



A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE CONCEPT "TRUTH" IN THE UPANIṢADS AND  
THE SUTTA-PIṬAKA

By  
Kazuhiro Yamamoto

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
Program of Sanskrit  
Department of Oriental Languages  
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The Graduate School, Silpakorn University has approved and accredited the Thesis title of "A Comparative Study of the Concept "Truth" in the Upaniṣads and the Sutta-Piṭaka" submitted by Mr.Kazuhiro Yamamoto as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Sanskrit.

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The purpose of this comparative study is to find out a philosophical trend underlying the Upaniṣads and the Sutta-piṭaka by analysing the concept “truth” (Skt. *satya*, Pāli *sacca*).

Admittedly, the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism have their own philosophical backgrounds. A longing for the eternal (*nitya*), which is seen everywhere in the old Upaniṣads, is not irrelevant to the theistic tendency inherited from the Vedic literatures. On the other hand, early Buddhism has its origin among a new group of thinkers, called “Śramaṇas/Samaṇas,” who are mostly atheists; some are materialists or sensationalists, and some are sceptics.

However, this study concludes that, in regard to the pursuit of truth, early Buddhism is an authentic follower of the old Upaniṣads: Firstly, in both of them, “intuitive knowledge” (Skt. *jñāna*, Pali *paññā*) is a clue to the pursuit of truth. Secondly, “intuitive knowledge” is understood as “transcendental knowledge” or “universal knowledge,” namely, this knowledge is that through which this whole ephemeral world is to be understood, or that through which the whole existence of this ephemeral world is established. Thirdly, both of them speak of the destruction of the world. When this ephemeral world is completely destroyed, the true state of the world is revealed. Fourthly, ultimately the true knowledge or the true intuitive knowledge must imply “becoming.” This must be a true meaning of “way” (Skt. *mārga*, Pāli *maggā*).

Besides, the Buddha is still a reformer of Indian orthodox philosophy, because his teaching brings about a great influence in the world, showing the possibility of a new philosophy through overcoming asceticism (*saṃnyāsa*).

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# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

This chapter mainly serves two purposes. The first is to clarify the question which should be asked in this study. The second is to provide the features of this study; its target, its limitations, its methodology, and so on.

### *Background of the Question*

This study is a documentary research on the Upaniṣads and the Sutta-piṭaka. The name “Upaniṣad” is not given to a certain book. It stands for a group of Sanskrit texts containing philosophical thoughts. For example, the *Muktikā-upaniṣad* gives the list of one hundred and eight Upaniṣads. However, in this study “the Upaniṣads” mean the old and authentic ones. There are ten Upaniṣads, the most traditional and authoritative ones, which are commented by Śaṅkara; the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, the *Chāndogya*, the *Taittirīya*, the *Aitareya*, the *Kena*, the *Kaṭha*, the *Īśa*, the *Muṇḍaka*, the *Praśna*, and the *Māṇḍūkya*. Traditionally, thirteen Upaniṣads are thought as major, which are the above ten and the Śvetāśvatara, the *Kauṣītaki*, and the *Maitrāyaṇīya*. These are the old Upaniṣads which this study has within its scope.

The Sutta-piṭaka is one part of the Pāli canon or the Ti-piṭaka, which is the earliest collection of the Buddha’s teachings. The texts are composed in Pāli (a dialect of the Magadha kingdom). The Pāli canon or the Ti-piṭaka has the three divisions; Vinaya, Sutta, and Abhidhamma. Moreover, the Sutta-piṭaka has five divisions called Nikāyas; the *Dīgha-nikāya*, the *Majjhima-nikāya*, the *Samyutta-nikāya*, the *Aṅguttara-nikāya*, and the *Khuddaka-nikāya*.

As for the date of the old Upaniṣads, although it is quite obscure as usual in the ancient history of India, some old Upaniṣads, such as the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, the *Chāndogya*, the *Taittirīya*, the *Aitareya*, the *Kauṣītaki*, and the *Kena* are surely pre-Buddhistic, and probably they belong to the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. On the other hand, there are some old Upaniṣads, which are post-Buddhistic and even under the influence of the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga, and which possibly belong to about 400 or 300 B.C.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See S. Radhakrishnan, ed. trans. **The Principal Upaniṣads** (India: HarperCollins, 1953), 22, and S. Radhakrishnan, **Indian Philosophy**, vol. 2 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), 141-142.

According to the Theravāda tradition, the Buddha was born in 623 B.C. and passed away in 543 B.C. Immediately after his death the first council was held to collect and preserve his teachings. Then, the whole Pāli-canon has been compiled probably around the third century B.C., and was written down in the last century B.C.<sup>2</sup>

### *Statements of the Question*

This is a philosophical study on the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism. Generally in ancient India, the people's main interest lies in a religious practice and a spiritual cultivation, not in a theoretical speculation. However, it does not necessarily mean that they have no interest in the philosophical quest for the eternal, the Immortal. It must be one of the issues which should be clarified by this study.

The philosophical themes put into question by the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism are still broad and multifarious. Then, this study focuses on one theme, "truth" (Skt. *satya*, Pāli *sacca*). The question how to understand and realise "truth" is verily to be answered through this whole study. In the old Upaniṣads, the truth is called Brahma, which is implied in such phrases as "through which the unheard becomes heard, the unknown becomes known, and the unrecognised becomes recognised" (*yenāśrutam śrutam bhavaty amataṃ mataṃ avijñātam vijñātam*), "not this, not this" (*neti neti*), and "not gross not minute" (*asthūlam anaṇu*). On the other hand, in early Buddhism, the truth is the Dhamma, which is thought of as something "profound, difficult to see, and difficult to understand" (*gambhīro duddaso duranubodho*) in the *Mahāpadāna-sutta* of the *Dīgha-nikāya*. Anyway, what is called "truth" here as neither natural nor empirical. The truth is somehow beyond our transitory and relative world.

By the way, in early Buddhism, some scholars often emphasise the refutation of metaphysics, or the rejection of questions on what is beyond our experience. There is no room for doubt that such a refutation is found even in the quite sophisticated form in the texts of early Buddhism. But, there are two questions. The first question is whether such refutation of dogmatic metaphysics is only found in early Buddhism. Is it more likely that such refutation is already seen in the old Upaniṣads? The second question is whether this refutation of metaphysics means the giving up of the philosophical pursuit of truth. Is it more likely that it implies another question "how the philosophical pursuit of truth is possible even under such refutation of metaphysics"? In regard to this second question, this study pays

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<sup>2</sup> See Oskar von Hinüber, **A Handbook of Pāli Literature** (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 2001), 88.

attention to the concept “transcendental,” which Paul Deussen indicates in his reading the old Upaniṣads, whereas he sometimes reads the Upaniṣadic texts under the strong, sometimes too strong, influence of a so-called transcendental philosophy. Admittedly, his indication is highly suggestive, but this tendency is still to be understood in the context of the Indian thought. This study supposes that this question is already asked by the commentators of the old Upaniṣads and the Sutta-piṭaka.

### *Significance of the Question*

The truth, the theme of this study, is ultimately “one” (*eka*) in both the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism. However, this truth is not questioned immediately as “one.” In the old Upaniṣads, Brahma is first questioned as “conditional.” In early Buddhism, the truth is often questioned in the twofold or fourfold way. There are two points to be considered.

Firstly, it may be understood thus: the conditional truth (Pāli *sammuti-sacca*) --- or the empirical truth --- should be first questioned, and then the unconditional truth (Pāli *paramattha-sacca*) --- the absolute truth --- should be questioned. Such understanding is not necessarily appropriate, if the division between the conditional and the unconditional is supposed as something empirical or intellectual. Strictly speaking, the conditional truth should be understood not as the empirical truth --- which may be unworthy to be called “truth” in a philosophical point of view ---, but as the non-empirical truth to be understood along with the empirical existence. In this point, this study refers to the concept “transcendental,” as mentioned above. Secondly, the unconditional implies that it transcends this worldly existence, although it does not necessarily mean that it stands outside this world --- this primitive view is verily negated by the old Upaniṣads ---. The unconditional or the Absolute --- called the Immortal in ancient India --- is still to be questioned, based on the realisation of the truth which is understood along with the empirical and ephemeral existence, and also based on the development of such realisation. Moreover, there are two things to be questioned about the Immortal, “the destruction of the world” and “way” (Skt. *mārga*, Pāli *magga*).

### *Goal and Objective*

This is a comparative study on the old Upaniṣads and the Sutta-piṭaka, focusing

on the theme “truth.” This study first admits that the old Upaniṣads and the Sutta-piṭaka have their own philosophical backgrounds. It also admits that they start with their own questions, and that sometimes they seem to go forward in opposite directions. However, this study’s purport does not consist in simply presenting different or similar philosophical characteristics between them, much less, in disputing their relative superiority or inferiority. This study’s ultimate aim is to find out a philosophical trend underlying the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism, through reading them in their respective context, according to some phases of the pursuit of truth, such as “intuitive knowledge,” “dispassion,” “the destruction of the world,” and so on, also with the help of their own traditional commentaries of the later period. Additionally, this study mentions a small --- but perhaps significant --- difference between them.

#### *Scope or Delimitation of the Study*

This study is a philosophical consideration on the concept “truth.” This study focuses only on the texts which are suitable for our philosophical investigation --- in fact, both the old Upaniṣads and the Ti-piṭaka have quite many texts which should be understood as literary or artistic expressions ---, because it is indispensable not to mix up philosophical expressions and literary or artistic ones, although we admit that literary or artistic expressions perhaps approach the truth more immediately and more directly than philosophical arguments and they sometimes even describes the Absolute, the true view of the world in the intuitive form.

The next limitation is related to Mahāyāna Buddhism. The texts of Sanskrit Buddhism are not included in what is called “the early Buddhist texts” here. This study regards the Pāli canon or the Ti-piṭaka as representative of the early Buddhist texts. In general, Mahāyāna Buddhism is out of the scope of this study.

Moreover, the most important limitation is concerned with the primary sources of this study, the old Upaniṣads and the Sutta-piṭaka. As mentioned above, this study considers the old Upaniṣads as thirteen principal Upaniṣads, and the Sutta-piṭaka as five Nikāyas. However, this study intensively investigates the ancient prose Upaniṣads --- such as the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, the *Chāndogya*, the *Taittirīya*, the *Kena*, and so on --- among the old Upaniṣads, and the *Dīgha-nikāya* and the *Majjhima-nikāya* among the Sutta-piṭaka. In the case of the old Upaniṣads, it is not that the whole old Upaniṣads would have a certain consistency in the philosophical tendency. It is likely that philosophical investigations should be done in each Upaniṣad, or perhaps even in each chapter. In regard to the theme “truth,”

this study should attach importance to the ancient prose Upaniṣads, considering the difference in dealing with the theme “truth” between the ancient prose Upaniṣads and the other old Upaniṣads. In the case of the Sutta-piṭaka, it is doubtful that the Pāli canon has no transition under the passage of time. Surely Abhidhamma belongs to the later period, and also very possibly even some parts of the Sutta-piṭaka belongs to the comparatively later period--- some are commentarial texts and some are literary texts---, whereas this study can not be deeply involved in the investigation of the historical strata of those texts. Thus, this study questions the concept “truth,” concentrating on the *Dīgha-nikāya*, the *Majjhima-nikāya*, many Suttas of which indubitably belong to the most ancient part of the Sutta-piṭaka.

### *Methodology of the Study*

This study is a documentary research and its primary sources are the old Upaniṣads and the Sutta-piṭaka. The most important secondary sources are Śaṅkara’s commentaries on the Upaniṣads and Buddhaghosa’s commentaries on the Sutta-piṭaka. Śaṅkara or Śaṅkarācārya [the seventh or eighth century A.D.] is the first and well-known commentator of the old Upaniṣads. As mentioned already, he commented ten principal Upaniṣads. Buddhaghosa [the fourth and fifth centuries A.D.] is the first and the most famous commentator of the early Buddhist texts. The following commentaries on the Sutta-piṭaka are attributed to him: *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī* (the commentary on the *Dīgha-nikāya*), *Papañcasūdanī* (the commentary on the *Majjhima-nikāya*), *Sāratthappakāsinī* (the commentary on the *Samyutta-nikāya*), *Manorathapūraṇī* (the commentary on the *Aṅguttara-nikāya*), *Paramatthajotikā*, *Dhammapada-aṭṭhakathā*, and so on.

There are mainly two reasons why this study consults these commentaries. The first reason is the oldness of the primary sources. As mentioned above, some texts of the old Upaniṣads belong to the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. Some teachings of the Sutta-piṭaka are preserved just after the Buddha-life. It is almost impossible to investigate such ancient texts without the commentaries on them. The second reason is the specific characteristic of these primary sources. The original texts in both the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism are formatted especially for recitation and memorisation. Therefore they are not suitable for philosophical arguments at all. In the history of Indian philosophy, the form of “commentary” (Skt. *bhāṣya*, Pāli *aṭṭhakathā*) is a significant methodology to interpret these texts from a philosophical or religious point of view and to hand down these interpretations to posterity. Besides, this study tries to understand the traditional

interpretations about the original texts, through reading the commentaries on them. But it also tries to understand a philosophical significance of these interpretations from the viewpoint of modern philosophy, because these interpretations are not only traditional and authoritative, but also philosophically suggestive even in our time.

### *Source Materials of the Study*

The main source materials of this study are the old Upaniṣads and the Sutta-piṭaka (especially, the *Dīgha-nikāya* and the *Majjhima-nikāya*). As for the texts of the old Upaniṣads, this study uses “Works of Śāṅkarācārya in Original Sanskrit Vol. 1 - ten Principal Upaniṣads with Śāṅkarabhāṣya” (*Śrīśāṅkarācāryagranthāvalī prathamō bhago - Īśādideśopaniṣadaḥ Śāṅkarabhāṣyasametāḥ*) (Śāṅkarācārya 1978), also referring to “Eighteen Principal Upaniṣads” (Limaye, ed. 1958) and “The Principal Upaniṣads” (Radhakrishnan, ed. trans. 1953). The following English translations are also consulted: “The Principal Upaniṣads” (Radhakrishnan, ed. trans. 1953), “The Thirteen Principal Upaniṣads” (Hume 1995), “The Sacred Books of the East Vols. 1 and 15 – the Upaniṣads part I and II” (Müller 1975), and so on.

As for the texts of the Sutta-piṭaka, this study is based on “Syāma-raṭṭhassa Te-piṭakam (สยามรฤจฺสุตฺต เตปิฏกํ)” of Mahamakut Buddhist University (มหามกุฏราชวิทยาลัย พ.ศ. 2523). The following English and Thai translations are also consulted: “Dialogues of Buddha” (Davids, trans. 1995), “Ten Suttas from Dīgha Nikāya – Long discourse of the Buddha” (Burma Piṭaka Association, trans. 1984), “The Collection of the Middle Length Sayings” (Horner, trans. 2004), “Phratraipidok Thai Translation: Royal Edition (พระไตรปิฎก ภาษาไทย ฉบับหลวง)” (กรมการศาสนา กระทรวงศึกษาธิการ พ.ศ. 2525), and so on.

Moreover, as for the texts of Śāṅkara’s commentaries on the Upaniṣads, this study is based on “Works of Śāṅkarācārya in Original Sanskrit Vol. 1 - ten Principal Upaniṣads with Śāṅkarabhāṣya” (Śāṅkarācārya 1978). As for the Buddhaghosa’s commentaries on the Sutta-piṭaka, this study uses “พระไตรปิฎกอรรถกถา-ฎีกาฉบับคอมพิวเตอร์ BUDSIR/TT V.3 for Windows” (สำนักคอมพิวเตอร์ มหาวิทยาลัยมหิดล พ.ศ. 2548).

To consider the philosophical tendency in the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism, this study refers to “Brahmasūtra-śāṅkarabhāṣyam with the Commentaries: Bhāṣyaratna-prabhā of Govindānanda, Bhāmātī of Vācaspatimīśra, Nyāyanirṇaya of Ānandagiri” (Shastri, ed. 1980), “Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosācariya” (Warren, ed. 1950), “Die Philosophie der Upanishad’s” (Deussen 1920), “Die Lehre der Upanishaden und die Anfänge des Buddhismus” (Oldenberg 1915), “Buddha – Sein Leben, Seine Lehre, Seine Gemeinde”

(Oldenberg 1923), “Die philosophische Grundlage des älteren Buddhismus” (Walleser 1904), “A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics” (C. Davids, ed. 1974), “Sakya; or Buddhist Origins” (C. Davids 1978), “คู่มือมนุษย์ ฉบับสมบูรณ์” (พุทธทาสภิกขุ พ.ศ. 2549), “L’Ātman-Brahman dans le Bouddhisme Ancien” (Bhattacharya 1973), “Brahmasūtrabhāṣya of Śaṅkarācārya” (Gambhirananda, trans. 1983), “Indian Philosophy” (Radhakrishnan 1989), “Life and thought of Śaṅkarācārya” (Pande 1998), and so on.

### *Review of Related Literature of Analysis or Previous Research*

There are three books which are highly suggestive to this study.

Paul Deussen, “Die Philosophie der Upanishad’s” (Deussen 1920). Deussen’s impressive analysis in this book provides a philosophical starting point for this study. Paul Deussen is a scholar who first pointed out the philosophical significance of the old Upaniṣads from the point of view of modern philosophy. As it is typically seen in his analysis of the sixth chapter of the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad*, his interpretation obviously surpasses dogmatic metaphysics and theistic ontology. There is a key word, “transcendental.” This study pays attention to this concept and considers its philosophical meaning. Besides, Deussen sometimes reads the Upaniṣadic texts under the strong, sometimes too strong, influence of a so-called transcendental philosophy. Therefore, this study tries to carefully investigate this concept in the context of Indian philosophy, also referring to Śaṅkara’s commentaries on the Upaniṣads and so on.

Caroline A.F. Rhys Davids, “A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics” (C. Davids, ed. 1974). This book is a translation of a book in the Abhidhamma-piṭaka, *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*. However, the introductory essay and notes by Caroline A.F. Rhys Davids include interesting suggestions which are worthy of being considered philosophically. This study pays a special attention to her analysis of *dhamma* or *dhātu*. In this analysis, the concept “the absence of entity” (*nissatta*) has an important meaning. Although this study does not necessarily agree with her view that early Buddhism consists in “non-substantialism” or “phenomenalism,” that concept “the absence of entity” is further questioned in this study.

Kamaleswar Bhattacharya, “L’Ātman-Brahman dans le Bouddhisme Ancien” (Bhattacharya 1973). This work leads this study to investigate a philosophical trend underlying the Upaniṣads and the Sutta-piṭaka. The most important point is that the Dhamma in early Buddhism is not different from Brahma in the old Upaniṣads. In this sense, this book is a support for this study to find out a common trend between the Upaniṣadic

thought and early Buddhism. Moreover, this work gives some suggestions on the absolute aspect of “truth,” for examples, “the Absolute” (*l’Absolute*) as something “void of all objective content” (*vide de tout contenu objectif*), “becoming” (*devenir*) as true “knowing” (*connaître*), and so on.

### *Scheme of Transliteration*

The original Sanskrit text in “Works of Śaṅkarācārya in Original Sanskrit Vol. 1 - ten Principal Upaniṣads with Śāṅkarabhāṣya” (Śaṅkarācārya 1978) is presented in Devanagari script. But, this study uses the Roman script. The scheme of transliteration is as follows:

#### Sanskrit

Vowels	a ā ī ū ṛ ṝ ḷ e ai o au
anusvara	ṁ
visarga	ḥ

#### Consonants

gutturals	k kh g gh ṅ
palatals	c ch j jh ṅ
cerebrals	ṭ ṭh ḍ ḍh ṇ
dentals	t th d dh n
labials	p ph b bh m
semi-vowels	y r l v
sibilants	ś (palatal sibilant) ṣ (cerebral sibilant) s (dental sibilant)
aspirate	h

Moreover, this study uses the Roman script also for the original Pāli text in “*Syāma-raṭṭhassa Te-piṭakaṃ*” (มหามกุฏราชวิทยาลัย พ.ศ. 2523) which is presented in Thai script.

#### Pāli

Vowels	a ā ī ū e o
niggahita	ṁ

## Consonants

gutturals	k kh g gh ṅ
palatals	c ch j jh ñ
cerebrals	ṭ ṭh ḍ ḍh ṇ
dentals	t th d dh n
labials	p ph b bh m
semi-vowels	y r   l v
sibilant	s
aspirate	h

*Abbreviations*

This study uses the following abbreviations for the Sanskrit names of the Upaniṣads and Śāṅkara's commentaries on them, and also for the Pāli names of the Nikāyas, the commentaries on them, and so on.

AU.	<i>Aitareya-upaniṣad</i>
AUB.	<i>Aitareya-upaniṣad-bhāṣya</i>
BU.	<i>Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad</i>
BUB.	<i>Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad-bhāṣya</i>
BŚB.	<i>Brahmaśūtra-śāṅkara-bhāṣya</i>
CU.	<i>Chāndogya-upaniṣad</i>
CUB.	<i>Chāndogya-upaniṣad-bhāṣya</i>
D.	<i>Dīgha-nikāya</i>
DA.	<i>Dīgha-nikāya-aṭṭhakathā (Sumaṅgalavilāsini)</i>
Dhp.	<i>Dhammapada</i>
ĪDUŚB.	<i>Īśa-ādi-deśa-upaniṣadaḥ Śāṅkara-bhāṣya-sametāḥ</i>
It.	<i>Itivuttaka</i>
ĪU.	<i>Īśa-upaniṣad</i>
ĪUB.	<i>Īśa-upaniṣad-bhāṣya</i>
KaU.	<i>Kaṭha-upaniṣad</i>
KaUB.	<i>Kaṭha-upaniṣad-bhāṣya</i>
KauU.	<i>Kauṣītaki-upaniṣad</i>
KeU.	<i>Kena-upaniṣad</i>

KeUB.	<i>Kena-upaniṣad-bhāṣya</i>
M.	<i>Majjhima-nikāya</i>
MA.	<i>Majjhima-nikāya-aṭṭhakathā (Papañcasūdanī)</i>
MaiU.	<i>Maitrāyaṇīya-upaniṣad</i>
MāKB.	<i>Māṇḍūkya-kārikā-bhāṣya</i>
MāU.	<i>Māṇḍūkya-upaniṣad</i>
MuU.	<i>Muṇḍaka-upaniṣad</i>
MuUB.	<i>Muṇḍaka-upaniṣad-bhāṣya</i>
PU.	<i>Praśna-upaniṣad</i>
PUB.	<i>Praśna-upaniṣad-bhāṣya</i>
S.	<i>Samyutta-nikāya</i>
ŚU.	<i>Śvetāśvatara-upaniṣad</i>
TU.	<i>Taittirīya-upaniṣad</i>
TUB.	<i>Taittirīya-upaniṣad-bhāṣya</i>
V.	<i>Visuddhimagga</i>
ขุ.ศ.	ขุททกนิกาย สุตตนิပါတ
ที.อ.	ทีฆนิกาย อฏฺฐกถา (สมงฺคลวิลาสินี)
ที.ปา.	ทีฆนิกาย ปาฎิกวคฺค
ที.ม.	ทีฆนิกาย มหาวคฺค
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ม.ม.	มชฺฉิมนิกาย มชฺฉิมปฺปนฺนาสก
ม.มู.	มชฺฉิมนิกาย มูลปฺปนฺนาสก

Besides, citations from the Upaniṣads and the commentaries on the Upaniṣads are indicated as in (IDUŚB., 1) --- the number in the reference stands for “page” ---, based on “Works of Śaṅkarācārya in Original Sanskrit Vol. 1 - ten Principal Upaniṣads with Śaṅkarabhāṣya” (*Śrīśaṅkarācāryagranthāvalī prathamo bhāgo - Īśādideśopaniṣadaḥ Śaṅkarabhāṣyasametāḥ*) (Śaṅkarācārya 1978). The verses of the Upaniṣads and the commentaries on the verses are indicated as in (BU. 1.1.1) or (BUB. 1.1.1) --- the three numbers in the reference stand for “chapter,” “section,” and “verse” ---, or as in (KeU. 1.1) or (KeUB. 1.1) --- the two numbers in the reference stand for “section” and “verse” ---, or as in (ĪU. 1) or (ĪUB. 1) --- the number in the reference stands for “verse” ---. Citations from the

Sutta-piṭaka are indicated as in (ที.ถี. 9/1/1) --- the three numbers in the reference stand for “volume,” “item,” and “page” ---, according to “Syāma-ratthassa Te-piṭakaṃ (สยามรฏฺฐสฺส เตปิฏกํ)” of Mahamakut Buddhist University (มหามกุฏราชวิทยาลัย พ.ศ. 2523). Citations from the *Dīgha-nikāya-aṭṭhakathā* and the *Majjhima-nikāya-aṭṭhakathā* are indicated as in (ที.ฉ. 1/1) or (ม.ฉ. 1/1) --- the two numbers in the reference stand for “book” and “page” ---, based on “พระไตรปิฎกอรรถกถา-ฎีกาฉบับคอมพิวเตอร์ BUDSIR/TT V.3 for Windows” (สำนักคอมพิวเตอร์ มหาวิทยาลัยมหิดล พ.ศ. 2548).

## CHAPTER 2

### CRITICAL SPIRIT AND PURSUIT FOR TRUTH

This chapter begins with surveying the philosophical backgrounds of the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism. It also considers the difficulties concerned with the philosophical inquiry into truth in both of them.

#### *Longing for the Eternal and Critical Spirit in the Old Upaniṣads*

##### ***Heritage of the tradition***

Obviously the old Upaniṣads inherit a longing for the eternal from the Vedic literatures, namely, the Saṃhitās, the Brāhmaṇas, and the Āraṇyakas. This longing for the eternal is the very core of the Upaniṣadic thought. It is undeniable that the earnest longing for the eternal is the very motif of the Upaniṣadic thinkers. In this point of view, they follow their traditional line.

It will be very difficult to say that this longing for the eternal is unrelated to the theistic tendency, which is also inherited from the ancient Vedic literatures. The arguments of the old Upaniṣads are almost involved in the theistic or ritualistic themes. Most Upaniṣadic thinkers are theists. Some are the teachers of the Vedic school, such as Yājñavalkya, Uddālaka Āruṇi, Bhāradvāja, Gārgya Bālāki, Gārgyāyaṇa, and so on. So are the thinkers who have a dialogue with Yājñavalkya, the greatest thinker in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad*: Uṣata (BU. 3.4), Kholā (BU. 3.5), Gārgī (BU. 3.8), Vidagdha Śākalya (BU. 3.9), and so on. The Upaniṣadic thinkers, Prācīnaśāla Aupamanyava, Satyayajña Pauluṣi, Indradyumna Bhālaveya, Jana Śārkarākṣya, and Buḍila Āsvatarāśvi --- together with Uddālaka Āruṇi ---, are called “great householder” (*mahāsāla*) and “great learned in the Vedas” (*mahāśrotriya*) in the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad*.<sup>1</sup> Some of the Upaniṣadic thinkers are the kings as the patrons of these teachers, who held religious congresses for the philosophical discussions, such as Ajātaśatru (BU. 2.1), Janaka (BU. 4.1-4), Pravāhaṇa Jaivali (BU. 6.2, CU. 1.8, 5.3), and so on. It is neither necessary nor appropriate to immediately conclude that the Upaniṣadic thought consists in the theistic absolutism, but it is to be admitted that the Upaniṣadic thought is born in the midst of the

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<sup>1</sup> See CU. 5.11.1. **IDUŚB.**, 493.

Vedic literatures under the strong influence of the theistic tendency.

### ***Māyā doctrine***

In the old Upaniṣads this longing for the eternal has borne a philosophical fruit. It is Māyā doctrine, a kind of illusionism, only through which the old Upaniṣads can be understood consistently. Just after having severely criticised the Sāṃkhya for their wrong interpretation of the old Upaniṣads,<sup>2</sup> Max Müller says in the introduction of the translation of the old Upaniṣads thus: "If we want to understand, what seems at first sight contradictory, the existence of a God, a Lord, a Creator, a Ruler, and at the same time the existence of the super-personal Brahman, we must remember that the orthodox view of the Vedānta is not what we should call Evolution, but Illusion. Evolution of the Brahman, or Parirāma [pariṇāma], is heterodox, illusion or Vivarta is orthodox Vedānta."<sup>3</sup>

Besides, as for the word *māyā*, except a verse of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* (BU. 2.5.19) --- where this word is used in the sense of creational power or illusional power ---, this word *māyā* appears only in the *Śvetāśvatara-upaniṣad* and the *Maitrāyaṇīya-upaniṣad*.<sup>4</sup> A verse of the *Śvetāśvatara-upaniṣad*, one of the later prose Upaniṣads, is a typical example: "One should know that Prakṛti is Māyā and the Maheśvara is Māyin" (*māyāṃ tu prakṛtiṃ vidyān māyinaṃ tu maheśvaram*).<sup>5</sup> This type of Māyā doctrine, which is often seen in the later prose Upaniṣads, and which is obviously connected to a kind of theism, is not in this study's focus, because this obvious tendency of theism is not useful but rather confusing for investigating the fundamental thought of the ancient prose Upaniṣads, such as the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad*, the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad*, and so on. Considering that the contents of the old Upaniṣads are various and multifarious, this study

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<sup>2</sup> "Whatever Sāṃkhya philosophers of a later date may have imagined that they could discover in that Upanishad in support of their theories, there is not one passage in it which, if rightly interpreted, not by itself, but in connection with the whole text, could be quoted in support of a dualistic philosophy such as the Sāṃkhya, as a system, decidedly is." F.Max Müller, ed. trans. **the Sacred Books of the East**, Vol. 15, **The Upaniṣads Part II** (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1975), xxxvi-xxxvii.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, xxxvii.

<sup>4</sup> "It is well known that, with the exception of the Svetāśvatara [Śvetāśvatara] and the Maitrāyaṇīya, none of the chief Upanishads exhibits the word 'māyā.' The term indeed occurs in one place the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* [Bṛhadāraṇyaka] ; but that passage is a quotation from *Rk Samhitā* [Rk Samhitā] in which māyā means 'creative power.'" F.Max Müller, ed. **the Sacred Books of the East**, Vol. 34, George Thibaut, trans. **Vedānta-Sūtra with the Commentary by Saṅkarācārya** (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1904), cxvii n. 1.

<sup>5</sup> ŚU. 4.10. V.P. Limaye and R.D. Vadekar, ed. **Eighteen Principal Upaniṣads** (Poona: Vaidika Saṃśodhana maṇḍala, 1958), 293.

does not link the Mâyā doctrine with the *Śvetâsvatara-upaniṣad* and the *Maitrâyaṇīya-upaniṣad*. As Thibaut says in the analysis of Śaṅkara's Mâyā doctrine, this type of Mâyā doctrine is not necessarily worthy for studying "the true unmixed doctrine of the Upanishads."<sup>6</sup>

What is here to be put into question under the topic of the Mâyā doctrine is not the illusional power or the creational power of the Absolute, God, but the unreality of this world. Max Müller says in regard to a verse of the *Chândogya-upaniṣad* (CU. 6.2.1)<sup>7</sup> thus: "... from the philosophical standpoint of the Vedânta, what is really meant is that before the *sr̥ṣṭi* [sr̥ṣṭi] (which is not creation, but the sending forth of the world, and the sending forth of it, not as something real, but as a mere illusion), the Real alone, i.e. the Brahman, was, instead of this, i.e. instead of this illusory world. The illusion was not, but the Real, i.e. Brahman, was."<sup>8</sup> Paul Deussen also says, referring to the chapters of the *Bṛhadâraṇyaka-upaniṣad*, where Yājñavalkya expounds his view of the world (BU. 2.4, 3.1-9, 4.1-5): "We will see how the teaching of the sole reality of the Ātman and the voidness of a manifold world outside of the Ātman is propounded more decidedly in these chapters than anywhere else." *Wir werden sehen, wie in diesen Abschnitten entschiedener als irgendwo sonst die Lehre von der alleinigen Realität des Ātman und von der Nichtigkeit einer vielheitlichen Welt außer dem Ātman vorgetragen wird.*<sup>9</sup> What is to be questioned under the theme of Mâyā doctrine is not the theistic view, but the view of the world --- or rather the two-world view; the reality of the transcendental and the unreality of the temporal and manifold.

### ***Critical spirit***

The Upaniṣadic thinkers are the followers of their traditional thought, but some of them become also pioneers of a new philosophical trend, which is not seen in the pre-Upaniṣadic periods. This new trend implies the pursuit of the eternal under the condition that the eternal should be discriminated from such a superstition as "the life after death" and such dogmatism as "the absolute creator." It is verily due to this new trend,

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<sup>6</sup> "I cannot discuss in this place the Mâyā passages of the *Svetâsvatara* [Śvetâsvatara] and the *Maitrâyaṇīya Upanishads*. Reasons which want of space prevents me from setting forth in detail induce me to believe that neither of those two treatises deserves to be considered by us when wishing to ascertain the true unmixed doctrine of the Upanishads." Müller, ed. **the Sacred Books of the East**, vol. 34, George Thibaut, trans. **Vedânta-Sûtra with the Commentary by Saṅkarâcârya**, cxxi n. 1. In regard to Thibaut's analysis of Śaṅkara's Mâyā doctrine, see *Ibid.*, cxvi-cxxvii.

<sup>7</sup> "In the beginning, Oh good one, this was Being alone, one only without a second ..." (*sad eva somyedam agra âsîd ekam evâdvitīyam...*) (CU. 6.2.1). **ĪDUŚB.**, 506.

<sup>8</sup> Müller, ed. trans. **the Sacred Books of the East**, vol. 15, **The Upaniṣads Part II**, xix.

<sup>9</sup> Paul Deussen, **Die Philosophie der Upanishad's** (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1920), 206.

which is brought about by some great Upaniṣadic thinkers, that the period of the old Upaniṣads can be regarded as the true dawn of philosophy in ancient India.

By the way, an example of such a critical spirit is seen in the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad*, one of the most important old Upaniṣads. What is firstly to be questioned is “question” itself. There are some questions which we can not answer. We do not have any intellectual faculty to answer them. We have even no right to answer them. We must be silent about those questions. According to the verses of the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad* (CU. 5.3.1-5), when Śvetaketu, who is a son of Uddālaka Āruṇi -- one of the great thinkers in the old Upaniṣads ---, went to the assembly of the Pañcālas, then Pravāhaṇa Jaivali, a king of Pañcāla, put several questions to him: “Where do men go from here?” (*yad ito'dhi prajāḥ prayanti*), “How do they return again?” (*yathā punar āvartante*), “[Where does] the path of the gods and the path of manes separate?” (*pathor devayānasya pitṛyānasya ca vyāvartanā*), “How is not the world full?” (*yathāsau loko na sampūryate*), “How does water come to be called Puruṣa after the fifth oblation?” (*yathā pañcamyām āhutāv āpaḥ puruṣavacaso bhavanti*) (CU. 5.3.2-3).<sup>10</sup> To Śvetaketu, who cannot answer those questions and becomes afflicted, Uddālaka Āruṇi says in a verse of the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad* (CU. 5.3.5) as follows:

Just as you asked me these [questions] at that time, so I do not know any of them. If I would know these, why would not I tell you ?

*yathā mā tvam tadaitān avado yathāham eṣāṃ naikañ cana veda yady aham imān  
avediṣyaṃ katham te nāvakṣyaṃ ....*<sup>11</sup>

What Uddālaka Āruṇi tries to propound must be that “well, just as you do not know these questions, so I do not know these either; this is the meaning (*yathā tvam evāṅga etān praśnān na jāniṣe tathāham apy etān na jāna ity arthaḥ*) (CUB 5.3.5).”<sup>12</sup> But, what is meant by this is not that these questions are too difficult even for the great seer, Uddālaka Āruṇi, to answer, but that they are rather inappropriate for the pursuit of truth --- or for the Upaniṣadic inquiry into the eternal ---.

Besides, there is another form of criticism of metaphysics, in a verse of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* (BU. 3.6.1). It is a criticism of speculative thought. This verse is a controversy between Gārgī and Yājñavalkya. While Yājñavalkya expounds Brahma as “immediate and direct” (*sākṣād-aparokṣāt*) (BU. 3.5.1), Gārgī asks Yājñavalkya about what is more essential element (or deity) successively; earth, water, air, sky, the world of the

<sup>10</sup> **IDUŚB.**, 476.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 477.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

Gandharvas, the sun, the moon, the stars, the world of gods, the world of Indra, the world of Virāj, and the world of Hiranyagarbha. Yājñalkya, the greatest thinker in the old Upaniṣads, blaming such a speculative attitude which leads to infinite regress, says in a verse of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* (BU. 3.6.1) as follows:

Do not, Oh Gārgī, question too far, lest your head should fall off. You verily question too far about deity which is not to be questioned too far. Do not, Oh Gārgī, question too far. ...

*gārgi mā'tiprākṣīr mā te mūrdhā vyapaptad anatipraśnyāṃ vai devatām atiprcchasi gārgi mā'tiprākṣīḥ ...*<sup>13</sup>

### ***Here and now***

What is called the eternal in the old Upaniṣads --- namely Brahma --- is inquired “here and now.” It should not be looked for after this life. It should not be searched for outside of this temporal and manifold world. Although the Upaniṣadic thinkers seem to think that we, human beings, have a certain faculty to transcend this temporal and manifold world in a sense--- this issue will be discussed in the fifth chapter “Meaning of Dispassion” ---, it is noteworthy that these thinkers do not quest for the eternal somewhere transcending this world.

The Upaniṣadic thinkers express this principle “here and now” in several places, but the most evident example is in regard to the concept “becoming Brahma” (*brahma-bhūta*) --- this concept itself will be discussed in the seventh chapter “Becoming Brahma and Becoming the Dhamma” ---. A typical example is seen in a verse of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* (BU. 4.4.6).

Then, man, not desiring, who is without desire, and who is freed from desire, becomes one whose desire is satisfied, and whose desire is the Self. His *prāṇas*<sup>14</sup> do not depart. Being but Brahma, he attains Brahma.

*athākāmayamāno yo'kāmo niṣkāma āptakāma ātmakāmo bhavati na tasya prāṇā utkrāmanti brahmaiva san brahmāpyeti.*<sup>15</sup>

This text clearly expresses the central thought of the old Upaniṣads. The eternal --- it is called Brahma in the Upaniṣads --- should be sought neither in the future nor beyond

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<sup>13</sup> **IDUŚB.**, 817.

<sup>14</sup> In this context, the word *prāṇa* perhaps should be translated as “sense organ.” However, it originally means “breath” as one of the sense organs, and it also implies “life” and “vital force.”

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 916.

this world. It should be sought in this world and in this life. Śaṅkara makes a comment on this text thus, “The wise, whose desires have been fulfilled, has become Brahma through the desire of the Self in this very life” (*sa ca vidvān āptakāma ātmakāmatayehaiva brahmabhūtaḥ*) (BUB. 4.4.6).<sup>16</sup>

Another example can be found in a verse of the *Kaṭha-upaniṣad* (KaU. 2.6.15).

When all the knots of the heart are destroyed even in this life, then the mortal becomes immortal. This is verily the instruction [of all the Upaniṣads].

*yadā sarve prabhidyante hṛdayasyeha granthayaḥ. atha martyo'mṛto bhavaty etāvad dhy anuśāsanam.*<sup>17</sup>

Here in this citation, what must be destroyed is “ignorance” (*avidyā*) in the truest sense. Therefore, even though the Upaniṣadic texts sometimes mention the eternal as something to be attained, it should be attained not in the future, but “here and now.” Śaṅkara explains thus: “There is no going for the knower, whose knots such as ignorance and so on are entirely destroyed through his realisation of the completely attributeless and pervading Brahma-Ātman, and who becomes Brahma even while living” (*nirastāśeṣaviśeṣavyāpibrahmātmapratiṣṭhā prabhinnasamastāvidyādi granther jīvata eva brahmabhūtasya vidūṣo na gatir vidyate...*) (KaUB. 2.3.16).<sup>18</sup> However, strictly speaking, it is not enough to understand that the eternal should be sought for even in this life, not in the life after death. What is more important is that the eternal is not that which is to be attained, but rather that which we have already attained, as it is said that there is no “going” (*gati*) to the eternal. In other words, the eternal is what we already are and what we should become --- but this issue will be investigated through this whole study ---.

### ***Criticism of Māyā doctrine***

As seen just above, it is evident that in the old Upaniṣads there is a new philosophical trend, which is a critical spirit overcoming superstitions and dogmatic beliefs. Besides, it is to be noted that, if this critical spirit is understood separately from the longing for the eternal as the core of the Upaniṣadic thought, this trend may be misunderstood as crude empiricism, verily because it is difficult to understand the meaning of this trend. In order to consider this issue, we want to see the arguments about Māyā doctrine between Hermann Oldenberg and Paul Deussen.

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<sup>16</sup> **IDUŚB.**, 917.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 103.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

Against Deussen, Oldenberg says about “the Māyā, that magical delusion which calls up the void appearance of the world-existence” (*die „Māyā“, jene zauberhafte Vorspiegelung, die den leeren Schein des Welt-daseins erweckt*) as follows: “Until the true knowledge destroys the illusion, the apparent multiplicity sinks in its voidness before the eternal One. It is definitely unlikely for me that the ancient age with which we are concerned here would have reached such extreme point of the Ātman-teaching.” *Bis wahre Erkenntnis den Trug vernichtet, die scheinbare Vielheit vor dem ewigen Einen in ihr Nichts versinkt. Daß schon jenes Altertum, mit dem wir uns hier beschäftigen, zu solch äußerster Zuspitzung der Ātmanlehre gelangt sei, is mir durchaus unwahrscheinlich.*<sup>19</sup> Oldenberg cites a verse of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* (BU. 2.5.15):

Just as all the spokes are held together in the nave and the felly of a wheel, so are all beings, all gods, all worlds, all prāṇas and all these selves held together in this Self.

*tad yathā rathanābhau ca rathanemau cārāḥ sarve samarpitā evam evāsminn ātmani sarvāṇi bhūtāni sarve devāḥ sarve lokāḥ, sarve prāṇāḥ. sarva eta ātmānaḥ samarpitāḥ.*<sup>20</sup>

Then he asks: “Are these statements evidences for the sole reality of the ātman, as it is strangely asserted?” *Zeugen solche Äußerungen, wie man befremdenderweise behauptet hat, für die alleinige Realität des Ātman?*<sup>21</sup> Again, he cites a verse (BU. 2.4.5):

Verily it is the Self (*ātman*) that is to be seen, to be heard of, to be thought of, and to be meditated on, Oh Maitreyī. Verily through seeing, hearing of, thinking of, and knowing this Ātman, this whole world is known.

*ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsītavyo maitreyī ātmano vā are darśanena śravaṇena matyā vijñānenedaṃ sarvaṃ viditam.*<sup>22</sup>

Again he asks: “Does it imply the denial of the world?” *Schließt das Leugnung der Welt in sich?*<sup>23</sup> Oldenberg concludes that “the Māyā teaching is alien to the old Upaniṣads, or at least, it is not guaranteed by them at all” (*die Māyālehre als den alten Upanishaden fremd oder mindestens durch sie schlechterdings nicht gewährleistet zu erweisen*).<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Hermann Oldenberg, **Die Lehre der Upanishaden und die Anfänge des Buddhismus** (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1915), 89-90.

<sup>20</sup> **IDUŚB.**, 774-775.

<sup>21</sup> Oldenberg, **Die Lehre der Upanishaden und die Anfänge des Buddhismus**, 93.

<sup>22</sup> **IDUŚB.**, 760.

<sup>23</sup> Oldenberg, **Die Lehre der Upanishaden und die Anfänge des Buddhismus**, 93.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 136.

As for the unreality of this manifold world, taking account of the fact that the old Upaniṣads set a high valuation on our experience, it may seem that Oldenberg is correct in saying, “the Upaniṣads here do not deny the reality of the manifold world.”<sup>25</sup> Or, it may appear that Thibaut is right in interpreting the phrases including the word *iva* of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad, such as *yatra vā anyad iva syāt* (BU. 4.3.31), *yatra hi dvaitam iva bhavati* (BU. 4.5.15), *dhyāyatīva lelāyatīva* (BU. 4.3.7) thus, “Those passages no doubt readily lend themselves to Mâyâ interpretations, and it is by no means impossible that in their author’s mind there was something like undeveloped Mâyâ doctrine. I must, however, remark that they, on the other hand, also admit of easy interpretations not in any way presupposing the theory of the unreality of the world. If Yâgñavalkya [Yājñavalkya] refers to the latter as that ‘where there is something else as it were, where there is duality as it were,’ he may simply mean to indicate that the ordinary opinion, according to which the individual forms of existence of the world are opposed to each other as altogether separate, is a mistaken one, all things being one in so far as they spring from --- and are parts of---Brahman.”<sup>26</sup> Thus, it does not seem that Thibaut finally agree with the Mâyâ doctrine as the thought of the unreality of the world.

