

**A CASE STUDY OF VIOLENCE AND RECOVERY IN  
MEIKHTILAR, MYANMAR**

**YE MYINT WIN**


**A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT  
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
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FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES  
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2017**

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Thesis  
entitled  
**A CASE STUDY OF VIOLENCE AND RECOVERY IN  
MEIKHTILAR, MYANMAR**



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A CASE STUDY OF VIOLENCE AND RECOVERY IN MEIKHTILAR, MYANMAR

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ABSTRACT

This study aimed to provide a better understanding of the violence perpetrated against Muslims to understand the rationale, nature, process, structure, dynamics and characteristics of the violence, and to identify human rights violations and the state's failure to fulfill its obligations to protect the citizens from violence as provided for in the international legal frameworks such as CEDAW and CRC already ratified by the Myanmar Government. This was a qualitative research based on in-depth interviews with key informants selected using the "snowball sampling" method in Meikhtilar and Mandalay.

Brass (2004) "institutionalized riot system," identifying the three elements of violence as "Preparation, Activation, and Explanation." (IRS) was applied to analyze the anti-Muslim violence examining only the "Preparation and Activation" of anti-Muslim Violence. In the preparation and activation, the rise of institutionalized anti-Muslim sentiment and hate speech which are imperative preconditions for instigating anti-Muslim violence, and the people's perception of what causes violence were analyzed respectively.

This study provided a case and exploration of the way anti-Muslim violence has proceeded from entrenched anti-Muslim sentiment promoted in recent years by a radical faction of nationalist Buddhist monks but dating back to the colonial-era Burma. It substantiated the theory of a nexus between the rise of institutionalized anti-Muslim sentiment and institutionalized anti-Muslim violence in Myanmar. This study also argues that promotion of anti-Muslim sentiment and hate speech has always escalated shortly before periodic outbreaks of mass violence against Muslims in Myanmar.

KEY WORDS: MYANMAR / INSTITUTIONALIZED ANTI-MUSLIM SENTIMENT / ANTI-MUSLIM VIOLENCE / HATE SPEECH

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# CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Introduction

In March 2013, Muslims from Meikhtilar were tortured, slaughtered, and burned alive by a rioting group of Buddhist nationalist extremists. The use of violence as a mean to oppress the religious minority Muslims in Myanmar is a well-known tactic of the Military regime. The military created Buddhist nationalist groups which contribute to social injustice, in which the religious minority Muslims are victimized by extremist nationalists. The use of violence is a serious human rights problem, and the Myanmar government has obligations under international human rights law, the 2008 Constitution, and the domestic legal framework to protect their citizens' fundamental rights.

During the outbreak of anti-Muslim violence in Meikhtilar, Myanmar magnetized researchers and scholars to conduct an in-depth study of this phenomenon. International media and various human rights organizations reported on the instigation of anti-Muslim violence and documented the different forms of human rights abuses during the violent outburst. However, in current times, no Burmese human rights researcher has thus far conducted an empirical and in-depth study of this complicated anti-Muslim violence, particularly in Meikhtilar, Myanmar.

Emphasizing local perspectives and drawing upon local knowledge to gain a better understanding of the local context, this study contributes to academic understanding and exploration of the rationale, nature, process, structure, dynamics and characteristics of the violence that occurred against Muslims in Meikhtilar. This study collects narratives from both Buddhist and Muslim communities in Meikhtilar and testimonies from survivors of the violence. Analyzing both narratives from Buddhist and Muslim communities, this study understands violence as a systematically organized activity in which the culture of impunity played a pivotal role in violations of human rights during the outbreak of anti-Muslim violence.

## **1.2 Background**

Since 1962, Burma was ruled by an authoritarian regime. Throughout the military regimes in Myanmar, the rise of anti-Muslim sentiment and hate speech aimed to instigate Buddhist-Muslim riots to deflect the people's anger and exasperation away from the military regime and onto a vulnerable minority group. It was also a means for the junta to maintain their power and their role in the political history of Myanmar. Evidently, the military regime has manufactured a culture of impunity to instigate anti-Muslim riots throughout Myanmar history. The contemporary outbursts of anti-Muslim violence in Myanmar demonstrate a nexus between the anti-Muslim movement implanted in institutionalized Buddhist-nationalism and collective violence against Muslims. Anti-Muslim sentiment and hate speech serve as precursors to or even prerequisites for anti-Muslim riots. The tactic of anti-Muslim speech acts is to generate a "new reality," in which Buddhist society in Myanmar is perceived to be under existential threat and this sentiment is inflamed by the media propaganda warning of a "Muslim threat." The emergence of "Ma-Ba-Tha," also known as "National Organization of Protecting Race and Religion," creates a new vision of insecurity which has imperiled the Buddhist race, religion, and economy under the so-called Muslim threat. This study argues that promotion of anti-Muslim sentiment and hate speech have always escalated just before outbreaks of collective violence against Muslims in Myanmar.

## **1.3 Research Problem**

The rise of the nationalist movement during Myanmar's democratization correlated with outbreaks of anti-Muslim violence. Burmese Buddhist nationalists, political elites who have a strong connection to the military regime, and religious leaders holding ultra-nationalistic views have been responsible for intensifying the intolerance and hatred by campaigning for boycotts against Muslim businesses and criminalizing inter-faith marriage (Newsdesk, 2014). Prohibition of "intermarriage" is a way to oppress a religious minority under the name of protecting Buddhist women from others, without regard for Myanmar women's free will. Accordingly, women's rights activists and organizations from Myanmar claim that the interfaith marriage ban

ignores the individual rights of women to choose their husbands. It is also a violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) Article 16, which indicates “(1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry, and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during the marriage, and at its dissolution, (2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses. (3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State (UDHR, 1948).”<sup>1</sup>

Kyaw (2013) claimed in *The Huffington Post* that a Buddhist monk named Ashin Wirathu led the anti-Muslim national campaign in Myanmar to promote the nationalist movement and campaign against the country’s Muslims. The radicalization of the nationalist movement encourages the anti-Muslim campaign, and there is evidence that radicals from both Muslim and Buddhist communities feed off each other. *Global Post* claimed that the '969' Campaign (a leading movement in spreading anti-Muslim sentiment) had been quickly growing in Myanmar (Winn, 2013). The UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office officially states that the spread of anti-Muslim sentiment and violence have occurred concomitantly with the rise of the Buddhist nationalist '969' Movement, and the foundation of "Ma-Ba-Tha." The founders of "Ma-Ba-Tha" claimed that the '969' Movement is a peaceful movement committed to developing and protecting Buddhists and Buddhism through the establishment of the "National Network to Develop and Protect Buddhism and Buddhists"<sup>2</sup> – a broad coalition led by nationalist Buddhist monks.

