

Corruption in the Nigeria Police Force: An Empirical Investigation into the Effects on Personnel and Police Activities

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Abstract

This study explored corruption among the executive police officers in the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) and the effects on the welfare of operational police officers and police activities in Ilorin Emirate of Kwara state, Nigeria. The study employed a survey research design; both the questionnaire and interview were the instruments of data collection adopted. The convenience and purposive sampling techniques were used to select a total of 200 operational police officers and 2 Superintendent Officers respectively. The information gathered was analysed using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) and thematic analysis. The study found that corruption among the executive police officers contributes to the poor welfare of the rank and file officers and the insufficient police operational facilities in Ilorin Emirate of Kwara state, Nigeria. The study suggests the need to recognise a strong connection between the availability of basic police equipment and the well-being of the operational police officers, and effective policing, security of lives and properties in Nigeria.

Keywords: *corruption, Nigeria Police Force, personal wellbeing, Ilorin Emirate, police pension fraud*

1. Background and Context

The Nigeria Police Force (NPF) is one of the major institutions in Nigeria pervaded by corruption and other unethical behaviour (Aremu, Pakes, & Johnston, 2009). This assertion was substantiated by a joint survey report submitted by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in 2017. The report revealed that the Nigeria Police Force is the most corrupt among state institutions followed by the judiciary (UNODC, 2017). Corruption and other misconducts among personnel of the Nigerian police manifest in acts like embezzlement, bribery, fraud, extortion and exploitation, falsification and alteration of investigation reports, fabrication of evidence, exchange of criminal suspect with innocent individuals, unlawful detention and torture of suspects and conspiracy or collusion with criminals among others (Folarin, 2012; Human Rights Watch, 2010a; Mohammed, 2013).

These acts have been widely researched and documented in literature. In other words, media reports, academic investigations, public debates and conferences have extensively discussed the widespread of corruption in the NPF and proffered numerous ways to curb the atrocities perpetrated by the personnel of the Nigerian police. Therefore, this study is not aimed at replicating the findings of the previous investigations. However, having revised a significant number of the (academic) literature, it was observed that many of the literature focused extensively on corruption and misconducts among the rank and file police officers, perhaps due to the fact that they operate within communities and their operations have a profound effect on the people.

For instance, Agbibo (2015a) observed that Nigerian society continues to experience uncontrolled crime rate because the law enforcement agencies have failed in all ramifications. The agencies are ill-equipped and their personnel are known for all kinds of transgressions being perpetrated at roadblocks, during patrols and other police activities. Oluwaniyi (2011) also stressed that police activities and services (such as patrols and response to emergency situations) to Nigerians have been commercialised. In most cases, people are required to fuel police vehicles before services are rendered; to give a sum of money to induce police activities, to resist arrest, and to keep people (both criminal and non-criminal suspects) in custody. Moreover, Nte (2011); Ibrahim, Isiaka, Salihu, Balogun, and Akande (2018) noted that public extortion (particularly from market men and women, sex workers, and drivers) is part of the daily activities of the Nigerian police personnel. Hoffman and Patel observed that 'an individual who refuses or fails to pay a bribe is likely to suffer a range of negative treatments, variously including lengthy delays at checkpoints, detention at the

agency office, threats of arrest and/or other violation charges, vehicle impoundment or tyre deflation' (Hoffman & Patel, 2017, p.9).

Additionally, Awojobi (2014) argued that police personnel usually overstep their bounds in the name of exercising their duties to Nigerians. For instance, civil disputes which the law clearly precludes the interference of police,¹ appear to have been completely merged with criminal matters. Self-interest has made police personnel to turn to civil disputes and handle civil wrongs in the same way as criminal matters (Awojobi, 2014). Adebayo and Ojo (2009) also claimed that police officers are frequently used as an instrument of threat, debt recovery and detention of debtors. Moreover, land disputes (involving no violence or criminal issues) that should be referred to, or addressed by a civil institution are now handled by the police. In many cases, individuals arrested for civil wrongs are not arraigned in the court, they are kept in custody on the request of the complainants (Akpunonu-Ogu, 2004). Although these misconducts and disrespect for the rule of law are perpetrated by the rank and file officers; however, many are in the form of a conspiracy between them and some executive officers (Igbo, 2017).

Nonetheless, scientific investigations that cover corruption among the executive police officers who are at the helm of police affairs are scanty. That is little or no attention is given to corruption among officers (including the police administrators) who are in charge of the management and allocation of police resources and funds, give orders and design policies and programs. By virtue of the provisions of the law, the chain of command in the NPF flows from the top to bottom- Inspector General down to the Constables. The Inspector-General of Police is the Chief police officer in the country and represents the highest cadre in the Nigeria Police Force followed by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, the Assistant Inspector-General of Police, the Commissioners of Police, the Deputy and Assistant Commissioners in the various states. Other senior (middle) cadres include the Chief Superintendent and Superintendent Officer, Deputy and Assistant Superintendent Officer, Inspector and Sergeant Major Officer. These cadres represent the top positions in the NPF; powers, instructions, distribution of police funds and resources flow among these groups. While Sergeants, Corporals and Constables constitute the lower (rank and file) cadre (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria: Police Act 1990, S 6; Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, S 215).

