

**TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY DILEMMA: BALANCING ZERO
PROBLEMS WITH NEIGHBORS AND HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION IN THE CASE OF SYRIAN CRISIS**

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Thesis
entitled

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THESIS ADVISORY COMMITTEE: SRIPRAPHA PETCHARAMESREE, Ph.D.,
EAKPANT PINDAVANIJA, Ph.D.**ABSTRACT**

Turkish Foreign Policy was challenged first by the Arab Spring and then by the Syrian crisis. This thesis examined how the Syrian Crisis affected the Turkish Foreign Policy through its humanitarian and human rights dimensions. It aimed to analyze the Zero Problem With Neighbors – ZPWN and its compatibility with the exigencies of the Syrian Crisis through the humanitarian intervention lenses. The theories of liberalism and realism were used to critically study the “humanitarian intervention” in the Turkish Foreign Policy through documentary research as well as interviews with humanitarian workers and the policy makers identified, whilst applying an analytic and interpretative approach in data analysis. This thesis only covered the period between 2011, when the Syrian Crisis began until 2013. With the background study of Turkish foreign policy during the Arab Spring, it was revealed that even though “ZPWN” was based on non-interventionism, crises like Libya and then Syria demanded that Turkey should have intervened and protected its self-interests. It was clear that finally, the political and economic interests and the realist perspective of the Turkish Foreign policy triumphed. The “ZPWN” policy introduced as the one and only foreign policy of the Turkish state had failed to answer all the needs and demands of Turkish foreign policy agenda when challenged by the crisis. The ZPWN policy was volatile as realist and liberal aspects challenged each other. Turkish foreign policy makers shifted from one to another in different circumstances. It was also found that whilst humanitarianism and human rights seemed to be high in the Turkish foreign policy agenda, they were not the determining factors of interventions. This thesis argued that self-interests were still pre-dominant in the Turkish Foreign Policy and that interests prevented the Turkish state to play a constructive role in the Syrian crisis. The Turkish self-interests, the failure of the international community to properly intervene, the competition between major powers such as USA and Russia resulted in continuing Syrian Crisis until today. Therefore it could be concluded that the over-responsiveness of Turkey and the non-responsiveness of the international community gave way to groups like ISIS to rise in the power-vacuum and created a major devastation and long-term future impacts in Syria.

KEY WORDS: SYRIAN CRISIS/ HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION/ TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY/ ZPWN

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

Starting with the AKP's coming to power in 2002, Turkey developed a new approach to its foreign policy, emphasizing "improvements in its relations with its surrounding countries and getting rid of the defensive policies which see all its neighbors as enemies", calling it a "zero problem with neighbors (zpwn)". This policy aimed to create a new foreign policy to deal with the regional conflicts. It also was adopted to create better relations with the neighboring countries by taking up the opportunities and responsibilities as an international power in Turkey's region. "Zpwn" policy was generally based on equal security for all neighboring countries, economic integration, the co-existence of different cultures in a respectful manner in both domestic and foreign relations, high-level political co-operation, a high-level of regional consciousness, and understanding the relationship between security and stability and development in regional and in international level (Zenturk, 2013). "Zpwn" policy was also designed to negate the effects of instability in the region to improve Turkey's democratization process, economic development and the long-term peace of its sovereign territory by establishing better relations with its neighbors.

In this thesis, I analyze the Turkish foreign policy, "zpwn", with a background of Arab Spring movements in North Africa and Middle East while specifically focusing on the challenges of humanitarianism and human rights issues in Syrian conflict as a primary research subject. This thesis will illustrate how Turkish foreign policy adapted to changes in the political structure in the region, specifically in Syria in liberal foreign policy perspective. The Syrian conflict is still an ongoing issue in both regional and international levels and Turkey's initial reactions to this conflict have affected the process until now. Turkish dilemma on whether to keep relations good with the Assad regime or to put humanitarianism, humanitarian intervention and human rights as priority concerns, has pushed Turkey in to the Syrian conflict. Turkey is now

hosting the largest number of refugees in its history from a conflict that started as a domestic disturbance but spread all through the region like a wildfire with a several actors involved. Another reason to research about this topic is that, before the Arab Spring Movements, Turkey has established stable economic and cultural relations with the countries affected by the movements. When the movements started the dilemma of whether to keep the non-interference policy or not, has challenged Turkish foreign policy from its grassroots as the international pressure on Turkish policy makers demanded action. Turkey resisted by keeping its interference only in the humanitarian aid level prior to Syrian crisis while Turkey was a pioneer to ask for an international intervention in Syria after all diplomatic solutions were depleted. This decision came after the Syrian conflict spilled to the neighboring countries in which Turkey is one. So as a conclusion, this subject is important as the dilemma of the “zpwn” policy will affect the future of the Turkish foreign policy and its relations with the regional and international partners.

This thesis also seeks to explain the challenges facing Turkey’s “zpwn” policy in the context of the developments and challenges associated with the ‘Arab Spring’. Under these developments and challenges, it shows how Turkey’s foreign policy understanding has been affected in the region, and how Turkey should cope with these changes requiring urgent answers. The main argument of the thesis is that the conflicts mentioned brought challenges and risks to the Turkish foreign policy, but these challenges can be seen as opportunities to move Turkish foreign policy forward in the ways of humanitarianism and human rights approach. First significance therefore is on the future of the policy formulation and Turkey’s recent challenges. This thesis main focus is to understand the hard choices that the AKP government had to make between non-interference in Syria due to the “zpwn” and humanitarian assistance due to the international pressure.

With AKP in power, “zpwn” policy has come in to full effect in Turkey’s relationships with its neighbors and with the international community, creating a new era for Turkish diplomacy. However this era of a more peaceful and smooth relations with the neighbors came to a halt when the “Arab Spring” movements started in North Africa and spread throughout the regions where Libya, Tunisia, Egypt and later on Syria got affected with the movement. Turkey’s “zpwn” policy was caught off-guard with the

Arab Spring movement (Oguzlu, 2012). By promoting peaceful negotiations and humanitarian aid policies as first options in Arab Spring movements, Turkey's foreign policy started to be tested in the North African region first. Turkish policy makers decided to take these movements as an opportunity to become a goal setting country in the way to democracy and humanitarianism for the countries affected by Arab Spring movements while also contributing to an international intervention in Libya by providing humanitarian aid to the Libyan people and implementing an economic and military embargo against the Qaddafi regime (Yesiltas, 2013) showing that Turkey will not stand idle if the conflict is continuous and is spilling its effects to the region. Therefore the "zpw" policy was put into test with the start of the Arab Spring movements about its humanitarian principles while also being tested in an international intervention to a domestic conflict that started in a sovereign state.

When the Syrian conflict erupted in 2011, Turkey's priority concern was to make sure that Syria's internal crisis, fueled by the Arab Spring movements would not affect Turkey-Syria relations in a negative way. Unlike Libya, Turkish policy makers also were more cautious against any foreign military intervention, from the lessons learned in Iraq. Iraq, being a state still with no near future solution to its domestic conflicts, majorly divided in three parts between three ethnic groups with different agendas Kurds in the North, Sunnis in the central Iraq and Shia mainly in southern Iraq). With each group claiming to have power outside the central government, Turkey became more cautious, to avoid a possibility to have another neighbor being divided and persistently under conflict. In these conditions, Turkish government promoted a more peaceful and optimistic approach to the Syrian conflict by trying to promote rule of law and democracy in Syria while trying to convince Assad regime to listen to their people by implementing more liberal policies and easing the situation by diplomacy. Turkey's approach to Syrian conflict transformed into a more "*liberal, assertive, normative and humanitarian*" (Oguzlu, 2013) approach. As the crisis continued and a surge of refugees entered into Turkish territory, running away from the Syrian military and opposition forces and new parties which entered the conflict such as ISIS creating a risk of having domestic problems in Turkish territory. Turkish foreign policy makers decided that taking a risk and letting the refugees enter Turkey, which have been seen as traitors and insurgents by the Syrian government, is a humanitarian way of intervening to the

conflict in Syria. Also the strengthening of Turkish democracy since 1990s made the Turkish foreign policy makers to be more attentive to the democratic situation in their neighboring countries. Syria, increasingly drifting away from democracy, urged Turkey to push its liberal agenda and be more assertive on the Assad regime to be more liberal and avoid being authoritarian. And even though Turkey was calling for democracy, it wasn't pushing its own agenda to the Syrian regime, the call was for Syrian government to hear the people more and be tuned in with the international discourse through liberal policies. Even though most of the rising powers like Russia and China had reservations on international intervention in Syria, Turkey also never pushed for an intervention until all the possible ways were depleted and there were no more diplomacy left to wheel the situation in Syria out of a conflict that will surely have an impact on the region while creating severe human rights violations.

Adopting the Turkish “zpwn” policy to the Syrian crisis, Turkish policy makers made it clear that when there are clear violations of human rights and rulers pursue them with their policies, both domestic and international, the international community might get involved to avoid severe human rights violations by stopping oppression of these rulers. These conflicting views showed that the “zpwn” policy is a thin line to walk according to Bülent Arınç (Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey). Turkish foreign policy is based on the humanitarian principles but it is hard to forget the historical and geopolitical connections with neighboring countries (Arinc, 2013). The question that the Turkish foreign policy makers asked the world was how humanitarian intervention could be balanced while not interfering until all the solutions are depleted and for Turkey the question was how to balance a call for a humanitarian intervention with its “zpwn” policy.

1.2 Research Objectives

The objectives of the thesis are as follows:

- To examine how the Syrian crisis affected Turkish foreign policy and its theoretical foundations

- To analyze the decisions made by the Turkish foreign policy makers' between the non-interference due to "zpwn" in Syria and humanitarian responsibilities due to international and domestic pressure
- To discuss how human rights contributes Turkey's foreign policy to shape decisions and actions
- To assess the theoretical relationship between the "zpwn" towards the Syrian Crisis in Turkish foreign policy's humanitarian perspective and its effects in the regional and international politics based on human rights issues and humanitarian approach

1.3 Research Questions

- How did Turkey balance its "zpwn" policy in its two edged non-intervention vs. need to intervene challenge in the ongoing conflicts around its region?
- When challenged with the Syrian Crisis and their regional and international effects, what were the Turkish foreign policy reactions to human rights issues and humanitarian crisis?
- What can the Turkish foreign policy learn from advancing and using human rights and humanitarianism as its main principles while adopting "zpwn" in a more effective human rights approach and humanitarian intervention cases?
- As in theory, what aspects have the "zpwn" policy affected the Turkish foreign policy implied in an ethical humanitarian interventionist view and/or a focused to the self-interest based foreign policy?

1.4 Research Methods

This thesis is based on Turkey's response and its approach to human rights issues and humanitarianism throughout the beginning of the Syrian civil war with the background of Arab Spring movements in Northern Africa. The thesis assesses the cooperation and negotiations between Turkey and the countries affected from the Arab Spring movements prior to the Syrian civil war and as a qualitative research, the thesis

is based on document research about Turkish foreign policy and its humanitarian principles regarding the Syrian civil war. In order to understand the framework of the Turkish foreign policy and its humanitarian principles, the thesis explores the relevant literature on the history of Turkish foreign policy and the more recent “zpwn” policy with a human rights focus. In order to give a broader sense of the nature of Turkish foreign policy, this thesis explores critiques about the “zpwn” policy as well as the Turkish involvement in the Arab Spring movements under humanitarian principles. To include these points of views, this thesis expands its literature to include relevant books, journal articles, academic papers and theses and dissertations about controversial views as well.

This research also includes documentary research such as the Geneva Conferences over the Syrian conflict and Turkey’s involvement in these conferences while also including the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) meeting papers through the course of the Syrian crisis wherever they are reachable. These documents are used in order to understand and analyze the international view on the Syrian crisis.

This thesis also focuses on the official Turkish foreign ministry declarations, international responses to Arab Spring movements, binding and non-binding human rights documents, country statements and ministry level speeches given to public about the Arab Spring movements. The document research also includes, without being limited to, academic papers, journal articles, and theses and dissertations about the subject.

To understand and analyze the Turkish foreign policy makers’ official point of view, this thesis also uses interviews with officials from the Turkish government as well as from the NGOs and international organizations to give a wider picture while having a deeper understanding of the topic. Officials from Turkish Foreign Ministry and NGOs and UNHCR have been pursued to establish these interviews. These interviews are important in the sense that they give some insight to the subject at hand and maybe show different point of views about the Syrian Conflict and Turkish Foreign Policy from different areas of officials and researchers working with the government, NGOs and UNHCR. 15 informants has been identified from 3 categories of people namely foreign policy makers in Turkey involved in decisions related to Turkish Foreign Policy, individuals working in the field of humanitarian intervention and human rights and

academics active in the field of foreign policy making and human rights. For each group, 5 persons were interviewed. The experts have been defined with their works related to human rights and Turkish Foreign Policy as well as their professional background related to the subject of the thesis. These officials have been contacted via email or phone and their consent were taken over the interview questions. The experts on foreign policy of Turkey have been selected from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Turkey, while the academics in foreign policies have been selected from a variety of state and private universities. The field experts have been selected from NGOs and international organizations that are working on the Syrian refugees as well as government official related to the Syrian crisis centers. The information on how and why the interviewees have been selected and the guidelines for the interviewees has been shown in the annex sections of the thesis.

This research also uses an interpretive approach, as this thesis is more on to understand rather than predict the incidents concerning the Syrian crisis as well the fluid situation of the policies involved during the research scope. This type of approach is used as the Syrian Crisis is still ongoing and it is an effective method in regards to the data collection techniques used in this thesis such as the interviews on the field from experts.

1.5 Research Scope

The scope of this thesis focuses on the period of the beginning of the Syrian civil war and to specify the subject, it is focused on the ongoing Syrian crisis and the Turkish foreign policy reactions throughout this time period. It includes Turkey's relations with other actors, with the countries that have been affected by the Arab Spring movements prior to the Syrian civil war to give background knowledge of the conditions affecting the Syrian civil war. The foreign policy analysis starts from the time AKP came to power in 2002 up until the first two years of the Syrian crisis (up until end of 2013) where the Turkish foreign policy saw significant changes to its discourse. This period of the Syrian conflict has seen numerous challenges to the Turkish foreign policy and Turkey got involved in the conflict more by starting to accept more refugees and drifting apart from the Syrian regime. Therefore the scope is important to understand

the start of the ongoing Syrian conflict as well as the Turkish reactions to the ongoing Syrian conflict within this research scope.

1.6 Conceptual Framework

This conceptual framework includes liberalism versus realism background for Turkish foreign policy's evolution during the AKP period in accordance with humanitarian intervention and Syrian crisis. Therefore this section will argue concepts such as realist foreign policy, liberal foreign policy, Turkish foreign policy in regards to both theories and humanitarian intervention and responsibility to protect (R2P) with a focus to the Turkish perspective. This section will also introduce the argument of

A) Realism and Turkish Foreign Policy

Realism in international relations theories is significant in its way of showing the competitive and conflicting nature of international politics. It is therefore usually contrasted with liberalism which is on the other side of spectrum by emphasizing cooperation between international political actors. The early radical realists such as Machiavelli consider that the principal actors in international relations are states which are concerned about their own security and their own self-interests pursuing their ways for their own struggle for power (Machiavelli, 1531). This significant emphasis of power and self-interest in the radical realist theory comes from skepticism of the realists' in regards to the ethical norms in relations between states which the radical realists argue that these states are also formed by individuals who are also egoistical and power-pursuing. According to radical realists domestic politics is a place for rule of law and absolute authority of the states themselves but when it comes to international relations, the international arena is a sphere with no justices and constantly characterized with potential conflict between state actors (SEP, 2013) This type of realism can be considered as a Machiavellian way of seeing state relations where there are no ethics but only self-interest when it comes to state relations in international arena .

Radical realism evolved in to classical realism during the 20th century with political philosophers such as Niebuhr and Morgenthau. Classical realists draw a distinct line from the Machiavellian radical realism by emphasizing that the nature of

international relations is not only war and conflict between states without any moral which are only justified by self-reasoning of states by arguing that realism is in fact a skepticism to morality in between states which don't take into political realities when making a decision about their actions (Bull, 1995). Classical realists give extreme importance on the understanding that states have the ability to justify the rightfulness of their actions from among several possible alternatives basing them on their possible political consequences (Morgenthau, 1954). As an important political philosopher, Morgenthau described realist theory as a "concept of power" or "interests defined in terms of power" as he wanted to transform realism as a tool of international relations and not only a theory where states and/or political leaders act in self-interests to define and justify their power and actions (Morgenthau, 1970). Although Morgenthau defines that interests defined as a power is a universal tool for state actors and a significant part of the political element, he also recognizes that several actors can be associated with the motive of self-interest in international relations depending on different time and consequences and these contents can be used in a manner of that specific political and cultural environments (Morgenthau, 1970). Morgenthau also argues against the radical realists by acknowledging that morals can be play a part in self-interests but he puts morals as a tool rather than as the main purpose of international relations. He argues how morals can be used as *"a man who was nothing but 'political man' would be a beast, for he would be completely lacking in moral restraints. A man who was nothing but 'moral man' would be a fool, for he would be completely lacking in prudence"* (Morgenthau, 1970). Morgenthau's argument on realism can be summarized in these words; it sees power and interests as central principles which makes politics and international relations as an autonomous discipline in which state actors pursue their own self-interests without concern of morality, religious beliefs, motives or ideologies of their individual political leaders and even though the leaders are the ones who make those self-interest decisions states are main and continuous actors that suffer from wrong decisions or egoistical ways of the leaders. Therefore Morgenthau argues that to avoid conflicts from egoistical decisions of the leaders or other actors that are involved, states, as permanent actors in international relations, should avoid taking actions such as moral crusades or ideological confrontations and just focus on their basis of satisfaction by compromising their mutual interests alone (Morgenthau, 1951). To strengthen his point

of view, Morgenthau argues the concept of “rational foreign policy”. As classical realism of Morgenthau goes, he describes that a good foreign policy as “rational” which emphasizes the pursuit of power and self-interests as a norm instead of presenting an actual portrait of relations between humans which also should be focused on minimizing risks and maximizing benefits (Morgenthau, 1970). It can be seen that classical realists such as Morgenthau still sees international relations as an area of anarchy but with more actors, such as morals and organizations that aren't state based, which can be involved for the sake of being used to reach the self-interests as an end-game.

Neo-realism on the other end, have evolved in the late 20th century with philosophers, such as Kenneth Waltz arguing different perspectives of realism. I will use Kenneth Waltz's perspective for explaining neo-realism and for Turkish foreign policy prior to AKP's coming to power, in this section. Kenneth Waltz responded to the liberal theory and the defects of the classical realism which have been argued by Morgenthau, by setting out a theory which isn't based on arguments of human nature but rather on arguments on a theory that is closely related to microeconomics (Waltz, 1979). According to Waltz, paying attention to the individual states, ideological, moral and economic issues, are a mistake both traditional liberals and classical realists do as they fail to understand and define a serious picture of the international system which can be easily abstracted from the wider socio-political and domestic domain of the states (Waltz,1979). Even though Waltz also realizes that abstracting such values from international system causes a lack of meaning to analyze development of different foreign policies while also he argues that the utility outweighs the disadvantages of the lack of individual analysis of foreign policies. His argument's base suggests that his point of view assists to understand the primary determinants of international politics and his neorealist theory can't be applied to domestic politics which classical realists see as an important part of the international relations (Waltz, 1979). And even though with this lack of understanding on how states create policies regarding their domestic and international affairs, neorealism can help explain why states behave in similar ways despite their differences in their government structures and political ideologies and despite their growing interdependence, how international relations and the way states act in international arena still remains the same (Waltz, 1979).

The difference between classical realism and neorealism is that Waltz argues that states act in uniform over centuries even with different agendas and self-interests, because of the constraints that have been imposed on them by international systems and structures. In that sense Waltz describes a system, defining it with its organization, its difference in between its units and by distribution of its power in between its units (Waltz, 1979). In an international system, Waltz sees anarchy or absence of authority as the main principle and even though there can be non-state actors they are irrelevant or relatively unimportant. In that sense Waltz and Morgenthau both agree that non-state actors are not as significant as in liberal theories which will be discussed in the upcoming sections. Neorealism argues that since all states want to survive and achieve its self-interests, and anarchy in international relations is the main element of the international relations, each state has to take care of itself with no division of labor or functional differences which sums up to the idea that while functionally similar they are only distinguished by their own capabilities to perform same functions (Guzinni, 1998).

Another difference between neorealism and classical realism can be argued on how they see power in which classical realists sees power as both means and an end with rational state behavior explained only to achieve as much power as possible whereas neo-realists argues that power should be distributed for the fundamental interest of security for each individual states (Morgenthau, 1970, Waltz, 1979). The distribution argued by neo-realists in between states can vary while anarchy in international relations remains unchanged. Even though emphasizing on interdependence in international relations, Waltz argues that anarchy limits international cooperation by fueling fears of insecurity and unequal gains (Waltz, 1979). Therefore according to neo realists even with international interdependence, states can only act in a way of self-help and self-interests and naturally they won't put themselves in conditions or situations that require increased dependence. Neorealism has become an influential an influential theory from the above theoretical elegance but also from its practical use in international relations in which Turkish foreign policy have also been affected.