After the outbreak of deadly violence against the Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State in June and October 2012, anti-Muslim violence quickly spread to other parts of Myanmar. The rise of anti-Muslim sentiment and anti-Muslim rhetoric over social media and print media in Myanmar, and the insufficient response of government and law enforcement forces mean that further violence against Muslims remains distinctly possible. As a result, anti-Muslim riots have happened in major and small

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<sup>1</sup> See the Article 16, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).

<sup>2</sup> See Nyi Nyi Kyaw (2014), *Securitization and Islamophobia Analysis of the 969 Movement in Myanmar: Islam, Law, and the state in Myanmar*. Centre for Asian Legal Studies, National University Singapore.

cities and villages of Myanmar including: "Meikhtilar" City (March 2013), "Okkan" Village (April 2013), "Yadanakon" Village, "Panipin" Village, "Chaukthe" Village, "Thekon" Village, "Lashio" City (May 2013), "Htangone" Village in the "Kanbalu" Township (August 2013), "Thabyachaing and Linthi" Villages in the Rakhine State, Mandalay City (July 2014), and more recently in Magwe Division. Violence and riots against Muslims took place more than six times in 2013 and 2014. At a time when Myanmar is transitioning to democracy from decades of military rule and isolation, the rise of the anti-Muslim movement and violence threaten to complicate the political transition to democracy. Human Rights Watch (2013) reports that the violence took place in Rakhine State in two waves in 2012 and then spread to some other parts of Myanmar; violence against Muslims has been accompanied by rising intolerance and anti-Muslim rhetoric, in part spread by radical Buddhist nationalist groups.

From 20 to 22 March 2013, according to the official government news, a set of deadly violence by extremists and rioters against Muslims in Meikhtilar resulted in 43 deaths. Estimates from inside the Muslim community from Meikhtilar suggest more severe violence: community members claim that over 80 Muslims were massacred by rioters during the anti-Muslim riot and at least 61 people were injured. As many as 12,000 were displaced, and more than 1,000 households and houses were destroyed by the rioters.<sup>3</sup>

The riots started after a disagreement over a business deal between a Muslim gold shop owner and a Buddhist customer, alleging that the gold shop owner and two Muslim employees assaulted a Buddhist customer (Szep, 2013). Violent rioters armed with machetes, swords, metal pipes, chains, and stones subsequently murdered 32 Muslim teenage students and four teachers while law enforcement forces stood by and failed to intervene (Win, 2013).<sup>4</sup> During the violence, women and children were particularly at risk, indicating the state's failure to uphold its obligations of CRC (Convention on the Rights of the Child) and CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women) which are already ratified

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<sup>3</sup> The documents received from the Muslim community leaders of Meikhtilar.

<sup>4</sup> See Physician for Human Rights Report (2013); Massacre in Central Burma: Muslim Students Terrorized and Killed in Meikhtilar. International Crisis Group Report (2013); The Dark Side of Transition: Violence Against Muslims in Myanmar.

by Myanmar Government. Physicians for Human Rights (PHR, 2013) issued a report entitled *Massacre in Central Burma: Muslim Students Terrorized and Killed in Meikhtilar*.<sup>5</sup> In April 2013, the BBC broadcasted a documentary displaying law enforcement officers standing by while rioters set the fire to the Muslim houses and businesses in Meikhtilar. This video showed two Muslim students burning alive — murdered by Burmese Buddhist extremists and ultra-nationalists.

## 1.4 Research Questions

- I. How did the anti-Muslim rioting occur in Meikhtilar in March 2013?
- II. How did hate speech and anti-Muslim sentiment lead up to the riot in Meikhtilar?
- III. What are people's perceptions of the causes of the violence in Meikhtilar?
- IV. What are the state's responses to the violence against their citizens under the state's obligations of the 2008 Constitution and international human rights law?

## 1.5 Objectives of the Study

- i) To provide a better understanding of the violence perpetrated against Muslims in Meikhtilar in March 2013.
- ii) To understand the rationale, nature, process, structure, dynamics and characteristics of the violence against Muslims that took place in Meikhtilar in March 2013.
- iii) To identify human rights violations and the state's failure to fulfill its obligations to protect citizens from violence against Muslims in Meikhtilar by international legal frameworks such as CEDAW and CRC which are already ratified by Myanmar Government.

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

## 1.6 Research Design

This research is a qualitative research study based on field research. To answer all research questions in this study, the scope of analysis has focused on immediate events during the violence against Muslims in Meikhtilar. This research is designed for reconstructing the violence against Muslims in Meikhtilar. By utilizing the theoretical tool and framework of “institutionalized riot system,” the unit of analysis (which is violence against Muslims in Meikhtilar in March 2013) is divided into three: i) Preparation, ii) Activation and iii) violating Muslims in Meikhtilar in March 2013, along with the proposed analytical framework (See 1.11 Analytical Framework).

The conceptual framework of this research refers to (i) the Preparation of anti-Muslim riot (looking at rumors, the rise of anti-Muslim sentiment, and anti-Muslim hate speech), (ii) the Activation (looking at the specific triggering or enactment of the anti-Muslim riot in Meikhtilar), (iii) the violence against Muslims (looking at the collective violence through collective actions such as the violations, killings, looting, murdering, rioting, burning down, etc.). After the research interviews were conducted by the author in the city of Meikhtilar, the proposed conceptual framework of “institutionalized riot system” is used to analyze facts and data which have acquired from the field trips. After collecting data and information, those data are analyzed through descriptive and interpretative analysis to understand the phenomenon in this research.

The analyses of studies of many scholars and international organizations attribute the anti-Muslim riots in Myanmar to structural and socioeconomic factors. Throughout the military regime’s rule in Myanmar, Myanmar’s academic institutions have been thoroughly controlled and restricted from all academic research. One of the significant outcomes of this study is to contribute to academic research and the systematic inquiry of the phenomenon of anti-Muslim violence. Another notable aspect of this study opens up new research opportunities and analysis of the phenomenon. The significance of this study is further demonstrated by proposed recommendations and solutions for the prevention of anti-Muslim riots in Myanmar in future. This study also identifies human rights violations and the state’s

responsibilities and obligations to protect the country's citizens during violence accordance with international law.