However, this study can not find any reason to agree with Oldenberg’s conclusion and Thibaut’s interpretation. Admittedly, the Upaniṣadic thinkers cannot disregard our direct experience in this temporal and manifold world, verily because of their critical spirit. They start their inquiry into the eternal with attaching importance to our experience in this temporal and manifold world. However, it is not that this critical spirit and the high regard for experience can be understood as crude empiricism. The Upaniṣadic thinkers first investigate the true reality verily in the midst of this temporal world --- this issue will be discussed in the third and the forth chapters in detail ---.

Moreover, however strange it sounds, ultimately through the quest for truth, the Upaniṣadic thinkers face the Immortal, the truth of truth, which is revealed as a fundamental experience along with the destruction of the ephemeral existence of this world --- it must be a true meaning of Mâyâ doctrine, but this issue will be discussed in the sixth chapter in

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<sup>25</sup> “It seems to me that it is appropriate to remind us of Spinoza’s teaching of modi, according to which the finite things are the affections and conditions of an infinite substance. It is clear that the Upaniṣads here do not deny the reality of the manifold world, like Spinoza.” *Man hat, mir scheint zutreffend, an Spinoza’s Lehre von den Modi erinnert, wonach die endlichen Dinge Affektionen, Zustände der einen unendlichen Substanz sind. Es ist klar, daß wie Spinoza so auch hier die Upanishaden der Vielheitswelt die Realität schlechterdings nicht abstreiten.* Oldenber, **Die Lehre der Upanishaden und die Anfänge des Buddhismus**, 88.

<sup>26</sup> Müller, ed. **the Sacred Books of the East**, vol. 34, George Thibaut, trans. **Vedānta-Sūtra with the Commentary by Saṅkarācārya**, cxx.

detail ---.<sup>27</sup>

### *Critical Spirit and Pursuit of Truth in Early Buddhism*

#### ***The thought of Samaṇas***

As seen above, the old Upaniṣads has a theistic tendency as their philosophical background. On the other hand, it is obvious that early Buddhism's background is extremely different. Among the opponents in the dialogue of the Buddha in the Sutta-piṭaka, some are called "Brāhmaṇas" --- who are not the Upaniṣadic thinkers, but are dualists, believing in the eternal Ruler and the ephemeral world ---, some are called "Samaṇas." Although the word *samaṇa* is also used for the Buddha and Buddhist, it originally indicates wandering ascetics, non-Buddhist thinkers. It is sure that this type of thinker called "samaṇa" has another origin than the Vedic tradition. In the *Sāmaññaphala-sutta* (the Sutta about the fruit of the life of a Samaṇa), the six Samaṇas are mentioned: Pūraṇa Kassapa, Makkhali Gosāla, Ajita Kesakambalī, Pakudha Kaccāyana, Sañjaya Velaṭṭhaputta, and Nigaṇṭha Nāṭaputta.<sup>28</sup> In the *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta*, they are also mentioned as the learned, the famous, "teachers who have followers" (*gaṇācariyā*), and "founders of school" (*titthakāra*).<sup>29</sup> Obviously they are atheistic, and they do not admit the Vedic authority. They are heretical.

It is not necessarily true that all of them are so-called materialists, because, except Ajita Kesakambalī --- a materialist --- and Sañjaya Velaṭṭhaputta --- a sceptic or a sophist ---, the other four Samaṇas are ascetics and keep the deliverance of the soul as an important theme. It means that they suppose the existence of the soul which is different from the materials. From a philosophical point of view, however, we can say that they are at least sensationalist or empiricist, because they do not admit any insight beyond empirical knowledge, also because they do not admit the philosophical pursuit of truth. Therefore, this study, having the concept "truth" as a central theme, is not directly interested in the detail of these ascetics' thoughts, but still admits their significant influence on early Buddhism in

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<sup>27</sup> This study supposes that the unreality of this manifold world does not imply only an epistemological issue such as phenomenality or insubstantiality of objective things. If Deussen means just "phenomenality of objective things" by the unreality of this manifold world, this interpretation is not appropriate for the old Upaniṣads. In this point, Oldenberg's claim against Deussen is perhaps correct. "Deussen's peculiar Kantian treatment of the problem for the Upaniṣads is not convincing" (*Deussens ... eigne kantianisierende Behandlung des Problems für die Upanishaden überzeugt nicht*). Oldenberg, **Die Lehre der Upanishaden und die Anfänge des Buddhismus**, 345 n. 59.

<sup>28</sup> See the *Sāmaññaphala-sutta*. **ñ.ñ.** 9/94-99/67-78.

<sup>29</sup> **ñ.ñ.** 10/138/174.

some points: Both these ascetics and early Buddhists keep the concept of impermanence as a significant theme, and attach the extremely high importance to our direct experience.

### ***Direct experience***

As for early Buddhism, it is clear that it regards the principle “here and now” as extremely important. A phrase of the *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta*, which is one of the most well-known phrases in the Sutta-piṭaka, shows a high regard for experience as follows:

The Dhamma is well preached by the Bhagavā.<sup>30</sup> It is visible [or seen together]. It is timeless [or without delay]. It is verifiable. It is leading towards [Nibbāna]. It is to be individually known by the wise.

*svākkhāto bhagavatā dhammo sandiṭṭhiko akāliko ehipassiko opanayiko paccattam vedītabbo viññūhi.*<sup>31</sup>

It is indisputable that early Buddhism emphasises the significance of experience --- but it is not correct that this text implies crude empiricism, as will be discussed later on ---. It is correspondent to the fact that the texts of the Sutta-piṭaka speak of “the silence of the Buddha” with regard to metaphysical questions. In the *Poṭṭhapāda-sutta*, Poṭṭhapāda asks the Buddha about the metaphysical questions like this: “Is the world eternal?” or “Is the world non-eternal?” The Buddha answers as follows:

Oh Poṭṭhapāda, I do not declare that the world is eternal, and that this [view] is but truth while the other [view] is false. ... Oh Poṭṭhapāda, I do not declare that the world is non-eternal, and that this [view] is but truth while the other [view] is false.

*etampi kho poṭṭhapāda mayā abyākatam sassato loko idameva saccam moghamaññanti. ... etampi kho poṭṭhapāda mayā abyākatam asassato loko idameva saccam moghamaññanti.*<sup>32</sup>

### ***The silence of the Buddha***

It is clear that early Buddhism has a tendency to regard our direct experience as important. This tendency, combined with the high regard for *magga* (Skt. *mārga*, literally “way”; often understood as “practice” in early Buddhism), might be understood as a kind of empiricism, or a kind of ethical empiricism. In this point of view, the Immortal, namely, Nibbāna in early Buddhism, might be considered as “nothing.” “It is true that the Buddha’s

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<sup>30</sup> In this text, “Bhagavā” is one of the epithets of the Buddha. This word consists of *bhaga* (a noun, expressing “luck” or “fortune”) and *vat* (a suffix, expressing “similitude” or “possessing”).

<sup>31</sup> **ṭi.ṃ.** 10/89/111.

<sup>32</sup> **ṭi.ṣ.** 9/292/232.

discipline sees in this world a state of perpetual suffering, but this suffering awakes in him only the feeling of compassion for those who still stay in the world; for himself he does not feel sorrow or compassion, because he knows that he is near the goal which presents a magnificent view toward him. Is this goal nothing? Perhaps [it is].” *Der Jünger Buddhas sieht freilich in dieser Welt eine Stätte beständigen Leidens, aber dies Leiden weckt in ihm nur das Gefühl des Mitleidens mit denen, die noch in der Welt stehen; für sich selbst fühlt er nicht Trauer oder Mitleid, denn er weiß sich einem Ziele nah, das ihm über alles herrlich entgegenblickt. Ist dies Ziel das Nichts? Vielleicht.*<sup>33</sup>

In such a point of view, it is sometimes said that early Buddhism attaches importance to our experience and practice, and rejects our philosophical inquiry into the eternal. There is a text of the *Brahmanimantanika-sutta* which would be cited as an example of early Buddhism’s tendency against the inquiry into the eternal.

Oh Bhikkhus,<sup>34</sup> at that period, the following false and groundless opinion occurs to Baka Brahmā, “This is eternal. This is constant. This is permanent. This is independent. This is the imperishable Dhamma. Verily this is not born, does not decay, does not die, does not leave, and is not reborn. Moreover, there is no higher liberation than this.” ... Surely Baka Brahmā is in ignorance.

*tena kho pana bhikkhave samayena bakassa brahmuno evarūpaṃ pāpakaṃ diṭṭhigataṃ uppannaṃ hoti idaṃ niccaṃ idaṃ dhuvam idaṃ sassataṃ idaṃ kevalaṃ idaṃ acavanadhammaṃ idaṃ hi na jāyati na jīyati na mīyati na cavati na upapajjati ito ca panaññaṃ uttariṃ nissaraṇaṃ natthīti. ... avijjāgato vata bho bako brahmā ...*<sup>35</sup>

However, it is not true that these texts mean to reject the philosophical inquiry into the eternal. What is rejected through these texts is our investigation of the non-eternal as the eternal, not our investigation of the eternal. Therefore, the following texts are to be added.

Surely Baka Brahmā is in ignorance. Surely Baka Brahmā is in ignorance, inasmuch as he says that the non-eternal is indeed the same as the eternal, and that the inconstant is indeed the same as the constant, and that the non-permanent is indeed the same as the

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<sup>33</sup> Hermann Oldenberg, **Buddha – Sein Leben, Seine Lehre, Seine Gemeinde** (Stuttgart und Berlin: J. G. Cotta’sche Buchhandlung Nachfolger, 1923), 249.

<sup>34</sup> The word *bhikkhu* (Skt. *bhikṣu*) is derived from a verbal root *bhikṣ* (literally, beg). It originally means “beggar” or “religious mendicant.” In Buddhism, bhikkhu is a member of the Buddhist order called “Saṅgha.”

<sup>35</sup> **п.п.** 12/552/590-591.

permanent, ...

*avijjāgato vata bho bako brahmā avijjāgato vata bho bako brahmā yatra hi nāma aniccaṃyeva samānaṃ niccanti vakkhati adhuvāṃyeva samānaṃ dhuvanti vakkhati assassataṃyeva samānaṃ sassatanti vakkhati ...*<sup>36</sup>

It is also said that the Buddha does not answer any philosophical questions. This silence is understood as rejection of the inquiry into the eternal, or rejection of philosophy itself. Indeed, in some places of the Pali canon, the Buddha is said to reject various views, such as eternalism, nihilism, and so on. The Buddha keeps silence about some questions like “Is the world is eternal?” or “Is the world is non-eternal?” He explains the reason of this silence in the *Poṭṭhapāda-sutta* as follows:

“But why is not this expounded by the Bhagavā?” “Oh Poṭṭhapāda, because it is not concerned with the good, because it is not concerned with the Dhamma, because it is not concerned with the Brahmācariya,<sup>37</sup> because it does not lead to disgust with worldly life, nor to dispassion, nor to destruction [of this world], nor to calmness, nor to intuitive knowledge, nor to enlightenment, nor to Nibbāna. Therefore, this is not expounded by me.”  
*kasmā panetaṃ bhante bhagavatā abyākatanti. na hetam poṭṭhapāda atthasañhitam na dhammasañhitam na ādibrahmacariyakam na nibbidāya na virāgāya na nirodhāya na upasamāya na abhiññāya na sambodhāya na nibbānāya samvattati tasmātam mayā abyākatanti.*<sup>38</sup>

### ***The answer of the Buddha***

However, it does not mean that the Buddha rejects our philosophical investigation of the eternal, the truth. First of all, it is to be noted that, when the Buddha rejects such various speculative views, such as eternalism, nihilism, and so on, he says that these views are not equal to his one, and that his view is higher than those views. It means that, in a higher level, he investigates the philosophical truth. It is not that he denies the meaning of philosophical investigation of truth. In the *Pāsādika-sutta*, the Buddha says:

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<sup>36</sup> **ṃ.ṃ.** 12/552/591.

<sup>37</sup> Brahmācariya corresponds to a Sanskrit word *brahmācariya*. In the Brahmanical tradition, Brahmācariya means a stage in the life of Brāhman. It is a life of unmarried religious students studying of the Vedic scriptures at the house of teacher (*guru*). This life requires a strict celibacy. Although Brahmācariya in early Buddhism is separated off from such a Brahmanical tradition, it is the same in point of requiring a strict celibacy.

<sup>38</sup> **ṃ.ṃ.** 9/292/233.

Indeed in regard to the exposition of this [or that] view, Oh Cunda, I do not see any one who is equal to me, not to say of one who is higher [than me]. It is verily I who am the highest with regard to the exposition of the higher knowledge

*imāyapi kho ahaṃ cunda paññattiyā neva attano samasamaṃ samanupassāmi kuto bhiyyo athakho ahameva tattha bhiyyo yadidaṃ adhipaññatti.*<sup>39</sup>

It is definitely not that the Buddha rejects philosophical investigation of the truth, but there remains a question what the words “not equal to me” (*neva attano samasamaṃ*) mean. As Buddhaghosa makes a comment: “*samasamaṃ* means ‘equal through equal intuitive knowledge’” (*samasamanti samena ñāṇena samaṃ*),<sup>40</sup> the Buddha rejects those speculative views, not by the higher speculative view, but by the higher knowledge or the higher intuitive knowledge. But this issue will be argued in the next chapter.

In other places of the Pali canon, the Buddha expounds the truth in higher standpoint. The Buddha does not directly answer such speculative questions, but he does answer verily through the Dhamma. The Dhamma, which is said to surpass the various views expounded in the *Brahmajāla-sutta*,<sup>41</sup> is repeatedly spoken of by the Buddha as follows:

These, Oh bhikkhus, are indeed the Dhammas which are profound, hard to see, hard to understand, tranquil, excellent, beyond the sphere of [worldly] logic, subtle, comprehensible only by the wise, which the Tathāgata<sup>42</sup> has taught after having himself realised through intuitive knowledge, and with regard to which one who rightly praises [the Tathāgata] according to the truth should speak.

*ime kho te bhikkhave dhammā gambhīrā duddasā duranubodhā santā paṇīṭā atakkāvacarā nipuṇā paṇḍitavedanīyā ye tathāgato sayamaṃ abhiññā sacchikatvā pavedeti yehi tathāgatassa yathābhuccamaṃ vaṇṇamaṃ sammā vadamānā vadeyyuṃ.*<sup>43</sup>

In the *Cūḷamāluṅkyovāda-sutta*, having kept silence about Māluṅkyaputta’s metaphysical questions, such as “Is this world eternal?” and so on, the Buddha explains his

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<sup>39</sup> 𑀧.𑀯𑀭. 11/124/152.

<sup>40</sup> 𑀧.𑀯. 3/106.

<sup>41</sup> “The Tathāgata knows these [views], and he also knows that [Dhamma] which surpasses them.” *tañca tathāgato pajānāti tato ca uttaritaraṃ pajānāti...* 𑀧.𑀯. 9/30/22.

<sup>42</sup> The word *tathāgata* literally means “thus come” or “thus gone.” It is a fact that this word is used as an epithet of the Buddha, but it must originally mean “one who understands the four noble truths,” “one who understands the Dhamma,” or “one who understand the highest truth.”

<sup>43</sup> 𑀧.𑀯. 9/30/22.

intention thus.

Therefore, Oh Māluṅkyaputta, it is said [by me] here thus, “hold (or understand) as the thing not to be expounded what has not been expounded by me, and hold as the thing to be expounded what has been expounded by me.”

*tasmātiha māluṅkyaputta abyākatañca me abyākatato dhāretha byākatañca me byākatato dhārethāti.*<sup>44</sup>

The Buddha did not answer such speculative questions, because these questions are beyond our intellectual capacity. These questions are something like an intellectual trap. To avoid falling into this trap, we should question how to question, or question how to pursue the truth. In this point of view, it is true that the Buddha answered. What the Buddha has expounded as the truth or the pursuit of truth is “the four noble truth,” as the commentator explains on the citation above, “[The sentence] ‘*tasmātiha ...*’ means that those [views] are not expounded by me, and the fourfold truth is expounded by me.” *tasmātihāti yasmā abyākatametam, catusaccameva mayā byākatam, tasmāti attho.*<sup>45</sup>

Besides, the *Brahmajāla-sutta* expounds 62 views. If this Sutta’s purpose is to enumerate and deny speculative theories about the world and the self to emphasise the significance of practical problems, this understanding is obviously wrong. In the *Sāmaññaphala-sutta*, the Buddha explains “the Tathāgata” as follows:

He [the Tathāgata], having realised this world [or these worlds] through intuitive knowledge by himself --- the world of Devas, the world of Māras, the world of Brahmās, and the world of human beings with Samaṇas and Brāhmins, kings and men ---, teaches it [to others].

*so imaṃ lokam sadevakaṃ samārakaṃ sabrahmakam sassamaṇabrāhmaṇiṃ pajam sadevamanussaṃ sayam abhiññā sacchikatvā pavedeti.*<sup>46</sup>

The direct experience of these worlds (or the several existence of the world) is indispensable factor for the enlightenment of the Buddha, who is also called “knower the world” (*lokavidū*).<sup>47</sup> And in fact some of 62 views are evidently correspondent to such worlds to be directly experienced --- but, this issue about the experience of the worlds will be argued in the fifth chapter “Meaning of Dispassion” ---. Besides, if the 62 views in the *Brahmajāla-sutta* are expounded only as trifling theories to be denied, it must be strange that this expounding of

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<sup>44</sup> **М.М.** 13/152/152-153.

<sup>45</sup> **М.Д.** 3/106.

<sup>46</sup> **Т.С.** 9/102/82.

<sup>47</sup> See **Т.С.** 9/92/64, 9/102/82.

62 views is called *brahma-jāla* (The net of Brahma) or *dhamma-jāla* (The net of the Dhamma) --- these names evidently suggest that these views ---or at least some of them --- are to be estimated highly. Therefore, these 62 views --- or at least some of them --- are not to be negated theoretically, but to be attained through fundamental experiences and to be gone beyond.

### ***The Immortal, Nibbāna***

It is Buddhaghosa who emphasises the importance of the inquiry into the eternal or the Immortal in the midst of early Buddhism. Govind Chandra Pande says citing a text of the *Visuddhimagga* thus: “Buddhaghosa describes Nibbāna as ‘Santilakkhaṇaṃ, accutirasam assāsakaraṇarasam vā, animittapaccupaṭṭhānaṃ nippañcapaccupaṭṭhānaṃ vā.’ He vigorously combats the view that Nibbāna is a non-Ens, or a mere absence or annihilation of the passions etc.”<sup>48</sup> Here, the eternal is Nibbāna (Skt. *nirvāṇa*), which is also called “Nibbāna realm” (*nibbāna-dhātu*), “immortal realm” (*amata-dhātu*), or “signless realm” (*animitta-dhātu*).

It is possible to interpret this eternal from a practical point of view. This view also belongs to Buddhaghosa himself. In regard to the Dhamma, which is said to be “visible,” “timeless,” “verifiable,” “leading to towards Nibbāna,” and so on, he explains the word *akālika* (literally “not temporal”) thus: “It has no time with regard to giving its own fruit. This is [meaning of the word of] ‘timeless,’ namely ‘not subject to time’” (*Attano phaladānaṃ sandhāya nāssa kālo ti akālo; akālo yeva akāliko*).<sup>49</sup> However, in spite of this interpretation, we should not understand that Nibbāna (the eternal) should be searched for through our practice. First of all, what does “fruit without delay” mean? Anyway, it is evident that such a practice or such a fruit is beyond our loose understanding. Moreover, this interpretation is only about “path” (*magga*), as is said; “this is said with regard to the path” (*idaṃ maggam eva sandhāya vuttam*).<sup>50</sup> In fact, just before this interpretation, Buddhaghosa says: “Nibbāna --- indeed the essence of which is eternal, immortal, refuge, shelter, and so on --- is well expounded, because it is expounded according to its essence such as eternal and so on.” *Nibbānaṃ sassatāmatatāṇaleṇādi-sabhāvam eva, sassatādisabhāvavasena akkhātattā svākkhātan ti*.<sup>51</sup> In other places, he also says thus: “Moreover, according to the

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<sup>48</sup> Govind Chandra Pande, **Studies in the Origins of Buddhism** (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1957), 445.

<sup>49</sup> Henry Clarke Warren and Dharmananda Kosambi, ed. **Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosācariya** (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1950), 178.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 178.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 177.

aforesaid reason, it is true that this [Nibbāna] is indeed eternal; and it is *arūpa* because it transcends the essence of *rūpa*.” *Yathāvuttayuttisabbhāvato pana idameva niccam; rūpasabhāvātikkamato arūpaṃ; ...*<sup>52</sup> “Namely, [Nibbāna is] the complete dispassion, the entire destruction, abandonment, renunciation, emancipation, no attachment, the destruction of passion, the destruction of hate, the destruction of delusion, the destruction of craving [literally “thirst”], no birth, attributeless, no support, no striving, no rebirth, no proceeding, no going, no birth, no decaying, no disease, immortal, no grief, no lamentation, no despair, no defilement, and so on.” *seyyathīdam, asesavirāgo asesanirodho cāgo paṭinissaggo mutti anālayo rāgakkhayo dosakkhayo mohakkhayo taṇhakkhayo anuppādo appavattam animittam appaṇihitam anāyūhanam apaṭisandhi appavatti agati ajātam ajaram abyādhi amataṃ asokaṃ aparidevaṃ anupāyāsaṃ asaṃkiliṭṭhanti ādīni.*<sup>53</sup>

Although it is correct that the truth should be ultimately questioned in regard to the issue of “path” (*magga*), indubitably early Buddhism keeps the pursuit for truth or the philosophical pursuit for the eternal truth as the core of its thought.

### ***Circular argument***

As for early Buddhism, there is another important issue to be considered. It is “circular argument” which we must face, when we further investigate its core concepts, such as “the four noble truths” and so on.

For example, “the right view” (*sammādiṭṭhi*) is the first in “the eightfold path” (*aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo*) which is correspondent to the fourth among “the four noble truths” (*cattāri ariya-saccāni*), while this right view is said to know each of “the four noble truths.” Similarly, “ignorance” (*avijjā*; Skt. *avidyā*) or “delusion” (*moha*) is said as unknowing each of “the four noble truths,” while it is “delusion” as “intoxicant” (literary “that which flows out” (*āsava*, Skt. *āsrava* which is derived from a verbal root *sru* or *śru*) whose destruction is “the noble truth of annihilation of dukkha” (*dukkhanirodho ariyasaccam*).

Needless to say, this study has no intention to criticise these circular arguments as vicious circles. Far from that, this study supposes that these circular arguments are concerning with a central problem in early Buddhism, the Immortal or Nibbāna. As this issue must be answered in the whole following chapters of this study, there are two things to be mentioned in advance. The first is that these circular arguments have a purpose to dare to expound that which is immortal, signless, and inexpressible. Moreover, this Immortal, which is mentioned even through these circular arguments, is the underlying single truth, even though this truth is also spoken of in the twofold, fourfold, or manifold way.

<sup>52</sup> Warren, ed. **Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosācariya**, 432.

<sup>53</sup> **ñ.a.** 2/416.

In a sense, “dhammā” spoken of as something manifold is not necessarily different from ultimate “Dhamma,” Nibbāna --- this issue will be considered in the next chapter ---.

The second is that circular arguments are concerned with the problem of knowledge and practice. The issue of “practice” at first sight seems to be questioned only in “the truth of the way of cessation,” but, in fact, the issue of “action” or “practice” is already questioned in “the truth of dukkha” and “the truth of origin of dukkha.” Moreover, “the truth of cessation” at first sight seems to be a kind of goal to be attained through “path,” namely, “the truth of way of cessation,” but, in regard to “the cessation” (*nirodha*) --- sometimes the same as Nibbāna ---, such expressions as “going out of cessation” (*nirodha-vuṭṭhāna*)<sup>54</sup> or “having gone out of cessation” (*nirodhā vuṭṭhāya*)<sup>55</sup> are in the commentaries. Thus, this study assumes that this issue of circular arguments give a warning not to loosely understand the division between knowledge and practice.

### *Two Factors in the Philosophical Inquiry*

#### ***Philosophical backgrounds are different***

As to their philosophical backgrounds, there is a big difference between the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism. Obviously the old Upaniṣads inherit a longing for the eternal from the Vedic literatures. The most of the Upaniṣadic thinkers --- some are the teachers of Vedic school and some are the kings, the patrons of those teachers --- strongly keep a theistic tendency. On the other hand, early Buddhism has its origin among a new group of thinkers, called “Samaṇas” --- most of them are atheists, some are materialists or sensationalists, and some are sceptics ---.

#### ***Two factors in the question of truth***

As seen above in this chapter, it is notable that both the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism has a coincidence from a philosophical point of view, whereas it is not expressed in the same way and sometimes explained in the reversed order. The old Upaniṣads directly express a longing for the eternal. But the Upaniṣadic thinkers’ critical spirit does not allow this longing to remain something imaginary, which simply transcends our experience. They want this longing to be fulfilled along with our temporal existence here and now. On the other hand, early Buddhism begins with emphasising the significance of direct experience. Early Buddhism does not answer metaphysical questions, such as “Is this

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<sup>54</sup> **u.a.** 2/273.

<sup>55</sup> **ñ.a.** 2/114.

world eternal?" and so on. However, it does not mean that early Buddhism abandons the philosophical pursuit of truth. The Buddha kept silence about the speculative questions, but at the same time the Buddha verily presented "the four noble truths" as the right pursuit of truth.

It is true that the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism have their own philosophical backgrounds, but it does not immediately follow from this that their philosophical thoughts are incompatible each other. This study assumes that it is necessary to consider the two factors seen in the philosophical investigation of both the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism: The first one is a critical spirit, which consists in attaching importance to our direct experience in this temporal and manifold world. The second factor is the pursuit of truth, the philosophical pursuit of the eternal truth.

## CHAPTER 3

### JÑĀNA AND PAÑÑĀ

This chapter has two purposes. The first is to survey the word “truth” (Skt. *satya*, Pāli *sacca*) in both the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism. The second is to present “intuitive knowledge” (Skt. *jñāna*, Pāli *paññā*) as a clue to investigate the concept “truth.”

#### *Truth in the Old Upaniṣads*

##### ***Truth, knowledge, and infinity***

In the old Upaniṣads, the word “truth” has various meanings. Sometimes, it means “righteousness” or “truthfulness in speech”: “I will speak of verily you, the immediate Brahma. I will speak of the righteousness. I will speak of the truth” (TU. 1.1.1). *tvām eva pratyakṣam brahma vadiṣyāmi. ṛtam vadiṣyāmi. satyaṃ vadiṣyāmi.*<sup>1</sup> “*Satya* [means] truthfulness in speech, ...” (TUB. 1.9.1). *satyaṃ satyavacanam.*<sup>2</sup> Sometimes, it even stands for the cosmic being: “The face of truth [Brahma in the solar orb] is covered by a golden vessel. Oh Pūṣan [the Sun], open it, so that it will be seen by me who am the performer of virtuous deed [or meditation]” (ĪU. 15). *hiraṇmayena pātreṇa satyasyāpihitam mukham. tat tvam pūṣann apāvṛṇu satyadharmāya dṛṣṭaye.*<sup>3</sup>

But, there is a verse to which special attention should be paid in this study. It is a verse of the *Taittirīya-upaniṣad* (TU. 2.1.1). The text runs thus:

Om! The knower of Brahma attains the highest. It is said thus: “Brahma is truth, knowledge, and infinity.” He who knows [Brahma] as placed in the hiding place and in the supreme space, obtains all desirable things, along with Brahma, the wise.

*om brahma vid āpnoti param. tad eṣābhyuktā. satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ brahma. yo veda nihitam guhāyām parame vyoman. so’snute sarvān kāmān saha. brahmaṇā vipaściteti.*<sup>4</sup>

The commentator Śaṅkara explains the concept “truth” in this text. He admits that,

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<sup>1</sup> **TUŚB.**, 260.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 271.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 280.

in the truest sense, Brahma, as “attributeless,” is not related to any empirical dealing, and “destroying all distinction” --- therefore, Brahma as truth is definitely beyond empirical reality ---. On the same time, however, he maintains that, the truth as in “Brahma [is] truth” implies “the external reality in general.”<sup>5</sup>

While the truth somehow indicates Brahma, which is the eternal and the attributeless, as it is explained thus: “The sentence --- Brahma is truth, knowledge, and infinity --- is expounded to indicate Brahma, ...” (*satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ brahmeti brahmaṇo lakṣaṇārthaṃ vākyam ...*) (TUB. 2.1.1),<sup>6</sup> this truth is also “the external reality in general” along with which Brahma is to be understood. Swami Gambhirananda says about the sentence “Brahma is truth, knowledge, and infinity” thus: “... the words Truth etc., though generally meaning empirical truth etc., imply here by a figure of speech a transcendental entity which is Truth Itself.”<sup>7</sup>

This study assumes that the verse of the *Taittirīya-upaniṣad* 2.1.1 suggests one of the important themes in regard to the concept “truth” in the old Upaniṣads: While obviously the truth denoting “external reality in general” is concerned with this ephemeral world, it also implies the eternal or the transcendental somehow. This is the theme to be investigated in the third and forth chapters.

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<sup>5</sup> “Therefore, it is for the purpose of attaining the Self --- which is expressed in the text [of the *Taittirīya* 2.1.1], ‘Brahma is truth, knowledge, and infinity’ --- that [such attributes as] ‘becoming many,’ ‘entering into the created world,’ ‘acquisition of *rasa*,’ ‘fearlessness,’ ‘attainment’ and so on are attributed to Brahma, which is not related to any empirical dealing. But, in the truest sense, it is not possible to attribute anything to Brahma, which is attributeless” (TUB. 2.8.5). *tasmāt satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ brahmeti yathoktalakṣaṇāmapratipattiyartham eva bahubhavanasargapraveśarasalābhābhayasaṅkramaṇādi parikalpyate brahmaṇi sarvavyavahārāviṣaye, na tu paramārthato nirvikalpe brahmaṇi kaścīd api vikalpa upapadyate.* **IDUŚB.**, 311. “Similarly, [Brahma is not characterized] even by the word *satya*, since Brahma is by nature destroying all distinctions. It is the external reality in general that is characterized by the word *satya*, as is said like ‘Brahma is truth,’ it is not that Brahma is to be spoken through the word *satya*” (TUB. 2.1.1). *tathā satyaśabdenāpi. sarvaviśeṣapratyastamitasvarūpatvād brahmaṇo bāhyasattāsāmānya- viṣayeṇa satyaśabdena lakṣyate satyaṃ brahmeti. na tu satyaśabdavācyaṃ eva brahma.* *Ibid.*, 285.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 282.

<sup>7</sup> “... Brahma is presented as the cause of the origin etc. of the universe. This is *taṭastha* definition of Brahma, where the characteristics mentioned are not an intrinsic part of the thing defined, though they distinguish it from others for the time being. The *svarūpa* definition is presented in such sentences as, ‘Brahma is Truth, Knowledge, Infinite’ (TU. 2.1.1), where the words Truth etc., though generally meaning empirical truth etc., imply here by a figure of speech a transcendental entity which is Truth Itself.” Swami Gambhirananda, trans. **Brahmasūtrabhāṣya of Śaṅkarācārya** (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1983), 18 n. 50.

### ***The word satya***

As seen above, “truth” is not to be understood apart from this temporal and manifold world. This is the starting point of investigation of “truth” in the old Upaniṣads. There is a verse of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* (BU. 1.6.3): “This [Brahma], the Immortal, is covered by *satya* (truth). Prāṇa is verily the Immortal, and name and form are truth. This prāṇa is covered by them.” *tad etad amṛtaṃ satyena cchannaṃ prāṇo vā amṛtaṃ nāmarūpe satyaṃ tābhyām ayaṃ prāṇas channaḥ*.<sup>8</sup> Such twofoldness of “truth” is also indicated through an interpretation of the word *satya* in a verse of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* (BU. 5.5.1):

*Satya* is Brahma. ... This is [made of] three letters, such as *sa*, *tī*, and *yam*. *Sa* is one letter. *Tī* is one letter. *Yam* is one letter. The first and the last letters are truth. The middle is untruth. ...  
*satyaṃ brahma. ... tad etat tryakṣaram satiyam iti sa ity ekam akṣaram tīty ekam akṣaram yam ity ekam akṣaram prathamottame akṣare satyam madhyato'nṛtam ...*<sup>9</sup>

Referring to Brahma --- which is called “the first born” or “Satya Brahma” (*satyaṃ brahma*) --- in a verse of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* (BU. 5.4.1), the commentator also explains this twofoldness of the truth (*satya*) thus: “[It] is especially indicated as *satya* indeed. [It is] Satya Brahma, or Brahma which is *sat* and *tyat*, the gross and the subtle, or that which is by nature [made of] the five elements. ... Thus, one who knows the great,

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<sup>8</sup> **IDUŚB.**, 714. This word *prāṇa* here can not be understood as “breath” or “sense organ.” As it is used as something implying Brahma, it implies something subtle --- in this point, this word has a similar meaning to *puruṣa* ---, such as the Self of all, Brahma realised along with the limiting adjuncts, and so on.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 959. Besides, the similar expression is also found in a verse of the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad* (CU. 8.3.5): “These are verily three letters, namely, *sa-tī-yam*. That which is *sat*, is immortal. Then, that which is *tī*, is mortal. Then, that which is *yam*, is that by which both are sustained. [It is] that by which both are sustained, therefore [it is called] *yam*. One who knows thus goes to the heavenly world everyday.” *tāni ha vā etāni trīṇy akṣarāṇi satiyam iti tad yat sat tad amṛtam atha yat ti tan martyam atha yad yaṃ tenobhe yacchati yad anenobhe yacchati tasmād yam ahar ahar vā evaṃ vit svargaṃ lokam eti*. *Ibid.*, 575.

By the way, the interpretations of the word *satya* here should not be understood from an etymological point of view. Etymologically speaking, it is more appropriate to understand the word *satya* as being derived from *sat* (verbal root *as*) by addition of suffix *ya*. Although those interpretations may be regarded as “popular etymology” or “pseudo etymology,” this study supposes that those --- which are very often seen in the old Upaniṣads, Śaṅkara’s commentaries on those, Buddhaghosa’s commentaries on the Sutta-piṭaka, and so on --- are to be understood as philosophical interpretations, expressed in a form of the analytical method of linguistic, which is a representative of well-established sciences in ancient India.

honourable, first-born Brahma as the Self which is *satya*, conquers these worlds” (BUB. 5.4.1). ... *viśeṣato nirdīśati --- satyameva. sacca tyacca mūrtaṃ cāmūrtaṃ ca satyaṃ brahma, pañcabhūtātmakamityetat. ... evaṃ satyātmānaṃ brahma mahadyakṣaṃ prathamajaṃ veda sa jayaīmāṃlokān.*<sup>10</sup>

Moreover, the fact that this view of “truth” is a starting point of a philosophical quest, and also the core of the Upaniṣadic thought, is also known from the interpretation of the word *upaniṣad*. In a verse of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (BU. 2.1.20), the truth is spoken of as the secret name *upaniṣad*.

As a spider ascends along the thread, and as small sparks go out from a fire into different directions, so from this self all *prāṇas*, all worlds, all gods, and all beings go out. Its secret name (*upaniṣad*) is the truth of truth. *Prāṇas* are verily truth, and it [the Self] is the truth of that.

*sa yathorṇanābhis tantu nocced yathāgneḥ kṣudrā viṣphulingā vyuccaranty evam evāsmād ātmanaḥ sarve prāṇāḥ sarve lokāḥ sarve devāḥ sarvāṇi bhūtāni vyuccaranti tasyopaniṣat satyasya satyam iti prāṇā vai satyaṃ teṣāṃ eṣa satyam.*<sup>11</sup>

What is firstly to be investigated is the view of truth, also called the secret name *upaniṣad* --- its meaning is said to be “non-worldly” (*alaukika*) ---, which is “that that which *nigamayati* brings us *upa* near” to the highest truth, Brahma.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> **IDUŚB.**, 959.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 732.

<sup>12</sup> “*Upaniṣad* is said to be a word expressing *upaniṣad* namely ‘[that which] *nigamayati* brings [us] *upa* near.’ On the authority of the scriptures, the peculiar meaning of this word is ascertained, namely, the character of that which brings [us] near. It has been said, ‘What is this *upaniṣad*? It has been answered, ‘[It is] the truth of truth.’ Moreover, this [*upaniṣad*] has a meaning which is difficult to be understood, because [this word] *upaniṣad* has a non-worldly meaning” (BUB. 2.1.20). *upaniṣad upa samīpaṃ nigamayatiṭy abhidhāyakaḥ śabda upaniṣad ity ucatyate. śāstraprāmāṇyād etac chabdagato viśeṣo’vasīyate upanigamayitṛtvaṃ nāma. kā’sāv upaniṣad ity āha --- satyasya satyam iti. sā hi sarvatra copaniṣad alaukikārthatvād durvijñeyārthā, ... Ibid.*, 733. The similar text is also found in the commentary on the *Taittirīya-upaniṣad* (TUB. 1.1 Introduction): “Knowledge is meant by the word *upaniṣad*, because it cuts off or ends such things as being born in a womb, old age, and so on for those who resort to it, or because it brings [us] near Brahma, or because the highest state is lying near it.” *upaniṣad iti vidyocyate. tat sevinām garbhajanmajarādiniśātanāt tad avasādanād vā, brahmaṇo vopaniṣad ity itṛtvāt, upaniṣaṇṇaṃ vāsyāṃ paraṃ śreya iti. Ibid.*, 260.

*Truth in Early Buddhism*

***Truth and the Dhamma***

This study assumes that, in early Buddhism, the truth (Pāli *sacca*, Skt. *satya*) is almost equivalent to *dhamma* (Skt. *dharma*). In the *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta* --- indubitably one of the most important Suttas in the Sutta-piṭaka ---, the Buddha speaks of the Dhamma as follows:

Therefore, Oh Ānanda, a bhikkhu [should let] himself be his support, and [should let] himself, not anything else, be his refuge; [a bhikkhu should let] the Dhamma be his support, and [should let] the Dhamma, not anything else, be his refuge.

*evaṃ kho ānanda bhikkhu attadīpo viharati attasaraṇo anaññasaraṇo, dhammadīpo dhammasaraṇo anaññasaraṇo.*<sup>13</sup>

In the *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta*, the Dhamma is also mentioned in the last words of the Buddha.

... Oh Ānanda, it may [come to the mind of] some among you: “The word lost its teacher. Our teacher is no more.” But, Oh Ānanda, it should not be thus considered. Oh Ānanda, the Dhamma and the Discipline, which are taught and laid down by me to you, are your teacher when I am gone. ...

*... siyā kho panānanda tumhākaṃ evamassa atītasatthukaṃ pāvacaṇaṃ natthi no satthāti na kho panetaṃ ānanda evaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ yo vo ānanda mayā dhammo ca vinayo ca desīto paññatto so vo mamaccayena satthā ...*<sup>14</sup>

By the way, the word *dhamma* (or *dhammā* in the plural) is considered in several meanings.<sup>15</sup> In regard to the sentence of the *Brahmajāla-sutta* “There, Oh bhikkhus, are indeed the other Dhammas which are profound, hard to see, hard to understand, tranquil, excellent, beyond the sphere of [worldly] logic, subtle, comprehensible [only] by the wise ...” (*atthi bhikkhave aññe va dhammā gambhīrā duddasā duranubodhā santā pañītā*

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<sup>13</sup> **¶.u.** 10/93/119.

<sup>14</sup> **¶.u.** 10/141/178.

<sup>15</sup> The commentary explains also thus, “The word *dhamma* also appears in [meanings of] teaching, truth, meditation, intuitive knowledge, original state, essence, voidness, goodness, attainment, that which is to be known, and so on.” *dhammasaddo panāyaṃ pariyattisaccasamādhipaññāpakatisabhāvasuññatāpuññāpattiñeyyādīsu dissati.* **u.a.** 1/18.

*atakkāvacarā nipuṇā paṇḍitavedanīyā*),<sup>16</sup> the commentator Buddhaghosa explains thus: “Through the method ‘there are, Oh bhikkhus, other Dhammā, profound, hard to see’ and so on, it began explaining the voidness (*suññatā*). There, the word *dhamma* means good quality (*guṇa*), teaching (*desanā*), texts (*pariyatti*), insubstantiality (*nissatta*), and so on.” *“atthi bhikkhave aññeva dhammā gambhīrā duddasā”ti ādinā nayena suññatāppakāsaṇaṃ ārabhi. tattha dhammāti guṇe desanāyaṃ pariyattiyaṃ nissatteti evamādīsu dhammasaddo vattati.*<sup>17</sup>

Besides, after the citation above of the *Brahmajāla-sutta*, the text continues as follows: “The Tathāgata expounds these [Dhammas] after realisation of these through intuitive knowledge by himself.” *ye tathāgato sayāṃ abhiññā sacchikatvā pavedeti.* Here is a question. What are “Dhammas”? The commentator also asks the same question: “What are these Dhammas?” He gives an answer by himself: “[It is] the intuitive knowledge of omniscience (*sabbaññuta-ñāṇa*.)” Furthermore, he asks another question: “Why is it described in the plural?” Again he answers by himself: “Because it takes multiple heaps of consciousness and it takes multiple [kinds] of objects according to the successive arising.”<sup>18</sup>

This argument is extremely important for us to understand the meaning of the Dhamma. Admittedly, it is a fact that the Dhamma is spoken of in twofold, fourfold, or manifold way in the the Pāli Canon, and that the Dhamma is sometimes used as plural. But, as far as this Dhamma means the omniscient intuitive knowledge --- which implies “one” ---, it must be carefully considered if we can easily understand the Dhamma (or the Dhammas) spoken of in twofold way --- for example, the formed and the unformed --- according to our empirical attitude. In other words, it must be questioned if it is appropriate to understand the formed as something empirical, and the unformed as something beyond our experience. Taking account of “the Dhamma as the omniscient intuitive knowledge,” the answer seems

<sup>16</sup> **ṭ.ṣ.** 9/26/16.

<sup>17</sup> **ṭ.ḁ.** 1/92.

<sup>18</sup> “What are these Dhammas praised by the Tathāgata? [It is] the intuitive knowledge of omniscience (*sabbaññuta-ñāṇa*). If so, why is it described in the plural? Because it takes multiple heaps of consciousness and it takes multiple [kinds] of objects.” This [intuitive knowledge of omniscience] is obtained in the four great functions of consciousness, which are endowed with intuitive knowledge. This [intuitive knowledge of omniscience] does not take any Dhamma as its object, as it is said: ‘It knows everything in the past, in the future, or at presence, thus it is the knowledge of omniscience. There is no obstacle, thus it is the unobstructed knowledge,’ and so on.” *katame ca pana te dhammā bhagavatā evaṃ thomitāti? sabbaññutañāṇaṃ. yadi evaṃ kasmā puthuvacananiddeso katoti? puthucittasamāyogato ceva puthuārammaṇato ca. taṃ hi catūsū ñāṇasampayuttamahākiriyaçittesu labbhati, na cassa koci dhammo ārammaṇaṃ nāma na hoti. yathāha “alītaṃ ... anāgataṃ ... paccuppannaṃ. sabbaṃ jānātīti sabbaññutañāṇaṃ, tattha āvaraṇaṃ natthīti anāvaraṇañāṇaṃ”ti ādi. ṭ.ḁ. 1/93*

to be negative. Besides, what is considered as the Immortal in the Pāli Canon is Nibbāna. The commentator makes a comment on Nibbāna, the Immortal, or the unborn: “Indeed, Nibbāna is one (*ekam*), but its names are manifold on account of the correspondence to the names of everything formed.” *ekameva hi nibbānaṃ, nāmāni panassa sabbasaṅkhatānaṃ nāmapaṭipakkhavasena anekāni hontī*.<sup>19</sup>

To return the topic, the word *dhamma* is also analysed in a treatise “Pāli Dhamma --- vornehmlich in der kanonischen Literatur” of Magdalena and Wilhelm Geiger. According to this treatise, the word *dhamma* have four important meanings, namely, law (*Gesetz*), teaching (*Lehre*), truth (*Wahrheit*), thing (*Ding, Sache*).<sup>20</sup> However, since these meanings do not necessarily stand for different things, this study assumes that the most important meaning is “truth,” especially, “the truth” as the Immortal.

Needless to say, as it will be seen in this and next chapters, early Buddhism also attaches importance to our direct experience in this temporal and manifold world. However, it is never to be forgotten that what is consistently to be questioned in early Buddhism is the Immortal, Nibbāna.

### *Simile of Arrow*

As seen in the sections above, the view of truth in ancient India has a common characteristic. Namely, while desiring inquiry into the eternal or the Immortal, its starting point should be found in --- or at least along with --- our direct experience in the temporal and manifold world.