For the purpose of this study, corruption (and other related misconducts) in the NPF is categorised into two. The first category is corruption among junior police officers. Acts of corruption at this level include bribery, exploitation, extortion, falsification and alteration of evidence, collusion with criminals among others. These acts are usually perpetrated against the public in the course of patrols, roadblocks, stop and search, investigations, arrests and prosecution of criminal suspects (Human Rights Watch, 2010a; Karimu, 2015). Junior police officers are defined in this study as operational officers or rank and file police officers. The second category is corruption among senior police officers. It comprises of mismanagement and misappropriation of funds and resources meant to cover basic police operations, provision and maintenance of police equipment and amenities, improve officers' welfare condition (including incentives, pensions and gratuity). These acts are perpetrated against the institution of police (and operational officers) during budgetary and implementation, allocation of funds and resources to the various divisions of police, procurement of arms and equipment, disbursement of allowance and benefits (Edobor-Igbinovia, 2000; Imhonopi & Ugochukwu, 2013). Senior police officers are defined as executive police officers. Hence, the focus of this study is on the second category.

The effects of this form of corruption are immense. Its impact is widely felt at the lower level in the force and across the country. For instance, Onyeozili (2005) attributed the poor living condition of the junior police officers and ineptitude of the Nigerian police to mismanagement and corruption. The annual sum of money allocated to improve police operations: capacity to control crime and support other activities and projects always end up being either mismanaged or embezzled by senior police officers (Oyemwinmina & Aibieyi, 2016).

¹ Section 8(2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria states that 'a person shall not be arrested merely for committing a civil wrong or breaching a contract'. Also, several court rulings have held that it is unlawful for the police to be involved in civil disputes and contracts. See McLaren v. Jennings (2003) FWLR (Pt. 154) 537-358; Onagoruwa v. State (1998) 1 ACLR 435 at 483; Nkpa v. Nkume (2001) 6 NWLR (Pt. 710) 543 at 549-55; S.P.D.C. (Nig) Ltd v. Olarewaju (2002) 76 NWLR (Pt. 792) 38 at 46 – 47; and Fawehinmi v. I.G.P. (2002) FWLR (Pt. 108) 1355 at 1378 and 1385.

Human Rights Watch reported that Nigerian police lack basic facilities to handle or control minor crimes and modern sophisticated weapons to tackle armed bandits. There are cases where police personnel ran away from operation and shootout with armed criminals because their weapons-grade is lower to those of the criminals' (Human Rights Watch, 2010b). In addition, Gholami and Salihu (2018) and Edobor-Igbinovia (2000) asserted that the appalling condition of many police posts in Nigeria and their infrastructural deficiencies are as a result of massive misappropriation of police funds and resources. Moreover, the far-reaching effects of corruption in the institution of police as Karimu (2015) and Okereke (1995) have described, is evident in the deplorable condition of police barracks and non-payment of allowances and incentives of serving officers, and pensions and gratuity of the retired officers.

There are numerous reported cases of fund mismanagement and diversion and illicit enrichment among senior police officers in the NPF. Among the weighty cases that almost wrecked the institution include the case of the former Inspector General of Police, Mr. Tafa Balogun, who was found guilty of embezzling 17.7 billion Naira police fund and eight other count charge including money laundering in 2005 (Yusuf, 2013). Similarly, another former Inspector General of Police- Mr. Sunday Ehindero and some other senior officers in the force were indicted for embezzling the sum 16.4 million Naira meant to purchase police equipment in 2012 (PM News Nigeria, 2018). Also, Mr. Sunday Ehindero and his confederates are presently standing trial for other five counts charge including fraud and conspiracy (Premium Times, 2018).

Furthermore, a senior police officer, in charge of the budget at the Police Headquarters in Abuja, Mr. John Obaniyi was convicted for embezzling 5.67 million Naira, a fund meant for equipping police stations in the country and procuring arms and ammunition in 2012. Also, the former Director of Police Pension Fund- Mr. Esai Dangarbar and some other senior officers embezzled 24 billion Naira police fund (International Centre for Investigative Reporting, 2016). Additionally, in a nationwide biometric verification exercise conducted for all pensioners in the country in 2011 by the Presidential Task Force on Pension Reform, it was detected that over 258,000 fake or ghost pensioners are on the police pensioner-payroll, while the genuine pensioners were 141,764. The Task team reported that the Federal Government pay 5 billion Naira monthly as pensions, but the actual monthly expenditure is 1 billion Naira. This indicates that 4 billion Naira is being misappropriated every month by the executive police officers in charge of police pension (Onwukwu, 2012).

The above cases are the few among numerous reported cases, there are several others under investigation, while some are still in court. This study seeks to investigate the detrimental effects of these frauds on the Nigerian police, particularly on the welfare of junior officers, availability of basic resources and the overall impact on service delivery in Ilorin Emirate of Kwara State, Nigeria.

2. Objectives

The objectives of the study are to investigate the effects of corruption among the executive police officers in the Nigerian police on the welfare of operational officers, the capability of the institution in term of resources and the overall impact on service delivery in Ilorin Emirate of Kwara State, Nigeria.