## **1.8 Methodology**

### **1.8.1 Methodology: Data Collection**

The interpretive paradigm always has been connected to qualitative research techniques. This research is a qualitative study based on in-depth interviews with key informants. Face-to-face interviews permit the interviewer to obtain and enquire into information from the key informants. Twenty participants were privately interviewed: this study truly protected their privacy and confidentiality. Documents and reports about violence against Muslims in Meikhtilar from international non-governmental organizations, the United Nations, and the government are collected and reviewed by checking all accuracy of information and data in this study. The news and mainstream media reporting of the Buddhist-Muslim violence in Meikhtilar and other media reports are gathered to analyze the Buddhist-Muslim violence.

### **1.8.2. Methodology: Data Sources**

The "snowball sampling" method is applied to find the next key informants through earlier informants. The advantages of social networking among the informants provide a concrete connection between information and the sources of information. In this way, 20 interviewees are identified and categorized into two groups. One group is from Meikhtilar where the violence against Muslims took place. The researcher interviewed different people from Muslim and Buddhist communities who had the first-hand experience of violent events in Meikhtilar. In this category, key informants are 15 people from both the Muslim and Buddhist community: those with radical and extreme views of Muslims are included as well as more moderate practitioners to balance the different views and perceptions of violence against the Muslims. The second group is from Mandalay where the '969' nationalist leaders from "Ma-Ba-Tha" have their office headquarters. Five in-depth interviews were done by the author and the five informants have a strong connection to the '969' nationalist

movement and their leaders (See Appendix A: Key Informants). This study also aims to collect Buddhist and Muslim narratives of Buddhist-Muslim violence to understand both sides of life stories and experiences.

**Table 1.1** Information Table of Respondents for In-depth Interviews in this study

<b>NO.</b>	<b>Respondents</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Location</b>
<b>1</b>	A Muslim woman who is one of the victims and who has lost her son age of 27. Her son was murdered by the rioters during the violence.	Female	Meikhtilar
<b>2</b>	A Muslim woman, who is one of the victims, and has lost her husband. Her husband was murdered by the rioters during the violence, and she witnessed the events.	Female	Meikhtilar
<b>3</b>	A Buddhist woman who is a victim of violence that her house was burned down during the violence. And she has witnessed the event.	Female	Meikhtilar
<b>4</b>	A Muslim man who is a victim of violence that his house was burned down during the violence. He is also a witness of the event.	Male	Meikhtilar
<b>5</b>	A lawyer who provided legal defense for some Muslims accused of murdering a monk and burning houses in Meikhtilar.	Male	Meikhtilar
<b>6</b>	A Muslim businessman who is working on inter-faith issues and helped IDPs with humanitarian assistance after the violence.	Male	Mandalay

**Table 1.1** Information Table of Respondents for In-depth Interviews in this study (cont.)

<b>NO.</b>	<b>Respondents</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Location</b>
<b>7</b>	An owner of the house where the gold shop was opened by the Muslim owner, and location of a fight between Muslim shop owner and Buddhist customer in Meikhtilar. The gold shop was rented from him.	Male	Meikhtilar
<b>8</b>	A Buddhist man who has been working as a political activist since 1988 in Meikhtilar. He is also a witness of the event.	Male	Meikhtilar
<b>9</b>	An Islamic scholar and a former Government teacher who lived in Meikhtilar for 15 years.	Male	Mandalay
<b>10</b>	A Member of Parliament from NLD Party (2012-2015)	Male	-
<b>11</b>	A Muslim who opened an electronics shop in Meikhtilar and who is also a victim of violence as his shop was destroyed by rioters during the violence. He is also a witness of the event.	Male	Meikhtilar
<b>12</b>	A Muslim political and social activist who helped victims and IDPs after the violence.	Male	Mandalay
<b>13</b>	A Muslim man who lost his 17 years old son during the violence. He also witnessed the event.	Male	Meikhtilar
<b>14</b>	A Muslim woman who is 96 years old and who experienced different episodes of violence against Muslims in Myanmar since her childhood.	Female	Meikhtilar
<b>15</b>	A Muslim man who is a victim of the violence whose house was burned down during the violence. He is a witness of the event.	Male	Meikhtilar

**Table 1.1** Information Table of Respondents for In-depth Interviews in this study  
(cont.)

<b>NO.</b>	<b>Respondents</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Location</b>
<b>16</b>	A Muslim political activist and a member of NLD Meikhtilar who worked for By-Election Winning Campaign for NLD.	Male	Meikhtilar
<b>17</b>	A Buddhist Monk who is a head of Monastery and working for inter-faith activities as well as peace in Myanmar.	Male	POL
<b>18</b>	A Buddhist Monk who is the Head of Monastery in Meikhtilar and saved 4 thousands of Muslim lives at his monastery during the violence. He is also a winner of “LawKaTharRa” Prize in recognition of his public service.	Male	Meikhtilar
<b>19</b>	A Rohingya woman who moved to Yangon from Northern Arakan State after 2012 violence.	Female	Yangon
<b>20</b>	A Muslim young man who is 18 years old and was forced to try to apply for NRC (National Registration Card) for his citizenship even though his grandparents and parents are citizens of Myanmar.	Male	Meikhtilar

In total, the major informants are 20 people. According to key informants' wishes to voluntary participate in the research's interviews, the author conducted the in-depth interviews. Before in-depth interviews, the interviewer acquired informed-consent (See Appendix B) from 20 key informants and to obtain personal information to identify the interviewees. This study protects the vulnerability of the interviewees' safety, security, privacy, and confidentiality through securing their identity and personal information. A digital voice recorder was used as a research tool if the interviewees allowed recording of their voices.

A field trip to Meikhtilar – a city in central part of Myanmar – was taken for the in-depth interviews. The study also documented videos, texts, images, media data, and publications related to the “anti-Muslims” hatred and discrimination in Myanmar including legal and policy reviews of available documents and reports about violence in Meikhtilar. International Human Rights Law including CRC and CEDAW is reviewed to identify the human rights violations which must be safeguarded against under the State’s obligations and responsibilities. The desk research method was practiced through exploring and analyzing secondary data and information about violence against Muslims in the mainstream media and printed-media including reports from International Non-Governmental Organizations.

After acquiring quality data and information, the research applies the triangulation and cross-check method on international NGOs’ and UN reports about violence against the Muslims. Validating quality information and data, the triangulation and cross-check among data sources also are required to reduce misinformation and faulty information in this study. The in-depth interview and interview questions are designed to answer the research question of this study. Sample selection criteria are adults, knowledgeable persons from Meikhtilar, and people who have moved to Mandalay from Meikhtilar after the outbreak of violence. Those people are neither criminals nor perpetrators, and they are volunteers who witnessed the event and were willing to take part in this research to contribute what they knew. For sensitivity and confidentiality of their information, this paper protects their identities.