It is “intuitive knowledge” --- *jñāna* (knowledge), *prajñā* or *prajñāna* (wisdom, knowledge) in the old Upaniṣads, *ñāna* (Skt. *jñāna*), and *paññā* (Skt. *prajñā*) in early Buddhism --- that is a key in this view of truth. The commentator Śaṅkara gives an explanation about “intuitive knowledge” (*jñāna*) in the verse “Brahma is truth, knowledge, and infinity” (TU. 2.1.1): “Knowledge, which is the nature of the Self, is not different from the Self. Therefore, it is eternal indeed” (*ātmanaḥ svarūpaṃ jñāptir na tato vyatiricyate ato nityaiva*) (TUB. 2.1.1).<sup>21</sup> “Since [Brahma] is not separated from the nature of being knower, and since [Brahma] is not dependent on other instrumental like the sense-organs, it is well known that Brahma, verily being by nature knowledge, is eternal” (*vijñātr̥svarūpāvyatirekāt*

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<sup>19</sup> **¶.a.** 2/416.

<sup>20</sup> Wilhelm Geiger, **Kleine Schriften; zur Indologie und Buddhismuskunde** (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1973), 104-109.

<sup>21</sup> **IDUŚB.**, 284.

*karaṇādinimittānapekṣatvāc ca brahmaṇo jñānasvarūpatve'pi nityatvaprasiḍḍhiḥ*) (TUB. 2.1.1).<sup>22</sup>

By the way, there is a simile which indicates intuitiveness of this sort of knowledge. It is a simile of arrow. The typical example of this simile is found in a verse of the *Muṇḍaka-upaniṣad* (MU. 2.2.3). In regard to the imperishable Brahma (*akṣaraṃ brahma*), which is explained thus, “That is this truth, that is immortal, that is to be penetrated” (*tad etat satyaṃ tad amṛtaṃ tad veddhavyaṃ*) (MuU. 2.2.2),<sup>23</sup> this simile of arrow (*śara*) is expounded as follows:

“Having taken the bow, the Upaniṣads’ great weapon, one should place [in it] the arrow sharpened through meditation. Having drawn [the bow], Oh good one, hit (*viddhi*) the target, the imperishable [Brahma], with the consciousness which has attained that state.”

*dhanur gṛhītvaupaniṣadaṃ mahāstraṃ śaraṃ hy upāsāniśitaṃ sandadhīta. āyamyā tadbhāvagatena cetasā lakṣyaṃ tad evākṣaraṃ somya viddhi.*<sup>24</sup>

Here is expressed the oneness of Brahma, the typical dogmatic theme of the old Upaniṣads, as is explained like “one should become [one with Brahman] just like an arrow” (*śaravattanmayo bhavet*) (MuU. 2.2.4).<sup>25</sup> But, what is to be noted here is “piercing,” “penetrating,” or “hitting” itself --- *veddhavya* (to be pierced) and *viddhi* (shoot; imperative, the second person, singular) are derived from a verbal root *vyad* or *vidh* ----. This expression “piercing” or “penetrating” does not only imply “oneness,” but a peculiarity of intuitive knowledge in the old Upaniṣads. The commentator gives an explanation about the word *veddhavyam* thus: “That is to be penetrated’ (*tad-veddhavyaṃ*) means that it is to be hit by the mind. It means that the mind should be concentrated on it” (MuUB 2.2.2). *tad veddhavyaṃ manasā tāḍayitavyam. tasmin manaḥsamādhānaṃ kartavyam ity arthaḥ.*<sup>26</sup> “The target, Brahma, is to be penetrated (*veddhavya*), without being intoxicated (*apramatta*), without any intoxication of thirst (*ṛṣṇā*) to obtain the external objects, without any passion at all, with the sense-organs controlled, and with the concentration of mind (*ekāgracitta*)” (MuUB 2.2.4). *apramattena bāhyaviṣayopalabdhitrṣṇāpramāḍavarjitena sarvato viraktena*

<sup>22</sup> IDUŚB., 285.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 159.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 160.

<sup>25</sup> “The mystical syllable om is the bow. The Self is verily the arrow, and Brahma is called that target. It is to be penetrated without intoxication. One should become one with that [Brahma] just like the arrow” (MuU. 2.2.4). *praṇavo dhanuḥ śaro hy ātmā brahma tal lakṣyam ucyate. apramattena veddhavyaṃ śaravat tanmayo bhavet. Ibid.*

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*.

*jitendriyeṅaikāgracittena veddhavyaṃ brahma lakṣyam.*<sup>27</sup>

### *Jñāna*

The word *jñāna*, which is derived from a verbal root *jñā* (to know), literally means “knowledge.” However, in the old Upaniṣads this word *jñāna* --- or *vidyā* --- usually stands for “intuitive knowledge,” while the words *vijñāna*, *saṃjñā*, and *buddhi* usually mean empirical or individual knowledge --- this empirical knowledge is rather bodily function, and it belongs to internal organ, which is called *buddhi* (intellect), *manas* (mind), or *cit* (consciousness) ---.<sup>28</sup> Besides, in the old Upaniṣads the usage of the word *vijñāna* is not always consistent. This word is sometimes used instead of *jñāna* as “intuitive knowledge,” while in many cases it stands for empirical knowledge.

There is a famous dialogue between Yājñavalkya and Maitreyī in a section of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* (BU. 2.4). There, one of the topics is related to two expressions *vijñāna-ghana* (literally mere knowledge)<sup>29</sup> and *saṃjñā-abhāva* (literally absence of

<sup>27</sup> IDUŚB., 161.

<sup>28</sup> In the *Kaṭha-upaniṣad*, while the Self (*ātman*) is compared to the lord of chariot (*rathin*), intellect (*buddhi*) and mind (*manas*) are compared to charioteer (*sārathi*) and reins (*pragraha*) respectively --- besides body (*śarīra*) is compared to chariot (*ratha*) and senses (*indriyāṇi*) to horses (*hayāḥ*) ---. See KaU. 1.3.3-4. *Ibid.*, 79-80. Moreover, in the *Chandogya-upaniṣad*, mind (*manas*) is just regarded as one of the five prāṇas (organs), namely breath (*prāṇa*), speech (*vāc*), eye (*caḥṣus*), ear (*śrotra*), and mind (*manas*). See CU. 2.7.2. *Ibid.*, 391.

<sup>29</sup> The word *ghana* can be also interpreted as “mass” or “multitude.” But this word is not to be confused with “aggregate” which stands for the individual beings in this temporal and manifold world. Here this word is to be understood as “mere” or “nothing but,” as the commentator explains thus: “The word *ghana* denies something belonging to a different species, like ‘a gold ingot’ or ‘a mass of iron.’” (BUB. 2.4.12). *ghanaśabdo jātyantarapariśedhārthaḥ. yathā suvarṇaghano'yoghana itī. Ibid.*, 766. Moreover, *Vijñāna-ghana* is originally that which is to be expressed as *prajñā-ghana* or *prajñāna-ghana*, and it is something closely related to *prajñā*, *prajñā-netra*, and *jñāna*. It is to be discriminated from empirical knowledge such as *vijñāna*, *saṃjñā*, or *buddhi*. See BU. 4.5.13 about the expression *prajñāna-ghana*. See AU. 3.3 and AUB. 3.3 about *prajñā* or *prajñā-netra*: “All this is that which has that *prajñā* (intuitive knowledge) as *netra* (leader or eye). [It is] situated in [this] *prajñā*. [This] world has that which has *prajñā* as *netra* (leader or eye). *Prajñā* is the ground (*pratiṣṭhā*). Brahma is *prajñā*’ (AU. 3.3). *sarvan tat prajñānetram prajñāne pratiṣṭhitam prajñānetro lokaḥ prajñā pratiṣṭhā prajñānaṃ brahma. Ibid.*, 348. “*Prajñā* is [intuitive] knowledge (*prajñāpti*), that is verily Brahma. *Netra* is that by which one is guided. [Therefore] *prajñā-netra* (the eye of intuitive knowledge) means that which has [intuitive] knowledge (*prajñā*) as a guide” (AUB. 3.3). *prajñāptiḥ prajñā tac ca brahmaiva, nīyate'neneti netram, prajñā netram yasya tad idaṃ prajñānetram. Ibid.*, 349.

knowledge). Yājñavalkya explains “the Immortal” --- the highest Self --- to Maitreyī in a verse of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* (BU. 2.4.12) as follows:

“This great being, endless, boundless, is pure knowledge indeed. Having come out from these beings, one vanishes with these. After attaining [the Self], there is no [empirical] knowledge. This is what I say, Oh [my dear].

*idaṃ mahad bhūtam anantam apāraṃ vijñānaghana eva. etebhyo bhūtebhyaḥ samutthāya tāny evānuvinaśyati na pretya saṃjñāstīy are bravīmi.*<sup>30</sup>

Then, about this explanation, Maitreyī makes a reasonable complaint like this: “Verily here, you, Bhagavat, have bewildered me: [You say,] after having attained [the Self], there is no [empirical] knowledge.” (*atraiva mā bhagavān amūmhan na pretya sañjñāstī*) (BU. 2.4.13).<sup>31</sup> Her confusion is concerned with the contradictory qualities “pure knowledge” (*vijñāna-ghana*) and “absence of knowledge” (*saṃjñā-abhāva*), as it is said in the commentary, “Having first said that [the Self] is pure knowledge indeed, now, [you, Yājñavalkya, say that] after attaining [the Self], there is no [empirical] knowledge” (*pūrvam vijñānaghana eveti pratijñāya punar na pretya sañjñāstī*) (BUB. 2.4.13).<sup>32</sup>

For this question, Yājñavalkya gives his answer in a verse of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* 2.4.14. But this study dares to postpone the consideration about this answer --- this answer will be argued in the sixth chapter ---, because this Yājñavalkya’s answer --- the concerning explanation in the commentary as well<sup>33</sup> --- is too difficult to consider immediately. What is sure here is that there are two kinds of knowledge to be discriminated, such as intuitive knowledge --- or pure knowledge --- and empirical knowledge. What is to

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<sup>30</sup> **IDUŚB.**, 765.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 767.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>33</sup> The concerning explanation in the commentary is as follows: “When the individual [or uncultivated] existence of the Self, which is brought up by ignorance (*avidyā*) and is connected with body and organs, is destroyed by knowledge (*vidyā*), then the particular [or empirical] knowledge, which is caused by it and is connected with body and so on and is characterised by the view of difference, is destroyed on the destruction of the limiting adjuncts [such as] the aggregates of body and organs. It is because there is no ground. It is just as, since the support such as water and so on is destroyed, the reflection of the moon and so on and the light and so on --- caused by it --- [are destroyed]” (BUB. 2.4.13). *yas tv avidyāpratyupasthāpitaḥ kāryakaraṇasambandhī ātmanaḥ khilyabhāvaḥ, yasmin vidyayā nāśite tannimittā yā viśeṣasañjñā śarīrādisambandhinī anyatvadarśanalakṣaṇā, sā kāryakaraṇasaṅghātopādhanau pravilāpīte naśyati hetvabhāvād udakādyaḍhāranāsād iva candrādipratibimbā tannimittā ca prakāśādīḥ.* *Ibid.*, 767-768.

be questioned next is “intuitiveness.”<sup>34</sup> What does “intuitive knowledge” (*jñāna*, *vidyā*) means? Then, this study further investigates this type of knowledge in regard to two points. The first point is the concept “knower” (*jñātr*). The second one is the concept “consisting of empirical knowledge” (*vijñāna-maya*).

### ***Jñātr is not “knower”***

As for *jñāna* as “intuitive knowledge,” it is noteworthy that this knowledge is discussed in a close relation with the words “knower” (*jñātr*), “knower” (*vijñātr*), and “seer” (*draṣṭr*). In a sense, such a word “knower” or “seer” itself implies the specific characteristic of this intuitive knowledge, as seen in the expression “the nature of being the knower” (*vijñātrsvārūpa*) (BUB. 2.1.1). For example, in a verse of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* (BU. 4.3.23):

Verily, [in the state of deep sleep, when it is said that] he does not see, it means that he does not see, while he [still] sees indeed: For there is no disappearance of the seer of seeing, because of its imperishability. But, there is not a second that he could see. [There is no] other things separated from him.

*yad vai tan na paśyati paśyan vai tan na paśyati na hi draṣṭur drṣṭer viparilopo vidyate'vināśitvāt. na tu tad dvitīyam asti tato'nyad vibhaktam yat paśyēt.*<sup>35</sup>

Grammatically, it is obvious that the words *jñātr* and *draṣṭr* are derived from verbal roots *jñā* and *drś* by addition of suffix *tr*. Therefore, it is quite appropriate to understand these words as implying a certain kind of “doer” (*karṭr*). Moreover, according to our natural attitude, it is also normal to understand these words as implying subjectivity in cognition or action.

However, in a philosophical point of view, such a loose understanding is far from what the Upaniṣadic texts mean. The commentator explains evidently thus: “*Jñāna* means understanding or knowledge --- the word *jñāna* denotes the concept (or the state) [of knowledge], but not the doer of knowledge; because it is the attribute of Brahma together with truth and infinity” (*jñānam jñāptir avabodho --- bhāvasādhano jñānaśabdo na tu jñānakarṭr, brahmaviśeṣaṇatvāt satyānantābhyaṃ saha*) (TUB. 2.1.1).<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> In modern philosophy, sometimes “intuition” is understood as “unity of subject and object.” But such understanding is not appropriate for “intuitive knowledge” in the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism.

<sup>35</sup> IDUŚB., 896.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 283.

There is another example in regard to “knower” or “seer” in a verse of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* (BU. 3.4.2):

“Explain to me Brahma which is immediate and direct, and which is the Self within all.” “This is your Self that is within all.” “Which is within all [things], Yājñavalkya?” “You cannot see the seer of seeing. You cannot hear the hearer of hearing; you cannot think the thinker of thought; you can not know the knower of knowledge. This is your Self that is within all; everything else but this is perishable.”

*yad eva sāḅśād aparokṣād brahma ya ātmā sarvāntaras taṃ me vyācakṣvety eṣa ta ātmā sarvāntarah katamo yājñavalkya sarvāntarah. na dṛṣṭer draṣṭāraṃ paśyer na śruteḥ śrotāraṃ śṛṇuyā na mater mantāraṃ manvīthā na vijñāter vijñātāraṃ vijñānīyāḥ. eṣa ta ātmā sarvāntaro'to'nyad ārtam ...*<sup>37</sup>

Here also the commentator speaks of non-agency of “seer” (*draṣṭṛ*), negating such an interpretation as “the seer of seeing is the doer of seeing” (*dṛṣṭer draṣṭā dṛṣṭeḥ kartā*) (BUB. 3.4.2). The wrong interpretation of this expression presupposes “the seeing” (*dṛṣṭi*) as something to be done or something done and “the seer” as a doer.<sup>38</sup> The first reason why this interpretation is to be negated is that, if this word “seer” is understood as agency, the expression *dṛṣṭer draṣṭā* would be redundant (*ādhikya*). “[It becomes] meaningless to hold the word *dṛṣṭi* with the genitive case-ending there ... The word *dṛṣṭeḥ* becomes meaningless, because [*draṣṭṛ*], having *ṭṛ* as a suffix, [is already enough] to stand for ‘the agency of seeing.’” *tatra dṛṣṭer iti ṣaṣṭhyantena dṛṣṭigrahaṇaṃ nīrarthakaṃ ... trjantenaiva dṛṣṭi- karṭṛtvasya siddhatvāt dṛṣṭer iti nīrarthakaṃ.*<sup>39</sup> The second reason is that there is a word “revealer” (*prakāśayitr*). It has a suffix *ṭṛ*, but does not necessarily indicate “doer.”<sup>40</sup>

<sup>37</sup> IDUŚB., 807.

<sup>38</sup> “[According to the wrong interpretation,] ‘[you can] not [see] the seer of seeing’ means that you cannot see the seer of seeing, [namely,] the doer of mere seeing, without discriminating the seeing (*dṛṣṭi*). The genitive case [as in *dṛṣṭeḥ* (of seeing)] is used in the meaning of accusative. That *dṛṣṭi* (seeing) is [something] to be done and [something] done, like jar. The agency of *dṛṣṭi* (seeing) is spoken of by the suffix *ṭṛ* of the word *draṣṭṛ*” (BUB. 3.4.2). *na dṛṣṭer draṣṭāraṃ dṛṣṭeḥ kartāraṃ dṛṣṭibhedam akṛtvā dṛṣṭimātrasya kartāraṃ na paśyer iti. dṛṣṭer iti karmani ṣaṣṭhī. sā dṛṣṭiḥ kriyamāṇā ghaṭavat karma bhavati. draṣṭāraṃ iti trjantena draṣṭur dṛṣṭi karṭṛtvam ācaṣṭe. Ibid., 808.*

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>40</sup> “As it is seen that the words having the suffix *ṭṛ* are used with regard to the doer of the temporal actions, such as *chetṭṛ* (cutter), *bhetṭṛ* (breaker) and *ganṭṛ* (goer), is this [word] *draṣṭṛ* also [to be considered] in the same way? No, [it is not necessarily so, for example,] *prakāśayitr* (revealer)” (BUB. 4.3.23). *nanu anityakriyākarṭṛviśaya eva trcpratyayāntasya śabdasya prayogo dṛṣṭo yathā chettā bhettā ganteti, tathā draṣṭety atrāpīti cen na, prakāśayiteti dṛṣṭatvāt. Ibid., 897.*

However, while, as the commentary says, the seer as in “the seer of seeing” is not to be understood as a perceiver or an epistemological subject --- in the same way, the seeing is not to be understood as something perceived or an epistemological object ---, this expression “the seer of seeing” still implies “essence” or “the own nature” (*svarūpa*), which is to be discriminated from empirical cognition. This issue is still to be questioned.

### ***Vijñāna-maya***

As for the word *vijñāna-maya* (literally “consisting of knowledge”),<sup>41</sup> *vijñāna* here does not mean “intuitive knowledge.” It is clear, also because another expression *mano-maya* (literally “being consisting of the mind”) (BUB. 4.3.7) is used instead of it. However, this word is still a key for considering “intuitive knowledge” (*jñāna*). A verse of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* (BU. 4.3.7), one of the most important verses in the old Upaniṣads, runs as follows:

What is the Self? Puruṣa, which is full of the mind [or identified with the intellect] among the organs, is the light in the heart. Being similar to it [the intellect], it [Puruṣa] moves between the two worlds; it thinks, as it were, it shakes, as it were. Having become the dream [or having identified with the state of dream], it [Puruṣa] transcends this world --- the forms of death.

*katama ātmeti yo'yaṃ vijñānamayaḥ prāṇeṣu hr̥dy antarjyotiḥ puruṣaḥ sa samānaḥ sann ubhau lokāv anusañcarati dhyāyatīva lelāyatīva sa hi svapno bhūtvemaṃ lokam atikrāmati mṛtyo rūpāṇi.*<sup>42</sup>

Evidently the word *vijñāna* is here considered as “intellect” (*buddhi*), “mind” (*manas*), or “heart” (*hr̥daya*) --- which is also called “internal organ” (*antaḥkaraṇa*) (BUB. 2.1.16) ---.<sup>43</sup> Then, what is to be considered in the word *vijñāna-maya* is rather the meaning of *-maya*. The argument here begins with a verse of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (BU. 2.1.16):

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<sup>41</sup> There are the concepts *anna-maya* (consisting of food) and *ānanda-maya* (consisting of bliss), which are spoken of along with *vijñāna-maya* in the later Vedānta system. However, Śāṅkara considers *anna-maya* and *ānanda-maya* as modification (*vikāra*). In this point, Śāṅkara's view is obviously different from the trend of the later Vedānta system. See TUB. 2.5.1. **IDUŚB.**, 294.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 867.

<sup>43</sup> As the word “dream” is used, what is to be questioned here is not necessarily the Immortal itself, but “intellect.” Besides, “intellect” --- as moving between two worlds (this world and the next world) --- will be considered in the fifth chapter, and the Immortal will be considered in the sixth and seventh chapters.

Ajātaśatru said, “When this puruṣa [namely, Brahma], consisting of the [empirical] knowledge, was thus asleep, where was it at that time, and whence did it thus come?” Gārgya did not know that.

*sa hovācājātaśatrur yatraiṣa etat supto'bhūd ya eṣa vijñānamayaḥ puruṣaḥ kvaīṣa tadābhūt kuta etad āgād iti tad u ha na mene gārgyaḥ.*<sup>44</sup>

According to the commentator Śaṅkara, the word *-maya* in *vijñāna-maya* should not be understood in the sense of “made of” or “consisting of.” Neither should it be understood in the sense of “resembling.” It is verily because the Self (*ātman*) --- which is here called *vijñāna-maya* --- is never known to be an effect or a modification, while these interpretations “made of,” “consisting of,” or “resembling” imply an effect or a modification. The commentator says: “[The word] *-maya* [in] *vijñāna-maya* [is used in the sense of] ‘being full of’” (*tanmayas tatprāyo vijñānamaya*). Again, what is meant by “being full of” (*prāya*)? “[It means] being perceived in it [empirical] knowledge (*vijñāna*), being perceived along with it, and being perceiver [along with it]” (*tasminn upalabhyatvaṃ tena copalabhyatvam upalabdhr̥tvaṃ ca*). Furthermore, in regard to the meaning “being full of knowledge,” there is a more important thing; it implies “something already well known” or “something already familiar.” The commentator says: “It is also because [Brahma] is repeatedly spoken of as something already well known, as it is said, ‘that which is full of [empirical] knowledge’ ...” (*‘ya eṣa vijñānamayaḥ’ iti ca prasiddhavad anuvādāt ...*) (BUB. 2.1.16).<sup>45</sup> The similar idea in regard to the concept *vijñāna-maya* is also expounded in a verse in the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad* (CU. 3.14.2): “[Brahma is] that which consists of mind, the body of which is prāṇa, the form of which is splendour” (*manomayaḥ prāṇasārīro bhārūpaḥ*).<sup>46</sup> The commentator here explains thus: “[Brahma] is that which consists of the mind, that which is full of the mind. [Here] the mind means that along with which one thinks. Through its own function, it is engaged in objects. [Brahma] is full of this [mind], [namely Brahma is realised] along with this [mind]. Thus, [Brahma] is engaged in [the objects] along with it [the mind], as it were, and is detached from [the object], as it were” (CUB. 3.14.2). *manomayo manaḥprāyaḥ. manute'neneti manas tatsvavṛtṭyā viṣayeṣu pravṛtṭam bhavati tena manasā tanmayaḥ. tathā pravṛtṭa iva tatprāyo nivṛtṭa iva ca.*<sup>47</sup>

Although the question why the intuitive knowledge is called “essence” or “the own nature” (*svarūpa*) --- or why the intuitive knowledge is called “the seer of seeing” in spite of

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<sup>44</sup> IDUŚB., 726.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 428.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 429.

the ambiguity of the expression --- is not answered yet, at least it is sure that this intuitive knowledge, also called the pure knowledge or the knowledge of Brahma, is to be discriminated from the empirical knowledge, and that this intuitive knowledge is first obtained along with the empirical knowledge, and that this intuitive knowledge is something already known along with the empirical knowledge.

### *Paññā*

#### ***The four noble truths and paññā***

In early Buddhism, there is also “knowledge” which is implied by “a simile of arrow.” It is *paññā* (intuitive knowledge; Skt. *prajñā*) or *ñāṇa* (intuitive knowledge; Skt. *jñāna*) --- *ñāṇa* is a synonym of *paññā* in the Pāli Canon ---. An example of “a simile of arrow” is found in the *Visuddhimagga* of Buddhaghosa: “Non-delusion has the characteristic of penetrating [things] according to [their] essence, or it has the characteristic of infallible penetration, as the penetration of an arrow shot by a skilful archer.” *Amoho yathāsabhāvapaṭivedhalakkhaṇo, akkhalitapaṭivedhalakkhaṇo vā kusalissāsakkhitta-usupaṭivedho viya, ...*<sup>48</sup> In the Pāli Canon also, *paṭivijjhati* (pierce, penetrate, Skt; *prati-vidhyati* --- its verbal root is *vidh* or *vyadh*) is used as closely related to *pajānāti* (know intuitively), as will be seen in the citations below in this section.

A Thai Buddhist, Buddhadāsa, emphasises the importance of “intuitive knowledge” in regard to the Dhamma as follows: “Rational thinking is neither intuitive knowledge nor what is called ‘seeing the Dhamma.’ One can not see the Dhamma through rational thinking. But one can know it intuitively through a true inner realisation.” การคำนึงคำนวณตามหลักเหตุผลนั้น ไม่ใช่ การเห็นแจ้ง อย่างที่เรียกว่า “เห็นธรรม” ... การเห็นธรรมจึงไม่อาจจะเห็นได้ด้วยการคำนวณไปตามเหตุผล; แต่ต้องเห็นแจ้งด้วยความรู้สึภายในที่แท้จริง ...<sup>49</sup>

Traditionally, *paññā* (intuitive knowledge) is said to mean “knowing the four noble truths.” For example, in the *Mahāvedalla-sutta*.

What does one know intuitively? One knows intuitively that this is dukkha, and one knows intuitively that this is the arising of dukkha, and one knows intuitively that this is the cessation of dukkha, and one knows intuitively that this is the way of cessation of dukkha.

*kiñca pajānāti idaṃ dukkhanti pajānāti ayaṃ dukkhasamudayoti pajānāti ayaṃ*

<sup>48</sup> Warren, ed. *Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosācariya*, 393.

<sup>49</sup> พุทธทาสภิกขุ, *คู่มือมนุษย์ ฉบับสมบูรณ์* (กรุงเทพฯ: สุขภาพใจ, พ.ศ. 2549), 49-50.

*dukkhanirodhoti pajānāti ayam dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadāti pajānāti ...*<sup>50</sup>

### ***Paññā and viññāṇa***

As for this *paññā*, what is to be understood carefully is that this intuitive knowledge is first only possible along with empirical knowledge (or rational knowledge), and that this is not related to a certain blind subjectivism. There is no possibility of this kind of “intuitive knowledge,” if there is no “empirical knowledge.” The *Poṭṭhapāda-sutta* runs thus:

It is, Oh Poṭṭhapāda, empirical knowledge (*saññā*), that arises first, and after that intuitive knowledge (*ñāṇa*) [arises]. And intuitive knowledge arises because of the arising of the [empirical] knowledge. And thus one recognises: “It is truly from this condition (*idappaccaya*) that intuitive knowledge (*ñāṇa*) has arisen to me.”

*saññā kho poṭṭhapāda paṭhamam uppajati pacchā ñāṇam saññuppādā ca pana ñāṇuppādo hoti so evam pajānāti idappaccayā kira me ñāṇam udapādīti.*<sup>51</sup>

By the way, let us avoid concluding easily that this text maintains a kind of empiricism, namely a doctrine which regards our empirical sense perception in this temporal and manifold world as the only source of our knowledge. What is meant by this text is not so simple. It is far from our natural or ordinal attitude. The *Mahāvedalla-sutta* speaks of these two kinds of knowledge thus:

“That which is intuitive knowledge (*paññā*), Oh friend, and that which is empirical knowledge (*viññāṇa*), these states (*dhammā*) are associated, not dissociated, and it is not possible to lay down a difference between these states, [even] through having separated repeatedly. What one knows intuitively (*pajānāti*), Oh friend, is what one knows empirically (*vijānāti*); and what one knows empirically is what one knows intuitively ...

*yā cāvuso paññā yañca viññāṇam ime dhammā saṃsaṭṭhā no visamṣaṭṭhā na ca labbhā imesaṃ dhammānaṃ vinibbhujitvā vinibbhujitvā nānākaraṇam paññāpetuṃ yañca āvuso pajānāti taṃ vijānāti yaṃ vijānāti taṃ pajānāti ...*<sup>52</sup>

### ***Paññā is to be developed***

For the time being, what this intuitive knowledge (*paññā*) stands for philosophically here is not clear yet. But, although these texts emphasise the importance of intuitive knowledge, it is to be noted that this knowledge is only possible along with empirical

<sup>50</sup> **М.У.** 12/494/536-537.

<sup>51</sup> **В.С.** 9/288/230.

<sup>52</sup> **М.У.** 12/494/537.

knowledge.<sup>53</sup> Besides, there is a text of the *Mahāvedalla-sutta* which expresses the difference between these two kinds of knowledge.

That which is intuitive knowledge, Oh friend, and that which is empirical knowledge, these states are associated, not dissociated. [But] intuitive knowledge (*paññā*) is to be developed (*bhāvetabba*), empirical knowledge (*viññāṇa*) is to be known fully (*pariññeyya*). This is the difference between them.

*yā cāvuso paññā yañca viññāṇaṃ imesaṃ dhammānaṃ saṃsaṭṭhānaṃ no visasaṭṭhānaṃ paññā bhāvetabbā viññāṇaṃ pariññeyyaṃ idaṃ nesaṃ nānākaraṇanti.*<sup>54</sup>

Moreover, as seen from this text above, although this intuitive knowledge is not necessarily manifold in the truest sense, it is that which is to be developed. The *Mahāvedalla-sutta* again explains this knowledge --- also called “the eye of intuitive knowledge” (*paññā-cakkhu*), through which the Dhamma is to be known --- like this:

“But through what does one know the Dhamma, which is to be known, Oh friend?” “Oh friend, through the eye of intuitive knowledge one knows the Dhamma, which is to be known.” “But what is intuitive knowledge for, Oh friend?” “Oh friend, intuitive knowledge is for magga-insight, and for full understanding, and for abandonment.”

*neyyaṃ panāvuso dhammaṃ kena jānātīti. neyyaṃ kho āvuso dhammaṃ paññācakkhunā jānātīti. paññā panāvuso kimatthiyāti. paññā kho āvuso abhiññatthā pariññatthā pahānatthāti.*<sup>55</sup>

The intuitive knowledge is something which is to be developed along with some kinds of action --- such as “knowing fully,” “abandonment,” and “magga-insight” ---. The commentator explains this issue in regard to the four noble truths in the commentary on the

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<sup>53</sup> In the commentary, *paññā* is also explained as “one knows [intuitively] as it is (*yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti*)” or “one knows [intuitively] according to the essence” (*yathāsabhāvato pajānāti*). “As to the words ‘This is the dukkha’ (*so idaṃ dukkhaṃ*) and so on, it implies that one knows [intuitively] even all the truth of dukkha (*sabbaṃ-pi dukkha-saccaṃ*) as it is through penetrating the characteristic along with essence thus, ‘Dukkha is this much, it is no more than this.’” *so idaṃ dukkhantiādīsu “ettakaṃ dukkhaṃ, na ito bhīyyo”ti sabbampi dukkhasaccaṃ sarasalakkhaṇapaṭivedhena yathābhūtaṃ pajānātīti attho.* **ṭ.ṇ.** 1/202. “There, the words ‘one knows [intuitively] in reality that this is the dukkha’ means that one knows [intuitively] according to the essence that this is the dukkha, namely [knows intuitively] the Dhammas in three spheres, except craving.” *tattha idaṃ dukkhanti yathābhūtaṃ pajānātīti ṭhapetvā taṇhaṃ tebhūmikadhamme “idaṃ dukkhan”ti yathāsabhāvato pajānāti, ...* **ṭ.ṇ.** 2/412.

<sup>54</sup> **ṭ.ṇ.** 12/494/537.

<sup>55</sup> **ṭ.ṇ.** 12/496/539.

*Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna-sutta* thus: “The four [noble] truths are penetrated through a single penetration, and are known intuitively through a single intuition. [Namely,] the dukkha is penetrated through penetration [along with] full understanding, and the origination is penetrated through penetration [along with] abandonment, and the cessation is penetrated through penetration [along with] realisation, and the way is penetrated through penetration [along with] development (or manifestation).” *cattāri saccāni ekapaṭivedhena paṭivijjhati, ekābhisamayena abhisameti. dukkhaṃ pariññāpaṭivedhena paṭivijjhati, samudayaṃ pahānapaṭivedhena, nirodhaṃ sacchikiriyā-paṭivedhena, maggaṃ bhāvanā-paṭivedhena paṭivijjhati.*<sup>56</sup>

In early Buddhism, “intuitive knowledge,” which is only the way to the truth, the Dhamma, is not the same as the empirical knowledge, whereas the former is not possible apart from the latter. This type of thought is extremely similar to what we have seen in our consideration about the old Upaniṣads. Since the philosophical meaning of this intuitive knowledge is not clear enough yet, this study can not yet say any philosophical relation between the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism, but hopefully this study will be able to approach their core thoughts verily through further studying the concept “truth” focusing on “intuitive knowledge” as a clue of this study. Thus, in the next chapter, Being and Dukkha, which are the most important themes in regard to the concept “truth” in the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism respectively, is to be investigated, considering the meaning of “intuitive knowledge.”

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<sup>56</sup> **¶.a.** 2/417. The more detailed explanation is found in the commentary on the *Mahāvedalla-sutta*. “In time of the way, the four [noble] truths are penetrated through a single penetration, and are known intuitively through a single intuition. The dukkha is penetrated through penetration [along with] full understanding, and the origination [of the dukkha] is penetrated through penetration [along with] abandonment, and the cessation [of the dukkha] is penetrated through penetration [along with] realisation, and the way [of the cessation of the dukkha] is penetrated through penetration [along with] development (or manifestation) [through the way]. The dukkha is known intuitively through intuition [along with] full understanding, and the origination is known intuitively through intuition [along with] abandonment, and the cessation is known intuitively through intuition [along with] realisation, and the way is known intuitively through intuition [along with] development. One penetrates the three truths along with actions, and [penetrate] the cessation as the object.” *maggakkhaṇe cattāri saccāni ekapaṭivedhena paṭivijjhati, ekābhisamayena abhisameti. dukkhaṃ pariññāpaṭivedhena paṭivijjhati, samudayaṃ pahānapaṭivedhena, nirodhaṃ sacchikiriyāpaṭivedhena maggaṃ bhāvanāpaṭivedhena paṭivijjhati. dukkhaṃ pariññābhisamayena abhisameti, samudayaṃ pahānābhisamayena nirodhaṃ sacchikiriyābhisamayena maggaṃ bhāvanābhisamayena abhisameti. so tīṇi saccāni kiccato paṭivijjhati, nirodhaṃ ārammaṇato. ¶.a.* 2/247.

## CHAPTER 4

### BEING AND DUKKHA

This chapter aims at further considering the concept “truth” focusing on “intuitive knowledge” --- *jñāna* in the old Upaniṣads and *paññā* in early Buddhism, as seen in the previous chapter --- as a clue of this study. As for “truth,” the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism have their own crucial themes, namely, Being and Dukkha respectively. Being is the most important theme to consider what “truth” means in the old Upaniṣads. On the other hand, Dukkha is the first truth to be known intuitively in early Buddhism. Through investigating these two themes, this study clarifies the meaning of “intuitive knowledge” in the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism.

#### *Being*

##### ***Being in the Chāndogya-upaniṣad***

As is mentioned in the second chapter, this study assumes that the Upaniṣadic thought is a true dawn of philosophy in ancient India. One of the reasons for this assumption is found in the sixth chapter of the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad*. A verse of this Upaniṣad (CU. 6.2.1) runs like this: “In the beginning, Oh good one, this was Being alone, one only without a second” (*sad eva somyedam agra āsīt ekam evādvitīyam*).<sup>1</sup> However, what is to be questioned here is not what the origin of the world. Neither is it a metaphysical question, such as “Is this world eternal or not?” As it is explained in the fifth chapter of the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad*, such dogmatic questions can not be answered. Moreover, strictly speaking, it is not that this verse is involved with the ontological problem.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> **IDUŚB.**, 506.

<sup>2</sup> First of all, the following verses should be taken into account. Evidently they are contradictory to the concerning verse of the *Chandogya-upaniṣad* (CU. 6.2.1), if these verses are understood as implying the origination of the world: “In the beginning, this [world] was non-Being alone. It was Being that became into existence ...” (*asad evedam agra āsīt. tat sad āsīt tat samabhavat*) (CU. 3.19.1). *Ibid.*, 439. “In the beginning, this [world] was but non-Being. From there verily Being was originated” (*asad vā idam agra āsīt. tato vai sad ajāyata*) (TU. 2.7.1). *Ibid.*, 302. Besides, Śaṅkara sometimes blames Buddhist for being “devilish party of nihilist” (*asadvādi-pakṣam-āsuram*), but it is not necessarily because he considers that the philosophy of the old Upaniṣads consists in the theistic ontology. See KaUB. 2.6.13. *Ibid.*, 102. This issue will be argued in the seventh chapter.

What is questioned here is our experience, our knowledge itself. Our experience is possible only along with temporal, spatial, and causal relations. Our experience is not possible apart from this temporal and manifold world. On the other hand, our experience can not be established only through temporal, spatial, and causal relations. There is something eternal prior to our empirical knowledge.<sup>3</sup> This is what is questioned under a theme “Being.”

### ***Neither the known nor the unknown***

First of all, intuitive knowledge (*jñāna*) is neither known nor the unknown, as a verse of the *Kena-upaniṣad* (KeU. 1.4) speaks of Brahma thus:

That [Brahma] is verily different from the known, and it is above the unknown. Thus have we heard from the ancients who have explained it to us.

*anyad eva tad viditād atho aviditād adhi. iti śuśruma purveṣāṃ ye nas tad vyācacaḥṣire.*<sup>4</sup>

The commentator Śaṅkara also emphasises that the intuitive knowledge (*jñāna*)

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<sup>3</sup> This problem is also asked in a question “discrimination of the eternal and the non-eternal.” In such a question, the eternal is to be searched in the non-eternal. “There is the eternal among the ephemeral, the consciousness among the conscious, and the one among many, which bestows the desired objects. There is the eternal peace for the wise who sees the one as abiding in the Self, but not for others” (KaU. 2.5.13). *nityo’nityānāṃ cetaś cetanānām eko bahūnāṃ yo vidadhāti kāmān. tam ātmasthaṃ ye’nupaśyanti dhīrās teṣāṃ śāntiḥ śāśvatī netareṣām.* **IDUŚB.**, 96. “Having thought of the Self, as the bodiless among the bodies, as the stable among the unstable, as great and all-pervading, the wise man does not grieve” (KaU. 1.2.22). *aśarīraṃ śarīreṣv anavastheṣv avasthitam. mahāntaṃ vibhum ātmānaṃ matvā dhīro na śocati. Ibid.*, 77. However, “searching the eternal in the non-eternal” does not mean that the eternal is to be searched in this temporal and manifold world.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 20. The similar explanation is also found in the *Brahmasūtra-śāṅkarabhāṣya* (BŚB. 1.1.4): “It is not that Brahman has entered into [the sphere of] the effects by [its] being an object of act of knowledge. ‘That [Brahma] is verily different from the known and is above the unknown’ (KeU. 1.4). Thus this passage denies that it [Brahma] is an object of act of knowledge. Another passage also says, ‘How should one know that by which one knows all this’ (BU. 2.4.14)? In the similar way, it is also denied that [Brahma] is an object of act of meditation. As it is said, ‘[Brahma is] that which is not expressed by speech, but that by which speech is expressed’ (KeU. 1.5), it is explained that Brahma is not an object to be meditated [or worshipped], and then it is said thus, ‘Let you know verily this Brahma, not that which is worshipped’ (KeU. 1.5).” *na ca vidikriyākarmatvena kāryānupraveśo brahmaṇaḥ, “anyad eva tad viditād atho aviditād adhi” iti vidikriyākarmatvapratīṣedhāt, “yenedaṃ sarvaṃ vijānāti taṃ kena vijānīyāt” iti ca. tathopāstikriyākarmatvapratīṣedho’pi bhavati -- “yad vācānabhyudītaṃ yena vāg abhyudyate” ity aviśayatvaṃ brahmaṇa upanyasya, “tad eva brahma tvaṃ viddhi nedaṃ yad idam upāsate” iti. J.L. Shastri, ed. **Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣyam** (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980), 78.*

--- the knowledge of Brahma (*brahma-jñāna*, *brahma-vidyā*) or the knowledge of the Self (*ātma-jñāna*) --- is neither the known nor the unknown. “What is known is trifling, mortal, and full of *duḥkha* in essence. And thus it is to be rejected. Therefore, when it is said that Brahma is different from the known, it should mean that it is not a thing to be rejected. In the similar way, when it is said that [Brahma] is above the unknown, it should mean that it is not a thing to be admitted. ... As it is said that [Brahma] is different from the known and the unknown, [Brahma] is denied as an object to be admitted or to be rejected. Since [Brahma] is not different from one’s own Self, the disciple’s desire of knowledge concerned with Brahma should be abandoned” (KeUB. 1.4). *yad viditaṃ tad alpaṃ martyaṃ duḥkhātmakaṃ ceti heyam. tasmād veditād anyad brahmety ukte tv aheyatvam uktaṃ syāt. tathā veditād adhīty ukte nupādeyatvam uktaṃ syāt. ... veditā veditābhyām anyad iti heyopādeyapraṭiṣedhena svātmano nanyatvāt brahmaviṣayā jñānāsā śiṣyasya nivartitā syāt*<sup>5</sup>

It is unbelievable that the Upaniṣadic thinkers would enjoy a speculative sophism. Therefore, it is to be further questioned what “neither the known nor the unknown” means.

### ***The extraordinary thing***

Let us return to our theme “Being.” In regard to the arguments about Being, the most important thing is mentioned in a verse of the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad* (CU. 6.1.3):

“[Oh Śvetaketu], have you asked about that instruction, through which the unheard becomes heard, the unknown [becomes] known, [and] the unrecognised [becomes] recognised?” [Śvetaketu asked,] “How, Oh Bhagavat, is the instruction [possible]?”

*uta tam ādeśam aprākṣyaḥ yenāśrutaṃ śrutaṃ bhavaty amataṃ matam avijñātaṃ vijñātam iti kataṃ nu bhagavaḥ sa ādeśo bhavātīti.*<sup>6</sup>

Paul Deussen, a scholar who first pointed out the philosophical significance of this verse, translates Uddālaka’s question in the citation above thus, “Have you then asked about that instruction, through which [also] the unheard becomes an [already] heard, the ununderstood an understood, and the unrecognised a recognised?” *Hast du denn auch der Unterweisung nachgefragt, durch welche [auch] das Ungehörte ein [schon] Gehörtes, das Unverstandene ein Verstandenes, das Unerkannte ein Erkanntes wird?*<sup>7</sup> It is evident that he intends to show what is questioned here as something non-temporal, by inserting the

<sup>5</sup> **TDUŚB.**, 20.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 504.

<sup>7</sup> Paul Deussen, **Die Philosophie der Upanishad’s**, 40-41.

words “also” (*auch*) and “already” (*schon*). The commentator expresses this question --- which is “extraordinary” (*adbhuta*) (CUB. 6.1.3) --- thus: “How does something become known through the knowledge of the other thing --- this is not well known fact? ...” *katham nv etad aprasiddham anyavijñānenānyad vijñātaṃ bhavati ...*<sup>8</sup> Through this intuitive knowledge the unknown becomes known. Through it we come to know something. This knowledge is preceding our experience or our empirical knowledge.

Besides, “Being”<sup>9</sup> is also spoken of as *kāraṇa* (cause, reason, or ground) or *mūla* (root or ground). This *kāraṇa* --- or *mūla* --- does not mean “temporal cause.” “Being” as the root (*sanmūlaṃ*) is the ground of the world (*jagato mūlaṃ*). “All beings have ‘Being’ as their root, as their support, or as their ground” (*sanmūlāḥ .... imāḥ sarvāḥ prajāḥ sadāyatanāḥ saṃpratiṣṭhāḥ*), and “those have Being as their ground” (*satkāraṇāḥ*).<sup>10</sup> What is meant by this Being as their ground --- or the ground of the world --- is not different from the meaning of the “all this [world] is Brahma” (*sarvaṃ khalv idaṃ brahma*) of the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad* (CU. 3.14.1). The commentator explains thus: “Thus, [this world] in the three states is not different from Brahma-Ātman, because it [this world] is not understood without that [Brahma]. Therefore, this world is that [Brahma] indeed. Furthermore, in the sixth [chapter of the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad*], we will explain in detail how this [world] is verily that [Brahma], one, without a second” (CUB. 3.14.1). *evaṃ brahmātmatayā triṣu kāleṣu avīṣiṣṭaṃ tadvyatirekeṇa agrahaṇāt. ataḥ tad eva idaṃ jagat. yathā cedaṃ tad eva ekaṃ advitīyaṃ tathā ṣaṣṭhe vistareṇa vakṣyāmaḥ*.<sup>11</sup> Therefore, the intuitive knowledge is preceding our

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<sup>8</sup> **IDUŚB.**, 504.

<sup>9</sup> Strictly speaking, it must be Being as the knowledge of Brahma, not simply Being, as it is under discussion here.

