex] there is a display, but how many patients read it? ... It is a matter of the sincerity of the officer, a matter of the mentality of the officer. I have [information] in the display but I do not have the mentality. Do you understand? Someone has a citizens' charter but is taking bribe money. We do not have direction to display information. In the human sector [health complex] displaying is compulsory. But it is not made compulsory for us [livestock office] (Interview 1, November 26, 2015, Interview).

This excerpt of the interview also reveals that the respondent is unaware of the legal requirement to display certain information by his office. The rules under the information law in Bangladesh require the Upazila offices to publicly display the citizens' charter, an organizational chart listing the staff and their responsibilities, and activities of the office among other things (BG, 2010, 2011). Other officers acknowledged the value for proactive disclosure of information:

“Without doubt I will say it is needed. I need to inform the clients about my service. If they don't know about my service, why will they come to me? Of course, it is needed” (Interview 2, November 26, 2015, Interview).

Another frontline bureaucrat expressed the value for proactive disclosure in the following manner:

A snake in a dark room, is everywhere in the room. I think all documents should be disclosed. If a person does not know about our activity, he will not realize the utility of my office. If he knows about our activities through the Internet, he will realize that this office is not doing badly. Publicity is expansion. Sometimes, some quarters misguide people. But if the information is there, then people will not misunderstand (Interview 4, December 2, 2015, Interview).

Proactive disclosure is considered as a burden. It requires extra activities. With a shortage of manpower and skills proactive disclosure not only seems to be a burden but also appears as a complex job. A frontline bureaucrat providing services related to women's affairs expressed her feeling about the job of proactive disclosure in the following way:

Yes, they can be benefited [from proactive disclosure] but, actually, it needs time and manpower [the office had 3 staff including the officer against 4 sanctioned posts]. Doing it every month puts extra burden on us. Our manpower is very small. [Moreover,] none of the departments here does it. Even the UNO [Upazila Executive Officer] office, a big one, has not started it. (In addition to that,) we did not get such decisions from the district or Dhaka. ... Many people come to the Upazila Parishad [Upazila Council] every day. They come for different purposes. Then these people can read notice boards and know about our activities. We don't upload information on the web portal. Many of us don't know the usage of this thing [web portal]. Moreover, the Internet is very weak here. ... It is very slow and we cannot afford much time to spend on it (Interview 13, December 14, 2015, Interview).

This excerpt of the interview reveals some important issues about the value of proactive disclosure. First, the interviewee believes that proactively

disclosing information will benefit people. Secondly, her value regarding proactive disclosure is marred by the limitation of resources that she has. Her manpower is limited. The office had three officials including the interviewee against 4 sanctioned posts. Her office provides micro-credits to poor women and she needs to collect the installments of the loans from the borrowers, sometimes, going to the homes in remote areas. She also mentions the weak infrastructure of the Internet speed. Another important thing about the limitation of resources is her skills; she does not know the usage of a web portal. She benignly confessed that also most officials did not know much about the usage of a web portal. Therefore, she considers doing proactive disclosure activities as an extra burden. Thirdly, there is no example before her. As none of the departments of her Upazila does these activities, she does not feel the need to do so. Especially, she refers to the UNO (Upazila Executive Officer) office. This office is headed by a bureaucrat from the administrative service and is perceived as the controlling office of an Upazila. According to the interviewee, this office does not proactively disclose information, so other offices don't do it. Fourthly, this interviewee lacks knowledge about the legal provisions for proactive disclosure. Moreover, she depends on her higher authority. Her district or Dhaka office did not ask her to do these things.

It is interesting to know the perspective of the UNO about proactive disclosure. As we have seen in the previous paragraph, the UNO office is considered as a model to follow by other offices of an Upazila. A UNO was asked about the citizens' charter, an important means of proactive disclosure as considered in this study. He did not have a citizens' charter at the time of the interview. He was asked whether he knew about the legal provision for publicly displaying a citizen charter. The interviewee admitted the following:

It is compulsory. Those who come for service will never look at the charter because, they do not know about the citizens' charter. They don't care about it. It has no utility. But some offices charge fees for services within a time frame and they should display it. I don't offer dedicated services. So, it is less applicable to my office. ... Here my clients are the chairmen [of the local councils]. Many things happen

that cannot come under the charter. A UNO office performs regulatory and monitoring functions. That is why the charter is dysfunctional here. It is more effective at the point where services are delivered (Interview 3, November 26, 2015, Interview).

4.4.2.3 Proactive Transparency Behavior

In order to learn about the proactive transparency behavior of the frontline bureaucrats observation data were noted extensively. Two important means of proactive disclosure were covered by the observation method. Observation data were recorded about the citizens' charters and notice boards of the frontline offices. It was discussed earlier that the disclosure of citizens' charters publicly is a legal requirement for every office at the Upazila level.

Table 4.6 Observation Data on Citizens' Charter and Notice Board

	Citizens' Charter		Notice Board	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Nowhere	124	52.1	153	65.4
Inside office room	19	8.0	10	4.3
Outside office room	95	39.9	71	30.3
Total	238	100.0	234	100.0

Table 4.6 summarizes the observation data on the citizens' charters and notice boards. This researcher observed 238 offices for the citizens' charter and 234 offices for the notice board in 23 Upazilas of 23 districts. The majority of the offices observed, over 52 percent, did not have a citizens' charter. With regard to the notice board, over 65 percent of the offices observed, did not have any notice board. Those offices that had a citizens' charter or a notice board, a good number of them had the charter or the notice board inside the office room of the office head. Sometimes, the citizens' charter is displayed on an A4 size paper printed from the computer attached to the notice board inside the office room. When a citizens' charter or a notice board is kept inside an office room, citizens can hardly read it because their access to the

office room of the head of the office is limited by the parochial attitudes of the office head as well as the citizens. This researcher found a citizens' charter of an office dumped in a corner of the corridor of the office along with other rejected broken furniture, like chairs and tables. In some offices, this researcher found no citizens' charter and asked why they did not display it. Then the officials brought the folded citizens' charter and hung it on their walls. It happened with offices where different rates are charged for different services. This behavior is an indication of the opportunist behavior of the frontline bureaucrats in using the citizens' charter for their own interests, i.e., they can claim that they have citizens' charters and at the same time do not show them to the service seekers. This argument was substantiated by the accounts of a frontline bureaucrat responsible for delivering land-related services to the citizens. He indicates this opportunist behavior when he says, "A citizen's charter is like the makeup done for a girl at the time of her marriage" (Interview 5, December 2, 2015, Interview). He further explains his comments:

We do not have transparency. If you go to any land office in this country to give khajana [land tax], you will not get good treatment. If you want to give 100 taka [Bangladesh currency] as a tax, you will have to spend an extra 500 taka. They [land officials] will not tell you the exact amount of your tax. If you give 500 taka as a land tax, they will give you a receipt for 50 or 100 taka. I think nowhere in Bangladesh the mutation fee is taken exactly. Everywhere is an expectation that I will get some bokshish [happy money]. The service recipient also gives it willingly. ... People also want to get service quickly and offer money (Interview 5, December 2, 2015, Interview).

This researcher took some observation notes during the data-collection period. Below are two observation notes taken on two different dates while visiting two Upazila describing the proactive disclosure behavior of the frontline bureaucrats. It can be argued from these notes that the proactive disclosure behavior of the frontline bureaucracies has deficits from the requirements:

The land office has some awareness-building papers or posters on its walls. But no notice board can be seen. The education office has a display board with some very old documents on it. The documents are so old that they are not readable. The UNO office has a notice board at the bottom of the stairs. The board has an on-top net-cover with a torn hole in the middle. Inside the torn net recent documents from the UNO office and the election office are found. It is understood that the documents were pasted through the hole of the net. The accounts officer did not want to fill out the survey questionnaire because he thought that it might bring him problems. He needs permission from his higher authority to fill out a survey questionnaire (Observation Note taken on October 6, 2015).

A printed leaflet describing the citizens' charter of the office was kept under the on-top glass of the table of the accounts officer. Now it was taken out of the on-top glass of the table and pasted on the outside wall of the office room as soon as the officer started filling in the survey questionnaire because the survey questionnaire had items on a citizens' charter (Observation Note taken on November 17, 2015).

In some offices, the citizens' charter appears as only a list of a few services of the office. The RTI laws in Bangladesh clearly mention what information a citizens' charter will show. The Right to Information (Information Preservation and Management) Rules mention six important components about services that must be mentioned in a citizens' charter that include specific quality, transparency, choice options, courtesy, placement of objections, and equality (BG, 2010). Under the transparency component the rules specify the service provider's identity, cost, and time of the service to be mentioned. In spite of this specification, no common format of the citizens' charter was found during the survey. The departments display citizens' charters in different formats.

Some offices did display the citizens' charters in an appropriate format. This researcher found most offices in an Upazila having citizens' charters. The field note taken in that Upazila reads:

Most offices show citizens' charters in front of their offices. The officer from the land office and the UNO said that citizens are not aware of the citizen's charters. They don't read them. Rather, they resort to the mediators. The officer from the land office said that they need to do a lot of work with limited manpower. There are vacant posts not fulfilled by the higher authorities (Observation Note taken on October 14, 2015).

Although there are legal provisions for proactively displaying certain documents using citizens' charters, notice boards, and web portals, the frontline bureaucrats practice it less than what is required. There are several reasons that can be found from the interviews. There is one assumption among the frontline bureaucrats that the citizens know about their activities. Therefore, no need arises to make people acquainted with the activities of an office through a citizens' charter. One interviewee said, "They [citizens] all know that this Upazila has an office. The system is there from the British rule" (Interview 1, November 26, 2015, Interview). Explaining his proactive disclosure activities another interviewee who delivers agriculture services to farmers stated the following:

We do weekly meetings and decisions are disseminated by the officials [in the meetings] and feedback [from farmers] is collected by them [officials]. We also need to inform the farmers. We do miking [publicity using loud speaker] for that. We camp in the Union Parishad complex. We go to the schools and colleges and train people. The method of dissemination depends on the activities. Our farmers or citizens do not read notice boards. It is good to hang decisions, letters on notice boards. Then information becomes available. Farmers can benefit but they have not been habituated to reading notice boards.

They are not aware, not habituated; do not feel the need to read notice boards. We have staff up to the village level. Farmers get services from them. So they do not come to the office. Sometimes, we upload information on the web portal. However, recently we did not upload any information. We have a Facebook page of this office. We post information there. Facebook is also a medium of information sharing (Interview 2, November 26, 2015, Interview).

When the head of a health complex was asked about his citizens' charter, he echoed the same as above. It is important to note that his health complex provides a special service which other health complexes in the district do not provide. It has a caesarean section but it is not mentioned in the citizens' charter. He stated the following:

It [citizens' charter] is there. But not all services are listed there. It is old and many new services have been introduced. The charter is designed from above; we do not decide what can be in it. Our citizens don't read the charter. Of course, the citizens' charter has a utility. More important is to make the facilities available. The services may be in the charter but if the facilities remain unavailable, then there will not be good results. The charter is not important. What is important is to appoint staff in the vacant posts. Maximum people know about the services. I think 2 out of 100 people read the billboards (Interview 10, December 8, 2015, Interview).

Confirming the same assumption about people's knowledge about the services that a frontline bureaucracy delivers, another interviewee who deals with financial services mentioned that he is a responsible officer. So, there is no need to display a citizens' charter. He said the following during the interview:

Yes, we have [a citizens' charter]. It is very old. We do a photo copy, sometimes, and paste it on the wall. Actually, people know [about

services] without the charter. We do a lot of work beyond the charter. It can be displayed but people are aware. There is no need to display it because all know, because I am a responsible officer. I understand their [service seekers] problems (Interview 14, December 14, 2015, Interview).

Besides the “people-know” assumption, the frontline bureaucrats also mentioned the citizens’ habit of not looking at the citizens’ charters or the notice boards. The excerpts mentioned earlier carry this indication. A question can be raised about the development of people’s habit of looking at or not looking at a citizens’ charter or a notice board: “How is the people’s habit developed?” It can be argued that people do not look at the citizens’ charter or the notice board because the frontline bureaucrats do not publish information using these tools. Moreover, publishing information using these tools is a legal requirement. Therefore, “people do not look at the citizens’ charter or the notice board” is a lame excuse for not publishing information using these two mediums. Almost all frontline bureaucrats interviewed by this researcher used this “people’s habit of not looking at a notice board or a citizens’ charter” as a reason for not publishing information using the mediums. A powerful bureaucrat in an Upazila recognized the importance of disclosing information using a notice board. However, he explained why it was not practiced. He was asked whether his office produces any documents that can be disclosed for public consumption using the notice board.

Yes, we have [documents for disclosure]. But people don’t read the notice board. None follow a notice board. It is a dangerous culture. Once upon a time the source of information for people was word of mouth. Then came newspapers whose function is to disseminate information. People became dependent on it. Then came television. The question is which one people will accept. It depends on the quality of the receiver. If he is not educated, a newspaper is of no use to him. Tradition is hearing from the horse’s mouth. Unfortunately, people still take this as the source of information here. It creates problems like

rumors. It spreads quickly. Unfortunately, people in Bangladesh still depend on the mouth's words as the important source of information. A notice board is one way or means for disclosing information. It is for everybody to see. But if he does not see, does not read [what to do?] (Interview 3, November 26, 2015, Interview).

This interviewee raised the issue of the quality of the service recipients. Another interviewee also blamed the citizens. He claimed that even the literate people do not understand the citizens' charter because it presents information in a complex way. He recognizes that the charter has to be presented to the citizens in an understandable way. Terming the citizens' charter as the mirror of an office, he mentioned the following:

The general people are illiterate, half literate. And those who are literate don't understand [a citizens' charter]. I have mentioned in the charter many rates, I have mentioned the ways things are done, whatever is needed, but the public do not go in front of it. They want to go to the officer directly. People have deficiency in trust. If somebody reads the charter, then he may be benefited. It [charter] needs to be made easy (Interview 15, December 22, 2015, Interview).