### **1.8.3 Methodology: Data Analysis**

This study examines causes of the violence in Meikhtilar in March 2013, people’s perceptions on the causes of the violence, how the anti-Muslim riot occurred, and the state’s responses to the violence against their citizens through the lens of the state’s obligations of the 2008 Constitution and international human rights law. According to Neuman (2006), an interpretive understanding of the meaning and self-description of the individual needs a methodology that focuses on the following: i) participants’ observation and field research where the researcher is required to spend many hours in direct personal contact with the subject of the study, ii) the analysis of interview transcripts; study of videos and photos taken during the outbreak of violence

, while looking at subtle nonverbal communication to understand details of interactions in their context. This process of data analysis is classified into four steps: organizing the data, identifying the framework (coding plan), sorting the data into the framework (coding), using the framework for descriptive and interpretative analysis known as content analysis to seek a relationship between the anti-Muslim sentiment/hate speech, and violence. "TAMS Analyzer," which is a data coding application, is used to define codes for analyzing qualitative data. According to the proposed analytical framework and literature reviews, this study focuses on historical analysis, pre-violence analysis, and post-violence analysis.

## **1.9 Research Ethical Consideration**

The primary ethical concern for this study is to obtain informed-consent, to secure privacy and confidentiality of the key informants who have willingly participated in this study, and to ensure respect for intellectual property. This study also needs to adhere to relevant laws, institutional or governmental policies. Underpinning objectivity of this research is needed to avoid bias; it is important that the competing narratives from both communities need to be investigated and analyzed in this study.

## **1.10 Assumption, Possible Limitation, and Scope of the Research**

The sampling size associated with the unit of analysis in this study is a limitation regarding to ensuring the representation of both Buddhist and Muslim communities. The competing narratives of Muslims and Buddhists from Meikhtilar attempted to explain the complicated process and situation of Buddhist-Muslim violence. However, the "snowball sampling" method helped the author to find suitable and meaningful key informants who willingly consented to the interview for this study. The lack of previous academic research in Myanmar and on this topic indicates that this research design is more exploratory rather than an explanatory, in the hope of encouraging more academic research relating to this subject. By the nature of qualitative research design, accessibility is the key concern, but the "snowball

sampling” method is a way of accessing sources of information. The media and international organizations published their reports online, but access to information about government responses to the violence is limited. However, interviews with people from Meikhtilar provided information on government responses and policy after the outbreak of anti-Muslim violence in Meikhtilar. The research is designed to explore people’s perception of Buddhist-Muslim violence, and collect the competing narratives to understand and analyze the anti-Muslim violence outbreak in Meikhtilar.

### 1.11 Analytical Framework




Figure 1.1 Analytical Framework

## 1.12 Thesis Plan

This thesis is organized into five chapters: Chapter I (Introduction), Chapter II (Literature Review), Chapter III (Preparation of Riot against Muslims in Meikhtilar), Chapter IV (Activation of Riot against Muslim in Meikhtilar), and Chapter V (Summary, Conclusion, and Analysis of the Research).

Chapter I introduces a brief introduction of this thesis, background of the research problem, research questions, objectives, research design, research methodology, and analytical framework.

Chapter II deliberates over the existing literature upon the preparation and activation of anti-Muslim riots, forms of violence, human rights violations during riots, and State's obligations under international law to respond to human rights violations.

Chapter III analyses when and how anti-Muslim hate speech was distributed to prepare the groundwork for anti-Muslim riots in Meikhtilar. This Chapter also looks at the ideology of Buddhist extremists using contemporary sources of anti-Muslim sentiment, hate speech, and violent acts in Meikhtilar. This chapter also provides a rigorous review of primary sources of anti-Muslim propaganda that served as an impetus to instigate anti-Muslim riots in Meikhtilar, including sermons, posters, letters and other texts of anti-Muslim propaganda.

Chapter IV of this study analyses narratives from both Buddhist and Muslim communities, eyewitnesses, and survivors of anti-Muslim violence in Meikhtilar to understand what instigates violence and people's perception of what caused the violence in Meikhtilar. According to various narratives gathered from both Buddhists and Muslims, the violence could have been prevented, but local authorities and law enforcement agencies did not take any measures to crack down on extremist mobs and allowed the violence to be instigated by the rioters. Various human rights abuses took place under the watch of police officers. While the city of Meikhtilar is surrounded by 26 various military camps and armed forces, the military did not appear or prevent the outbreak of violence. After the violence, perpetrators of human rights abuses were never brought to justice – a failure of the State to meet its human rights obligations. Local authorities and law enforcement forces from Meikhtilar were never investigated or questioned about the outbreak of anti-Muslim violence. Chapter (IV)

also argues that President Thein Sein's administration created a catastrophic situation by taking no precautionary measures against the nationalist extremists, notably Ashin Wirathu, who distributed anti-Muslim sentiment, hate speech, and pamphlets. This Chapter also looks at the activation of anti-Muslim riots in Meikhtilar, narratives of when and how the anti-Muslim riot was instigated by the rioters, and human rights violations during the rioting.

Chapter V of this thesis summarizes the key findings and provides major analysis of the study with recommendations to prevent further outbreaks of anti-Muslim violence in Myanmar. This chapter also attempts to deliver answers to the research questions in this study.

## **CHAPTER II**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### **Introduction**

In social science, many theories and conceptual frameworks have attempted to explain what instigates violence, particularly the causations and instigations of anti-Muslim rioting as well as collective violence against Muslims in Myanmar. In this Chapter, this study firstly deliberates over the preparation of the riot, exploring the nexus between the rise of anti-Muslim sentiment, anti-Muslim hatred, anti-Muslim hate speech, and anti-Muslim riots. The second part of this Chapter looks at the "Institutionalized Riot System" as an analytical framework that deliberates the "Preparation and Activation of anti-Muslim riot" by the scholarly work of Professor Paul Brass from India's Hindu-Muslim riots. The third part of this Chapter reviews the definition of collective violence from existing literature to contextualize what anti-Muslim riots looked like in Myanmar. The final part of this literature review explores the state's obligations under International Human Rights Law including the CRC (Convention on the Rights of the Child) and CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women) which have been ratified by Myanmar government.

Although social science has various theories to explain anti-Muslim violence in Myanmar, this literature reviews only focuses on the literature relevant to the context of Myanmar, particularly on nature, rationale, process, structure, dynamics, and characteristics of anti-Muslim violence. On this point, some scholars and researchers speak to prototypes of violence as "the decisive means for politics" which was enunciated by Max Weber in late 1918 to the "Free Students Union of Munich University."<sup>1</sup> However, this Chapter is designed to provide an analytical framework to analyze the outbreak of anti-Muslim riot in Meikhtilar, Myanmar.