<sup>10</sup> See CU. 6.8.4 and CUB. 6.8.4. *Ibid.*, 524-525. As to “cause,” “ground” (*kāraṇa*), or “material cause” (*upādāna-kāraṇa*, *upādāna-hetu*), ultimately it means the knowledge of Brahma (*brahma-vidyā*), which is the ground of the world or the cause of Liberation (*mokṣa-kāraṇa*). But sometimes ignorance (*avidyā*), desire (*kāma*), activity (*karma*) are also called “cause” or “material cause.” For example, “material cause” (*upādāna-hetu*) is explained in the introduction of the commentary on the *Taittirīya-upaniṣad* 1.1 thus: “The Liberation is the state in the own Self, when the material cause of ignorance, desire, and action is ceased” (*avidyākāmakarmopādānahetunivṛttau svātmany avasthānaṃ mokṣa itī, ...*) (TUB. 1.1 Introduction). *Ibid.*, 259-260. The commentator, however, does not mean that Brahma or the Liberation would be merely the absence of ignorance, desire, activity, and so on. “Even if desire is said to be the root [of bondage], [in the truest sense] it is said that ignorance, opposed to the ground of the Liberation, is the ground of bondage.” (*yady api kāmo mūlam ity uktam, tathāpi mokṣakāraṇaviparyayeṇa bandhakāraṇam-avidyety etad apy uktam eva bhavati*) (BUB. 4.4.7). *Ibid.*, 920. Besides, as to “ignorance” (*avidyā*) and “knowledge” (*vidyā*) --- the knowledge of Brahma --- which are opposed to each other, they will be discussed in the sixth chapter.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 428.

experience not temporally, but logically. This is a meaning of “intuitiveness” of this type of knowledge. In this point of view, Radhakrishna is correct in saying: “The logical priority of Brahman to the world is brought out by the statement that Being alone was this in the beginning.”<sup>12</sup> In the sense of the logical priority, it is perhaps possible for us to call Brahma --- as the ground of the world --- as “the transcendental” or “transcendental ground.”

### ***The transcendental knowledge***

This study concludes that what is to be questioned under the theme of Being is the intuitive knowledge. This knowledge is the logical ground of our actual recognition, namely, that through which our empirical knowledge is established.

It is an undeniable fact that what we can experience is the individual and temporal things --- but, it is not reasonable to conclude from this that everything we can experience is the empirical ---. While they still firmly keep a longing for the Immortal, the Upaniṣadic thinkers with a critical spirit, such as Yājñavalkya, Uddālaka Āruṇi, and so on, must begin with accepting this fact. This is the very starting point of the Upaniṣadic thought. As the intuitive knowledge --- the knowledge of Brahma --- is called “consisting of [empirical] knowledge” or “full of [empirical] knowledge” (*vijñāna-maya*), it is perceived in empirical knowledge, or it is perceived along with it.<sup>13</sup> Moreover, this knowledge is not necessarily that which is to be obtained. It is something already known along with our empirical recognition. In short, the intuitive knowledge is the transcendental ground of empirical knowledge, and the empirical knowledge is limiting adjuncts of the intuitive knowledge. The eternal --- here intuitive knowledge --- is first to be investigated verily in our empirical knowledge, or along with it. It must be investigated something already known in our empirical knowledge. It must be the logical ground, or the essence (*svarūpa*) through which the individual and temporal knowledge is established. Moreover, verily because this knowledge as the logical ground or the essence is prior to empirical knowledge, Brahma --- or the knowledge of Brahma --- can also be called *sarvajña* (the omniscient or the universal),<sup>14</sup> namely, it means that this knowledge is that through which everything established through this knowledge is understood. As it is seen in the arguments of Being, this intuitive knowledge is the logical ground or the essence of our recognition of this world, but neither the temporal cause as the originator of the world, nor the substratum of the objects. Moreover, although it is called *jñātr* (literally, knower), the Self is the epistemological transcendental ground, but not the subject of act of knowing.

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<sup>12</sup> Radhakrishnan, ed. trans. **The Principal Upaniṣads**, 448

<sup>13</sup> See BUB. 2.1.16. **IDUŚB.**, 726.

<sup>14</sup> For example, see PU. 4.11. *Ibid.*, 128.

This study concludes that this very knowledge is the consistent theme spoken of through the following statements: “Have you asked about that instruction, through which the unheard becomes heard, the unknown [becomes] known, [and] the unrecognised [becomes] recognised?” (CU. 6.1.3); “How does something become known through the knowledge of the other thing --- this is not well known fact ---?” (CUB. 6.1.3); “[It is] that which is not expressed by speech, [but] that by which speech is expressed; you must know that alone to be Brahma, not that which one worships” (*yad vācā'nabhyuditaṃ yena vāg abhyudyate. tad eva brahma tvaṃ viddhi nedaṃ yad idam upāsate*) (KeU. 1.5).<sup>15</sup> “[Brahma is] verily speech of speech” (*vāco ha vācaṃ*) (KeU. 1.2).<sup>16</sup> “When speaking, [Brahma is called] speech” (*vadan vāk*) (BU. 1.4.7).<sup>17</sup> “He who controls the speech from within” (*yo vācam antaro yamayati*) (BU. 3.7.17).<sup>18</sup>

## *Dukkha*

### ***The truth of Dukkha***

To ask the question of truth in early Buddhism, what is firstly to be considered is dukkha (Skt. *duḥkha*).<sup>19</sup> Dukkha is one of the most important concepts in early Buddhism. The truth is first questioned as the truth of dukkha, which is the first truth of the four noble truths --- the most important teaching in early Buddhism ---. A text of the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* runs thus:

Oh bhikkhus, the noble truth of dukkha is recognised and known intuitively. The noble truth of the origin of dukkha is recognised and known intuitively. The noble truth of the cessation of dukkha is recognised and known intuitively. The noble truth of the way of cessation of

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<sup>15</sup> **IDUŚB.**, 21.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 17.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 654.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 823. Besides, according to the commentator, Brahma, which is different from the known and the unknown --- here in this study it is considered as something to be attained through intuitive knowledge ---, is spoken of also through the following statements: “This Self is Brahman” (*ayam ātmā brahma*) (BU. 2.5.19, 4.4.5). *Ibid.*, 780, 913. “That Self which is untouched by sin” (*ya ātmā'pahatapāpmā*) (CU. 8.7.1). *Ibid.*, 583. “The Brahma which is immediate and direct, the Self which is within all” (*yat sākṣād aparokṣād brahma ya ātmā sarvāntaraḥ*) (BU. 3.4.1). *Ibid.*, 806. See KeUB. 1.4. *Ibid.*, 20-21.

<sup>19</sup> The word *dukkha* literally means “pain,” “sorrow,” suffering,” and so on. But here in this study it is not translated, because it means something inherent in existence, so to speak, a state of existence where we first find ourselves, as it will be discussed from here on.

dukkha is recognised and known intuitively. When the craving for the existence is eradicated and what leads to the existence is destroyed now, then there is no more existence.

*tayidaṃ bhikkhave dukkhaṃ ariyasaccaṃ anubuddhaṃ paṭividdhaṃ dukkhasamudayo ariyasaccaṃ anubuddhaṃ paṭividdhaṃ dukkhanirodho ariyasaccaṃ anubuddhaṃ paṭividdhaṃ dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā ariyasaccaṃ anubuddhaṃ paṭividdhaṃ ucchinnā bhavataṅhā khīṇā bhavanetti natthidāni punabbhavoti.*<sup>20</sup>

Besides, what does dukkha mean? For example, in the *Mahāsatipatthāna-sutta*, dukkha is explained as follows:

Oh bhikkhus, what is the noble truth of dukkha? Birth is dukkha. Decaying is also dukkha. Death is also dukkha. Grief, lamentation, pain, distress, and despair are also dukkha. To associate with those whom one does not love is also dukkha. To be separated from those whom one loves is also dukkha; Inability to obtain what one desires is also dukkha; in brief, the five aggregates which are [the objects of] clinging are dukkha.

*katamañca bhikkhave dukkhaṃ ariyasaccaṃ. jātipi dukkhā jarāpi dukkhā maraṇampi dukkhaṃ sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsāpi dukkhā appiyehi sampayogopi dukkho piyehi vippayogopi dukkho yampicchaṃ na labhati tampi dukkhaṃ saṅkhittena pañcupādānakkhandhā dukkhā.*<sup>21</sup>

“The five aggregates are dukkha.” As the destruction of the five aggregates ultimately means “death”<sup>22</sup> --- therefore these aggregates mean “body,” “bodily existence in this world,” or “the world as bodily existence” ---, what is called dukkha here is beyond physical pain and mental anguish. Dukkha as the truth is not a particular characteristic of the individual things. “Ten Suttas from Dīgha Nikāya – Long Discourses of the Buddha” of Burma Piṭaka Association gives a note on the word *dukkha* thus: “Dukkha as a Noble Truth is left untranslated. ‘Suffering’ and ‘ill’ are inadequate rendering. Dukkha is inherent in existence. The five Aggregates which are the objects of Clinging therefore embody dukkha. Dukkha has connotations of impermanence, insubstantiality, unsatisfactoriness, emptiness, imperfection, insecurity, besides the obvious one of suffering, physical pain and mental affliction.”<sup>23</sup> It is neither physical pain nor mental anguish. It must be essentially concerned

<sup>20</sup> **¶.u.** 10/86/107.

<sup>21</sup> **¶.u.** 10/294/340-341.

<sup>22</sup> This issue of “the destruction of the aggregates” will be argued in the sixth chapter.

<sup>23</sup> Burma Piṭaka Association, trans. **Ten Suttas from Dīgha Nikāya – Long Discourses of the Buddha** (Rangoon: 1984), 331.

with our existence itself. It must be a common state of our existence. It must be something universal. Otherwise, the purpose of *dukkarakiriyā* (asceticism or penance) --- through which the Buddha himself is said to look for the Liberation in a certain period --- can not be understood, because it must mean nothing but overcoming dukkha which is beyond physical pain and mental anguish, through mortifying one's own body and mind.

### ***Dukkha is nissatta***

By the way, in regard to our recognition of this external world, early Buddhism speaks of “the Dhammas” (*dhammā*), such as the five aggregates (*khandha*), eighteen elements (*dhātu*), twelve bases (*āyatana*), and so on. What is to be noted here is that these concepts are always presented to negate any substratum in the temporal and manifold things. The *Alagaddūpama-sutta* speaks of rūpa thus:

Therefore, Oh bhikkhus, here in regard to whatever is rūpa --- in the past, in the future, [or] at present, internal or external, gross or subtle, low or excellent, distant or near ---, all rūpas should be seen thus by right [intuitive] knowledge as it is thus: This is not mine, I am not this, this is not my self.

*tasmātiha bhikkhave yaṅkiñci rūpaṃ atītānāgatapaccuppannaṃ ajjhattaṃ vā bahiddhā vā oḷārikaṃ vā sukhumāṃ vā hīnaṃ vā paṇītaṃ vā yaṃ dūre santike vā sabbaṃ rūpaṃ netāṃ mama nesohamasmi na meso attāti evamevaṃ yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya daṭṭhabbaṃ.<sup>24</sup>*

The *Chachakka-sutta* also speaks of rūpa thus:

If someone would say, “Eye is the Self,” it is not possible. For both the origination and the decaying of the eye are known [intuitively]. ... If someone would say, “Rūpas are the Self,” it is not possible. For both the origination and the decaying of the rūpas are known [intuitively].

*cakkhu attāti yo evaṃ vadeyya taṃ na upapajjati. cakkhussa uppādopi vayopi paññāyati. ... rūpā attāti yo vadeyya taṃ na upapajjati. rūpānaṃ uppādopi vayopi paññāyati.<sup>25</sup>*

It is quite appropriate to understand that what these texts mean is to negate our vain search for “entity” or “substratum” --- the eternal as a support of the individual things --- in this temporal and manifold world. Moreover, it is also appropriate to understand that the word *dhātu* (element) --- or *dhamma* --- implies “lifeless” (*nijjīva*) or “soulless” (*nissatta*).

<sup>24</sup> **ṃ.ṃ.** 12/284/276.

<sup>25</sup> **ṃ.ṃ.** 14/818/512.

What is just supposed or postulated as the eternal can not be transferred in this temporal and manifold world. This is a rigid principle of early Buddhism.<sup>26</sup> “The fundamental importance in Buddhist philosophy of this Phenomenalism or Non-substantialism as a protest against the prevailing Animism, which, beginning with projecting the self into objects, saw in that projected self a noumenal quasi-divine substance, has by this time been more or less admitted.”<sup>27</sup>

However, it does not follow from this principle that the concept *dhamma* --- or *dhātu* --- in Early Buddhism is to be interpreted from the viewpoint of empiricism, sensationalism, or phenomenism. Needless to say, negating the transfer of the supposed or postulated substratum into this ephemeral world does not necessarily mean the view of the world of “materialist” or “sensationalist” --- including a scientific view of the world ---. On the contrary, early Buddhism is consistently against such views, which belong to our natural and ordinary attitude. What should be considered here is intuitive knowledge, through which the Dhamma --- or the Dhammas (*dhammā*) --- is to be understood.

### ***The words dhamma and dhātu***

As for the word *dhamma* (Skt. *dharma*), it is derived from a verbal root *dhṛ* --- which means “hold,” “bear,” or “keep” ---. Buddhaghosa explains this word thus: “*dhammā* means causing to bear the own character” (*attano lakkhaṇaṃ dhārenīti dhammā*) in the commentary on the *Majjhima-nikāya*.<sup>28</sup> In the *Visuddhimagga*, he also explains thus: “The

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<sup>26</sup> “Moreover, dhātu is verily a term for the lifeless (*nijjīva*) of the self (*atta*). Thus, as it is said, ‘Oh Bhikkhu, this man has six dhātus,’ the Bhagavā taught about *dhātu* that the life (*jīva*), the aggregate of [empirical] knowledge, is not the self. Therefore, this is the exposition to be known in such a meaning as is already said, [namely], in the following meaning: It is an eye and that is dhātu. It is the eye-dhātu. ... It is mind-consciousness and that is dhātu. It is mind-consciousness-dhātu.” *Api ca, dhātū ti nijjīvamattass’ev’etaṃ adhivacanaṃ. Tathā hi Bhagavā “Chadhāturo ayaṃ bhikkhu puriso” ti ādisu jīvasaññāsamūhananattaṃ dhātudesanaṃ akāsī ti. Tasmā yathāvuttena atthena, cakkhu ca taṃ dhātu ca cakkhudhātu . . . pe . . . manoviññāṇaṃ ca taṃ dhātu ca manoviññāṇadhātū ti evaṃ tāv’ettha atthato vedītabbo vinichayo.* Warren, ed. **Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosācariya**, 412.

“Once more the Cy. [commentary] points out ... the significance of the affix -dhātu (element), as meaning the absence of entity (nissatta), the ‘emptiness’ or phenomenal character of the ideational faculty.” Caroline A.F. Rhys Davids, ed. **A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics** (London and Boston: P.T.S., 1974), 119-121 n. 3.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, xlii.

<sup>28</sup> **u.ā.** 1/18. The similar explanation is found in the *Visuddhimagga*: “The Dhammas mean that [they] cause to hold [their] own characteristic.” *Attano lakkhaṇaṃ dhārayantī ti dhammā.* Warren, ed. **Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosācariya**, 408.

Dhammas mean the essences” (*Dhammā ti sabhāvā*),<sup>29</sup> “Here again *paññā* has the characteristic of penetrating the essence of the Dhamma” (*ettha pana, dhammasabhāva-paṭivedhalakkhaṇā paññā*).<sup>30</sup>

As for the word *dhātu* (element), it sometimes means “distributing” like this: “Thus each Dhamma among such as ‘eye’ and so on, as it comes into existence, is called a *dhātu* in regard to such a meaning as, ‘it distributes, it is laid out’” *Iti cakkhādīsū ekeko dhammo yathāsambhavaṃ, vidadhāti dhīyati ti ādinā atthavasena dhātū ti vuccati*.<sup>31</sup> But, it also means “the essence”: “But these are the dhātus, as it is said that they cause to hold the own essence.” *Etā pana, attano sabhāvaṃ dhārentī ti dhātuyo*.<sup>32</sup> Here is a question. How should we understand the Dhammas or the dhātus which are said to be the essences?

Mrs. Rhys Davids, who radically interprets early Buddhism as non-substantialism or phenomenalism, explains the Dhamma as the essence thus, “.. He [Buddhaghosa] gives a more positive expression to this particular meaning by saying that dhammo, so employed, signifies ‘that which has the mark of bearing its own nature’ (or character or condition --- *sabhāva-dhāraṇa*); i.e. that which is not dependent on any more ultimate nature. This, to us, somewhat obscure characterization may very likely, in view of the context, mean that dhammo as phenomenon is without substratum, is not a quality cohering in a substance.”<sup>33</sup> Needless to say, Mrs. Rhys Davids is right. Early Buddhism is against the prevailing animism, and rejects the projection on the Self into the ephemeral and individual objects. It must be appropriate to the word *dhātu* as “the absence of entity” (*nissatta*). Buddhaghosa explains the Dhammas and the Dhātus thus, “Again, they are dhātus, because they hold their own characteristic, and because they hold dukkha, and because they lay down dukkha, and because none of them are beyond the characteristic of the dhātu. They are the Dhammas, because they hold the conformity to the momentariness; [they] are non-eternal in the sense of destruction, and are dukkha in the sense of fear, and are non-self in the sense of having no essence (*rasa*).” *Salakkhaṇadhāraṇato pana dukkhādānato ca dukkhādānato ca sabbā pi dhātulakkhaṇaṃ anātittā dhātuyo; salakkhaṇadhāraṇena ca attano khaṇānurūpadhāraṇena ca dhammā; khayatthena aniccā, bhayatthena dukkhā, asārakatthena anattā*.<sup>34</sup> It is sure that it is the most rigid principle in early Buddhism not to transfer the eternal --- which is substratum --- in this temporal and manifold world.

<sup>29</sup> Warren, ed. **Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosācariya**, 242.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 370.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 411.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 411.

<sup>33</sup> C. Davids, ed. **A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics**, xl.

<sup>34</sup> Warren, ed. **Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosācariya**, 308.

However, Mrs. Rhys Davids seems to be still irresolute in interpreting the concept *dhamma*. Why must she say “this somewhat obscure characterization”? This study assumes that it is still not reasonable enough to understand the Dhamma as “bearing the essence” only from the viewpoint of non-substantialism. In that case, how should we understand the Dhamma as “holding the essence”? This is the next question.

### ***The Dhamma of change as the universal knowledge***

Let us return to the topic “dukkha” as something universal. It is notable that dukkha is often considered as something closely related to “impermanence” (*aniccatā*), as it is seen in the text of the *Alagaddūpama-sutta*.

“Oh bhikkhus, how do you think of this: Is rūpa eternal or non-eternal?” “Non-eternal, Oh venerable sir.” “Again, is that which is non-eternal dukkha or sukka (happy)?” “Dukkha, Oh, venerable sir” “Again, is it proper to regard that which is non-eternal, is dukkha, and has the Dhamma of change (*vipariṇāma-dhamma*), as ‘This is mine, I am this, this is my self?’” “No, venerable sir.”

*taṃ kiṃ maññatha bhikkhave rūpaṃ niccaṃ vā aniccaṃ vāti. aniccaṃ bhante. yampanāniccaṃ dukkhaṃ vā taṃ sukhaṃ vāti. dukkhaṃ bhante. yampanāniccaṃ dukkhaṃ vipariṇāmadhammaṃ kallaṃ nu taṃ samanupassituṃ etaṃ mama esohamasmi eso me attāti. no hetāṃ bhante.*<sup>35</sup>

As this text assumes that a ground of dukkha is “non-eternality” (*aniccatā*), dukkha is first “the state of dukkha of change” (*vipariṇāma-dukkhatā*). This state of dukkha of change, as something non-particular, is here called the Dhamma of change (*vipariṇāma-dhamma*).<sup>36</sup>

In the *Salāyatanaṅga-sutta*, rūpa (visible object) --- together with *sadda* (object of hearing), *gandha* (object of smelling), *rasa* (object of tasting), *phoṭṭhabba*

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<sup>35</sup> **ᆞ.ᆞ.** 12/284/275-276.

<sup>36</sup> The word *vipariṇāma-dhamma* is not to be interpreted as “changing Dhamma,” but “the Dhamma of change” or “the Dhamma on changing things” --- in plural, “those which have the Dhamma of change” ---. As for the word *dhamma* or *dhammā*, in some cases it is used in the meaning of “thing” or “things” as object of consciousness (*viññāṇa*, *mano-viññāṇa*), but, needless to say, it is to be discriminated from the Dhamma as the truth, which is under discussion. Therefore, the expressions *vipariṇāma-dhamma*, *khaya-dhamma*, *vaya-dhamma*, *virodha-dhamma*, or *saṅkhata-dhamma* mean rather “the Dhamma on changing things,” “the Dhamma on decaying things,” “the Dhamma on aging things,” “the Dhamma on ceasing things,” and “the Dhamma on formed things” than “changing Dhamma,” “decaying Dhamma,” “aging Dhamma,” “ceasing Dhamma,” and “formed Dhamma” respectively.

(tangible object), and *dhamma* (object of consciousness) --- mentioned thus: “However, one has known the impermanence of rūpas, [their] change, the dispassion [from them], and [their] destruction, seeing as it really is through the right intuitive knowledge, ‘Formerly and now all these rūpas are impermanent, dukkha, those which have the Dhamma of change.’” *rūpānaṃ tveva aniccatam viditvā vipariṇānavirāganirodham pubbe ceva rūpā etarahi ca sabbe te rūpā aniccā dukkhā vipariṇāmadhammāti evameva yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya passato ...*<sup>37</sup> What is here to be noted is that the Dhamma of change is realised for “all” rūpas and so on. Generally speaking, the probability of our knowledge is increased through our empirical knowledge. But the necessity of our knowledge never comes from our empirical knowledge. Similarly, the universal proposition --- such as proposition including “all” or “everything” (*sabba*, Skt. *sarva*) --- never comes from our empirical knowledge. Although early Buddhism never changes the idea that such universal statements is to be realised along with empirical knowledge in this ephemeral world --- otherwise the statement is possibly empty in content ---, it is evident that this statement as universal proposition requires something beyond empirical knowledge. What is required for it is the intuitive knowledge, as it is said in the *Alagaddūpama-sutta*. “Therefore, Oh bhikkhus, here in regard to whatever is rūpa --- in the past, in the future, [or] at present, internal or external, gross or subtle, low or excellent, distant or near ---, all rūpas should be seen thus by right [intuitive] knowledge as it is.” It is the intuitive knowledge, the intuitive knowledge of the Dhamma, which is also called “omniscience” or “the universal knowledge” (*sabbaññutā-ñāṇa*).<sup>38</sup>

### ***The truth of dukkha as intuitive knowledge***

To further consider “intuitive knowledge,” let us focus on a word *cakkhu* (literally, “eye”). *Cakkhu* is mentioned in regard to a topic “guarding the sense-faculties” (*indriya-saṃvara*) in the *Sāmaññaphala-sutta* thus:

And how, Oh great king, does a bhikkhu have the door [well] guarded against sense-organs? Here, Oh great king, having seen rūpa with his eye, the bhikkhu grasps neither phenomenal characters nor the supplementary attributes. ...

*kathaṅca mahārāja bhikkhu indriyesu guttadvāro hoti. idha mahārāja bhikkhu cakkhunā rūpaṃ disvā na nimittagāhī hoti nānubyañjanaggāhī ...*<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> M.ṅ. 14/626/402.

<sup>38</sup> See T.ṅ. 1/93.

<sup>39</sup> T.ṅ. 9/122/93.

The commentary explains the word “eye” in the sentence above thus: “[The word ‘eye’] here stands for ‘pure eye’ (*pasāda-cakkhu*) when it is said, ‘Dependent upon eye, there are rūpas.’ But here this [word] stands for eye-consciousness according to the popular usage of ‘pure eye.’ [Therefore,] here it means ‘seeing rūpa through eye-consciousness.’” *“cakkhuñca paṭicca rūpe cā”ti ettha pasādacakkhumhi vattati. idha panāyaṃ pasādacakkhuvohārena cakkhuvīññāṇe vattati, cakkhuvīññāṇena rūpaṃ disvāti ayamettha attho.*<sup>40</sup> To be sure, when “eye” is interpreted as “eye-consciousness,” not as the physical organ or “eye of flesh” (*maṃsa-cakkhu*), then, this interpretation does not belong to our ordinary attitude according to which the existence of “the eye of flesh” and “the external thing” is already supposed.<sup>41</sup> However, considering that “eye-consciousness” is originally that which should be called “pure eye” --- which is spoken of along with “the eye of Buddha” (*buddha-cakkhu*), “the universal eye” (*samanta-cakkhu*), “the eye of the Dhamma” (*dhamma-cakkhu*), “the eye of intuitive knowledge” (*paññā-cakkhu*), “the divine eye” (*dibba-cakkhu*) in the commentary ---, it is not enough that this argument can not be understood as non-substantialism or phenomenalism. What is to be considered is again “intuitive knowledge” (*paññā*). The pure eye, through which the Dhamma is to be understood --- verily along with our empirical consciousness seeing the external objects ---, is this intuitive knowledge.<sup>42</sup>

### ***The truth of dukkha and vipariṇāma-dhamma***

The truth of dukkha, the Dhamma of dukkha (*dukkha-dhamma*), or the Dhamma of change (*vipariṇāma-dhamma*) is understood only along with our empirical knowledge (*pariññā*) about individual things in this temporal and manifold world. It is a fact that the

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<sup>40</sup> **f. a.** 1/165-166.

<sup>41</sup> See C. Davids, ed. **A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics**, 159 n. 1. “Cakkhu, which stands for vision, sense of sight and eye. ‘Eye,’ however, is always in the present work to be understood as the seeing faculty of visual sense, and not as the physical organ or ‘eye of flesh (*maṃsa-cakkhu*).”

<sup>42</sup> In the *Visuddhimagga*, the eye-consciousness is explained as something closely related to “intuitive knowledge”: “But, the ancients have said: ‘The eyes do not see rūpa, because it has no mind. The mind does not see [rūpa], because it has no eyes. But, when the door and the object encounter each other, one sees [rūpa] through the consciousness which has pure eye (*pasāda-cakkhu*) as its ground. Again, such discourse as ‘He shoots with his bow’ and so on is called *sasambhāarakathā*. Therefore, what is meant in this case is this: ‘Having seen rūpa with eye-consciousness.’” *Porāṇā pan’āhu: “Cakkhu rūpaṃ na passatī acittakattā, cittaṃ na passatī acakkhukattā; dvārārammaṇasaṅghaṭṭe pana cakkhupasādavatthukena cittena passatī. īdisī pan’esā dhanunā vijjhatī ti ādisu viya sasambhāarakathā nāma hotī. Tasmā cakkhuvīññānena rūpaṃ disvā ti ayam ev’ettha attho”ti.* Warren, ed. **Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosācariya**, 17.

Dhamma is originally a concept or an idea, as it is also considered as object of consciousness. However, it should not be a fanciful concept. As it is seen in the examples of the five aggregates or the six elements, the Dhamma --- or the truth --- is first to be understood only along with the temporal and manifold existence, “as it is [in this ephemeral world]” (*yathābhūtaṃ*) or “as it is according to the essence [along with ephemeral existence]” (*yathāsabhāvato*). But still the Dhamma is that which is to be grasped through “intuitive knowledge” (*paññā*) --- “universal knowledge” (*sabbaññutā-ñāṇa*) ---. Therefore, it is not appropriate to understand the truth of dukkha only from the viewpoint of empiricism or sensationalism. This truth of dukkha or the Dhamma of change (*vipariṇāma-dhamma*) is something to be understood through intuitive knowledge. In other words, this intuitive knowledge is that through which we can know, or, that through which we have already known this world.

### *Meaning of Intuitive Knowledge*

#### ***Historical backgrounds are different***

In the two previous sections, we have considered the view of truth in the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism, focusing on Being and Dukkha respectively. Admittedly these two philosophical themes have their own philosophical backgrounds, as is mentioned in the second chapter. The old Upaniṣads begins with inquiring the eternal --- Being ---. On the other hand, early Buddhism consistently negates our vain search for the eternal in this ephemeral world. It may be interpreted roughly thus; the former might be classified as theistic ontology, while the latter might be regarded as materialistic or sensationalistic ethics.

#### ***Intuitive knowledge as universal knowledge***

As seen in the previous chapter and this chapter, from the viewpoint of knowledge --- especially “intuitive knowledge” ---, this study concludes that there is a strong philosophical trend common to these two. There are three points to be understood with regard to “intuitive knowledge.”

Firstly, this intuitive knowledge is, in this stage, not possible apart from our empirical perception. As to early Buddhism, which originally attaches high importance to our experience, this fact is almost self-evident. On the other hand, although the old Upaniṣads starts with the inquiry into the eternal, still this inquiry is only possible along with the temporal and manifold world, as we have already seen in our arguments about “Being.”

The eternal is to be inquired as something immediate and direct. Intuitive knowledge is not such a blind subjective intuition as would be imagined to be realised through denying our empirical perception.

Secondly, this intuitive knowledge is a kind of transcendental or universal knowledge. Whereas “Being” is considered as a ground (*kāraṇa*), it does not mean a temporal cause, but a logical reason or ground. Shortly, “Being” is the transcendental concept, that through which this entire ephemeral world is to be understood. “Being” is prior to this world. But it is prior in a logical sense. On the other hand, evidently, early Buddhism does not agree that the eternal is to be supposed in this ephemeral world. It emphasises the transitoriness of this temporal world. But, it is still not appropriate to consider early Buddhism as a kind of empiricism, such as non-substantialism, phenomenalism, or sensational ethics. As seen in this chapter, the Dhamma is also regarded as that which bears --- or causes to bear --- “the own nature” or “the essence” (*sabhāva*, Skt. *svabhāva*). Since it is extremely clear that this “essence” can not be understood in the sense of “substratum” in the ephemeral sphere, this “essence” must be the logical reason or ground, that through which this entire ephemeral world is to be understood. Verily through this intuitive knowledge --- the universal knowledge or the omniscience --- as “the state of dukkha of change” (*vipariṇāma-dukkhatā*) or “the Dhamma of change” (*vipariṇāma-dhamma*) ---, this entire ephemeral world is known. Besides, the universality of this intuitive knowledge should be discriminated from the empirical probability or the empirical generality, because, however high the empirical probability is, this probability can not be a ground for the knowledge of the entire world. As far as it is considered in regard to the truth of Dukkha, “intuitive knowledge” (*paññā*) in early Buddhism is also this type of knowledge --- which is first found in the old Upaniṣads ---. Very because they have their own philosophical backgrounds, the points of argument are quite different between the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism. But at least, in regard to this intuitive knowledge, which should be considered as the core thought in both of them, early Buddhism is an authentic follower of the old Upaniṣads.

Thirdly, this intuitive knowledge is concerned with the view of the world. Brahma in the old Upaniṣads is often called “cause” or “ground” (*kāraṇa*) of this ephemeral world, but Brahma is not the substratum in the ephemeral world. The Dhamma in early Buddhism is often called “the essence” or “the own nature,” while it is emphasised that there is nothing eternal in this ephemeral world. Thus, this intuitive knowledge also implies a fact that, while we live in this temporal and manifold world, we are able to have the universal knowledge through which this entire world is to be understood --- however, the universal knowledge as a cause or a ground can not be found in this ephemeral world ---. Namely, we are abiders of

two worlds. But this view --- so to speak, the two-world view --- is not to be confused with the primitive “two-world view” like this world and the heaven. We are abiders of two worlds “here and now.” This two-world view is indispensable step to attain the ultimate view of the world, even though this view is not the ultimate view of the world.<sup>43</sup> As to the old Upaniṣads, this view is perhaps the first meaning of Māyā.<sup>44</sup> As for early Buddhism, the truth of dukkha --- which is understood as the universal knowledge and the two-world view --- is the first truth in the four noble truths, and therefore this intuitive knowledge is still to be developed. This issue will be discussed in the following chapters.

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<sup>43</sup> See the section “The Right View” in the next chapter.

<sup>44</sup> Śaṅkara makes a comment on the word *māyā* in a verse of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*: “It is said, ‘Why does it [Brahma] come to reveal in forms?’ Those [forms] of it is for its appearance and its manifestation. If name and form are not developed, the attributeless form of the Self --- called ‘pure knowledge’ --- should not become known. When, however, name and form are developed as the body and organs, its form should become known” (BUB. 2.5.19). *kim arthaṃ punaḥ pratirūpaṃ āgamaṇaṃ tasyety ucyate. tad asyātmano rūpaṃ praticakṣaṇāya pratikhyāpanāya. yadī hi nāmarūpe na vyākriyete tadā asyātmano nirupādhikaṃ rūpaṃ prajñānaghanākhyam na pratikhyāyeta. yadā punaḥ kāryakaraṇātmanā nāmarūpe vyākṛte bhavataḥ. tadāsya rūpaṃ pratikhyāyeta.* **IDUŚB.**, 780. Moreover, Govind Chandra Pande uses the concept “transcendental” in a close relation with “illusion” or “ignorance” thus, “This illusion or ignorance, called avidyā does not have an origin in time. It is the precondition of the world of time and duality. It may, thus, be described as ‘transcendental’, in the sense that it is the innate condition of the empirical self and the world of phenomena in which it finds itself placed. Being the uniform precondition of phenomenal experience, Avidyā remains neutral as far as the phenomenal distinction of truth and falsity is concerned. In other words, although false from the noumenal point of view, avidyā is not false from the phenomenal point of view. Avidyā, thus, is beginningless or ‘transcendental’, empirically real but noumenally false.” Govind Chandra Pande, **Life and thought of Śaṅkarācārya** (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1998), 209. In this point of view, “ignorance” (*avidyā*) or “illusion” (*māyā*) is not not-knowing in an epistemological sense, but the state of existence where human beings should firstly find themselves.

## CHAPTER 5

### MEANING OF DISPASSION

This chapter begins with questioning “dispassion” (*virāga*), the most important theme in the practical field of both the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism. And then, it further questions its philosophical significance, also taking account of the concept “right view” (Skt. *samyagdarśana*, Pali *sammādiṭṭhī*).

#### *Dispassion in the Old Upaniṣads*

##### ***Dispassion as means***

A verse of the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad* (CU. 2.23.1) speaks of three kinds of virtue (*dharma*): “There are three divisions of virtue” (*trayo dharmaskandhāḥ*). The first one is sacrifice (*yajña*), study (*adhyayana*) of the Vedas, and charity (*dāna*).<sup>1</sup> The second one is austerity (*tapas*) --- penance or severe meditation ---. The last one is celibacy (*brahmacarya*). Besides, the first kind of virtue is related to “householder” (*gṛhastha*). Austerity (*tapas*) means physical penances, such as *cāndrāyaṇa* (a fast regulated by the moon), and so on. One who has austerity is called *tāpasa* or *parivrāj* (mendicant). Brahmacarya is to live in the teacher’s house and to keep celibacy.<sup>2</sup>

Generally speaking, in the old Upaniṣads all of these three kinds of virtue are considered as means (*sādhana*) to attain Brahma, the Absolute. But, what is argued here

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<sup>1</sup> See a verse of the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad* (CU. 2.23.1): “There are three divisions of virtue (*dharma*). The first one consists of sacrifice (or meditation), study of the Veda, and charity. The second is verily austerity (or severe meditation). The third is the Brahmacārin, living in the house of the teacher, dedicating oneself completely in the house of teacher. All these become the virtuous worlds. [But] one who is established in Brahma attains the Immortality.” *trayo dharmaskandhā yajño'dhyayanaṃ dānam iti prathamā tapa eva dvitīya brahmacāryācāryakulavāsī tṛtīyo'tyantam ātmānam ācāryakule'vasādayan sarva ete puṇyalokā bhavanti brahmasaṃstho'mṛtatvam eti.* **IDUŚB.**, 404. Also see a verse of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* (BU. 4.4.22): “The knower of Brahma wishes to know this [Self] through the study of the Vedas, sacrifice, charity, austerity, and fasting. Having known it, one becomes a Muni (an ascetic).” ... *tam etaṃ vedānuvacanena brāhmaṇā vividiṣanti yajñena dānena tapasā'nāsakenaitam eva viditvā munir bhavati.* *Ibid.*, 929.

<sup>2</sup> See CUB. 2.23.1. *Ibid.*, 404-405. Besides, as the commentator speaks of “perpetual religious student” (*naiṣṭhika*), for him, this celibacy should be kept to the end of life.

under the topic “dispassion” is almost only “austerity” and “celibacy.” It is because “dispassion” already implies renunciation of the householder’s life. When Yājñavalkya renounces the life of householder and wants to be a mendicant, he explains the reason for this renouncement to his wife, Maitreyī, in a verse of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* (BU. 2.4.5) as follows:

He [Yājñavalkya] said, “Verily, the husband is dear not out of desire for the husband, but the husband is dear out of desire for the Self. ... Verily, the Self, Oh Maitreyī, should be seen, should be heard of, reflected on, and meditated upon. ...”

*sa hovāca na vā are patyuh kāmāya patiḥ priyo bhavaty ātmanas tu kāmāya patiḥ priyo bhavati. ... ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyo maitreyi ...*<sup>3</sup>

The commentator Śaṅkara explains; “Wishing to indicate dispassion (*vairāgya*) as a means to immortality, he [Yājñavalkya] gives rise to dispassion (*virāga*) for wife, husband, sons, and so on, in order to abandon them” (BUB. 2.4.5). *amṛtatvasādhanam vairāgyamupadidikṣuḥ jāyāpatiputrādibhyo virāgam utpādayati tatsamnyāsāya.*<sup>4</sup> While we will argue from now on about the virtue focusing on “dispassion,” what is to be questioned here is “dispassion” (*virāga*) or “renunciation” (*saṃnyāsa*) beginning with abandoning the worldly life. “Knowing this Self, the Brāhmaṇas abandon the desire for sons, for wealth, and for the worlds, and live the mendicant’s life” (BU. 3.5.1). *etaṃ vai tam ātmānaṃ viditvā brāhmaṇāḥ putraiṣaṇāyās ca vittaiṣaṇāyās ca lokaiṣaṇāyās ca vyutthāyātha bhikṣācaryaṃ caranti.*<sup>5</sup> Therefore, the so-called worldly virtues are not to be questioned here.

It is evident that austerity (*tapas*) or meditation (*upasāna*) is considered as a means to the Immortal or the Absolute, as it is said: “He practised meditation [or concentration]” (*sa tapo'tapyata*) (TU. 3.1.1).<sup>6</sup> “To him [Bhṛgu] he [his father Varuṇa] said; ‘Wish to know Brahma through meditation [or concentration]; meditation is Brahma.’ He practised meditation. Having practiced meditation, he ...” (TU. 3.1.2). *taṃ hovāca. tapasā brahma vijñāsasva. tapo brahmeti. sa tapo'tapyata. sa tapas taptvā.*<sup>7</sup> The commentary explains also “meditation” (*tapas*) thus: “This *tapas* (meditation) is the concentration of the external and internal organs, because it is the door to attain Brahma, as it is said by a Smṛti (Mbh. Śā. 250.4), ‘The concentration of mind and senses is the highest meditation (*tapas*).

<sup>3</sup> **IDUŚB.**, 759-760.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 760.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 809.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 313.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 314.

Since it is higher than other virtues (*dharma*), this virtue is called the highest” (TUB. 3.1.1). *tac ca tapo bāhyāntahkaraṇasamādhānaṃ, taddvāratvād brahmapratīpatteḥ. “manasaś cendriyāṇāṃ ca hy aikāgryaṃ paraṃ tapaḥ. taj jyāyaḥ sarvadharmebhyaḥ sa dharmāḥ para ucyate” iti smṛteḥ.*<sup>8</sup>

In a verse of the *Muṇḍaka-upaniṣad* (MuU. 2.2.3), this meditation is mentioned in a close relation with the intuitive knowledge --- which is compared to “arrow” --- as follows:

“Having taken the bow, the Upaniṣads’ great weapon, one should place [in it] the arrow sharpened through meditation. Having drawn [the bow], Oh good one, hit (*viddhi*) the target, the imperishable [Brahma], with the consciousness which has attained that state.

*dhanur grhītvaupaniṣadaṃ mahāstraṃ śaraṃ hy upāsānīṣitaṃ sandadhīta. āyamyā tadbhāvagatena cetasā lakṣyaṃ tad evākṣaraṃ somya viddhi.*<sup>9</sup>

It is sure that virtue --- especially, meditation --- is a means to attain Brahma, the Absolute. On the other hand, the commentator Śāṅkara insists that Brahma can be attained only through knowledge;<sup>10</sup> because Brahma, the Absolute is not that which is to be attained in a literal sense,<sup>11</sup> and also because action is contradictory to knowledge.<sup>12</sup> Although this issue will be argued in detail later on in the seventh chapter, here we want to investigate the philosophical meaning of virtue --- especially, meditation ---. Anyway, how should we

<sup>8</sup> **IDUŚB.**, 314.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 160.

<sup>10</sup> “Therefore it is established that the highest state of emancipation is [achievable] through knowledge alone” (*ataḥ kevalāyā eva vidyāyāḥ paraṃ śreya itī siddham*) (TUB. 1.11.1-4). *Ibid.*, 278.

<sup>11</sup> “No, because the Emancipation is eternal. The Emancipation is desired, because it is eternal. It is well-known in the world that the results of actions are non-eternal. If the Emancipation would be due to the actions, it would be non-eternal. And this is undesirable” (TUB. 1.11.1-4). *na. nityatvān mokṣasya. nityo hi mokṣa iṣyate. karmakāryasya cānityatvaṃ prasiddham loke, karmābhyas cec cchreyo’nityaṃ syāt tac cāniṣṭam. Ibid.*, 276. “Therefore the Emancipation is not to be attained. What is to be attained by a goer is a place, which is different from himself. Because it is not [a fact] that the very place, not different from a man, is attained by himself” (TUB. 1.11.1-4). *ato nāpyo mokṣaḥ. gantur anyad vibhinnaṃ deśaṃ prati bhavati gantavyam. na hi yenaivāvyatiriktaṃ yat tat tenaiva gamyate. Ibid.*, 277.

<sup>12</sup> “The co-existence of knowledge and karma is not possible, because of their [mutual] contradiction. Knowledge is related to the true state, where [all] distinctions of instrumentals, such as the agent, disappear, and [this knowledge] is contradictory to the accomplishment of action through instrumentals, which is contrary to it [the true state]” (TUB. 1.11.1-4). *virodhāc ca vidyākarmaṇoḥ samuccayānupapattiḥ. pravīṇakartrādikāravīṣeṣatattvaviṣayā hi vidyā tadviparītākārasādhyena karmaṇa virudhyate. Ibid.*, 277. “In regard to the Emancipation, knowledge does not depend on action, verily because of contradiction” (TUB. 1.11.1-4). *virodhād eva ca vidyā mokṣaṃ prati na karmāny apekṣate. Ibid.*, 278.

understand that virtue --- especially, meditation --- is a means to Brahma, although it is repeatedly emphasised that Brahma, the Absolute, can be attained only through knowledge?

### ***Purification and the virtuous worlds***

Sometimes the old Upaniṣads speak of virtuous actions (sacrifice or meditation) as something related to “purification.” For example, a verse of the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad* (CU. 4.16.1) speaks of them thus:

That which purifies [or blows] is verily sacrifice. This, moving through, purifies all this. Wherever it moves through, it purifies all this. Therefore it is indeed sacrifice. Mind and speech are its paths.

*eṣa ha vai yajño yo'yaṃ pavata eṣa ha yann idaṃ sarvaṃ punāti yad eṣa yann idaṃ sarvaṃ punāti tasmād eṣa eva yajñas tasya manaś ca vāk ca vartanī.*<sup>13</sup>

Also, a verse the *Muṇḍaka-upaniṣad* (MuU. 3.1.8) speaks thus:

One's nature [becomes] pure through the purity of knowledge. Then one sees the Indivisible through meditation.