Another important reason for not proactively disclosing information is the absence of pressure from above. The higher authorities are not rigid in displaying information proactively. Nobody monitors whether the required information is disclosed proactively. All of the interviewees recognized this. In some excerpts presented earlier there were indications of this. One interviewee professed: "We don't feel the urge, the pressure from above, to display. In the last two years, I did not get any pressure" (Interview 9, December 8, 2015, Interview). Recognizing the legal provision for displaying a citizens' charter, another interviewee stated the following:

There is a provision to display the charter in an open space visible to the people. But it is not implemented. Look at the UNO office, it is not

there. It is not implemented because the authority is not rigid about it. Or it has no monitoring. Secondly, it needs funds but they are not available. If someone wants to display it, he has to do it with his own managed funds. However, if one wishes, he can manage the funds (Interview 2, November 26, 2015, Interview).

This interviewee mentioned that arranging funds to create a citizens' charter is not a problem. It depends on the will of the office head. Here is a quote from this interview: "For my office, if I wish, I can do it. But I don't know about other offices. If it is not displayed, till now, no problem has arisen" (Interview 2, November 26, 2015, Interview). Recognizing the value of proactive disclosure, another frontline bureaucrat also mentioned that the government does not provide separate funds for preparing a citizens' charter but the government provides the offices with a contingency fund from where such expenditure can be met easily. Here are his arguments:

The charter has value. The reality is that there is an instruction from the government that there should be a citizens' charter. But along with the instruction, the government will never be able to show that I have given you this budget [to materialize the instruction]. But I also consider that the government gives me contingency in different ways (Interview 11, December 8, 2015, Interview).

The "will-dependence" nature of proactive disclosure was also confirmed by another bureaucrat that provides educational services. According to her, it is not a big matter to prepare and display a citizens' charter. In her own words:

One can do it if she wishes. It will need a board and the charter written on it, just this. It can be done. Just draw some money from another budget head. I can do it. It is not a big matter. It will not require a big amount. It is just a matter of will (Interview 9, December 8, 2015, Interview).

Some interviewees mentioned that they do not practice disclosure of information using notice boards because they have internal mechanisms for the dissemination of information. These offices have extended staff up to the villages. Therefore, when any new information arrives, they can quickly disseminate it through their manpower network. One interviewee dealing with education services mentioned the use of mobile phones in the dissemination of information: “We have so my documents that we disseminate them through the assistant education officers instantly. In fact, mobile phones have made it easy and now mobile communication costs less than before” (Interview 9, December 8, 2015, Interview). The use of mobile phones as a means to disseminate information does not mean sending documents to the recipients. They share some instructions or meeting dates through phone calls. Another frontline bureaucrat delivering family planning services to the citizens said that besides the internal mechanism of the dissemination of information, he also uploads the information on the web portal. However, he has doubts about people’s habit of visiting their web portal:

We don’t have such mandatory activities [uploading information on the web portal]. But for the sake of the program we use these technologies. A detailed charter is on the web portal but how many people visit it? We take this opportunity as much as possible. If something new arrives, we upload it on the portal. We share it in coordination meetings and with other offices. We update our portal by preparing information and sending it to the technician for uploading. ... We use field workers to disseminate information. Although Internet users are increasing, they are not interested in knowing about services through the Internet (Interview 11, December 8, 2015, Interview).

Lack of training on Internet activities is a reason for not uploading information on the web portal for many frontline offices. Moreover, the web portal is managed centrally. At the time of the data collection, the web portal for all of the offices of a Upazila was managed by a technician in the UNO office. Therefore, it

requires every other office to prepare information and to go to the UNO office for uploading them. This requires them extra time, as an education officer stated:

We have limitation of time. We do so much work. We don't have the required manpower. I don't have the skills to upload information on the web portal. I have awareness but don't have the skills. We should be given an administration password for our part of the portal (Interview 9, December 8, 2015, Interview).

Some interviewees said that they do not display citizens' charters outside the office because they fear that people will damage them. Some officials hang the charter list outside the office room during office hours and keep it inside the office room when the office closes. An interviewee explained the situation:

We are supposed to show the citizens' charter outside the office room. After the office hours when we go out, and we lock the office room. There is no system to lock the citizens' charter. Vagrants spent the night in the open space. The wicked boys keep bad company with idle talkers. They damage the citizens' charter. How many times should I make a citizens' charter? Every department has a citizens' charter. My office has it inside the office room. Once upon a time, everyday it was taken out [in the morning] and in [after the office hours]. At one point we started keeping it inside (Interview 8, December 5, 2015, Interview).

Some frontline bureaucrats expressed the fear that opportunists might create problems for them if information is disclosed through the notice boards or the web portals. They acknowledged that some authorities do not publish information because they are corrupt. One bureaucrat said that he did not disclose some information to prevent corruption. Here is what he told:

The Union Parishads [Union Councils] are supposed to display information about its projects but it is not done. They do not do it because they are corrupt. Disclosing information will fetch public wrath. So, they don't do it. I will also not share publicly many things [such as], for example, how much money I have transferred from the revenue to the development fund. If I do it, then different [political] leaders will come and demand many things. They will take different projects to misuse the funds. They will even come with projects approved by a minister which I cannot ignore. So, I will not disclose this information (Interview 3, November 26, 2015, Interview).

Another bureaucrat is confused about publishing information on notice boards and showed an ambivalent attitude towards proactive disclosure. He thinks that there is no problem in publishing information on notice boards. He also considers that sometimes, publishing information may create problems and bring an uncertain future. Below are his opinions:

We let people know different rules and regulations, and some awareness building leaflets [are distributed]. Meeting resolutions are not published but copies are sent to members. If they are published, I don't think there are any problems. Where can I publish it? If I hang it on the notice board, how many people will look at it? I will not say that there are no people to utilize this. There are people to utilize it. But the target people do not come to my Upazila office regularly. May be they come twice or thrice a year. If it is put on the notice board, there is no problem. However, there are some issues to consider. Different members of a meeting say different things. One member may suggest something while another member may oppose it. We need to write in the resolution what the members say. There are some opportunist beneficiaries. Those people may create problems. They may become angry with an officer whose opinion in the meeting was against their interests. They create problems based on the opinions of a specific

participant of the meeting. It creates an uncertainty for the future. [Moreover], sometimes, decisions are imposed (Interview 8, December 5, 2015, Interview).

4.5 Outward Accountability

4.5.1 Findings from the Regression Analysis

This section focuses on the outward accountability attitude of the frontline public bureaucrats. Therefore, it answers the third research question: “How does the proactive transparency behavior of the frontline public bureaucrats in Bangladesh affect their attitude towards outward (citizen-centric) accountability?” as set out in the first chapter. It was hypothesized in the revised model that proactive transparency behavior will be positively related to outward accountability. We have seen in the correlation matrix table (Table B2 in appendix B) that there is no significant bivariate correlation between proactive transparency behavior and outward accountability ($r = .059$, $p = 0.144$). Thus, a multiple regression was run where outward accountability was the dependent variable and 14 variables were used as independent variables, including proactive transparency behavior. Thirteen of these independent variables were the same as those used in predicting proactive transparency behavior.

The results of this multiple regression analysis are presented in table B6 in appendix B. The fourteen independent variables together explained a small amount of variance in outward accountability ($R^2 = 0.129$, $p = 0.000$). Five independent variables out of fourteen stood out as significant predictors of frontline accountability. The standardized coefficient (beta) for value generic was 0.147 and was significant at $p < 0.01$; for value specific it was 0.140 and was significant at $p = 0.013$; for citizen orientation it was 0.138 and was significant at $p = 0.016$; for risk avoidance it was -0.119 and was significant at $p = 0.040$; and for experience in current position it was -0.126 and was significant at $p = 0.033$.

As we have already discussed, proactive transparency behavior had a non-significant correlation with outward accountability. The variable also became non-significant in the multiple regression analysis. Regarding the cultural dimensions, power distance was non-significant. None of the variables from organizational

structure and organizational endowment became significant either. Out of the five demographic variables none but experience in current position became significant for outward accountability.

Table 4.7 Regression Results for the Significant Independent Variables Predicting Outward Accountability

	Unstandardized Coefficients (b)	Standardized Coefficients (beta)	t	Sig.
Constant	2.723		10.188	.000
Value Generic	.182	.159	2.933	.004
Value Specific	.076	.145	2.663	.008
Citizen Orientation	.085	.120	2.230	.026
Risk Avoidance	-.063	-.129	-2.425	.016
Experience	-.006	-.101	-1.894	.059

Note: R = .335 R² = .112 Adjusted R² = .098 F = 8.075 Sig. = .000

$$\text{Outward Accountability} = 2.723 + .159*\text{VALUGEN} + .145*\text{VALUSPEC} + .120*\text{CITIOR} - .129*\text{RISKAVO} - .101*\text{EXPERI}$$

Where:

- VALUGEN : Generic Value for Proactive Transparency
- VALUSPEC : Specific Value for Proactive Transparency
- CITIOR : Citizen Orientation
- RISKAVO : Risks Avoidance
- EXPERI : Experience in current position

A second round of regression was run using only the five significant independent variables predicting outward accountability. The results of this second multiple regression are presented in table 4.7.

The second standard multiple regression was performed between outward accountability as the dependent variable and the five significant independent variables

of value generic, value specific, citizen orientation, risk avoidance, and experience in current position. These significant variables were identified from the first round of standard multiple regression results.

Table 4.7 shows the unstandardized regression coefficients (b) and intercept, the standardized regression coefficients (β), t , significance, R , R^2 , adjusted R^2 , and F values. The R for the regression was significantly different from zero ($F_{5, 320} = 8.075$, $R^2 = 0.112$, $p = 0.000$). The R^2 value of .112 (Adjusted $R^2 = .098$) indicates that only around 11 percent of the variability in outward accountability was predicted by value generic, value specific, citizen orientation, risk avoidance, and experience in current position. The size and direction of the relationships suggest that outward accountability was enhanced by possessing more generic and specific value for proactive transparency, more citizen orientation attitudes, and less risk avoidance tendency. The negative relationship of experience in the current position with outward accountability can be interpreted that older frontline bureaucrats are less willing to be answerable to citizens than the younger ones. The standardized regression coefficients also revealed the relative importance of the predictors. Among the positive roles, value generic ($\beta = .159$, $p = .004$) received the highest importance in the model followed by value specific ($\beta = .145$, $p = .008$) and citizen orientation ($\beta = .120$, $p = .026$). Among the negative roles, risk avoidance ($\beta = -.129$, $p = .016$) received more importance than experience in current position ($\beta = -.101$, $p = .059$).

While the negative effect of risk avoidance on outward accountability was understood, that of experience in current position was problematic. The negative effect of experience in current position may indicate that the newer bureaucrats show more of an outward accountability orientation than the older ones.

4.5.2 Findings from the Interviews

The frontline bureaucrats have shown a positive attitude towards “outward accountability.” Outward accountability is citizen-centric where bureaucrats are accountable to the citizens through answering questions asked by the citizens. In a society where public administration has received its traditions from colonial rule, the bureaucracy’s willingness to be accountable to the citizens is less expected. Contrary to this expectation, this researcher found frontline bureaucrats’ positive attitude

towards citizen-centric accountability. These bureaucrats acknowledged that the citizens are the principal and the bureaucrats are the citizens' agents. While talking to the interviewees, the researcher developed this understanding. Finding the reasons behind the attitudinal change was not a part of this study, but it can be argued that the right to information act that was enacted in 2009 and the publicity undertaken towards this effect might have had a greater contribution to this attitudinal change. The change in attitude is reflected in the following excerpt of an interview. This interviewee was asked to put his opinion about whether citizens should have the right to ask the bureaucrats questions about their services. He replied in the following manner:

They should have and they have. [But] we hardly get questions from citizens. Citizens still behave with us as they would during the British rule and say "sir, sir." I hope for days to come when we will call them "sir." I dream of it. We should have an obligation to answer citizen's questions. Then we will have transparency in our activities and will have the mental satisfaction that we are answerable to our *monib* [master]. For example, if I take 100 taka from my father and go to the market and, if after doing marketing, I can tell my father that "93 taka was spent and take back this 7 taka," and give him the account, then I will have satisfaction from my side. But if I do not return that 7 taka, then I will have the feeling of a thief and the father may think that "I have given him 100 taka; he might have misappropriated 50 taka." But if he knows about the accounts, he will be happy and the spender will also feel happy. Therefore, I think that we should be completely answerable to the people (Interview 4, December 2, 2015, Interview).

A land-related service-providing frontline bureaucrat that recently had renovated his citizens' charter showing the rates of the fees for different services was asked about why he renovated the charter. He said: "I did it to bring accountability so that they (citizens) can question if they are charged more" (Interview 5, December 2, 2015, Interview). This interviewee believes that citizens' direct access to the bureaucrats can reduce corruption in frontline offices. He believes that sometimes,

corruption takes place without the involvement of the office head. The other staff in the office creates holes in the procedures to get extra benefit while delivering services to citizens. “When access (to the head of the office) is made easy, the holes made are blocked” (Interview 5, December 2, 2015, Interview). However, this researcher has also noticed that some frontline bureaucrats are less willing to grant citizens direct access to them. They believe in some kind of restrictions imposed on direct access because they think that direct access may hinder their work.

The frontline bureaucrats’ attitudes are changing towards citizen-centric accountability. Citizen-centric frontline accountability requires a cultural change. A frontline officer felt this change in cultural orientation. Here is her realization:

In the government sector there has started a concept called public hearing. The UNO has to sit along with other officers of the Upazila in a place once in a month where any person can ask any question to any officer. Of course, it has utility. We are bound to answer questions from the citizens because the citizens have the right to know the activities and facilities of the offices (Interview 13, December 14, 2015, Interview).

4.6 Mediation Analysis

This section looks at the possible mediating role played by value for proactive transparency between the cultural dimensions and proactive transparency behavior. Therefore, it answers the fourth research question: “Does the value for proactive transparency play any mediating role between the organizational cultural dimensions and the proactive transparency behavior of the frontline public bureaucrats in Bangladesh?” Baron and Kenny (1986) quoted in Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) described certain conditions to be met for a variable to become a mediator between an independent variable and a dependent variable. These conditions are: 1) there is a significant relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable; 2) there is a significant relationship between the independent variable and the mediator; 3) the mediator still predicts the dependent variable after controlling for the

independent variable; and 4) the relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable is reduced when the mediator is in the equation.