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<sup>1</sup> See Weber, M., 1918. Politics as a Vocation.

## **2.1 The Rise of Anti-Muslim Sentiment and Hate Speech in Myanmar**

The United Nations' Report (2013), *Religious Violence in Myanmar*, indicates "the spread of anti-Muslim sentiment in Myanmar, including by academics and groups such as the '969' Movement."<sup>2</sup> Walton and Hayward (2014) claim that '969' or "Ma-Ba-Tha," also known as the National Organization for the Protection of Race and Religion, arose with a stated purpose to protect and promote Buddhist values and traditions, especially from perceived threats. Both Walton and Hayward (2014) highlight that the leaders associated with "Ma-Ba-Tha" have articulated anti-Muslim sentiments and hate speech that emanated from rumors and mischaracterizations of Islamic teachings and objectives. The rumors are constructed and designed to circulate and publicize anti-Muslim sentiments and hate speech deriving from the British legacy of Muslims, demonization of Muslims, and historicizing of Buddhist-Muslim differences. Rumors and daily incidents are manipulated to ignite the conflagration of larger violence.

Benesch (2011) defines hate speech as speech that attacks or denigrates a group or person, for characteristics ostensibly representative of the group. The elements of hate speech are (i) a speaker highlights a person or a group in order to denigrate, offend, frighten, or humiliate that audience directly and when the speech humiliates, denigrates, etc., the speech constitutes an action, such as the speech act of humiliating and offending, (ii) inflammatory speech has indirect effects on the victims' group that the speech is intended primarily for another, different audience, with the goal of causing that audience to share the views expressed or implied in the speech, and to retaliate against the victims group, e.g., with hostility, discrimination, or violence. If a speech act provokes responses from its audience, it becomes a perlocutionary act. When the inflammatory speech inspires an audience to harm another person or group, the indirect effect produces successful incitement.

Benesch (2012) defines "five variables which affect the dangerousness of a particular speech act in the time and place in which it was made or disseminated: the speaker, the audience, the speech act itself, the social and historical context, and the

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<sup>2</sup> See United Nations, 2013. Report on "Religious Violence in Myanmar.

mode of dissemination."<sup>3</sup> The most dangerous speech act would be one in which all five variables are maximized such as "(1) a powerful speaker with a high degree of influence over the audience, (2) an audience with grievances and fear that the speaker can cultivate, (3) a speech act that is clearly understood as a call to violence, (4) a social or historical context that is propitious for violence, for any of a variety of reasons, including longstanding competition between groups for resources, lack of efforts to solve grievances, or previous episodes of violence, and (5) a means of dissemination that is influential in itself, for example, because it is the sole or primary source of news for the relevant audience."<sup>4</sup>

## **2.2 Institutionalized Riot System (IRS): Preparation and Activation of Anti-Muslim Riot**

Brass (1996, 1997, 2003, 2006) shows theoretical and factual ethnographic studies to explain the production of collective violence in addition to the tenacity of some of these patterns in particular places. Firstly, Brass (2002, 2003, 2004, 2006) has discussed and paid attention to the organization and planning of riots and the political circumstances in which pogroms tend to take place and the political interests generated in the riots. Brass (2003, 2004) focuses on the process of riot production which is categorized into preparation/rehearsal, activation/enactment, and explanation/interpretation in what he refers to as the "institutionalized riot system". Brass (2003, 2006) argues that by labeling riots as "communal violence or communal conflict," an imprecise judgment is created that there are two groups who share the similar responsibility and who suffer in a similar and proportional way. However, Brass (2002, 2004, 2006) claims that this is rarely the truth, with often highly disproportionate levels of deaths, suffering and property destruction inflicted onto one side of a conflict. Brass (2003, 2006) claims that what are labeled as Hindu versus Muslim riots have more often than not turned out to be pogroms and massacres of

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<sup>3</sup> See Benesch, S., 2011. Contribution to OHCHR Initiative on Incitement to National, Racial, or Religious Hatred. Available at: <<https://voicesthatpoison.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/beneschohchr1.pdf>> [Accessed 28 April 2015].

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

Muslims, in which only a few Hindus are killed. The institutionalized riot system endemically highlights how the rise of Hindu-ultra-nationalistic movement has sharply correlated with Hindu-Muslim violence. The perpetrators acquire immunity for the crimes and riots for which they have been responsible.

Brass (1996, 2002, 2004) argues that riots and pogroms, which are wrongly dismissed as inter-communal violence, often occur as endemic: they regularly occur in certain areas. Accordingly, the institutionalized riot system keeps tensions alive and from time to time activates riots and pogroms for identifiable political benefits. Horowitz (2001) also shares the view that tensions and rumors are retained to trigger riots. Importantly, both Horowitz (2001) and Brass (2003, 2004) concur that the riot or the collective violence is produced and directed against a precisely identified group of targets and implemented with considerable advisability. Brass (2003, 2006) claims that the riots are endemic and the institutionalized riot system is constructed for riots to misplace the blame after the fact in various ways. The institutionalized riot system is a rational, integrated explanation for the inequality in the incident of riots that requires deliberately cultivated communal discourse, specific political circumstances, and an organized network of persons and groups to implement them (Brass, 2006).

Regarding the institutionalized anti-Muslim violence in Myanmar specifically, Cheesman (2014) stated that “violence that may have very particular characteristics in each individual site is reinterpreted as part of a shared response—and a shared responsibility—to the supposed threat posed by the steady infiltration of so-called illegal Bengalis, or more generally, kalar.”<sup>5</sup> In the production of anti-Muslim violence, it is contingent on a broad category of agencies and agents. Brass (2010) also highlighted that specialists grow skills to manufacture the violence that institutionalizes it. Cheesman (2014) stated that “Rehearsal specialists create the enabling environment for communal violence, preparing for, and sometimes hastening its eventuality; enactment specialists initiate and supervise the performance of communal violence, and interpretation specialists narrate and analyze it afterward,

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<sup>5</sup> See Cheesman, N., 2014. Democratization, Violence, and Myanmar. Ed. Nick Cheesman, Nicholas Farrelly, and Trevor Wilson. pp. 335.

ensuring that it remains a feature of public discourse."<sup>6</sup> Cheesman (2014) also states that "The qualities of the specialists and features of institutionalization vary from one place to the next. In Myanmar, rehearsal and production specialists learned their techniques under successive periods of military rule."<sup>7</sup>