*jñānaprasādena viśuddhasattvas tatas tu taṃ paśyate niṣkalaṃ dhyāyamānaḥ.*<sup>14</sup>

Moreover, this purification (*viśuddhi*, *saṃskāra*, or *prasāda*) seems to be related to “destruction” (*kṣaya*) of accumulated sins as hindrance” (*upacitaduritapratibandha*). “But, in the attainment to the one's Self, the obligatory karmas become the ground for knowledge in way of removing the obstacle of piled sins in the past.” *svātmalābhe tu pūrvopacitaduritapratibandhāpanayadvāreṇa vidyāhetutvaṃ pratipadyante karmāṇi nityānīti* (TUB. 1.11.2-4).<sup>15</sup> After this purification --- throwing away of those sins ---, knowledge emerges, and the cessation of ignorance and the entire destruction of the world follow. “The rise of knowledge [can] not be imagined for one who has accumulated sins as obstacles. When [these obstacles] are destroyed, there may be the rise of knowledge; and then, [there may be also] the cessation of ignorance and the entire destruction of this ephemeral existence” (TUB. 1.11.2-4). *upacitaduritapratibandhasya hi vidyoṭpattir nāvakaalpate. tatḥsaye ca vidyoṭpattiḥ syāt tatas cāvidyānivṛttis tat ātyantikaḥ saṃsāropamaḥ.*<sup>16</sup>

<sup>13</sup> **IDUŚB.**, 462.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 169.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 278.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

However, although obligatory actions (*dharma*) --- sacrifice or meditation --- removes these accumulated sins, these actions never directly lead to the Absolute. It leads to only the virtuous worlds (*puṇyalokāḥ*) or “the world of gods” (*devaloka*) as the worlds which are produced: “Because the [virtuous] worlds and so on are products of dharma and so on” (*dharmādikāryatvāl lokādīnām*) (CUB. 2.2.1).<sup>17</sup> Even the mendicant’s virtuous actions --- such as “austerity” (*tapas*) and “celibacy” (*brahmacarya*) --- lead to only these virtuous worlds, not Brahma, the Absolute, which is “the world that is Brahma,” and which is spoken of like, “Oh good one, they verily told you the worlds. But I shall tell you that, to the knower of which a sinful act does not cling, as water does not cling to a lotus leaf” (CU. 4.14.3). *lokān vāva kila somya te'vocann ahaṃ tu te tad vakṣyāmi yathā puṣkarapalāśa āpo na śliṣyanta evam evaṃ vidi pāpaṃ karma na śliṣyate*.<sup>18</sup> --- but this issue will be argued in the following chapters ---. Anyway, “All these [the three kinds of dharma] become the virtuous worlds” (*sarva ete puṇyalokā bhavanti*) (CU. 2.23.1).<sup>19</sup>

By the way, these virtuous worlds are in facts the states of existence, and they are sometimes compared to “body” (*śarīra*).<sup>20</sup> This body is said to be “subtle” (*amūrta*), “undefined” (*tyat*), or “relating to the gods” (*adhidaivata*) in opposition of the “gross” (*mūrta*) and “defined” (*sat*), and “relating to the [gross] body” (*adhyātma*).<sup>21</sup> The commentator explains *adhyātma* and *adhidaivata* thus: “They explain the division of the gross and subtle, which is expressed by the word satya [sat and tyat], and which is the limiting adjunct of Brahma, and which is relating to the [gross] body and relating to the gods as the division of the body and the sense-organs” (BUB. 2.3.6). *brahmaṇaṇa upādhibhūtayor mūrtāmūrtayoḥ kāryakaraṇavibhāgena adhyātmādhidaivatayor vibhāgo vyākhyātaḥ satyaśabda-vācyayoḥ*.<sup>22</sup>

### ***Intellect has pseudo transparency***

Moreover, the old Upaniṣads speak of *devaloka*. As it is considered as one of the external worlds, this world (or these worlds) is not necessarily beyond this transitory world. In the commentary, the concept *deva* is explained in regard to the words *devāsurāḥ* (CU.

<sup>17</sup> **IDUŚB.**, 388.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 459-460.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 404.

<sup>20</sup> “It is true that good deed and bad deed, preceded by desire and so on, are the cause of taking a body. Thus, being driven by desire, a man accumulates these good and bad deeds (*karma*)” (BUB. 4.4.5). *satyaṃ kāmādīpūrvake puṇyāpuṇye śarīragrahaṇakāraṇaṃ, tathāpi kāmāprayukto hi puruṣaḥ puṇyāpuṇye karmaṇī upacinoṭi*. *Ibid.*, 915.

<sup>21</sup> As to the concepts “gross” and “subtle,” see BU. 2.3.1-6.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 752.

1.2.1) as follows: “*Devāsurāḥ*, devas and asuras: The word *deva* is derived from the verbal root *div* in the sense of shining, and devas are the functions of the sense organs, which are illuminated by the scriptures. Asuras, opposed to them [devas], are verily natural and dark [or ignorant] functions of the sense organs (*svābhāvīkyas tamātmikā indriyavṛttayaḥ*), because of enjoyment of their own lives, different objects, and animating functions” (CUB. 1.2.1). *devāsurā devās cāsurās ca. devā dīvyater dyotanārthasya śāstrobhāsītā indriyavṛttayaḥ. asurās tadviparītāḥ sveṣv evāsuṣu viṣvagviṣayāsu prāṇanakriyāsu ramaṇāt svābhāvīkyas tamātmikā indriyavṛttaya eva.*<sup>23</sup>

What has a close relation to “virtuous action” and “activities of organs which are illuminated by the scriptures” is “intellect” (*buddhi*) --- also called “mind” (*manas*) or “empirical knowledge” (*vijñāna*) ---.

First of all, “intellect” is the basis of all actions. The word *brahma-pura* is explained in the commentary like this: “In truth, however, the city of Brahma (*brahma-pura*) is that which is Brahma, because it is the basis of all empirical dealing. Therefore, all desires, brought about by the external things, are located in the city that is Brahma, implied by the word ‘lotus,’ [namely,] in this very own Self. Therefore, you must follow the means for attaining it. You must give up the thirst (*trṣṇā*) for external things. This is its meaning” (CUB. 8.1.5). *satyaṃ tu brahmapuram etad eva brahma. sarvavyavahārāspadatvāt. ato’smin puṇḍarīkopalakṣite brahmapure sarve kāmā, ye bahirbhavadbhiḥ prārthyante, te’sminn eva svātmani samāhitāḥ. atas tatprāptyupāyam evānutiṣṭhata bāhyaviṣayatṣṇāṃ tyajatety abhiprāyaḥ.*<sup>24</sup> “The city of Brahma” here means “intellect” (*buddhi*) --- “mind” (*manas*), or “heart” (*hṛdya*) ---.<sup>25</sup> This is the basis of all actions. This is that through which all thirst for external things are given up.

What is to be questioned here is, so to speak, the pseudo-transparency of intellect. In the old Upaniṣads “transparency” is an expression implying Brahma, the Absolute --- this issue will be argued in the seventh chapter ---, but “intellect” snatches this transparency from the Absolute. A verse of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* (BU. 4.3.7) speaks of “intellect” thus:

What is the Self? Puruṣa, which is full of the mind [or identified with the intellect] among the organs, is the light in the heart. Being similar to it [the intellect], it [Puruṣa] moves between

<sup>23</sup> IDUŚB., 357.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 569.

<sup>25</sup> “Therefore the phrase [*vijñāna-maya*] means ‘full of the internal organ [the intellect],’ which has the nature of decision, indecision, and so on. Because Puruṣa dwells in the city” (BUB. 2.1.16). *tasmāt saṅkalpavikalpādyātmakam antaḥkaraṇaṃ tanmaya ity etat. puruṣaḥ puri śayanāt. Ibid.*, 726.

the two worlds; it thinks, as it were, it shakes, as it were. Having become the dream [or having identified with the state of dream], it [Puruṣa] transcends this world --- the forms of death.

*katama ātmeti yo'yaṃ vijñānamayaḥ prāṇeṣu hr̥dy antarjyotiḥ puruṣaḥ sa samānaḥ sann ubhau lokāv anusañcarati dhyāyatīva lelāyatīva sa hi svapno bhūtvemaṃ lokam atikrāmati mṛtyo rūpāni.*<sup>26</sup>

The intellect is the basis of all actions, which includes “austerity” and “celibacy” in “the life of mendicant” after “abandoning the human world.” Moreover, the intellect has a kind of transcendence, but it leads to just the virtuous world --- but it is not the Absolute ---. The commentator says: “Being transparent and proximate [to the Self], the intellect, indeed, becomes the reflection of the illumination of the consciousness of the Self” (BUB. 4.3.7). *buddhis tāvat svacchatvāt ānantaryācca ātmacaitanyajyotiḥpraticchāyā bhavati.*<sup>27</sup>

In the old Upaniṣads *virāga* (dispassion) is a practical way to attain the Absolute --- which is also called the Liberation ----, although the commentator Śāṅkara denies consistently that *virāga* (dispassion) is the cause of attaining the Absolute, and that the final attainment to Brahma, the Absolute, is possible only through knowledge. In regard to this entangled argument about “dispassion” and “knowledge”, three points are sure: Firstly, “dispassion” means “throwing away the thirst for external thing,” --- such as desire for sons and so on ---, but indeed it means also the actual renouncement of the worldly life. Secondly, after having abandoned the worldly life, through the virtuous deeds --- such as “austerity” and “celibacy” ---, one attains the virtuous world (the world of gods), but this world is again to be abandoned. Thirdly, when we attain the virtuous world, we are apt to fall in the fallacy of the pseudo-transparency of intellect, so that we would wrongly believe the virtuous world as the Absolute.

However, the philosophical meaning of dispassion here is not clear yet. This issue is further to be questioned in the section “The Right View,” also taking account of the arguments about dispassion in early Buddhism.

### *Dispassion in Early Buddhism*

#### ***Alobha***

“Non-greed” (*alobha*) or “dispassion” (*virāga*) is spoken of in regard to the problem

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<sup>26</sup> IDUŚB., 867.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 868.

of “abandonment” (*pahāna, cāga*). Non-greed is one of the three good roots (*kusala-mūlāni*) --- the other two are non-hate (*adosa*), non-delusion (*amoha*)---. First of all, this “non-greed” should be understood as “the abandonment of the household life.” In the *Sāmaññaphala-sutta*, a householder or a householder’s son, who wants to become a bhikkhu, speaks of the worldly life as follows:

The household life is full of obstacles. It is a way of impurities. The ascetic life (*pabbajjā*) is [free like] the open air. It is not easy for house-dwellers to practice Brahmachariya (celibacy), which is extremely fulfilled, extremely pure, and bright like a conch-shell. Let me cut off hair and beard, [let me] clothe myself in the yellow robes, [and let me] leave the household life into the homeless state.

*sambādho gharāvāso rajāpatho abbhokāso pabbajjā nayidaṃ sukaraṃ agāraṃ  
ajjhāvasatā ekantaparipuṇṇaṃ ekantaparissuddhaṃ saṃkhalikhitaṃ brahmachariyaṃ  
caritaṃ yannūnāhaṃ kesamassaṃ ohāretvā kāsāyāni vatthāni acchādetvā agārasmā  
anagāriyaṃ pabbajeyyanti.*<sup>28</sup>

What is questioned through “greed, hate, delusion” (*lobha-dosa-moha, rāga-dosa-moha*) is not different from what is questioned through “craving” (*taṇhā*). It must be “the noble truth of the origin of dukkha” (*dukkhasamudayo ariyasaccaṃ*), as it is said in the *Mahāsatiṭṭhāna-sutta*. “It [the origin of dukkha] is the craving, which causes new existence, which is accompanied by pleasure and passion, and which finds a great pleasure in this or that existence.” *yāyaṃ taṇhā ponobhavikā nandirāgasahagatā tatra tatrābhinandini.*<sup>29</sup>

Besides, what does the word *samudaya* mean? The word *samudaya* is sometimes interpreted as “cause” or “reason.”<sup>30</sup> However, it is not good enough to understand it as the cause which produces the suffering in this ephemeral existence. It is to be noted that what is spoken of as craving here, evidently, includes the craving for the eternal. It is not enough to think that annihilating such cravings --- as causes --- results in the annihilation of dukkha. For example, the word *samudaya* seems to also mean “collection,” “multitude,” “heap,” or “aggregation.” According to the *Abhidhānappadīpikā* (Gāthās 629, 630, 631), *samudaya* is

<sup>28</sup> **ṭ.ṣ.** 9/102/82-83.

<sup>29</sup> **ṭ.u.** 10/295/343.

<sup>30</sup> For example, Buddhaghosa explains this word: “The word *sam* implies connection, as in the words *samāgama* (meeting with), *sameta* (connected with), and so on. The word *u* implies arising, as in the words *uppanna* (arising), *udīta* (rising), and so on. The word *aya* implies a ground (*kāraṇa*).” *Sam itī ca ayaṃ saddo, samāgamo sametan ti ādisu saṃyogaṃ dīpeti; u itī ayaṃ, uppannaṃ uditan ti ādisu uppattim. Ayaṃ saddo kāraṇaṃ dīpeti.* Warren, ed. **Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosācariya**, 420.

one of the words standing for “aggregation”; *samūho gaṇasarīghātā samudāyo ca sañcayo sandoho nivaho ogho visaro nikaro cayo. kāyo khandho samudayo ghaṭā samiti saṃhati rāsi puñjo samavāyo pūgo jātaṃ kadambakaṃ. byūha vitānagumbā ca kalāpo jāla maṇḍalaṃ*.<sup>31</sup> Therefore, although the word *samudaya* means the ground (*kāraṇa*), it is to be understood as “existences” (*bhava*) or “the states of existence” --- also called “bodies,” which are usually considered as something like “aggregation” or “heap” ---. Moreover, although “craving” is something deeply related to *lobha-dosa-moha* as “not-good-roots” (*akusala-mūlāni*), it is to be understood as “craving” for such an existence.

As “craving” is often spoken of as something threefold like “craving for desire” (*kāma-taṇhā*), “craving for existence” (*bhava-taṇhā*), and “craving for non-existence” (*vibhava-taṇhā*),<sup>32</sup> it is to be noted that these three kinds of “craving” are correspondent to “existence (or state of existence)” (*bhava*), “realm” (*avacara*), or “world” (*loka*), such as “existence of desire” (*kāma-bhava*), “existence of rūpa” (*rūpa-bhava*), “existence of arūpa” (*arūpa-bhava*) and so on.

The point is: The origin of dukkha is “craving,” but it by no means follows that “craving” as *samudaya* is simply to be abandoned, much less that this “craving” is theoretically to be negated. In this case, the abandonment necessarily presumes the fundamental experience of such states of existence, and then these states of existence are to be abandoned.

### **Adosa**

As it is said just above, “non-greed” already implies the abandonment of the worldly life. However, the abandonment of the worldly life is not based on a pessimistic view of life. Rather, it intends to attain the higher state of existence. This higher state of existence is closely related to “non-hate” (*adosa*).

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<sup>31</sup> พระมหาสมปอง มุทิโต, **คัมภีร์อภิธานวรรณนา** (กรุงเทพมหานคร: โรงพิมพ์ธรรมสภา. พ.ศ. 2542), 758-761.

<sup>32</sup> “Here, *taṇhā* is threefold like this: *Rūpa-taṇhā* means craving having rūpa as its object, namely, craving in rūpa. When one enjoys rūpa through the state of ‘passion’ (*kāma-rāga*), this [*rūpa-taṇhā*] results in *kāma-taṇhā* (craving for desire). When one enjoys [*rūpa*] [thinking] that rūpa is eternal, stable, permanent, through the state of desire born together with externalism, this [*rūpa-taṇhā*] results in *bhava-taṇhā*. When one enjoys [*rūpa*] [thinking] that rūpa is destroyed and lost --- namely rūpa will not exist after death --- through the state of desire born with nihilism, this [*rūpa-taṇhā*] results in *vibhava-taṇhā*.” *ettha ca rūpārammaṇā taṇhā, rūpe taṇhāti rūpataṇhā. sā kāmarāgabhāvena rūpaṃ assādentī pavattamānā kāmataṇhā. sassatadiṭṭhisahagatarāgabhāvena rūpaṃ niccaṃ dhuvaṃ sassatanti evaṃ assādentī pavattamānā bhavataṇhā. ucchedadiṭṭhisahagatarāgabhāvena rūpaṃ ucchijjati vinassati pecca na bhavissatīti evaṃ assādentī pavattamānā vibhavataṇhāti evaṃ tividhā hoti. น.ธ. 1/234.*

While “hate” (*dosa*) or “anger” (*vyāpāda*) comes from “thinking not based on intuition” (*ayonisomanasikāra*),<sup>33</sup> “non-hate” is related to the Emancipation of consciousness such as “fraternity” (*mettā*).<sup>34</sup> This Emancipation or this state of existence is called the abode of Brahmā in the *Visuddhimagga*. “The abode of Brahmā is here to be known in the sense of ‘best’ and in the sense of ‘being free from anger.’ Because these abodes are the best in the sense of ‘right practice towards living beings.’” *Settḥatṭhena tāva niddosabhāvena c’ettha brahmavihāratā veditabbā. Sattesu sammāpaṭipattibhāvena hi settḥā ete vihārā; ...*<sup>35</sup> The *Tevijja-sutta* speaks of this brahmavihāra --- which is also called “rūpa-bhava” --- as follows:<sup>36</sup>

With the mind full of fraternity (*mettā*) he dwells pervading one quarter [of the world], the second, the third, and the fourth. ... Oh Vāseṭṭha, this is verily the way to the state of union with Brahmā. And with the mind full of compassion (*karuṇā*) ..., and with the mind full of sympathy (*muditā*) ..., and with the mind full of equanimity (*upekkhā*), [he dwells pervading] one quarter [of the world], the second, the third, and the fourth.

*so mettāsahagatena cetasā ekaṃ disaṃ pharivā viharati tathā dutiyaṃ tathā tatiyaṃ tathā catutthaṃ ... ayaṃpi kho vāseṭṭha brahmānaṃ saḥabyatāya maggo. puna caparaṃ vāseṭṭha bhikkhu karuṇāsahagatena cetasā .pe. muditāsahagatena cetasā .pe. upekkhāsahagatena cetasā ekaṃ disaṃ pharivā viharati tathā dutiyaṃ tathā tatiyaṃ tathā catutthaṃ ...*<sup>37</sup>

It is obvious that this “existence of rūpa” (or the abode of Brahmā) implies the virtuous world. According to the philosophical tradition in ancient India, this virtuous world is deeply related to “mind” or “intellect” (*manas*), without which our practice is not possible. The *Brahmajāla-sutta* speaks of “the world of radiance” (*ābhassara*) --- which is said to be correspondent to “joy” (*pīṭi*) and “fraternity” (*mettā*) in “existence of rūpa” --- as follows:

When the world is dissolved, the living beings are mostly going toward Ābhassara [radiant Brahmā]. There, they are made of mind (*mano-maya*), eating joy, radiating light from

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<sup>33</sup> “Again, anger arises in the obstacle (the object of repulsion) through thinking not based on intuition.” *paṭighanimitte ayonisomanasikārena pana byāpādassa uppādo hoti. ṅ.ṅ. 2/393.*

<sup>34</sup> “Again there is the abandonment of it [anger (*byāpāda*)] through thinking based on intuition in the emancipation of consciousness full of fraternity.” *mettāya pana cetovimuttiyā yonisomanasikārenassa pahānaṃ hoti. ṅ.ṅ. 2/394.*

<sup>35</sup> Warren, ed. **Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosācariya**, 266.

<sup>36</sup> The similar text can be found in the *Mahāgovinda-sutta. ṅ.ṅ. 10/234/284.*

<sup>37</sup> **ṅ.ṅ. 9/383-384/310.**

themselves, travelling in the air [the divine worlds], staying in splendour. And they stay for a long time.

*saṃvaṭṭamāne loke yebhuyyena sattā ābhassarasamvattanikā honti. te tattha honti manomayā pītibhakkhā sayampabhā antalikkhacarā subhaṭṭhāyino ciraṃ dīghamaddhānaṃ tiṭṭhanti.*<sup>38</sup>

“Abandonment” is firstly to be understood as abandonment of the worldly life. This abandonment is not based on a pessimistic view, but it intends to attain the higher world, the virtuous world. This virtuous world is the world by way of which the ultimate emancipation is attained. However, even “the virtuous life (or the religious life)” (*brahmacariya*) --- implying chastity, which presumes the study of the Dhamma and the renouncement of the worldly life --- brings us to only the world of Brahmā as the virtuous world, and it does not bring us to the higher intuitive knowledge, to Nibbāna. The *Mahāgovinda-sutta* speaks of the world of Brahmā:

I taught those disciples the way to be united with the world of Brahmā. But, Oh Pañcasikha, Brahmācariya [religious life, or celibacy] does not lead [us] to disgust [with worldly life], to dispassion, to cessation [of craving], to calmness, to intuitive knowledge, to enlightenment [or higher intuitive knowledge], to Nibbāna, but [it leads us] only to an existence [, called, ] the world of Brahmā.

*ahaṃ taṃ sāvakānaṃ brahmalokasahabyatāya maggaṃ desesiṃ taṃ kho pana pañcasikha brahmacariyaṃ na nibbidāya na virāgāya na nirodhāya na upasamāya na abhiññāya na sambodhāya na nibbānāya samvattati yāvadeva brahmalokūpapattiyā ...*<sup>39</sup>

The virtuous life conduces to the abandonment of the worldly impurities. However, the virtuous deeds lead us just to another state of existence, where we can not find the ultimate emancipation, the Absolute. The commentary says: “Although the four meditations in the realm of rūpa, still twofold, endowed with equanimity, destroy impurities, yet they --- still near by impurities --- go forth in the state of rūpa as object. ... The meditation in the realm of rūpa does not overcome this object. Therefore, abandoning rūpa throughout, and

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<sup>38</sup> **ṭi.ṭi.** 9/31/23. The *Visuddhimagga* speaks of “equanimity” like this: “Equanimity is a character causing to practice with impartiality towards living beings. Its essence is seeing the state of equality in living beings. It is manifested as tranquillising anger and friendliness. Its proximate cause is seeing kamma as its own deed.” *Sattesu majjhātakārapavattilakkhaṇā upekkhā, sattesu samabhāvadassana rasā, paṭighānūyavūpasamapaccupaṭṭhānā, ... pavattakammassakatā dassanapadaṭṭhānā.* Warren, ed. **Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosācariya**, 264.

<sup>39</sup> **ṭi.ṭi.** 10/234/285.

destroying the impurities through the power of meditation of arūpa, one attained the Arahatsip, --- this is two-sided emancipation. ...” *rūpāvacaracatutthajjhānaṃ kiñcāpi duvaṅgikaṃ upekkhāsahagataṃ, kilese vikkhambheti, kilesānaṃ pana āsannapakkepi rūpārammaṇaṭṭhāne samudācarati. ... rūpāvacarajjhānañca taṃ ārammaṇaṃ na samatikkamati. tasmā sabbaso rūpaṃ nivattetvā arūpajjhānavasena kilese vikkhambhetvā arahattaṃ pattova ubhatobhāgavimutto ...*<sup>40</sup>

### ***Bhava and vibhava***

By the way, in early Buddhism the concept “existence” (*bhava*) or “non-existence” (*vibhava*) is thought as something related to “eternalism” (*sassata-ditṭhi, sassata-vāda, bhava-ditṭhi*) or “nihilism” (*uccheda-ditṭhi, ucheda-vāda, vibhava-ditṭhi*) respectively. For example, the commentary on the *Mahāsatipatṭhāna-sutta* explains like this:<sup>41</sup> “*Kāma-taṇhā* means craving in desire. This is a name of passion for the five strands desire. *Bhava-taṇhā* means craving in existence. This is a name of passion for the existence of rūpa and arūpa, which is born along with externalism, and which is born by power of wishing existence, when [the worldly desire] is abandoned by concentration. *Vibhava-taṇhā* means craving in non-existence. This is a name of passion, which is born along with nihilism.” *kāmatāṇhāti kāme taṇhā, pañcakāmaguṇikarāgassetam nāmaṃ. bhava taṇhā bhavataṇhā, bhavapatthanāvasena uppannassa sassataditṭhisahagatassa rūpārūpabhavarāgassa ca jhānanikkantiyā cetam adhivacanaṃ. vibhava taṇhā vibhavataṇhā, ucchedaditṭhisahagatarāgassetam adhivacanaṃ.*<sup>42</sup>

Of course, such an interpretation is not wrong, but it belongs to the lowest level of “intuitive knowledge.” Anyway, it is extremely inappropriate to consider “cessation” (*nirodha*) --- which is also called “non-existence” (*vibhava*) --- as something related to this nihilism (*vibhava-ditṭhi*).

The word *vibhava* is commented in a note of “Dialogues of the Buddha --- Part II” like this: “*Vibhava*. This word usually means power, prosperity, success---the prefix vi being

<sup>40</sup> **ṭ. a.** 2/114.

<sup>41</sup> “All cravings [including craving for desire] is expressed like this: all Dhammas in three spheres of existence are the basis of *taṇhā* in the sense of ‘leading to desire.’ Among them [all craving], excepting craving for desire ---, the other two kinds of *taṇhā* are shown. Among [these two such as] *rūpa-taṇhā* and so on, *Rūpa-taṇhā* means passion in the existence of rūpa. *Arūpa-taṇhā* means passion in the existence of arūpa. [This is] *nirodha-taṇhā*, passion which is born along with nihilism.” *sabbepi tebhūmikā dhammā rajanīyaṭṭhena taṇhāvattukāti sabbataṇhā kāmatāṇhāya pariyādiyitvā tato nīharitvā itarā dve taṇhā dasseti. rūpataṇhādīsū rūpabhava chandarāgo rūpataṇhā. arūpabhava chandarāgo arūpataṇhā. ucchedaditṭhisahagato rāgo nirodhataṇhā.* **ṭ. a.** 3/182.

<sup>42</sup> **ṭ. a.** 2/415.

used as an intensive particle. In this particular connexion the traditional interpretation takes the prefix in a negative sense, and paraphrases the word by ‘the absence of becoming (bhava).’ This view is apparently supported by some Nikāya passages (S. III, 57 ; It. no 49), and Dhamma Samganī 1314. But it may be derived from them; and it is odd that word should have been found nowhere else in that sense. At Dhṛ. 282 it seems to mean decline in wisdom.”<sup>43</sup> In the *Abhidhānappadīpikā* (Gāthā 1088), “vibhū” is interpreted as follows: “*Vibhū* --- masculine --- means ‘eternal’ or ‘great’ ” (*vibhū niccapabhūsu so*).<sup>44</sup>

Buddhaghosa himself explains the superficiality of that interpretation like this: “But, one, rejecting this true view and admitting that a [living] being exists, would allow either his destruction or [his] non-destruction. One, allowing the non-destruction, falls into the eternity [view]. One, allowing the destruction, falls into the annihilation [view]. Why? Because there is no successive connection of one thing to another thing like a successive connection of milk to curds.” *Yo pan’etaṃ yathābhūtadassanaṃ pahāya, satto atthī ti gaṇhāti, so tassa vināsaṃ anujāneyya, avināsaṃ vā; avināsaṃ anujānanto sassate patati, vināsaṃ anujānanto ucchede patati. Kasmā? Khīranvayassa dadhino viya tadanvayassa aññassa abhāvato.*<sup>45</sup> Besides, this argument should be compared to the argument in the Śāṅkara’s commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*: “Because it [Brahma as the cause of the world] is possible because of a peculiar nature of the material, like milk. Just as milk or water, in the world, transforms into curds or ice by itself not depending on any external means, even so it [Brahma] will become [the cause of the world] here.” *yataḥ kṣīravaddravyasvabhāva-viśeṣādupaladyate. yathā hi loke kṣīraṃ jalaṃ vā svayameva dadhihimabhāvena pariṇamate’napekṣya bāhyaṃ sādhanam tatthehāpi bhaviṣyati.*<sup>46</sup> However, these two arguments of Buddhaghosa and Śāṅkara are not to be understood as the so-called *pariṇāmavāda* --- this issue is further questioned in the next section ---.

Anyway, in the phase of “abandonment,” what is questioned in regard to *bhava* or *vibhava* is not “theoretical view,” but our states of existence to which various steps of intuitive knowledge --- our fundamental experience --- correspond. The Buddha, also called “knower of the worlds” (*lokavidū*), is verily one who knows the worlds or the states of existence thoroughly, as it is said in the *Sāmaññaphala-sutta* thus, “He [the Tathāgata], by himself, realises this world [or these worlds] through intuitive knowledge --- the world of Devas, the world of Māras, the world of Brahmās, and the world of human beings with Samaṇas and Brāhmans, kings and men.” *so imaṃ lokaṃ sadevakaṃ samārakaṃ*

<sup>43</sup> T.W. Rhys Davids, trans. **Dialogues of the Buddha** part 2, (Oxford: P.T.S., 1995), 340 n. 1.

<sup>44</sup> มุทิต, **คัมภีร์อภิธานารรณนา**, 1028.

<sup>45</sup> Warren, ed. **Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosācariya**, 509.

<sup>46</sup> Shastri, ed. **Brahmasūtrasāṅkarabhāṣyam**, 396.

*sabrahmakam sassamaṇabrāhmaṇiṃ pajam sadevamanussam sayam abhiññā sacchikatvā ...*<sup>47</sup>

As it is already seen, early Buddhism starts the inquiry into the truth with intuitive knowledge (*paññā*), intuitive knowledge of the truth of dukkha through which this whole world is to be understood. Through the actual renouncement of worldly life, or through meditation, this intuitive knowledge is to be developed. However, although those states of existence are to be abandoned, it does not mean that those states are theoretically to be rejected, as the abandonment of the existence of rūpa does not mean only the theoretical rejection of eternalism and the abandonment of the existence of arūpa does not mean only the theoretical rejection of the nihilism. It seems that the abandonment of the state of existence presumes the fundamental experience of it or the intuitive knowledge (*vipassanā* or *abhiññā*) of it.<sup>48</sup>

Verily, in order to further develop such an experience, or in order to acquire higher intuitive knowledge, one should abandon --- or sublimate --- that state of existence. Besides, this thought of *pahāna* ---- the abandonment for development of intuitive knowledge or the meditation for development of intuitive knowledge --- is very probably also one of the reasons why Śaṅkara admits the virtuous deed like meditation as a means to the Absolute, while he insists that only knowledge is the cause to attain it.

### *The Right View*

#### ***Samyagjñāna***

In the third and fourth chapters, this study has investigated the concept “truth” especially in regard to “intuitive knowledge.” In the old Upaniṣads, there is a word standing for the thought based on this “intuitive knowledge”; namely, “right view” (*samyagdarśana*) or “right knowledge” (*samyagjñāna*). The word is found in a verse of the *Muṇḍaka-upaniṣad* (MuU. 3.1.5):

This Self is to be attained through truth, meditation (*tapas*), right knowledge (*samyagjñāna*), and the constant [practice] of celibacy (*brahmacarya*). Those ascetics, who have destroyed

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<sup>47</sup> १.१. 9/102/82.

<sup>48</sup> The intuitive knowledge (*paññā*) is also called *vipassanā*, *vipassanā-paññā*, or *abhiññā*, in the phases of “abandonment” and “path,” as the meditation is explained by the commentator like “meditation forming a basis of intuition” (*vipassanāpāḍakajjhāna*) or “meditation forming a basis of insight” (*abhiññāpāḍakajjhāna*). See १.१. 1/134.

impurities, see this bright (*jjyotirmaya*) and pure [Self] within their bodies.

*satyena labhyas tapasā hy eṣa ātmā samyagjñānena brahmacaryeṇa nityam. antaḥśarīre  
jjyotirmayo hi śubro yaṃ paśyanti yatayaḥ kṣīṇadoṣāḥ.*<sup>49</sup>

The commentator Śaṅkara explains the word *samyagjñāna* as “seeing the Self as it is” --- namely seeing the Self as it is along with this ephemeral world ---: “[This Self is to be attained] by *samyagjñāna* (right knowledge), by seeing the Self as it is” (*samyagjñānena yathābhūtātmadarśanena*) (MuUB. 3.1.5).<sup>50</sup> As it is seen in regard to “truth,” this concept is first found along with this temporal and manifold world. As Gambhirananda explains, this knowledge does not immediately mean mature knowledge, even though it is right knowledge: “By samyak jñāna, here, is to be understood such immature but adequate knowledge of the meaning of the text which matures into knowledge of the things itself. The mature knowledge, productive of direct perception, does not depend on other factors for bringing about its results, viz the cessation of ignorance. So it is immature knowledge that alone can be combined with such disciplines as truth etc. for acquisition of mature knowledge.”<sup>51</sup>

However, although it is not immediately mature, this *samyagjñāna* or *samyagdarśana* is only the door to the Absolute. A verse of the *Kena-upaniṣad* (KeU. 2.4) explains about “attainment to the Absolute through knowledge” as follows:

It [Brahma] is known when It is known with each state of [empirical] consciousness, because [thereby] one finds immortality. Through the Self one finds strength, [and] through [intuitive] knowledge one finds immortality.

*pratibodhaviditāṃ matam amṛtatvaṃ hi vindate. ātmanā vindate vīryaṃ vidyayā  
vindate mṛtam.*<sup>52</sup>

As it is seen already, the truth is first to be investigated along with this ephemeral existence. The commentator explains the verse above: “The Self, [empirical] ideas of which become related to [external] object, is aware of all states of consciousness. [The Self] is the seer (*darśin*) of all ideas, and it is merely the faculty of consciousness, which is its own nature. [The Self] is recognised verily along with [those empirical] ideas, in the midst of [those] ideas, although [the Self] is not distinguished from them.” *sarve pratyayā*

<sup>49</sup> IDUŚB., 167.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 168.

<sup>51</sup> Swami Gambhirananda, trans. **Eight Upaniṣads**, vol. 2 (Kolkata: Advaita Ashrama, 1989), 145 n. 1.

<sup>52</sup> IDUŚB., 27.

*viṣayībhavanti yasya sa ātmā sarvabodhān pratibudhyate sarvapratyayadarśī cicchaktisvarūpamātraḥ pratyayair eva pratyayeṣv avīśiṣṭatayā lakṣyate, ... (KeUB. 2.4).<sup>53</sup>*

Although it is through the intuitive knowledge that we should attain the Absolute, this intuitive knowledge is possible only along with our empirical knowledge. This is only a way to the Absolute. It is to be called “the right view” (*samyagdarśana*). “There is no other door to its [Brahma’s] knowledge. Therefore when Brahman is known as the inner Self of ideas, then it is known, [namely], then there is its right view.” *nānyad dvāram ātmano vijñānāya. ataḥ pratyayapratyagātmatayā viditaṁ brahma yadā tadā tanmataṁ tatsamyagdarśanam ... (KeUB. 2.4).<sup>54</sup>*

### ***Being as conditional***

As it is seen in the previous chapters, “truth” (*satya*) is first to be questioned along with this ephemeral world. A verse of the *Taittirīya-upaniṣad* (TU. 2.6.1) speaks of it thus:

Having created it, [Brahma] verily entered it. And having entered it, [Brahman] became the formed (*sat*) and the formless (*tyat*), the defined and the undefined, the founded and the non-founded, consciousness and non-consciousness, truth and untruth. [Brahma], as truth (*satya*), became whatever there is here.

*tat sṛṣṭvā. tad evānuprāviśat. tad anupraviśya. sac ca tyac cābhavat. niruktaṁ cāniruktaṁ ca. nilayanaṁ cānilayanaṁ ca. vijñānaṁ cāvijñānaṁ ca. satyaṁ cānuṛtaṁ ca satyam abhavat. yad idaṁ kiñ ca.<sup>55</sup>*

This is not a story about creation of the world. What is here questioned is our condition only through which we can approach the Absolute truth. The commentator explains this text above like this: “[Considering the current] topics, ‘truth’ (*satya*) [in the verse] is related to the empirical, not the absolute truth, because the absolute truth is one, which is Brahma. But here ‘truth’ (*satya*) is related to the sphere of the empirical” (TUB. 2.6.1). *satyaṁ ca vyavaharaviśayam adhikārān na paramārthasatyam. ekam eva hi paramārthasatyam brahma. iha punar vyavahāraviśayam āpekṣikaṁ satyaṁ, ...<sup>56</sup>*

What is not to be wrongly misunderstood is that “Being” or “Being that is Brahma” (*sad-eva-brahma*) does not belong to “the truest truth,” as far as it is considered as a ground or a transcendental ground of the ephemeral existence of this word --- which is

<sup>53</sup> **IDUŚB.**, 27.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 296.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, 301.

regarded as “name and form” (*nāma-rūpa*) like “All transformation has speech as its basis, and it is name only” (*vācārambhaṇaṃ vikāro nāmadheyam*) (CU. 6.1.4) ---. In this case, “Being” or “non-dual Self” can be considered even as a ground of illusions. “The non-dual Self, although it is the absolute truth, is still the ground of illusory manifoldness, like the rope and so on is the ground of the illusory snake and so on” (MāKB. 1. Introduction). *rajivādir iva sarpādivikalpasyāspadaṃ advaya ātmā paramārthaḥ san prāṇādivikalpasyāspadaṃ ...*<sup>57</sup> This issue is more clearly explained by a verse of the *Kaṭha-upaniṣad* (KaU. 2.6.13) as follows:

[The Self] is [first] to be realised as Being, and then [it is to be realised] through the true state; [thus the Self is to be realised] in both way. [After] having been realised merely as Being, [the Self] becomes transparent (or favourably disposed) as the true state.

*asīty evopalabdavyas tattvabhāvena cobhayoḥ. asīty evopalabdhasya tattvabhāvaḥ prasīdati.*<sup>58</sup>

“Truth” is first to be realised along with the ephemeral existence: “*Asti iti eva upalabdavyaḥ* ([the Self] is [first] to be realized as Being), --- along with effects in which Being inheres, and along with intellect and so on as its limiting adjuncts” (KaUB. 2.6.13). *asīty evātmopalabdavyaḥ satkāryabuddhyādyupādhibiḥ.*<sup>59</sup> However, when the ephemeral existence is annihilated, the Absolute --- the true nature --- then is revealed: “But, when the Self is devoid of this [world] and unchangeable --- without this ground [namely the Self] the effects do not exist, as it is said, ‘All effects have speech as its basis, and they are just names. The clay is the truth’ ---, then the attributeless and signless Self, being free from the sphere of [empirical] ideas such as Being, Non-Being, and so on, become [clear as] the true state” (KaUB. 2.6.13). *yadā tu tadrāhito’vikriya ātmā kāryam ca kāraṇavyatirekeṇa nāsti ‘vācārambhaṇaṃ vikāro nāmadheyam mṛttikety eva satyam’ iti śruteḥ. tadā tasya nirupādhikasyāliṅgasya sadasadādipratyaṅgavaiṣayavavarjitasātmanas tattvabhāvo bhavati.*<sup>60</sup>

It is clear that there are two steps to the Absolute. The first one is “conditioned” (*sopādhika*), the second one is “unconditioned” (*nirupādhika*). The truth --- as Being (*asti*) --- is “first” (*pūrvam*) realized along with ephemeral existence --- “limiting adjuncts” (*upādhi*)

<sup>57</sup> IDUŚB., 177.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 102.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*

---. Then, it is “later on” (*paścāt*) realized as the true nature --- as the Absolute.<sup>61</sup> These two are not empirical and transcendent steps, but rather transcendental and absolute steps.

In regard to a verse of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* (BU. 2.5.15): “This Self is verily the ruler of all beings, and the king of all beings.” *sa vā ayam ātmā sarveṣāṃ bhūtānām adhipatiḥ sarveṣāṃ bhūtānām rājā* ...,<sup>62</sup> the commentator explains this issue in a similar way: “This man of knowledge, this knower of Brahma, as having all [this world] as limiting adjuncts, as the Self of all, becomes all. [But] there is a difference thus: [Brahma] is without limiting adjunct, indiscernible, neither internal nor external, and entire. [Brahma] is pure knowledge, birthless, undecaying, immortal, fearless, immovable, and should be described [only] as ‘Not this, not this, neither gross nor subtle’” (BUB. 2.5.15). *sa eṣa vidvān brahmanī sarvopādhiḥ sarvātmā sarvo bhavati. nirupādhir nirupākhyāḥ anantaro'bāhyaḥ kṛtsnaḥ prajñānaghano'jo'jaro'mṛto'bhayo'calo neti nety asthūlo'naṇur ity evaṃ viśeṣaṇo bhavati.*<sup>63</sup> “Being,” which is questioned along with the individual existence in this temporal and manifold world, is not to be considered as the Absolute, which is here called the true nature (*tattva-bhāva*), and which is considered as something expressed by the following texts: “Not this, not this” (*neti neti*) (BU. 2.3.6, 3.4.26), “neither gross nor minute, neither short nor long, ...” (*asthūlam anaṇv ahrasvam adīrgham*) (BU. 3.8.8). Besides, the Absolute is to be argued later on in the next chapter.

There, as far as Being is realised only as the conditional truth --- as far as Being is realised only along with this ephemeral world ----, this Being should be overcome. It is verily through “abandonment” --- such as the abandonment of the worldly life, the abandonment

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<sup>61</sup> See **IDUŚB.**, 102. Moreover, two steps to the Absolute are also explained in the commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* thus: “[Firstly,] now Brahma has two forms. [Brahma] is related with effects and instruments produced of the five elements, and is called as gross and subtle, and is characterised by the impressions produced of the five elements, and is mortal and immortal as its own nature, and is the omniscient, omnipotent, [but] discernible [namely conditioned] Brahma. It is the sphere (*āspada*) of all empirical affairs consisting of actions, instruments, and effects. [Secondly,] the very same Brahma is described, “Not this, not this.” Because it is devoid of any difference of all limiting adjuncts, and is the object of right view (*samyagdarsana*), and is birthless, undecaying, immortal, and fearless, and is not the object of speech and mind, and is not dual. There, it is verily those two [forms] by way of elimination of which Brahma is indicated” (BUB. 2.3.1). *tatra dvirūpaṃ brahma pañcabhūtajanitakāryakaraṇa-sambaddhaṃ mūrtāmūrtākhyam martyāmṛtasvabhāvam tajjanitavāsanārūpaṃ ca sarvajñam sarvasakti sopākhyam bhavati. kriyākārahaphalātmakam ca sarvavyavahārāspadam. tad eva brahma vigatasarvopādhiviśeṣam samyagdarsanaviśayam ajam ajaram amṛtam abhayaṃ vānmanasayor apy aviśayam advaitatvāt 'neti neti' iti nirdiśyate. tatra yad apohadvāreṇa 'neti neti' iti nirdiśyate brahma te ete dve vāva. Ibid., 749.*

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 774.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, 775.

of the virtuous world --- that Being, this transcendental knowledge should be overcome.<sup>64</sup> Thus, dispassion is the means to arrive at the unconditional truth.

### ***Sammāditthi***

As it is already seen, also in early Buddhism “intuitive knowledge” is a clue for the inquiry into the truth. Although the truth is always that which is to be known intuitively, firstly this intuitive knowledge is possible along with empirical knowledge. Moreover, this intuitive knowledge is a universal knowledge, through which this whole ephemeral world is to be understood as non-eternal and suffering. Although early Buddhism inquires Nibbāna, the Absolute, this inquiry is to be started with this ephemeral world --- this is exactly the same as the old Upaniṣads ---. The commentator explains this issue as two divisions of “intuitive knowledge.” “Virtue’ means ‘the four pure virtues’ as is expressed like ‘being endowed with virtue’ (*sīla-sampanna*) and so on. ‘Concentration’ (*samādhi*) means eight attainments (*samāpatti*), forming a basis of *vipassanā* (intuitive knowledge along with concentration). *Paññā* means *ñāṇa*, which is mundane (*lokiya*) and supra-mundane (*lokuttara*). Emancipation means the noble fruit. [It is] nineteen fold contemplation-intuition, the intuitive view, ‘being emancipated.’” *sīlasampannotiādīsu sīlanti catuppārisuddhisīlaṃ. samādhīti vipassanāpādakā aṭṭha samāpattiyo. paññāti lokiyalokuttaravasena ñāṇaṃ. vimuttīti ariyaphalaṃ. vimutaṭi ñāṇadassananti ekūnavīsatividhaṃ paccavekkhaṇañāṇaṃ.*<sup>65</sup> As it is already evident from our arguments in the previous chapter, “mundane intuitive knowledge” does not mean “worldly knowledge” or “empirical knowledge,” but intuitive knowledge or transcendental knowledge through which this whole empirical world is to be understood.

Moreover, in a sense, these two divisions of “intuitive knowledge” are already meant verily in the fourfold noble truth. “There the first two truths are ‘[concerned with] the ephemeral’ (*vaṭṭa*), and the last two are ‘[concerned with] the non-ephemeral’ (*vivaṭṭa*). In

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<sup>64</sup> The criticism of the Self as Being in the sixth chapter of the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad* is one of the important themes in Śaṅkara’s commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*. “It should mean thus: A man, desiring to point out the [tiny star] Arundhaī, first shows a big star standing near by it indirectly as the Arundhaī itself. Then he refutes it and shows subsequently the Arundhaī itself. Similarly [after the text ‘that thou art’] it should have been said, ‘This is not the self.’ However, it has not been said [in the *Chāndogya*]. [Rather,] it is seen that the sixth chapter [of the *Chāndogya*] is concluded by the dependence (*niṣṭha*) upon the knowledge of the self as mere ‘being’ (*san-mātra-ātma-avagati*).” *yathārundhatīm didarśayīṣus tat-samīpasthām sthūlām tārām amukhyām prathamam arundhatīi grāhayivā tāṃ pratyākhyāya paścād arundhatīm eva grāhayati tadvan nāyamātmeti brūyāt. na caivam avocat. sanmātrātmāvagatiniṣṭhaiva hi ṣaṣṭhaprapāṭhakaparisamāptir dṛśyate.* Shastri, ed. **Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣyam**, 112-113.