3. Literature Review

3.1 Corruption

One of the challenges facing researchers trying to study corruption is how to define the concept of corruption (Caiden, 2011). Despite different attempts scholars have made, the concept continues to raise serious issues and criticisms as to what acts constitute corruption. Thus, there is no single accepted definition of corruption (Quah-Jon, 2000). However, among the most widely adopted meanings of corruption are those provided by the World Bank, Transparency International Agency and the United Nations Development Programme.

According to the World Bank (1997), corruption is the illegal use of public resources or funds for personal gains. For Transparency International (2009) corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private advantages. Similarly, corruption is described as the ill use of public power, office or authority for private benefit (United Nations Development Programme, 2004). These definitions only addressed corruption in the public sector or abuse of public powers; however, corruption also exists in the private sectors and at the individual level.

According to Folarin (2011), corruption is a broad term that describes immoral acts, such acts may include embezzlement, bribery, fraud, dishonesty, perjury, indiscipline, among others. Olken and Pande (2012) also stressed that act of corruption includes larceny and stealing, deceit and graft, contracts and procurement inflation, nepotism, favouritism and cronyism, extortion, tax evasion, trading of confidential information, and money laundering.

For the purpose of this paper, corruption is defined as any unethical conduct perpetrated by a group or employee of an organisation (public or private) which breaches the standards or sways the principles and policies of the organisation for the purpose of private or personal benefits. Therefore, police corruption can be described as the abuse and misuse of police power or any unethical conduct (including omission to act) perpetrated by police personnel which violates the standards, code of conducts, principles and the policies of the police force for personal or collective gains.

Police corruption is one of the significant challenges facing police departments in this modern time. It appears to be a universal phenomenon recurring in all society around the world- in developed, developing and underdeveloped nations (Sahin, 2010). Police activities and corruption go hand in hand; in some ways, corruption appears to be ingrained in policing (Ejikman, 2006). Sherman (1978) noted that corruption is a major feature of every police institution; every police department around the world has witnessed one scandal or the other at a point in time. Newburn (1999) also stressed that corruption is a phenomenon common in all police agencies in all societies and stages of police history; it is pervasive at all levels, and goes beyond operational officers and taking or soliciting for bribes. Similarly, Punch (2009, p.10) submitted that 'corruption is found in virtually all countries, in all forces and at all level of police organisation'.

Thus, police corruption is multifaceted and usually surrounded by ambiguity (Sahin, 2010). In general, it is characterised by collective participation, whether by a small group, special task squad or a substantial subdivision of the force rather than individual and largely fostered by leadership and organisational structure, an available opportunity which often vary within agencies and departments, the nature of police work and police culture (Ejikman, 2006). Withdraw and Dailey (2004) opined that certain elements which are embedded in the nature of police work predispose officers to corruption. Withdraw and Dailey further noted that in the process of law enforcement role, officers are frequently brought into contact with violators of the law who are willing to do whatever it takes (including giving bribes) in order to get away. As law enforcement agents who hold discretionary power to act or not to act at a particular situation, police officers have a significant opportunity to accept bribe and overlook crimes especially when there is no close supervision and where they are aware that the leadership or organisational structure is too loose to make them accountable for their action and in action.

Additionally, the underlying misconducts that form police corruption are, in most cases, concealed by the superior officers who are often part of the whole picture. Police profession, according to Agbiboa (2015b) is inextricably linked to multiple characters which are continually swerved as situation demands. While describing the complex nature of corruption in the institutions of police and the multiplicity of police behaviour in Europe and America, Punch (2009, p.3) observed that:

The actors at all levels have multiple personalities and identities and slip continually between them, espousing the official paradigm at one moment while acknowledging the operational code at the other. Police officers learn to become shrewd and crafty chameleons, opportunistically and instinctively changing colour to fit the arena, audience, and shifting occupational roles.

Hence, clandestineness and deception are inextricably features of the police organisation. Roebuck and Barker (1974) identified typologies of police corruption which includes corruption of the authority, kickbacks, opportunistic theft, shakedowns and internal payoffs. Corruption of authority involves an executive police officer(s) receiving unjustified benefits simply because he or she occupies an important position in the law enforcement institution. These undeserved gains may be in the form of material gifts, discounts on merchandise, and cash among others (Arrigo & Claussen, 2003). Corrupt officer(s) often presents such benefits as tokens from a respectable philanthropist for his efficient performance in the police work. In addition, it also involves the diversion of resources meant to support and improve police operations and projects by superior officers (Roebuck & Barker, 1974). Kickbacks as a form of police corruption involve

an officer(s) receiving bribes from private institutions or individuals (usually night-club and bar owners, lawyers, cab drivers, and towing agents) who intend to advance their clientele or who need police for the effective operation of their activities. Through kickbacks, these groups develop good relations with police in order to ease their private transactions (Arrigo & Claussen, 2003). Opportunistic theft is a form of police corruption generally perpetrated by operational officers in charge of the investigation of crime and accidents scenes. These officers have the privileges of entering and assessing crime scenes and materials; some of them exploit these privileges by obtaining material goods or money from crime scenes for personal use or by removing (in collusion with the suspect) valuable evidence from the scene in return for some rewards from the suspect or to intimidate and extort the suspect (Roebuck & Barker, 1974).