We know from the factor analysis that the value for proactive transparency was split into two variables—value generic and value specific. We have seen in section 4.4.1.1 that from among the three cultural dimensions only citizen orientation had significant relationships with value generic and value specific (see table 4.4). Therefore, it was necessary to examine the mediating role of these two variables between citizen orientation and proactive transparency behavior.

4.6.1 Mediation Analysis of Value Generic


The mediating role of value generic between citizen orientation and proactive transparency behavior was tested by performing three regression analyses. The results of these analyses are presented in table 4.8. In the first model, in table 4.8 citizen orientation significantly predicted the dependent variable of proactive transparency behavior ($F_{1, 324} = 15.337, R^2 = 0.045, p = 0.000$). Its beta coefficient was .213. In the second model shown in the same table, citizen orientation significantly predicted value generic, the mediator variable ($F_{1, 324} = 6.844, R^2 = 0.021, p = 0.009$). Its beta coefficient was .144. The third model in table 4.8 shows the results of the mediated analysis. It shows that both citizen orientation and value generic significantly predicted the dependent variable of proactive transparency behavior ($F_{2, 323} = 10.916, R^2 = 0.063, p = 0.000$). This analysis of the direct effect of citizen orientation revealed a reduction in its beta coefficient from .213 to .193 when controlling for value generic. The beta coefficient of value generic was .136 when controlling for citizen orientation. The path structure of the three models is depicted in figure 4.1 with the beta coefficients. These analyses show that value generic as a mediator fulfills the four conditions described by Baron and Kenny (1986).

The ratio of the indirect to the direct effect of citizen orientation was $(0.144 \times 0.136 / .213) 0.0919$. This means that approximately only 9 percent of the effect of citizen orientation on proactive transparency behavior was mediated through value generic. These results partially support hypothesis 5a.

Table 4.8 Mediation Analysis of Value Generic

Model	R ²		b	beta	t	Sig.
1	.045	Constant	2.235			
		Citizen Orientation	.260	.213	3.916	.000
2	.021	Constant	3.506			
		Citizen Orientation	.089	.144	2.616	.009
3	.063	Constant	1.297			
		Citizen Orientation	.236	.193	3.547	.000
		Value Generic	.267	.136	2.499	.013

Note: Model 1: Citizen orientation predicting proactive transparency behavior;
 Model 2: Citizen orientation predicting value generic; Model 3: Citizen orientation and value generic predicting proactive transparency behavior

**Figure 4.1** Mediation Model of Value Generic with Its Path Coefficients

4.6.2 Mediation Analysis of Value Specific

Like the previous sub-section, the mediating role of value specific between citizen orientation and proactive transparency behavior was also tested by performing three regression analyses. Table 4.9 shows the results of these analyses. The first model in table 4.9 is the same as in table 4.8 where citizen orientation significantly predicted the dependent variable of proactive transparency behavior ($F_{1, 324} = 15.337$, $R^2 = 0.045$, $p = 0.000$) with the same beta coefficient of .213. In the second model of table 4.9, citizen orientation also significantly predicted value specific, the second mediator variable from the value for proactive transparency ($F_{1, 324} = 4.582$, $R^2 = 0.014$, $p = 0.033$). Its beta coefficient was .118. In the third model, the independent variable (citizen orientation) and the mediator (value specific), in the mediated analysis, significantly predicted the dependent variable of proactive transparency behavior ($F_{2, 323} = 9.727$, $R^2 = 0.057$, $p = 0.000$).

Table 4.9 Mediation Analysis of Value Specific

Model	R ²		b	beta	t	Sig.
1	.045	Constant	2.235			
		Citizen Orientation	.260	.213	3.916	.000
2	.241	Constant	2.871			
		Citizen Orientation	.160	.118	2.141	.033
3	.063	Constant	1.954			
		Citizen Orientation	.244	.200	3.671	.000
		Value specific	.098	.109	1.994	.047

Note: Model 1: Citizen orientation predicting proactive transparency behavior;
 Model 2: Citizen orientation predicting value specific; Model 3: Citizen orientation and value specific predicting proactive transparency behavior

This analysis of the direct effect of citizen orientation revealed a reduction in its beta coefficient from .213 to .200 when controlling for value specific. The beta coefficient of value specific was .109 when controlling for citizen orientation. The path structure of the three models is depicted in figure 4.2 with the beta coefficients. These analyses show that value specific as a mediator fulfills the four conditions described by Baron and Kenny (1986).




Figure 4.2 Mediation Model of Value Specific with Its Path Coefficients

The ratio of the indirect to the direct effect of citizen orientation was $(0.118 \times 0.109 / .213) 0.0604$. This means that approximately only 6 percent of the effect of citizen orientation on proactive transparency measure was mediated through value specific. These results support hypothesis 3b and partially support hypothesis 5b.

4.7 Final Model

Based on the findings of the study the final model is shown in figure 4.3. This final model depicts the relationships that were found in the regression analyses as well as in the mediation analyses. It was further revised from what was presented in the revised model in chapter three. The paths shown in the model are the significant ones only. The model signifies that citizen orientation is an important organizational

culture that significantly affects the proactive transparency behavior and outward accountability of the frontline bureaucrats. The organizational endowment of IT skills significantly affected the proactive transparency behavior. Risk avoidance as a dimension of organizational culture significantly and negatively affected the outward accountability orientation of the frontline bureaucrats. Age as a demographic variable also negatively affected proactive transparency behavior. Lastly, both value generic and value specific mediated the relationship between citizen orientation and proactive transparency behavior. Based on the findings from the quantitative analysis, the status of the hypotheses is presented in table 4.10.




Figure 4.3 Final Model

Table 4.10 Results of the Hypothesis Testing

Hypotheses	Findings
H1a: Power distance of the frontline bureaucrats will be negatively related to generic value for proactive transparency.	Not Supported
H1b: Risks avoidance tendency of the frontline bureaucrats will be negatively related to generic value for proactive transparency.	Not Supported
H1c: Citizen orientation of the frontline bureaucrats will be positively related to generic value for proactive transparency.	Supported
H2a: Power distance of the frontline bureaucrats will be negatively related to specific value for proactive transparency.	Not Supported
H2b: Risks avoidance tendency of the frontline bureaucrats will be negatively related to specific value for proactive transparency.	Not Supported
H2c: Citizen orientation of the frontline bureaucrats will be positively related to specific value for proactive transparency.	Supported
H3a: Generic value for proactive transparency of the frontline bureaucrats will be positively related to proactive transparency behavior.	Supported
H3b: Specific value for proactive transparency of the frontline bureaucrats will be positively related to proactive transparency behavior.	Supported
H3c: Discretion of the frontline bureaucrats will be negatively related to proactive transparency behavior.	Not Supported
H3d: Resource endowment of the frontline bureaucrats will be positively related to proactive transparency behavior.	Not Supported
H3e: IT skills endowment of the frontline bureaucrats will be positively related to proactive transparency behavior.	Supported
H4: Proactive transparency behavior of the frontline bureaucrats will be positively related to outward accountability.	Not Supported
H5a: Value generic will mediate the relationship between cultural dimensions and proactive transparency behavior.	Partially Supported
H5b: Value specific will mediate the relationship between cultural dimensions and proactive transparency behavior.	Partially Supported

4.8 Chapter Summary

This chapter presented the quantitative and qualitative results of the study. The quantitative results were based on 326 survey questionnaires and the qualitative results were based on 16 interviews of the heads of sub-district level officials and observation of 238 sub-district level offices. The proactive transparency behavior of the frontline bureaucrats was affected by their IT skills, their orientation to the citizens, and the value they attached to the importance of disclosure of information proactively. These bureaucrats possess positive attitudes towards outward accountability, which was also affected by their orientation toward the citizens.

CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

5.1 Introduction

Transparency and accountability are broad concepts. Both are argued to be malleable. This dissertation narrowed both concepts and focused on specific issues. It identified some of the relationships and tested them. The concept of transparency is often equated with citizens' unhindered access to information of an organization or any agency of the government. There are arguments that the passive notion of access to information is not enough, there should be provisions to actively disclose information for citizens' perusal. The rationale for proactive disclosure of information lies in that argument. This research takes this narrow dimension of transparency and applies it to a narrow context. It took the frontline public bureaucracies in Bangladesh as the context and examined the provision of proactive transparency behavior. According to the principal agent theory, the bureaucrats are the agents of the citizens and the citizens are the principal. The principal employs the agents to perform jobs on his behalf. Therefore, the agents must be accountable to the principal. However, the information asymmetry regarding the agents' performance that exists between the principal and the agents is a problem in making the agents accountable to the principal. Thus, the argument for proactive disclosure comes whereby the principal can hold the agents accountable. This dissertation looks into this dimension of accountability, i.e. the attitude of the frontline bureaucrats to be accountable to the citizens by answering their questions. This accountability dimension is termed here as outward accountability.

The proactive disclosure of information is not an automated action; it involves the members of the staff of an organization. The activities related to proactive disclosure are influenced by the attitudes of the bureaucrats regarding the value they

attach to proactive disclosure, which in turn is influenced by their bureaucratic culture. In addition to the cultural aspects, proactive disclosure activities are also related to the structural relations of the bureaucrats in an organization and the availability of the resources in the organization. Therefore, proactive transparency activities are contingent upon a number of organizational issues. Thus, the central research question was set as to how organizational factors affect the proactive transparency behavior and the outward (citizen-centric) accountability attitudes of the frontline public bureaucrats in Bangladesh. The organizational factors that were included in this study were cultural dimensions, structural relations, and resources. Three culture dimensions stood out to be used in the regression analyses: citizen orientation, risk avoidance, and power distance. Discretion as organizational structure, and IT skills and other resources as organizational endowment, were used as the other organizational factors in order to see their effects on the proactive transparency behavior and attitudes towards outward accountability of the frontline bureaucrats.

This chapter summarizes the findings of the study in the discussion part. Then the implications of the research are presented. Lastly, it acknowledges the limitations, and provides some guidelines for future research.

5.2 Discussion

Government organizations are plagued by transparency and accountability problems in every society, but there has been little effort to understand these problems from the micro perspective, i.e. at the grassroots level. Discussions around bureaucratic transparency and accountability are centered on the macro perspectives of these issues. The literature focuses on these problems at the central level without understanding the local level. They are concerned about the transparency and accountability of the government as a whole or the ministries and agencies of the government. These are efforts to address big corruption. However, understanding the transparency and accountability of local organizations for addressing petty corruption is neglected. The frontline organizations serve the grassroots people. The majority of these people have limited income. Even a small amount of money taken illegally from these low income people by the frontline service providing organizations is painful for

these groups of people. Understanding how proactive transparency works at these local levels and how it relates to the answerability to the service seekers can help with choosing appropriate policies for stopping petty corruption in the micro level organizations. This is the first study that focuses attention at the micro level of these issues. Thus, the general objective of the study was to develop a conceptual model for understanding the proactive transparency behavior and outward (citizen-centered) accountability orientation of the frontline public bureaucrats.

Overall, the findings of the study have been able to develop a model for understanding the proactive transparency behavior and citizen-centric accountability of the bureaucrats through statistically significant relationships and qualitative data. This model did not establish all of the relationships that were proposed. Statistical evidence could not support some of the proposed relationships; some relationships were supported and some other relationships evolved during the analytic process. These relationships are discussed here in accordance with the specific objectives of the study. These specific discussions are presented under two main themes of the study: proactive transparency and outward (citizen-centric) accountability.

5.2.1 Proactive Transparency

One specific objective was to examine the relationship between bureaucratic cultural dimensions and the value that the frontline public bureaucrats in Bangladesh attach to proactive transparency. In the original model, four cultural dimensions were identified through the literature review, which were proposed to have effects on the value for proactive transparency. These cultural dimensions were power distance, uncertainty avoidance, guiding decisions, and team orientation. In the statistical process through the factor analysis, three cultural dimensions were sustained. The cultural dimension of team orientation was not supported by the proposed items. Among the sustained three dimensions, power distance remained intact but uncertainty avoidance was changed to risk avoidance, and guiding decisions was changed to citizen orientation. These changes were made to make the constructs meaningful based on their associated items. On the other hand, the concept of value for proactive transparency, in the original model, was split into value generic and value specific in the factor analysis process.

Only one cultural dimension, citizen orientation, in the multiple regression analysis appeared to be statistically and significantly related to the value for proactive transparency (both value generic and value specific). Citizen-oriented bureaucrats try to understand the needs of the citizens. They want maximum satisfaction for the service seekers. Accordingly, they design their services to satisfy the citizens' needs. These bureaucrats believe in the welfare of the citizens. Therefore, they possess high value regarding the proactive disclosure of information concerning their activities. The value for proactive disclosure can be generic and specific. The generic value for proactive disclosure refers to the belief that the availability of information in general can benefit the citizens. This generic value comes from the realization of the importance of information to the citizens, not only from the perspective of the office of the particular bureaucrat, but from the overall perspective of its importance in all public sector organizations in society. When information about the activities of an office is available to the citizens, they can become aware of their rights regarding that office. For example, if the citizen's charter of an office is published, the citizens can know what they are legally entitled to from that office with regard to the services it provides. Being acquainted with the activities of an office, the citizens can provide feedback to the office pertaining to its services. Moreover, knowledge of the activities of an office empowers citizens to hold the service providers accountable. In this way, citizens as service seekers can contribute to the overall improvement of the service delivery processes only when they have full knowledge of the activities and provisions of an office. The specific value for proactive transparency concerns the specific image of the particular office. Frontline bureaucrats, who possess anxiety over the disclosure of information about their offices, possess little value regarding proactive disclosure. The interview data also supported the relationship between citizen orientation and the value assigned to proactive transparency. That is, citizen-oriented bureaucrats possess higher value in relation to proactive transparency.

The other dimensions of organizational culture—power distance, and risk avoidance—did not get support from the data in the statistical analysis in terms of having a relationship with the value for proactive transparency. However, from the interview and observation data, support for a relationship between uncertainty avoidance (risk avoidance) and value for proactive transparency was sensed. The

frontline bureaucrats possess an uncertainty avoidance tendency with relation to their higher authority; they remain anxious about satisfying their bosses. These anxious bureaucrats (possessing a higher degree of uncertainty avoidance tendency) normally have less value regarding proactive transparency; the value they give to it can be assumed from their proactive transparency behavior and not from word of mouth.