<sup>65</sup> **u.a.** 2/54.

the ephemeral there is clinging, not in the non-ephemeral. Therefore, when one has clinging, he has it in the truth of dukkha.” *tattha purimāni dve saccāni vaṭṭaṃ, pacchimāni vivaṭṭaṃ, vaṭṭe abhiniveso hoti, no vivaṭṭe, tasmā ayaṃ abhinivisaṃāno dukkhasacce abhinivisaṃti.*<sup>66</sup>

Besides, this intuitive knowledge that is closely related to the two divisions of the inquiry into the truth is also called “right view” (*sammādiṭṭhi*) --- this word consists of *sammā* (Skt. *samyāñc* or *samyak*) and *diṭṭhi* (Skt. *dr̥ṣṭi*), which inevitably reminds us of *samyagdarśana* in the old Upaniṣad --- or “right intuitive knowledge” (*sammappaññā*). The commentary on the *Sammādiṭṭhi-sutta* explains this word as follows: “This right view is twofold; mundane and supra-mundane. There, the mundane right view is intuitive knowledge (*ñāṇa*) [along with] kamma as one’s own deed and intuitive knowledge (*ñāṇa*) according to the truth, briefly, all intuitive knowledge accompanied by the intoxicant (*āsava*). The supra-mundane right view is intuitive knowledge (*paññā*) connected with the noble path and fruit.” *sā cāyaṃ sammādiṭṭhi duvidhā hoti lokiyā lokuttarāti. tattha kammassakatāññāṇaṃ saccānulomikaññāṇaṃca lokiyā sammādiṭṭhi, saṅkhepato vā sabbāpi sāsavā paññā. ariyamaggaphalasampayuttā paññā lokuttarā sammādiṭṭhi.*<sup>67</sup> As “intuitive knowledge according to the truth” (*saccānulomikaññā*) --- which is also called “intuitive thinking” (*yoniso manasikāro*)<sup>68</sup> --- is mentioned as the intuitive knowledge accompanied by the taints, the inquiry into the truth is started with this tainted existence, this ephemeral world. This is the idea that we have already seen in the old Upaniṣads.

As it is already seen in the third chapter, in early Buddhism “intuitive knowledge” is that which is to be developed. What is truly questioned in regard to “abandonment” is verily this development of “intuitive knowledge” along with a purification of external worlds --- including body or mind ---, which is expressed as the abandonment of the existence of desire (*kāma-bhava*) or the existence of rūpa (*rūpa-bhava*) --- the existence of devas, so to speak, the virtuous worlds ---, while, at the same time, it means the actual abandonment of the worldly life. Therefore, in the initial stage of the inquiry into the truth, the truth of dukkha or the Dhamma on the ephemeral (*vipariṇāma-dhamma*) is known intuitively as that through which all this existence of ephemeral world is understood. However, verily now in regard to

<sup>66</sup> **u.a.** 2/246.

<sup>67</sup> **u.a.** 1/209.

<sup>68</sup> “There, what is called ‘thinking based on intuition’ (*yoniso manasikāra*) is ‘thinking along with means’ (*upāya*), ‘thinking along with way’ (*patha*), or ‘thinking’ which makes consciousness turn, divert, reflect, and concentrate through the means according to the truth, as it is said ‘what is ephemeral is [to be realised as] ephemeral’ and so on. This is called *yoniso manasikāra*.” *tattha yoniso manasikāro nāma upāyamanasikāro pathamanasikāro, aniccādisu aniccanti ādinā nayena saccānulomikena vā cīttassa āvajjanā anvāvajjanā ābhogo samannāhāro manasikāro, ayaṃ vuccati yoniso manasikāro.* **u.a.** 1/71.

the issue of “dispassion” (*alobha*), along with the actual abandonment of the worldly life, this truth is to be developed or sublated. Thus, we arrive at higher existence --- *rūpa-bhava* or *arūpa-bhava* --- along with higher “intuitive knowledge” (*paññā*, *vipassanā*, or *vipassanā-paññā*). In both the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism, renouncement of the world life and renouncement of the virtuous worlds --- also called renouncement of the gross body and renouncement of the subtle body in the old Upaniṣads, *rūpa* body and *nāma* body in early Buddhism --- is actually a means to attain the Liberation. But such a thought is not based on popular pessimism. Such a renouncement of a certain state of existence presumes the fundamental experience or the intuitive knowledge of it. After having acquired the intuitive knowledge through which this whole ephemeral world is to be understood, we should actually abandon this ephemeral world --- or the worldly life ---, so that we can acquire the higher intuitive knowledge. After having acquired the intuitive knowledge (Skt. *jñāna*, Pāli *paññā*, *vipassanā*, *abhiññā*) --- which is also called the liberation of consciousness (*cetovimutti*) in early Buddhism --- in the virtuous worlds, we should again abandon these worlds. Through the fundamental experience of these worlds --- or the states of existence ---, and through the abandonment of these worlds, the intuitive knowledge should be developed, in order to arrive at the Immortal, the Liberation. As it is seen in regard to “right view,” such an approach is only the door to attain the Immortal. It is not possible to arrive at the Immortal, without passing through the virtuous worlds, as “non-hate” (*adosa*) must be spoken of along with “non-greed” (*alobha*), as “meditation” as virtue must be spoken of as the only door to attain Brahma. Thus, in regard of “dispassion” --- in fact, there are still significant differences between the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism ---, at least, the thought of “development of intuitive knowledge” as the door to the Absolute is common to both of them.

What is further to be questioned in both the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism is “ignorance” (Skt. *avidyā*, Pāli *avijjā*) or “delusion” (*moha*) --- through the destruction of which the knowledge (Skt. *vidyā*, Pāli, *vijjā*) is revealed ---. Moreover, what does “non-existence” (*vibhava*) mean in the truest sense? What does “the cessation of dukkha” (*dukkhanirodha*) mean? What does the oneness (*ekatva*) of the Self mean? But these issues will be argued in the next chapter “Destruction of the World.”

## CHAPTER 6

### DESTRUCTION OF THE WORLD

Neither the Upaniṣadic thought nor early Buddhism is nihilism. However, both of them speak of the destruction of the world in a close relation with the Absolute --- Brahma in the old Upaniṣads and Nibbāna in the early Buddhism ---. In this chapter this study will investigate this destruction.

#### *Destruction of the World in the Old Upaniṣads*

##### ***Neti, neti***

The old Upaniṣads often speak of Brahma --- as the Absolute --- using negative expressions. A verse of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (BU. 2.3.6) runs thus:

Now therefore there is the teaching [of Brahma]; “not this, not this,” because there is nothing higher than this, “not this.” Now it is named: “the truth of truth,” ....

*athāta ādeśo neti neti na hy etasmād iti nety anyat param asty atha nāmadheyam satyasya satyam iti, ....*<sup>1</sup>

A verse of the *Taittirīya-upaniṣad* (TU. 2.7.1) speaks of Brahma thus:

Whenever this man verily finds the state of fearlessness in this unseen, bodiless, inexpressible, and unsupported [Brahma], then he becomes fearless.

*yadā hy evaiṣa etasminn adṛśye'nātmye'nirukte'nīlayane'bhayaṃ pratiṣṭhām vindate. atha so'bhayaṃ gato bhavati.*<sup>2</sup>

A verse of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (BU. 3.8.8) runs thus:

It is neither gross nor minute, neither short nor long, ...

*asthūlam anaṇv ahrasvam adīrgham ...*<sup>3</sup>

However, these negative expressions do not imply a kind of agnosticism. These

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<sup>1</sup> **IDUŚB.**, 752.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 302.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 827.

negative expressions imply the Upaniṣadic approach to Brahma. Although Brahma as the Absolute can not be the object of our experience, the old Upaniṣads verily try to approach it, through the intuitive knowledge through which this whole ephemeral world can be understood, through the abandonment of the worldly life --- which is often spoken of as the gross ---, and through the abandonment of the world of devas --- which is often spoken of the subtle ---. The words “not this, not this” does not mean the logical negation, but our fundamental experience and our renouncement of this fundamental experience.<sup>4</sup> Through these fundamental experiences, through the abandonment of these experiences, and through the development of the intuitive knowledge along with these experiences, we verily approach Brahma, the Absolute, as it is already seen in the previous chapter.

### ***The pure oneness of the Self***

The old Upaniṣads speaks of the attainment to Brahma, the Absolute. As to this attainment, a verse of the *Īśa-upaniṣad* (ĪU. 7) speaks of the Self as the oneness as follows:

When all beings has become the Self indeed for one who knows, then what delusion and what sorrow [could there be] for one who sees the oneness?

*yasmin sarvāṇi bhūtāni ātmaivābhūd vijānataḥ. tatra ko mohaḥ kaḥ śoka ekatvam anupaśyataḥ.*<sup>5</sup>

The commentary explains about the Self which is here also called “oneness” (*ekatva*) or “the pure oneness of the Self” (*ātmaikatvaṃ viśuddhaṃ*) (ĪUB. 7). “Because the question ‘what delusion and what sorrow [could there be]?’ indicates the impossibility of delusion and sorrow, the effects of ignorance. It indicates the entire destruction of this ephemeral existence along with its ground” (ĪUB. 7). *ko mohaḥ kaḥ śoka iti śokamohayor avidyākāryayor ākṣepeṇāsambhavapradaśanāt sakāraṇasya saṃsārasyātyantam evocchedaḥ pradaśīto bhavati.*<sup>6</sup> However, what does “the entire destruction of this ephemeral existence” mean here? A verse of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* (BU. 2.4.12)

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<sup>4</sup> Therefore, such expressions remind us of the following text: “Now, Oh Aggivessana, in regard to whatever is rūpa --- in the past, in the future, [or] at present, internal or external, gross or subtle, low or excellent, distant or near ---, a disciple of mine sees all rūpa as it is, through right intuitive knowledge thus: This is not mine, I am not this, this is not my self.” *idha aggivessana mama sāvako yankiñci rūpaṃ atītānāgatapaccuppannaṃ ajjhattaṃ vā bahiddhā vā oḷārikaṃ vā sukhumam vā hīnaṃ vā pañītaṃ vā yaṃ dūre santīke vā sabbaṃ rūpaṃ netam mama nesohamasmi na meso attāti evametaṃ yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya passati.* Cūḷasaccaka-sutta, **ṃ.ṃ.** 12/401/433.

<sup>5</sup> **ĪDUŚB.**, 6.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

speaks of the destruction of the empirical consciousness.

“As a piece of salt, thrown in water, dissolves in water, and there would be nothing of it to be taken out, but, wherever one takes it, it tastes salt, even so this great being is endless, boundless, and pure knowledge indeed. Rising up from these beings, [one] vanishes with those. Having departed, there is no more [empirical] consciousness. This is what I say, my dear,” so said Yājñavalkya.

*sa yathā saindhavakhilya udake prāsta udakam evānuvilīyeta na hāsyodgrahaṇāyeva syāt. yato yatas tv ādadīta lavaṇam evaivaṃ vā ara idaṃ mahad bhūtam anantam apāraṃ vijñānaghana eva. etebhyo bhūtebhyaḥ samutthāya tāny evānuvinaśyati na pretya saṃjñāstīty are bravīmīti hovāca yājñavalkyaḥ.*<sup>7</sup>

This empirical consciousness is not illusional subjective consciousness, but rather this ephemeral world itself or the ephemeral state of this existence which consists of various object of our experience. The commentator explains this empirical consciousness thus: “When a piece of existence of the Self, superimposed by ignorance and associated with effects and instruments, is destroyed by knowledge, then the particular [empirical] consciousness, associated with effects and so on, characterised by the view of difference, is destroyed on the destruction of the limiting adjuncts, the aggregate of effects and instruments; just as the reflection of the moon, the light as its effect, and so on [disappear], when the water and so on, which are their support, are destroyed” (BUB. 2.4.13). *yas tv avidyāpratyupasyāpitaḥ kāryakaraṇasambandhī ātmanaḥ khilyabhāvaḥ, yasmin vidyayā nāśīte tannimittā yā viśeṣasaṃjñā śarīrādisambandhinī anyatvadarśanalakṣaṇā, sā kāryakaraṇasaṅghātopādhau pravilāpīte naśyati hetvabhāvād udakādyādhāranāśād iva candrādīpratibimbā tannimittāś ca prakāśādīḥ.*<sup>8</sup>

### ***The entire destruction of the world***

This entire destruction of this ephemeral world is consistently insisted by the commentator Śaṅkara thus: “And the aim of this Upaniṣad is the entire destruction of this ephemeral existence, characterised by the attainment to Brahma” (KaUB. Introduction). *prayojanaṃ cāsyā upaniṣada ātyantīkī saṃsāranivṛttir brahmaprāptilakṣaṇā.*<sup>9</sup> “And the aim of this knowledge of Brahma is the destruction (*nivṛtti*) of ignorance, and hence the entire destruction (*abhāva*) of this ephemeral existence” (TUB. 2.1.1). *prayojanaṃ cāsyā*

<sup>7</sup> **IDUŚB.**, 765.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 767-768.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 58.

*brahmavidyāyā avidyānivṛttiḥ tatas cātyantikāḥ saṃsārābhāvaḥ.*<sup>10</sup> “... And that very non-dual Brahma, which is the cessation of all duality called up by ignorance, is the state [or support] (*pratiṣṭhā*) [of the blissful Self]. Because the blissful [Self] ceases in [that] oneness. There is one and non-dual Brahma, which is the cessation of all duality called up by ignorance, Brahma, the state, [like] tail” (TUB. 2.5.1). *tad eva ca sarvasyāvidyāparikalpitasya dvaitasyāvasānabhūtam advaitam brahma pratiṣṭhā. ānandamayasyaikatvāvasānatvāt. asti tad ekam avidyākalpitasya dvaitasyāvasānabhūtam advaitam brahma pratiṣṭhā puccham.*<sup>11</sup>

The commentary on the *Muṇḍaka-upaniṣad* explains the entire destruction of the world as follows: “There, the sphere of the lower knowledge is the state of the ephemeral existence, which is characterised by the means like doer and so on, and by the distinction of actions and results. [This state], having no beginning and no end, has duḥkha as its own nature. Therefore, it is to be abandoned individually together with [one’s own] bodies” (MuUB 1.2.1). *tatrāparavidyāviśayaḥ kartrādisādhanakriyāphalabhedarūpaḥ saṃsāra’nādir ananto duḥkhasvarūpatvād dhātavyaḥ pratyekaṃ śarīribhiḥ.*<sup>12</sup> Gambhirananda also explains this entire destruction in his note: “The world of diversity is not eradicated wholly in deep sleep; but on the rise of realization, when nescience is destroyed, its effect, the world, also is eliminated entire and for ever.”<sup>13</sup> However strange it sounds, it is evident that the old Upaniṣads speak of the entire destruction of this world. It is not the disappearance of subjective illusion, but the destruction of this world which consists of various objects of our experience --- including the world as the object of modern natural science ---.

### *Destruction of the World in Early Buddhism*

#### **Amoha**

In early Buddhism, *paññā* (intuitive knowledge) is that which is to be developed. According to the fourfold noble truth, this knowledge should be developed through “empirical knowledge” (*pariññā*), “abandonment” (*pahāna*), “realisation” (*sacchikiriya*), and so on. Moreover, what is to be abandoned is “greed (or desire), hate, and delusion” (*lobha-dosa-moha*, or, *rāga-dosa-moha*). Nibbāna is “voidness” because it is void of desire, hate, and delusion. “Moreover, Nibbāna is called voidness, because it is void of desire and so on in regard to its object. It is called signlessness, because there is no sign of desire and so on. It is called supportlessness, because there is no support of desire, hate, and

<sup>10</sup> IDUŚB., 281.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 295.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 147.

<sup>13</sup> Gambhirananda, trans. **Eight Upaniṣads**, vol. 2, 89 n. 1.

delusion.” *ārammaṇena pana nibbānaṃ rāgādīhi suññattā suññaṃ nāma, rāganimittādīnaṃ abhāvā animittaṃ, rāgadosamohappaṇidhīnaṃ abhāvā appaṇihitaṃ*.<sup>14</sup> It is “delusion” (*moha*) or “ignorance” (*avijjā*, Skt. *avidyā*) what we should question here --- the issue about “desire” and “anger” is already argued in the previous chapter ---. The *Sāmaññaphala-sutta* speaks of *avijjā* as one of three intoxicants (*āsava*).

One, knowing thus and seeing thus, sets his mind free from the intoxicant (*āsava*) of sensual desire, the intoxicant of [better] existence, and the intoxicant of ignorance.

*tassa evaṃ jānato evaṃ passato kāmāsavāpi cittaṃ vimuccati bhavāsavāpi cittaṃ vimuccati avijjāsavāpi cittaṃ vimuccati*.<sup>15</sup>

Besides, although “ignorance” (*avijjā*) can be interpreted as not knowing the fourfold noble truth, this interpretation is here not enough. What is to be questioned here is “ignorance” as the last step of abandonment (*pahāna*). The *Sāmaññaphala-sutta* speaks of the Liberation --- the Absolute --- just after the citation above as follows:

When liberated, there is knowledge (*ñāṇa*) of the Liberation. He knows that the life is destroyed (*khīṇa*), that the Brahmachariya has been completed, that what is to be done has been done, and that there is no further for this existence.

*vimuttasmiṃ vimuttamiti ñāṇaṃ hoti. khīṇā jāti vusitaṃ brahmachariyaṃ kataṃ karaṇīyaṃ nāparaṃ itthattāyāti pajānāti*.<sup>16</sup>

Indeed the expression *nāparaṃ itthattāya* means that there is no more to do because of the destruction of the defilements (*kilesa-kkhaya*). “The sentence ‘there is no more for this existence’ (*nāparaṃ itthattāya*) means intuitively knowing that what is to be done for the state of this existence, for the state of the sixteen duties, and for the state of the destruction of the defilements --- namely *magga-bhāvanā* (way-development) --- is no more for me.” *nāparaṃ itthattāyāti idāni puna itthabhāvāya evaṃ soḷasakiccabhāvāya kilesakkhayabhāvāya vā kattabbaṃ maggabhāvanākiccaṃ me natthīti pajānāti*.<sup>17</sup>

However, it is also possible to understand that the expression *nāparaṃ itthattāya* means “the cessation of the five aggregates.” “Or, this sentence ‘... for this existence’ means intuitively knowing that for me there is no other series of five aggregates than this existence, this kind [of existence], or this currently existing series of this five aggregates,

<sup>14</sup> **u.a.** 2/274-275.

<sup>15</sup> **ṭ.ṭ.** 9/138/111.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> **ṭ.a.** 1/203.

and that these five aggregates, thoroughly known, remains just like an uprooted tree, and that they will cease as fire without fuel and will become inexpressible, through the cessation of the final consciousness.” *athavā itthattāyāti itthabhāvato imasmā evaṃpakārā idāni vattamānakkhandhasantānā aparame khandhasantānaṃ mayhaṃ natthi. ime pana pañcakkhandhā pariññātā tiṭṭhanti chinnamūlakā rukkhā viya, te carimakacittanirodhena anupādāno viya jātavedo nibbāyissanti, apaṇṇattikabhāvaṃ ca gamissanṭi pajānāti.*<sup>18</sup>

### ***Destruction of the five aggregates***

The *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta* speaks of the destruction of “the own existence” thus:

The Muni [the Buddha], considering the measurable and immeasurable existence (*sambhava*), has renounced the formation of existence. Being meditating with inward delight, he has destroyed his own existence (*attasambhava*) which is like armour. *tulamātulañca sambhavaṃ bhavaśaṅkhāramavassajji muni ajjhatarato samāhito abhindi kavacamivattasambhavanti.*<sup>19</sup>

According to the commentary, this destruction of the own existence means the destruction of the five aggregates, or the destruction of the formation of existence, through the destruction of the existence-producing kamma (*bhavaḡāmikakamma*).<sup>20</sup> Considering that the five aggregates often imply the state of this ephemeral existence, this destruction should be understood also as the destruction of this ephemeral world itself. Moreover, generally in early Buddhism, the world (*loka*) or existence (*bhava*) is also called “body.”<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> **ṭ.ṇ.** 1/203. In early Buddhism, it is evident that the ultimate renouncement of ignorance is possible only through the noble path. But, considering the difficulty of circular arguments in early Buddhism, this issue will be argued in the next chapter.

<sup>19</sup> **ṭ.ṇ.** 10/96/125.

<sup>20</sup> “Considering in such a way as ‘the five aggregates are not eternal, the cessation of these five aggregates is Nibbāna, the Eternal’ and so on, and seeing the demerit in the existence and the merit in the Nibbāna, the Muni, the Buddha, has renounced the existence-forming kamma, which is the basis of the five aggregates, through the noble path, which causes the destruction of the kamma, as it is said, ‘[he] exists for the destruction of the kamma.’” *“pañcakkhandhā aniccā, pañcannaṃ khandhānaṃ nirodho nibbānaṃ niccaṃ”ti ādinā nayena tulayanto buddhamuni bhava ādinavaṃ, nibbāne ca ānisaṃsaṃ divā taṃ khandhānaṃ mūlabhūtaṃ bhavaśaṅkhārakammaṃ “kammakkhayāya saṃvattati”ti evaṃ vuttena kammakkhayassa kareṇa ariyamaggena avassajji. ṭ.ṇ. 2/160.*

<sup>21</sup> “In the sentence ‘In this world covetousness and grief are to be abandoned,’ what is ‘this world’? Here the body is called the world. It is said [in the Vibhanga]: ‘the fivefold aggregate of clinging is also the world.’ This is called the world.” *vineyya loke abhijjhādomanassanti tattha katamo loko. sveva kāyo loko, pañcapi upādānakkhandhā loko. ayaṃ vuccati loko. ṇ.ṇ. 1/260.*

Besides, according to the *Visuddhimagga*, the destruction of *carimakacitta* (the final consciousness) means the destruction of “the death consciousness.”<sup>22</sup> Moreover, this destruction of the death consciousness means the destruction of the formation or the destruction of the five aggregates thus: “Contemplating its [consciousness’s] destruction thus, as it is said, ‘Attendance on the voidness,’ he succeeds in attending on the voidness thus, ‘Formations are destroyed. Their destruction is death. There is nothing else at all.’ Therefore, the ancients said: ‘Aggregates are destroyed. There is nothing else. It is said that the destruction of aggregates is death. He sees their destruction carefully, as [he] pierces a jewel with diamond properly.’ *Suññato ca upaṭṭhānan ti tass’evaṃ bhaṅgaṃ anupassato, saṅkhārā va bhijjanti, tesam bhedo maraṇaṃ, na añño koci atthi ti suññato upaṭṭhānaṃ ijjhati. Ten’āhu porāṇā: “Khandhā nirujjhanti na c’atthi añño, khandhānaṃ bhedo maraṇaṃ ti vuccati; tesam khayaṃ passati appamatto, maṇiṃ va vijjaṃ vajirena yoniso” ti.*<sup>23</sup>

### ***The destruction of the world***

In the fourfold noble truth, “cessation” (*nirodha*) is usually “cessation of dukkha” (*dukkha-nirodha*). However, as it is already seen in the fourth chapter, “dukkha” does not mean individual suffering such as physical pain or mental anguish, but something universal or something inherent in this ephemeral world itself. Therefore, “cessation” or “cessation of dukkha” is rather to be understood as “destruction of the world.”<sup>24</sup> Ultimately,

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<sup>22</sup> “Those [in-breaths and out-breaths (*assāsa-passāsā*)] which arise along with the sixteenth consciousness preceding the death consciousness (*cuti-citta*) cease along with the death consciousness. These are called “final in death.” *Ye pana cuticittassa purato soḷasamena cittena saddhiṃ uppajjitvā cuticittena saha nirujjhanti, ime cuticarimakā nāma.* Warren, ed. **Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosācariya**, 241.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 552-553.

<sup>24</sup> In fact, in some places “cessation” (*nirodha*) is expressed as “cessation of world” (*loka-nirodha*). The commentary on the *Brahmajāla* speaks of the fourfold noble truth using “world” instead of “dukkha” in explaining the meaning of the word *tathāgata*. “The word ‘going’ (*gata*, literally ‘gone’) means ‘knowing,’ ‘overcoming,’ ‘attaining,’ and ‘walking on the path.’ Here, the *tathāgata* means “going as it is,” namely, knowing the whole world [along] with empirical knowledge; the *tathāgata* means ‘going as it is,’ namely, overcoming the world as an aggregate [along] with empirical knowledge through abandoning, the *tathāgata* means ‘going as it is,’ namely, attaining the cessation of the world [along] with realisation, and the *tathāgata* means ‘going as it is,’ namely, walking on the path through the cessation of the world.” *gatoti avagato aṭṭo patto paṭipannoti attho. tattha sakalalokaṃ tīraṇapariññāya tathāya gato avagatoti tathāgato. lokasamudayaṃ pahānapariññāya tathāya gato aṭṭoti tathāgato. lokanirodhaṃ sacchikiriyāya tathāya gato pattoti tathāgato. lokanirodhagāminiṃ paṭipadaṃ tathaṃ gato paṭipannoti tathāgato.* **ṭ.ṇ.** 1/66. The almost same expression is found in the commentary on the *Mūlapariyāya-sutta*. See **ṇ.ṇ.** 1/56-57.

the cessation of dukkha, the cessation of craving, the cessation of consciousness, the cessation of the final consciousness, and the cessation of the five aggregates indicate the destruction of this ephemeral world itself.

Moreover, the word *loka* usually means “world.” However, in Pāli language, this word is sometimes understood as that which breaks up. The word *loka* is explained in Pali-English Dictionary of T. W. Rhys Davids and William Stede: “To the etym. feeling of the Pāli hearer *loka* is closely related in quality to *ruppati* (as in pop. etym. of *rūpa*) and *rujati*. As regards the latter the etym. runs ‘*lujjati kho loko ti vuccati*’ S IV. 52, ...” Buddhaghosa also explains in the *Visuddhimagga*: “The word [*loka*] means that all that is *loka* in the sense of breaking up or destruction” (*so sabbo pi lujjanapalujjanatthena loko ti ayam vacanattho*).<sup>25</sup> In the *Abhidhānappadīpikāṭīkā*, *loka* is interpreted as follows: “*Loko* --- [which consists of] *luja* (destruction) + *ko* (produced) --- means [that which] breaks up” (*lujjati loko. luja vināse, jassa ko*) (Gāthā 93).<sup>26</sup> “*Loko* --- [which consists of] *luja* (disappearance) + *ko* (going) --- means [that which] breaks up” (*luja adassane, lujjati loko, gassa ko*) (Gāthā 186).<sup>27</sup> This study does not question the etymological validity of these analyses. But very probably, it is not inappropriate to understand that early Buddhism expresses the fundamental character of this ephemeral existence in the form of etymological analysis. Anyway, it is evident that in early Buddhism, while approaching Nibbāna, the Absolute, this transitory world disappears. However, the destruction of this world does not mean the so-called nihilism (*uccheda diṭṭhi*).<sup>28</sup> As it is already seen in the previous chapter, the so-called nihilist is thus: Firstly, holding a primitive empiricism or realism, one blindly believes the reality of this ephemeral existence; and then, still holding such a superficial view, he metaphysically insists that this ephemeral existence is destructible.<sup>29</sup> This view is not related to the destruction of the world under discussion. However, the world disappears.

<sup>25</sup> Warren, ed. **Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosācariya**, 361.

<sup>26</sup> สิริมหาจตุรงคพล มหามัจจุ, **อภิธานศัพท์ปฏิกายิกา**, ปรึวรรตโดย สิริสุทธิวิสต์เถร (กรุงเทพฯ: วัดปากน้ำ, พ.ศ. 2526), 77.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 143.

<sup>28</sup> “The Buddha is neither ‘pessimist’ nor ‘nihilist.’ He never advocates the destruction of the individual existent; he shows, on the contrary, the way which leads from the ephemeral to the Eternal, from the mortal to the Immortal, from the suffering of the finite to the Beatitude of the Infinite.” *Le Buddha n’est ni un «pessimiste», ni un «nihiliste»; il ne préconise point la destruction (uccheda, vināsa, vibhava) de l’individu existant (sato sattassa). Il montre, au contraire, le chemin qui mène de l’éphémère à l’Éternel, du mortel à l’Immortel, de la douleur du fini à la Béatitude de l’Infini.* Kamaleswar Bhattacharya, **L’Ātman-Brahman dans le Bouddhisme Ancien** (Paris: École Française d’Extrême-Orient, 1973), 10-12.

<sup>29</sup> See the argument about “milk and curds” in the previous chapter.

As it is seen in the previous chapters, *yathābhūta* is the intuitive knowledge which presumes the denial of our vain search for the eternal in this ephemeral world. In the stage of “truth of suffering” --- or *vipariṇāma-dhamma* ---, this intuitive knowledge implies the knowledge through which this whole phemeral world can be understood. But, here this intuitive knowledge implies more than that. That is the destruction of this ephemeral world.

### *The True View of the World*

#### ***I and mine in the old Upaniṣads***

What is to be questioned here is: How should we understand this destruction of the world? First of all, we want to investigate the concept “non-duality” which is very often used as a representative expression of Brahma, the Absolute. A verse of the *Kena-upaniṣad* (KeU. 2.5) runs thus:

If one has known [Brahma] here, then there is truth. If one has not known here, then there is a great ruin. The wise, having discerned [Brahma] in all beings, and having left this world, becomes immortal.

*iha cedavedīd atha satyam asti na ced ihāvedīn mahatī vinaṣṭiḥ. bhūteṣu bhūteṣu vicitya dīrāḥ pretyāsmāl lokād amṛtā bhavanti.*<sup>30</sup>

The commentator, Śāṅkara, comments on this verse thus: “*Pretya* (having left) means ‘having turned away’; having abandoned this world, which has ignorance as its own nature, and which is characterised the state of mine and I, and having attained the non-dual state --- consisting in becoming the Self of all ---, [one] becomes immortal, [one] become Brahma indeed. This is the idea” (KeUB 2.5). *pretya vyāvṛtya mamāhambhāvalakṣaṇād avidyārūpād- asmāl lokād uparamya sarvātmaikatvabhāvam advaitam āpannāḥ santo'mṛtā bhavanti brahmaiva bhavantīty arthaḥ.*<sup>31</sup>

This concept “ignorance” --- “the state of I and mine”---, cannot be understood from such a moralistic point of view as egoism and desire for possessions, because the destruction of ignorance is an ultimate ground to attain the Absolute, which is beyond “virtuous worlds.” The destruction of ignorance is not only the rejection of animism, which consists in looking for the eternal substance in the ephemeral world. It is even beyond the

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<sup>30</sup> IDUŚB., 29.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

realisation of the eternal as the transcendental ground of this ephemeral world. It must be related to higher intuitive knowledge.

A verse of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* (BU. 2.4.14) speaks of “duality,” which is deeply related to the concept “state of mine and I” as follows:

When there is duality as it were, then one smells something, then one sees something, then one hears something, then one speaks something, then one thinks something, then one knows something. When to him [the knower of Brahman] everything has become the Self, then by what and what should one smell, then by what and what should one see, then by what and what should one hear, then by what and what should one speak, then by what and what should one think, then by what and what should one know?

*yatra hi dvaitam iva bhavati tad itara itaram jighrati tad itara itaram paśyati tad itara itaram śṛṇoti tad itara itaram abhivadati tad itara itaram manute tad itara itaram vijānāti yatra vā asya sarvam ātmaivābhūt tat kena kaṃ jighret tat kena kaṃ paśyēt tat kena kaṃ śṛṇuyāt tat kena kaṃ abhivadet tat kena kaṃ manvīta tat kena kaṃ vijānīyāt.*<sup>32</sup>

This verse implies “ignorance” as “the state of mine and I” in regard to a form of knowledge. The commentator explains about “the state of ignorance”: “Like the reflection of the moon and so on in water, a nose smells something else --- what is to be smelled --- through something else --- smelling ---. [One] knows [something else]. This is the state of ignorance” (BUB. 2.4.14). *candrāder ivodakacandrādipratibimbaḥ, itaro ghrāṇetareṇa ghrāṇenetaram ghrātavyaṃ jighrati. ... vijānāti. iyam avidyāvad avasthā.*<sup>33</sup>

Empirical knowledge is possible only in such a form as “one’ (*itara*) empirically knows ‘something’ (*itara*)” --- which is the same case as in actions ---. Empirically, knowledge supposes “knower” and “known” ---- or two typical factors of actions, agency and object ---. According to our natural and normal attitude, we suppose without ground --- however, extremely strongly --- that, while we know something, there are naturally two factors --- “knower” and “known” ----. This natural supposition is implied by the word “ignorance” --- “state of mine and I” ---. The commentator explains this duality also in another place: “Now, what is this death, the emancipation from which has been told in detail? This death is the place of attachment through the natural ignorance (*svābhāvika-ajñāna*), and is divided into the objects of the [gross] body and the [fine] elements, and is characterised by the organ and the object” (BUB. 3.2 Introduction). *kaḥ punar asau mṛtyur yasmād atimuktir vyākhyātā? sa ca svābhāvikājñānāsaṅgāspado-*

<sup>32</sup> IDUŚB., 768.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 768-769.

*'dhyātmādhibhūtaviṣayaparicchinnō grahātigrahalakṣaṇo mr̥tyuḥ.*<sup>34</sup>

This issue implies that, when our natural attitude in knowledge is thrown away, this ephemeral world is indeed destroyed and disappears. “Dispassion” is required for the renunciation of the worldly life to reach the higher knowledge, as it is seen in the previous chapter. But, the goal is not “dispassion,” but the Absolute revealed along with the entire destruction of this ephemeral world --- “All this [world] is bondage, characterised by ends and means, because it is not free from organs and objects” (BUB. 3.2 Introduction). *sarvo'yaṃ sādhyasādhanalakṣaṇo bandhaḥ. grahātigrahāvinirmokāt.*<sup>35</sup> Even if the Absolute is spoken of as something freed from passions, it is not dispassion that leads to the Absolute. While this ephemeral world is destroyed absolutely, there is no object of desire --- and there no desire is possible: “And one, who desires, engages himself in acting. Therefore, the ephemeral existence is characterised by material causes, such as the body so on, which is to be enjoyed as the results. Contrarily, to desire is impossible for one, who sees the oneness of the Self, because there is no object [of desire]” (TUB. 1.11.1-4). *kāmayamānaś ca karoti karmāṇi. tatas tatphalopabhogāya śarīrādyupādānalakṣaṇaḥ saṃsāraḥ. tadvyatirekeṇa ātmaikatva- darsīno viṣayābhāvāt kāmānuṭpattiḥ ...*<sup>36</sup> It is not that there is no clinging to the existence because of no passion, but it is that there is no passion because of no existence of objects.

### ***I and mine in early Buddhism***

As to the destruction of the world in early Buddhism, we should question the meaning of the sentence “this is not mine, this am I not, this is not my self” (*netam mama nesohamasmi na meso attā*), although this sentence is sometimes interpreted as an expression of “anti-egoism” and sometimes interpreted as an expression of “anti-substantialism.” For example, it is said in the *Cūlasaccaka-sutta* thus:

Now, Oh Aggivessana, in regard to whatever is rūpa --- in the past, in the future, [or] at present, internal or external, gross or subtle, low or excellent, distant or near ---, a disciple of mine sees all rūpa as it is, through right intuitive knowledge thus: This is not mine, I am not this, this is not my self.

*idha aggivessana mama sāvako yaṅkiñci rūpaṃ atītānāgatapaccuppannaṃ ajjhattaṃ vā bahiddhā vā oḷārikaṃ vā sukhumaṃ vā hīnaṃ vā paṇītaṃ vā yaṃ dūre santike vā sabbaṃ rūpaṃ netam mama nesohamasmi na meso attāti evametam yathābhūtaṃ*

<sup>34</sup> **IDUŚB.**, 791.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 792.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 278.

*sammappaññāya passati.*<sup>37</sup>

Is it appropriate to interpret this passage about “mine and I” as an expression of “anti-substantialism,” even though it implies the denial of the transfer of the supposed or postulated substratum into this ephemeral world”? Considering this passage in a close relation with the destruction of dukkha, such an interpretation is not convincing at all.

In regard to this issue “mine and I”, what is here to be considered is the stage of arūpa-bhava ---- which is also the last stage of abandonment (*pahāna*) ---, especially, “the sphere of no-thing” (*ākiñcañña-āyatana*) and “the sphere of neither-knowledge-nor-no-knowledge” (*nevasaññānāsaññāyatana*). For example, the *Āneñjasappāya-sutta* speaks of these two as follows:

Moreover, Oh bhikkhus, a noble disciple, having gone to a forest, a root of tree, or an uninhabited shed, reflects thus: “This [world] is void in regard to the self or the belonging to the self.” While he is practicing along thus, his mind, absorbed in this, becomes transparent in this sphere. When he is pure, he attains the sphere of nothing, or he becomes intent to intuitive knowledge.

*puna caparaṃ bhikkhave ariyasāvako araññagato vā rukkhamūlagato vā suññāgāragato vā iti paṭisañcikkhati suññamidaṃ attena vā attaniyena vāti. tassa evaṃ paṭipannassa tabbahulavihārino āyatane cittaṃ pasīdati sampasāde sati etarahi vā ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ samāpajjati paññāya vā adhimuccati.*<sup>38</sup>

Moreover, Oh bhikkhus, a noble disciple considers thus: “There is no ‘I’ anywhere. There is no ‘I’ of anyone anywhere. There is nothing of ‘mine’ anywhere. There is nothing of ‘mine’ anywhere anything.” ... [The sphere] where all these consciousness are destroyed without remainder, this is tranquil, this is excellent, and this is that which is called the sphere of neither-consciousness-nor-non-consciousness.

*puna caparaṃ bhikkhave ariyasāvako iti paṭisañcikkhati nāhaṃ kvacini na kassaci kiñcanatasmim na ca mama kvacini kismiñci kiñcanaṃ natthīti. ... sabbā saññā yatthetā aparisesā nirujjhanti etaṃ santaṃ etaṃ pañitaṃ yadidaṃ nevasaññānāsaññāyatanaṃti.*<sup>39</sup>

Besides, the word *mama* (mine) here does not only mean “my possession” or “my property.” It means rather that there is no substratum as object. The commentator explains the word *mama* in the text above as follows: “If the word *mama* is not used in the sentence

<sup>37</sup> M. M. 12/401/433.

<sup>38</sup> M. A. 14/86/77.

<sup>39</sup> M. A. 14/87-88/77-78.

'there is nothing of mine anywhere,' it means that one does not see any self [as substratum] of the other anywhere. Using the word *mama* like 'there is nothing of mine anywhere and anything,' it means that one does not see that there is self [as substratum] of the other anywhere of mine, in any state [of mine]." *na ca mama kvacinīti ettha mamasaddaṃ tāva thapetvā na ca kvacini parassa attānaṃ kvaci na passatī ayamattho. idāni mamasaddaṃ āharitvā mama kismiñci kiñcanaṃ natthīti so parassa attā mama kismiñci kiñcanabhāve atthīti na passatī.*<sup>40</sup> Therefore, as far as the statement "this is not mine, this am I not, this is not my self" (*netam mama nesohamasmi na meso attā*) is considered in a close relation with the sphere of "nothing" and so on, very probably it is not inappropriate for us to understand this statement as something similar to the destruction of ignorance as the state of mine and I in the old Upaniṣads.

What is to be questioned in regard to this *arūpa-bhava* is "voidness" (*suññatā*) --- or "selflessness" (*anattā*) ---, as it is said like this: "[What is spoken of] here is the sphere of nothing; the sphere of nothing is to be known like, 'there is nothing.' What is spoken here is 'voidness'; [one] knows intuitively through the eye of intuitive knowledge." *"natthi kiñcīti ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ neyyan"ti ettha ākiñcaññāṃ. "paññācakkhunā pajānāti"ti ettha suññatā kathitā.*<sup>41</sup> This "voidness" (*suññatā*) does not mean only the negation of our vain search for the eternal substratum in the temporal and manifold world. Such an interpretation is even not enough for our removing "ignorance" of the truth of dukkha. First of all, as it is already seen, the truth of dukkha is "universal knowledge" --- "intuitive knowledge" ---, "Dhamma on the ephemeral existence" (*vipariñāma-dhamma*), through which this entire ephemeral world can be understood. Secondly, this "intuitive knowledge" is to be developed through our abandoning the worldly life and the virtuous life. Thirdly, at the highest stage of this abandonment, when "ignorance" as "substratum" (*vatthu*) and "object" (*ārammaṇa*) --- "ignorance" as "the state having the support as condition" and "the state having object as condition" --- is removed, the ephemeral world actually disappears. *Nirodha* (cessation) or "cessation of dukkha" is ultimate "cessation of world" (*loka-nirodha*). It is the destruction of this ephemeral world, realised through abandoning the worldly life, through abandoning the virtuous worlds by deep mediation (*jhāna*), ultimately, through abandoning "ignorance" consisting in seeing this ephemeral world as "substratum" and "object" --- our natural and ignorant attitude ---, by attaining "the sphere of no-thing," "the sphere of neither-knowledge-nor-no-knowledge" --- which is called "the immediate condition of cessation" (*nirodhassa anantarapaccayaṃ*) in the commentary --- , or "cessation of

<sup>40</sup> **u.a.** 4/43.

<sup>41</sup> **u.a.** 2/261.

empirical knowledge and feeling” (*saññāvedayitanirodha*).<sup>42</sup>

By the way, as to the word “void” (Pali *suñña*, Skt. *sūnya*), the word *sūnya* can not be found in the ten Upaniṣads which this study mainly focuses --- although the *Maitrāyaṇīya-upaniṣad* sometimes uses this word along with the words *sānta* and *śuddha* (MaiU. 2.4, 6.10, 6.23, 6.28, 6.31, 7.4) ---. The word *nirodha* is found in the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad* (CU. 8.6.5) and the *Praśna-upaniṣad* (PU. 1.10). Although this word is used in the meaning of “shutting up” or “stopping,” it does not imply the state of Brahma. Moreover, the word *nirvāṇa* can not be found in the ten Upaniṣads which this study mainly focuses. Generally, it is not sure that early Buddhism’s concepts in regard to the destruction of the world, such as *suññatā*, *nirodha*, or *nirvāṇa*, has some connection with the Upaniṣadic texts. However, it is to be noted that the word *nirvāṇa* is used in the commentary of Śaṅkara in such expressions as “this liberation is the destruction of the sense-organs and the objects verily here, like the extinction of a light” (*sa ca mokṣo grahātigraharūpāṇām ihaiva pralayaḥ, pradīpanirvāṇavat*) (BUB. 3.2.13) and so on.<sup>43</sup>

### ***Intuitive knowledge brings about the destruction of the ephemeral existence***

What is to be questioned here in the entire destruction of the world is again “intuitive knowledge” (*jñāna*). As it is seen in the third and forth chapters, this intuitive knowledge is a transcendental ground of this ephemeral world, namely, that through which this ephemeral world is to be understood. But here this intuitive knowledge has another meaning. It is said that this knowledge destroys the essence of the individual existent, as it is said in a verse of the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad* (CU. 6.4.1):

That which is the red colour in the [gross] fire is the colour of the [subtle] fire. That which is

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<sup>42</sup> “There, ignorance in dukkha is to be known through four grounds; containment, substratum, object, and concealment. Thus, it [ignorance] is the containment in dukkha, because of the truth of dukkha --- namely because [everything is] contained in the ephemerality ---. As to the truth of dukkha, [ignorance is] the substratum through its [ignorance’s] being a substratum condition. And [ignorance] is the object because [its] being of object condition. And it [ignorance] conceals the truth of dukkha by its preventing the penetration of the true characteristic and by not bestowing knowledge’s appearance. Ignorance in the origin [of dukkha] is to be known through three grounds; substratum, object, and concealment.” *tattha catūhi kāraṇehi dukkhe aññānaṃ veditabbaṃ antogadhato vatthuto ārammaṇato paṭicchādanato ca. tathāhi taṃ dukkhasaccapariyāpannattā dukkhe antogadhaṃ, dukkhasaccaṃ tassa nissayapaccayabhāvena vatthu, ārammaṇapaccayabhāvena ārammaṇaṃ, dukkhasaccaṃ tassa paṭicchādeti, tassa yāthāvalakkhaṇapaṭivedhanivāraṇena, ñāṇappavattiyā cettha appadānena. samudaye aññānaṃ tīhi kāraṇehi veditabbaṃ vatthuto ārammaṇato paṭicchādanato ca. ᠒.᠗. 1/237-238.*

<sup>43</sup> TDUŚB., 796.

the white colour [in the gross fire] is [the colour of] of the [subtle] water. That which is the black colour [in the gross fire] is [the colour of] of the [subtle] earth. [Thus] has the firehood of fire vanished. All effects, which have speech as its basis, are just names. The truth is that it [the gross fire] is just these three colours.