The Iraqi invasion by USA, the incidents of 9/11 in 2001, the NATO operation in Afghanistan, also pushed Turkey to the edge that it felt alone in international arena with its supposed allies having their own agenda without consulting

Turkey and other regional powers. This and a constant fear from neighbors such as Greece with which it was in constant conflict over the islands in Aegean and with countries like Iran where both Turkey and Iran trying to become a regional power, Turkey adopted a realist perspective of foreign relations which can be considered as neorealist which Waltz argued. Turkey kept its relations with the international organizations and non-state actors while in the meantime, organized its domestic politics to have self-dependence and maintained its seeking of power in accordance with the trends of the time, for example pushing its own ideals in NATO to intervene to Bosnian crisis and also disapproving but still being pushed to be a part of the Afghanistan invasion by assuming only a peacekeeping position in the operation with its military. Turkey also had domestic problems mostly in economy prior to AKP, where organizations such as IMF and World Bank, having a tight grip in Turkish economy pushing Turkey even further from becoming a part of the international community and pursuing self- help understanding of foreign and domestic policies. Therefore the series of events that pushed Turkish foreign policy to be more realist than liberal were also the reasons that AKP came to power promising to restore Turkey as a regional and international power by changing its foreign policy and solving its struggles in international arena. AKP as a domestic actor used this lonely and paranoid realist foreign policy and Turkish point of view to see neighbors and international organizations as enemies and changed them to more liberal views or used liberal policies together with realist policies when needed which is discussed in next section.

B) Liberalism and Turkish Foreign Policy

Liberalism sees international system as a means to maintain a peaceful world order and actors can achieve this order by being a part of this system (Burchill, 2005) countering the idea of realism that this kind of order can't be achieved due to violence and insecurities. As such liberalism argues that human beings are not naturally violent and peace is actually achievable. Burchill argues that Thomas Payne explains that people actually want peace but their governments have an interest in creating wars (Burchill, 2005). So it can be argued that liberalism is possible and desired in people level while realism is a constant reality of states and governments. Burchill also states that wars are cancers that make people suffer but on the other hand people, themselves,

are the only cure to treat and cure the disease of wars (Burchill, 2005). The means to cure the disease of wars, liberals argue that democracy and democratic institutions will break the power struggles of the ruling elites and free trade and diplomacy would support the democracies and democratic institutions to curb the violence in search of achieving maximum gain from both diplomacy and trade. Liberal foreign policy relies on rejecting coercive instruments and rather relies on diplomacy (Smith, Hadfield and Dunne, 2012). Diplomatic tools that can be used in this period of diplomacy, in a liberal foreign policy can be named as such; economic interdependence, high-level political dialogue, development assistance, cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy (Smith Hadfield and Dunne, 2012). Free trade and free commerce, according to liberals would break the barriers in between states and communities while rule of law in international relations, instead of anarchy as argued in realism, would create a secure environment to protect everyone's interests (Burchill, 2005). Naturally rule of law, democracy and free trade can also be alternatives to military solutions and even prevent military actions before they happen.

Unlike realism, liberalism in international relations sees non-state actors as important and as significant part of international relations as the state actors. Liberals disagree with realism that the state is the sole actor that is important in international relations in which they argue that even though the states are important part of the international system, individual actors and domestic politics which is cast aside by realists, are also important in international relations and international system. Therefore liberals put great importance on individual actions, groups and both individuals' and groups' self interest in their states (Moravcsik, 1993). Moravcsik also argues that despite realists argument on individual loyalty to the state, in liberal theory individuals can have their own interests which often are different from the government leaders or the state actors both in domestic and international arenas (Moravcsik, 1993). In this sense Moravcsik argues, "*private individuals independently calculate personal gains and losses from foreign policy, popular support for foreign policy initiatives, for government institutions and, indeed, for the survival of the state itself, all depend fundamentally on the precise nature of individual preferences and their relation to the international environment*" (Moravcsik, 1993). Liberalism clearly suggests, contrary to realism, that individuals can have completely different agendas compared to state actors when it

comes to both foreign and domestic policies and the ideal of realism that states are unified actors in themselves don't exist in practice and won't exist (Viotti, Kauppi, 1999). To prove this point liberals argue that even in domestic politics there are political parties, electoral systems, bureaucracies and over all these individual choices that effect elections therefore a unified idea of state actors is just a claim that can't be achieved as realists argue. And even though these individual needs and goals are also not unified, liberals argue that individuals can use tools such as democracy, rule of law and free trade to express and possibly achieve their need of peace and common objectives (Moravcsik, 1999).

Even though realists and liberals both agree that anarchy exists in both international and domestic politics, liberals differ with realists in the sense that anarchy isn't a tool to compete for power and resources but instead a to cooperate and achieve common goals which lead to a peaceful order. Therefore liberals put important emphasis on both regional and international cooperation and institutions and argue that with such institutions international community can reach the optimum goal of peace (Keohane, 2015). Liberals also argue that with international cooperation there won't be a need for a sole superpower for organizing and/or forcing behaviors to keep actors balanced and/or checked (Burchill, 2005). Burchill explains these notions as *“anarchy is mitigated by regimes and institutional cooperation which brings higher levels of regularity and predictability to international relations. Regimes constrain state behavior by formalizing the expectations of each party to an agreement where there is a shared interest. Institutions then assume the role of encouraging cooperative habits, monitoring compliance and sanctioning defectors. Regimes also enhance trust continuity and stability in a world of ungoverned anarchy. Regimes constrain state behavior by formalizing the expectations of each party to an agreement where there is a shared interest. Institutions then assume the role of encouraging cooperative habits, monitoring compliance and sanctioning defectors. Regimes also enhance trust continuity and stability in a world of ungoverned anarchy”* (Burchil, 2005). It can be argued that according to liberals, the checks and balances can be achieved by constant cooperation between state actors and non-state actors. Non-state actors can be formed by organizations imposed by state actors or individuals whereas there can also be international organizations formed solely by state actors to help impose international

peace ideals. In this sense free economic relations, promotion of democracy and forming international organizations can walk hand in hand to create a secure international environment and also secure domestic environments.

Liberals also disagree with the realists on forming alliances and trade agreements. Liberals see that alliances and trade agreements are worth considering if both states benefit regardless of how well one or another state get an advantage while realists discourage any and all alliances or trade agreements, arguing that relative power advantages will surely create violence and insecurities even both states will benefit from such agreements one way or another (Burchill, 2005). In that sense, free trade is an essential part of liberal theory where all states benefit one way or another from the free flow of goods instead of pursuing their own national interests and self-sufficiencies where some states that don't have the resources will end up being left out. With free-trade ideal, liberals argue that economic interdependence and cooperation will bring state actors closer and they can achieve the means to create a peaceful international environment (Burchill, 2005). Furthermore, according to liberals, trade makes states not only more powerful in their economy, but also demolishes barriers in between communities and individual actors too. Therefore, with economic interdependence based on free trade, states avoid war and aggressive behavior against each other.

Turkish foreign policy adopted the ideals of liberalism during the AKP era with promoting free trade and regional organizations such as the Arab League. Turkish foreign policy makers during the AKP era, have given incentives to businessmen going into foreign markets and companies dealing with infrastructure projects all around the region while working on more relax visa regiments in order to create economic interdependence in the region, while creating a development assistance program for countries that are developing in the region in order to increase trade opportunities (Smith, Hadfield and Dunne, 2012). While working on these projects, Turkey also have launched a diplomatic initiative to become more influential in international politics, while forming regional pacts and organizations to increase its say in regional level as well (Fidan, 2013). Turkey also used its cultural ties backed up with its development assistance, in its region, increasing its ODA for more than 1.2 billion dollars (Karacasulu, 2015). As it can be seen the Turkish foreign policy during the AKP era is based on liberal arguments in foreign policy theories. However, the former foreign

minister Prof. Ahmet Davutoglu has also shaped Turkish foreign policy with his book, *The Strategic Depth (Stratejik Derinlik)*. The Turkish foreign policy in AKP era has been influenced from Prof. Ahmet Davutoglu's book, "The Strategic Depth" (*Stratejik Derinlik*). In his major academic work, Prof. Davutoglu argues that Turkey, which has been silent over the years in its foreign policy, can open up slowly, starting a regional advance in diplomatic relations which is followed by a more international approach based on economic and cultural relations (Davutoglu, 2001). His argument relies on the historical ties between Turkey and its region and Turkey's western orientation despite being surrounded by mostly middle-eastern world, that Turkey is a bridge in between cultures and it has an advantage to use both regions' experience for advancing Turkish foreign interests without creating conflicts (Davutoglu, 2001). Turkey's foreign policy, based on a liberalism concept during the AKP era, evolved from the realist policies of the past that have been argued above, using the historical and cultural ties and economic incentives as well as economic investments in the developing region created a stable period of time for Turkish foreign policy makers. However, with the start of the Arab Spring movements and later on the Syrian Crisis which affected Turkey's regional and international interests as well as its policy agenda, Turkey got stuck in between a liberal non-interventionist foreign policy and a realist and more self-interest based foreign policy again and from time to time had to use both theories at hand which will be discussed in upcoming chapters. Therefore this thesis will argue through showing Turkey's reactions to the Syrian crisis at hand, how Turkey's AKP era, liberal "zpw" policy have been challenged with self-interests and international actors while going back and forth due to fluid conditions of the crises at hand.

C) Humanitarian Intervention and Turkish Perspective

Another concept that is used in this thesis is the concept of "humanitarian intervention" that Turkey has been using as an argument in Syrian Crisis to appeal to the international community. Humanitarian intervention is a controversial concept in international relations and there are arguments for and against it (Hozlgrafe and Keohane, 2003). There is the argument that humanitarian intervention changes the way sovereignty is defined; as in international community sovereignty is defined as indivisible while on the other hand sovereignty can also be defined as contingent on

protecting civilian populations, upholding and protecting human rights, and fulfilling domestic and international fundamental obligations of human rights (Haass, 2007). On the other hand, arguments against humanitarian intervention can be seen as that the process of militarily intervening against another sovereign state is a violation of that states' right to self-determination, which can be argued as a violation of the United Nations (UN) Charter (UN Charter, 1945). Apart from the major realist concern mentioned above, the critique made by the realists on humanitarian intervention is to avoid intervention based on national interests of great powers (Yoshida, 2013). A more detailed stu

1.7 Significance of The Research

This thesis is significant because there are not enough research about the humanitarian intervention concept and the Syrian crisis together, especially for the beginning of the Syrian crisis. The Syrian crisis is still ongoing so this thesis can contribute as an academic paper for the past of the Syrian crisis in order to understand the future of the crisis. This thesis also contributes by putting new data collected from experts in the human rights field as well as government officials. The writer is conducting this research in order to fill a gap between relations of the concepts of humanitarian intervention, the changing Turkihs foreign policy and Syrian crisis as well as the Arab Spring movements.

This thesis also contributes to the academic literature by assessing how Turkish foreign policy has been affected by the Syrian crisis both theoretically and practically. The beginning of the Syrian crisis has been a contradicting era for the Turkish foreign policy and its foundations so this thesis helps to put this period into a context of assessment of Turkish foreign policy through the Arab Spring movements until Syrian crisis and the Turkish reaction to these conflicts while putting the Turkish foreign policy in a more theoretical concept with its implementations in the real-time politics There are missing research on the existing academia on the humanitarian side of the Turkish foreign policy and this thesis tries to add to the limited research on this subject.

1.8 Limitations Of The Research

Transcripts of the state negotiations as well as important negotiations on human rights issues are classified documents. Information on these issues, including statements made, conditions dealt and a variety of diplomatic maneuvers are limited to media reports, quotes from public statements and secondary documents which provide some details on what are allowed to be discussed and shared with public. This limitation of closed door negotiations and agreements, binds this thesis to rely on public documents and author's own assessment of these documents and information as well the state and/ or NGO or international organizations officials' statements in the interviews made. The thesis tries to overcome these limitations by using an extensive set of literature from a variety of resources as well as by taking personal opinions of experts in their field that have access to the documents stated above or working in the same subject.

1.9 Thesis Outlines

This thesis is divided into five chapters including the introduction in chapter one which gives an overall introduction to the thesis as well the theoretical framework to give the readers an idea on which concepts are used to analyze the Syrian crisis and Turkish foreign policy.

The second chapter of the thesis gives a brief history on how the Turkish foreign policy was implemented prior to the AKP era, later on focusing on the early stages of the Arab Spring movements which coincided with the third term of the AKP government. This chapter will analyze and argue how the new ZPWN policy in the AKP era was implemented towards different actors prior to the Syrian crisis with an example of an intervention from the Libyan case.

The third chapter analyzes how the Turkish foreign policy reacted to the early years of the Syrian crisis which is the main subject of this thesis by giving a history of the two countries' relations while focusing on how the zpwn coped with an immediate threat to the Turkish foreign and domestic politics giving examples of the Turkish policy makers' struggles to mobilize the international community to take action.

The fourth chapter focuses on the concept of humanitarian intervention and the humanitarian principles of the Turkish foreign policy in Syrian crisis. This chapter

argues how the international community and Turkish foreign policy reacted to the Syrian humanitarian crisis, analyzing how the international community failed to take action in the Syrian crisis, leaving Turkey and the countries in the region alone to struggle with the challenges which the Syrian crises brought.

Chapter five is the conclusion and the last analysis about the Turkish foreign policy challenges and the Syrian crisis and an overview of the thesis with an epilogue on current issues regarding the Syrian crisis.

CHAPTER II

PRE-ARAB SPRING AND DURING ARAB SPRING TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN AKP ERA (2002 TO 2011)

2.1 Introduction

With the general elections results in 2002, AKP established a 34.28 percentage of the votes with 363 seats in the parliament, becoming a single-party government following decades of coalition governments in Turkey. When AKP came to power, Turkey's foreign policy was severely disrupted with its eastern neighbors, regarding the mutual distrust on political matters and recent conflicts in the region, while Turkey was stuck in its EU membership process. Also coming out of the economic crisis in 2001, Turkey's priorities were focused on its domestic politics and economic situation. Being a single-party government, AKP starting working on the damage done by the economic crisis as well as introducing reforms that were mainly focused on social security which were their priority in their party agenda. AKP also started to shape the Turkish foreign policy as soon as it came into power and introduced the new long-term foreign policy to the Turkish foreign policy literature, namely the "zero problems with neighbors (zpwn)".

Prof. Ahmet Davutoglu, at that time being a scholar and a close consultant on foreign policy to Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his AKP, defined zpwn as Turkey's redefinition of its foreign policy as well as its geopolitical agenda by balancing Turkey's long-term western orientation to its historical and cultural roots and neighbors (Davutoglu, 2001). Davutoglu's theories on the changing Turkish foreign policy argues that Turkey, being in the middle of west and east, could use its geopolitical power to have economic and diplomatic ties with both its western and eastern neighbors as well as in the regional and international arena (Davutoglu, 2001). A total balancing foreign policy with a focus on economic, cultural and historical ties; AKP started to use the ideals of zpwn which are peace and democracy as well as mutual economic benefits, to normalize relations with neighbors as well as creating new ties with countries that

Turkey didn't have historical ties with. Recep Tayyip Erdogan defined the phase of the new Turkish foreign policy as "building peace with diplomacy", referring to the regional and international ties built by his government and his trips to all around the globe to sign agreements with his counterparts (SAIS, 2009).

The question however remains on how Turkish foreign policy changed its approach and solutions to the challenges through the recent Turkish history (between 1990 and 2002) and how these changes ended up with the reactions in the pre-Arab Spring AKP period. This chapter will analyze how zpwn shaped the pre-Arab spring period of the AKP ruled Turkish foreign policy while giving a recent history before the AKP government came to power. It will also argue the main aspects of zpwn and its liberal roots in relation with Turkey's western allies (EU and US) as well as its historical and cultural ties to the east and its region. It will also show how Arab Spring movements affected the Turkish foreign policy prior to the Syrian crisis to give a background for the Syrian crisis that has taken its roots from the Arab Spring movements. This chapter will also include an example of international intervention, the Libyan example, where Turkey's "zpwn" policy was challenged to compare it with the Syrian crisis in chapter four.

2.2 Turkish Foreign Policy Prior to AKP in 1990s

Turkish foreign policy in the 1990s relied heavily on realist confrontational tools because of the role of the military in politics and foreign relations and the National Security Council (NSC) became the place where the militaristic foreign policies manifested themselves. By the end of Cold War in 1991, the military's concern for security, became one of the main aspects of Turkish foreign policy and with NSC's status as a advisory body since 1961 constitution, the military could easily voice its security concerns and managed to maintain and affect an important portion of Turkish foreign policy (Aydin, Akmesse, 2007). NSC increased its power with the military drafted 1982 constitution by becoming a powerful institution led by the Prime Minister but controlled by the Turkish military elite, with a national security agenda commonly referred as the "Red Book" which established national security, priorities and interests of the Turkish state and the policies to achieve both security and interest goals. As an

example, the “Red Book” contained Kurdish separatism in 1992 as a major security threat both domestically and internationally and was updated to add radical Islam in 1997 due to domestic security concerns (Ozcan, 2001). NSC being the main institution affecting the Turkish foreign policy through 1990s consisted of the commanders of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Gendarmerie and the Chief of General Staff as army officers and the President, Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence (nominated by military) and Minister of Interior as civilian members which ends up to a 5 to 5 ratio and with governments not being unified in the turbulent Turkish domestic politics of 1990s, the military side of the NSC stayed more unified and became stronger to push forward their national security agenda.

Pinar Bilgin argues that the foreign policy set by the military or rather affected heavily by the military elite had three, purely neo-realist concerns, “*the fear of abandonment, fear of loss of territory and geographical determinism*” (Bilgin, 2005). Turkey, still respecting the international organizations that it has been a member of for decades such as NATO, still didn't fully trust the institutions and this will be argued through this section. The neo-realist security based foreign policy have been fueled with the increased PKK attacks, the rise of political Islam with REFAH Party coming to power through a coalition government, and NATO reviewing its mission after the Cold War while EU was expanding by leaving Turkey behind. As it can be seen both domestic and international factor affected the neorealist security concerned Turkish foreign policy and with the growing instability in the region, the military pointed out in 1993 that it has to take more responsibility to achieve security goals and that the army has to step up its efforts to keep up with the foreign policy dilemmas (Ozcan, 2001). The fact that the coalition governments were weak through the 1990s with several early elections with nine different Foreign Ministers in between 1994 and 1997 didn't help civilian foreign policy makers to push through a more liberal agenda. Turkey was stuck with a paranoid, security concerned foreign policy with a more assertive military grabbing more responsibility (Robins, 2003).

Turkish foreign policy has been affected and has reacted to the changes of 1990s openly. With the end of the Cold War, Turkey realized that it has lost its vital importance in the NATO as a forefront against the Soviet Bloc. With wars going on around its region (ex. Gulf War) which created instability, Turkey pointed out a neo-

realist perspective of foreign policy to use the international organizations such as NATO to achieve its security goals and to achieve its foreign policy agenda by staying as a strong member in the Western alliances against common threats. Kirisci argued that it was no surprise at the time when the Cold War ended, Turkey was the most vocal member to push NATO to continue its mission and existence and even the president of the time Demirel argued that Turkey will always be a member of NATO which is the most successful alliance that the mankind has ever witnessed (Kirisci, 2006). As well as NATO's restructuring, Turkey was also concerned in the international arena with the EU expansion of the former Soviet States in the 1990s. Turkey, which signed the Ankara agreement in 1963, liberalized its economy in 1980 and applied for full membership in 1987; saw itself as a cast away when EU decided to expand to the former Soviet bloc by leaving Turkey out. At the same time Turkey was concerned with the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia with ethnic conflicts and Turkey decided to determine its foreign policy in regards to these developments. Turkey's foreign policy in practical sense was formed by the military elite who were concerned with the geographical position and geographical determinism became an important aspect of the neo-realist Turkish policy of the 1990s. Naturally the military, without a significant civil opposition, put forward an argument that Turkey is on the edge of a conflict ridden geographical area and the military should be an important part of the foreign policy making regarding all the developments that Turkey was facing. Pinar Bilgin, argues that this securitization of geography actually was triggered by the fear of loss that has been in the Turkish political past since the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in the early 20th century and given to that event, the military's view of the world didn't change from being insecure (Bilgin, 2005).

According to Drorian, the treaty of Sevres (1920) which saw to the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, even though it was never implemented, made Turkish politician and military suspicions of their neighbors, friends and even allies, creating a "Sevres Syndrome" in Turkish foreign policy (Drorian, 2005). The painful EU process which is formed by countries that tried to carve territories out of the Ottoman territory at the end of the WW1 was felt even in the foreign policy making process in the 1990s when Turkey was applying for full membership to fulfill its westernization ideals and foreign policy goals. During the 1990s, the military used the negative

sentiments against the western world when dealing with the PKK problems inside and outside Turkish territory, often arguing that the PKK is backed by western states who also tried to push Sevres Treaty down the Turkish people's throats to push Turkey to lose territory to minorities (Robins, 2003). This, in return, naturally, created a suspicious and paranoid domestic environment that fueled a foreign policy for Turkey in which it never trusted its allies or the organizations that it belonged to. Turkey always argued that PKK, with the support of other countries such as Syria and Greece at the time, was aimed to weaken and divide the Turkish state and was used as a tool by western countries to diminish Turkish state's power.

The definition of the goal to be secure (the territorial integrity, the secular and homogenous features of the Turkey), and the linking of domestic and foreign threats to this goal, with the particular background of past events, especially the Treaty of Sevres and the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, all contributed to the definition of security considerations among the military elite in Turkey during the 1990s. According to Robins, this security argument, in the sake of protecting self-interests without looking for a moral justification, was used in a wide range of incidents from closing political parties to establishing martial law in the south-eastern Turkey for a decade where PKK has its strongholds (Robins, 2003). In international arena, Turkish foreign policy didn't shy away from using its military, which used mandatory subscription and stood as the second largest army in NATO. When it came to issues such as following PKK targets to neighboring country territories, the foreign policy makers of Turkey mainly the military elite, saw that using its military when and wherever needed to intimidate any threats to the Turkish nation as an essential part of their policy making. When Turkey was still using a narrow minded Cold War Era foreign policy based on geographical threats and domestic issues to create a fear atmosphere to fuel the self-interests of its military elite, Europe was moving towards a completely different security strategy and security culture, in which it didn't define its foreign policy as force using but rather as more civilian (Oguzlu and Kibaroglu, 2008). Europe, coming out the Cold War, saw it as a chance to put civilian ways to deal with security issues where it started to argue that the threats were not to the states anymore but to individuals and societies inside states. Europe foresaw that instead of military force as a last resort, it will use negotiations and consensus building to tackle against any security problem (Oguzlu, Kibaroglu, 2008).