### 2.3 Defining Violence and Collective Violence

Grassiani, Horstmann, Segal, Stade, and Vigh (eds) (2015) clarify that "Violence, defined as the intentional inflicting of injury and damage, seems always to have been a fact of human life. Whether in the shape of raids, ambushes, wars, massacres, genocides, insurgences, terrorism, or gang assaults, socially organized violence, that is, human groups orchestrating and committing violent acts, has been a steady companion of human life through the ages."<sup>8</sup> The World Health Organization (2002) defines violence as "the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either result in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation."<sup>9</sup> The World Health Organization (2002) defines "collective violence" as "the instrumental use of violence by people who identify themselves as members of a group (whether this group is transitory or has a more permanent identity) against another group or set of individuals in order to achieve political, economic or social objectives."<sup>10</sup> The WHO's "*World Report on Violence and Health*" (2002) claims that collective violence has a strong link with socio-economics factors such as the poverty and inequality between groups in society. Varshney (2007) defines "Collective Violence" as violence carried out by a group on another group (e.g. in riots and pogroms), by a group on an individual, by an individual on a group (e.g. in Terrorist Activities), by the State of a group, or by a group of agencies of the State (e.g. in Civil Wars).

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid. pp.335.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid. pp. 335-336.

<sup>8</sup> See Grassiani, E, Horstmann, A, Segal, LB, Stade, R & Vigh, HE (eds) 2015, 'Conflict and Society: Advances in Research: A New Journal of Qualitative Research on Socially Organized Violence (editorial)' *Conflict and Society: Advances in Research*, vol 1, pp. 1-3., [10.3167/arcs.2015.010101](https://doi.org/10.3167/arcs.2015.010101)

<sup>9</sup> See World Health Organization, 2002. *World Report on Violence and Health*. Geneva.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

The most visible collective violence has been classically divided into the three categories of riots, pogroms, and civil wars (Varshney, 2007). Riots refer to a raging clash between two groups of civilians, frequently characterized as mobs (Varshney, 2007). During riots, the neutrality of the state may be skeptical, but the state does not give up the principle of neutrality (Varshney, 2007). In pogroms, a majority group attacks an unarmed minority, and the principle of neutrality is for all practical purposes dropped by the State (Varshney, 2007). The State administration either looks away or sides with the attacking group (Varshney, 2007). In civil wars, the State not only renounces the principle of neutrality but it either becomes a combatant fighting an armed rebel group or is physically unable to adjudicate between two armed groups fighting each other (Kalyvas, 2006). The crucial contrast between pogroms and civil wars is that in the former, the target group which is prototypically a minority, is hapless and unarmed, whereas in civil wars both combating sides are armed (Varshney, 2007).

## **2.4 Exploring the State's Obligations and Responsibilities Under the International Human Rights Law**

The United Nations human rights frameworks and mechanisms are designed to respect, secure, improve, and fulfill human rights to meet their mandates. Accordingly, to prevent, eradicate and punish violence are states' obligations and mandated responsibilities. International human rights laws broadly define violence as violations of human rights such as the right to life, liberty, autonomy and security of individuals, the right to equality, the right to be free from torture, inhuman and humiliating treatment, the right to privacy, and the right to the highest attainable standard of health. These human rights are embodied in international laws, international human rights treaties, national constitutions, and domestic laws which specify the State's obligations including the process and procedure to hold States accountable for protecting a country's citizens by their legal system. Preventing "collective violence" is required to meet obligations of internationally agreed treaties relating to human rights. The failure of a State to comply with its obligations and

responsibilities under international law is reflected upon the human rights status of the country.

Myanmar has not ratified most international human rights treaties. However, the fact that Myanmar is not a State party does not release it from its obligations and responsibilities to protect citizens from being violated and prevent collective-violence against Myanmar citizens, being provided for under customary international law, which is binding on all States.<sup>11</sup>

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948)<sup>12</sup>: Article 1 states that "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood." Article 2 states that "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or another opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or another status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty." Article 3 states that " Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person." Article 8 states that " Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law." Article 17 states " (1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property." Article 18 states that "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance."

The Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC) Article 19 states that:

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<sup>11</sup> See Rianne ten Veen and Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2005. *Myanmar's Muslims: The Oppressed of the Oppressed*.

<sup>12</sup> See Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).

1. States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other person who has the care of the child.
  
2. Such protective measures should, as appropriate, include effective procedures for the establishment of social programs to provide necessary support for the child and for those who have the care of the child, as well as for other forms of prevention for identification, reporting, referral, investigation, treatment and follow-up of instances of child maltreatment described heretofore, and, as appropriate, for judicial involvement.<sup>13</sup>

The Committee on the Rights of the Child's General Comment No. 13 (CRC, 2011) addresses "The right of the child to freedom from all forms of violence."<sup>14</sup> The general Comment No. 13 (CRC, 2011) defines "violence" (which is violence against children) as "all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse" as enumerated in the Article 19 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women's general recommendation and comment No.19 (CEDAW, 1992) comments that violence against women as a means of constraint and despotism may include: social or economic force, coercion or pressure, as well as physical abuse and any form of intimidation, threats, persecution, deception, and other forms of psychological or social pressure that can be defined as violence. The person suffering this kind of violence is acting out of fear against her will. An incident of violence is a series of

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<sup>13</sup> See Article 19 of The Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC).

<sup>14</sup> See the Committee on the Rights of the Child's General Comment No. 13 (CRC, 2011).

harmful acts by a perpetrator or a group of perpetrators against a person or a group of individuals."<sup>15</sup>

In this study, the conceptual framework of institutionalized riot system (IRS) is applied to analyze, explore, and explain the phenomenon of the violence against Muslims in Meikhtilar in March 2013. The word “violence” is defined according to the UDHR, CEDAW, and CRC of the United Nations human rights framework and standards. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was signed by Burmese government on 10 December 1948 after the country joined the United Nations on 19 April 1948. Myanmar ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women on 22 July 1997, and it entered into force on 21 August 1997. The Convention on the Rights of the Child was also ratified on 15 July 1991, and it entered into force on 14 August 1991.

Since 2012, the outbreak of violence against the Rohingya in Rakhine State has escalated across some parts of Myanmar. There have been more than six violent attacks against the Muslims after the violence against the Rohingya Muslims in 2012. In this study, the institutionalized riot system is considered to be a conceptual and analytical tool to analyze the violence against Muslims in the city of Meikhtilar in March 2013.

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<sup>15</sup> See the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women’s general recommendation and comment No.19 (CEDAW, 1992).