In addition, shakedowns as a form of police corruption occur when officers solicit inducement for overlooking a criminal offence, or not presenting evidence that incriminates a suspect, or not making an arrest, or not investigating a case properly. Shakedowns usually arise when corrupt officers are put in charge of policing drug and human traffickers' routes (Roebuck & Barker, 1974). Finally, internal payoffs are usually perpetrated within police institution especially between superior and junior officers. Officers who want to be posted for a special job assignment, work for certain hours in a week or want to be promoted may be required to induce other officers in charge of personnel management and administration (Bucak, 2009). The implications of police corruption are immense. Generally, it undermines the legitimacy of the police institution and damages police reputation for trustworthiness, and above all, it jeopardizes police-community relations which play a vital role in effective policing (Roebuck & Barker, 1974).

3.2 Personnel's Wellbeing and Challenges of Policing in Nigeria

The police force is the most feasible and indispensable subsystem of the criminal justice system. Generally, the institution of police is considered as a body that initiates entry point into the criminal justice system, operates within communities and provides regular and direct contact with the general public (Hills, 2012). The police, according to Dambazau (2009), is a unique institution among other components of the criminal justice system because its activities and decisions have a profound effect on the existence of the general public. Therefore, the responsibilities of the police cannot be overemphasised.

Police responsibilities include the enforcement of law, prevention and detection of criminal activity, apprehension of criminal suspects, investigation of criminal activities and other violations of law, promotion and preservation of civil order and safety, provision of emergency assistance to the general public, protection of human rights and freedoms, management and control of traffic and resolution of conflicts among others (see Section 4, Part II of the Police Act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990). In carrying out these responsibilities, police officers are required to engage in random patrol of neighbourhoods, respond to emergency calls, stop and search suspected individuals, investigate crimes, make and process arrests, debrief criminal suspects (victim and witness) and take statement, gather prosecution evidence, give evidence in court, foster good relationship with the public and educate the public on how to help police to prevent crimes (Deflem & Hauptman, 2015; Hills, 2012).

Generally, officers at the lower cadre (operational officers) in the police force are responsible for most of these activities. In the course of exercising their duties, they are more likely to sustain injuries, get ill and lose their lives (Karimu, 2015). For instance, some officers who are patrol agents are required to carry out their responsibilities in dangerous and inaccessible areas such as slums, drug zones, mountains and coastal areas. Also, most of them are susceptible to infections and diseases while responding to emergency situations such as accidents, disasters and injured suspects and victims of crime (Ojo, 2014). As a result of the dangerous and tasking nature of their job, many police officers have sustained serious injuries (temporary and permanent), some have developed mental health problems, while others have lost their lives while attempting to arrest criminal suspects and restore orderliness (Okereke, 1995).

To mitigate these challenges, there is a need for continuous improvement in officers' morale and provision of adequate apparatus. Bowles and Cooper (2009) noted that behind the mind of every career individual or employee is a desire for a favourable welfare at work and a conducive working environment. A favourable employees' welfare and working condition, according to Bowles and Cooper increase employees' commitment and make them better and more productive workers. Also, Gholami and Salihu (2018) observed that effective and efficient police activities are determined by officers' welfare (including favourable

incentives, conducive working environment, safety and training etc.), access to essential operational apparatus and public support.

Moreover, using Effort-Reward Imbalance (ERI) theory, Siegrist (2016) claimed that work role is on the basis of a social contract (between employee and employer) where rewards are mutually defined and parties expect some kind of reciprocity. Employees spent effort at work as part of the social contract in return for adequate rewards. The rewards are usually in the form of wages, esteem, career opportunities and job security. Siegrist further noted that failure (of the employer) to reciprocate adequately for the efforts spent (by the employee), in term of low rewards received, may provoke negative emotions and stress in the exposed party. In other words, positive emotions induced by appropriate social rewards stimulate employees' well-being and productivity. Also, Bakker, Christel, Johannes and Wilmar (2000) adopted this model in their study where they established that workers who experienced an effort-reward imbalance at work recounted different dimensions of strains (burnout) such as emotional fatigue and depersonalisation which frequently affect their productivity and commitment.

Similarly, Weiss and Cropanzano (1996) using Affective Events Theory (AET), explained that employees' cognitions, emotions, mental states (internal stimuli) and reactions to incidents (forms of rewards and incentives) at work environment play an important role in their performance, commitment, and job satisfaction. Positive-inducement (e.g. incentives) and negative-inducement (e.g. lack of safety, benefits and poor working condition) are emotional incidents at the workplace that have a significant psychological effect on employees' job satisfaction and performance.

Accordingly, a favourable police welfare in term of reasonable earnings (wages, salaries and incentives), health care and safety program, and other welfare benefits are essential in boosting officers' morale and commitment to the job as well as making them better and more productive police officers. In effect, it will enhance effective and efficient police activities (Gocke, 1945). Provision of a reasonable welfare package according to Seltzer, Alone, and Howard (1996), boosts officers' confidence in the job, increases their self-esteem and sense of belonging, and practically makes them effectual. However, in a situation where officers' welfare is lacking or not adequately provided for, officers may not put in their best in carrying out their responsibilities. Besides, it may lead them to engage in unlawful activities.