To sum up, 1990s saw Turkish foreign policy, as military-based, force using, paranoid and neo-realist. With military's heavy influence on foreign policy making and a weak domestic political environment, pushed Turkey out of international arena and made it a closed state which only saw threats in every foreign relation it had and no real allies by its side. Kirisci argues that in 2001 right before AKP came to power, two thirds of the Turkish people believed that 'Turks have no friends but Turks.' which can easily summarize the foreign policy makers' point of view through the 1990s, dealing with international and domestic political environments (Kirisci, 2006).

2.3 Turkish Foreign Policy in AKP era prior to Arab Spring Movements

The decision of the EU to accept Turkey as a candidate country at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999 became a significant turning point in the Turkish foreign policy (Onis, 2003). After the European Commission published the Accession Partnership document in March 2000, a series of reform packages were put in place in Turkey, creating a more subtle and non-aggressive foreign policy. The series of reforms included the lift of ban on political parties, lift of ban on minority languages and reforming the NSC with more civilian members, pushing out the military away from the policy making process, banning the death penalty and such reforms started a change in Turkish politics in early 2000s. The Motherland Party (ANAP) leader Mesut Yilmaz, a member of the coalition government of the time when the reform packages were introduced, even argued that the Turkish membership to EU has been delayed due to 'national security syndrome' that Turkey couldn't get out and lost decades when it could have been already a regional and international power with its resources which he argued that Turkey need not a dogmatic and solid national security policy but rather a reformable and flexible policy which can adapt to the needs of all times which also can address to specific incidents with spot-on policies rather than the broad and unbendable Turkish security and foreign policy of the 1990s (Bilgin, 2005). General Erguvenc, in 1999, pointed out that Turkey can now use softer policies in contrast to the militaristic character of its both domestic and foreign policies by pushing a new national security definition through "*education, research and investment in infra-structure, and less*

expenditure on the military” therefore using Turkey’s resources in a more liberal Turkish foreign and domestic policy culture (Bilgin, 2005).

Due to the change in Turkish politics, new actors who saw a benefit in becoming more liberal in both economics and international relations, became more vocal to express their questions to establish different approaches to Turkey’s upcoming problems. Even though, the Turkish politics changed through 1990s, the main aspect that saw a fast and drastic change in Turkish foreign policy was the prospect of EU membership (Aydin, Akmes, 2007). The prospect of EU membership influenced Turkish foreign policy to come out of its closed shell. First of all, Turkey with the expectation to join EU as a full member accepted the prospect of adopting the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU, which made Turkey a part of a larger organization with common goals. Second Turkey pushed social reforms in its domestic politics to meet the criterias that were set by the EU which affected the foreign-policy conduction, deeming Turkey as a more democratic state which puts forward western values when it comes to its foreign policy. Third, EU insisted on non-militaristic and peaceful dispute settlement in Turkish politics both in domestic and international issues (Heper, 2005) which was a sharp contrast to the foreign and domestic policies of Turkish state. These three principles paved a way for the AKP to change the Turkish foreign policy from its roots by promoting democracy, human rights and peaceful relations with once-seen enemies.

When AKP came to power, apart from the process of EU membership, it also contributed to the decrease in use of military and confrontational policies in Turkish foreign policy as well as defining a number of issues such as neighbor relations as existential threats. The foreign policy brought forward by the AKP, started as a different version of the foreign policy of 1990s and can be defined as neo-Ottomanism in which Turkey started to see its neighbors and region as its backyard and started to improve the long-lost relations with its neighbors (Murison, 2006). The doctrine of ‘Strategic Depth’, which was formulated by the then foreign policy advisor to the Prime Minister Erdogan, argued that the Turkish foreign policy prior to AKP and the EU membership process promoted isolationism and denied the facts that Turkey is connected to a larger Turkic and Islamic world through, Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism (Murison, 2006). Even though it can be argued that it will be an exaggeration to say that Turkey was

solely an isolated state prior to AKP as it was a member of NATO and UN, and was applying for alliances such as EU, it can also be argued that Turkey decide to stay away and watch from afar when it came to the problems of its neighbors and regions unless those problems affected the Turkish security goals because it saw its neighbors as threats and unfriendly states.

Davutoglu's concept of "Strategic Depth" argued and criticized that the foreign policy since the end of WW2 didn't take advantage and use its Ottoman heritage of cultural and historical ties with its region, pushing away possible positive outcomes from such policies (Davutoglu, 2001). For that Davutoglu argued that Turkish foreign policy could grasp and use its historical, political and cultural depth in the region and in international arena with establishing a liberal multi-directional foreign policy and elude its role of being a frontier to become a bridge between eastern and western world (Davutoglu, 2001). Davutoglu argued that Turkey should be an example of stability to its neighbors, and anywhere that it considers as its areas of influence from the Americas to Africa and from Middle East to Far-East and of course in Balkans and Caucasus (Davutoglu, 2001). With these ideal put through, it can be argued that Davutoglu and his doctrine not only envisioned Turkey as a regional power but rather a global power that has a say in international politics with its multi-dimensional foreign policies. Davutoglu also argued that Turkey, instead of being a paranoid isolated country in its foreign policies, should rather be an influencing factor on conflict management, diplomacy and democracy promotion, using its Turkish and Islamic routes as well the Kemalist western ideals (Deavutoglu, 2001). Under Davutoglu's 'Strategic Depth' concept, Turkey opened up its foreign policy and started to become more liberal in its policies which will be discussed in the next section.

2.4 Turkish Foreign Policy Reactions

This section will show how the AKP's multi-dimensional 'Strategic Depth' doctrine worked through the first years of AKP era and how Turkey interacted with different actors through its more liberal foreign policy, zpwn.

a) Turkey's Unending EU Dream

Since the application to become a permanent member to the European Union in 1987, Turkey's relationship with the EU has always been in an up and down condition. The question of inclusion and exclusion to the EU has been used as domestic politics tool even before AKP came to power. When AKP came to power in 2002, Turkey's relations with the EU regarding the EU full-membership, have come to a point of exclusion of Turkey even from the European Economic Community (EEC) which it became a permanent member in 1963 (Bozdaglioglu, 2003). Turkey's desire to join the EU was a dream of westernization of the country and the reason for Turkey's application was primarily political and was aiming to strengthen its ties with the West (addressing the EU) by participating in its political, economic and military institutions (Bozdaglioglu, 2003). Sharing a common destiny with the west has always been the dream for the modern Turkish foreign policy makers. Even though certain domestic politics issues stalled the process, such as the 2 coups that happened after the signing of Ankara Agreement in 1963 to become a member of EEC, Turkish foreign policy makers saw that a full membership to EU is the ultimate goal for Turkey.

AKP's policy on the EU membership, seeing all the strains in between Turkey and EU in the last decade as well as the anti-Turkish membership opinions of the EU officials and countries, has changed during the course of its first years in power. The moderate-Islam background of AKP and the general public opinion of the Turkish citizens have paved the way that Turkey will still work for the reforms and modernization into EU standards. This did not mean necessarily pushing forward to become a European Union member as the debates in the foreign policy circles realized that being a Muslim country, Turkey's place in a Christian Europe will take time (Akyol, 2009). Therefore, with AKP in power, Turkey continued its modernization and reforms to create a more stable democracy and establish security for the rights of its citizens using the EU as an example (Mardin, 2005).

The question of whether Turkey can and/or will become a member of EU lingered in the strained relationship between EU and Turkey since then and when AKP came to power, it was obvious that the strains in the relationship were not only political and economic but also cultural and were concerned about the identity problems. The problems in the strained relations between EU and Turkey affected the Turkish foreign

policy towards EU. While Turkish foreign policy makers saw EU also as a way of achieving a high-standard of civilization as well as modernizing the country; EU saw Turkey as a country bordering a conflict ridden Middle-East and a gate to the Muslim world (Kramer, 2000) with a Muslim population therefore a border to conflicts which EU is not ready to deal with. Even though Turkey has been promoted by the western world as a secular Muslim country and as an example to the rest of the Muslim world, EU's policy makers were not convinced that Turkey can even become fully westernized under EU standards and also create secure borders for the EU (Dokos, 2009). Even though Huntington argues that the West and Islam are synonymous for separate civilizations that are basically incompatible and always on the other end of the arguments with a conflict waiting to occur (Huntington, 1996); Turkey's secular domestic politics that saw religion and state separate, have become an important pillar for AKP's moderate Islam views as its political party agenda. AKP government, under the democratization reforms during the EU process, used secularism to increase religious rights for minorities as well as reforms such as removing bans related to the students' religious views in the universities that has been implemented since the 1982 constitution (Hale, 2003), arguing that religious freedoms are an important part of human rights. Also as its liberal foreign policy in effect, Turkey's democratization process and increasing human rights movements has been shown to the Muslim world as an example, promoted by the EU and the rest of the western world (McLaren, Bac; 2003).

Turkey also opened negotiations on the Cyprus issue that has been a major strain in Turkey-EU relationship during the AKP era. Even though a failure of coming to terms, Turkey made clear that its stand will always be to protect Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus interests but left an open door by pushing EU to lift its ban on the Turkic Cypriot state and only then it will recognize Republic of Cyprus and the Greek Cypriot regime in the island (Suvarierol, 2003/ Tsakonas, 2009). On the other hand, a law establishing the "Turkish National Human Rights Institution" was adopted by the Turkish parliament in 1990 (TBMM, 2000) to work on human rights issues and during AKP's tenure it started working extensively on issues that the EU is concerned about; such as freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and association, ethnic rights and women rights. As it can be seen, Turkey still keeps EU as an important factor in its

foreign policy and democratization and modernization processes pushed by the EU membership process is seen important by the AKP government to improve Turkey's standing point in the international arena, however Turkish foreign policy also started looking for alternatives as economic and diplomatic partners which will be analyzed below.

b) Turkey, USA, NATO and UN: Regional Conflicts

A widely publicized poll taken in Turkey in 2002 showed that Turks when asked which country in the world was Turkey's "best friend" in the international arena said "nobody" by 33 percent while USA was in the second place by 27 percent. In 2006, the same poll showed "nobody" to be in 24 percent with 19.1 percent EU in second place and 13.2 USA just before Islamic world and Pakistan (Gordon, Taspinar, 2008). Turkey and USA's relations have always been an up and down relationship. Being a shared member in several international organizations such as UN, NATO, OECD and OSCE; Turkey and USA continuously try to improve their relations.

When AKP came to power, under the post-September 11 environment, Turkey was a close ally to USA and its war on terror but an invasion plan of Iraq from the Turkish soil in 2003 was strongly opposed by the Turkish public and therefore the Turkish Parliament couldn't reach a majority decision allowing US troops to enter Iraq from Turkish side in a close vote with 264 for and 25 against (Sadik, 2009). This has strained the relations between Turkey and USA as the invasion of Iraq took longer than planned and Turkish public opinion stayed that the invasion was illegal which created a sentiment against USA affecting the Turkish foreign policy makers.

A cooling off period until Obama's election remained between USA and Turkey and when Obama was elected as the President of the United States, he made his first overseas trip to Turkey in 2009. In a press conference Obama said: *"I'm trying to make a statement about the importance of Turkey, not just to the United States but to the world. I think that where there's the most promise of building stronger U.S.-Turkish relations is in the recognition that Turkey and the United States can build a model partnership in which a predominantly Christian nation, a predominantly Muslim nation -- a Western nation and a nation that straddles two continents, that we can create a modern international community that is respectful, that is secure, that is prosperous,*

that there are not tensions; inevitable tensions between cultures, which I think is extraordinarily important.” (CNN, 2009). On April 22, 2009, right after Obama’s visit, Turkish and Armenian authorities also officially announced a provisional roadmap for the normalization of diplomatic ties between the two countries which didn’t have diplomatic ties for decades (Today’s Zaman, 2009).

Turkey also was a member of the Afghanistan operation with the US troops under the NATO umbrella, giving both military and humanitarian support. Starting with a military support, Turkey’s position in Afghanistan changed through the operation and Turkey become more than a civil-military partner for Afghanistan. In relation with its extensive economic and diplomatic relations based foreign policy, Turkey increased its socio-economic development activities by building schools, dormitories, clinics, sport complexes and parks and several other infrastructure projects in Afghanistan, increasing its development aid year by year (MFA, 2009) which was related to its new neo-Ottomanism policies by being involved in the region. In the field of security, Turkey also helped to NATO forces to increase its potential in the central Asian region, to increase its relations with the US and other NATO partners as well to increase US support on diplomatic problems with EU and Armenian issues (Eksi, 2010). Turkey’s dedication to democratization and western values as well as its historical and cultural ties in Afghanistan, made Turkey an example for the future of Afghanistan and US administration also approved that being a Muslim partner in a region that needs examples for modern values, Turkey has been a pillar of modernization and peaceful foreign policy (CNN, 2009).

Turkey’s relations with USA and NATO also shows that Turkey’s willingness to work with international partners extensively in regions that Turkey was turning an eye away during the pre-AKP era as it can be seen in the Afghanistan example. Turkey also showed its willingness to be a strong and acting international actor with its relations to the UN during the pre-Arab spring period. Turkey’s human rights agenda and its humanitarian foreign policy found a chance to show its arguments in the second term of AKP era and the major incident that has seen an extensive diplomacy in a major international incident showed itself where a Turkish humanitarian aid boat was raided in international waters by the Israeli Special Forces in 2010 couple of months before the Arab Spring movements started. Referred as the “Gaza Flotilla Raid”, nine

activists who were Turkish citizens were killed in “Mavi Marmara” boat after Israeli Special Forces raided 6 ships in international waters. Israeli side defended its actions by arguing that the activists were armed and attacked the Israeli Navy boats before they boarded the flotilla (CNN, 2010).

However, Turkey defended that the activists only used their self-defense right and Israel had no right to raid humanitarian aid boats in international waters. The long-term diplomatic relations came to a halt in between Turkey and Israel and Turkey showed its belief in the international community by trying to solve this issue in the UN level. The UN report (Palmer Report) in September 2011, regarding the flotilla incident showed evidence that Israeli reaction against the boats were excessive but it also pointed out that due to the continuous threat against the Israeli state in the region, the way that the boats tried to break the blockade in international waters was reckless as well as the intention of the passengers were not clear according to the Israeli official, about their reasons to enter Gaza strip (UN, 2011). The Palmer Report was a result on Turkey action to push UN to investigate the incident and the results showed both states’ interim reports on the incidents and Turkey’s foreign policy makers saw the report as a sign that UN report has been partial for the Israeli interests. The report also later was rejected by the UNHRC, arguing that the Israeli blockade is amounted to collective punishment and is unlawful (Reuters, 2011) which was Turkey’s argument on human rights violation committed by the Israeli state.

As it can be seen, the relations with the EU, USA and international organizations that Turkey has been a member for decades; saw some conflicts during the AKP era in pre-Arab Spring period and Turkey’s diplomatic advance in regional and international level saw some alternatives to be sought by the Turkish foreign policy makers in the Muslim world as well in regions that Turkey hasn’t been an important actor which will be discussed in the next section. The strained relationship between Turkey and its western allies shaped the Turkish foreign policy in the upcoming Arab Spring movements and the Syrian crisis which will be discussed in the next chapters extensively.

2.5 Turkey, New Frontiers and the East: Building Peace with Diplomacy

The dominant western oriented foreign policy of Turkey started to change and to look for new alternatives and new connections with AKP coming into power. Davutoglu's foreign policy specifically emphasized that to become a global power, Turkey must aim to resolve all the pending disputes which Turkey is a part of that has accumulated throughout the years in its region and in international level (Davutoglu, 2001). Therefore with AKP in power, the prime minister of the time Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the foreign ministers of Turkey (Abdullah Gul, Ali Babacan and Ahmet Davutoglu) started a busy schedule of diplomatic traffic all around the globe in the first years of the AKP era which continued until now. This section will show the alternatives sought by AKP according to their regions, analyzing how AKP's liberal ideals were put into practice.

1) Turkey in Middle-East: Cultural and Historical Ties

This section will argue how Turkey have used the principles of AKP to normalize and/or increase its relations with its neighbors such as Iraq, Syria and Iran in the pre-Arab spring period. Turkey having more than half of its land borders with the Middle East, didn't have close diplomatic relations with its Middle-Eastern neighbors and conflicts in political agenda such as terrorism, Kurdish problems and border issues as well as religious divides between Iran and Turkey; have overshadowed Turkish foreign policy in the pre-AKP era. When AKP came to power, the invasion of Iraq and the NATO's Afghanistan operation have already strained the relations between the regions countries therefore Turkish foreign policy makers gave a priority to become more active in Middle-East in order to be on track with the recent developments and grab the opportunities, such as historical and cultural ties, to become an advantage for post-conflict Middle-East (Karagul, Aslan, 2013).

In March 2009, in the post-invasion Iraq with US still having an active role in the domestic politics in Iraq and US being a major actor in the region regarding Iraq, the president of Turkey, Abdullah Gul became the first head of the state to visit Iraq in 33 years (Shadid, Ibrahim, 2009). Following Gul's visit, Erdogan also visited Iraq on October 2009 to sign 48 trade agreements on issues such as security, trade, infrastructure

and energy as well as social issues such as education, agriculture and health (Giderler, 2014). During Erdogan's visit, the foreign minister Davutoglu also visited the Northern Iraq, also known as the Iraqi Kurdistan, becoming the first high-level official to visit northern Iraq in decades (Milliyet, 2014). The opening of a consulate in Arbil during Davutoglu's visit, also showed that Turkey was willing to solve its problems with the Iraqi Kurds via diplomacy as well as protecting its interests in the region with close diplomatic and economic ties.

The diplomatic relations that nearly came to a stop between Syria and Turkey also started to normalize in the pre-Arab spring period of the AKP era. Following the severe conflicts between Turkey and Syria in late 1990s when Syria was supporting the terrorist group PKK in Turkey, the diplomatic relations came to a point of an open war between two nations. However, with AKP coming to power, the relations slowly increased positively. With the unconventional friendship between the Erdogan and Assad family, Assad made a Turkey visit in 2004, becoming the first Syrian President to ever visit Turkey in 57 years (Milliyet, 2004). Following the visit, Turkey being an instrumental partner for its neighbor, opened the way to break the isolation of Syria, opening the way for Assad to visit France in 2005 (Manfreda, 2013). The increasing diplomatic ties resulted with a "Free Trade Agreement" in 2007 and a joint military maneuver in 2009 as well as lifting of visa restrictions in 2009 (Biskhu, 2012). Up until the Syrian conflict following the Arab Spring movements, the relations between Turkey and Syria cherished with the close ties between Erdogan and Assad family as well as the cultural and historical background, supported by increasing economic and political relations (Tepeciklioglu, 2015). Turkey seemed to successfully normalize relations with an old enemy with AKP's new foreign policy agenda.

On the other hand, the relations with Iran; being the largest Middle-Eastern neighbor of Turkey and a historical rival due to sectarian differences and conflicting interests in the region; have improved significantly with Turkey's attempts with Brazil to broker a deal between Iran and the Western world over the nuclear dispute (AlJazeera, 2010) as well as Turkey's economic advances regarding the Iranian energy lines. Turkey used these improvements in diplomatic relations to advance in an economic level where Turkish companies established infrastructure building contracts in Iran. The growing trade between Turkey and Iran indicated that the two countries were willing to

strengthen mutual ties. Even though, Iran and Turkey stand still on several topics such as the Turkish-Israeli relations, the improvements on several topics can be seen as success for Turkey's new foreign policy in the means of peaceful diplomacy. The next section will shed light to the Arab Spring movements and the Turkish foreign policy reactions to give a background and understanding of the main subject of this thesis, Syrian crisis.

The beginning of the Arab Spring movements was a turbulent time in the Middle East and North African region. The movements started in 2010 in Tunisia and the remnants of the movements are still ongoing in the region up until this day. The protests that fueled the movements, started as rallies, strikes, civil society movements and demonstrations but all of them were tackled by states' repressions and severe human rights violations (MFA, 2015). In the age of social media, most of the movements and their ideals spread around the region and in international world and the states were helpless to tackle the movements that were internet-based, youth fueled and against years of repression (ethnic, religious, political...) which ended up in violent responses against their civilian population.

The Turkish foreign policy makers as well as the Turkish investments in the region were caught off-guard when the movements started and small sparks of civil-society movements became fires of civil disobedience and civil resistance which led to ways of revolutions. Turkey's self-interests were challenged in the region and its non-interference foreign policy had its first real test in diplomatic and theoretical terms.

This section of this chapter will analyze how the Turkish foreign policy have been challenged through the Arab Spring movements as well as arguing the concepts realism and liberalism in Turkish foreign policy from both international and Turkish perspective through the Arab Spring movements. The movements that will be analyzed will be Tunisia, and Egypt, all with their unique traits and at the same time similarities.

2.6 Arab Spring and its Origins

The Arab Spring movements are protests that were sparked in Tunisia on 8 December 2010 following Muhammed Bouazizi's self-immolation against corruption and ill-treatment and swept through the Arab Nations all over Northern Africa and

Middle East. In 2010-2011, within a year, the Arab Spring protests left Tunisia and Egypt in major changes with two long reigning dictatorial regimes toppled, while in Syria and Yemen there were civil uprisings. Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, Algeria, Oman and Iraq saw major protests with Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Sudan experiencing minor protests. Not a single Middle-Eastern country was left untouched with the Arab Spring movements which showed itself in ways such as civil resistance, strikes, demonstrations, marches and rallies. The way that the protestors organized these protests also was particularly interesting as despite the fact that all the protests were organized under either repressive or censored states, the protestors used the social media and gathered thousands of people with the risk of facing violent responses from authorities as well as pro-government protestors and counter-demonstrators (Dalacoura, 2011). The protestors used major gatherings such as the Friday prayers to organize as well and by October 2011 after 11 months of protests, all around the region three heads of states in Tunisia (Zine El Abidine/ January 14), Libya (Muammar Al-Gaddafi/ killed on 20 October 2011) and Egypt (Hosni Mubarak/ 11 February 2011), have left power with either civil or military interventions (Gelvin, 2012). During this period, several other leaders were faced with demands from their citizens and they had to show their willingness to reform or their willingness to step down in order to control their citizens from toppling their regime. In this sense, Arab Spring movements were a good example where it can be seen that realism theory collapsed where the states are no longer seen as the sole powers in international politics but rather the will and interests of individuals and/or groups have been promoted.