## **CHAPTER III**

### **PREPARATION OF ANTI-MUSLIM RIOT IN MEIKHTILAR, MYANMAR**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

The rise of anti-Muslim sentiment and hate speech right before the outbreak of violence against Muslims in Myanmar is not a new phenomenon; it is deeply rooted in the history of pre-independence Burma. A source of anti-Muslim sentiment in pre-independence Burma shows that the Indians and Arakan migration into Burma played a great role in anti-Indian and anti-Indian-Muslim hatred and violence during the British rule of Burma. The memorialization of what had happened to Burmese Buddhists and their society by considering Indian-Muslim as having been responsible during the British colonial era is a tactic of contemporary anti-Muslim sentiment in Myanmar. Gravers (2013) stated that “Colonial rule had an enormous impact on the Burmese society and self-identification; the reverberations continue to the present day.”<sup>1</sup> historicalization of historical trauma and oral history are ways of keeping Burmese Buddhists’ memories alive and contributed to the framing of current day anti-Muslim sentiment and hate speech. Gravers (2013) also stated that “the colonial rulers did not support the Buddhist monastic order (sangha). Royal power and Buddhist spiritual power had been intertwined and the core of Burman self-identification based on Buddhist cosmology.”<sup>2</sup> Anti-Muslim sentiment and hate speech are reflected in the past and present attitudes amongst Burmese Buddhists’ displaying resentment and fear of Muslims, and their concerns about the insecurity of the Buddhist society, particularly their cultural identity.

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<sup>1</sup> See Gravers, M., 2013. *The colonial legacy*. Burma / Myanmar: Where Now? Ed. Mikael Gravers and Flemming Ytzen. pp. 143.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. pp. 144.

After Independence, the 1947 Constitution and the Citizenship Law of 1948 legally recognized the citizenship of “Rohingyas” and the Burmese Muslims as well as the Indians and Indian-Muslim Immigrants who are qualified for citizenship in Burma. However, when General Ne Win came to power in 1962 using “coup d’état,” his BSPP (Burma Socialist Programme Party) produced the 1974 Constitution and the 1982 Citizenship Law of Burma. The 1974 Constitution and the 1982 Citizenship Law of Burma canceled the citizenship of the Rohingya Muslims as well as Burmese Muslims. The citizenship crisis of the Rohingya Muslims and Burmese Muslims were beginning by the 1974 Constitution and the 1982 Citizenship Law of Burma. The Ne Win regime was overthrown by the '8888' Democracy Movement in 1988. The military seized the political power by mean of coup d’état in 1988 after the 8888 Democracy Movement. During the military rule of Myanmar, the religious minority, particularly Rohingya Muslims and Burmese Muslims have been persecuted and victimized by the Buddhist extremists. Throughout the military junta in Myanmar, the escalation of anti-Muslim sentiment and hate speech aimed to instigate Buddhist-Muslim riots to proselytize the people’s anger and exasperation towards the military regime. Since 1988, anti-Muslim sentiment has been involved in hate and dangerous speech that have been mainly circulating on print media, and nowadays particularly on social media in Myanmar. However, most of the people in rural area cannot access the Internet but anti-Muslim sentiment, hate speech, and propaganda such as pamphlets, leaflets, DVDs, VCDs, CDs, posters and others have been distributed in some parts of Myanmar right before outbreaks of mass violence against Muslims such as the 1997 anti-Muslim riot in Mandalay, the 2001 anti-Muslim riot in Taungoo, and the 2013 anti-Muslim riot in Meikhtilar.

This chapter argues that among the rise of anti-Muslim sentiment, hate speech and the anti-Muslim riots have occurred throughout the recent history of Myanmar. Anti-Muslim sentiment and hate speech have always escalated right before outbreaks of mass violence against Muslims in Myanmar. The escalation of anti-Muslim sentiment and propaganda is a precondition for the mass violence against Muslims, in which those anti-Muslim sentiments are prepared to instigate collective violence. This chapter indicates that the rise of contemporary anti-Muslim sentiment and hate speech have been generated through hatred, fear, especially phobic fear,

insecurity of Buddhist society based on perceived threat, societal insecurity in which Buddhists' identity has been threatened, religious and racial purification, and seniority and superiority of Buddhist culture. The current-day nationalist movement creates a new vision of insecurity: their race, their religion, and their economy are in danger and Buddhists need to take actions against the Muslims in Myanmar with a sense of urgency to respond to this 'historical trauma' created by nationalist extremists.

### **3.2 Documented Sources of Anti-Muslim Sentiment in Pre-Independence Burma and Influence on the Anti-Muslim Movement of the Present-Day**

The Republic of the Union of Myanmar is also known as Burma since the British colonized it. Myanmar is the second largest country in South East Asia that reaches out nearly (1,500) miles from North to South with an area of (678,500) square kilometer and a demography of about (51) million according to the census in 2014 (The Ministry of Immigration and Population, 2014).<sup>3</sup> Myanmar is located between India and China who are two Asian giants and shares borders with Bangladesh, Thailand, and Laos. Myanmar is geo-politically significant as it is encircled by the Indian Ocean, the Bay of Bengal, and the Andaman Sea in the southwest and south. According to Huntington (1996), Myanmar lies across the fault lines of the Hindu, Buddhist, and Confucian civilizations.<sup>4</sup> Myanmar is a nation-state with many races in the Southeast Asia, and there is an official recognition of 135 ethnic groups which does not include the Rohingya. In Myanmar, the ethnic Bamar or Burmese is the majority, but there is the prominent minority of “Shan, Kachin, Kayin (Karen), Kaya, Chin, Mon, Rakhine (Arakan).” Burma is inhabited by a very diverse of ethnic people whose past historical relations were often contended with Burmese kings regularly

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<sup>3</sup> See Department of Population under the Ministry of Immigration and Population published “The Population: A Housing Census of Myanmar, 2014”.

<sup>4</sup> See Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of World Order* (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1996, quoted in *Burma's Muslims: Terrorists or Terrorized?* By Andrew Seth (Australia: Strategic and Defense Studies Centre, National University Australia, 2003), 1.

conquered other ethnic peoples, and in three periods consolidated their rule over some neighboring kingdoms and principalities (Fink, 2001).