In Nigeria, the wellbeing of (operational) police officers is a key factor that continues to hinder personnel efficiency. Officers' welfare package and entitlements are neither attractive nor favourable (Hills, 2012). Adebayo (2005) argued that Nigerian police has witnessed decades of underfunding, the absence of promotion, undesirable living and working condition and neglect of the general welfare of rank and file officers who perform basic police duties in Nigerian communities. Besides, officers' allowances and emoluments are often not paid when due, their quarters are deplorable. Also, those who suffered injuries on the job are not catered for; likewise, those who died in the line of duty are not given appropriate burial rites and their families are not usually given the required compensations (Karimu, 2015).

The consequences of these on officers' motivation and commitment to the job are not far-fetched. Owen (2014) pointed out that the end result of the neglected police welfare in Nigeria are evident in the increasing level of unchecked crimes, illicit activities and insecurity in the country; indiscipline among officers and inhuman treatment many Nigerians have suffered in the hands of police officers. Similarly, Agbibo (2015b) noted that failure of the government to provide adequate welfare for police officers (particularly the rank and file) is apparent in poor response to emergency situations and maintenance of order and officers' involvement in illegitimate activities. Oluwaniyi (2011) reported that because of the meagre income and incentives given to officers, all roadblocks and patrols in community streets and highways in Nigeria have become a business enterprise where police harass and extort money from the motorists and other road users. Also, arbitrary arrests of innocent Nigerians for the purpose of getting bail charges are now the order of the day among the police personnel.

Furthermore, the apparent dismal performance of the NPF cannot be totally attributed to the neglect or poor state of personnel's welfare, rather scholars have also affirmed that the essential police resources are not sufficient enough to safeguard lives and properties in Nigerian communities. Police officers do not have access to vital operational apparatus such as functional police posts and patrol vehicles with digital communication facilities such as computers, internet and database, camera drones, police radio, interrogation apparatus among others (Gholami & Salihu, 2018). Availability of these tools would have enhanced and

simplified police operations in crime control, response to an emergency situation, call for backup and speedy exchange of information between the police and other law enforcement agencies when necessary (Solar, 2015).

Personnel is increasingly exposed to avoidable risks by patrolling (on foot and without appropriate weapons) inaccessible and dangerous places that could have been conveniently monitored through drone surveillance system (Gholami & Salihu, 2018). Gholami and Salihu stressed that some police stations lack basic facilities such as running water, electricity, flush toilet, resting and changing rooms. Also, 24-hour functioning telephone hotlines which people can easily dial or call when in trouble or for emergency purposes are not available in virtually all police posts in Nigeria. It is, therefore, practically impossible for Nigerians to reach the nearby police station for assistance. All these inadequacies, according to Mohammed (2013) are consequences of mismanagement and embezzlement of police funds meant to provide the needs and improve operations.

4. Materials and Methods

Nigeria operates a unified police force with jurisdictions in all states in the country. The police command in Nigeria is categorised into 12 major divisions. Ilorin Emirate (the focus of this study) is the capital city of Kwara state, located in the North-Central geopolitical zone of Nigeria. It is an ancient city with a population of over 777,667, which makes it the sixth largest urban centre in Nigeria in terms of population (NBS, 2016). Administratively, Ilorin is divided into 3 local government areas. Furthermore, Ilorin and other cities in Kwara state are categorised (alongside 2 other neighbouring states: Kogi and Ekiti) under Zone 8 Division in the Nigeria Police Command. The police staff strength in Kwara state is about 4,325 officers (NPF, 2018). However, the total number of police officers (executive and rank and file officers) serving in Ilorin is not known because there are no official figures available to the public.

Thus, the population of this study includes all junior or operational police personnel serving in Ilorin Emirate, the capital city of Kwara State, Nigeria. Since it is not possible to cover or include all the officers, a variety of sampling techniques including convenience and purposive sampling were employed to select samples for this study. The convenience sampling was used to select a total of 200 junior or operational police officers (Sergeants, Corporals and Constables) from all police divisions in Ilorin Metropolis, and purposive sampling technique was used to select 2 Superintendent Officers. The selection of the 2 Superintendent Officers was considered necessary in order to corroborate the opinions of the junior officers. They were selected from two districts (Police Division A and C) in Ilorin Metropolis. It should be noted, that the researcher initially requested to interview the heads of police divisions (Divisional Police Officers: DPOs) in Ilorin or the next in command, the requests were declined. However, two divisions (A and C) later recommended Superintendent Officers each to participate in the interview. Thus, these two officers participated voluntarily with the approval of their superior officers.

Furthermore, a structured questionnaire and open-ended interview were the research instruments used in data collection. The questionnaire was used to gather quantitative information from the selected rank and file officers. It was considered appropriate in this kind of study given the nature of their everyday jobs and the rules guiding their operations. In addition, police protocol prohibits them from attending to unofficial matters while on duty; also, they may be stressed out after their daily working hours. For these reasons, they cannot respond to questions if other methods were adopted.

Many of them were approached at their various posts- roadblocks, checkpoints, patrols and police stations around Ilorin where they were given the questionnaires. They were told to complete them at their leisure. Initially, a total of 375 questionnaires were distributed out of which 200 were returned and well completed. The questionnaires were divided into 3 parts: the first covered the socio and demographic information of respondents- age, gender, education, and rank, the second part centred on questions relating to officers' perception of corruption in NPF and accessibility to modern operational apparatus and the third part covered issues relating to officers' well-being and efficiency. In addition, the contents of the questionnaire were evaluated by 2 research experts in police study from the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ilorin, Nigeria for validity purpose.