The geopolitical implications of the Arab Spring movements have affected the global international politics as well. It can be argued that even though Arab Spring movements triggered one another, spreading sporadically through the region, each and every case has to be analyzed and understood separately as each revolution unfolded in different ways and each had its own heroes and each therefore requires its own narrative (Khondker, 2011). The Arab Spring movements or as some mention as revolutions, are products of multiple actors and changes, all having their own economic, technological and demographic backgrounds, and different cultural flavors that distinguished one from another. It can be argued that Arab spring revolutions put their roots in liberal democratic ideals as well as liberal nationalism where the individuals and/or groups in

each nation affected by the movements defined by itself. This can be seen in the different goals that the protestors demanded from their rulers or regimes. The particular reason that all the protests shared, considering the liberal democratic needs of the masses in the region, was that all the Arab countries even the ones that considered themselves as democracies, had a repressive regime. Also the political movements that the new generation Arabs defined themselves in over the past decades, redefined their understanding of 'themselves and others' in both domestic and international politics (Muedini, 2012). In this context it can be argued that the traditionalist ideals in the region were losing ground while the new liberal views were gaining ground with the demands of the protestors to get rid of oppressive and unjust regimes so that a new Arab-identity with liberal, democracy-seeking, and anti-oppressive principles can rise (Ramadan, 2012). The mix of corruption and repressive actions and violent natures of the region's governments led to the suppression of civil liberties and due to the corruption, the masses were forced to live under heavy economic burden, where the financial burden boiled up the region and pushed the people to demand for their civil and economic liberties.

The reason behind the economic pressure in the region was mainly the grip on the economic structures of the states by the international financial institutions such as IMF and World Bank since mid-1980s. The Arab Spring movements in each country also shared the belief that every country should have a right to liberally regulate its economic structure as well as its economic relations with its neighbors and with international partners which in the end will create better economic conditions (Stepanova, 2011). Massive violations of human rights have also been a significant determinant provoking the Arab Spring movements where the Arab youth and the majority of the protestors believed that their governments were controlled by the few where the majority has been suffering from lack of their basic human rights. The protestors have a legitimate right to believe that their basic human rights were being violated as Arab regimes historically exploited their own people and used methods such as, state of emergency and laws which define a very broad sense of terrorism to justify their self-interest against their own citizens, including methods such as abduction, involuntary disappearances, unwarranted arrest, torture and unfair trials, and even unlawful killings (Rutherford, 2012).

As it can be seen the realist state-orientalist with leaders self-agendas in Arab governments' domestic and foreign policies, failed to contain the liberal and democratic believes of the masses that were under the rule of those oppressive regimes and with a multi-dimensional set of principles and views, the Arab spring movements were set into motion. The next sections of this chapter will show how Turkish foreign policy dealt with all these principles and movements in Tunisia and Egypt with a more specific argument on the Syrian Crisis.

2.7 Arab Spring Movements: Tunisia, Egypt and Libya

Turkey's reaction to the Egyptian and Tunisian uprisings was resistant and appreciated by pro-democracy movements of the western allies as well as the regional partners. Turkish authorities made it clear that their support for Egyptian demonstrators will continue and were among the first to demand for Mubarak's resignation who has been a longtime ally but who also refused to create a more democratic future for Egypt by reforming the Egyptian system. This made sure that Turkey's popularity among the Arab public will rise, and the Arab public started to view Turkey's political and economic transformation as a pioneer for their own future, as well as a source of inspiration, and even as a model (Lecha, 2011).

Turkish foreign policy makers, seeing the modern Turkish foreign policy as well as the principles of the Turkish states as examples for their region, promoted these principles in the movements in Tunisia and Egypt to keep their image of an example to the Arab world. However, a combination of economic and security interests drove Ankara's initial prudence when the first clashes erupted in Tunisia and Egypt. The class of Turkish foreign policy's liberal and realist theories became apparent in both cases where the Turkish foreign policy makers were trying to save the Turkish interests (business investments, diplomatic ties) while also trying to impose their principles to the region to create a more democratic and easier to navigate region for the future Turkish foreign policy (Nafaa, 2011). Under the lights of these theoretical conflicts as well as more complex challenges, Turkish foreign policy makers corresponded the Arab Spring movements in Tunisia and Egypt.

2.2.1 Tunisia: A Good Example For the Future of Arab Spring Movements

Starting with the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in December 2010, the social situation in Tunisia sparked a series of protests, demonstrations and civil rights movements ending up with the Tunisian Revolution and a wider range of Arab Spring movements. On January 2011, the long-time president Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali was ousted due to severe political protests as well as the violent clashes between the law enforcement forces and the protestors (Spencer, 2011). After the ousting, President Ben Ali went into exile in Saudi Arabia, ending his reign of 23 years (Wyre, 2011). From 2011 until 2014, Tunisia elected its first post-revolution government and established a new constitution which has been seen as a more democratic, human rights based, open version of the existing constitution that can lead to a decentralized and open-government ruled Tunisia (Amara, 2014).

Throughout the revolution and the post-revolution, the Turkish foreign policy has been challenged over its theoretical framework where Turkey was a supportive hand for the protestors and supported the transition to democracy in Tunisia while also protecting its self-interests by diplomatically and economically staying connected with the new regime. In a conference in 2012, the then Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu and Tunisian foreign minister Refik Abdusselam, both mentioned that Turkey and Tunisia will always support each other in three levels through Tunisia's transformation to a better future. Davutoglu explained that these three levels will be interstate relations, civil society relations and the relationship between the two foreign ministries (SETAV, 2012). Showing how the Turkish foreign policy will work with the future of Tunisian state, Davutoglu explained that Turkey can be an example for the Arab world, and Tunisia and Turkey can cooperate in multi-levels (economic, diplomatic and cultural) to mutually create a better region and good examples for the future of the Arab Spring movements (SETAV, 2012).

Asked in an interview, a senior Turkish foreign ministry official mentioned that Turkey was playing on a two-ended staff. According to his own view, the liberal theories which were pioneered by imposing Turkey's democratic regime into a region (Middle-East and North-Africa) were also intertwined with realist concerns of losing self-interests in the region, however Turkey's main concern was losing the

diplomatic relations that just have been normalized and blossomed in the last decade with its surrounding region. Therefore, the Turkish foreign policy had to play a two-sided game by being a mediator and a soft-power actor between the states and the opposing parties while also protect its economic, diplomatic and cultural ties with the then current regimes as well as the possible future rulers of the countries affected by the Arab Spring movements (F2, 2015).

Fortunately for Turkey, the Tunisian revolution was a good example in the sense that democracy was restored in a smooth transition compared to Libya and Egypt and Turkey managed to maintain its relationship without any major problems with the new regime by praising the elections as well as the democratic transition after the 2014 elections won by the secular party, Nidaa Tounes (Yasar, 2014). For Turkish foreign policy, maintaining relations with Tunisia through the Arab Spring movements has been a success in both liberal and realist perspectives as Turkey became an example of a democratic Muslim country for Tunisian revolution as well as Turkey protected its self-interests in the country by smoothly transitioning between the old and the new regime.

2.2.2 Egypt: A Challenge for the Turkish Foreign Policy, Power-Sharing Conflicts

The Egyptian revolution, as a part of the Arab Spring movements, can be considered as a massive political revolution as it had roots from all parts of the society with an educated, upper-middle class youth to sparkle it (Nafaa, 2011). The revolution was considered as a political movement more than a social movement even though the ideals of social justice gathered many supporters for the opposition but the Egyptian revolution mainly started from a long-term stir in the society against the Mubarak regime that was becoming more and more controlling and was blocking all kinds of reform chances in the system (SBS, 2011). The Nobel-prize winner Mohamed Elbaradei also warned Egypt when the Tunisian revolution started, stating that the same Mubarak's regime of three decades might suffer the same fate if he doesn't reform the system and give in to his people's needs (Shenker, 2011).

Turkish foreign policy, in the midst of the Egyptian revolution which ended up with a military junta, has been challenged in both realist and liberal perspectives as

it was challenged in Tunisian example. However, Egypt, being a power-player in the region and a long-term rival for Turkey, posed different and more complex challenges than Tunisia. When Mubarak lost his grip of power and left the position, with the first democratic elections in Egypt, Mohammed Morsi came into power with the powerful support of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 2012 which the ruling AKP government in Turkey had a good relation with.

In November 2012, Morsi made a declaration which was supported by the Muslim Brotherhood in the parliament but on the other hand was criticized by the secular and liberal parties as it would lead to a strict Islamism (AP, 2012). The main opposition leader Mohamed ElBaradei criticized Morsi, arguing that Morsi, with the declaration he announced, has made himself the new Pharaoh of Egypt (Birnbaum, 2012). The aforementioned declaration gave Morsi power over the judiciary system and several immunities that also created an upsurge in the international arena. The criticism from ElBaradei and other secular and liberal groups stirred another set of protests against the Morsi regime which ended up in bloodshed and a coup-d'état in July 2013 after Morsi refused to step down from power against the protestors' will (Saleh, Taylor, 2013).

Through this process, Turkey-Egypt relations were stable up until the coup-d'état. Turkey, being an example for the Muslim Brotherhood and having a good relation with the regime, made good connections in both diplomatic and personal level between the Morsi and Erdogan government. AKP, using the liberal perspective supported the newly elected president Morsi and promoted democracy and more rights to the Egyptian people. However, with Morsi's fall and the military taking control, AKP's and especially the then Prime Minister Erdogan's views changed on Egypt. Erdogan's criticisms over the military regime and his support for Morsi to take power back were not welcomed by the Egyptian regime under General Abdulfettah Sisi (Idiz, 2015). Turkey failing to be a role model for the Egyptian revolution also lost a potential powerful ally after decades of conflicts were nearly solved and with Erdogan's strong opposition to the Sisi rule, the diplomatic ties are still severed up until this day.

2.2.3 The Case of Libya: Western Military Intervention in Arab Spring

The anti-government protests started on 15 February 2011 in Libya amid the ongoing movements in Tunisia and Egypt. By 18 February the rebel forces took control of the country's second largest city, Benghazi, forming an interim government against the Gadhafi Regime. As early as February 22nd the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, declared that the attacks against the Libyan people were both widespread and systematic by the government forces which were mounting to crimes against humanity (BBC, 2011). In the beginning of March, the bombings by Libyan Air force against the civilian populated towns in the east prompted the rebel interim government in Benghazi to reluctantly call-in a formal request for foreign intervention (Leila, 2011). By the 12th of March, the then president of the rebel interim government, Mustafa Abdel Jalil, warned that the Gadhafi forces were bombing and advancing to the rebel capital of Benghazi successfully and the defected Libyan army officials were confirming reports that Gadhafi was planning a full-strike without concerning civilian casualties to take back the city (McGreal, 2011). The suspected death toll mentioned by the rebels were around half a million people which prompted the UNSCR 1973 (UN, 2011) to be accepted in the UNSC but the then military commander and Gadhafi's son have declared that the military operations have finished and the Libyan government forces are close to taking Benghazi in 48 hours, mentioning that whatever decisions were made in the UNSCR 1973 will be too late to apply to the Libyan situation (Al Jazeera, 2011). UNSCR 1973 mainly imposed a no-fly zone over Libyan air space, hoping to curb Gadhafi's military power and its ability to have advantage over the rebel forces.

Gadhafi and his officials' rhetoric became more and more violent from the beginning of the protests and especially after the rebels captured Benghazi. Gadhafi coming out and asking its supporters to cleanse Libya door to door from the rebel forces, naming them "greasy rats" and "cockroaches" sparked and outrage and a massive concern of a possible genocide just the same as the one in Rwanda in 1994 (Stalinsky, 2011). Officials from Gadhafi regime also mentioned through this period that the government forces will fight until the last one drops but the defections from the Libyan army became a severe problem when the army officers refused to attack civilian settlements as well as refused to shoot at protestors, Gaddafi regime staggered. Around

6000 Libyans were killed in a period around February 15th to March 5th, just two weeks before the NATO intervention started (Guardian, 2011). While the government forces were defecting to the western world or to the rebel forces, Gadhafi also hired thousands of African mercenaries that his regime supported through the civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa which meant that the fall of Benghazi would definitely be a bloodshed and massacre (Fahim, Kirkpatrick, 2011). This pushed the international community to decide whether to let the Gadhafi regime to put a bloody end to the rebellion or to intervene and save civilians that are doomed to be massacred.

a) Libyan Intervention: A First and Last in Arab Spring

When the UNSCR meeting in March took place, Gadhafi regime had already lost most of its support both domestically and internationally. Calls from the rebel forces and the defectors as well as the Libyan people over the severe human rights violations, increased the popular and diplomatic support for an intervention as well as an establishment of a regional support allowed for a political step to be taken to support the opposition forces both by international and regional actors. The Libyan case was special in the sense that it has been an intervention in which political and legal legitimacy was sought before its launch extensively as well as it was an intervention that was averting a threat to a large population of civilians. The leading intervention force NATO sought the preconditions of demonstrable need, clear legal basis and firm regional support before giving a decision that has been allowed with the UNSCR 1973 (News 24, 2011). Obama administration that has promoted a full intervention also sought for a local request for intervention, a regional support and legitimacy, legal legitimacy and a multilateral intervention coalition who would share the costs of the burden of the operation (The Telegraph, 2011). The legitimacy of NATO's intervention in Libya has been argued both from the realists and liberal perspectives. Realist scholars argued that an intervention to the Libyan state was necessary just to follow up national interests of powerful international actors as the situation in Libya was a threat to a region important for many powerful states such as USA, France and UK as well unions like the EU while liberals argued that human life and a failed state should be intervened to stop the conflict to create a peaceful environment for democracy and liberal ideals can grow (Fernandes, 2013).

Regarding the humanitarian intervention principles, the NATO intervention sought a sufficient reason to use military force under the just cause principle while clearing its intentions to show that the intervention was in accordance with the right intention principle (Romaniuk, 2011). The pros and cons of the intervention for both NATO and the Libyans were also cleared to be proportional (Kazianis, 2011). NATO also waited to see that it is the last reasonable option to intervene as a military force to resolve the Libyan conflict as a last resort as well as checking if it has a right to intervene under right intention principle (Ramoin, 2012). NATO intervention in Libya started on the 19th March just 2 days after the UNSCR, with bombings against the Gadhafi regime. A coalition force, formed by 27 states from Middle-East and Europe contributed to the intervention both in military and humanitarian resources (Chigoize, 2014). From March to August, severe fighting between the coalitions backed rebel forces and the Gadhafi regime continued with Tripoli falling into the hands of the rebels but not until 20th October the fighting stopped when Sirte, the self-claimed new capital of Libya, also fell into rebel forces' hands, killing Gadhafi in the process (CBS, 2011).

With the death of Gadhafi, the NATO intervention finished leaving a country with no social structure and severely damaged infrastructure. The reasons for the intervention can be justified to save civilian lives as well national self-interests of the intervening powers; however the international community as well as the Libyans will wait to see if Libya can succeed in becoming a democratic model that the opposition supported as an ideal that hasn't been achieved up until this thesis was written.

b) Turkish Foreign Policy Reactions Towards Libyan Intervention

Turkey had initially opposed NATO's intervention in the uprising against Moammar Gadhafi's regime in Libya. Turkey has described the call for a no-fly zone that has been the main principle of the UNSCR 1973 as unhelpful and risky in both diplomatic and militaristic forms (ACRPS, 2011). The then Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan openly declared when asked that any type of military intervention by NATO in Libya or any other country or coalition would only be counter-productive (Oguzlu, 2011). After the UNSCR 1973 (UNSCR, 2011), several Arab and Western analysts criticized the Turkish stance against the no-fly zone, given the fact that Turkey has previously participated in several NATO interventions, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Afghanistan with its NATO allies (Champion, 2011).

When the Libyan crisis started, Turkey was careful not to side with both the Gadhafi regime and the rebels to presume a role of a mediator when the time calls. In its reaction to the Libyan crisis, Turkey was seen as approaching the crisis with more of a realist perspective to protect its self-interests as well as maintain a good relation with the long-term partner Gadhafi regime, while also maintaining a contact with the rebel forces. According to ACRPS report, *“Turkey's orientation was reflected in its relations with Libya. The volume of trade between the two states reached 9.8 billion dollars in 2010, and Libya announced its intention to invest 100 billion dollars' worth of investment in Turkish companies until 2013; they also announced that 15 billion dollars had been invested in Turkish construction companies. Since 2010, 160 Turkish investment projects in Libya have begun implementation.”* (ACRPS, 2011). Asked in an interview a Turkish foreign ministry official also pointed out the historical relations between the Turkish state and the Gadhafi regime where Moammer Gadhafi helped the then Turkish government to achieve the Cyprus intervention in 1974, therefore a more cautious and realist Turkish foreign policy played a part in Turkey's reaction against the Libyan conflict (F3, 2015). Also being the second biggest army in the NATO force, Turkey wanted to partake only a leading role in the humanitarian side of the NATO operation and decided to be active in enforcing a UN-imposed arms embargo but opposed a no-fly zone until it gave in to let NATO use Izmir as the headquarters for the NATO intervention (Champion, 2011).

Turkish foreign policy makers tried to act as a mediator in between the actors of the Libyan conflict which didn't end up in a mutual understanding. However the Turkish rhetoric didn't change on how an intervention will not solve the problems of the Libyan people in the long term. Therefore an avoidance of choosing sides by Turkey was a good example of its *zpwn* policy to maintain good relations in not only state level but also in people's level where a long-term friendship between the Libyans and the Turkish people has been emphasized. Turkish foreign policy makers who were interviewed argued that if at the time Turkey choose a side in the military intervention in Libya, the future of the Turkish foreign policies and its relations with the Middle-Eastern region would have been downgraded from the level it was achieved since AKP came to power and without at least a diplomatic leverage in the region Turkey would had no say for the future of the region therefore Turkey found a middle way to not to be

in military operations with the west but also to be in the humanitarian side of the intervention for the Arab world (F3, 2015).

2.8 Conclusion

The pre-Arab spring period, with AKP in power, saw Turkey increasing its relations not only in its region but in new frontiers that Turkey didn't focus before AKP came to power. Several ties; diplomatic, economic and/or cultural have been formed. With Turkey starting to get a grasp of being an international actor, respecting international organizations and voicing its opinions over topics such as human rights; the zpwn principles started to dominate Turkish Foreign policy and have been cherished by Turkey's regional and international partners.

The change in the neo-realist, mostly isolationist, paranoid Turkish foreign policy saw a sharp change during AKP era and the political environment of the 1990s and decades of fear based on security concerns were cleared during the first years of the AKP government. This of course saw to an increase in both economic and political power for Turkey and Turkey became a regional power also started to become more vocal when it came to international problems. The change in Turkish foreign policy came from the change of its domestic policy environment therefore it can be said that Turkish foreign policy was challenged severely when the Arab Spring movements came right after Turkey just was getting a grasp of its new foreign policy ideals.

Arab Spring also changed the Turkish foreign policy and challenged its new more liberal "zpwn" policy that AKP implemented after it came to power. Through the Arab Spring, it can be seen that Turkey navigated between realist and liberal policies in order to tackle every single conflict in different countries and this was the main challenge for the "zpwn" policy where non-interventionism in Libya was discussed in this chapter.

CHAPTER III

ARAB SPRING, SYRIAN CRISIS AND CHALLENGES TO TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

3.1 Introduction

Being immediate neighbors, Turkey-Syria relations have always been problematic historically. However, with AKP coming into power in 2002, the relations between the two culturally and historically connected nations, started to heal, which created closer economic ties as well as cross-border relations. When the then Prime Minister Erdogan, became close friends with the Assad family and created not only diplomatic connections but also personal ties, the relations went to a positive, brighter future. When the Arab Spring movements hit the region, the relations started to go down-hill when Turkey's borders were threatened with several refugees running from a violent conflict while the personal ties between Erdogan and Assad went sour.

This chapter analyzes the Turkish foreign policy during the Syrian crisis and it will discuss the biggest ever challenge for the Turkish state for decades, by showing how the Syrian crisis affected the region and the world while Turkey was trying to navigate and still maintain its regional power status. It shows opinions from experts on how Turkish foreign policy has been challenged and how humanitarian intervention mechanisms failed to interfere with one of the most severe conflict in the last decade, affecting millions and creating severe human rights abuses. This chapter will focus on the beginnings of the Syrian crisis from the Turkish Foreign Policy point of view as the conflict is still ongoing and it is a complex subject to research.

3.2 Turkey-Syria Relations Prior to Conflict

For the most of the last century, the relations between the Turkish state and Syria have always been sour. Turkey, being an imperial power with its Ottoman roots, controlled the region where Syria is included since the 1517 and by the time nationalism

movements started to take root in Europe, Ottoman Empire was seen as an oppressor over the lands it controlled which Syria was also a part. By the end of the World War 1, Ottomans being defeated in all fronts, several more conflicts erupted in the region when the Ottoman army took severe actions against Syrians as well as several Arabs and other ethnic groups who supported the Arab revolution during that time. This, of course left a bitter taste in the region, as Landis argued (Epatko, 2012). The annexation of Hatay in 1939 with a popular vote referendum increased the tensions between the two countries and still up to this day, has created controversial maps where both countries showed Hatay in their own maps as their own province.