The interview data indicated the existence of a power distance between the frontline bureaucrats and their higher authorities. These bureaucrats showed support for the saying that “boss is always right.” However, it was not clear in the interview data whether there existed a power distance between the office head and his or her subordinates. The interviewees talked about their tendency to work on a team, and this team orientation was another dimension of the bureaucratic culture identified in the original model. All of the frontline offices provide services to the citizens. The bureaucrats working in these offices face huge demands for services from the citizens. On the other hand, they are endowed with limited resources. Moreover, they get pressure from their higher authorities to meet targets. This requires them to work for long hours, sometimes beyond the normal office hours. The pressure from the workload orients them towards team work. The power distance among the team members is thus reduced. A power distance with the higher authority of the frontline bureaucrats exists because, perhaps, the higher authority stays at a distance, in the district headquarters. On the other hand, the frontline bureaucrat and his or her team members work within the same office. Thus, every moment of contact between the frontline bureaucrat and his or her subordinates may contribute to the waning of power distance between them. However, evidence for relationship between power distance and the value for proactive transparency was not evident in the qualitative data.

With respect to power distance, it was noticed in the qualitative interviews that social culture affected professional life. Whether this is good or bad is debatable. Respecting seniors and arguing with seniors are made synonymous in the name of cultures. This can be argued as a bad practice because the placement of logical arguments in office matters should not be considered as disobeying seniors. If this is considered so, it can cause corrupt practices.

The second specific objective was to know the effects of value for proactive transparency on the actual proactive transparency behavior of the frontline public bureaucrats in Bangladesh. The statistical analyses produced results indicating positive effects of the value for proactive transparency on the actual transparency measures taken by the frontline bureaucrats. The value for proactive disclosure arises out of a sense or feeling of its importance. One should distinguish three things here. Actual measures for proactive disclosure can be undertaken by a frontline bureaucrat because of his/her understanding of the importance of the activities or because he/she has to meet the legal requirements that the information laws impose on him. It is also true that he/she may undertake the proactive disclosure activities because he/she has the feeling of the importance of the activities and wants to meet the legal requirements.

The study findings showed that the frontline bureaucrats possessed a higher degree of value regarding proactive disclosure. The mean score for value generic was 3.81 with a standard deviation of 0.33. The mean score for value specific was 3.42 with a standard deviation of 0.73. These findings may indicate that the frontline bureaucrats value the proactive disclosure activities of other offices higher than they value the proactive disclosure activities of their own offices. The disclosure of information of a frontline office opens the possibility of questions being asked by others and facing questions from others about services, which can be unpleasant for a frontline bureaucrat. Consequently, the value that one attaches to the disclosure of information of other authorities will naturally be higher than when it comes to himself.

The actual proactive disclosure behavior is lower than the value that the frontline bureaucrats attach to proactive disclosure as an ideal. As we have seen in table 4.2 in chapter four, 84 percent of the respondents agreed with value generic and 63 percent agreed with value specific, whereas, only 41 percent practiced proactive transparency “always.” In one’s mental process the ideal position does not require actual activities; it remains at the desired level. However, the actual activities are conditioned by many other factors in addition to the desire factor. Actual proactive disclosure activities require a combination of a host of things and issues, and a variety of resources to be discussed shortly. This variety in resources is related to the

multifront activities of proactive disclosure. Proactive transparency on the part of the frontline bureaucracies can begin with the display of their citizens' charters. This researcher found in the training sessions that the members of the staff of an office in a sub-district did not have clear ideas about the service provisions of even the neighboring office. It can be assumed that the remote villagers would never have even moderate ideas of the service provisions and activities of a frontline office unless they are acquainted with this information.

Proactive transparency involves the Internet to a great extent. This is true even at the grassroots level in a poor country like Bangladesh. The daily activities of a frontline office produce a lot of information that the space of a notice board cannot accommodate. This information finds its place on the Internet. There is a web portal for every sub-district that is linked to the official web page of the government. Each office of a sub-district has its part in the web portal where it uploads its information. Updating the respective parts of the web portal by the frontline offices is a daily job. Some information does not require daily updates like the citizens' charter or the profiles of the staff and their responsibilities. However, the decisions and accounts of daily activities require daily updates. These proactive disclosure activities are constrained by resources discussed in a later paragraph.

One recent phenomenon—Facebook—has become one of the proactive disclosure tools. This is considered a medium of proactive disclosure of information. Some interviewees mentioned this medium as a means of awareness building means. These interviewees reported to have their official Facebook accounts. Caution should be made here with respect to the use of Facebook as a medium of information dissemination. Its utility lies in the number of followers of the Facebook account. Moreover, officials can become selective in choosing information for disclosure on the Facebook. They may avoid choosing information that can hold them accountable by their followers. These arguments are augmented by the critics of proactive transparency, saying that authorities may bury the truth by providing a lot of information or by distorting it (Christensen and Cornelissen, 2015).

Another proactive disclosure activity is displaying decisions on the notice board. The interview data revealed that the service seekers were not habituated to reading notice boards. This is a very common reason for all interviewees not hanging

decisions and information on these boards. This habit must begin with the frontline bureaucrats. If the frontline bureaucrats develop the habit of posting information on notice boards, then the citizens' habit of reading the boards will take place. It can be argued that there is a causal relationship here, where the cause will be the habit of posting information on notice boards and the effect will be the development of the citizens' habit of reading the notice boards. The survey data claimed that the frontline bureaucrats practiced this habit while the observation data revealed that they had deficits in their practice.

Of course, there was an argument from the frontline bureaucrats that the common service seekers are not educated and cannot read what is written on a bill board or on a notice board, in the context of Bangladesh. It was also argued that Internet penetration is low and the speed of the Internet is weak. These arguments should not deter them however from implementing the legal provisions. The legal provisions require them to display the citizens' charters, and publish decisions on web portals and notice boards. Moreover, the young generation in Bangladesh is receiving an education and the literacy rate in the country is rising every year. The primary school enrolment rate has attained one hundred percent and the completion rate is increasing. Therefore, the number of people that can read citizens' charters and notice boards is increasing rapidly, and the number of Internet users is increasing daily. These are temporal problems. Over time, as the trend shows, these literacy problems, whether educational or about the Internet, will go, but the bureaucrats' habit of proactive disclosure using the tools discussed so far should not be limited by temporal literacy problems from the citizens' perspective.

The third specific objective of the dissertation was to determine the relationship between organizational structure (discretion) and the proactive transparency behavior of the frontline public bureaucrats in Bangladesh. The survey data did not substantiate the hypothesis that there is a negative relationship between the two. However, the interview and observation data can be argued as indicative of having the hypothesized relationship. The frontline bureaucrats enjoy discretion in terms of displaying information through citizens' charters and notice boards. This discretion is a result of lack of monitoring. These bureaucracies are in remote areas and are therefore, out of sight of the district authorities. At this level of the

bureaucracy, media coverage is also weak. Therefore, the discretion related to proactive disclosure originates in overlooking the legal provisions.

The fourth specific objective was to examine the effect of organizational endowment (resources) on the proactive transparency behavior of the frontline public bureaucrats in Bangladesh. The factor analysis produced IT skills as a separate variable from the single variable of resources that was originally proposed. The regression results showed a statistically significant effect of IT skills on the proactive disclosure behavior of the frontline bureaucrats. In the statistical analysis, the other variable, “resources,” was not supported by the data to have significant effect. However, during the interviews the frontline officials invariably mentioned the lack of manpower in their offices. Resources include not only manpower but also sufficiency of funding. Additionally, in the comments section of the survey questionnaire, most of the respondents wrote about insufficiency of their staff, the skills of the staff, and the insufficiency of funding.

The shortage of manpower on the part of the frontline bureaucracies happens mostly because of vacant positions. The sanctioned posts in most offices are sufficient, as stated by the officials, but some positions remain vacant for years. These grassroots bureaucracies face a huge demand for services but suffer from a shortage of manpower. As a result, the officials need to share the workload for the vacant positions. This sometimes causes them to work even after the normal office hours. This shortage of staff affects the proactive disclosure activities in these offices negatively. However, the insufficiency of funds for proactive disclosure can be managed from the contingency head of their office budget. Therefore, funds are not considered as a major barrier to proactive disclosure activities.

The other endowment was IT skills. As has been stated earlier, in the comments section of the survey questionnaire, the respondents frequently mentioned lack of proper training. These officials need proper training on the computer and Internet-related matters. They have been given equipment but not sufficient training. IT-related training is required not only for the office head but also for the other relevant officials of an office. The survey respondents and the interviewees mentioned a lack of other resources that are related to web portal updating, i.e. publishing information using the web portal. These resources are Internet speed and the supply of

electricity; they reported the slow speed of the Internet and hindrances in electricity supply. These two things make their work slower.

One important thing, mentioned by some interviewees, related to the proactive disclosure activities using the web portal, was the management of the web portal. The web portal contains pages for each office in a sub-district and the individual offices in the sub-district cannot manage their respective pages. It is centrally managed by the UNO (sub-district executive officer) office. This office has a technician that uploads the information supplied by all of the offices in the sub-district. It is true that the staff in the individual offices is not skilled in managing its own pages. Therefore, they need to rely on the technician. The administration password of the web portal also lies with the technician. This process consumes time and discourages the frontline offices from uploading information on their pages. Ultimately, it hinders their proactive disclosure activities.

Another specific objective that should be discussed here was to examine the mediating effects of the value for proactive transparency between the bureaucratic culture dimensions and the proactive transparency behavior of the frontline public bureaucrats in Bangladesh. It was already discussed that only one cultural dimension was found to be significantly correlated with value for proactive transparency as well as with proactive transparency behavior. The mediation analyses found that the two components of the value for proactive transparency—value generic and value specific—mediated the correlation between citizen-orientation and the proactive transparency behavior of the frontline bureaucrats. The Interview data suggested the same. The Value for proactive transparency mediated correlation between the proactive transparency behavior and the other dimensions of bureaucratic culture as well.

In addition to the relationships discussed above, one more relationship was found to be statistically significant between proactive transparency behavior and the age of the respondent: age was found to be negatively correlated with the proactive transparency behavior. This can be interpreted as an indication of greater proactive disclosure orientation on the part of the younger frontline bureaucrats. Culture is not static; it changes over time with conscious effort. The older bureaucrats have been influenced by the colonial culture of secrecy while the younger ones are influenced by

the continuous discourse on the issues of transparency and accountability. The younger bureaucrats have been exposed to this discourse from their early lives in their jobs, not only through the trainings that they participated in but also through the media.

5.2.2 Outward Accountability

This research had the specific objective of assessing the relationship between the proactive transparency behavior and outward (citizen-centered) accountability orientation of the frontline public bureaucrats in Bangladesh. The statistical analyses did not find any significant relationship between these two phenomena. The regression results revealed that the outward accountability of the frontline bureaucrats was significantly influenced by some factors that we have discussed already: citizen orientation, value generic, value specific, risks avoidance, and experience in current position. The outward accountability orientation of the frontline bureaucrats implies that they are willing to receive constructive criticism from the citizens with regard to the services they provide. The citizen-oriented bureaucrats are willing to explain how decisions are made in their offices and why certain requests for services are not met. The frontline bureaucrats are also willing to explain why certain decisions are made and are ready to regret mistakes made during also service-delivery process.

It is quite normal that the citizen orientation of the frontline bureaucrats will influence them to be accountable to the citizens. As we have seen before, citizen orientation also influences the value for proactive transparency of the frontline bureaucrats. Thus, the value for proactive transparency, in turn, influences their orientation towards citizen-centric accountability. This research also implies that if frontline bureaucrats do not take risks in serving citizens appropriately, they will also not be willing to be accountable to the citizens. To put it differently, risk-taking bureaucrats are more willing to be accountable to the citizens. This requires mental courage in taking risks. Merely following routines and rules appropriately may not bring about the expected results. Therefore, those frontline bureaucrats that emphasize good results are willing to take some risks and are also willing to be accountable to the citizens for their actions.

Another finding is similar to the differences in attitudes of the younger and older bureaucrats. It was found that the frontline bureaucrats that were more experienced in their current positions were less willing to be accountable to the citizens. The explanation applied to younger and older frontline bureaucrats' attitudes towards the proactive disclosure measures is also applicable here: less-experienced frontline bureaucrats are younger in their age and they have positive attitudes towards citizen-centric accountability.

5.3 Implications

This study contributes to the theoretical arguments about transparency and accountability issues by establishing statistically-significant relationships between the proactive transparency behavior and the citizen orientation of the frontline bureaucrats. This study also shows that the relationship between citizen orientation and proactive transparency behavior is mediated by the value for proactive transparency (value generic and value specific). The negative correlation between age and proactive disclosure behavior implies that new or younger bureaucrats have been positively influenced by the discourse on transparency and accountability issues.

This study also shows that there is no direct relationship between proactive transparency behavior and outward (citizen-centric) accountability as is implied in the literature on transparency and accountability issues. Rather, the citizen orientation and value for proactive transparency influence the attitude of the frontline bureaucrats toward citizen-centric accountability. Unlike age, the experience of the frontline bureaucrats has an effect on their citizen-centric accountability orientation, which actually has the same implication as with the case of age. Moreover, more risk-taking attitudes are associated with greater citizen-centric accountability orientation.

This study has revealed that the younger frontline bureaucrats undertake more proactive transparency activities than the older ones. They are also more oriented toward outward accountability. This finding has an important implication for the policy options for a government that culture can be changed through conscious efforts. The positive attitudes toward proactive transparency and outward accountability of the younger bureaucrats may be interpreted as a result of their being

exposed to the discourse on transparency and accountability issues augmented by the enactment of transparency laws. Therefore, more discussions on these issues should be included in training programs and in other forums of government activities.