*yad agne rohitam rūpaṃ tejasas tad rūpaṃ yac chuklaṃ tad apāṃ yat kṛṣṇam tad annasyāpāgād agner agnitvaṃ vācārambhaṇaṃ vikāro nāmadheyaṃ trīṇi rūpāṇīty eva satyam.*<sup>44</sup>

Although intuitive knowledge is the transcendental ground of the individual existence, it is never the substratum of the individual existence. Contrarily, it destroys the individual existence itself, or rather it destroys the essence of the individual existence. Through the discriminatory knowledge” (*viveka-jñāna*) (CUB. 6.4.1), the essence of the individual will vanish, as the firehood of fire will vanish, through the knowledge of three colour. “The meaning is: The idea of fire, which you had before the discriminatory knowledge of three colours, has vanished. And the word of fire [has also vanished]” (*prāgrūpatrayavivekavijñānāt yā agnibuddhir āsīt te sāgnibuddhir apagatāgnisabdaś cety arthaḥ*) (CUB. 6.4.1).<sup>45</sup> Moreover, these three colours also vanish along with the intuitive knowledge. “*Nāvijānan satyaṃ vadati* (one, not knowing, does not speak the truth) (CU. 7.17.1). The meaning is: One, who speaks the truth without knowing, speaks by [using] the word of fire and so on, thinking that the [gross] fire and so on are the real form. But, in the truest sense, they do not exist apart from their three colours. Similarly, these colours do not

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<sup>44</sup> **IDUŚB.**, 514.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.* In early Buddhism, the *Mahānidāna-sutta* speaks of the disappearance of the individual existence through the destruction of the *jāti* (which should mean abandonment of the states of existence) --- *jāti* does not mean only “birth” but “existence in a certain state” or “existence with a certain essence,” as the word *jāti* also means “state (of existence)” or “species” ---: “It is said that aging and death are conditioned by *jāti* (birth). Oh Ānanda, this, how aging and death are conditioned *jāti*, is to be understood in the following method. Suppose, Oh Ānanda, there is no *jāti* --- anything, in any state, of anyone, anywhere, for example, [*jāti*] for godhood of gods, for Gandhabbahood of Gandhabbas, for Yakkhahood for Yakkhas, for beings’ state [or essence], for human being’s state, for four-legged beings’ state, for bird’s state, for serpent’s state. If there is no *jāti* for the state [or essence] (*tathatta*) of all beings, would there be any appearance of aging and death, [even] after the destruction of *jāti*?” *jātipaccayā jarāmarañanti itī kho panetaṃ vuttaṃ. tadānanda imināpetam pariyāyena veditabbaṃ yathā jātipaccayā jarāmarañam. jāti ca hi ānanda nābhavissa sabbena sabbaṃ sabbathā sabbaṃ kassaci kimhici seyyathidaṃ devānaṃ vā devattāya gandhabbānaṃ vā gandhabbattāya yakkhānaṃ vā yakkhattāya bhūtānaṃ vā bhūtattāya manussānaṃ vā manussattāya catuppadānaṃ vā catuppadattāya pakkhīnaṃ vā pakkhittāya sirīmsapānaṃ vā sirīmsapattāya. tesam tesañca hi ānanda sattānaṃ tathattāya jāti nābhavissa. sabbaso jātiyā asati jātinirodhā api nu kho jarāmarañam paññāyethāti.* Mahānidāna-sutta, **ṅ. 11.** 10/58/67.

exist in regard to Being” (CUB. 7.17.1). *nāvijānan satyaṃ vadati yas tv avijānan vadati so'gnyādīśabdena agnyadīn paramārthasadrūpān manyamāno vadati, na tu te rūpatrayavyatirekeṇa paramārthaḥ santi. tathā tāny api rūpāṇi sadapekṣayā naiva santīty ato nāvijānan satyaṃ vadati.*<sup>46</sup>

Thus, beginning our investigation with “truth” along with the world, here we arrive at “truth” along with the entire destruction of this ephemeral world. “Similarly [Brahma is not characterized] even by the word ‘truth,’ because Brahma has its own nature which brings the destruction of all distinctions” (TUB. 2.1.1). *tathā satyaśabdenāpi. sarvaviśeṣa-pratyastamītasvarūpatvād brahmaṇo.*<sup>47</sup> At the first stage, “intuitive knowledge” is a transcendental ground, that through which this temporal and manifold world is understood --- or that through which this ephemeral world exists. But here, this intuitive knowledge as the transparency of knowledge --- which appears through throwing away our ordinary and natural attitude of knowledge --- eliminates the essence of the individual --- through which the individual is born and exists ---, namely deprives ephemeral existence itself from the individual and manifold things, ultimately eliminates this entire ephemeral world. Maybe because of difficulty of some similes in Māyā doctrine, the eradication of this existence is misunderstood as the destruction of the subjective illusion. However strange it sounds, it means the eradication of the objective world, which is also such a world as the object of the natural science.<sup>48</sup>

### ***The Absolute is already there***

As it is seen already, the cessation of dukkha in early Buddhism is in the truest sense the destruction of this world.

By the way, admittedly, this cessation of dukkha also means the destruction of craving, but it does not only mean the fundamental experience of the state of existence and the renouncement of that state, but it also indicate where Nibbāna, the Immortal, or the Absolute is to be realised. As to the destruction of craving, it is said that “there is no more coming into existence” (*punabbhavābhiniḥḥatti na hoti*). But this sentence does not mean only that there is no other life more than this, but also that Nibbāna, the Absolute, is spoken

<sup>46</sup> IDUŚB., 559.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 285.

<sup>48</sup> It is not the annihilation of subjective illusion. It is the annihilation of the objective contents of this world. Bhattacharya says about *sūnyatā* or *suññatā*. “What is the *sūnyatā* or *suññatā*? --- The Absolute of the Upaniṣad and Buddhism is void of all objective content. From an objective point of view, it is non-being.” *Qu'est la sūnyatā/suññatā? --- L'Absolu des Upaniṣad et du bouddhisme est vide (sūnya/suñña) de tout contenu objectif. Du point de vue objectif, c'est un «non-être» (asant).* Bhattacharya, **L'Ātman-Brahman dans le Bouddhisme Ancien**, 96.

of thus: “there is neither going, nor coming, nor going-and-coming” (*gamaṇaṃ āgamaṇaṃ gamaṇāgamaṇaṃ na hoti*).<sup>49</sup> In other words, Nibbāna is to be realised verily here. Nibbāna, which is also called “no-proceeding, no-going, birthless, undecaying, diseaseless, immortal” (*appavatti agati ajātaṃ ajaraṃ abyādhi amataṃ*),<sup>50</sup> is not that which is to be reached. In a sense, Nibbāna is already there.

As to Brahma, the Immortal --- which is also called the Emancipation --- in the old Upaniṣads, it is often said that Brahma is not that which is to be attained,<sup>51</sup> but it does not mean that Brahma is beyond that which can be attained, but that Brahma is already attained. Brahma is already there --- this is verily the consistent tone in the Upaniṣadic philosophy ---. “Even before [realisation] being [already] Brahma indeed, one was not Brahma through ignorance; and, being [already] all [this], one was not all [this]. Therefore, the knower of Brahma, having removed this ignorance through knowledge, being [already] Brahma, became Brahma; being [already] all [this], he became all [this]” (BUB. 2.5.15). ... *pūrvam api brahmaiva sad avidyayā abrahmāsīt sarvam eva ca sad asarvam āsīt tāṃ tv avidyām asmād vijñānāt tiraskṛtya brahavid brahmaiva san brahmābhavat sarvaḥ sa sarvam abhavat*.<sup>52</sup> “Moreover, the knowledge [of Brahma] is the cessation of the state of that which is not that [Self]. The state of the Self is not directly established as that [Self], because the state of the Self is [already] there. The state of the Self is eternal for everybody, [but] it appears to be related to that which is not that [Self]” (BUB. 4.4.20). *jñānaṃ ca tasminparātbhāvanivṛttir eva. na tasmin sāksād ātmabhāvaḥ kartavyo, vidyamānatvād*

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<sup>49</sup> “The words *taṇhā-nirodhā* mean ‘because of the destruction, namely, the destruction of craving.’ The words *punabbhavābhiniḥbatti na hoti* mean ‘there is no more coming into existence, and there is neither going, nor coming, nor going-and-coming. It has pointed out that one has attained the summit of development of existence.’ *taṇhānirodhāti taṇhāya khayanirodhena. punabbhavābhiniḥbatti na hotīti evaṃ āyatim punabbhavassa abhinibbatti na hoti, gamaṇaṃ āgamaṇaṃ gamaṇāgamaṇaṃ na hoti, vaṭṭaṃ na vattatīti vivaṭṭaṃ matthakaṃ pāpetvā dassesi. J.A. 2/256.*

<sup>50</sup> **J.A.** 2/416.

<sup>51</sup> “No, because the Emancipation is eternal. The Emancipation is desired, because it is eternal. It is well-known in the world that the results of actions are non-eternal. If the Emancipations would be due to the actions, it would be non-eternal. And this is undesirable.” *na. nityatvān mokṣasya. nityo hi mokṣa iṣyate. karmakāryasya cānityatvaṃ prasiddhaṃ loke, karmābhyaś cec cchreyo’nityaṃ syāt tac cāniṣṭam* (TUB. 1.11.1-4). **IDUŚB.**, 276. “Therefore the Emancipation is not to be attained. What is to be attained by a goer is a place, which is different from himself. Because it is not [a fact] that the very place, not different from a man, is attained by himself.” *ato nāpyo mokṣaḥ. gantur anyad vibhinnaṃ deśaṃ prati bhavati gantavyam. na hi yenaivāvyatiriktaṃ yat tat tenaiva gamyate* (TUB. 1.11.1-4). *Ibid.*, 277.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 775.

*ātmabhāvasya. nityo hy ātmabhāvaḥ sarvasyātadviṣaya iva pratyavabhasate.*<sup>53</sup> The Immortal --- the Absolute, Brahma in the old Upaniṣads and Nibbāna in early Buddhism --- is already there. It is to be found here and now. In this point, there is no difference between early Buddhism and the old Upaniṣads.

But, although it is a fact that we already attained the Absolute, still it does not mean that we already realise this. There is a difficulty. As to the statement “That which is this subtle is this whole [world], the state of being the Self. That is the truth. That is the Self. Thou art that, Oh Śvetaketu” (*sa ya eṣo'ṇimaitadātmīyam idaṃ sarvaṃ tat satyaṃ sa ātmā. tat tvam asi śvetaketo iti ...*) (CU. 6.8.7),<sup>54</sup> the commentator Śāṅkara deplores this difficulty thus: “Everybody does not know ‘we are transparent [or united] in Being’ [even] after entering in Being, by way of entering into Being during deep-sleep day after day” (*ahany ahani sarvāḥ prajāḥ suṣuptau sat sampadyanta ity etad yena tat sampadya na viduḥ sat sampannā vayaṃ ...*) (CUB. 6.8.7).<sup>55</sup>

In early Buddhism, it is usual that Dhamma is divided into the formed and the unformed. As it is already said, it does not mean that there are empirical Dhamma and non-empirical Dhamma --- this division itself is empirical and groundless --, but that the Dhamma is first to be realised along with the empirical and ephemeral existence, and then to be realised without it. There is a difficulty. Although *saṅkhatadhamma* is not necessarily different from *asaṅkhatadhamma*, it is still not admissible to lay down that *saṅkhatadhamma* would be *asaṅkhatadhamma*. As to texts of the *Rathavinīta-sutta*: “Oh friend, if there would be Parinibbāna without attachment apart from these states, the ordinary person would cease to exist, because the ordinary person does not have these states” (*aññatra ce āvuso imehi dhammehi anupādāparinibbānaṃ abhaviṣṣa puthujjano parinibbāyeyya puthujjano hi āvuso aññatra imehi dhammehi*),<sup>56</sup> the commentator Buddhaghosa explains thus: “[If Parinibbāna without attachment would be laid down as Parinibbāna without attachment, ... and if *saṅkhatadhamma* would be laid down as *asaṅkhatadhamma*, ...,] as it is said like *puthujjano hāvuso*, it is to be seen that the ordinary person, worldly and childish, follows the circle of existence. Indeed he is apart from these states, because he does not have even the fourfold pure morality.” *puthujjano hāvusoti ettha vaṭṭānugato lokiyabālaputhujjano daṭṭhabbo. so hi catuppārisuddhisīlamattassāpi*

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<sup>53</sup> **DUŚB.**, 928.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 527.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 528.

<sup>56</sup> Rathavinīta-sutta, **u.u.** 12/297/293.

*abhāvato sabbasova aññatra imehi dhammehi.*<sup>57</sup> These arguments presuppose that Nibbāna as *asaṅkhatadhamma* is that which is already attained. Moreover, verily for this reason, it can not be realised immediately. It requires our realisation of it along with the ephemeral existence, along with the abandonment of the ephemeral existence. Ultimately the ephemeral existence is that which is to be overcome and abandoned. However, our inquiry into truth should start along with this ephemerality.

However, ultimately this ephemeral world disappears through knowledge --- knowledge of the state of Brahma, as it will be seen later on ---, as the darkness vanishes by the light of a lamp. This ephemeral world and the state of Brahma is not co-existence. Through the destruction of the ephemeral world --- the state of ignorance ---, the state of Brahma is revealed. “Knowledge and ignorance does not exist in a person, because [they are] contradictory like darkness and light. Therefore, as to the knower of the Self, one should not see his relationship with the sphere of ignorance, which is differentiated forms, such as actions, means, results, and so on” (BUB. 3.5.1). *na ca vidyāvidye ekasya puruṣasya saha bhavato, virodhāt, tamaḥprakāśāv iva. tasmād ātmavidō-vidyāviśayo'dhikāro na draṣṭavyaḥ kriyākārahaphalabhedarūpaḥ.*<sup>58</sup> As it is already seen in this chapter, this ignorance means our ordinary and natural attitude in knowledge, which presupposes “knower” and “known.”

Early Buddhism uses the simile of darkness and light very similarly: “When it [ignorance] is abandoned, the ignorance is destroyed through the destruction (*nirodha*) [of the world], as it is said, ‘through abandoning the ignorance.’ [The ignorance is destroyed] through the intuitive knowledge of *arahattamagga*, as it is said, ‘through the rise of knowledge.’ Is the ignorance first destroyed? Or is the intuitive knowledge first revealed? Both of them are not to be said. Because the ignorance is destroyed through the revelation of knowledge, just as the darkness disappears through the light of a lamp.” *tassa vissajjane avijjāvirāgāti avijjāya khayanirodhena. vijjuppādāti arahattamaggavijjāya uppādena. kiṃ avijjā pubbe niruddhā, atha vijjā pubbe uppānāti? ubhayametam na vattabbaṃ. dīpujjalanena andhakāravigamo viya vijjuppādena avijjā niruddhāva hoti.*<sup>59</sup>

### ***The true state of the world***

Now, we will consider the knowledge revealed through the destruction of the ignorance (Skt. *avidyā*, Pāli *avijjā*). This knowledge is evidently of Nibbāna (Skt. *nirvāṇa*), which is also called “Nibbāna realm” (*nibbāna-dhātu*), “Immortal realm” (*amata-dhātu*), or

<sup>57</sup> **u.a.** 2/64.

<sup>58</sup> **ĪDUŚB.**, p. 814.

<sup>59</sup> **u.a.** 2/256.

“signless realm” (*animitta-dhātu*). This Nibbāna is not only the destruction of the world, but something more.

Buddhaghosa explains the cessation of the world thus: “This [the truth of cessation] has tranquillity as its characteristic. It has immortality as its *rasa*. It has relief as its *rasa*. It has signlessness as its manifestation, or it has non-diffuseness as its manifestation.” *Tayidaṃ santilakkhaṇaṃ, accutirasam assāsakaraṇarasam vā, animittapaccupaṭṭhānaṃ nippapañcapaccupaṭṭhānaṃ vā*.<sup>60</sup> Moreover, Buddhaghosa even says positively thus: “Because it is to be realised through discrimination of knowledge established by untiring efforts, and also because it is the word of the omniscient one, in the truest sense it is not that there is not found Nibbāna as the essence [of this world]: since it is said thus: ‘Oh Bhikkhus, there is an unborn, a non-existence, an unmade, an unformed.’” *asithilaparakkamasiddhena ñāṇavisesena adhigamanīyato Sabbaññūvacanato ca paramatthena sabhāvato nibbānaṃ nāvijjamānaṃ. Vuttaṃ h’etaṃ: “Atthi, bhikkhave, ajātaṃ abhūtaṃ akataṃ asaṅkhataṃ” ti* [Ud. 80; It. 37].<sup>61</sup> In early Buddhism, Nibbāna, revealed along with the destruction of the world, is not something negative. It is not nothing.

As for Brahma, the Immortal, or the Absolute in the old Upaniṣads, this Brahma, which is realised through the destruction of the state of ignorance, is not something which can be known, but rather the state which is to be realised through intuitive knowledge, as it is said in a verse of the *Taittirīya-upaniṣad* (TU. 2.7.1).

When one verily finds fearlessness as the state [or support] in this unseen, bodiless, inexpressible, and supportless Brahma, then he attains the state of fearlessness.

*yadā hy evaiṣa etasminn adṛśye’nātmye’nirukte’nīlayane’bhayaṃ pratiṣṭhāṃ vindate. atha so’bhayaṃ gato bhavati*.<sup>62</sup>

The word *pratiṣṭhā* can be translated as “support,” but it does not imply something like substratum. Although Brahma is also realised as the transcendental ground of the ephemeral existence, ultimately the realisation of this ground brought about the destruction of the transitory and individual existence. Therefore, perhaps this word had better be translated as “state.” The commentator explains thus: “*Atha*, then; there he does not see the diversity which is produced by ignorance and is the cause of fear, therefore he attains the state of fearlessness” (*atha tadā sa tasmin nānātvasya bhayahetor avidyā-*

<sup>60</sup> Warren, ed. **Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosācariya**, 431.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, 432-433.

<sup>62</sup> **IDUŚB.**, 302.

*kṛtasyādarśanād abhayaṃ gato bhavati*) (TUB. 2.7.1).<sup>63</sup> This is the state revealed through the destruction of ignorance, also called “the state of birthlessness and immortality” (*ajāto hyamṛto bhāvaḥ*),<sup>64</sup> “the state of non-causality” (*abījāvasthā*) “the state without any relations to body and so on” (*dehādisaṃbandharahitā pāramārthikī [avasthā]*).<sup>65</sup>

Let us further consider Brahma revealed through the destruction of the world. A verse of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (BU. 4.4.22) speaks of the world which is discriminated from the external three worlds.

Desiring this world alone, mendicants (*pravṛājīn*) leave their homes. Verily, the ancient sages did not desire their offspring, as it is said, “What shall we do with our offspring, we who [have attained] this Self, this world?” They abandoned their desire for sons, for wealth, and for the worlds, and live the life of bhikṣu (beggar).

*etam eva pravṛājīno lokam icchantāḥ pravrajanti. etad dha sma vai tat pūrve vidvāmsaḥ prajāṃ na kāmāyante kiṃ prajāyā kariṣyāmo yeṣāṃ no'yaṃ ātmā'yaṃ loka itī te ha sma putraiṣaṇāyās ca vittaiṣaṇāyās ca lokaiṣaṇāyās ca vyutthāyātha bhikṣācāryaṃ caranti ...*<sup>66</sup>

One who wishes to know the truth does not want the external worlds --- the human world, the world of the manes, and the world of gods which correspond the desire for sons, desire for wealth, and desire for the words ---, but the Self, this world alone. “Because of the statement, ‘Desiring this world alone,’ it is [to be] understood that those who desire the threefold external world are not entitled to the mendicant’s life” (*etameva lokamicchantāḥ ityavadhāraṇāna bāhyalokatrayepsūnāṃ pārivṛājye'dhikāra itī gamyate*) (BUB. 4.4.22).<sup>67</sup>

The Self or this world alone is expressed as *brahmaloka*. But this *brahmaloka* is to

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<sup>63</sup> **IDUŚB.**, 303. The commentator Śāṅkara explains Brahma as the state in another place thus: “... And that very non-dual Brahma, which is the cessation of all duality called up by ignorance, is the state [or support] (*pratiṣṭhā*) [of the blissful Self]. Because the blissful [Self] ceases in [that] oneness. There is one and non-dual Brahma, which is the cessation of all duality called up by ignorance, Brahma, the state, [like] tail” (TUB. 2.5.1). *tad eva ca sarvasyāvidyāparikalpitasya dvaitasyāvasānabhūtam advaitaṃ brahma pratiṣṭhā. ānandamayasyaikatvāvasānatvāt. asti tad ekam avidyākalpitasya dvaitasyāvasānabhūtam advaitaṃ brahma pratiṣṭhā puccham. Ibid.*, 295.

<sup>64</sup> “And the Self is the state of birthlessness and immortality, Being as its essence” (*sa cājāto hyamṛto bhāvaḥ svabhāvataḥ sannātmā*) (MāKB. 3.20). *Ibid.*, 217.

<sup>65</sup> “The true state ---- the state of non-causality, the state without any relations to body and so on --- of that which is called *prājñā* will be spoken separately in its fourth stage” (*tām abījāvasthāṃ tasyaiva prājñāśabdavācyasya turīyatvena dehādisaṃbandharahitāṃ pāramārthikīm pṛthag vakṣyati*) (MāKB. 1.2). *Ibid.*, 183.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, 929.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, 932.

be discriminated from the world of Brahmā --- which is the highest of virtuous worlds ---. A verse of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* (BU. 4.3.32) speaks of *brahmaloka* thus:

“It becomes [transparent like] water, one, the seer (*draṣṭṛ*), and without a second. This is the world of Brahma, Oh Emperor.” Thus did Yājñavalkya instruct: “This is its highest attainment, this is its highest accomplishment, this is its highest world, this is its highest bliss. On a particle of this very bliss other beings live.”

*salila eko draṣṭā'dvaito bhavaty eṣa brahmalokaḥ samrāḍ iti hainam anuśāsāsa yājñavalkya eṣā'sya paramā gatir eṣā'sya paramā sampad eṣo'sya paramo loka eṣo'sya parama ānanda etasyaivānandasyānyāni bhūtāni mātrām upajīvanti.*<sup>68</sup>

Paul Deussen says: “It is correctly recognised by the commentator that *brahmaloka* is not to be understood as the world of the Brahma, but the Brahma as the world (not *brahmaṇo lokaḥ*, but *brahma eva lokaḥ*.)” *Denn daß unter der „Brahmanwelt“ nicht die Welt des Brahman, sondern Brahman als Welt (nicht brahmaṇo lokaḥ, sondern brahma eva lokaḥ) zu verstehen ist, bemerkt schon der Kommentator ... mit Recht.*<sup>69</sup> The commentator Śāṅkara says as follows: “Therefore, being embraced by its own intuitive Self --- by its own nature as its own light ---, [one] become united, pure, with his desires fulfilled, desirous of [only] the Self, *salila*, namely, transparent like water, one, because there is no second; because the second is separated due to ignorance. ... This is immortal and fearless. This is ‘brahmaloka,’ [which implies] the world that is Brahman (*brahma-eva loko*)” (BUB. 4.3.32). *ataḥ svenaiva hi prājñenātmanā svayaṃjyotiḥ svabhāvena sampariṣvaktāḥ samastāḥ samprasanna āptakāma ātmakāmaḥ salilavat svacchībhūtaḥ salila iva salila eko dvitīyasyābhāvāt. avidyāyā hi dvitīyaḥ pravibhajyate. ... etad amṛtam abhayam eṣa brahmaloko brahmaiva loko brahmalokaḥ.*<sup>70</sup> As it is already seen, in the old Upaniṣads, Brahma is first investigated as the transcendental ground of this ephemeral existence. Through abandoning the worldly existence, and through the development of intuitive knowledge, one attains the destruction of ignorance, namely the destruction of this ephemeral world, where the world that is Brahma is revealed as the Absolute.

“The world that is Brahma” is not the highest virtuous world like “the world of Brahmā.” Neither is it that which simply transcend this world. Much less, neither is it “the Absolute One.” But still “the world that is Brahman” is not necessarily the same with this

<sup>68</sup> IDUŚB., 900.

<sup>69</sup> Deussen, *Die Philosophie der Upanishad's*, 131.

<sup>70</sup> IDUŚB., 900.

ephemeral world, but it can not found outside of this world. It is the true state of this world --- or the true view of the world ---.

Both the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism speak of the destruction of the world, while they are approaching the Absolute. In both of them, this destruction is not only the destruction of desire. It must be also the destruction of the world itself, as the objects of desire. Through overcoming our natural and ordinary attitude --- according to which “knower” and “known” are brought about and this ephemeral existence is thought as that which can not be sublated ---, this ephemeral world verily disappears. As darkness vanishes by light of a lamp, this world disappears. However, neither the Upaniṣadic thinkers nor the Buddha is nihilist. The so-called nihilist is thus: Believing that our natural and ordinary view or attitude --- including the view of the world as the object of natural science --- is correct, one supposes that this ephemeral world is not eternal, and destructible. Contrarily, the Upaniṣadic thinkers and the Buddha question our natural and ordinary view itself. Through understanding the transcendental ground of this world, through abandoning the worldly life, and through abandoning the virtuous worlds, they are verily present at the destruction of this ephemeral world. Then, there is revealed the true state of this world or the true view of the world.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> The concepts “transcendental” and “absolute” may be expressed using the concepts “immanence” and “transcendence.” Bhattacharya explains these concepts “immanence” and “transcendence” thus: “The transcendence of brahman-ātman in the Upaniṣads, like the One of Plotin, is the condition of its true immanence.” ... *la transcendance du brahman-ātman dans les Upaniṣad, comme de l’Un chez Plotin, est la condition de sa véritable immanence.* Bhattacharya, **L’Ātman-Brahman dans le Bouddhisme Ancien**, 8 n. 2.

As for the concepts “immanence” and “transcendence,” we should refer to the view of Radhakrishana as well: “It is māyā, or mysterious, or anirvacanīya (inexplicable), as Śaṅkara puts it. We cannot ask how the relationless Brahman is related to the world. The presumption is that the world of relations does not in any way affect the nature of Brahman. The destruction of the world of experience does not in the least take away from the being of Brahman. Brahman can exist and does exist apart from the world of relations. The world is not an essential factor in the existence of Brahman. ... Brahman is in the world, though not as the world.” Radhakrishnan, **Indian Philosophy**, vol. 1, 184.

Besides, the origin of these interpretations is probably Śaṅkara’s view as follows: “Although the cause [namely Brahma] and the effect [namely the world] is not different, the effect has the cause as its essence; but it is not that the cause has the effect as its essence.” *ananyatve’pi kāryakāraṇayoḥ kāryasya kāraṇātmatvaṃ natu kāraṇasya kāryātmatvam.* Shastri, ed. **Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣyam**, 364.

## CHAPTER 7

### BECOMING BRAHMA AND BECOMING THE DHAMMA

The theme of this chapter is “way” (Skt. *mārga*, Pāli *maggā*). “Practice” is also contained in this theme, but here the core of the problem must be “way,” not “practice.” In the previous chapters, this study mainly focuses on a philosophical trend lying under both the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism, but here in this chapter a philosophical difference between them is also mentioned --- besides, this difference is still closely related to that trend ---.

#### *Brahmapatha*

##### ***The word “patha”***

In the texts of the old Upaniṣads, there are some words which imply “way,” “road,” or “path,” such as *mārga*, *patha*, *gati*, and so on. Admittedly, based on the fact that “way” or “path” means “going along path,” it is quite natural that it comes to imply “practice” as well. However, *patha* (path) as in *brahmapatha* can not necessarily be understood as “action” like “going.” There are various texts negating such a loose understanding, which belongs to our natural and ordinary attitude. A verse of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (BU. 4.4.6) runs thus:

Then, man, not desiring, who is without desire, and who is freed from desire, becomes one whose desire is satisfied, and whose desire is the Self. His organs do not depart. Being but Brahma, he attains Brahma.

*athākāmayamāno yo'kāmo niṣkāma āptakāma ātmakāmo bhavati na tasya prāṇā utkrāmantī brahmaiva san brahmāpyeti.*<sup>1</sup>

Another verse of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (BU. 4.4.25) speaks of Brahma as follows:

This is that great unborn Self, which is undecaying, deathless, immortal, and fearless Brahma. Brahma is verily fearless. One who knows thus becomes the fearless Brahma  
*sa vā eṣa mahān aja ātmā'jaro 'maro 'mṛto 'bhayo brahmābhayaṃ hi vai brahma bhavati ya evaṃ veda.*<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> TDUŚB., 916.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 938.

A verse of the *Muṇḍaka-upaniṣad* (MuU. 3.2.9) speaks of the highest Brahma thus:

Verily one who knows that highest Brahma becomes Brahma. It is not that in his family someone does not know Brahma. He overcomes grief, and overcomes sin. Freed from knots of the hiding place, he becomes immortal.

*sa yo ha vai tat paramaṃ brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati nāsyābrahmanvī kule bhavati. tarati śokaṃ tarati pāpmānaṃ guhāgranthibhyo vimukto'mṛto bhavati.*<sup>3</sup>

As is seen in the previous chapter, the Absolute --- the Immortal (*amṛta*) --- is the true view of this world. In a literal sense, the Absolute is not that which is to be attained, but that which is already attained. But, it does not mean that the Absolute can be realised by our natural and ordinary attitude. As to the statement "That which is this subtle is this whole [world], the state of being the Self. That is the truth. That is the Self. Thou art that, Oh Śvetaketu." (*sa ya eṣo'ṇimaitadātmyam idaṃ sarvaṃ tat satyaṃ sa ātmā. tat tvam asi śvetaketo iti ...*)(CU. 6.8.7),<sup>4</sup> the commentator Śaṅkara comments thus: "Everybody does not know 'we are transparent [or united] in Being' [even] after entering in Being, by way of entering into Being during deep-sleep day after day" (*ahany ahani sarvāḥ prajāḥ susuptau sat sampadyanta ity etad yena tat sampadya na viduḥ sat sampannā vayaṃ ...*)(CUB. 6.8.7).<sup>5</sup>

### ***Becoming Brahma***

Our natural and ordinary attitude is to be overthrown. The attainment to the Absolute in a literal sense is not possible. So to speak, we can not attain that which we already attained. In a verse of the *Kaṭha-upaniṣad*, "the highest attainment" (*parā gatiḥ*) is spoken of: "The Unmanifested is higher than Mahat; the Puruṣa is higher than the Unmanifested. There is nothing higher than the Puruṣa. He is the highest goal. He is the highest attainment" (KaU. 1.3.11). *mahataḥ param avyaktam avyaktāt puruṣaḥ paraḥ. puruṣān na paraṃ kiñcit sā kāṣṭhā sā parā gatiḥ.*<sup>6</sup> The word *gati* (attainment) should not be understood literally. It means "knowing" (*avagati*), not "going." The commentator says: "Since it is the individual Self of all, the realisation of it is figuratively spoken of as the attainment to it" (*sarvasya pratyagātmatvād avagatir eva gatiḥ ity upacaryate*)(KaUB. 1.3.12).<sup>7</sup> When the word *patha* (way) in *brahmapatha* is understood in a literal sense, this *brahmapatha* means

<sup>3</sup> **IDUŚB.**, 174.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 527.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 528.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 82.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

“the path to the Brahmā” --- the path to the virtuous worlds (*punya lokāḥ*) ---. In the old Upaniṣads, the virtuous deed is regarded as something leading to the Absolute, as it is explained in the commentary: “But, in the attainment to the own Self, the obligatory karmas become the ground for knowledge in way of removing the obstacle of piled sins in the past” (*svātmalābhe tu pūrvopacitaduritapratibandhāpanayadvāreṇa vidyāhetutvaṃ pratipadyante karmāṇi nityānīti*) (TUB. 1.11.1-4).<sup>8</sup>

However, at the same time, the virtuous deed is consistently discriminated from intuitive knowledge (*vidyā*) through which we can attain the Absolute. Ultimately the Absolute is established through knowledge alone. “The highest state of emancipation is [achievable] through knowledge alone” (*kevalāyā eva vidyāyāḥ paraṃ śreyaḥ*).<sup>9</sup> First of all, the Absolute --- the Emancipation --- is eternal in the truest sense, and the eternal can not be the effect, therefore the Absolute can not be the effect of actions like virtuous deed.<sup>10</sup> As it is already seen, the Absolute is the true view of the world --- the true state of the world, or “the world that is Brahma” (*brahma-eva lokāḥ*),<sup>11</sup> which is revealed through the removal of “ignorance” as obstacle.<sup>12</sup> When “ignorance” --- as our natural and ordinary attitude, according to which we blindly presuppose “knower” and “known” --- is removed, this world as the objects of desire verily disappears, as it is said “For one who sees the oneness of the Self, there arises no desire, because objects [of desire] do not exist” (*ātmaikatvadarśīno viṣayābhāvāt kāmānutpattiḥ*) (TUB. 1.11.1-4).<sup>13</sup> It is verily here that the true meaning of “becoming Brahma” or “attaining Brahma” is found. “Knowing Ātman-Brahma is in fact becoming. It is not enough to know it objectively. As far as we only know it, we are far from

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<sup>8</sup> TDUŚB., 278.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup> The commentator Śaṅkara explains thus: “Moreover, the statement, ‘the Emancipation is to be produced (or attained) through karma, because it is the result of karma; because [it is] the unsurpassable joy, called heaven,’ is wrong. For the Emancipation is permanent; whatever is permanent is not produced; and whatever is produced in this world is impermanent. Therefore, the Emancipation is not to be produced by karma” (TUB. 1.1 Introduction). *yac coktaṃ niratīśayaprīteḥ svargaśabdavācyāyāḥ karmanimittatvāt karmārabhya eva mokṣa iti. tan na. nityatvān mokṣasya. na hi nityaṃ kiñcid ārabhyate loke yad ārabdhaṃ tad anityam iti. ato na karmārabhyo mokṣaḥ. Ibid., 259.*

<sup>11</sup> See BUB. 4.3.32. *Ibid.*, 900.

<sup>12</sup> As to a verse of the *Muṇḍaka-upaniṣad* “Verily one who knows that highest Brahma becomes Brahma” (*sa yo ha vai tatparamaṃ brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati*) (MU. 3.2.9), the commentator explains like this: “It is verily by knowledge that all obstacles are removed. The emancipation is that which has only ignorance as the obstacle, and it has no other obstacles. For [it is] eternal and is becoming the Self” (MuUB. 3.2.9). *vidyayaiva sarvapratibandhasyāpanītatvāt. avidyāpratibandhamātro hi mokṣo nānyapratibandhaḥ. nityatvād ātmabhūtatvāc ca. Ibid., 174.*

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 278.

knowing it: Ātman, the Self, remains an object for us, and consequently, it is a non-Ātman.”  
*Connaître l'ātman-brahman, c'est, en effet, le devenir. Il ne suffit pas de le concevoir objectivement. Tant que nous faisons que le concevoir, nous sommes loin de le connaître: l'ātman, le Soi, demeure pour nous un objet et, par suite, un non-Soi.*<sup>14</sup>

### **Mendicancy**

As it is seen just before, the theme “way” is ultimately “realisation” of the Absolute. Although the virtuous deed is admitted as something leading to the Absolute, it is just a subsidiary means. The attainment is solely an ultimate realisation of the Absolute. It is definite that “practice” in general --- including the virtuous deed --- is ultimately something to be abandoned. As to this tendency, there is one thing to be noted. It is “mendicancy” (*pārvrajya*) or “asceticism” (*saṃnyāsa*).

The verse 2.23.1 of the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad* explains the Immortality --- the Absolute --- in contrast of the virtuous worlds.

There are three divisions of virtue (*dharma*). The first one consists of sacrifice (or meditation), study of the Veda, and charity. The second is verily austerity (or severe meditation). The third is the Brahmācārin, living in the house of the teacher, immersing oneself in the house of teacher for life. All these become the virtuous worlds. [But] one who is established in Brahma attains the Immortality.

*trayo dharmaskandhā yajño'dhyayanaṃ dānam iti prathamas tapa eva dvitīyo brahmācāryācāryakulavāsī tṛtīyo'tyantam ātmānam ācāryakule'vasādayan sarva ete puṇyalokā bhavanti brahmasaṃstho'mṛtatvam eti.*<sup>15</sup>

“One who is established in Brahmam” (*brahma-saṃstha*) is a mendicant (*parivrāj*), an ascetic, who can attain the Absolute --- the Immortality ---.<sup>16</sup> According to the commentator Śaṅkara, the realization of the Absolute in the truest sense is nothing but “intuitive knowledge.” It is a revelation of the true view of world --- the world that is Brahma --- along with the annihilation of the ephemeral world by overthrowing our natural and ordinary attitude. In a literal sense, there is no attainment to the Absolute. Therefore, when we dare to speak of the issue of “attainment,” there remains only “mendicancy.” The typical

<sup>14</sup> Bhattacharya, *L'Ātman-Brahman dans le Bouddhisme Ancien*, 14.

<sup>15</sup> *IDUŚB.*, 404.

<sup>16</sup> “The one who is not yet mentioned is *parivrāj*, one who is in the fourth stage of life, one who is established in Brahma. He attains the Immortality, which is different from the virtuous worlds, and which is the infinite state of the Immortality” (CUB. 2.23.1). *avaśiṣṭas tv anuktaḥ parivrāj tūrīyo brahmasaṃstho brahmaṇi samyaksthitāḥ so'mṛtatvaṃ puṇyalokavilakṣaṇam amaraṇabhāvam ātyantikam eti ... Ibid.*, 405.

example is found in a verse of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* (BU. 3.5.1).

Then, Kohala, the son of Kuṣītaka, asked him. “Oh Yājñavalkya,” said he, “Explain to me that which is immediate and direct Brahma, and which is the Self within all.” “It is your Self within all.” “Oh Yājñavalkya, which is within all?” “It is that which transcends hunger, thirst, grief, delusion, decay, and death. Knowing this Self, the Brāhmaṇas abandon the desire for sons, for wealth, and for the worlds, and live a mendicant’s life. That which is the desire for sons is the desire for wealth, and that which is the desire for wealth is the desire for worlds, for both these are but desires.”

*atha hainaṃ kaholaḥ kauṣītakeyaḥ papraccha yājñavalkyetei hovāca. yad eva sākṣād aparokṣād brahma ya ātmā sarvāntaras taṃ me vyācakṣvety eṣa ta ātmā sarvāntaraḥ. katamo yājñavalkya sarvāntaro yo’sanāyāpipāse śokaṃ moham jarāṃ mṛtyum atyeti. etaṃ vai tam ātmānaṃ viditvā brāhmaṇāḥ putraiṣaṇāyās ca vittaiṣaṇāyās ca lokaiṣaṇāyās ca vyutthāyātha bhikṣācaryaṃ caranti yā hy eva putraiṣaṇā sā vittaiṣaṇā yā vittaiṣaṇā sā lokaiṣaṇobhe hy ete eṣaṇe eva bhavataḥ.*<sup>17</sup>

“The mendicant life” (*pārvirājya*) requires the renouncement of sacrifice as duties. It also requires the renouncement of desire for “the three external worlds” (*bāhya-loka-traya*) (BUB. 4.4.22) --- the world of human beings (*manuṣyaloka*), the world of the manes (*pitṛloka*), and the world of gods (*devaloka*) (BU. 3.1.8) ---.<sup>18</sup> Moreover, this mendicant life intends to thoroughly abandon whatever is ephemeral. “They [knowers of Brahma] lead the mendicant’s life, living upon begging; giving up the sign, the symbol of the mendicancy, which is prescribed by the Smṛti, and which is the means of livelihood and the refuge merely for this stage of life.<sup>19</sup> Being pierced (or penetrated), the sign is abandoned. The Smṛtis say: ‘Therefore the knower of Dharma wears no signs; his signs are not manifested, and his actions are not manifested’” (BUB. 3.5.1). *bhikṣārthaṃ caraṇaṃ bhikṣācaryaṃ caranti tyaktvā smārtaṃ liṅgaṃ kevalaṃ āśramamātraśaraṇānāṃ jīvanasādhanam pārvirājyavyaṅjakam. viddhāṃli liṅgavarjitaḥ. "tasmād aliṅgo*

<sup>17</sup> **IDUŚB.**, 809.

<sup>18</sup> “Therefore, the ancient Brāhmaṇas --- knower of Brahma --- abandoning sacrifices and their accessories, such as the sacred thread and so on, live the life of mendicant, called Paramahaṃsa, and lead the life of bhikṣu (beggar)” (BUB. 3.5.1). *tasmāt pūrve brāhmaṇā brahmavido vyutthāya karmabhyah karma- sādhanebhyaś ca yajñopavitādibhyaḥ paramahaṃsapārvirājyaṃ pratipadya bhikṣācaryaṃ caranti. Ibid.*, 813.

<sup>19</sup> It is a banner (*dhvaja*) of Saṃnyāsins. According to the dictionary of Monier-Williams (1899), it is “a skull carried on a staff” as “a penance for the murder of a Brāhman” or “as a mark of ascetics and Yogīs.”

*dharmajño'vyaktalingo- 'vyaktācārah' ityādismṛtibhyaḥ.*<sup>20</sup>

This study concludes that according to Śaṅkara the old Upaniṣads consist in “mendicancy” or a kind of mystic quietism --- although it is not pessimism ---.

### *Arahattamagga*

#### ***The word “magga”***

Early Buddhism speaks of *arahattamagga* or *ariyamagga*, --- namely the fourth of the noble truth (*ariyasacca*), “the path leading to the cessation of dukkha” (*dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā*) ---. The word *magga* (Skt. *mārga*) means “road” or “way.” The word *paṭipadā* --- being derived from a prefix (*paṭi*, Skt. *prati*) and a verbal root *pad* --- means originally “going along,” “path,” and further, “taking a line of action” or “practice.” It is reasonable that the word *magga*, being interpreted as “means” or “method,” comes to imply “practice.” However, it is not necessarily appropriate to consider *arahattamagga* as a means to attain the Absolute.

There are several reasons why we can not understand this *arahattamagga* only as leading to the Absolute. Firstly, the fourfold noble truth is questioned along with “practice” (*kiriya*), such as “empirical knowledge” (*pariññā*), “abandonment” (*pahāna*), and so on. It is not fact that only the fourth truth is concerned with “practice.” Secondly, as it is said that the intuitive knowledge is to be developed, this *arahattamagga* is also related to the development of the intuitive knowledge. Thirdly, it is not reasonable to consider that here in the issue of “way” the virtuous deed is to be questioned, because the virtuous matter has been already overcome in the step of “abandonment” (*pahāna*), as it is already argued in the fifth chapter “Meaning of Dispassion.” Fourthly, “destruction of dukkha” (*dukkhanirodha*) or “destruction of the world” (*lokanirodha*) --- which is also called Nibbāna, and which belongs to the Absolute or the Supramundane (*lokuttara*) --- is usually mentioned before this *arahattamagga*. Fifthly, “going out” (*uṭṭhāna*) or “overcoming” (*taraṇa*) is spoken of about the Absolute.

Above all, as it is already seen in the previous chapter, the Absolute or Nibbāna --- which is first realised along with the destruction of the world --- is not that which is to be attained, but that which is to be realised. The Absolute --- also called the Emancipation (*vimutti*) --- is to be intuitively known ultimately through abandoning the taints of “ignorance.” The Absolute is to be realised along with the destruction of this ephemeral existence, through abandoning the worldly life, through abandoning the virtuous worlds, and ultimately through abandoning “ignorance.” The Absolute is to be realised even here

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<sup>20</sup> IDUŚB., 813.

and now. It is the true view of the world, the true state of this existence, through abandoning our natural and ordinary attitude, which blindly presumes the knower and the known. The Absolute --- called “unborn” (*ajata*) and “immortal” (*amata*) --- is also called “no-going”.

### ***Becoming the Dhamma***

Thus, it is not that “way” (*magga*) is just a means. Nor is it that the Absolute --- Nibbāna --- is an aim to be attained. Therefore, in early Buddhism also, the attainment to the Absolute can not be understood in a literal sense. It must be understood as the realization of it. This type of thought inevitably reminds us a series of Upaniṣadic statements, such as “being but Brahma, he attains (or enters into) Brahma” (*brahmaiva san brahmāpyeti*) (BU. 4.4.6). “Brahma is verily fearless, and one who knows thus becomes the fearless Brahma” (*abhayaṃ hi vai brahma bhavati ya evaṃ veda*) (BU. 4.4.25).