After Syria gained independence from French colonialism, the relations between Turkey and Syria remained tense under the Hafez al-Assad regime, who is the father of the current Bashar al-Assad. The relations between the two states went even tenser in 1970s when Turkey decided to build water dams in the rivers originating from Turkey but have both economic and life-sustaining importance in the lower Mesopotamia region. Syria protested and argued that Turkey was building illegal dams in the Tigris and Euphrates rivers during this time (Landis, 2012). Landis argued that, the dams were a major blow to countries such as Syria and Iraq that were already struggling with draughts and Turkey building dams, was a way of using its position as a power player in the region to control the upper-stream advantage against its neighbors who now became dependent on Turkey for their agricultural and other needs (Landis, 2012).

The retaliation to the realist power-play Turkish foreign policy of the late 20th century came with Hafez al-Assad giving refuge to the Kurdish nationalists who were seeking independence from Turkey by dividing the country. Hafez al-Assad gave refuge to these groups, while also letting them train in Syrian territory and armed them and gave them safe passage in and out of Syria's borders; which created a distrust between two nations in the next two decades (Tejel, 2009). When 1990s came, Turkey's struggle with the Kurdish nationalist terrorist groups escalated and an increasing pressure from Turkey against the Syrian authorities led to the arrest and delivery of Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the so called Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), creating a conflict with the Syrian Kurds while giving Turkey a chance to finish PKK (Tejel, 2009). Ocalan's handover pushed the relations to a more positive level and the relations

between two countries started to normalize until the invasion of Iraq by the US forces in 2003. This invasion became an opportunity for two countries, Turkey being unhappy about the US actions in the region and Syria being worried that another invasion might lead to its way. Therefore, both countries sought better ties and alliances and US invasion became a trigger for better Syria-Turkey relations (Landis, 2012).

In 2004, after US invasion of 2003, Bashar al-Assad, became the first Syrian president to ever visit Turkey since World War One, and several improvements in relations followed, like open-trade between borders as well as easing of visa requirements (Haddad, 2005) which sparked the common bond that the two nations had historically. By the time, Arab Spring started, it can easily be said that the long time conflicting nations who didn't look at each other fondly, was on the verge of normalizing and increasing their diplomatic, cultural and economic ties in liberal founding.

3.3 Syrian Crisis: Beginnings

When the Arab Spring started, not many scholars or international relations experts foresaw that it will spread in the region like a wildfire. Syria; being a majority Sunni country, with a Shia-Alawite minority ruling elite; has had domestic problems even before the Arab Spring movements started and the spark from the movements ignited a fire that no country in the region or around the world, was ready to handle. With a strong military and a strong intelligence service controlled by an oppressive regime, Syria was seen as a country that could withstand the Arab Spring movements' ideals but when the civil unrest started in 2011, the regime was unable to control it and the civil unrest turned into a civil war by 2012. To understand about the Syrian conflict, it is important to argue first who were the actors in the beginning that were opposing each other and second how the conflict escalated to a civil war in a year's time, affecting millions of people and surrounding countries, in its course.

Bashar al-Assad, who succeeded power from his father (Hafez al-Assad) when he passed away in 2000 and elected again in 2007, became the head of the ruling Baath Party, which heavily relied on the support of the Shia-Alawite minority in the country. Taking over a country that his father has formed for over 30 years of power;

with institutions and power sharing mechanisms that used religion, army and politics to secure its authoritarianism; Bashar al-Assad continued the cycle with little or no obstacles on his way (Hinnebusch, 2005). Even though, classifying themselves as a secular and non-ethnic political party, many scholars argue that the Baath Party effectively used its voters' base of Shia-Alawite minority to maintain its control over Syria (Lesch, 2011). From the 1990's; where Syria was challenged with political, economic and diplomatic problems; during Hafez al-Assad regime, Syrian authorities were not concerned about fixing Syria's problems but instead they have used a demagogic foreign policy to mobilize the people against shadow enemies, which actually existed but the disputes fed to the Syrian population could actually have been solved peacefully and in diplomatic ways (Rubin, 2007).

When Bashar succeeded power in 2000, Syria was in a bad shape, both economically and politically and with the 2001 invasion of Iraq by the US, the Syrian regime was afraid that they would be the next to be targeted. In an interview with a Turkish foreign ministry official it has been mentioned that with Bashar al-Assad being pressured to reform its country in order to stay outside US's radar, he had but no choice to normalize its relations with Israel and Turkey in the beginning of 2000s that followed its succession to power (F4, 2015). Even though the relations with Israel stayed rocky with no prominent future of peaceful solutions; Syrian regime started to normalize its relations with Turkey as mentioned in chapter two where two countries have increased their diplomatic and economic ties in the years after Bashar al-Assad took power and AKP became the ruling party in Turkey. Even though this had no domestic policy affect for Syria except for increasing economic ties with Turkey and a steady money flow into the country from Turkey, it was important that the Bashar al-Assad regime successfully overcame a challenge to avoid a US intervention.

In 2003, Anwar Al-Bunni, one of the most powerful and active human rights' activists in Syria commented on the Guardian; that the Syrian government's fear that it will be the next on America's list for committing human rights crimes and/or being an oppressive regime might be useful for the leaders to give reformers more chance to change the country (Hirst, 2003). However, a reform from top or a reform that has been requested by the activists never came and things didn't change in a positive way in Syria which created more resentment up until the Arab Spring movements where

the resentments that have piled up kindled protests in 2011 which escalated to a civil war in a no more than a year's time. With the regime on the one hand, the actors on the other hand became political activists, religious minorities, ethnic groups such as Kurds and international actors such as Iranian backed Hezbollah; Syria went into a chaotic civil war in which no clear lines can be drawn between many actors anymore. The reason that the escalation was that fast was also because without hearing the international pleas to reform, the Baath regime under Bashar al-Assad responded to the civil protests with heavy military interventions where soldiers opened fire to protestors, killing with impunity (Nafaa, 2011). These actions from the regime resulted with more demonstrations and military sieges in major cities and what started as peaceful protests, ended up in a civil war that is still ongoing with actors that are no longer divided with clear lines or objectives as well as a major refugee crisis that effected the whole region as well as countries around the world (Barzani, 2014).

3.4 Causes of the Human Rights Violations and Humanitarian Issues in Syria

1. Sectarian And Ethnic Conflict: Syria being a majority Sunni Muslim nation (%60 approx.), is being ruled by the Shias (%16 approx.) (Phillips,2010). Therefore, the sectarian conflict has always been there. There are also minorities such as Christians, Kurds and Yezidis. When the Syrian conflict started, Al-Assad criticized the mostly Sunni related opposition groups and created an argument that these groups will topple his rule and create an extremist Islamic state in its place (Ozkan and Korkut, 2013). Also the northern side of Syria, having a big Kurdish minority with the dreams of having an independent country, has been a major concern for the Syrian regime and there have been clashes between government forces, Kurdish opposition and Sunni related opposition forces in order to control the strategic points, causing severe human rights violations which some include using of chemical weapons and mass executions (Sterio, 2014). One of the other massive human right violations is mass executions of prisoners of war and even civilians due to their affliction to one or the other side as well

as their religious sects and/or ethnicities. These executions have been reported heavily in the foreign media as well as the Syrian media (in which the regime backed newspapers only showed the Syrian soldiers being executed) (Talev and Razzouk, 2012).

2. Repressed Activism: Syria has seen some political reforms and many political gatherings between the Syrian intellectuals have started during the beginning of 2000s. Ideals of democracy and human rights rules have spread through the Damascus intellectuals, as they began to criticize freely about the government programs. This movement has been called the “Damascus Spring” and until end of 2002 was tolerated by the Syrian regime (Ziadeh, 2011). However, this political climate change when the Al-Assad government started clamping down on the political forums and soon banning all meetings and arrests started to target citizens attending these forums, therefore strengthening the iron-clad of control (Ziadeh, 2011). This breakdown on the democratization movements has been an important milestone on the way to the Syrian conflict.

All these humanitarian and human rights issues and more are discussed throughout the thesis to give a greater picture and a more specific research about the situation in Syria and its effects on the Turkish foreign policy.

3.5 The Syrian Crisis: Security, Human Rights and Humanitarian Challenges

By 2013, the escalating conflict with several actors joining the civil war in between themselves and against Syrian government forces, an approximate number of 90000 people have already been killed according to UN and other organizations working in the region and in the next year the number was estimated to double up (OI, 2015). A UN commission of inquiry, started to investigate the alleged human rights violations since 2011 and during the period of investigation, in an ongoing conflict, found several evidences that all the parties involved in the Syrian conflict have been committing war crimes since the start of the conflict (OHCHR, 2011). These war crimes include murder, torture, rape and enforced disappearances, all committed by government forces and the

other parties involved. The commission also found out that access to basic needs have been blocked by both the government and rebel forces since the beginning of the conflict (OHCHR, 2011). A UN official working in the field answered the question of whether Turkey took a stance on this issue to protect its own self-interests or rather with humanitarian concerns, argued that what Turkey did with open-border policy for people who are fleeing the war-torn Syria was an act of selflessness and have saved millions of lives that could have been trapped in conflict areas within Syria (O2, 2015) which will be argued in the next chapter more thoroughly. This section looks deeper into the Syrian crisis and its implications in the lives of Syrians, the region and the world in general.

When the Syrian crisis started and turned into a violent conflict, the chemical weapons owned by the Syrian government, started to become a major concern for both regional and international powers. The violent response against the opposition, created a major power vacuum in areas which fell to the hands of the various parties in the Syrian opposition. Some were seen as moderate by the western world (such as the Kurdish YPG and the Free Syrian Army) and major international powers were not concerned in the areas they were controlling. However groups like Al- Nusra Front, which gave birth to ISIS later on in the conflict, were known to be extremists and they were also considered terrorists by several countries such as the USA and members of the EU. In 2012, Syria has been warned by Obama administration against the use of chemical weapons in its domestic conflict. Syrian government refused the use of chemical weapons and weapons of mass destruction such as barrel bombs and biological weapons as well (Blake and Mahmud, 2013). However continuous reports from the field, and from the opposition groups, have proved that chemical weapons have been used by the Syrian regime and the regime also was failing to protect its chemical weapons supplies from the opposition forces (Ziadeh, 2011). Even though Syria is not a part of the Rome Statue that bans the use of any type of chemical weapons; Turkey and western countries, pressured the Security Council to regulate a resolution against the Syrian Regime (Blake and Mahmud, 2013). UNSC resolution 2118 was adopted unanimously by all the UNSC permanent members on 12 December 2013 to address this issue. The resolution pushed forward the agreement made on 14 September 2013 between the Syrian government and the relevant UN agencies, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), to destroy Syrian Arab Republic's chemical

weapons program in the earliest and safest manner while expressing Syria's commitment in the process (UNSC, 2013). This resolution was a limited victory for the UN system and a Turkish official mentioned that with the agreement the international community and the Turkish foreign policy makers saw a light for decreasing number of human rights violations in the conflict but this agreement had but little effect on neither a solution nor a decreases in the use of chemical weapons (O2, 2015). Even though in the beginning of the Syrian crisis, chemical weapons were used majorly by the government forces against any and all opposition, international community was extremely cautious that the captured territories did not have any chemical weapons facilities. The international community also urged all parties to not to use any weapons of mass destruction or any weapons against international conventions. With disputed reports on who uses the chemical weapons against each other, it is important to understand that civilians are the majority to suffer from such attacks (Hummel, 2013).

Another major problem in the Syrian crisis can be seen as the rise of extremism and its uncontrollable spread both in the region and globally. The rise of extremism was out of control and the fractured opposition gave birth to and/or supported the foundation of several extremists groups as a result of this unmanageable division. Groups such as Al-Nusra and ISIS started to shape the outlook of the Syrian crisis and the international community as well as Turkey was caught unprepared. When the Syrian crisis started, the thinly spread Syrian government forces created a power vacuum that was filled with several opposition groups and the extremists were not exceptions. The extremist al-Nusra Front gained control in several districts in Aleppo area and started to act as a pseudo state giving basic services as well as distributing justice and providing security (Abrams, 2013). Even though the regular citizens in the districts welcomed the idea of at least a shred of security, the areas controlled by the opposition attracted severe backlash from the government forces. Except facing severe government response, the civilians also suffered in the hands of the groups that control their areas. Extreme Islamic sharia law was imposed by several of these groups, which delivered swift but excessive justice to civilians and combatants alike. Severe human rights violations were reported from the field where many civilian who once welcomed the feeling of security under opposition groups, started to complain that even their basic human rights were taken away from them by the same groups they welcomed. As a result feeling of impunity in

such groups increased. In an interview, a UN official who was working in Syria during the conflict before being pulled out due to security reasons argued that the extremist groups just do whatever they feel like doing under the disguise of religion and enforce their rule in the regions they control with fear (A2, 2015). This argument seems valid as ISIS was born from one such group (Al-Nusra Front) who was closely related to Al-Qaida in Iraq, and it spread violence and destruction to the region. Laub and Masters argue that this fractured and uncontrollable opposition created a major problem for any powers involved in Syria to wage war in two parallel line; one between the regime and the opposition, and the other between opposition moderates and extremists (Laub, Masters, 2013).

The tribal and sectarian divide in Syria also affected the future of the conflict. Kurds in the north, the Sunni majority and a Shia-Alawite minority, all had different agendas as well as support from different major powers. Even though the divisions were clear even before the Syrian crisis started, they also started to deepen when several powers were involved with different sides. The western world saw the Kurds and the moderate Sunni opposition groups as their major allies in the Syrian conflict to fulfill their own interests. Russia and its proxies saw Assad Regime as their ally while Iran supported Assad Regime both directly with open military and political support and indirectly through Hezbollah militia. Arab world supported the Sunni opposition without giving an idea on whom they are and what they wanted to achieve, just in spite of the Assad regime, argues a Turkish foreign policy expert (A3, 2015). During this period, Turkey opened its borders to any and all moderate opposition which are already exiled in Turkey. In the beginning of the Syrian crisis, the conflict could have been identified as medium-intensity civil war with the active involvement of neighboring countries: Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Qatar (Álvarez-Ossorio, 2013). The involvement of several states continued as the Syrian crisis continued to escalate and the divisions between actors deepened even more. It can be easily argued that with intense involvement from actors, all with their own interests attached to the outcome of the Syrian crisis, the situation went for worse rather than changing for better.

As mentioned above, the crisis in Syria not only has implications in Syria itself but for every other country in the world. A possibility of several fighters who have joined to one of the actors in the Syrian civil war, especially the extremist groups,

returning back to their countries with experience gained in the Syrian crisis, scared and is still scaring the international community. Several extremists who returned back and spread terrorism in their own countries and globally after wars such as Afghanistan and Iraq wars, increases the chances of extremists returning back and doing the same after the Syrian crisis ends. Many foreign policy and security experts fear that foreign fighters hailing from Europe, the Middle East and North Africa will return to their home countries hardened by battle and empowered by the extremist ideologies in Syria (Price, 2013). The spread of violence from Syria to the region also can be seen as a major concern which might eventually plunge the whole region into chaos and conflict. It can be argued that human right violators in Syria from several different actors act with complete impunity and spread violence through the region as well.

3.6 Turkey's International Stand: A Lonely Struggle

Compared to the other revolutions that occurred during the Arab Spring movements, Syria has been the most complex, delicate and urgent incident for the Turkish foreign policy. Turkey, while keeping its distance from the other revolutions to maintain its zero-problem foreign policy, has to offer a solid solution for the Syrian crisis as it was closer to its home and it was spreading out of control for the regional and international actors to control. Yilmaz (2011) argued that Turkey had to adjust its foreign policy when it came to the Syrian crisis, considering the close economic relations between two countries, sect problems in Syria (Alewife-Sunni) that can affect the region and Syria itself, Turkey's democratization pioneering and the long standing Kurdish problems. When the demonstrations in Dera'a started, and escalated in a short time to armed struggle which ended up to be a civil war that spread chaos through the region, Turkey's then foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu urged the Assad regime to win the hearts of the Syrian people back with reforms that will address the needs of the protestors (Yilmaz, 2011). When asked, a foreign ministry official argued that Turkey being in a different era in its foreign policy, tried to use its influence in the region and the personal relations between the Turkish and Syrian leadership and miserably failed which can be seen in the fluid conditions of the crisis (Interview, 2015). Even though Turkey seemed to take a more pressuring stance against the Assad regime through the

Syrian conflict, the Prime Minister of the time, Erdogan, sent its chief of national intelligence, Hakan Fidan, to discuss the situation with the Assad regime through dialogue when the protests first started. Turkish officials recommended Assad and his officers, to create an anti-corruption campaign inside the bureaucracy as well as the security and intelligence services while using non-lethal ways to deal with the protestors (Ozkan, Korkut, 2013). Turkey's another concern was the situation of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB), which was a Sunni organization, suppressed for years and Erdogan also asked Assad to lift the ban on the SMB to tackle a growing resentment against the Syrian government. According to a foreign ministry official interviewed for this thesis who was at the time with the think-tank group over the Middle Eastern policies of Turkey, Assad regime saw Turkey's Sunni agenda by backing the SMB threatening but all in all, Turkey assured that with a more balanced domestic and sectarian politics Assad could be a long term ally and Turkey made its calculations this way for the future of the crisis which went out of control right after it started (F5, 2015). Despite being critical to the Syrian regime, Turkish foreign policy was initially based on supporting Assad so that a neighbor wouldn't descend into chaos as the Arab countries went through the Arab Spring revolutions. And even though Turkey seemed to get involved directly and/or indirectly with the Syrian domestic politics, Turkey's concerns were mainly regional and related to its checkered past with Syria.

Turkey, trying to protect a major trade interest and a wind of change in relations with the Syrian regime, had reasons to support the Assad regime in the beginning of the civil unrest. Erdogan and Assad formed a personal relationship during their time as leaders while Turkey and Syria started to have a cooperative understanding against the PKK with Assad regime helping Turkey in the fight against the Kurdish separatist movements (Ozkan, Korkut 2011). In this case, for Turkish foreign policy makers, Syria's descend to civil war would have created an environment where PKK can recruit in the Kurdish majority northern Syria and therefore Turkish policy makers argued that it was the best choice to keep a strong Assad in power to have a strong neighbor and strong relations (A5, 2015). Turkey was also seen as the best candidate to be a mediator between the Assad regime and the Sunni majority protestors. Even a UN interviewee whose focus was on the ongoing Syrian crisis argued that Turkey, with its soft politics stance has somehow broke its shell completely and looked ready to be the

middle-man in between two sides to stop Syria from descending into chaos which showed that Turkey was ready to take a stance in the region permanently and assertively to show that its way is the right way and that way is diplomacy rather than power-politics (A1, 2015).

When the protests started, Turkish Prime Minister of the time, Erdogan, sent his Foreign Minister Davutoglu in April 2011, after his Chief of Intelligence, Fidan visited Syria twice before. Davutoglu was told to force Assad to introduce democratic reforms, and keep human rights standards while dealing with the protestors but the ongoing protests increased Turkey's dissatisfaction about how Assad regime was dealing with the situation and Turkey's stance changed through the first year of the conflict. The zero problems with neighbors policy, was to be changed as Erdogan announced in 2011 in a press conference if the Syrian regime will not hear their pleas to introduce reforms and be more humane when dealing with the protestors (Kardas, 2011) and a foreign ministry official confirmed that the tides have changed in the Turkish Foreign Ministry to follow the new assertive and more interventionist policies of the Erdogan regime (F2, 2015).

Turkey's foreign policy started to change towards anti Assad principles when the Turkish government started to understand that their pleas to Assad regime for less violent options were unheard and the second year of the conflict didn't bring any positive progress regarding the Syrian-Turkish relations. On 22 June 2012, a Turkish jet fighter plane on a reconnaissance mission near the Syrian border got shot down by Syrian army which led to accusations from both sides and Turkey started to talk with its long-time ally US for the first time to find a solution to the Syrian crisis without Assad and a new government (BBC, 2012). Even though the incident ended up with both countries navies to search for the downed jet (Burch, Solomon, 2011), Turkey's foreign policy changed with a move to change its engagement rules against any threat coming from Syria. It can be seen that an optimistic Turkish foreign policy went more pessimist with every passing day throughout the Syrian conflict when Turkish government of the time realized that they will be alone to deal with their problems with their southern neighbor.

Turkey's lonely struggle to urge the international community to react to the Syrian conflict was on the edge when the unrest turned into a civil war and the war

couldn't be contained inside Syria anymore. Throughout 2012, in the first year of the civil war, Turkish authorities didn't hold back their comments on how the international community failed to intervene the Syrian crisis as they should have done from past experiences learnt (Ferris, Kirisci, Shaikh, 2013). In both UN level and in other international bodies that the Turkish authorities could have made their voices heard, they have criticized the international community about their hesitance to intervene both in humanitarian way and if necessary as a military intervention to provide grounds for an humanitarian intervention. The Prime Minister of the time, Erdogan, criticized UN system and the Security Council's inability to put together and enact a resolution for Syria where the Western Front (USA, UK and France) tried to push a resolution while Russia vetoed and China stayed natural (Reuters, 2012). It can be seen that Turkey felt more and more alone in its foreign policy with no help from the international community and an ever growing crisis at its gates.

The Turkish proposals in the UN were to pressure Assad regime to stop human rights violations such as using of chemical weapons or carpet bombs while also asking the UN to create a non-military/no-fly zone in Syria's north for the refugees to have safe haven (Guardian, 2012). However none of these suggestions to the council have passed as a resolution because of the Russian support to the Syrian regime and in Erdogan's own words, Turkey started to believe that "the world is bigger than five", relating to the five permanent members of the Security Council (CBS, 2012). Even though the western allies of Turkey (UK, USA and France) declared that no option is out of the table, since 2012 until the writing of this thesis, a resolution strong enough to pass a no-fly zone inside Syria has not passed while the refugee crisis and the civil war itself have escalated to limits that no country in the region can contain with too many parties waging war and committing severe human rights violations and all the Turkish foreign policy makers, local NGO members and the UN officials interviewed for this thesis agreed that for all the devastation and massacres in Syria the international community is responsible for not taking a step forward in order to save lives rather than thinking of their self-interests (A4, 2015).