The model that was developed on the basis of the literature review did not get much support from the data from the research context. Only 20 percent of the variability in the proactive transparency behavior ($R^2 = 0.204$, $p = 0.000$) and only 11 percent of the variability in the outward accountability ($R^2 = 0.112$, $p = 0.000$) were explained by the regression models. As we have seen in the literature review, transparency and accountability works in western democracies. These are democratic values. In these western democracies, citizens are aware of their rights. They have quality education, and have been enjoying individual freedom for centuries. However, the research context is a fragile democracy and the citizens' education and awareness level was very weak in the research context. For centuries, citizens were under colonial rule, and until now they live under, more or less, an authoritative administration. Moreover, the bureaucratic cultural values in Bangladesh are not supportive of transparency activities and accountability orientation.

Although the demand for transparency laws has been raised by different groups in the country, including the civil society, this demand has not met by the bureaucratic or political leadership. The military-backed caretaker administration, which has received support from donor agencies and governments, promulgated a right to information ordinance in 2008 in Bangladesh. Although the next elected government enacted a right to information law in 2009 in the first sitting of the parliament based on the 2008 ordinance, it does not mean that the bureaucrats and the political leaders wholeheartedly welcomed such a law. Transparency and accountability are deeply related to cultural values. The findings of this research imply that, unless the cultural values are changed, laws can do little to help in installing transparency and accountability in public administration. These values cannot be imposed on a society; they evolve over time with citizens' awareness and initiatives.

Institutions in a society develop within the context of the power relations, value patterns, and cognitions of a particular time (Meijer, 2015). The transparency law of 2009 has theoretically empowered the citizens in Bangladesh regarding their

access to information and, thereby holding the bureaucrats accountable. But weak democracy, dominant bureaucracy, and lack of quality education make the citizens less powerful, in practice. However, the findings from the regression analyses indicated that bureaucratic culture has started to change. The younger frontline bureaucrats undertook more proactive transparency activities and showed more willingness to be accountable to the citizens than the older ones. This is because the older bureaucrats were influenced by the culture of secrecy but the younger ones were influenced by the continuous discourse on transparency and accountability, which was reinforced by the enactment of the transparency law in 2009. It implies that culture can change with conscious efforts.

This research has implications for public administration theories. Organization theories assert that organizations adapt to their environments and structure their designs accordingly. Organizations also take decisions incrementally. The culture of an organization affects its performance. The findings of this research are supportive of these theoretical arguments about an organization. It appears that the environment of the frontline bureaucracies does not create strong demand for transparency and accountability. Thus, the frontline public bureaucrats overlook the implementation of the provisions of the transparency law. They resort to incremental changes, i.e., they implement the law partially. This is due to the cultural values that the frontline bureaucrats inculcate, which they have gained historically. Their elitist mentality and alienation from the common masses affect their performance with regard to the implementation of transparency law. Thus, the context of an organization determines its design and the technologies it applies. The context in a western democratic society compels organizations to behave in a way desired by the citizens. Applying these western designs and technologies to the context of a fragile democracy inhabited by unaware citizens may not work.

5.4 Limitations and Future Research

Transparency and accountability in general, and proactive transparency and outward accountability in particular, are less empirically explored topics. Although the constructs of the research were measured using validated items, they were applied

to a new context. The proactive transparency and outward accountability of frontline public bureaucracy have never been studied before. Thus, the measurement items might have limitations when they are applied in the context of a poor country's frontline bureaucracies. Proactive disclosure activities require strong Internet infrastructure and Internet penetration, which are present in developed countries. However, for a poor country where these infrastructures are being built, this measurement tool may be considered less appropriate. Moreover, the reliability coefficients (Cronbach's Alpha) of some of the constructs were below .7. Thus, the measurement tools might have some limitations.

Babbie (2013) has argued that explanatory cross-sectional study design has an inherent weakness, which lies in that this type of study draws conclusions about phenomena based on observation made only at one point in time, while the conclusion aims at understanding phenomena that happen over time. This study does not avoid this inherent weakness.

Babbie (2013) also argued that the survey method is excellent for measuring the attitudes and orientations of a larger population. However, he also informed researchers that this method has some known weaknesses; it may appear superficial in the coverage of complex issues and can hardly deal with complex social life. Further, it may produce artificial results, meaning that what the participants say may not represent what they actually believe or do. The respondents may give answers to survey questions without thinking about them. Therefore, survey research is weak on validity but strong on reliability. This researcher agrees with these arguments.

This study has considered only the supply side of the issues under consideration. This means that this study carries the perspectives of the outward bureaucrats only. The demand side or the citizens' perspective has remained outside the purview of the current study.

Future studies should consider these methodological issues. They should include more items in the measurement tools that may be deemed appropriate to the context. Future studies on the frontline bureaucracy's proactive transparency and outward accountability should be carried out from the citizen's perspective. What the citizens think about these important issues can provide important insights into these problems.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

ADDITIONAL DATA ON METHODOLOGY

A.1 Data Screening

Data screening is an important step in any multivariate data analysis (Hair et al., 2010; Meyers et al., 2013). It looks at some properties of data so that they accurately represent what they measure and meet the important assumptions of the multivariate data analysis techniques. This section, therefore, checks these properties of the data collected for this research. These techniques include missing values, outliers, normality, linearity, homoscedasticity, and independence of errors.

A.1.1 Missing Values

Tabachnick and Fidell, (2013) have commented that missing data are the bane of every researcher. Almost all researchers face this problem when they research social phenomena. The missing values in a data set may follow a pattern. They may be random or may follow a systematic process. Books on multivariate data analysis usually discuss three types of missing values. Values may be missing completely at random (MCAR), missing at random (MAR), or not missing at random (NMAR). Tabachnick and Fidell (2013) have cautioned researchers that the pattern of missing data is more important than the amount of the missing values. Dealing with missing data is important because they affect generalizability of research findings. Missing values may be dealt with by following either the deletion method or the imputation method. After entering the 326 survey questionnaires into the SPSS program, this researcher found that 28 cases had missing values in some of the items measuring the constructs of the study. Thirteen items did not have any missing value. Twenty one items had missing values. The maximum number of missing values for a single item was 4; and the minimum was 1. In percentage terms, they varied from 0.3 percent in

the minimum to 1.2 percent in the maximum, based on the total number of respondents. With regard to the demographic information, there were three missing values in “age” (0.9 percent) and seven missing values in “experience in current position” (2.1 percent). Tabachnick and Fidell (2013) suggested that if few data points are missing (5 percent or less) in a random pattern from a large data set, problems are less serious; and all procedures for handling the missing values produce similar results. Tabachnick and Fidell (2013) suggested that if fewer than 5 percent of the cases have missing values, statistical tests for patterns of missingness are not required. Therefore, it was not tested whether the missing values follow a pattern. The researcher chose to substitute the missing values by following the estimation process. Table A1 shows the number and percentage of the missing values in each item of the constructs and the demographic variables as well. Each missing value was substituted by the grand mean of an item. Table A1 shows that there were 3 missing values in “age” and 7 missing values in “experience in current position.” These missing values were substituted by the group mean. The group mean here refers to the mean of the respondents belonging to a particular category in terms of their offices.

Table A1 Information on Missing Data

Items	N	Missing	
		Count	Percent
PTB2 My office displays the citizens’ charter on our webpage	326	0	.0
PTB3 My office publishes office decisions on notice boards	325	1	.3
PTB4 My office publishes office decisions on its webpage	324	2	.6
PTB5 My office updates its webpage	324	2	.6
PTB6 My office makes citizens aware of their information rights	325	1	.3
PTB7 My office posts office-related information on Facebook	325	1	.3
VPT1 If information is proactively displayed, citizens can become aware of their rights	326	0	.0

Table A1 (Continued)

Items	N	Missing	
		Count	Percent
VPT2 If information is proactively displayed, service seekers can give feedback about office activities	326	0	.0
VPT3 If information is proactively displayed, accountability to citizens can increase	326	0	.0
VPT4 The proactive display of information may damage the image of my office (R)	326	0	.0
VPT5 The proactive display of information may damage official secrecy (R)	326	0	.0
RS1 My office gets/has sufficient funds	325	1	.3
RS2 My office has a sufficient staff	324	2	.6
RS3 My office gets sufficient time	324	2	.6
RS4 The relevant office staff in my office has sufficient training for preparing content of our webpage	324	2	.6
RS5 The relevant office staff in my office has sufficient training for displaying and updating information on our webpage	324	2	.6
DN1 I have control over forming committees for official purposes	324	2	.6
DN2 I have control over selecting the recipients of our services	324	2	.6
DN3 I have control over designing/redesigning the procedures of service delivery	324	2	.6
DN4 I have control over adjusting the office budget to the targeted goals	322	4	1.2
DN5 I have control over adjusting office goals to the context	325	1	.3

Table A1 (Continued)

Items	N	Missing	
		Count	Percent
CO1 My office should serve citizens according to their preferences	326	0	.0
CO2 Officers can learn nothing from service seekers (R)	326	0	.0
CO3 My office should seek feedback from service recipients about their satisfaction	324	2	.6
CO4 Service seekers should not advise us on what to do (R)	324	2	.6
ACC1 My office should welcome constructive criticisms from citizens about our services	326	0	.0
ACC2 My office should regret mistakes with service seekers	326	0	.0
ACC4 My office publishes office decisions on its webpage	326	0	.0
ACC5 My office updates its webpage	325	1	.3
ACC6 My office should explain why certain requests have not been met	326	0	.0
RA1 I emphasize results more than following routines and procedures to the point (R)	325	1	.3
RA3 I look for the best alternative even if it goes beyond routines, and procedures (R)	326	0	.0
PD3 Confident subordinates in my office disagree with my decisions (R)	324	2	.6
PD5 When I am confident, I disagree with my higher authority (R)	323	3	.9
Age	323	3	.9
Experience in current Position	319	7	2.1
RTI Training	326	0	.0
Gender	326	0	.0
Education	326	0	.0

A.1.2 Outliers

Outliers are the extreme values in a data set. Hair et al. (2013) defined outliers as observations that take unique combinations of characteristics that can be identified as distinctly different from the other observations. They can be very low or very high values compared to the majority of the values. These extreme values can affect data analysis severely. Among many other causes, doing mistakes when data are entered into a software program can be a cause of outliers. Hair et al. (2013) classified outliers into four categories based on their source of uniqueness. They termed the first category procedural error, which occurs because of data entry errors or coding mistakes. The second category arises from extraordinary events. These are true observations but not representative of the population. The third category comprises extraordinary observations that may represent an emerging element of the population not previously identified. The fourth category contains observations that fall within the ordinary range of values but are unique in combination of values across the variables. The same authors suggested that an outlier-detection method can be univariate, bivariate, or multivariate. The univariate detection method selects those cases as outliers that have extreme values on a particular variable. The bivariate detection method examines pairs of variables jointly through a scatterplot. The multivariate outliers are ones that lie on a combination of variables; and they can be detected by the Mahalanobis distance. This technique (Mahalanobis D^2) measures the multivariate distance between each case and the group multivariate mean called centroid.

The SPSS program offers a number of ways to check outliers. All of the items measuring the constructs had four options. Frequency of these measurement items were checked for outliers. Data on demographic items such as age and experience in current position, which are continuous variables, were checked by an inspection of their histograms, box plots, and normal probability plots. Moreover, data entry was checked more than once through an inspection of both the questionnaire data and the data entered into the software for avoiding mistakes. No univariate outliers were found in the data set. No bivariate detection method was applied. As to the detection of multivariate outliers, the Mahalanobis distance method was used. The Mahalanobis distance is not produced as a separate output in the SPSS program. However, the

multiple regression program in the SPSS produces a separate variable in the data file containing a Mahalanobis distance value for every case in the data set. From these values, outliers can be detected by determining the critical chi-square value using the number of independent variables as the degrees of freedom. As is discussed in the factor analysis, this study had ten variables. Two of them were dependent variables: one was proactive transparency behavior and the other was outward accountability. For proactive transparency behavior, there were eight independent variables and for outward accountability there were nine independent variables. Beside these, other dichotomous and continuous variables, such as age and experience in current position, were included in the multiple regressions as independent variables. For eight and nine degrees of freedom, using an alpha level of .0001, the critical chi-square values were 26.125 and 27.877, respectively. Table A2 shows the five highest and five lowest Mahalanobis distance values found in the data set. Using the above critical values as the decision making criteria, case number 98 could be considered as an outlier that produced a Mahalanobis distance value of 30.04. However, Pallant (2005) suggested that finding only a few outliers in large samples is not uncommon and it might not be necessary to take corrective actions. Therefore, this case was retained in the analysis.

Table A2 Mahalanobis Distance Values

		Extreme Values	Case Number	Value
Mahalanobis Distance	Highest	1	98	30.03974
		2	299	24.59182
		3	146	15.48469
		4	143	13.28423
		5	286	12.77369
	Lowest	1	17	.21529
		2	151	.34027
		3	159	.34700
		4	258	.39246
		5	18	.40089

A.2 Evaluation of Assumptions

This research applied the multiple regression technique for analyzing quantitative data. This technique, like other multivariate data analysis techniques, makes a number of assumptions about the data. Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) mentioned a number of them to be evaluated before doing a multivariate analysis. These assumptions are discussed below.

A.2.1 Sample Size

Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) suggested that the ratio between the sample size and the number of independent variables has to be substantial in a multiple regression analysis. The sample size depends on some issues such as desired power, alpha level, number of predictors, and expected effect sizes. However, these authors mentioned some rules of thumb to determine the required number of cases for testing the multiple correlation and individual predictors. These rules of thumb include $N \geq 50 + 8m$, for testing the multiple regression, and $N \geq 104 + m$ for testing individual predictors, where m is the number of independent variables. Pallant (2005) cited Stevens (1996) who recommended 15 cases for each predictor variable for doing social science research. Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) mentioned that if the dependent variable is not normally distributed and no transformations are undertaken, more cases are required than what is mentioned in the rules of thumb. They also cautioned researchers aware that as the number of cases becomes quite large, almost all multiple regressions depart significantly from zero, even one that predicts only negligible amount of variance in the dependent variable.