Additionally, the qualitative data was gathered through a phone interview with the 2 Superintendent Officers. The officers were fully informed of the objectives of the study and assured of their anonymity. Since

it was not possible to conduct the interview in their offices and while on duty, each officer provided a mobile/telephone number and fixed a date (off-duty) for the interview. Each interview lasted for about 20 minutes. Finally, the questionnaire information was coded and analysed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). Frequency and percentage distributions were generated and correlation on some responses relating to the research objectives was made. Also, thematic analysis was used to examine the key themes within the qualitative data in relation to the objectives of the study.

5. Results

Table 1 Demographic distribution of all the respondents

| Sex | Frequency % | Age | Frequency % | Education | Frequency % | Rank/Cadre | Frequency% |
|--------------|------------------|----------|------------------|----------------|------------------|----------------|------------------|
| Male | 137(68) | 25-30 | 51 (25) | Primary Edu. | 63 (31) | Superintendent | 2 (1) |
| Female | 62 (32) | 31-35 | 83 (41) | Secondary Edu. | 112 (55.4) | Sergeant | 46 (23) |
| | | 36-40 | 44 (22) | ND/NCE | 25 (12.6) | Corporal | 83 (41) |
| | | 41-above | 24 (12) | HND/Degree | 2 (1) | Constable | 71(35) |
| Total | 202 (100) | | 202 (100) | | 202 (100) | | 202 (100) |

Source: Researcher Field Survey, 2017

Table 1 presents the socio-demographic distribution of all the respondents. The table shows that 68% of the respondents were male and 32% were female police personnel. Also, 25% of these respondents were between the ages of 25-30 years old, 41% were between 31-35 years old, 22% were 36-40 years old and 12% were between the age of 41 years and above. In addition, it can be observed from the table that 31% of the respondents had primary education, 55.4% had secondary education, 12.6% had National Diploma/National Certificate in Education and 1% had Higher Diploma Degree/Degree. Also, 1% of the respondents were Superintendent Officers, 23% were Sergeant Officers, 41% were Corporal Officers and 35% Constable Officers.

Table 2 Distribution of respondents' perception of the widespread corruption among senior police personnel.

| Items | Frequency | Percentage% |
|----------------------------|------------|-------------|
| Strongly Disagree | 0 | 0 |
| Somewhat Disagree | 0 | 0 |
| Neither agree nor disagree | 12 | 6 |
| Somewhat Agree | 76 | 38 |
| Strongly Agree | 112 | 56 |
| Total | 200 | 100 |

Source: Researcher Field Survey, 2017

Table 2 indicates that while none of the respondents strongly and somewhat disagree that there was corruption among senior police officers, 6% neither agree nor disagree; also, 38% and 56% of the respondents somewhat agree and strongly agree respectively that there was corruption among senior officers in the police force. Moreover, the respondents interviewed corroborated the above results. The first respondents (Superintendent Officer 1) stressed that

‘among the major reasons why the Nigerian police and other security institutions continue to fail Nigerians in controlling crime and restoring peace and orderliness is the unavailability of the basic equipment. The enormous amount of money earmarked in the yearly budget, intervention funds and donations meant to provide police basic amenities and finance activities have been squandered or misappropriated by some officers at the top’. Additionally, the second respondent (Superintendent Officer 2) also noted that

‘there is massive corruption in the Nigeria Police Force most especially at the top level. The impacts of the massive looting of police funds are evident in the present deplorable condition of the police stations or posts in the country and the ineffectual police services’.

The implication of these results is that there is corruption among the senior police officers who are in charge of the allocation and distribution of police resources.

Table 3 Distribution of respondents’ perception of their general welfare (income, incentives, promotion, insurance, medical health care and conducive quarters) as junior officers and availability of operational resources.

| Items | Frequency | Percentage % |
|---------------|------------|--------------|
| Very Poor | 66 | 33 |
| Somewhat poor | 94 | 47 |
| Moderate | 40 | 20 |
| Somewhat Good | 0 | 0 |
| Very Good | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 200 | 100 |

| Items | Frequency | Percentage% |
|---------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| Inadequate | 106 | 53 |
| Somewhat Inadequate | 90 | 45 |
| Neither adequate nor inadequate | 4 | 2 |
| Somewhat Adequate | 0 | 0 |
| Adequate | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 200 | 100 |

Source: Researcher Field Survey, 2017

Table 3 shows that 33% of the respondents perceived that their welfare as junior police officers (in term of incentive, reasonable income, promotion, insurance, medical care and retirement benefit) was very poor, 47% held that it was somewhat poor and 20% were of the view that it was moderate; while none of the respondents perceived their welfare to be somewhat good or very good. In addition, information gathered from the interview suggested that the general welfare of the junior police officers in the NPF was not favourable. Superintendent 1 observed that

‘... the physical conditions and working environment of most of the police stations in the country (not only Ilorin) are appalling, shattered and lack basic tools such as toilet facilities, water system, electricity and electronic office gadgets such as the computers, internet; and other communication apparatuses. Also, the welfare of officers is pitiable. The barracks and quarters are uninhabitable....., the income is meagre and the inducement funds meant to reinforce officers are not often shared, promotions are often influenced or bought, and the health care program is often not accessible.....’.