Turkey's self-interest vs. ethical dilemma widened when it became clear that the international community will turn a blind-eye to the Syrian civil war. The Turkish foreign policy seemed to become obsolete when it turned out that that the Syrian civil war

became evident that it will spread and escalate. In a UN meeting the foreign minister of the time, Davutoglu, asked the international community until when they will turn a blind eye to the situation in Syria and implied that Turkey is willing to do everything in its power to help control the civil war in Syria with the international community's help. However, as a UN official and a Turkish foreign policy expert argued in their interviews, Turkey also decided to intervene no matter what to control the situation as much as it can (O3, 2015). The direct intervention of Turkey unofficially was reported as arms trade to the opposition forces in Syria but officially Turkey hosted a meeting including the Syrian opposition forces in Istanbul in 2012 to topple the Assad regime and find a solution for the future without the Syrian regime involved (BBC, 2016). Turkey also reportedly became a hub for foreigners travelling to Syria to fight with or against the Syrian regime, as mentioned by an NGO member working in the Syrian border who argued that Turkish authorities turned a blind-eye (A2, 2015). Unfortunately both the Syrian regime and the Turkish government blamed each other for alleged human rights violations or interference to their domestic problems but nothing became official which the author believes that a conclusion to these accusations will not base on evidences until the conflict ends and an independent investigation will be established.

As the conflict continued, the effects of the Syrian war felt heavily on the Turkish side of the border. The refugees running from the conflict increased in numbers and by the time this thesis' research scope, the official number in Turkey was 1.8 million refugees according to UNHCR numbers (UNHCR, 2015).

3.7 Future Challenges to Turkish Foreign Policy

The crisis in Syria reflected the limits of Turkey's "zpw" policy when it was challenged between its self-interests and interventionism. While trying to become a constructive and effective actor in the Syrian crisis, Turkey's policies were challenged both by regional and international actors. This section will analyze some of those actors that are involved in Syrian crisis and their challenges to the Turkish Foreign Policy. As mentioned in the earlier chapters, Syria has a major sectarian division in its domestic politics where a minority Shia population rules the country that is mostly populated by Sunni Muslims. As a predominantly Sunni country, Turkish foreign policy makers tried

to use their negotiation skills in the beginning of the Syrian crisis to negotiate a common ground between the disgruntled Sunni population and the Syrian regime. Using the personal relationship between the Turkish and Syrian leaders as well as their historical, cultural, economic and diplomatic ties; Turkish foreign policy makers tried to mediate the worsening situation in Syria. However these efforts were fruitless and the peaceful protests turned violent in a short period of time. The Syrian regime was left alone with international sanctions and embargoes and started looking for allies due to the solitude and this opened an opportunity for other major regional powers to step in, such as Iran.

Being the predominantly Shia country in the region and seen as the protector of the Shias around the world, Iran used the opportunity in Syria to assert its regional power. Iran immediately ran to the help of its ally, the Syrian regime, in the beginning of the Syrian crisis. The Iranian diplomats claimed that Iranian troops and civil personnel were helping the Syrian regime to deal with the protestors in the beginning of the crisis and they were there for technical and personnel support as long as the Syrian regime needed (Tisdall, 2011). The deeply involved Iranian regime, not only supported the Syrian regime directly, but also there were reported incidents that Hezbollah militia from Lebanon, backed by the Iranian authorities, entered Syria to help the Syrian regime in areas they were needed (Fulton, 2013). It can be argued that Iran was seen as the main antagonist in the region by powers like Israel and western states, before the conflict started. For that reason, Iran saw Syria as the only ally that can be used to protect its geopolitical interests. A Turkish foreign policy expert argued that the relationship between Syria and Iran is a marriage of convenience as both countries needed an ally in the region which is hostile (F5, 2015). Another point of view, was argued by Ilan Berman also argued that both countries had a common goal not to become the next Iraq (Pan, 2006). Iran also saw Syria, as a proxy war area, to fight against the western world, which it believed were the reason to create chaos in the region (Ward, 2016). The Iranian agenda in Syria was a major challenge to Turkish foreign policy. Turkey being a western ally and a predominantly Sunni country did not approve Iran's involvement (Kutlay and Dincer, 2012). Both being from a different sect and a rival in the region, Turkish and Iranian involvement in the Syrian crisis created even more conflict when both countries' self-interests clashed.

As a major international power, Russia is one of the main actors which are involved in the Syrian crisis. The long-term Syria-Russia relations, was reinforced with the Russian navy base in Tartus, Syria. Being the only Russian naval base in Mediterranean and an important strategic port for Russian navy, Tartus remained operational since Soviet times. In the beginning of the Syrian crisis, it was argued that Russia kept its distance against the western rhetoric of Assad regime to step down due to the strategic alliance between Russia and Syria. Russian support to the Syrian regime showed itself as military assistance and most importantly as a political stance in the UNSC. Russia vetoed all the UNSC resolutions related to an intervention in Syria, strengthening the hand of the Assad regime (Ozkan and Korkut, 2013). The deputy Foreign Minister of Russia in 2012, have openly pointed out that any and all attempts from the UN to pass a resolution against the Assad regime will be vetoed (Gutterman, 2012). Even though, events such as the Houla Massacre which was proven to be executed by the Syrian Army troops in 2012, Russia still kept its prominent foreign policy objective to protect its ally, the Assad regime against the western adversary (Gutterman, 2012). A UN expert in Syria, argued that even against a brutal attack to the civilian population in Houla by the Syrian army troops, Russia turned a blind eye to protect its self-interests (O5, 2015). Russia vetoed four times in the UNSC to block the resolutions regarding Syria until 2015, denying any resolutions that it saw as a threat to the Syrian regime (Borger, Inzaurrealde, 2015). Between 2011 and 2013, Turkish government lashed out to Russia in several occasions, arguing that any Russian veto in the UNSC is a step away from humanity and an approval for massacres to happen from both government and rebel forces (Baczynska, 2012). With Russian opposition in the UNSC, a hope for a change in Syrian regime was quelled (Grove, 2012) and Turkey with the other states affected by the Syrian crisis, were left alone to deal with the humanitarian crisis, spilling to their territories too.

Regarding the Russian reaction to the western propositions, the Turkish foreign policy was challenged in the international arena where both Russia and China vetoed all the resolutions in UNSC which were against the Assad regime in Syria. Support from these two major powers, can be argued as impunity for the Syrian government decisions. Turkish foreign policy makers, which were pushing forward a post-Assad Syria, in order to stop the human rights violations as well as the civil war

itself, were powerless against a stalemate in the UNSC. Despite being a challenge to the Turkish foreign policy makers, this stalemate in the UNSC can be argued as an end for the “zpwn”, forcing Turkey to move towards more realist policies. Seeing that the international community is being slow in response Turkey decided to take issues in to its own hands which will be further discussed in chapter four of this thesis.

3.8 Conclusion

Turkish policy makers faced a major dilemma with the onset of the Syrian Crisis. Strong bilateral relationship had been established with countries before and during AKP era like, Tunisia, Egypt and Syria, based on principles of state sovereignty under “zero problems” policy. This understanding had allowed increased relations to develop with highly authoritarian states, whose results have been profitable in economic terms with significant benefits in the realms of trade, investment and tourism. Taking a pro-democracy position and providing active support for opposition groups against the established regimes would have jeopardized Turkey’s important economic interests in the region (Onis, 2012). At the same time, continuing to support the existing regimes at a time of great opposition would undermine Turkey’s ambitions to play a regional leadership role and diminish its credentials to serve as a role model for countries, which for the first time enjoyed a great opportunity to dismantle authoritarian regimes and replace them with open and competitive political systems (Onis, 2012). Therefore Turkey came to a point of Syrian crisis under these dilemmas in which Syrian crisis became the most important test for Turkish foreign policy.

In this turbulent times, “zpwn”’s challenge was to show how concerned the Turkish policy makers were in regards of the humanitarian issues and human rights violations going all around the region, and Turkish foreign policy makers continuously tried to make it clear that Turkey does not want to intervene to the domestic politics of the countries affected with the Arab Spring movements, while also clearly telling the international community that they won’t be a part of a military operation or intervention but they will gladly help for the humanitarian efforts to help people in need in countries facing humanitarian crisis all around the world. Therefore Turkey was trying to balance the good neighbor as a regional partner to countries affected with the Arab Spring while

also trying to maintain its economic and cultural ties with those countries without harming its diplomatic relations or taking minimal damage to the relations until the Syrian crisis became more than a domestic conflict and spilled over to the region, affecting Turkish domestic politics as well with a big refugee surge from Syria to Turkey and leaving Turkey dealing with the largest number of refugees that it has taken into its borders since the Kurdish surge running away from Saddam Hussain in early 1990s (Baser, 2014).

In theory, Turkey is still facing a dilemma between having a fully liberal view where it is trying to put its humanitarian and human rights principles forward in its foreign policy and being non-interventionist but the challenges to these principles clash with the relations between Turkey and the countries affected with the Arab Spring as well as Syria as the economic and diplomatic ties are getting damaged from the humanitarian and pro-democratic views of Turkey. Turkey had to return to its hard-power realist policies and these policies intertwined leaving no clear lines between idealistic “zpw” principles and realist power policies. Current regimes in the countries affected with the Arab Spring movements, specifically Syria, find Turkey’s approach to become an example for the region in its democratic image and humanitarian foreign policy, aggressive and actually more interventionist than the Turkish foreign policy makers think. Therefore this thesis has argued whether “zpw” policy actually can be implemented completely with its non-interventionist and humanitarian roots while keeping the ties with the countries affected with conflicts and suffering from severe human rights violations. This thesis has discussed until now, how much of the “zpw” policy can be implemented theoretically with its liberal roots in a region scorched with conflict and war, and how “zpw” can adapt to the current conditions of the conflicts continuing in the Middle East, especially in Syria, as the clashes of keeping “zpw”’s base of humanitarian and human rights perspectives while also protecting Turkey’s self-interests continues. These challenges show that Turkey, bringing a soft-power policy base to its foreign policy against Syrian crisis, can’t stir away from realist policies when they are needed.

The next chapter argues and analyzes the problems faced by the Turkish foreign policy makers in regards with the humanitarian intervention in Syria and the international response to the Syrian crisis when it comes to humanitarian intervention.

CHAPTER IV

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY: IMPLICATIONS AND CHALLENGES IN SYRIAN CRISIS

4.1 Introduction

Turkish policy makers faced a major dilemma with the onset of the Arab revolutions. Strong bilateral relationship had been established with countries before and during AKP era like, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria, based on principles of state sovereignty under “zero problems” policy. This understanding had allowed increased relations to develop with highly authoritarian states, whose results have been profitable in economic terms with significant benefits in the realms of trade, investment and tourism. Taking a pro-democracy position and providing active support for opposition groups against the established regimes would have jeopardized Turkey’s important economic interests in the region (Onis, 2012). At the same time, continuing to support the existing regimes at a time of great opposition would undermine Turkey’s ambitions to play a regional leadership role and diminish its credentials to serve as a role model for countries, which for the first time enjoyed a great opportunity to dismantle authoritarian regimes and replace them with open and competitive political systems (Onis, 2012).

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relations until the Syrian crisis became more than a domestic conflict and spilled over to the region, affecting Turkish domestic politics as well with a big refugee surge from Syria to Turkey and leaving Turkey dealing with the largest number of refugees that it has taken into its borders since the Kurdish surge running away from Saddam Hussain in early 1990s (Baser, 2014). In theory, Turkey is still facing a dilemma between having a fully liberal view where it is trying to put its humanitarian and human rights principles forward in its foreign policy and being non-interventionist but the challenges to these principles clash with the relations between Turkey and the countries affected with the Arab Spring as well as Syria as the economic and diplomatic ties are getting damaged from the humanitarian and pro-democratic views of Turkey. Current regimes in the countries affected with the Arab Spring movements as well as Syria, find Turkey's approach to become an example for the region in its democratic image and humanitarian foreign policy, aggressive and actually more interventionist than the Turkish foreign policy makers think.

In this regard, humanitarian intervention and a responsibility to protect from the major powers in international arena or the international community as a whole haven't showed objectivity when it came to Arab Spring movements. In Libya ,as mentioned in chapter two, the international community jumped into the political wagon and intervened, maybe even prematurely; whereas they failed to take any action against the major human rights violations and massacres in Syria at least when it came to practice. This chapter will first provide a conceptual framework of humanitarian intervention. It will later analyze and explain what happened in regards with the humanitarian intervention theory in the military and humanitarian intervention and Syria, for showing how non-interventionism worked. This chapter will also argue how Turkish foreign policy interacted and reacted to the interventionism during Syrian crisis and the reactions of powers such as UN.

4.2 Humanitarian Intervention to Responsibility to Protect: Origins of R2P and Theoretical Framework

Humanitarian intervention has been a contradicting subject for the last two decades where self-interests of the states have clashed with the morality and the dire

consequences of the conflicts. The UN, as an international mechanism, has been both shunned and praised for its decisions on intervening and not intervening to different conflicts and therefore, humanitarian intervention still stays a subject which the international community can't have a clear agreement on. This section will show how the humanitarian intervention theory evolved within its limits of international community approval. The concept of humanitarian intervention has already been discussed in chapter one in theory therefore this section will focus on its practicality. Unfortunately an entire assessment of all the aspects of humanitarian intervention is an impossible task but this section will argue the reasons why humanitarian interventions take place or not and it will classify these reasons as the reasonableness, the importance, the legal status, the morality, the justification and the implementation of humanitarian interventions. These six reasons are argued to understand how complex the humanitarian intervention concept is when it comes to practicality.

The reasonableness of the humanitarian intervention concept has been widely accepted by scholars in case of imminent genocides or massacres. Even though this argument is widely accepted by scholars, a negative experience have been formed against the reasonableness of humanitarian interventions when UN have failed in this concept in the 1990s to intervene in countries such Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia as well as the UN missions in Kosovo and East Timor where UN peacekeepers only watched the genocides as they happened without proper mission enforcement. It can be argued that in these cases the failure of the interventions happened because the missions were primarily focused on hard-military interventions without proper implications of economic and diplomatic enforcements. Pieterse argues that the form of humanitarian interventions during those times, not only was reasonable but it also has dire consequences such as reinforcing authoritarianism and even more militarization in both countries that were intervening and in countries that were intervened (Pieterse, 1997). Doyle and Sambanis also share Pietrese's opinion on how only military humanitarian intervention can't define the humanitarian intervention concept and they argue that a wide variety of political and economic factors to make a clearer humanitarian intervention concept (Doyle, Sambanis, 2007). Doyle and Sambanis also argues that even with military, economic and political enforcements, humanitarian interventions might not be enough to create a self-sustaining democratic peace in the intervened

country (Doyle, Sambanis, 2007). It can be seen that the humanitarian intervention concept is a complex subject which can be affected by not only the power of the intervening states but also with the situation in the intervened countries. In regards with the reasonability on why to intervene, it can be argued that an economic debate is constant in states that are looked upon to intervene to conflict ridden countries and with the economic crisis in the world, the relationship between the monetary input and the outcome of the humanitarian interventions stand on a knife's edge. Valentino argues that military interventions are costly way to save lives and he describes his argument with calculations from different military humanitarian interventions, discussing that there can be ways to find more cost-effective methods and measures in order to intervene without being cynical on considering monetary issues when saving lives (Valentino, 2011). His arguments can be linked with the reasonableness of humanitarian intervention and the cost-effective methods which leads to Mandelbaum's more pessimistic question of the budget cuts where in the future the foreign policy makers will think twice and maybe more when they are dealing with genocides and massacres and whether their state should intervene or not and the morality of the humanitarian intervention concept will lay in the hands of economic restrictions (Mandelbaum, 2011).

It can be argued that the morality of the humanitarian interventions is closely related with self-interests and economic restrictions. Reviewing the significance of the moral aspect and the justification of humanitarian interventions, we lead to a conflict between two major arguments where there is a will and obligation to intervene and stop mass atrocities and their outcomes and there is a political view of either the foreign and domestic policy makers and/or the states with self-geo-strategic interests, objectives and domestic interests, plus a realist point of view where some states believe that state sovereignty is the one and only important aspect of international relations. In this regard, Huntington argued that in the first period of humanitarian interventions after the Cold War ended, the deaths of the US Armed forces in Somalia is morally unjustifiable and politically incorrect and he argued against all US participation in the intervention in Somalia (Huntington, 1993). However with the end of the 1990s and with several lessons learnt from cases like Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda and Kosovo; the recent reactions to humanitarian aren't as pessimistic as the early 1990s. With the new wars, which have several factions fighting each other and no clear lines between state actors

and the rebels/opposition groups etc. Valentino argues that the interveners now face a tough moral dilemma whether to support one faction over another to put an end to the conflicts and whether this support can be justified through political and moral means (Valentino, 2011). According to Valentino, statistically in every conflict the supported faction does more human rights violations and these incidents puts a moral burden on any intervening state and/or states creating the question, whether humanitarian interventions do have a right to take lives or not, including civilian lives (Valentino, 2011).

The vicious circle of morality and justification binds the scale for humanitarian interventions. Since every justification is also a moral argument and every moral argument is a mean to justify the interventions Griffith argues that the moral judgment heavily relies on the moral authority (Griffith 1958), meaning that in practicality the decision for an intervention in its moral judgments and obligatory tasks all depends on will and the ability of the states and even governments and/or individuals to react. Henceforth as it will be argued in this chapter, the national politics, self-interests of states, governments and/or individuals and groups are actually the main actors and have an important share on the discussion about the humanitarian intervention concept. As an example, this scenario can be seen in Germany's absenton on the UN Resolution 1973 regarding the no-fly zone in Libya where the German parliament saw that it isn't in their best interest to intervene to Libya (Stelzenmueller, 2011). It can also be seen in Power's book, who is a pro-interventionist and member of the US Senate under Obama administration, argued that American leaders didn't intervene to conflicts that caused so much pain and suffering through severe human rights violations, just because they simply didn't want to (Power, 2002).

On the optimistic side of the moral arguments Finnemore argues that a multilateral agreement and actions taken by this multilateral consensus can strengthen and multilateralism must be an imperative with wide scale consensus in humanitarian interventions (Finnemore, 1996). The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) created the concept of 'Responsibility to Protect (R2P)' regarding this argument which will be explained and discussed to explain how humanitarian intervention has evolved in order to understand how the world saw the intervention in Libya and non-intervention in Syria later on in the chapter. Even though

no nation will accept a standardized intervention policy R2P was a step forward from the old-interventionism with more multilateral roots. In the decade following the fall of the Soviet Union, the conflicts also start to change from their traditional inter-state dimensions. These conflicts in several different geographical areas of the world, started trigger reactions in different levels from different states and actors. R2P came as a consequence to these new conflicts, defining the new way of humanitarianism with three pillars agreed by scholars and governments from all around the world under Canadian initiative which formed the ICISS to establish the framework for R2P in 2000 (Pingeot, Obenland, 2014). The R2P concept established and determined the main principles of state sovereignty and interventions in political, economic and judicial way. A shift in the definition of state sovereignty in which the states are no longer seen as main actors which are allowed to do as they desire in their domestic issues also urged the international community a responsibility to react under the multilateral implementations within limits of international law. The three pillars that defined R2P were responsibility to prevent, responsibility to react and responsibility to rebuild. The ICISS report explained these pillars as follows;

“The responsibility to prevent: to address both the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises putting populations at risk.

The responsibility to react: to respond to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme cases military intervention.

The responsibility to rebuild: to provide, particularly after a military intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert.” (ICISS, 2001). The new humanitarianism under the concept R2P, heavily relied on multilateral consensus and it put its moral basis on international law and agreements whereas in the old traditional humanitarianism only the powerful states were looked upon to intervene to severe human rights violations with no regards to international law. Contrary to the traditional militaristic humanitarian interventions, R2P also saw military interventions as the last resort where everything else failed to prevent states from disregarding their citizens’ basic human rights and most importantly right to live. R2P argued that a military intervention if necessary should be proportionate, with right intentions, with

reasonable prospect for an outcome that will prevent more loss of human life and should be implemented as a last resort (ICISS, 2011). Evans, argues that, even though R2P has good intentions and a good theoretical framework, when it came to practicality, it actually wasn't different from the traditional humanitarian intervention principle when it came to the morality and self-interest argument in which he argues that just cause and right authority clauses have not been implemented in Kosovo while they have been implemented with extreme measures in Iraq (Evans. 2006). When it came to the role of the non-state actors in R2P, Chandler argues that in new humanitarianism concept, NGOs should take more responsibility before any military interventions are implemented of their political impartiality and universalism (Chandler, 2001).

4.3 Humanitarian Intervention and Responsibility to Protect: A New Way of Humanitarian Interventions

From the beginning of 19th century the humanitarian policies started to affect foreign policies and national interests in the international arena and the aspect of sovereignty have been manipulated with the ideal of humanitarianism. Even though, humanitarianism is a political and economic ideal, it also became a way to shape foreign policies, security policies and even the contemporary world politics. During the Cold War, due to a high number of conflicts in the developing countries and regions all around the world, such as civil wars in Africa, UN became an important tool and its main elements, UNICEF and UNHCR, became significant organizations for humanitarian acts. During this period several NGOs were also formed and/ or rose to help such as the Red Cross and Save the Children and it became obvious that the humanitarian ideals can't be achieved by only IGOs while implementing programs or interventions in order to achieve humanitarian ideals. After the Cold War, UN and the NGOs continued working on humanitarian crises, but they also realized that with the formation of new wars through and after the Cold War, where there are no open boundaries between states and the conflicting actors and with the rise of civil wars which disregards international treaties, theories and the practices of humanitarianism also has to start to change. In this

period NGOs also established themselves as widely useful and flexible actors to help and adapt international organizations such as UN and NATO.