The present study had eight independent variables for proactive transparency behavior as a dependent variable and nine independent variables for outward accountability as a dependent variable. For eight independent variables the required sample size, according to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), is $50 + 8(8)$ or 114, in the case of the first rule of thumb mentioned above. According to Stevens (1996), the required sample size is 15×8 or 120. For nine independent variables the required sample size is 122 or 135. This research had 326 cases. This sample size was greater than the required number recommended by the authors mentioned above.

A.2.2 Normality, Linearity, Homoscedasticity, and Independence of Residuals

Normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity refer to distribution of scores of the variables of a study. They reveal the underlying relationships of variables. Almost all of the multivariate analyses, including multiple regression, assume that the shape of a distribution of a quantitative variable should be similar to a normal distribution. The assumption of linearity means that the variables in an analysis should be related to each other in a linear manner. The assumption of homoscedasticity means that the variability in a quantitative dependent variable should be equal across all of the independent variables. It can be argued that if the problem of normality in a data set is addressed, then the other two problems—nonlinearity and heteroscedasticity—will be remedied. This is because non-linearity and heteroscedasticity occur when a variable is not normally distributed. On the other hand, independence of errors signifies that errors of prediction, i.e. the residuals or error components of the dependent variable scores, are independent across individual cases. In other words, each case is independent of the other cases in the data set.

Violation of the normality rule can be assessed using statistical or graphical approaches (Meyers et al., 2013; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013). Normality is of two types—univariate normality and multivariate normality. Multivariate normality refers to the normal distribution of the observations among all combinations of variables. Univariate normality is an essential condition to achieve multivariate normality. Therefore, this research reported univariate normality only. The graphical approach to univariate normality includes graphs such as histograms or stem-and-leaf plots. The statistical approach to assessing univariate normality includes reporting on skewness and kurtosis values. Skewness and kurtosis values are two components of normality. Normally distributed data produce skewness and kurtosis values that are close to zero. If these values are within the ± 1.0 range, they are likely to be normally distributed. Skewness values indicate distance of a distribution from the mean of a variable. Positive skewness indicates a pile of the cases to the left side of a distribution, while negative skewness shows a pile of the cases to the right side of a distribution. On the other hand, kurtosis values reveal the peakedness of a distribution. A kurtosis value, which is above zero, tells that a distribution is too peaked and a kurtosis value, which

is below zero, says that the distribution is too flat. There are also other statistical tests for assessing normality. They include the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and the Shapiro-Wilk test. In a large data set, statistical tests are not as important as looking at the shape of the distribution (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). This research reported skewness and kurtosis values and residuals plot for assessing univariate normality.

Table A3 (see next page) shows these values for the independent and the dependent variables of this study. Three variables had values above 1 in each of skewness and kurtosis. Value generic was negatively skewed and had a positive kurtosis value; both were much above 1.0. Value specific was negatively skewed showing a value little over 1.0. IT skills showed a kurtosis value also little over the expected range of ± 1.0 . The last variable, outward accountability, was negatively skewed and leptokurtosis (positive kurtosis). This was a dependent variable. Despite having this normality problem, no variable was transformed. Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) stated that transformations are not universally recommended. Data transformations make interpretation harder. For outward accountability, the kurtosis value was very high. Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) argued that as the sample size becomes larger, the impact of kurtosis values that depart from zero diminishes. These authors also argued that normality is not always required for an analysis. Normality just makes an analysis better. Non-normality degrades solution, particularly when some variables are positively skewed and some are negatively. The non-normal variables show non-normality only in a negative way. Therefore, non-normality here should not be a problem. Meyers et al. (2013) argued that most of the univariate and multivariate techniques are fairly robust with respect to data that deviate markedly from normality, particularly if the sample size is large.

Table A3 Skewness and Kurtosis Values

Construct	Skewness	Kurosis
Proactive Transparency Behavior	-.705	-.087
Value Generic	-2.034	4.477
Value Specific	-1.158	.675
Citizen Orientation	-.926	.517
Risk Avoidance	.661	.049
Power Distance	.252	-.214
IT Skills	.536	-1.137
Resources	.573	-.494
Discretion	-.609	-.555
Outward Accountability	-3.369	17.729

Residual scatter plots and Normal probability plots produced by a regression program offer an examination of the assumptions not only of normality but also of linearity and homoscedasticity between the predicted dependent variable scores and errors of prediction. Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) suggested that residual scatter plots may be examined in lieu of or after initial screening. Two normal probability plots—one for the proactive transparency behavior as a dependent variable and the other for outward accountability as a dependent variable—are presented in figures A1 and A2, respectively. Two scatterplots of the standardized residuals—one for the proactive transparency behavior as a dependent variable and the other for outward accountability as a dependent variable—are presented in figures A3 and A4, respectively. In a normal probability plot, the points are expected to lie along the diagonal from bottom left to top right. On the other hand, in a scatterplot, the residuals are expected to be distributed rectangularly, with most scores falling along the 0 point. The figure with the proactive transparency behavior as a dependent variable more or less meets the criteria. But the figure with outward accountability reveals deviation. However, as Meyers et al. (2013) suggested, with large data set, it is not uncommon to find some outlying residuals, and it may not be necessary to take corrective measures. Thus, no corrective measure was undertaken.




Figure A1 Normal P-P Plot for Proactive Transparency Behavior




Figure A2 Normal P-P Plot for Outward Accountability




Figure A3 Scatterplot for Proactive Transparency Behavior




Figure A4 Scatterplot for Outward Accountability

A.2.3 Absence of Outliers

The issue of outliers has been discussed in the previous section.

A.2.4 Absence of Multicollinearity and Singularity

Multicollinearity refers to the relationship among independent variables. Very high correlation ($r = .9$ and above) among independent variables indicates existence of multicollinearity. On the other hand, singularity refers to the situation when one independent variable is actually a combination of other independent variables. When multicollinearity exists, it distorts interpretation. It becomes difficult to say which independent variable is responsible for what variance in the dependent variable because they measure the same characteristic. As a general rule of thumb, Meyers et al. (2013) recommend not to include two variables together in a regression analysis or in any other multivariate analysis that are correlated in the middle .7s or higher.

The SPSS software package produces tolerance and variance inflation factor (VIF) values as indicators of multicollinearity. The tolerance value indicates the amount of variance of an independent variable not accounted for by the other predictors. Lower tolerance value indicates possible existence of multicollinearity. The tolerance value is calculated using the formula $1 - R^2$ for each variable. On the other hand, the VIF value is the inverse of the tolerance value. It is calculated as 1 divided by the tolerance value. A VIF value of 10 is associated with a tolerance value of .1. Pallant (2005) recommended the cut-off points for determining multicollinearity: a tolerance value of less than .1 or a VIF value of above 10.

This research presented the correlation matrix of all the variables, the tolerance value, and the VIF value for detecting multicollinearity. Table B1 in appendix B presents the correlation matrix of the variables of the study including dependent variables, independent variables, age, and experience in current position of the respondents. The table shows that the bivariate correlations between the independent variables are very low. This indicates the absence of multicollinearity in the data set. In addition to the correlation matrix, both tolerance and VIF values were calculated to ensure that multicollinearity is detected if it exists. These values can be found in tables B3 through B6 in appendix B. The last two columns of these tables show these values. The lowest tolerance value in table B5 is .731 and in table B6 is

.684. The highest VIF value in table B5 is 1.368 and in B6 is 1.461. Therefore, it can be concluded that the data set does not violate the multicollinearity assumption.

A.3 Validity and Reliability

Validity and reliability are two important methodological issues relating to any research claims. Any research findings need justification that the instruments that were used for data collection were valid and reliable. Therefore, social scientists pay attention to these two issues when they develop and use measurement tools for their research. This research attempted to address both concerns appropriately. The following three subsections deal with how the validity and reliability of the constructs of this study were addressed.

A.3.1 Validity

The concept of validity in social research refers to accuracy of measurement tools in measuring what the researcher wants to measure. This is particularly important in social science research because most social research deal with measurement of concepts. Concepts do not exist on their own. Humans create concepts through shared meanings. Thus, people agree in meaning when they use various terms. Any measurement of concepts must cover the agreed-on meanings attached to them. When designing a measurement tool, a researcher needs to consider some aspects of the validity issue. Babbie (2013) reported several criteria for successful measurement of agreed-on meanings of concepts. These are face validity, criterion-related validity, construct validity, and content validity. Face validity is a quality of a measurement tool that makes it reasonable to be considered as a valid tool. Criterion-related validity of a measurement tool shows its validity by relating it to some other behavior-related external criteria. Construct validity shows a variable's logical relationship with some other variables of a study. Content validity shows sufficiency of a measurement in covering all of the dimensions of a variable. The constructs of this dissertation were measured using items that were used by other researchers in their studies or the constructs have theoretical arguments for them. The factor analysis was run to assess validity of the items that were used for measuring the

different constructs. The results of the factor analysis are discussed in the third subsection of this section. Thus, the concerns for validity of the measurements have been addressed in this study.

A.3.2 Reliability

Reliability refers to the quality of a measurement tool, which makes it able to produce the same result if it is used again and again. Babbie (2013) mentioned some techniques for ensuring reliability of a measurement tool. These techniques are test-retest method, split-half method, using established measures, and reliability of research workers. The test-retest method refers to using the same measurement more than once; a reliable measurement gives the same result each time. Although the measurements used in this research are not established ones, they were used previously by other researchers. Moreover, there are some statistical methods for testing reliability of measurement items; these statistical measurements are reported in the following section. After identifying the relevant items for each factor, reliability of them was tested using Chronbach's reliability alphas, which use the principle of split half method. The reliability coefficients reported in this study show internal consistency of the responses of the respondents. The following subsection discusses the factor analysis, which takes care of both concerns of validity and reliability to some extent.

A.3.3 Factor Analysis

The term factor analysis is used in this report in a generic sense to refer to principal components analysis. For testing how the proposed items match to their corresponding constructs, a principal component analysis was conducted. The components, in a principal component analysis, arise from the measured variables. It is a technique to discover how the measured variables (items) meaningfully form coherent subsets that are independent from each other. One of the orthogonal rotation strategies, the commonly used varimax method, was used in the principal component analysis. The factor analysis was done two times.

Initially, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) and Bartlett's test of sphericity, and the scree plot were asked for with all of the 45 items entered into the analysis. These

45 items were identified and assigned to measure nine constructs as is discussed in section 3.10 of chapter three. The KMO measure is a test of sampling adequacy. It measures the adequacy of the correlations for the factor analysis. Tabachnick and Fidell (2013) suggested that the KMO values of .6 and above are needed for good a factor analysis. The initial test results, with the 45 items, produced a KMO value of .690, which suggested that the data were suitable for a principal components analysis. The Bartlett's test also produced significant results, which provides a test of the null hypothesis that none of the variables is significantly correlated. Both test results are presented in table A4 below.

Table A4 KMO and Bartlett's Test with 45 Items

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.690
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	4244.666
	df	990
	Sig.	.000

The scree plot test in the SPSS produces a table with initial eigenvalues and the total variance explained. It also shows the scree plot placing the eigenvalues and the components. Choosing the number of factors is related to the amount of variance explained because eigenvalues represent variance. Table A5 and figure A5 suggested factor solution and the total variance explained with the 45 items. Tabachnick and Fidell (2013) suggested that a component with an eigenvalue less than 1 is not so important. An inspection of table A5 and figure A5 suggested a 15 component solution with eigenvalues of at least 1 which extracts 64 percent of the variance.

Table A5 Eigenvalues and Variance Explained with 45 Items

Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
	1	4.540	10.088	10.088	4.540	10.088
2	3.492	7.761	17.849	3.492	7.761	17.849
3	3.158	7.017	24.866	3.158	7.017	24.866
4	2.293	5.096	29.962	2.293	5.096	29.962
5	1.992	4.426	34.388	1.992	4.426	34.388
6	1.844	4.097	38.485	1.844	4.097	38.485
7	1.654	3.676	42.160	1.654	3.676	42.160
8	1.561	3.469	45.629	1.561	3.469	45.629
9	1.511	3.357	48.987	1.511	3.357	48.987
10	1.298	2.885	51.872	1.298	2.885	51.872
11	1.244	2.764	54.636	1.244	2.764	54.636
12	1.203	2.674	57.310	1.203	2.674	57.310
13	1.081	2.402	59.712	1.081	2.402	59.712
14	1.030	2.289	62.002	1.030	2.289	62.002
15	1.016	2.257	64.259	1.016	2.257	64.259
16	.951	2.113	66.371			
17	.934	2.076	68.447			
18	.919	2.043	70.490			
19	.887	1.971	72.462			
20	.831	1.847	74.308			
21	.783	1.740	76.049			
22	.735	1.633	77.682			
23	.726	1.613	79.295			
24	.688	1.528	80.823			
25	.682	1.517	82.340			
26	.638	1.418	83.758			
27	.624	1.386	85.144			
28	.620	1.377	86.521			
29	.567	1.259	87.780			
30	.540	1.200	88.980			
31	.473	1.050	90.031			
32	.458	1.017	91.048			
33	.434	.965	92.012			
34	.404	.899	92.911			

Table A5 (Continued)

Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
35	.393	.874	93.785			
36	.381	.847	94.632			
37	.350	.778	95.410			
38	.343	.761	96.171			
39	.319	.710	96.881			
40	.296	.659	97.540			
41	.284	.632	98.171			
42	.262	.582	98.753			
43	.258	.573	99.326			
44	.208	.462	99.787			
45	.096	.213	100.000			

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.




Figure A5 Scree Plot Based on 45 Items

However, the proposed model of this study (see Chapter 2) had 9 constructs. Therefore, a principal component analysis was run with varimax rotation fixing the number of factors at 9, which accounted for 49 percent of the variance. The results of this factor analysis are presented in table A6. It shows that the “Team Orientation” (TO) items did not load together. Therefore, these items were candidates for deletion and were deleted from the data set. One “Proactive Transparency Behavior” (PTB) item was detached from the rest of the items of that construct. This item was also deleted. Three items from the “Power Distance” (PD) construct and two items from the “Risk Avoidance” (RA) (initially was termed as “Uncertainty Avoidance” (UA)) construct clustered together, which did not make any sense. Therefore, these five items were also deleted. One item from the “Accountability” (ACC) construct departed from the rest of it. So, this item was removed from the data set. Altogether, 11 items were deleted from the set of 45 items. The results also showed that two items from the “Power Distance” construct and two items from the “Uncertainty Avoidance” construct go together. It was also noticed in the initial factor analysis results that the items from the “Value for Proactive Transparency”(VPT) construct tend to form two different constructs. Taking note of these characteristics of the data set, a second factor analysis was run with the remaining 34 items in the data set. The results of the second factor analysis are discussed in chapter three.