Similarly, Superintendent Officer 2 noted that

‘... there is a lack of medical services (and insurance) for the police officers and their families. In most cases, officers who sustained injuries in operation are not taken care of, they often spend out of their meagre income to treat themselves. Also, families of officers who lost their lives on duties are often not paid. Also, the entitlements- gratuity and pensions of retired officers’ are not paid’.

The implication of these results is that majority of the respondents (including the Superintendent Officers) held the perception that the welfare of junior police officers in the force was poor.

Additionally, Table 3 also indicates that 53% of the respondents were of the perception that the police operational facilities were inadequate, 45% said they were somewhat inadequate, 2% held that they were neither adequate nor inadequate, and none of the respondents held that they were adequate. Also, while responding to questions on the availability of the essential equipment, the interviewed respondents indicated

that the basic and sophisticated equipment needed for effective police operations are lacking. Superintendent 1 commented that

‘...police personnel and stations are poorly equipped. They lack all the required or essential facilities to police and secure communities. The patrol vehicles are always not in good conditions..., many police officers do not have access to communication gadgets, bulletproof vests and modern sophisticated weapons. In fact, inadequate police equipment and facilities are the major factors hampering effective police operations in Nigeria’.

In the same way, the Superintendent 2 also stated that

‘a significant number of the police posts or stations in Nigeria do not have basic communication or IT facilities such as computers and internet network, secret camera and other IT conveniences. In fact, basic office tools are absolutely lacking..., even the arms and ammunition given to officers cannot be compared with the ones usually carried by criminals’.

He further stressed that

‘one of the annoying things is that, in this 21s century, pen and papers recording system is still the common practice across all stations in Nigeria and people expect officers to perform miracles.officers are trying their best with the available resources to carry out their mandates to Nigerians; however, we cannot expect them to perform beyond what they are presently doing’.

These results clearly indicate that the essential facilities and tools needed for effective police operations are not available in the police stations.

Table 4 Distribution of respondents’ perception of corruption as an underlying factor responsible for their present welfare condition and inadequate police operational resources

| Items | Frequency | Percentage % |
|----------------------------|------------|--------------|
| Strongly Disagree | 0 | 0 |
| Somewhat Disagree | 0 | 0 |
| Neither agree nor disagree | 16 | 8 |
| Somewhat Agree | 68 | 34 |
| Strongly Agree | 116 | 58 |
| Total | 200 | 100 |

| Items | Frequency | Percentage% |
|----------------------------|------------|-------------|
| Strongly Disagree | 0 | 0 |
| Somewhat Disagree | 2 | 1 |
| Neither agree nor disagree | 22 | 11 |
| Somewhat Agree | 74 | 37 |
| Strongly Agree | 102 | 51 |
| Total | 200 | 100 |

Source: Researcher Field Survey, 2017

Furthermore, the respondents’ perception of corruption as a factor responsible for their present welfare and inadequate operational resources at the police posts is presented in Table 4. It can be observed from the table that majority (92%) of the respondents agreed that corruption is responsible for their present welfare condition as junior police officers, 8% neither agreed nor disagreed, while none of them disagreed. Similarly, 88% agreed (strongly agree and somewhat agree) that the widespread of corruption in the NPF is responsible for the inadequacies of police operational apparatus, 11% neither agreed nor disagrees, and 1% somewhat disagree.

Table 5 Correlation analysis of the respondents' perception of corruption among the senior police personnel and the welfare of junior officers.

| Variables | Mean | SD | Significant Level | Correlation Coefficient (r-value) | p-value |
|--------------------------------|-------|-------|-------------------|-----------------------------------|---------|
| Corruption | 65.49 | 7.480 | 0.01 | 0.825 | 0.003 |
| the welfare of junior officers | 65.12 | 8.290 | | | |

Source: Researcher Field Survey, 2017. $p < 0.01$

Moreover, table 5 indicates that the calculated r-value = 0.825 is greater than 0.5 ($0.825 > 0.5$), also the estimated p-value = 0.003 is less than the level of significance 0.01 (i.e. $p < 0.01$). Therefore, there is a positive correlation between corruption among the senior police officers and the present well-being of the junior police personnel in (NPF) Ilorin metropolis of Kwara State, Nigeria.

Table 6 Correlation analysis of the respondents' perception of the corruption among the senior police personnel and availability of operational resources.

| Variables | Mean | SD | Significant Level | Correlation Coefficient (r-value) | p-value |
|---------------------------------------|--------|-------|-------------------|-----------------------------------|---------|
| Corruption | 59.616 | 8.431 | 0.01 | 0.971 | 0.000 |
| Availability of operational resources | 61.891 | 7.257 | | | |

Source: Researcher Field Survey, 2017

Similarly, table 6 shows that the calculated r-value $0.971 > 0.5$, also the p-value $0.000 <$ the level of significance 0.01 (i.e. $p < 0.01$). Thus, there is a correlation between corruption among the senior police officers and the inadequate operational resources available to safeguard communities in Ilorin metropolis of Kwara State, Nigeria.