Kaldor (1999) argued in her book that here are three steps to the new wars concept that asks for a new humanitarianism theory. According Kaldor, the new wars are evolving beyond the state based implementations of violence while also professionalizing and separating from generic militarism (Kaldor, 1999). Therefore the new wars, without clean borders in between civil wars and interstate wars required both a new understanding and new point of view for the international actors to react with. In that regard, Weiss argues that the 'Third World' or in another words the developing nations are forming the mainframe for the new wars and these wars are in return form the main arguments on new humanitarianism (Weiss, 2012). According to Weiss, these new wars called for a new kind of sovereignty idea especially in the liberal theories where interventions are favored in case state actors fail to continue their obligations to protect their own citizens (Weiss, 2012). In this sense, the new wars changed the perspective of the non-interventionist Westphalian realist theories where state sovereignty is of major importance.

4.4 Humanitarian Intervention in Realism and Liberalism

The realist and liberal as reflected in concept of humanitarian intervention could be for or against humanitarian intervention. This section shows how the concept of humanitarian intervention has been defined and used by Turkey during AKP era. As argued, the conditions that trigger a humanitarian intervention arises from the cases where governments disregard the rule of law and use their means against their own people and/or where states fall into lawlessness. The argument between the liberal point of view where the actors should and must protect the human rights principles through cooperation in between states and impose these principles to actors that stir away, the realists argue that any type of intervention is a violation of any states' sovereignty and solidarity (Wheeler, 2002). Michael Walzer argues that international society should be constituted by a rule-governed framework in which sovereign powers can protect the values of individual life and communal liberty even when a state stirs away from the rule-governed framework (Walzer, 1978). The realists on the other hand argue whether

outsider are legally and morally permitted or whether they are required or not to intervene even in such violations of international law. Bull argues and criticizes the concept of humanitarian intervention morally claiming that states might have different definitions of justice and that states haven't experimented with the right of humanitarian intervention because of an "unwillingness to jeopardize the rules of sovereignty and non-intervention by conceding such a right to individual states" (Bull, 1984).

In this sense the defense of non-interventionists is based on the belief that while allowing intervention states also accept that the cultural predilections of those who have the power to carry out interventions (Wheeler, 2002). Realists also argue that interventions won't be moral as state actors. This argument is based on the reality of self-interests of the states involved. Realists argue that the states won't intervene if the intervention risks domestic problems or significant economic loss, meaning that actors who have the power to intervene will be selective and won't be objective on their choice of intervention. Realists back this argument by pointing out that even though the humanitarian beliefs can be an actor for a state actor to intervene, states will not risk more than they will gain in order to intervene based on just humanitarian principles, therefore they will be unwilling to risk the lives of their own soldiers or civilians as well their economy (Wheeler, 2002). Liberals such as Walzer argue against this realist view by pointing out, that the concept of humanitarian intervention can be put under rule of law with four conditions. Walzer explains those conditions as just cause (an extreme humanitarian emergency is a good example), use of force as a last resort, meeting the requirement of proportionality and having a high probability that an intervention with force will achieve positive humanitarian outcome (Walzer, 1978). According to liberals, humanitarian intervention can be clearly justified in these four conditions on the other hand realist clearly argues against this argument pointing out that not all intervention will satisfy these conditions proclaiming any type of interventions as not moral, not objective and not just.

Realists also argue that humanitarian interventions give means to the leaders that seek their own agenda and wanting to play god on other people's lives while also getting entangled on their humanitarian claims therefore drifting away from their self-interests and risking being immoral in their intervention by overstepping their boundaries. Fierke argues that states and/or leaders will and/or can use humanitarian

principles to push forward their own agendas when pushed to the corner and have to defend their actions. (Fierke, 1999). Even though that is not the case all the time, realists argue that if there is a risk that this kind of immoral actions happening, humanitarian intervention can't be seen as just when the motives and justifications are clear. Liberals on the other hand argue that international organizations can be means to put forward motives and justifications of any and all interventions where state actors can openly argue the said interventions to the fullest extent which certainly will create the problem of international bureaucracy slowing down the process while the end-goal of peaceful world order can be achieved with international consensus.

The "humanitarian intervention" concept that Turkey is pushing forward can be seen quite relevant to Michael Walzer's liberal internationalism point of view where he argues that military intervention can only be justified as a last resort and as a means to protect civilians from human rights violations, such as genocide and crimes against humanity from the state or other actors in the conflicts (Walzer, 1983). However, according to Turkey's policy makers, such intervention should not be undertaken unilaterally, but rather multilaterally with the authorization of the UN Security Council because Turkey believes that multilateralism prevents major powers from pursuing their own interests rather than humanitarian objectives in an intervention. The Turkish government emphasized several times how the significance of international organizations like European Union, United Nation, Organization of the Islamic Conference and NATO can affect the crisis and the intervention criteria in Syria in order to tackle the problem in its liberal foreign policy foundations (Sarac, 2010). Turkey's major criticism under this conceptual framework is that UN Security Council isn't working in the best interests of the Syrian people but rather each member state is working for their national interests and this creates an unethical and immoral international problem.

4.5 Turkish Foreign Policy and Humanitarian Intervention

Turkish foreign policy prior to the AKP government has always been based upon the principle of "peace at home, peace in the world" principle which has been established by the founder of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. This principle has clear

outlines in which there is respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations including Turkey itself. In early years of the Turkish Republic, up until right before AKP came to power, Turkey has always been careful to interfere and/or intervene to the domestic issues of the other countries in its region and globally. Even though the non-interventionist, realist Turkish foreign policy were sensitive to the domestic affairs of the others, Turkey's sensitivity over the issues such as human security and humanitarian diplomacy increased through the years from its experiences in its region and in global scale. Turkey has been a signatory state for the UN Universal Declaration of Human Right and also a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights while recognizing the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. Therefore it can be seen that human rights and humanitarianism are essential parts of the Turkish foreign policy. Being a signatory to international agreements, Turkey pledged itself to comply and protect the basic human rights in both its domestic and foreign policy, which pushed Turkey to not become an irresponsible state that remains silent in the wake of genocides, war crimes, ethnic cleansings and crimes against humanity in a global scale. Turkey, however, instead of acting alone to interfere and intervene with such incidents, chose to work with the international and regional organizations and/or the international community to stop such acts.

Turkey gained important experience during the 1990s, right after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991 created a turbulent region which Turkey saw as its backyard and these turbulent region paved way to severe human rights violations and humanitarian crises that Turkey foresaw coming. Turkey also experienced conflict between its eastern neighbors Armenia and Azerbaijan, secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia and the ethnic conflict in Chechnya where severe human rights violations were experienced in a daily basis. The civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia were the milestones in Turkish foreign policy in which Turkey decided to be a more assertive actor in its region to avoid such humanitarian crises in the future. In shadow of these conflicts, Turkey was pushed to take part in international operations to find stable solutions to such conflicts and to fight against humanitarian crises both to put an end to the domestic conflicts in those countries and to the wave of refugee crises that are torn apart from their homes with constant conflicts. During all these conflicts, Turkey always

kept dialogue with all the parties involved and used organizations such as UN to voice its opinion. Even though some conflicts have come to a ceasefire such as Karabakh and Abkhazia/South Ossetia, Turkey still believes that the parties involved should reach to an ultimate peaceful solution. Turkey had also been an advocate that conflicts should first be solved through diplomacy as from experience the Turkish foreign policy makers believed that military interventions were not ultimate solutions and inevitable they lead to a resurgence of armed conflict and humanitarian crises all over again (Cetin, 2015)

The tragic lesson learnt from the Bosnian Civil war has haunted Turkish foreign policy makers in this regard where diplomacy as well as the military intervention which came late, have been a failure to prevent the humanitarian crises occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At that point, during the war, thousands of people, the majority being Bosnian Muslims have lost their lives and millions were internally displaced with fear of ethnic cleansing and massacres disregarding civilians and armed combatants alike. The massacre of 8000 Bosnian Muslim men in the town of Srebrenica have been a black spot in the history of interventions which could have been easily avoided and it was recognized as genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). During the conflict, Turkey always has been the advocate to preserve Bosnia and Herzegovina's independence and territorial integrity which ultimately aimed at ending the armed conflict immediately and safeguarding all the ethnic groups in the country. Turkey at that point were keeping contact with all the parties involved as well as the international organizations, such as UN, EU, NATO and even Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to push for peaceful solutions. Even though severe human rights violations have happened and the humanitarian crises grew in Bosnia and Herzegovina when all the diplomacy failed, the UN somehow found a solution to halt the conflict with a partial temporary solution which ended up with the crisis of Kosovo that UN proved unable to solve (Cetin, 2015).

When Kosovo conflict began in mid-1990s, Turkey was pushing the international community to look at the lessons learnt from Bosnia and Herzegovina and was arguing that a major refugee crisis will increase the chance of a widespread regional conflict in countries such as Albania and Macedonia as well. Unfortunately Turkey was proven right, when the Kosovar Albanians started to get internationally displaced running from the conflict at home, and the sensitive ethnic balances were toppled in

countries such as Albania and Macedonia with the arriving refugees. At the time of the Kosovo conflict, if NATO was a little late to intervene, the crises would have been even bigger and Turkey have sent peace-missions and police forces to both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo to prevent such crises from happening again after peace agreements were reached. In case of Macedonia, Turkey favored diplomacy between different ethnic groups to re-establish long lost mutual trust between Macedonians, Albanians and Turks in Macedonia which created a constitutional reform. Turkey, again kept close relations with EU which was the pioneer in the peace consolidation process of Macedonia (Kuperman, 2008).

On the eastern front, Turkey has been a part of the NATO backed Afghanistan operation in the beginning of 2000s until the end of 2014, contributing non-combatant troops to peace-keeping efforts with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). For Turkey, instead of joining combat operations, the priorities have been prevention of terrorism, achievement of stability, building a functioning state, establishment of democracy and improvement of the life standards of the Afghan people (Ozcan, 2010). With these peace-making and humanitarian goals as priorities, Turkey implemented several infrastructure work such in public health and education fields, investing in the physical and social infrastructure of Afghanistan in both rural and urban areas to strengthen the peaceful outcome of the conflict. It can be argued that these actions taken by the Turkish foreign policy makers was from the sole belief of Turkey that Afghanistan will one day integrate to the international community through persistent support further strengthening the situation of Afghanistan's place in international community to prevent future humanitarian crises. With all the examples, it can be seen that the non-interventionist, realist Turkish foreign policy, through painful experiences, has evolved to a more liberal, international community oriented view through the 1990s and early 2000s before AKP came to power and with AKP in government the new foreign policy solidified these liberal ideals.

In the wake of Arab Spring movements which started in 2011, the wave of instability and conflict, which as a result gave a momentum on the R2P discussions as there were several humanitarian crises going on the region under dictatorial regimes against the people revolting and/or protesting, which even disregarded basic human rights. In case of Libya, the international community believed that an intervention is

only possible under a NATO umbrella backed by a UNSC resolution which came as UNSCR 1973 in 2011. The UNSCR 1973, focused on stopping the Gaddafi regime implementing measures that will pave way to civilian massacres (UNSCR, 2011). NATO, as a result intervened into Libya in order to topple the Gaddafi regime allowing the opposition to take over the country but the results were not as expected. With a fractioned opposition and a power-vacuum left after Gaddafi's demise, Libya fell into further chaos and the humanitarian crisis continued without slowing down. During the NATO intervention, Turkey participated in humanitarian aid missions as well as the naval blockade and continuously promoted an establishment of a democratic regime which responds to the needs of its people. However with the failure of building a stable and democratic Libya, Turkey could only continue to have communication with the parties involved in the ongoing civil war in Libya, promoting permanent peaceful solutions. A foreign ministry official when asked the question on why Turkey's non-interventionist policies have altered during the Libyan operation, she answered that, with extreme close ties with several partners in Libya, Turkey couldn't stay away from being involved in Libya but also didn't want to directly target the government or any other parties due to self-interests in the country and even the region where Turkey didn't want to be an open partner of a western military intervention in the Arab world (F5s, 2015).

The transformation in Syria on the other hand, demanded for the similar things as Libya, where people protested to have more democratic rights and less corruption but the consequent civil war which was a result of a repressive state that didn't heed to the international community, especially Turkey itself, deeply disturbed the Turkish foreign and domestic policies. Millions of Syrian refugees entering Turkey interrupted the Turkish domestic politics with an economic and social burden on the state. Also the instability and insurgency in Syria, created groups like ISIS and Turkey, reminded the international community that if they don't intervene, sooner or later they will have a conflict affecting not only the region but also the world in global scale. Turkey has been calling for a military intervention by an international coalition under the framework of R2P since the early years of the Syrian conflict which will be argued further on in this chapter.

Turkey has been an insistent defender of international cooperation and still sends troops or humanitarian assistance to peace-keeping operations such as Mali and Central African Republic to show its belief in the R2P principles and it can be argued that Turkey believes that any humanitarian crisis, wherever it happens, should be objectively dealt with consistent international cooperation under legitimate grounds

4.6 Turkish Effort To Push For Humanitarian Intervention in Syria

The ongoing Syrian crisis started in February 2011 when the protestors started to demand democratic rights and less corruption. The situation escalated swiftly to a civil war after the violent reactions from the Syrian government and until now the crisis in Syria, has affected the regional and global international politics. The severe civilian toll of the conflict has brought up the question on why the international community hesitates to intervene in Syria which relates to every principle of R2P in order to have a moral, justified intervention. It can be argued that, even though the liberal international ideals have gained momentum during the Arab Spring movements, Syria is a classical realist state centered self-interest case where the international community found no reason to intervene by looking at the costs and getting affected by their domestic policies. Therefore the international community failed to intervene to a country where civilians, in large numbers, have been killed, displaced and/or impoverished by the ongoing conflict. This failure in intervening Syrian conflict has damaged the liberal and impartial principles of R2P and it can be said that humanitarianism, failed once again to rise up for its responsibilities. This section will argue how Turkish foreign policy interacted with the international community while also showing the international community responses to the Syrian crisis.

According to the UN Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, the suffering inflicted in Syria on ordinary civilians, is unacceptable and only words that have been talked by the international community isn't enough to explain what really is going on in the Syrian conflict (UNOCHA, 2013). At the end of 2013, 9.3 million people in Syria were in need of humanitarian assistance including the 6.5 million internally displaced Syrians facing a tough winter and the refugees outside the country in the neighboring areas reached approximately to 2.3 million people with

approximately 3 million people losing their jobs and again approximately 3 million children being denied their education (UNOCHA, 2013). The regime also deliberately was attacking its citizens and impartial humanitarian workers which under international treaties can be constituted as war crimes and crimes against humanity together with International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecution. According to the Oxford Research Group, by August 2013, **10%** of the confirmed civilian deaths were children under 18 years of age which again is a shocking fact that the international community failed to protect innocent lives that are killed without differentiating (Salama, Dardagan, 2013). In 2013, the deliberate targeting of hospitals, medical workers, medical transports and denial to even the basic medical needs, have also been reported by the International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic and the Syrian government as well as the opposition forces, failed to respond to the demands to put an end to deliberate targeting of civilians (OHCHR, 2013). The lack of respect for humanitarian impartiality in Syria has been a constant reminder from the past conflicts all around the world, and is one of the most concerning issues in the Syrian conflict. The decision making process in the UNSC within the permanent members, also named as P5 (China, France, Russia, UK and US), has been catastrophic when it came to a point to find a political solution to help the Syrian government and/or the opposition. From the early days of the conflict in 2011, P5 members were locked in a constant argument where the Western block (UK, USA, and France) was backing a solution with Assad out of the picture and Russia and China vetoing every single resolution attempt. Kofi Annan as a mediator between the major powers also failed in his attempt to find a middle ground during the Syrian conflict in the UNSC. During the time Susan Rice, the US ambassador to UN, even called the vetoes of Russia and China over a resolution regarding the Syrian conflict as ‘disgusting and shameful’ (Guardian, 2012) which showed an outspoken clash between self-interests and international community responsibility to intervene in Syria. With that it can be said that with moral authority, objectivity and neutrality out of the window, the impartiality in any attempt to intervene in Syrian conflict became impossible.

It can be argued that Syria is a clear example of the lowest point of liberal interventionism whose ideals were born in 1991 in response to the humanitarian crisis in Northern Iraq and strengthened by the conflict in Kosovo and started to decline during the Invasion of Iraq in 2003. The label of humanitarian intervention, now an old term

compared to its successor, the R2P doctrine, is once again labeled as having a nature of political agenda and self-interests which can be said that it is very degrading when it comes to the concept of humanitarianism. As the system is locked between the national interests of the P5, it is impossible to say that even the new humanitarianism is doomed to fail in the eyes of the international community if it fails to do something progressive, in Syria. De Waal argues that in several cases during the 1990s and 2000s UN and the P5 have continuously failed the international community when it came to the subject of humanitarian interventions and UN has failed its charter where it didn't save or protect people's lives in a timely and organized manner in conflicts such as Darfur and Bosnia and without a consent from the UNSC nothing can happen (De Waal, 2007) as it is the case in Syria still. In Syria, in contrast with the Libyan example where the regime lost nearly all their allies (except Russia and Iran) in international community, USA and its western allies (France and Britain), were not ready to intervene to topple a regime which was backed by the Russians and the Iranians and Turkey's wishful thinking on pushing the international community to reach within R2P principles failed miserably with the concept of humanitarian intervention became a far dream for the Syrians affected by the conflict. A member of the delegate which was in the talks where Davutoglu was urging the international community to intervene described the meeting in the UNSCR as a shameful display of diplomacy (A3, 2015) which the writer of this thesis also agrees that the P5 members only thinking of their self-interests but not the demise of millions of people.

Turkey, having a lonely struggle with the incoming refugees and a conflict ridden Syria where Turkish national interests have been undermined, decided to back the opposition since the early days of the Syrian conflict after its attempts failed to persuade the Assad regime to reform and not use violence against its own citizens. Even though Turkey was backing up the opposition in Syria in its own means, it was also emphasizing to the world about the humanitarian part of the conflict (Baris, 2013). The domestic politics, in Turkey, also pushed Turkey to react to the humanitarian crisis in Syria when the economic and social toll of the refugees and the Syrian conflict, became a heavy burden in Turkish politics. Turkey lost its control on the humanitarian principles when its effort to push the international community to intervene and the thin line between humanitarian relief and opposition backing, vanished (Doster, 2013). A local

NGO official argued that even though Turkey was doing the right thing by letting the refugees come as they are, Turkey was also a reason by backing up rebels in Syria to create those refugees (O4, 2015). As Kaldor argued, the globalization being an important factor in new humanitarian interventions, globalization also became an important aspect for Turkish-Syrian relations during the conflict when Syria spiraled to an ongoing conflict and Turkey stayed lonely in its efforts for an intervention to be implemented in Syria.

The next section will analyze the international response to the Syrian crisis and how the UN system failed several times with limited achievements.

4.7 International Chaos: Non-Response from International Community to Syrian Crisis

This section will analyze the responses from the international community and Turkish foreign policy through the timeframe of the research scope of this thesis.

a) Early UN Response

After the Syrian crisis started in 2011, the international community watched the conflict and expected that the strong Syrian regime will be able handle what was going on in the country, domestically. The international hope was for Syria not to be another Libya as the international community still had their hands full with the intervention and the spillover effect of the Libyan crisis. However, that was not the case and the peaceful protests, soon turned out to be more violent and the country plunged into an ongoing civil war in 2012. UN was forced to move with the international pressure but as it will be discussed in this section, the outcome of the UN involvement had little effect in the Syrian crisis in intervention level.

In April, 14 2012, UNSC took its first action on Syria and adopted a resolution that authorized an observer mission including 30 military observers in Syria (UNSC, 2012). This resolution was expected to pave way to a more complex mission as in the early days of the conflict in Syria, the actors were still more or less stable, but the international community realized that this was not the case through the crisis and a series of vetoed or failed initiatives and resolution continued to undermine the international

commitment and involvement in Syrian crisis. As usual this resolution urged for the sides in the conflict to cease fire, condemning the widespread violations of human rights by the Syrian authorities, as well as any human rights abuses by armed groups but with Syrian government's and armed groups' commitment the military observers were deployed in Syria. This resolution also passed to endorse the six point plan of the joint special envoy of the UN and League of Arab States which with six points urged the hostilities to cease. These six points included; commitment to work with the envoy for all sides, cessations of all hostilities, ensuring provisions for humanitarian assistance for all Syrian people affected with the conflict, intensifying the release of non-violent political prisoners, ensuring press freedom for both domestic and international press members and respecting rights to peaceful demonstrations and right to demonstrate (UN, 2012). When asked in an interview, a UNHCR official unofficially argued that even though the joint plan looked very ideal, the fluid conditions in which the sides of the conflict could not be identified was the main reason that the proposal plan was doomed to fail (A2, 2015).