Table A6 Factor Analysis Results for a Nine Component Solution with 45 Items

Item	Description	Component								
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
DN3	I have control over designing/redesigning the procedures of service delivery	.859	.039	.017	.067	.021	.090	.053	-.003	.045
DN2	I have control over selecting the recipients of our services	.802	.026	.090	.000	-.033	.050	.035	.026	.043
DN5	I have control over adjusting office goals to the context	.748	.077	-.051	.100	-.079	-.005	-.088	-.021	-.005
DN1	I have control over forming committees for official purposes	.704	-.011	.092	.070	.125	-.038	.113	-.045	.049
DN4	I have control over adjusting the office budget to targeted goals	.658	-.044	.017	.216	-.111	-.079	-.127	.020	.033
PTB4	My office publishes office decisions on its webpage	.017	.801	-.034	.061	.029	-.019	-.047	.092	.059
PTB5	My office updates its webpage	-.008	.772	-.039	.221	.105	.048	.100	-.049	-.078
PTB2	My office displays the citizens' charter on our webpage	-.104	.707	.048	.107	.047	.003	.062	-.044	-.021
PTB3	My office publishes office decisions on notice boards	.150	.553	-.022	-.091	-.066	-.041	.050	.081	.119
PTB7	My office posts office-related information on Facebook	-.063	.511	.030	-.031	.228	-.096	-.085	-.046	.066
PTB6	My office makes citizens aware of their information rights	.107	.415	.024	.099	-.003	.060	.054	.110	.186
ACC1	My office should welcome constructive criticisms from citizens about our services	.029	-.059	.740	-.096	.019	.033	-.005	.089	-.152
ACC5	My office should tell citizens how decisions have been taken	.046	.019	.737	.030	.052	-.092	.032	.037	.188

Table A6 (Continued)

Item	Description	Component								
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
ACC6	My office should explain why certain requests have not been met	.063	.063	.704	-.011	-.054	-.064	-.085	.056	.271
ACC4	My office should explain why certain decisions have been taken	-.024	.046	.570	-.054	.214	-.085	.121	.424	-.049
ACC2	My office should regret mistakes with service seekers	-.028	.010	.533	.009	.078	-.099	-.266	.508	-.126
TO1	Working in teams can produce better results	.109	-.093	.452	.105	-.049	.029	.191	-.191	-.037
RS2	My office has a sufficient staff	.093	-.044	.066	.736	.020	-.043	.067	-.075	.096
RS4	The relevant office staff in my office has sufficient training for the preparing content of our webpage	.118	.381	-.087	.690	.095	.059	-.040	.071	-.159
RS5	The relevant office staff in my office has sufficient training for displaying and updating information on our webpage	.154	.374	-.110	.677	.067	.073	-.043	.053	-.133
RS3	My office gets sufficient time	.082	-.063	.002	.661	.204	-.186	.087	-.044	.069
RS1	My office gets/has sufficient funds	.075	.082	.043	.621	-.124	-.100	-.076	.095	.041
CO4	Service seekers should not advise us on what to do (R)	-.044	.119	-.087	.029	.632	-.127	.101	.204	-.058
CO2	Officers can learn nothing from service seekers (R)	-.078	.126	.104	-.106	.588	-.171	.288	.019	.024
CO3	My office should seek feedback from service recipients about their satisfaction	.054	.057	.061	.141	.570	.187	-.109	-.022	.046

Table A6 (Continued)

Item	Description	Component								
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
TO3	Sometimes subordinates can give better opinions than superiors	-.002	.036	.039	.030	.502	-.149	-.085	.112	.108
CO1	My office should serve citizens according to their preferences	-.125	.016	.333	.100	.395	.058	-.037	-.172	.166
PTB1	My office displays citizen's charter in front of the office	-.080	.259	.006	.075	-.262	.031	.047	.238	.062
PD5	When I am confident, I disagree with my higher authority (R)	.058	.029	-.051	-.124	.033	.705	.014	-.015	.034
PD3	Confident subordinates in my office disagree with my decisions (R)	.051	.006	.073	.053	-.210	.647	-.021	-.040	.006
RA1	I emphasize results more than following routines and procedures to the point (R)	-.144	-.005	-.037	-.082	.074	.578	.127	-.076	-.047
RA3	I look for the best alternative even if it goes beyond routines, and procedures (R)	-.058	.055	-.159	-.167	-.081	.543	.274	.086	-.106
TO4	Subordinates should not disagree with superior's opinion (R)	-.219	.213	.009	-.112	.151	-.492	.302	.027	-.010
RA2	I feel nervous about satisfying my higher authority with my work	.036	-.095	-.097	-.071	-.137	.090	-.596	-.029	-.028
PD1	I seek my subordinates' opinion before taking a decision (R)	-.068	-.085	-.108	-.106	-.156	.150	.588	-.081	.020
RA4	I expect my higher authority telling me if I am doing a good job	-.149	-.082	.068	.013	.026	-.002	-.562	-.070	.153

Table A6 (Continued)

Item	Description	Component								
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
PD2	My subordinates suggest me ideas about my office work (R)	-.010	-.007	.080	-.015	-.409	.094	.506	-.009	-.028
PD4	I tell my subordinates what decisions are to be taken	.039	.013	-.068	-.108	-.267	-.121	-.398	.064	.048
VPT5	The proactive display of information may damage official secrecy (R)	.017	.060	-.058	.070	.068	-.060	-.021	.687	.146
ACC3	My office should answer citizens' questions about our services	-.126	.012	.386	-.058	.104	-.100	-.231	.635	-.130
VPT4	The proactive display of information may damage the image of my office (R)	.093	.052	.003	.009	.012	.102	.250	.618	.331
VPT3	If information is proactively displayed, accountability to citizens can increase	.100	.050	.155	.034	-.012	-.029	-.060	.063	.709
VPT2	If information is proactively displayed, service seekers can give feedback about office activities	-.012	.060	.076	.075	.242	-.053	.007	.128	.706
VPT1	If information is proactively displayed, citizens can become aware of their rights	.026	.097	-.089	-.071	-.044	-.026	-.068	.054	.619
TO2	We should help each other in our office works	.039	.190	.247	.008	.100	.080	-.081	-.123	.264

Note: R = Recoded; Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis; Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization; Rotation converged in 10 iterations.

Table A7 KMO and Bartlett's Test with 34 Items

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.709
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	3364.232
	df	561
	Sig.	.000

Table A8 Eigenvalues and Variance Explained with 34 Items

Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	4.273	12.568	12.568	4.273	12.568	12.568
2	3.039	8.939	21.506	3.039	8.939	21.506
3	2.966	8.725	30.231	2.966	8.725	30.231
4	2.094	6.160	36.390	2.094	6.160	36.390
5	1.735	5.102	41.492	1.735	5.102	41.492
6	1.570	4.619	46.111	1.570	4.619	46.111
7	1.499	4.409	50.520	1.499	4.409	50.520
8	1.379	4.056	54.576	1.379	4.056	54.576
9	1.144	3.366	57.942	1.144	3.366	57.942
10	1.090	3.206	61.148	1.090	3.206	61.148
11	.997	2.934	64.082			
12	.971	2.855	66.936			
13	.853	2.507	69.444			
14	.821	2.414	71.858			
15	.795	2.339	74.197			
16	.762	2.242	76.439			
17	.739	2.173	78.612			
18	.692	2.034	80.646			
19	.671	1.972	82.618			

Table A8 (Continued)

Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
20	.636	1.870	84.489			
21	.564	1.659	86.147			
22	.546	1.606	87.753			
23	.502	1.476	89.228			
24	.455	1.339	90.568			
25	.439	1.291	91.859			
26	.422	1.241	93.100			
27	.396	1.164	94.264			
28	.358	1.052	95.316			
29	.341	1.003	96.319			
30	.328	.965	97.284			
31	.308	.905	98.189			
32	.289	.849	99.037			
33	.225	.662	99.700			
34	.102	.300	100.000			

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

APPENDIX B

ADDITIONAL DATA ON FINDINGS

Descriptive Statistics of Measurement Items

This section discusses the descriptive statistics of the measurement items of the study. Table B1 presents the descriptive statistic of the measurement items, which include mean and standard deviation. The table presents the measurement items in the order in which they appeared in the factor analysis results. However, the discussion here is organized in accordance with the order of the variables in the proposed model. If we look at the mean scores of the four items of citizen orientation, we find that all were above the average score. The first three items, CO1, CO2, and CO3 had mean scores of 3.70, 3.41, and 3.69 respectively, with low standard deviation. The fourth item, CO4, had comparatively a lower mean (2.81) but well above the average. The respondents differed greatly in this item. The standard deviation was 1.114. This can be explained that the frontline bureaucrats were willing to serve the citizens according to their preferences (CO1). The bureaucrats were also willing to learn from the citizens (CO2) through seeking feedback from them (CO3). However, the bureaucrats were less willing to allow the citizens to advise them (bureaucrats) on their office activities.

The second construct from the organizational cultural dimensions was risk avoidance tendency. Lower risk avoidance tendency in the frontline bureaucrats was expected. The two indicators of the construct—RA1 and RA3—show mean scores, 2.02 and 2.14 respectively, which were below the average. This can be explained as a good sign in the frontline bureaucrats. They took some risks to get the desired results. However, the respondents varied to a large extent in their risks taking behavior, which was revealed by the relatively large standard deviations, .892 and .979 for RA1 and RA3 respectively.

Table B1 Measures of Central Tendency and Dispersion of Measurement Items

Construct	Item	Description	N	Mean	SD
Discretion	<i>DN1</i>	I have control over forming committees for official purposes	324	3.13	1.077
	<i>DN2</i>	I have control over selecting the recipients of our services	324	3.07	1.049
	<i>DN3</i>	I have control over designing/redesigning the procedures of service delivery	324	3.02	.995
	<i>DN4</i>	I have control over adjusting the office budget to the targeted goals	322	2.34	1.280
	<i>DN5</i>	DN5 I have control over adjusting office goals to the context	325	3.04	1.013
Accountability	<i>ACC1</i>	My office should welcome constructive criticisms from citizens about our services	326	3.96	.290
	<i>ACC2</i>	My office should regret mistakes with service seekers	326	3.56	.736
	<i>ACC4</i>	My office should explain why certain decisions have been taken	326	3.65	.703
	<i>ACC5</i>	My office should tell citizens how decisions have been taken	325	3.89	.423
	<i>ACC6</i>	My office should explain why certain requests have not been met	326	3.87	.464
	Proactive Transparency Behavior	<i>PTB2</i>	My office displays the citizens' charter on our webpage	326	3.39
<i>PTB3</i>		My office publishes office decisions on notice boards	325	3.27	.912
<i>PTB4</i>		My office publishes office decisions on its webpage	324	2.56	1.145
<i>PTB5</i>		My office updates its webpage	324	3.10	.949
<i>PTB6</i>		My office makes citizens aware of their information rights	325	3.56	.703
<i>PTB7</i>		My office posts office-related information on Facebook	325	2.84	1.144
IT Skills		<i>ITS4</i>	The relevant office staff in my office has sufficient training for preparing the content of our webpage	324	1.99

Table B1 (Continued)

Construct	Item	Description	N	Mean	SD
	<i>ITS5</i>	The relevant office staff in my office has sufficient training for displaying and updating information on our webpage	324	2.12	1.134
Resources	<i>RS1</i>	My office gets/has sufficient funds	325	1.97	.973
	<i>RS2</i>	My office has a sufficient staff	324	2.07	1.059
	<i>RS3</i>	My office gets sufficient time	324	2.06	.940
Citizen Orientation	<i>CO1</i>	My office should serve citizens according to their preferences	326	3.70	.647
	<i>CO2</i>	Officers can learn nothing from service seekers (R)	326	3.41	.794
	<i>CO3</i>	My office should seek feedback from service recipients about their satisfaction	324	3.69	.680
	<i>CO4</i>	Service seekers should not advise us on what to do (R)	324	2.81	1.114
Value Generic	<i>VG1</i>	If information is proactively displayed, citizens can become aware of their rights	326	3.90	.306
	<i>VG2</i>	If information is proactively displayed, service seekers can give feedback about office activities	326	3.71	.528
	<i>VG3</i>	If information is proactively displayed, accountability to citizens can increase	326	3.82	.472
Value Specific	<i>VS4</i>	The roactive display of information may damage the image of my office (R)	326	3.63	.740
	<i>VS5</i>	The proactive display of information may damage official secrecy (R)	326	3.20	.949
Risk Avoidance	<i>RA1</i>	I emphasize results more than following routines and procedures to the point (R)	325	2.02	.892
	<i>RA3</i>	I look for the best alternative even if it goes beyond routines, and procedures (R)	326	2.14	.979
Power Distance	<i>PD3</i>	Confident subordinates in my office disagree with my decisions (R)	324	2.74	.821
	<i>PD5</i>	When I am confident, I disagree with my higher authority (R)	323	2.37	.884

Note: N = Number of Respondents, SD = Standard Deviation, R = Reversed Score

The third construct from the organizational cultural dimensions was power distance, which was measured by two items—PD3 and PD5. Low power distance in an office was desirable. The two indicators showed power distance scores of the frontline bureaucrats, which hovered around the average. These bureaucrats maintained relatively a high power distance in relation to their subordinates (2.74) compared to the power distance in relation to their higher authority (2.37). However, in the power distance behavior, the respondents showed variation. The standard deviation of PD3 was .821 and that of PD5 was .884.