6. Discussion

From the findings presented, it can be observed that the welfare of operational or rank and file police officers (in term of incentives, reasonable income, medical care and safety program, and retirement benefit etc.) in Ilorin Emirate is poor, and there are inadequate operational facilities (such as IT gadgets, sophisticated arms and ammunition) required for effective police operations in Ilorin Emirate of Kwara State, Nigeria. These challenges were attributed to the massive misappropriation of police funds and resources by the senior or executive police officers in the force.

In addition, the correlation analysis suggested positive relationships between corruption among senior officers who are at the helm of police affairs and the present poor welfare condition of junior officers and inadequacies of operational resources in police posts in Ilorin Emirate of Kwara state, Nigeria. The implications of these results are: the embezzlement of police funds and resources in the NPF is blameable for underpayment, inadequate accommodation, poor medical and health care and safety program for junior police officers; absence of basic police equipment, inadequate operational vehicles, weapons and erratic communication facilities that would have assisted police in crime control and maintenance of order.

Accordingly, the strain of the neglected officers' welfare combined with inadequacies of the resources appears to have made operational officers whose obligations are to control crime in Nigerian communities through patrol and roadblock formation, to put less effort into the job. Officers' appears to have lost enthusiasm for the job as a result of the failure of the government to adequately reciprocate the efforts they spent at work in term of reasonable income, payment of incentives, and the avenue for promotion opportunities, provision of medical and health care program and conducive living and working environments. In other words, the positive inducements officers expected to receive from their employer or superiors due to the dangerous and tasking nature of their work is practically lacking; thus, the experiences that emerged (from such negative stimuli) at the workplace seems to produce certain strains and fatigue in officers. Consequently, their drive and commitment to safeguard communities are affected.

The findings, therefore, corroborate the results of the previous studies that attributed the ineptitude of the Nigerian police to poor personnel's welfare, inadequate facilities and corruption that has pervaded the institution. For instance, the Human Rights Watch (2010a) found that Nigeria police has been grossly incapacitated over the past years in its role to adequately police communities and protect lives and properties due to the insufficient and/or unavailability of modern police equipment. The Nigerian police personnel are left with limited resources to patrol communities and control crimes. In addition, Adebayo (2005) found that officers' perceived negative workplace fairness, the absence of incentives and corrupt leadership in the Nigerian police manifest in officers' indiscipline, public extortion, disrespect for the rule of law and fundamental human rights, inaction and neglect of crime and services.

Additionally, in a study titled pay, reference points and police performance, Mas (2006) found that police incentive and/or working condition that is below a reference point reduce job performance. Mas noted that in the months following the loss of arbitration by the New Jersey police, the rate of arrest and prosecution declined and crime reports increased. The findings strongly suggest that the more law enforcement agents are paid, the better they are committed to their job. In other words, when officers are paid wages/salaries below what is expected or desired, they are more likely to overlook crimes and violators of the law, but when adequate salary and other demands are received they are more willing to work and committed to their job. Thus, consideration for a favourable police welfare and working condition with regard to a reference point affect performance and workplace behaviour.

7. Conclusion and recommendation

This study examined the phenomenon of corruption among executive police officers in the NPF as an underlying factor responsible for the deficient officers' welfare, inadequate police operational apparatus and the overall impact on the ability of the police to safeguard lives and properties in Ilorin metropolis. From the findings presented, the author, therefore, concludes that corruption (mismanagement and misappropriation of police funds) among senior or executive police officers in the NPF is responsible for the poor welfare condition of junior or operational police officers and inadequate facilities as well as the inability of the police to exercise their mandates to people in Ilorin Emirate of Kwara state, Nigeria.

Thus, to eradicate corruption in the Nigeria police force, there is a need to ensure transparency in the police budgetary proposals, implementation and procurement processes. Analysts have stated at different fora that among the factors that encourage corruption in the Nigerian public sector are secrecy in the budgetary and its implementation and procurement processes. As Osoba (1996) has noted, most of the public institutions hardly give a full list of items budgeted for. In most cases, the overall figures needed by institutions are presented. Therefore, Nigerian authority should take appropriate steps to improve budgetary transparency not only in the police but also in all the public institutions. The authority should ensure that every item or activity for which provisions are being made are clearly indicated. In addition, there is a need for a periodic and comprehensive assessment of how the funds and resources allocated to the police force are expended. The assessment should be carried out by an authorised institution with the supervision of the anti-corruption agency. Moreover, all the 12 police commands in the country should be mandated to publish their procurement and financial reports periodical.

Furthermore, officers' welfare can be improved by resuscitating and equipping the existing police welfare packages (like the insurance and health care program, safety measures, junior officers' housing scheme among others) through adequate funding and monitoring. Also, all personnel's incentives and allowances should be removed from the Nigerian police's expenditure. Officers should receive their monetary incentives and other benefits the same way their monthly salaries are paid directly to their various bank accounts by the federal government through the ministry of finance. In addition, there is a need to re-jig the support program for officers that suffered (temporary and permanent) injuries, those with mental health issues and families of officers that lost their lives on duty. Finally, there is a need to recognise the strong connection between the well-being of the operational police officers, security and safety of citizenry and the entire nation.

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