Just a week after in 21 April, due to severe human rights violations still being committed, by both government and non-government forces and also being observed by the military observers, UNSC established the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) mandated by the UNSC Resolution 2043 (UNSC, 2012). UNSMIS became fully operational by 30 May 2012 with 278 military observers and 121 civilian staff spread around the main population centers of Syria where the conflict can be seen more intense (UN, 2012). UNSMIS, when fully deployed, mix teams of UNSMIS personnel tried to engage with both sides of the conflict as well as the civilians but the mission's monitoring and reporting activities were hampered by inaccessible areas as well as incorporation from both sides of the conflict. By mid-June UN realized that the ground teams are also in danger of being involved in hostilities as the firing in the vicinity and/or the observation sites increased drastically and on 15 June the UNSMIS mission was suspended indefinitely until further notice and until 20th July, when UNSC resolution 2059 (UNSC, 2012) which extended the mandate of the mission for another 30 days for the last time, UNSMIS mission was halted. With rapidly deteriorating conditions in Syria, UNSMIS mission came to an end on 19 August 2012 after the UNSC resolution 2059's two demands were not met (*cessation of the use of*

heavy weapons and a reduction in the level of violence sufficient by all sides' to allow the UNSMIS monitors to implement their mandate) (UNSC, 2012). Right before the mission was put to an end, on 3 August 2012, a UNGA resolution deplored the Security Council's failure to act on Syria and called for a political transition, urging the UNSC member to move forward and be more assertive to stop human rights violations in the Syrian conflict (UNGA, 2012). This failed mission could have been seen as a warning to the international community on how the future of the Syrian crisis will look like but lessons were not learnt and Syria became a civil war area with no possible long term end to hostilities in the near future and no decrease in violations against even the basic human rights.

b) Refugees at the Gate: Turkish Response

The shift in the Turkish foreign policy, *zpwn*, started as a reaction to the massive influx of refugees running from the Syrian conflict into Turkey's borders. With all the diplomatic and economic ties cut and a feeling of loneliness in the international community, Turkey started to realize that without being involved in the conflict, it can't control the outcome in the future. The main problem that this thesis will argue is the refugee crisis that put a heavy burden on the Turkish foreign policy at the time that this thesis is written as well as its effect for the future of the Turkish foreign policies.

Turkey's open door policy for the refugees coming consisted of three main pillars prior to the Syrian crisis historically. These three pillars included ensuring temporary safety as long as it takes for the refugees until they feel safe to go back to their homes; protecting the rights of non-refoulement and providing the optimal humanitarian assistance (Icduygu, 2015). However; Turkey, being an immediate neighbor, became involved with the Syrian crisis quickly, taking an anti-Assad stance through the process when diplomacy failed to convince Assad to reform. Initially, the influx of the Syrian refugees running from the conflict and coming to the Turkish border was relatively small compared to the ones in Iraq and Lebanon. According to a SAM report, the number of refugees at the end of 2011 was only 8000 (Kibar, 2013). Soon after the influx of refugees increased in great number starting from 2012 when the ceasefire attempts failed and Turkey started to see four to five digit numbers a month, and in sometimes in one day when the conflict escalated around the border areas, in a

day with both registered and unregistered refugees flowing in to its borders. This high amount of influx started to put a strain on Turkey's open door policies starting from 2012. By mid-2012 when the ceasefire talks completely collapsed the conflict in Syria escalated and Turkey started to see around 20000 refugees a day seeking entry into its borders (Kirisci, 2014). A UNHCR official argued that with level of refugees that are registered and non-registered, coming through the borders with a free-flow, even the UN agencies were overwhelmed and with the support from the Turkish government they could only form as much of a refugee protection program but there are still many refugees in the urban areas of Turkey that couldn't even be traced (F3, 2015). This could be seen as a severe problem for the Turkish domestic politics and demographics of the urban areas which the Turkish government is still trying to tackle.

Turkey showed the international community that it was ready to welcome any and all refugees coming to its borders and will do everything it can to ensure their safety and well-being and the Prime Minister of the time, Erdogan defined the refugees as "guests" rather than refugees (Ozden, 2013). Turkey's open door policy was a result of a EU's July 2001 directive which inspired turkey to give Syrian refugees under a legal basis regarding temporary protection (UN, 2013). Turkish policy makers, despite their past experiences, have ignored the possibility of the Syrians staying permanently or long-term and have established camps, also declaring that Turkey will welcome any and all of its cultural brothers running away from an oppressive regime, in Erdogan's words (Ozden, 2013). An NGO official, argued in an interview during the writing of this thesis that Turkey, up until late 2013's managed the camp system efficiently and almost all of the refugees coming into Turkey were settled in the camps. The conditions of the camps also have been defined as more comfortable and more controlled by many domestic and international organizations such as UNHCR and AFAD with reference to the Turkish authorities' hospitality; compared to the other regional countries hosting Syrian refugees in great numbers (NYT, 2014). But the ever increasing rate of Syrian refugees coming in through the borders crippled the system and by mid-2014, Turkey started to see refugees in urban areas and outside the camps more and more which ended up with domestic policy problems and an ever more aggressive Turkish foreign policy in order to stop and/or control the war in Syria (O2, 2015). With increasing numbers of refugees and no end to the conflict in Syria, Davutoglu called for a greater burden

sharing from the international community and increased contributions to the Syrian Regional Response Plan (RRP) of the UN and the Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP) and repeated Turkey's needs throughout the ongoing response plans until this thesis was written (Davutoglu, 2013) (RRP, 2013). Both the plans were based on international humanitarian intervention to the Syrian Crisis. The ongoing nature of the conflict unfortunately limits the ability to have a clear view on how both the plans works in the field which has been a limitation for the research.

4.8 Conclusion

Turkish- Syrian relations in humanitarianism aspects had a foreign policy heritage where the bumpy relations between the two countries normalized before the Syrian crisis and then went back into being enemies during the Syrian crisis. Turkey continuously backed up a military intervention as a resort against the Syrian regime which was disregarding human rights. With that, Turkey was promoting to the international community to respect the principles of the R2P to find a permanent peaceful solution and a post-conflict peace-building plan. It can be said that a Turkish foreign policy, following the R2P principles directly, would have had a positive result in the Syrian conflict in the long-term but both domestic problems because of the refugees and the international failure to implement a permanent solution with P5 not being able to agree in a resolution strong enough for an intervention in Syria, disturbed the Turkish foreign policy makers to stop and think on their every step. In this sense it can be argued that Turkey should increase its transparency in its humanitarian efforts in Syria and prove that it's neutral to be an example to the international community, working with the IGOs and NGOs alike to efficiently aid the Syrian people who were denied their basic human rights.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

Turkish foreign policy has changed through the course of the Arab Spring movements, trying to adapt to the unfolding unrests and/or conflicts as they went on. Syrian civil war was the greatest challenge that the Turkish foreign policy has ever encountered and therefore needed a more complex approach. Since AKP came to power, Turkish foreign policy was theoretically more liberal and with Turkey opening up to the world and going to great distances in regions that Turkey, prior to AKP, didn't have ties, this foreign policy was ought to be challenged. Arab Spring movements and the following Syrian Civil war were good examples for the challenges discussed in this thesis and it can be seen that Turkey, through good and worse have fluctuated and adapted its foreign policy with the several ongoing crisis in its region. The zpwn, as the official foreign policy for the beginning of the AKP era in Turkey, urged the Turkish foreign policy to form not only diplomatic but also cultural and economic ties with its region and the global community and reach beyond where Turkey has never been an influential partner before. Therefore zpwn was an important tool to achieve Turkey's desire to become a regional and international power. With Davutoglu's own words, a zigzag diplomacy has been achieved by promoting economic and cultural ties through visits to regions that Turkey, before, did not have strong relations with.

For this particular conclusion, the following questions are addressed.

1) How did Turkey balance its “zpwn” policy in its two edged non-intervention vs. need to intervene challenge in the ongoing conflicts around its region?

With the region continuously spiraling down to chaos, Turkey tried to establish a balance in between its zpwn policies of non-interventionism and immediate neighbor conflicts such as Syria. This thesis has tried to analyze how Turkey moved through the Arab Spring movements and ended up with the Syrian crisis in its door

steps. With its new and upcoming diplomatic relations throughout its region and all around the world, Turkey tried to use its personal relations between its leadership and the economic and cultural ties in between Syria and Turkey, before giving up on its hopes that the crisis can be solved with diplomatic means. Unfortunately the Syrian crisis hasn't ended as the other Arab Spring conflicts (except Libya) and the crisis turned into a civil war with several different parties involved. Turkey's efforts to get the international community involved failed miserably as it was argued through the thesis and the zpwn policies had to be altered to take a stance on both domestic and foreign policies. Syrian crisis could be argued as the end of zpwn policies where Turkey, without any international support at the beginning of the crisis decided to took the matters in its own hands and take a stance against the Syrian regime which it thought to be against core human rights and humanitarianism values. This stance ended up with Turkey backing up rebels that by several scholars have been argued to aggravate the situation in Syria even more by creating sectarian and racial conflicts as well as political unrest. Turkey continuously urged the international community to react but until recently was left alone with the other countries in the region to deal with an ever growing security crisis in its own territory as well as a continuous flow of refugees. Syria, being an immediate neighbor and an ongoing crisis, taught Turkey lessons that when it comes to the self-interests of the international community, Turkey couldn't trust its neighbors or international allies as well as the international organizations that it belongs. With zpwn still affecting the Turkish foreign policy during the early years of the Syrian crisis, Turkey's foreign policy makers argued that through diplomacy and international cooperation, crises could be averted but that was not the case. A Turkish foreign ministry official defined this as Turkey being a staunch believer in international organizations such as UN, felt quite upset when its pleas of intervention went into deaf ears (F1, 2015).

2) When challenged with the Syrian Crisis and their regional and international effects, what were the Turkish foreign policy reactions to human rights issues and humanitarian crisis?

Turkish foreign policy makers as argued in chapter two, three and four, have continuously urged the international community to intervene in Syria, but the international non-responsiveness forced Turkey's policy makers to take things into their

own hands. With the highest number of refugees in the region, Turkey used its own resources mostly, by opening its borders to refugees with an open border policy and managing refugee camps with government funding.

Turkey also realized that the solution can't include the current Syrian government, the Assad regime, and it is asking them to remove any obstacles on the road to increased humanitarian assistance to their citizens as well as ceasing using all types of illegal weaponry while fighting any party. Even though there are still obstacles in Syria against the humanitarian assistance workers and/or convoys, it can be understandable in a conflict where several parties have several different allegiances while the conflict is really fluid. Turkey also pushes for non-ethnic, non-sectarian, non-political humanitarian assistance to any and all citizens of Syria and the refugees in its borders and throughout the region and the world. This requests have been unheard by the Syrian government, but the international community is trying to adjust to the conflict still. Turkey also asks the international community to increase their effort and support for the regional governments and/or international organizations to be able to work cross-border with safety assured from both the warring parties in Syria as well as the regional countries themselves. This, as a consequence, have been pushed through international organizations as well as major NGOs working in the region to ensure that a safe passage for the refugees on their way to countries hosting them. Even though Davutoglu's idea of imposing a no-fly zone in Syria have been unheard by the UNSC members and the international community at the time this thesis was being written, it can be said that a strong cooperation between countries that are in the region as well as major powers and countries that want to get involved to stop human rights violations in Syria, both a humanitarian intervention and a military no-fly zone can be helpful to assist civilians running from the conflict while also decreasing the burden for the countries hosting large amounts of refugees inside their borders by making it possible to deal with the influx of the refugees before they reach the countries.

3) What can the Turkish foreign policy learn from advancing and using human rights and humanitarianism as its main principles while adopting “zpwn” in a more effective human rights approach and humanitarian intervention cases?

The recent developments in Syria, urged Turkey to be more involved in the region's politics, leaving zpwn behind as Turkey went from a soft power to a hard power politics but with both of the policies used together if needed, in order to create a safe domestic environment as well as a safe zone around its borders with the conflict ridden Syria. Humanitarian and human rights values, being a fueling point for the Turkish foreign policy makers also have been started to use to impose its more interventionist policies to intervene beyond its borders with Syria to show that it will not stand aside anymore during the crisis in the region by taking interventions in to its own hands. There are also humanitarian crises all around the world and with a more open foreign policy that pushes humanitarian agendas all around the world, Turkey can achieve its desire to become both a regional and international power. However, of course, the domestic politics is a significant factor in Turkish politics that will be discussed in the epilogue section of this chapter to show how Turkish foreign policy is being stalled by recent developments in Turkey. Therefore, Turkey couldn't stand far from the Syrian crisis and avoid conflict of interest as it managed with the other Arab Spring movements. The Syrian crisis has no short-term end in the horizon so the Turkish foreign policy makers will have to be alert continuously to tackle each and every aspect of the conflict until a solution is found and the sever human rights violations stop. A Turkish foreign policy expert from the foreign ministry also argued that Turkey was on the road to become a shining example for the Middle East but was caught unprepared when Arab Spring swept the region and even though Turkey was getting a grip on the crises all around the region, Syria was the last drop in a bucket where Turkey had to learn lesson day by day basis without any long-term policies or with long-term policies that had to be changed due to international politics (F2, 2015) which will also be argued in the epilogue section of this chapter.

4) As in theory, what aspects have the “zpwn” policy affected the Turkish foreign policy implied in an ethical humanitarian interventionist view and/or a focused to the self-interest based foreign policy?

Even though the “zpwn” policy was a liberal theory based policy, Turkey had to resort to realist agendas from time to time which can be seen in Turkey taking steps militarily to protect its borders and supporting rebels against the Syrian regime for its self-interests. However, “zpwn” policies of non-interventionism and humanitarianism worked well for Turkey as in examples in Tunisia and Libya (even though Libya became a failed state after the Arab Spring movements) but it failed due to Turkish political and economic self-interests in Egypt and security and political self-interests in Syria. So therefore “zpwn” as pushed by the AKP government to be the one and only foreign policy of Turkey, failed to answer all the needs that Turkey’s foreign policy demanded in general especially in the case of Syria where the conflict was and still is so fluid that no country can create a permanent long term foreign policy involving the crisis. Zpwn’s non-interventionism aspect is focused on self-interests whereas the peace agenda pushed by economic, social, cultural, diplomatic ties moves Turkish foreign policy to a more liberal agenda with humanitarianism and human rights as its base aspects. This thesis tried to answer this question with a background of Arab Spring and a specific focus on Syria to show how “zpwn” achieved and failed foreign policy goals.

Epilogue

The future of the Syrian conflict is still at large as the civil war is getting more and more complex each and every ongoing day but Turkey’s demands from the international community can be seen as a future plan that can bring less human rights violations as well as a more peaceful transition if the international community does their share on intervening to the conflict and/or cutting their support to any parties that commit severe human rights atrocities. The conflict in Syria has no near future conclusion but several things can be done for the future of the country as well the region and the world. Turkey’s foreign policy recommends that all parties involved should comply with the international humanitarian law and have strict control on their peers over protecting the basic needs which are recognized in the international law. According to the Turkish foreign policy makers, failure considering protecting civilians, regardless

of which side they belong to, will result in losing hope for any future permanent solution which will not only affect Syria but the whole region and the world. Turkey also pushes forward to develop and strongly impose a solid UNSC resolution to address the situation in Syria with both military and humanitarian intervention staying on the table until the conflict ends. Even though it was argued through the thesis that the major power politics in the UNSC and disagreements between the permanent states shadows this efforts, Turkey still tries to lobby with the UN Council members to act without the UNSC resolution as they argue it will be a shame for the future generations to see that the international community looked the other way when they could have taken initiative and acted together to put an end to the suffering of the Syrians as well as any victims suffering from the conflicts around the world.

More recently, after the research scope of this thesis, from 2013 to now, the emergence of ISIS and severe ethnic and sectarian divides in Syria also blurs a possible solution that can be achieved in the Syrian crisis. Turkey and the international community obviously could not react to ISIS at an appropriate timeframe and ISIS gained control of territories in Syria and Iraq, using the power vacuum of the Syrian state's failure to control the conflict. As well as ISIS, Turkey also was challenged by the re-emergence of the Kurdish rebel militia (PKK) in its southeastern and eastern provinces as well major cities where several bombings occurred right after a ceasefire agreement was cancelled due to distrust and hostilities between the Turkish state and the militias. Turkey's domestic policy disturbances distracted its foreign policy implementations and its focus returned back to the domestic politics instead of the conflicts outside its borders.

Also the heavy influx of refugees, around 2.8 million people officially (UNHCR, 2016), created an economic burden in the 5th year that Syrian refugees started to arrive creating both socioeconomic and domestic disturbances in major cities. The refugees who couldn't find a space in camps, became urban refugees, creating a disturbance in the daily lives of the Turkish citizens according to an NGO official who was dealing with urban refugees in major cities of Turkey and he also noted that the refugees were being abused as they didn't know their rights as well as no means to pursue their rights if they were mistreated (O4, 2015). This can actually also show how, Turkish foreign policy makers were not ready to deal with the Syrian crisis as with an

open border policy, they did not expect the Syrian crisis to continue this long and they did not put into account how the citizens or more specifically the domestic politics would be affected as “Zpwn” was offering just an idealistic liberal world view with an integrated foreign policy to that view but no solution for the clashes between domestic and foreign policies.

As it can be seen, Turkish foreign policy have been both challenged from internal and external factors and Turkey now has to deal with its rights and wrongs by navigating through the embroilment of Syrian conflict. “Zpwn” is surely left behind with Erdogan now controlling all the reins through the years and a new era for Turkish foreign policy is at hand with close relationship to its domestic politics.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Interviews

Fifteen informants were identified from 3 categories of people namely foreign policy makers in Turkey involved in decisions related to Turkish Foreign Policy, individuals working in the field of humanitarian intervention and human rights and academics active in the field of foreign policy making and human rights. For each group, 5 persons shall be interviewed. The experts have been defined with their works related to human rights and Turkish Foreign Policy as well as their professional background related to the subject of the thesis. The inclusion criterion was implemented as follows;

1. Acceptance to be interviewed
2. Being either decision makers in foreign offices, officers of international and national organizations working in the fields of humanitarian intervention and human rights or foreign policies related matters or experts in the fields
3. Speak either Turkish and/or English
4. Experience in the fields not less than 3 years

Exclusion criteria

1. Informants do not give consent
2. Informants do not meet criteria for inclusion
3. If language barrier is present between the informant and the interviewer

Termination criteria

Upon the request or withdrawal of or consent by the interviewees.

Sample size calculation

Fifteen informants were identified from 3 categories of people namely foreign policy makers in Turkey involved in decisions related to Turkish Foreign Policy, individuals working in the field of humanitarian intervention and human rights and academics active in the field of foreign policy making and human rights. For each group, 5 persons shall be interviewed. Being a Master's thesis, this research will use 5 persons that were from 3 categories of people namely foreign policy makers in Turkey involved in decisions related to Turkish Foreign Policy, individuals working in the field of

humanitarian intervention and human rights and academics active in the field of foreign policy making and human rights who are experts in their field to gain a better insight on the topic that will contribute to the field in a master's thesis level. As the subject of the thesis is sensual and there are still government censorship and still ongoing the interviewees have decided to be anonymous therefore will not be named and recognized.

Questions

- Turkish Foreign policy-makers
 - How long have you worked in your respective field?
 - What do you consider the push factors in policy-making?
 - How do you think human rights fit in with the overall Turkish foreign policy?
 - How do you think human rights fit in with Turkish foreign policy in humanitarian intervention specifically?
 - What is your view on the challenges that a liberal Turkish foreign policy is facing in case of Syrian crisis?
 - How do Turkish foreign policy makers see the future of the Syrian Crisis in case humanitarian intervention doesn't happen?
- Turkish and international organizations based in Turkey promoting humanitarianism and/or human rights (such as AFAD, UNHCR Turkey, Strategic Research Center)
 - How long have you worked in your respective field?
 - What are the objectives of your organization?
 - What role do non-governmental organizations play in policy-making in Turkey?
 - What are your views on the present Turkish foreign policy on Syria?
 - Are the objectives of your organization in line with the foreign policy objectives on zero problems with neighbors? If yes, how is the human rights agenda promoted; if not, how do your objectives differ from the conventional thinking of foreign policy on zero problems with neighbors?
 - Do you consider the present humanitarianism policy as a facilitator of human rights?

- Experts in the field of development and human rights (activists, academics, etc.)
 - How long have you worked in your field of expertise?
 - What kind of human rights work are you involved in?
 - Where do you situate human rights in the field of foreign policy?
 - What is your opinion on the humanitarian intervention in Turkish Foreign Policy?
 - Where do you situate human rights in Turkish Foreign policy?
 - Should Turkish Foreign policy and human rights be linked? If yes, why? If no, why?
 - Are there any policy changes required in current policy to reinforce human rights in Turkish foreign policy?

APPENDIX B

Turkish Foreign Ministry Interviewee List

- Turkish Foreign Ministry Experts on Middle East (5 Interviewees)
 - Vice Chairman of the Committee on Middle Eastern Relations – Interview Date/Place: 10 January 2015/ANKARA (F1)
 - Middle East Desk- Board Member- Interview Date/Place: 12 January 2015/ANKARA (F2)
 - SAM Board Member- Interview Date/Place: 13 January 2015/ANKARA (F3)
 - Former Syria Consulate General- Interview Date/Place: 18 January 2015/ ISTANBUL (F4)
 - Former SAM Board Member in Middle East Desk- Interview Date/Place: 19 January 2015/ ISTANBUL (F5)

International Organizations Interviewee List

- International Organizations Operating in Turkey on Syrian Crisis (5 Interviewees)
 - UNHCR Field Manager in Urfa Camp- Interview Date/Place: 11 January 2015/ANKARA (O1)
 - UNICEF Field Manager Kilis Camp- Interview Date/Place: 13 January 2015/ANKARA (O2)
 - WHO Hatay Camp Vice-Manager- Interview Date /Place: 14 January 2015/ANKARA (O3)
 - UNDP Program Director- Interview Date/Place: 17 January 2015/ISTANBUL (O4)
 - UNHCR Turkey Representative- Interview Date/Place: 18 January 2015/ISTANBUL (O5)

Academic and NGO Experts in Syrian Crisis Miscellaneous Experts in Syrian Crisis (5 Interviewees)

- Bilkent University International Relations Department Professor- Interview Date/Place: 11 January 2015/ ANKARA (A1)
- Bilkent University International Law Professor- Interview Date/Place: 12 January 2015/ANKARA (A2)
- Turkish Women Rights NGO (Name Hidden) Manager- Interview Date/Place: 20 January 2015/ISTANBUL (A3)
- Minority Rights Expert in Undisclosed NGO- Interview Date/Place: 21 January 2015/ANKARA (A4)
- Ankara University Political Science Department Professor- Interview Date/Place: 24 January 2015/ANKARA (A5)

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