There were two constructs from organizational endowment. These were IT skills and resources. IT skills had two items. The first item—ITS4—had a very low mean score (1.99). The second item—ITS5—had a slightly higher score (2.12) but was still lower than the average score. These two indicators revealed that the frontline bureaucracies were poor in IT skills. IT skills of the employees of an organization are its important resources, especially to disclose information proactively through the Internet. The other construct from organizational endowment was resources, which comprised three items. RS1, RS2, and RS3 were about sufficiency of fund, staff, and time respectively that should be available to an organization for proactive disclosure activities. All of the means of these three items were below the average. They were 1.97, 2.07, and 2.06 respectively. These findings indicated poor resource endowment of the frontline bureaucracies, which put a limitation on their proactive transparency activities. However, the frontline offices had variation in their resource endowment as indicated by the standard deviations of .973, 1.059, and .940 of the three items respectively.

The descriptive statistics of the measurement items discussed so far were parts of the independent variables. There was one more independent variable termed discretion. The construct of discretion was characterized as organizational structure. It was measured by five items. Four of them revealed mean scores much above the mid-point and one had a score little below the mid-point. All of these items showed a higher degree of variance; four of them had standard deviation above 1 and the rest one had standard deviation very close to 1. Seemingly, the mean and the standard deviation scores revealed that the respondents enjoyed a higher degree of discretion, especially regarding their control over forming committees (DN1), selection of

recipients (DN2), design/redesign of service delivery procedures (DN3), and adjustment of the office goals to the context (DN5). Their control over adjustment of the office budget to the targeted goals (DN4) was comparatively low. However, their discretionary power varied across groups.

Value generic and value specific were two constructs that indicated the value that the frontline public bureaucrats attach to the necessity of disclosing information proactively. These two constructs were mediating variables in the proposed model. Value generic was an indication of the value that the respondents had regarding proactive disclosure in general while value specific was an indication of the value they had regarding proactive disclosure in relation to their own office activities. Value generic was measured by three items. All of these three items had very high mean scores. All were close to 4. The first item—VG1—had the highest mean score of 3.90. The second item—VG2—had a mean score of 3.71 while the third item—VG3—had a mean of 3.82. Standard deviation was also low with regard to these three items. This can be explained that the frontline bureaucrats, more or less, placed high value on proactive transparency in general. They placed high value on value specific also. But the specific value was comparatively lesser than the generic value. The mean scores for VS4 and VS5 were 3.63 and 3.20 respectively. There was high degree of variance in these scores, which indicated differences in their opinions with regard to these items.

The proactive transparency behavior was a dependent variable. It was measured by six items. The respondents scored high but with relatively wide variation. Outward accountability had six items. Four of the items had mean scores very high while the other two were above the average. However, the frontline bureaucrats were widely dispersed in their opinions with regard to outward accountability. Outward accountability was also a dependent variable. It was measured by 5 items. All of the five items had mean scores close to 4 and standard deviation below 1. According to the mean scores, they showed their willingness to be answerable to the citizens.

Table B2 Correlation Matrix of the Variables along with Age and Experience

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1. Outward Accountability	1.000											
2. Transparency Behavior	.059	1.000										
3. Value Generic	.214**	.164**	1.000									
4. Value Specific	.189**	.132**	.193**	1.000								
5. Citizen Orientation	.180**	.213**	.144**	.118*	1.000							
6. Risk Avoidance	-.156**	-.004	-.101*	-.072	-.057	1.000						
7. Power Distance	-.098*	-.018	-.062	-.005	-.137**	.320**	1.000					
8. IT Skills	-.011	.346**	.034	.044	.118*	-.078	-.020	1.000				
9. Resources	.039	.162**	.090	.082	.121*	-.147**	-.141**	.395**	1.000			
10. Discretion	.055	.049	.106*	.032	-.046	-.108*	.038	.186**	.216**	1.000		
11. Age	.021	-.242**	.077	.001	-.244**	-.004	.111*	-.022	.021	.138**	1.000	
12. Experience	-.088	-.006	.031	.101*	-.117*	-.065	.032	.038	.027	-.073	.372**	1.000
Mean	3.79	3.12	3.81	3.42	3.40	2.08	2.56	2.05	2.04	2.92	42.72	8.37
S.D.	0.39	0.66	0.33	0.73	0.54	0.78	0.69	1.09	0.77	0.83	8.51	6.96

Note: ** P < 0.01 * P < 0.05

Table B3 Multiple Regression Results For Three Culture Dimensions Predicting Value Generic

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		Sig.	95.0% Confidence Interval for B		Correlations			Collinearity Statistics	
	b	Std. Error	beta	t		Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Zero-order	Partial	Part	Tolerance	VIF
Constant	3.618	.148		24.491	.000	3.327	3.908					
Power Distance	-.007	.028	-.015	-.257	.798	-.062	.048	-.062	-.014	-.014	.883	1.132
Risk Avoidance	-.038	.025	-.088	-1.527	.128	-.087	.011	-.101	-.085	-.084	.897	1.115
Citizen Orientation	.085	.034	.137	2.468	.014	.017	.153	.144	.136	.135	.981	1.019

Note: R = .172 R² = .030 Adjusted R² = .021 F = 3.267 Sig. = .05

Table B4 Multiple Regression Results For Three Culture Dimensions Predicting Value Specific

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		Sig.	95.0% Confidence Interval for B		Correlations			Collinearity Statistics	
	B	Std. Error	Beta	t		Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Zero-order	Partial	Part	Tolerance	VIF
Constant	2.920	.324		9.013	.000	2.283	3.558					
Power Distance	.038	.062	.036	.617	.537	-.083	.159	-.005	.034	.034	.883	1.132
Risk Avoidance	-.072	.054	-.077	-1.323	.187	-.179	.035	-.072	-.074	-.073	.897	1.115
Citizen Orientation	.161	.076	.119	2.130	.034	.012	.310	.118	.118	.118	.981	1.019

Note: R = .139 R² = .019 Adjusted R² = .010 F = 2.124 Sig. = .10

Table B5 Multiple Regression Results for 13 Independent Variables Predicting Proactive Transparency Behavior

	Unstandardized		Standardized	t	Sig.	Correlations			Collinearity	
	Coefficients					Coefficients	Zero-	Partial	Part	Tolerance
	b	Std. Error	(beta)							
Constant	1.570	.504		3.114	.002					
Citizen Orientation	.119	.065	.097	1.826	.069	.213	.103	.091	.875	1.142
Risk Avoidance	.042	.045	.050	.926	.355	-.004	.052	.046	.848	1.180
Power Distance	.023	.051	.024	.454	.650	-.018	.026	.023	.850	1.177
Value Generic	.285	.102	.145	2.795	.006	.164	.156	.139	.917	1.091
Value Specific	.067	.047	.074	1.408	.160	.132	.079	.070	.895	1.118
Resources	.014	.048	.016	.282	.778	.162	.016	.014	.787	1.271
IT Skills	.187	.033	.310	5.629	.000	.346	.304	.280	.814	1.229
Discretion	.014	.042	.018	.335	.738	.049	.019	.017	.875	1.143
Age	-.021	.005	-.268	-4.605	.000	-.242	-.252	-.229	.731	1.368
Experience	.008	.005	.086	1.558	.120	-.006	.088	.077	.815	1.227
Training on RTI	.017	.071	.012	.240	.810	.066	.014	.012	.926	1.080
Education	-.028	.074	-.020	-.380	.704	.043	-.021	-.019	.887	1.127
Gender	.070	.108	.033	.650	.516	.005	.037	.032	.948	1.055

Note: R = .478 R² = .229 Adjusted R² = .197 F = 7.124 Sig. = .000

Table B6 Multiple Regression Results for 14 Independent Variables Predicting Outward Accountability

	Unstandardized		Standardized	t	Sig.	Correlations			Collinearity	
	Coefficients					(beta)	Zero-	Partial	Part	Tolerance
	b	Std. Error			order					
Constant	2.527	.316		7.998	.000					
Transparency Behavior	.014	.035	.024	.398	.691	.059	.023	.021	.771	1.297
Value Generic	.168	.064	.147	2.631	.009	.214	.148	.139	.894	1.118
Value Specific	.073	.029	.140	2.492	.013	.189	.140	.132	.889	1.125
Citizen Orientation	.098	.040	.138	2.431	.016	.180	.137	.129	.866	1.155
Risk Avoidance	-.058	.028	-.119	-2.059	.040	-.156	-.116	-.109	.845	1.183
Power Distance	-.021	.031	-.038	-.667	.505	-.098	-.038	-.035	.849	1.177
IT Skills	-.018	.022	-.052	-.843	.400	-.011	-.048	-.045	.739	1.354
Resources	-.009	.030	-.019	-.312	.755	.039	-.018	-.017	.787	1.271
Discretion	.006	.026	.013	.230	.818	.055	.013	.012	.875	1.143
Age	.004	.003	.094	1.465	.144	.021	.083	.078	.684	1.461
Experience	-.007	.003	-.126	-2.137	.033	-.088	-.120	-.113	.809	1.237
Education	.003	.046	.004	.076	.939	-.005	.004	.004	.887	1.127
Training on RTI	.046	.044	.058	1.046	.296	.085	.059	.055	.926	1.080
Gender	.072	.067	.059	1.084	.279	.065	.061	.057	.947	1.056

Note: R = .359 R² = .129 Adjusted R² = .089 F = 3.280 Sig. = .000

APPENDIX C

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Please indicate your opinion on the following statements:

	Always	Sometimes	Seldom	Never
(a) My office displays the citizens' charter in front of the office	()	()	()	()
(b) My office displays the citizens' charter on our webpage	()	()	()	()
(c) My office publishes office decisions on notice boards	()	()	()	()
(d) My office publishes office decisions on its webpage	()	()	()	()
(e) My office updates its webpage	()	()	()	()
(f) My office makes citizens aware of their information rights	()	()	()	()
(g) My office posts office related information on Facebook	()	()	()	()

2. If information is displayed (like citizen's charter, official decisions and other activities) in front of office, in webpage, in notice boards -

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree
(a) citizens can become aware of their rights	()	()	()	()
(b) service seekers can give feedback about office activities	()	()	()	()
(c) accountability to citizens can increase	()	()	()	()
(d) it may damage the image of my office	()	()	()	()
(d) it may damage official secrecy	()	()	()	()

3. For information activities (like displaying citizen's charter, official decisions and other activities in front of office, in webpage, in notice boards) -

(a) my office gets/has sufficient funds	()	()	()	()
(b) my office has a sufficient staff	()	()	()	()
(c) my office gets sufficient time (after doing routine work)	()	()	()	()

4. The relevant staff in my office has sufficient training for -	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree
(a) preparing the contents for webpage	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
(b) displaying and updating the information in our webpage	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

5. Please indicate the level of control you have in the following office matters:	Major Control	Moderate Control	Minor Control	No Control
(a) Forming committees for official purposes	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
(b) Selecting the recipients of your services	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
(c) Designing/redesigning the procedures of service delivery	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
(d) Adjusting the office budget to the targeted goals	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
(e) Adjusting the office goals to the context	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

6. Please indicate your opinion about the following statements:	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree
(a) Working in teams can produce better results	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
(b) We should help each other in our office work	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
(c) Sometimes subordinates can give better opinions than superiors	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
(d) Subordinates should not disagree with the superior's opinion	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
(e) My office should serve citizens according to their preferences	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
(f) Officers can learn nothing from service seekers	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
(g) My office should seek feedback from service recipients about their satisfaction	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
(h) Service seekers should not advise us on what to do	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
(i) My office should welcome constructive criticisms from citizens about our services	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
(j) My office should regret mistakes with service seekers	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

		Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree
(k) If citizens want to know, my office should ---					
(i) answer their questions about our services	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(ii) explain why certain decisions have been taken	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(iii) tell them how decisions have been taken	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(iv) explain why certain requests have not been met	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
 7. Please indicate how often the statements below affect you:					
		Always	Sometimes	Seldom	Never
(a) I emphasize results more than following routines and procedures to the point	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(b) I feel nervous about satisfying my higher authority with my work	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(c) I look for the best alternative even if it goes beyond routines, and procedures	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(d) I expect my higher authority to tell me if I am doing a good job	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(e) I seek my subordinates' opinions before taking a decision	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(f) My subordinates suggest me ideas about my office work	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(g) Confident subordinates in my office disagree with my decisions	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(h) I tell my subordinates what decisions are to be taken	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(i) When I am confident, I disagree with my higher authority	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8. Do service seekers ask you questions about your service?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> N/A		
9. If yes, does your office answer their questions?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> N/A		
10. If yes, does your office ---					
(a) answer questions about your services	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> N/A		
(b) explain reasons for decisions	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> N/A		
(c) tell process of decision making	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> N/A		
(d) explain when certain requests are not met	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> N/A		
11. The government has a right to information law	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't Know		
12. Proactive disclosure of certain information is a legal requirement of the offices	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't Know		

13. I have received training on right to information Yes No
14. My colleagues have received training on right to information Yes No Don't Know
15. Did you get any requests for information in last 6 months? Yes No Don't Know
16. If yes, how many applications did you get in last 6 months? N/A Don't Know
17. How many requests for information have you replied in last 6 months? N/A Don't Know
18. This office has notice board(s) Yes No

19. If yes, location of notice board(s) is Inside office room Outside office room In both places
20. If yes, how often information on the notice board(s) is updated ---
 Daily Weekly Monthly As needed Never N/A

21. Your age is years
22. You are working in your current position for years
23. You are a Male Female

24. Your highest education is Bachelor Masters PhD

25. Your office is
- | | | |
|--|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> UNO | <input type="checkbox"/> Agriculture | <input type="checkbox"/> Primary Education |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Health | <input type="checkbox"/> Fisheries | <input type="checkbox"/> Social Welfare |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Family Planning | <input type="checkbox"/> Livestock | <input type="checkbox"/> Women Affairs |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Land | <input type="checkbox"/> PIO | <input type="checkbox"/> Youth Development |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Sub-registrar | <input type="checkbox"/> Rural Development | <input type="checkbox"/> Engineering |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Accounts | | |

25. Do you have any comments about transparency and accountability in public offices?

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BIOGRAPHY

NAME

Md. Morshed Alom

ACADEMIC BACKGROUND

Bachelor of Social Science (International Relations)

Dhaka University, 1996

Master of Social Science (International Relations)

Dhaka University, 1997

Master of Arts (Southeast Asian Studies)

Chulalongkorn University, 2005

PRESENT POSITION

Senior Research Officer

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EXPERIENCE

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