It is doubtless that, as to the starting point of the thought of “way,” early Buddhism is based on the old Upaniṣads, and that the true meaning of *arahattamagga* should be understood first in a close relation with the old Upaniṣads --- although it does not mean that the thought of “way” is the same between both of them, as it will be argued later on ---. In fact, the *Aggañña-sutta* speaks of “becoming the Dhamma” and “becoming the Brahma” as follows:

Oh Vāseṭṭha (and Bhāradvāja), as to a man whose confidence in the Tathāgata is sure, rooted, established, firm, and indestructible --- not to be destroyed by Samaṇa, Brāhmaṇa, Deva, Māra, Brahmā, or anyone in the world ---, it is proper for him to say thus: I am a true son of the Bhagavā, born from his mouth, born of the Dhamma, created by the Dhamma, an heir of the Dhamma. And why? Because, Oh Vāseṭṭha (and Bhāradvāja), the Tathāgata is also called: one who has the Dhamma as his body,<sup>21</sup> one who has the Brahma as his body, one who becomes the Dhamma, and again one who becomes the Brahma.

*yassa kho panassa vāseṭṭhā tathāgate saddhā niviṭṭhā mūlajātā patitṭhitā dalhā asaṃhāriyā samaṇena vā brāhmaṇena vā devena vā mārena vā brahmunā vā kenaci vā lokasmiṃ tassettaṃ kallaṃ vācāya bhagavatomhi putto oraso mukhato jāto dhammajō dhammanimmito dhammadāyādoti. taṃ kissa hetu. tathāgatassa hetam vāseṭṭhā*

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<sup>21</sup> “There, as for the words *dhammakāyo itipi* (one who has the Dhamma as the body), why is the Tathāgata called ‘one who has the Dhamma as the body’? It is because the Tathāgata, having thought out the Tepiṭaka-Buddha-word through his mind, and expressed himself by his speech. Therefore his body is the Dhamma itself, because his body is made from the Dhamma. Thus, [he is called] *dhammakāya*, one who has the Dhamma as the body.” *tattha "dhammakāyo itipi"ti kasmā tathāgato "dhammakāyo"ti vutto. tathāgato hi tepiṭakaṃ buddhavacanaṃ hadayena cintetvā vācāya abhinīhari. tenassa kāyo dhammamayattā dhammova. itī dhammo kāyo assāti dhammakāyo. ṅ. a. 3/50.*

*adhivacanam dhammakāyo itipi brahmakāyo itipi dhammabhūto itipi brahmabhūto itipi.*<sup>22</sup>

### **Ubhatobhāgavimutti**

As it is seen just above, as to the thought of “way,” early Buddhism follows the old Upaniṣads at least in its starting point. Moreover, only with such an understanding, it is possible to truly understand another aspect of the thought of “way” in early Buddhism.

What is to be considered here is “two-sided emancipation.” Sometimes, this two-sided emancipation is mentioned as abandoning the existence of desire through “meditation in the realm of *rūpa*” (*rūpāvacarajjhāna*) and abandoning the existence of *rūpa* through “meditation [in the realm] of *arūpa*” (*arūpajjhāna*).<sup>23</sup> However, this two-sided emancipation is also mentioned as abandoning the existence of *rūpa* through meditation in realm of *arūpa* and abandoning the existence of *arūpa* through *arahattamagga*, as it is said “emancipation from the body in *rūpa* through meditation in *arūpa* and emancipation from the body in *nāma* through *magga*.”<sup>24</sup> Needless to say, to consider the significance of the two sided emancipation, the latter case is more important.

<sup>22</sup> 𑀧.𑀯𑀭. 11/55/92. Buddhaghosa explains that “Brahma” (or “Brahmā”) here is used in the sense of “best” (*seṭṭha*, Skt. *śreṣṭha*). “The Dhamma is called Brahma in a sense of ‘best.’ Becoming the Dhamma means having the Dhamma as its own nature. Verily because of having the Dhamma-body (the body made of [based on] the Dhamma), one becomes Brahma.” *dhammo hi seṭṭhaṭṭhena brahmāti vuccati. dhammabhūtoti dhammasabhāvo. dhammabhūtattāeva brahmabhūto.* 𑀧.𑀯. 3/50. However, the word “best” is one of the synonyms of Brahma in the old Upaniṣads: “Anyone who indeed knows the oldest and greatest, verily becomes the oldest and greatest” (*yo ha vai jyeṣṭham ca śreṣṭham ca veda jyeṣṭhas ca ha vai śreṣṭhas ca bhavati ...*) (CU. 5.1.1). **TDUSB.**, 467.

<sup>23</sup> “Although the four meditations in the realm of *rūpa*, still twofold, endowed with equanimity, destroy impurities, yet they --- still near by impurities --- go forth in the state of *rūpa* as object. ... The meditation in the realm of *rūpa* does not overcome this object. Therefore, abandoning *rūpa* throughout, and destroying the impurities through the power of meditation of *arūpa*, one attained the Arahatsip, --- this is two-sided emancipation. ...” *rūpāvacaracattahajjhānam kiñcāpi duvaṅgikam upekkhāsahagatam, kilese vikkhambheti, kilesānam pana āsannapakkepi rūpārammaṇaṭṭhāne samudācarati. ... rūpāvacarajjhānañca tam ārammaṇam na samatikkamati. tasmā sabbaso rūpam nivattetvā arūpajjhānavasena kilese vikkhambhetvā arahattam pattova ubhatobhāgavimutto ...* 𑀧.𑀯. 2/114.

<sup>24</sup> “*ubhatobhāgavimutta* means the two-sided emancipation: emancipation from the body in *rūpa* through meditation in *arūpa* and emancipation from the body in *nāma* through *magga*. ... Again, this one, who is emancipated in two sides, going out of one of the [four *arūpa*] planes, such as *ākāsānañcāyatana* and so on, attains Arahatsip. Moreover, one, going out the destruction (*nirodha*) as a Never-returned, attains Arahatsip; [therefore] it is fivefold.” *ubhatobhāgavimuttoti dvīhi bhāgehi vimutto, arūpasamāpattiyā rūpakāyato vimutto maggena nāmakāyato vimuttoti. ... so panesa ubhatobhāgavimutto ākāsānañcāyatanādīsu aññatarato vuṭṭhāya arahattam patto ca anāgāmī hutvā nirodhā vuṭṭhāya arahattam patto cāti pañcavidho hoti.* 𑀧.𑀯. 2/113-114.

Moreover, this two-sided emancipation is also mentioned as “emancipation of consciousness (or intellect)” (*cetovimutti*) and “emancipation in intuitive knowledge” (*paññāvimutti*). The *Pasādika-sutta* speaks of this two-sided emancipation thus:

Moreover, Oh friend, a bhikkhu, because of destruction of intoxicants, freed from intoxicants, realising through intuitive knowledge by himself even in this [visible] world, has attained the emancipation of mind (or intellect) and the emancipation of intuition, and abides there.

*puna caparaṃ āvuso bhikkhu āsavānaṃ khayā anāsavañcetovimuttiṃ paññāvimuttiṃ diṭṭhe va dhamme sayāṃ abhiññā sacchikatvā upasampajja viharati ...*<sup>25</sup>

In regard to “abandonment” (*pahāna*), *cetovimutti* is spoken of as something related to “the plane of *rūpa*”, such as “fraternity” (*mettā*), “compassion” (*karuṇā*), “equanimity” (*upekhā*), and so on. And through meditation in “the plane of *arūpa*,” one attains “destruction” (*nirodha*) of the world --- destruction of both “formation of body” (*kāyasaṅkhāra*) and “formation of consciousness” (*cittasaṅkhāra*) ---, which implies no consciousness, but pure intuition. But, however strange it sounds, this “destruction” (*nirodha*) --- Nibbāna as the Absolute --- should be abandoned. Again, *cetovimutti* is further to be questioned. Buddhaghosa explains “the plane of nothing” (*ākiñcanāyatana*) --- which implies here “Nibbāna” as the Absolute --- in the commentary on the *Mahāvedalla-sutta*. “The nine Dhammas, called ‘*ākiñcaññā cetovimuttiyo*,’ are the plane of nothing, [fourfold] path, and [fourfold] fruit. There, as to the plane of nothing, *ākiñcaññā* means that one has no object, and as to path and fruit, they are *ākiñcaññā*, because there are no impurities crushing or obstructing. Although Nibbāna is *ākiñcaññā*, there is not yet emancipation of consciousness. Therefore, [Nibbāna] is not grasped.” *ākiñcaññā cetovimuttiyo nāma nava dhammā ākiñcaññāyatanañca maggaphalāni ca. tatha ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ kiñcanaṃ ārammaṇaṃ assa natthīti ākiñcaññāṃ, maggaphalāni kiñcanānaṃ maddanapalibuddhana-kilesānaṃ natthitāya ākiñcaññāni, nibbānaṃpi ākiñcaññāṃ, cetovimutti pana na hoti, tasmā na gahitaṃ.*<sup>26</sup>

The point is: Nibbāna as the Absolute requires us to turn over when we attain it. When, through several steps of abandonment and meditation, we attain the destruction of the world, Nibbāna, the Absolute --- including the destruction of *citta-saṅkhāra* ---, we must turn over into the existence along with consciousness. For example, “As it is said, ‘consciousness has been developed verily thus before,’ [consciousness has been

<sup>25</sup> 7.11. 11/116/146.

<sup>26</sup> 1.1. 2/262.

developed] for a certain length of time before the attainment of 'destruction.' [Then] having no consciousness for a while before attainment of 'destruction,' thereafter the consciousness is developed for a certain length of time, as it is said; 'I will further have consciousness.' The words 'bringing him up into the truth (*tathattā*)' means 'developing consciousness thus': 'bringing this man up into the truth, the state along with consciousness.' Thus, what is spoken of about the former is the time of attaining destruction (*nirodha*). [What is spoken of] about the latter is the time of going out of destruction." *pubbeva tathā cittaṃ bhāviṭṭaṃ hotīti nirodhasamāpattito pubbe addhānaparicchedakāleyeva ettakaṃ kālaṃ acittako hutvā tato paraṃ sacittako bhavissāmīti addhānaparicchedacittaṃ bhāviṭṭaṃ hoti. yaṃ taṃ tathattāya upaneṭīti yaṃ evaṃ bhāviṭṭaṃ cittaṃ, taṃ puggalaṃ tathattāya sacittakabhāvāya upaneṭi. itī heṭṭhā nirodhasamāpajjanakakālo kathito. idha nirodhavuttānakālo.*<sup>27</sup>

### **A simile of raft**

By the way, there are some Suttas which speak of abandonment of the Dhamma by the simile of raft. The *Alagaddūpama-sutta* runs thus:

Even so, Oh bhikkhus, is the Dhamma, expressed by the simile of raft (*kulla*), taught by me as for crossing over, not for grasping (*gahaṇa*). Oh you bhikkhus, after being taught and understood, this Dhamma, expressed by the simile of raft, should be abandoned --- much more Adhammas.

*evameva kho bhikkhave kullūpamo mayā dhammo desito nittharaṇatthāya no gahaṇatthāya kullūpamaṃ vo bhikkhave dhammaṃ desitaṃ ājānantehi dhammāpi vo pahātabbā pageva adhammā.*<sup>28</sup>

The *Mahātaṇhāsāṅkhaya-sutta* speaks of it thus:

If you, Oh bhikkhus, cling to, take a pride in, desire, and cherish this view, which is thus pure, thus clear, then, Oh bhikkhus, would you understand that this Dhamma, expressed by the simile of raft, taught for knowing and crossing over, not for grasping?

*imañce tumhe bhikkhave diṭṭhiṃ evaṃ parisuddhaṃ evaṃ pariyodātaṃ allīyetha keḷāyetha dhaneyyātha mamāyetha api nu tumhe bhikkhave kullūpamaṃ dhammaṃ desitaṃ ājāneyyātha nittharaṇatthāya no gahaṇatthāyāti.*<sup>29</sup>

<sup>27</sup> M. 1. 2/273.

<sup>28</sup> M. 1. 12/280/271.

<sup>29</sup> M. 1. 12/445/479.

Considering the importance of the two-sided emancipation --- or the attainment to the Absolute and the abandonment of it ---, it is not appropriate to interpret this Dhamma to be abandoned only as the worldly Dhamma (the Dhamma which is understood along with the worldly existence --- as the essence of the worldly existence). This Dhamma should be interpreted also as the destruction of the world (*loka-nirodha*) --- which is the Absolute, Nibbāna ---. The Absolute, Nibbāna --- as the destruction of the world --- is to be experienced, to be intuitively known through meditations, but this Absolute is also to be abandoned or to be crossed over. The Absolute is going forward over itself: “The words *nibbānogaḍha* [literally ‘merging into Nibbāna’] means entering along with Nibbāna into Nibbāna. The word *nibbānaparāyana* [parāyana (derived from a prefix *parā* and a verbal root *ī*) literally “going through to” or “ending in”] means ‘going further’ (*paraṃ ayanam*), ‘going further [or higher] from it’ (*assa parā gati*). It does not mean ‘going somewhere else than it.’ Nibbāna is the Culmination, because Nibbāna is the culmination and cessation of it.” *nibbānogaḍhanti nibbānabbhantaram nibbānaṃ anupaviṭṭham. nibbānaparāyananti nibbānaṃ paraṃ ayanamassa parā gati, na tato paraṃ gacchatīti attho. nibbānaṃ pariyosānaṃ avasānaṃ assāti nibbānapariyosānaṃ.*<sup>30</sup>

What is said here is not a theoretical negation of the Absolute. It is doubtless that, in early Buddhism, the Absolute is first to be realised through a fundamental experience. After this realisation, the Absolute is to be overcome. Verily in this point, there is a significant difference between the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism. But this issue is further argued in the next section.

### *Transparency*

#### ***Starting point and difference***

As it is argued in the previous sections, as to “way,” *brahmapatha* and *arahattamagga* have the same starting point. This starting point is typically expressed by the statement “being but Brahma, he attains (or enters into) Brahma” (*brahmaiva san brahmāpyeti*) (BU. 4.4.6).

However, while in the old Upaniṣads “way” (*mārga, patha*) is ultimately to be re-interpreted as “realisation,” in early Buddhism “way” (*magga, paṭipadā*) is to be considered as that which is questioned as “two-sided emancipation” --- “attaining” and “going out” ---. To make this difference more evident, we want to reconsider the Absolute from another aspect. What is to be considered is a concept of “transparency.”

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<sup>30</sup> **u.a.** 2/278.

### **Transparency**

In the old Upaniṣads, “transparency,” “clearness,” or “pureness” is always used in connection with the Absolute. A verse of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* (BU. 4.3.32) runs as follows:

“It becomes [transparent like] water, one, the seer (*draṣṭṛ*), and without a second. This is the world of Brahma, Oh Emperor.” Thus did Yājñavalkya instruct: “This is its highest attainment, this is its highest accomplishment, this is its highest world, this is its highest bliss. On a particle of this very bliss other beings live.”

*salīla eko draṣṭā'dvaito bhavaty eṣa brahmalokaḥ samrāḍ iti hainam anuśāsāsa yājñavalkya eṣā'sya paramā gatir eṣā'sya paramā sampad eṣo'sya paramo loka eṣo'sya parama ānanda etasyaivānandasyānyāni bhūtāni mātrām upajīvanti.*<sup>31</sup>

What is spoken of is the Absolute: “this is immortal and fearless, this is the world of Brahma, the world that is Brahma” (*etad amṛtam abhayam eṣa brahmaloko brahmaiva loko brahmalokaḥ*) (BUB. 4.3.32). Being realised through intuitive knowledge --- also called its own light (*svayaṃjyotis*) ---, the Absolute is “pure” (*sampranna*) and “transparent like water” (*salilavat svacchībhūta*).<sup>32</sup>

In early Buddhism also, this concept “transparency” is mentioned. Just after speaking of “intuition of liberation” (*vimuttamiti nāṇa*) and “the destruction of life” (*khīṇā jāti*), the *Sāmaññaphala-sutta* describes the Absolute as follows:

Just as, Oh great king, in the midst of a group of mountain there is a pool of water, transparent (*accha*), clear (*vippassanna*), and serene (*anāvila*); and there a man, standing on bank, and with eyes [to see], would see the oysters and the shells, the gravel and the pebbles, and a school of fish, as they move about or lie still, he [should know]: “This pool is transparent, clear, and serene; and there a man, standing on bank, and with eyes [to see], should see the oysters and the shells, the gravel and the pebbles, and a school of fish, as they move about or lie still,” ...

<sup>31</sup> IDUŚB., 900.

<sup>32</sup> “Therefore, being embraced by its own intuitive Self --- by its own nature as its own light ---, [one] become united, pure, with his desires fulfilled, desirous of [only] the Self, *salīla*, namely, transparent like water, one, because there is no second; because the second is separated by ignorance” (BUB. 4.3.32). *ataḥ svenaiva hi prājñenātmanā svayaṃjyotiḥ svabhāvena sampariṣvaktāḥ samastāḥ samprasanna āptakāma ātmakāmaḥ salilavat svacchībhūtaḥ salīla iva salīla eko dvitīyasyābhāvāt. avidyāyā hi dvitīyaḥ pravibhajyate. Ibid., 900.*

*seyyathāpi mahārāja pabbatasamkhepe udakarahado accho vipprasanno anāvilo tattha cakkhumā puriso tīre thito passeyya sippikasambukampi sakkharaṭṭhalampi macchagumbampi carantampi tiṭṭhantampi tassa evamassa ayaṃ kho udakarahado accho vipprasanno anāvilo tatthime sippikasambukāpi sakkharaṭṭhalampi macchagumbāpi carantipi tiṭṭhantipiṭi ...<sup>33</sup>*

By the way, the word *prasāda* --- derived from a prefix *pra* and a verbal root *sad* --- is used sometimes in the sense of “purity” or “clearness,” and sometimes in the sense of “kindness” or “favour.” The word *pasāda* (Skt. *prasāda*) is also used sometimes in the sense of “purity” or “clearness,” and sometimes in the sense of “joy,” “good mind,” “virtue,” or “belief.” It may be not easy to decide the meaning of this word in some texts.<sup>34</sup> However, in the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism, this word should be understood as “purity” or “transparency,” as far as it is used as relevant to the Absolute. It can mean neither “kindness” nor “belief,” because the Absolute is not that which is known as object. The Absolute is not the Absolute One, but the true view of the world --- or the Absolute state of this existence ---. The Absolute, revealed through the disappearance of obstacles, is realised through “intuitive knowledge” --- characterised by “piercing” or “penetration” ---. “Transparency” is a symbolic concept implying the Absolute throughout both the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism.

<sup>33</sup> 𑀧.𑀲. 9/138/110.

<sup>34</sup> “[The Self] is [first] to be realised as Being, and then [it is to be realised] through the true state; [thus the Self is to be realised] in both way. [After] having been realised merely as Being, [the Self] becomes transparent (or favourably disposed) as the true state” (KaU. 2.6.13). *astīty evopalabdavyas tattvabhāvena cobhayoḥ. astīty evopalabdhasya tattvabhāvaḥ prasīdati.* **IDUŚB.**, 102. “But here ‘one who has right view’ means one who is endowed with supramundane right view, which guides and leads to the Emancipation. Therefore it is said: One whose view is straight, and who has perfect clearness (or perfect belief) in the Dhamma, and has arrived at this true Dhamma.” *idha pana nīyatāya niyyānikāya lokuttarakusalasammādiṭṭhiyā samannāgato “sammādiṭṭhi”ti adhippeto. tenevāha “ujugatāssa diṭṭhidhamme aveccappasādena samannāgato āgato imaṃ saddhamman”ti, ...* **U.Ḍ.** 1/209. Moreover, the word *saddhā* (Skt. *śraddhā*) is usually translated as “faith” or “belief.” But even this word is understood as something related to “clearness.” Buddhaghosa explains this word thus: “*Saddhā* means that through which one believes, or the believing by oneself, or verily just this [act of] believing. Its character is believing, or its character is fixing one’s mind. Its essential property is purity, like a water-clearing jewel, or its essential property is jumping over, like crossing over a flood of water.” *Saddahanti etāya, sayam vā saddahati, saddahanamattam eva vā esā ti saddhā. Sā saddahaṇalakkhaṇā, okappanalakkhaṇā vā, pasādanarasā udakappasādakamaṇi viya, pakkhandhanarasā vā oghuttaraṇaṃ viya, ...* Warren ed. **Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosācariya**, 393.

## Light

In the old Upaniṣads, there is another concept, which is often mentioned with reference to the Absolute. It is a concept “light,” which brings up a significant question about the difference between the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism. A verse of the *Muṇḍaka-upaniṣad* (MuU. 2.2.9) speaks of “the light of lights” (*jyotiṣām jyotiḥ*).

In the golden, highest sheath is Brahman, free from taints and without parts. It is pure, and is the light of lights. It is that which the knowers of the Self realise.

*hiraṇmaye pare koṣe virajaṃ brahma niṣkalam. tac chubhraṃ jyotiṣām jyotiḥ tad yad ātmavido viduḥ.*<sup>35</sup>

This “light of lights” or “the light within the heart” (*hṛdy antarjyotiḥ*) (BU. 4.3.7) is that which is often called “seer” or “witness” (*draṣṭṛ*), but as it is already seen, it is neither “agent” nor “knower.” It is not so-called subject. Nor is it “epistemological subject.” Much less, it is not the Absolute subject. A verse of the *Chāndogya* (CU. 8.12.4) speaks of “one existing in the eye” (*cākṣuṣa*) thus: “*Cākṣuṣa* means one existing in the eye. His eye is the organ for seeing or perceiving of rūpa, because the supreme seer’s purpose is associated with his body and so on. Here he is seen in the eye along with a means of seeing, [but he is still] supreme, unembodied, unassociated.” ... *cākṣuṣas cākṣuṣi bhava iti cākṣuṣaḥ, tasya darśanāya rūpopalabdhye cākṣuḥ karanam, yasya taddehādibhiḥ samhatatvāt parasya draṣṭur arthe, so'tra cākṣuṣi darśanena liṅgena drśyate paro'śarīro'samhataḥ.*<sup>36</sup>

What is spoken of here is, so to speak, a transcendental subject, namely, that through which empirical knowledge is established. It is that which should be inevitably postulated for our synthetic consciousness of experience. This transcendental subject is not the subject negated by a so-called non-substantialism. This non-substantialism means just: What is just supposed or postulated as the eternal should not be transferred in this temporal and manifold world. This non-substantialism pretends to negate every speculation about the eternal, but it is evident that it remains speculative. As it is already seen in the fourth chapter, although early Buddhism rigidly forbids to look for the permanent in the temporal and manifold world, its truth of *dukkha* does not consist in such a speculative negation, but

<sup>35</sup> IDUŚB., 163.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 601. In a similar way, the commentator explains “Puruṣa” in the statement “the Puruṣa that is seen in the eye, is this Self” (*ya eṣo'kṣiṇi puruṣo drśyata eṣa ātmā*) (CU. 8.7.4) thus: “Prajāpati said: the Puruṣa that is [seen] in the eye’, [this Puruṣa] is the seer (*draṣṭṛ*) realised by the yogins, who have withdrawn eyes and so on [from the external world] and have destroyed the impurities ...” (CUB. 8.7.4). *prajāpatir uvāca ha --- ya eṣo'kṣiṇi puruṣo nivṛttacakṣurbhir mṛditakaṣāyair drśyate yogibhir draṣṭā, .... Ibid.*, 585.

in “intuitive knowledge” of the Dhamma, through which “everything” in this temporal and manifold world is empirically known as “impermanent,” “painful” and so on. Although “intuitive knowledge” in the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism does not necessarily mean such a transcendental subject, but rather transcendental grounds --- or concepts --- through which our empirical knowledge is established, still “transcendental subject” is not specifically negated in the texts related to this “intuitive knowledge.” Consciousness or knowledge is originally that which is conscious of itself --- it must be a fundamental or transcendental condition or state of consciousness ---. Even early Buddhism does not ignore this fact.

### ***Max Walleser's argument***

However, according to Walleser, early Buddhism does not approve this type of transcendental subject. His argument is related to the following text of the *Mahānidāna-sutta*.

Then, Oh Ānanda, in what respect is the self regarded? The self is regarded as feeling: “my self is feeling.” Or [it is regarded thus]: “my self is not feeling, [moreover] my self does not have feeling.” Or again [it is regarded thus]: “my self is not feeling, not is it that it does not have feeling; my self feels, [and] my self has the property of feeling.” In these respects is the self regarded.

*kittāvatā ca ānanda attānaṃ samanupassamāno samanupassati. vedanaṃ vā hi ānanda attānaṃ samanupassamāno samanupassati vedanā me attāti na heva kho me vedanā attā appaṭisaṃvedano me attāti. na heva kho me vedanā attā nopi appaṭisaṃvedano me attā me vedayati vedanādhammo hi me attāti iti vā hi ānanda attānaṃ samanupassamāno samanupassati.*<sup>37</sup>

Among these three, the third opinion is negated by the Buddha, just a little later on: “Therefore, Oh Ānanda, here it is not right to consider thus: My self is not feeling, nor is it that it does not have feeling; my self feels, [and] my self has the property of feeling.”

*tasmātihānanda etenapetaṃ nakkhamati na heva kho me vedanā attā nopi appaṭisaṃvedano attā me vedayati vedanādhammo hi me attāti samanupassitum.*<sup>38</sup>

According to Walleser, the Buddha first refutes that the self is identical with feeling. And he also refutes that the self has feeling. And he even refutes that the self possesses a faculty

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<sup>37</sup> **ṭī.ṃ.** 10/63/78.

<sup>38</sup> **ṭī.ṃ.** 10/63/80.

of feeling.<sup>39</sup> Walleser interprets this as the negation of this transcendental subject. "Indeed it stands for a significant difference whether man denies every transcendental meaning from 'I' as the Buddha does, or whether man proves the individual independency of the separate Self as untenable without touching on the existence of a transcendent subject" (*Allerdings bedeutet es einen gewaltigen Unterschied, ob man dem Ich jede transzendente Bedeutung abspricht, wie es Buddha tut, oder ob man die individuell Selbständigkeit des Einzel-Ich als unhaltbar nachweist, ohne die Existenz eines transzendenten Subjekts anzutasten*).<sup>40</sup> Although it is extremely interesting that early Buddhism negates "every transcendental meaning" from "I," how should we understand this issue?

Besides, this study does not agree with Walleser's view that early Buddhism results in wishing "the own personal happiness" and "painlessness" verily because it negates the transcendental subject as a recipient of actions, into where "universal aims of the absolute subject" flow. The fact is that the old Upaniṣads --- according to Śāṅkara --- result in a static "mendicancy," while early Buddhism becomes a dynamic religion, which consists in intending to remove the suffering from this ephemeral world. As it is already seen in the previous chapter, the Absolute in the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism is not the Absolute One, but the Absolute state, the true view of the world, the true state of the world --- if Walleser understands the Absolute only as Absolute One, at least, in regard to

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<sup>39</sup> "The question, what various possible views of ātman are, will be answered in that place thus; firstly, one can identify it [ātman] with perception (or feeling, *vedanā*). Another view would be thus: one would say; 'perception does not belong to my self; my self does not have perception.' According to the third view, admittedly perception is not my self, but it is not that the latter [my self] does not have perception. Rather, my self has perception, and it possesses the faculty of perception." *Die Frage, welche die verschiedenen möglichen Betrachtungsweisen des ātman seien, wird an jener Stelle dahin beantwortet, daß man es zunächst mit der Empfindung (oder dem Gefühl, vedanā) gleichsetzen könne. Eine andere Auffassung wäre die, daß man sagte: „Empfindung gehört nicht meinen Selbst an; mein Selbst ist ohne Empfindung“. Nach einer dritten ist zwar nicht die Empfindung mein Selbst, auch ist letzteres nicht ohne Empfindung; vielmehr hat mein Selbst Empfindung, es besitzt die Fähigkeit zur Empfindung.* Max Walleser, **Die philosophische Grundlage des älteren Buddhismus** (Heidelberg: Carl Winter's Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1904), 69.

"The third view about the ātman, which is denied by the Buddha, is; this [ātman], being not identical with the perception, has perception and the faculty of perception in itself." *Die Dritte von Buddha bestrittene Ansicht über das ātman ist nun diejenige, nach welcher dieses, ohne mit der Empfindung identisch zu sein, Empfindung und die Fähigkeit des Empfindens an sich have. Die Widerlegung dieser Lehre wird in folgende Frage gekleidet. ... Ibid., 71.*

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 73.

the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism, it must be misunderstanding.<sup>41</sup>

### ***Śaṅkara's criticism***

By the way, it is verily Śaṅkara who points out the lack of the transcendental subject in early Buddhism. This transcendental subject, which is implied by “the light of lights,” is verily the most important reason why Śaṅkara sometimes blames Buddhist for being nihilist. For example, “Therefore, rejecting the devilish party of nihilist, the Self should be realised as Being itself, which has effects [based on] Being, and which has intellect and so on as its limiting adjuncts” (KaUB. 2.6.13). *tasmād apohyāsadvādīpakṣam āsuram astīty evātmopalabdavyaḥ satkāryabuddhyādyupādhibhiḥ.*<sup>42</sup> “As to the agreement of non-agentship by Buddhists because of agreement of non-existence [of everything], that is also wrong. It is because one agrees [the existence of] person, who agrees it [non-agentship]. ...” (CUB. 2.23.1). *yac ca bauddhaiḥ śūnyatābhyupagamād akartṛtvam abhyupagamate tad apy asaḥ. tadabhyupagantuḥ sattvābhyupagamāt.*<sup>43</sup>

As it is seen in the third chapter, in the old Upaniṣads even “seer” (*draṣṭṛ*) or “knower” (*jñāṭṛ*) does not imply an epistemological subject, but “intuitive knowledge” (*jñāna*), that through which our experience is established. Also here “agent” (*karṭṛ*) does not imply a subject of a deed, but the transcendental subject, which is postulated as a recipient of a deed. This transcendental subject is questioned here, as Śaṅkara says like this: “When they [the Buddhists] even assume that the annihilation (*nirvāṇa*) of consciousness is the aim of human life, then a recipient of results is impossible. ... Similarly, when there is no recipient during the annihilation of everything, it is totally meaningless to assume the aim of

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<sup>41</sup> “These various views are expressed practically thus: In the first case [in early Buddhism, which is negating even the transcendental self], in the case of lack of any other interest, which can be used as a counter-balance for a balance, the own personal happiness, being directed to painlessness, requires all efforts, while under another assumption [negation of only the independency of the individual self], the universal aims of the absolute subject, as far as they are noticeable for the individual, flow in and fill the emptied space of the private aims of person.” *Praktisch äußert sich diese verschiene Auffassung darin, daß im ersten Fall bei dem Fehlen jedes anderen Interesses, das als Gegengewicht in die Wagschale fallen könnte, das eigene persönliche Wohl, auf Schmerzlosigkeit gerichtet, unbedingt alles Sinnen und Trachten in Anspruch nimmt, während unter der anderen Voraussetzung die universalen Zwecke des absoluten Subjekts, soweit sie dem Individuum erkennbar sind, in den leergewordenen Raum der persönlichen Privatwecke einströmen und ihn ausfüllen.* Walleser, **Die philosophische Grundlage des älteren Buddhismus**, 73. As to early Buddhism, Walleser speaks of “the lack of the Absolute” (*der Mangel eines Absoluten*). It is not correct. What is lacking in early Buddhism is not the Absolute, but the Absolute One. See *Ibid.*, 71.

<sup>42</sup> **IDUŚB.**, 102.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 408.

human life" (BUB. 4.3.7). *yad api tasya vijñānasya nirvāṇaṃ puruṣārthaṃ kalpayanti, tatrāpi phalāśrayānupapattiḥ. ... tadvat sarvanirvāṇe'sati ca phalāśraye puruṣārthakalpanā vyarthaiva.*<sup>44</sup>

Thus, Śāṅkara correctly understands that early Buddhism does not approve the transcendental subject. But needless to say, early Buddhism is not nihilism. Why and how does early Buddhism abandon the transcendental subject?

### ***Becoming Brahma and becoming the Dhamma***

What is to be considered here is verily the two-sided emancipation --- the thought that the Absolute should be attained and overcome ---. This transcendental subject can never be negated by a speculative argument. In this point, Śāṅkara is correct. However, early Buddhism abandons the transcendental subject, verily through overcoming the Absolute. In other words, early Buddhism intends to overcome the Absolute together with that transcendental subject.

Originally, what is the core of the question in early Buddhism is "intuitive knowledge" (*paññā*). Or it is the development of intuitive knowledge. Intuitive knowledge is to be developed through empirical knowledge (*pariññā*), abandonment (*pahāna*), and realisation (*sacchikiriya*). What is to be achieved by this development is overcoming our natural and ordinary attitude --- which blindly supposes "knower" and "known" ---.

What is to be questioned through this two-sided emancipation is a criticism of this intuitive knowledge itself --- together with the transcendental subject ---. The true knowledge or the true intuitive knowledge does not end in "knowledge." It goes forward on. It means "becoming the Dhamma," embodying the Dhamma, or the way of embodying the Dhamma. What early Buddhism teaches here is not the superiority of practice to theory, but a fundamental question about the division between knowledge and action. What is here to be overcome is again our natural and ordinary attitude --- which supposes the groundless division between action and knowledge ---. Here, the true knowledge means "becoming."

As it is already seen in the previous chapter, in regard to the Absolute --- Brahma and Nirodha (or Nibbāna), there is almost no difference between the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism. Even as to "way," it is doubtless that early Buddhism is an authentic follower of the old Upaniṣads, as the thought of "becoming the Dhamma" is to be understood in a close relation with the Upaniṣadic statement "being but Brahma, one attains Brahma." Early Buddhism truly understands the philosophical essence in the old Upaniṣads, and it goes step further than them. Early Buddhism goes forwards through the two-sided emancipation --- attainment to the Absolute and abandonment of it ---. While in

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<sup>44</sup> IDUŚB., 876.

the old Upaniṣads “becoming Brahma” is ultimately to be understood as just “understanding” (*avagati*), in early Buddhism “becoming the Dhamma” implies obviously more than that. While the Upaniṣadic seers, the Saṃnyāsins, intend to realise the Absolute, getting rid of the ephemeral existence through abandoning signs --- including “banner” of the Saṃnyāsin ---, early Buddhism will intend to become “Dhamma-banner” (*dhammaddhaja*). The *Cakkavattisīhanāda-sutta* speaks of “banner” (*dhaja*, Skt. *dhvaja*) of the Dhamma as follows:

But what, Oh king [royal hermit], is this noble [duty] of turning the [Dhamma-]wheel? Oh dear son [king], it is that through which you, based on the Dhamma, honouring the Dhamma, respecting it, revering it, thinking highly of it, doing homage to it, as a banner of the Dhamma (*dhammaddhaja*), as a symbol of the Dhamma (*dhammaketu*), as one having the Dhamma as sovereignty, should provide a right protection for your family, for the army, for Kṣatriyas, for vassals, for Brāhmaṇas and householders, for town and country dweller, for Samaṇas and Brāhmaṇas, and for beasts and birds.

*katamaṃ panetaṃ deva ariyaṃ cakkavattivattanti. tenahi tvaṃ tāta dhammaṃyeva nissāya dhammaṃ sakkaronto dhammaṃ garukaronto dhammaṃ mānento dhammaṃ pūjento dhammaṃ apacāyamāno dhammaddhajo dhammaketu dhammādhigateyyo dhammikaṃ rakkhāvaraṇaguttiṃ saṃvidahassu antojanasmiṃ balakāyasmiṃ khattiyesu anuyantesu brāhmaṇagahapatikesu negamajānapadesu samaṇabrāhmaṇesu migapakkhīsu ...*<sup>45</sup>

In this stage, “transparency” is not necessarily antagonistic to “obstacles.” The Absolute is to be understood as even penetrating the obstacles --- the ephemeral existence of this world ---. So to speak, there one has crossed over the opposition between transparency and obstacles, as it is said in the *Suttanipāta*: “Lotus is not soiled by water” (*padumaṃva toyena alippamāno*).<sup>46</sup>

<sup>45</sup> 𑀓.𑀧𑀫. 11/35/64-65.

<sup>46</sup> 𑀓.𑀧. 25/296/339. Besides, a similar expression is still found in the old Upaniṣads. “Oh good one, they verily told you the worlds. But I shall tell you that, to the knower of which a sinful act does not cling, as water does not cling to a lotus leaf” (CU. 4.14.3). *lokān vāva kila somya te'vocann ahaṃ tu te tad vakṣyāmi yathā puṣkarapalāśa āpo na śliṣyanta evam evaṃ vidī pāpaṃ karma na śliṣyata ...* **IDUŚB.**, 459-460.

## CHAPTER 8

### CONCLUSION

The old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism have their own philosophical backgrounds. They start with their own points in dispute. A longing for the eternal, which is seen everywhere in the old Upaniṣads, is not irrelevant to the theistic tendency inherited from the Vedic literatures. Usually the Upaniṣadic thinkers begin with questioning how the eternal is found. On the other hand, in the Sutta-piṭaka, early Buddhism has its origin among a new group of thinkers, called "Samaṇas," who have mostly an atheistic tendency. The philosophical arguments in the Sutta-piṭaka begin with criticising the animistic view, which consists in looking for the eternal in this ephemeral world.

However, in spite of the difference in their own philosophical backgrounds and in their own points in dispute, both the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism face the same problem. This problem is concerned with two factors in the philosophical inquiry, which at first sight seem to be opposed to each other: The first one is a critical spirit, which consists in attaching importance to our direct experience in this temporal and manifold world. The second one is the pursuit of the truth, the truth as the Immortal. This study assumes that this problem is verily what is questioned under the theme "truth" in the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism.

This study pays attention to a concept "intuitive knowledge" (Skt. *jñāna*, *prajñā*, Pali *ñāṇa*, *paññā*) as a clue to question the concept "truth." As seen in the third chapter, this intuitive knowledge is first established along with empirical knowledge in this temporal and manifold world. This intuitive knowledge must be discriminated from a blind subjective intuition, which would be supposed to be established through abolishing our empirical knowledge.

To consider the meaning of "intuitive knowledge," this study investigates Being and dukkha, which are the most important themes in regard to the concept "truth" in the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism respectively. Admittedly, it can be roughly said that the theme of Being is closely related to theistic ontology, while the theme of dukkha is regarded as something materialistic or sensationalistic. But, from the viewpoint of knowledge --- especially "intuitive knowledge" ---, this study concludes that there is a strong philosophical trend common to these two. Firstly, this intuitive knowledge is established only along with the empirical knowledge. Secondly, this intuitive knowledge is the transcendental knowledge or the universal knowledge, namely, that through which this whole ephemeral

world is to be understood, or that through which the whole existence of this ephemeral world is established. Thirdly, this intuitive knowledge indicates a view of the world, so to speak, the two-world view: We are abiders of the two worlds. Although we live in this temporal and manifold world, at the same time we are able to intuitively know the universal through which this entire world is to be understood.

In ancient India, philosophy is always concerned with religious practice. "Dispassion" is a typical theme in this point. It is correct that abandonment of the worldly life, virtuous deed, and meditation are required as something leading to the Liberation. However, such an interpretation does not fully clarify the philosophical meaning of dispassion. In the old Upaniṣads, dispassion is a practical way to attain the Immortal, but the commentator Śāṅkara insists consistently that the final attainment to Brahma is possible only through knowledge --- in this point, the commentator's intention is not necessarily clear here ---. On the other hand, it is evident that in early Buddhism, what is questioned through dispassion --- and also through non-hate ---, namely, what is questioned through abandonment of worldly existence and virtuous existence is the development of intuitive knowledge along with our fundamental experience in the various states of existence.

In early Buddhism, the pursuit of truth begins with the truth of dukkha, which is the intuitive knowledge --- or the universal knowledge --- of the Dhamma of change. However, this truth is to be overcome by the development of intuitive knowledge, verily through dispassion and non-hate. Very probably this thought is not different from Śāṅkara's strange explanation about dispassion as a means to the Liberation. Being, which is the transcendental knowledge, is also to be overcome. This thought of "development of intuitive knowledge" is common to both of the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism, as it is expressed verily in the same word "the right view" (Skt. *samyagdarśana*, Pali *sammādiṭṭhi*).

Both the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism speak of the destruction of the world. This destruction is sometimes interpreted as merely the absence of passion or the absence of craving. But such an interpretation is not acceptable, although this interpretation is correct in thinking that neither the Upaniṣadic thought nor early Buddhism is nihilism.

As seen in the sixth chapter, in the old Upaniṣads, when we first understand the meaning of intuitive knowledge rightly, and when, through sublating the conditional truth such as the knowledge of Being by means of dispassion and so on, our normal and natural attitude --- called "ignorance" (*avidyā*) ---, according to which the world is seen as the knower and the known, is abandoned, and when the ephemeral existence of this world is destroyed by "knowledge" --- the knowledge of Brahma, or the right intuitive knowledge ---, then, the true state of the world or the true view of the world, which is called "the world which is Brahma," is revealed. "The destruction of the world" or "the entire destruction of

this ephemeral existence” here is to be understood in the literal sense. It implies the destruction of the world as the object in our normal and natural attitude, including the world as the object of natural sciences.

On the other hand, in early Buddhism, when the truth of dukkha is first to be understood through intuitive knowledge, and when this intuitive knowledge as our fundamental experience is developed through dispassion and non-hate, and when “ignorance” (*avijjā*) --- “ignorance” as the state having the substratum as condition and the state having the object as condition, one of the meanings of “I and mine” --- is abandoned, then, the truth of cessation ---- or the truth of cessation of dukkha --- is ultimately to be realised. Definitely this truth implies the realisation of the Immortal, Nibbāna, which is revealed along with the destruction of the five aggregates, the destruction of the body --- also called “death” ---, or the destruction of the world.

Thus, this study concludes that both the Māyā doctrine in the old Upaniṣads and the truth of cessation of dukkha in early Buddhism ultimately intend to express the fundamental experience or the realisation of the Immortal. Knowledge manifests instead of extinguished ignorance, or, in other words, the true state of the world or the true view of the world is revealed, when this ephemeral existence of the world is completely destroyed. In this point too, it is indubitably that early Buddhism is an authentic follower of the old Upaniṣads.

When the issue of “way” as in the way of Brahma and in the way of Arahatta is understood in the sense of “practice,” there might seem to be a big difference between the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism. According to such inappropriate understanding, the old Upaniṣads might seem to be an intellectual pessimism, which abandons the traditional practice such as “ritual” or “sacrifice,” and early Buddhism might seem to be a kind of idealistic moral philosophy, understanding the limitation of intellect, and attaching a high importance to “practice.” What is important is that the issue of “way” is questioned as the final step of the pursuit of truth, which is consistently based on the development of knowledge or intuitive knowledge. According to our normal and natural attitude, the difference between “knowledge” and “practice” has always been established already before our critical consideration. This difference, however, is what the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism commonly put into question. Ultimately, the true knowledge or the true intuitive knowledge must imply “becoming,” as it is typically said thus, “Being Brahma, he attains Brahma” in the old Upaniṣads. This must be a true meaning of “way.” Moreover, this Upaniṣadic thought of “way” evidently bears fruit in the form “having Dhamma as body” or “becoming Dhamma” in early Buddhism. As to the thought of “way” too, early Buddhism is an authentic follower of the old Upaniṣads.

This study, however, does not conclude that early Buddhism should be regarded as belonging to the traditional line in the Indian philosophy. It is undeniable that the Buddha is still a reformer of Indian orthodox philosophy, although he is a true reformer who, following the pursuit of truth which is also the core thought of the old Upaniṣads, keeping a critical spirit, still tries to go step further than it. Admittedly, this reformation is spoken of as a small difference with the old Upaniṣads in regard to the thought of “way” --- it consists in the point whether “attaining the Immortal” or “attaining and overcoming the Immortal” is to be understood as the ultimate realisation ---, it brings about a great influence in the world in the later periods, showing the possibility to open the door to the dynamic philosophy through overcoming the static monasticism.

### *Suggestion*

This study tried to investigate the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism as they originally were at that time, based on the ancient texts, which hold their authentic thoughts, such as the ten Upaniṣads and the Sutta-piṭaka --- especially the *Dīgha-nikāya* and the *Majjhima-nikāya* ---, while it also referred to their traditional and authoritative commentaries, such as Śaṅkara’s commentaries on the ten Upaniṣads, Buddhaghosa’s commentaries on the *Dīgha-nikāya* and the *Majjhima-nikāya*, and so on. Although it is not by any means appropriate to interpret the original thought based on the different thoughts in the later period, still possibly the true meaning of the original thought is revealed reflecting on its philosophical development. In this sense, the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism are to be further studied along with the investigation of various texts in the later periods, such as the philosophical texts of the Vedānta system, the commentarial texts of the Theravada Buddhism, the non-traditional texts of the Mahāyana Buddhism, and so on.

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