The country is ethnically diverse, with the remarkable correlation between ethnicity and religion<sup>5</sup> but groups have been divided according to their ethnic, religious, and cultural identity since the British colonization of Burma accordance with the divide and rule policy which I view as a negative legacy of the British's imperialism or colonialism. The British colonized Burma by three Anglo-Burmese Wars (1824-1885) (Gravers, 2013). Geographically, Myanmar is in the neighborhood of India, and it is inescapably influenced by Indian culture and traditions (SarDesai, 2012). According to Burmese historical textbooks, Indians have been traditional trading allies. In the ancient Burmese kingdoms, Myanmar (Burma) used to import herbs and export rice to India (Than, 1992). Historically and factually, India has been the source of religion for Bamar (Burmese), including Brahmanism and Buddhism (Yin, 2005). As the result, Indian and Bamar cultures are so interlinked in several aspects that it is hard to extract one from another, such as chewing beetle nuts and wearing the longyi, a wrap skirt.

Contemporary anti-Muslim sentiment along with the hate and "dangerous speech" espoused by Burmese Buddhist nationalists derives from experiences during the colonial era when Burma was a part of British India. After the first Anglo-Burmese War in 1824, the British colonization of Burma unlocked the door to the migration of Indians into Burma. As a result of the unregulated immigration practice of the British in Burma, large waves of Indian migration happened particularly after 1852, again after the opening of the Suez Canal and also following the blooming of Burma's delta as one of the kernels of rice production and export (Kyi, 2006). The migration of Indians such as investors, workers, civil servants, soldiers, police, construction workers, traders, etc. brought socio-economic structural changes into Burmese society that challenged and threatened the Burmese majority's security, culture, religion, identity, homeland, and livelihood. According to Khin Maung Yin (2005), "These Indian migrants had technically taken control of almost all sectors of Burmese society: they were dock laborers, transport workers, municipal employees, rickshaw pullers

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<sup>5</sup> See entry of ethnicity and religion, Burma International Religious Freedom Report, 2013.

and were actively participating in trading, brokerage, services, banking, milling, contracting and shop keeping, communications, mining, oil, wholesale trading, medicine and money lending, with high-interest rates.”<sup>6</sup> The historical evidence shows that entire businesses were under the domination of Indians in Burma. Economically, the domination of all business by Indians and Arakan also generated the hatred and fear that those Indians and Indian Muslims will overwhelm the country (Burma) where Burmese Buddhists are the majority. In the 1930s, a well-known song lyric said that Indians and Arakan were “exploiting our economic resources and seizing our women, we are in danger of racial extinction” (Yi, 1988).<sup>7</sup> Nowadays, the framing of anti-Muslim sentiments and propaganda are conspicuously similar to the terms that were used in the past and history of pre-independence Burma.

The British colonization of Burma impacted social, economic, cultural, and administrative changes and had a huge ramification with migration especially Indian migrants (so-called “Kalar”). It is interesting to note that the term Kalar contemporarily refers to all Muslims of Burma irrespective of their backgrounds and races which are considered derogatory for Burmese Muslims in Myanmar. By referencing them as Kalar, all regimes in Myanmar try to identify all Muslims with the recent migrants of Indians under the British or even intentionally criticize them of being recent illegal immigrants (Yin, 2005). The number of Muslims multiplied in Burma during the British colony because there were new waves of Indian Muslim immigration (Yegar, 1972). According to the history of the dynasty in Burma, early settlers of Muslims were trading and working for Burmese kings. For those early settlers, Muslims brought their culture, religion, painting, arts, and medicine into the Burmese kingdom to assist the wellbeing of the Burmese kings. The pioneer Muslims had been serving Bamar kings since the sixteenth century, and a lot of them were prisoners by the victorious war of Bamar kings to settle in Upper Burma after Arakan, and Pegu coastal kingdoms were occupied by the Bamar kings (Selth, 2003). For those early settler Muslims, it is interesting to note that they considered themselves Pati,

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<sup>6</sup> See Yin, K. M., 2005. Saliency of Ethnicity among Burman Muslims: A Study in Identity Formation. *INTELLECTUAL DISCOURSE*. VOL 13, NO 2, P 161-179.

<sup>7</sup> See Yi, K., 1988. The Dobama Movement in Burma (1930 - 1938), p.96.

later known as "Zerabadees."<sup>8</sup> Pati has been recognized as one of the official '135' ethnic groups in Myanmar, and they dislike the term "Kalar," which is considered derogatory and a generalization of Indian Muslims and Burmese Muslims who were pioneers before the Indian Muslim migrations and the British arrival. Those early settler Muslims prefer to be called Bamar Muslims (Kyi, 2006). In 1941, the Burmese census changed the term "Bamar-Muslim" into the word "Mohammeden" to distinguish between Indians of the same faith, a gross generalization of all Muslims irrespective of their backgrounds and race.

In truth, the Burmese Muslims and Muslims of Indian descent have quite varied perceptions of Islamic philosophy and practices; many Burmese Muslims believe that there are no variances between themselves and the Burmese Buddhists, apart from religion. The same faith of two communities varies in the sense that religion and religious affairs are unquestionably responsible for the hand of "Mawlawi" which is Indian Muslims' tendency towards "Mawlawi-ism" (Yin, 2005). Also, the majority of Indian Muslims use the Urdu language as their means of communication in daily life. Urdu is historically considered in connection with the Muslims of the region of Hindustan and now the national language of Pakistan. At the Islamic schools in Burma, Urdu became a medium of instruction for those Indian Muslims. Internalizing the caste system into the casteless Burmese Muslim community to against discriminate Muslim women as practicing in India impacted on both Burmese Muslims and Buddhists in Burma, especially Buddhist women who got married to Muslim men. The Arakan are viewed by the Burmese Muslims and Buddhists as religious radicals suffering from a religious superiority complex. As a result, Arakan rarely socializes with local Buddhists even with Burmese Muslims of the same faith with them. According to some scholars, the Arakan had established minorities within the minority Arakan by subdividing themselves into "Chulia, Pathan, Memon, Surti," and others, a system based entirely on the caste system from India, in which it was almost impossible for a Chulia man to get married with a Surti girl or a Pathan man to marry a Surti girl, for example. Burmese Muslims looked down upon

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<sup>8</sup> See entry for Zerabadi or Zerabadees. Yule, H., and Burnell, A. C., 1903. *Hobson-Jobson*. London.

Arakan and accused them of insulting Islam's basic tenet of uniting mankind irrespective of one's culture and tribe.

Arakan often wears kurta, an Indian style of long shirt and worn in almost all Islamic schools in Burma. For Arakan, the Burmese Muslims are considered as second class believers of Islam because they have "Muslim body and Buddhist soul" (Yin, 2005). During an interview with a Muslim elder woman, she stated "the Burmese Muslims love to speak Burmese language, and they are very proud to be able to do so" which is the legitimate signifier of being a Burmese, regardless of being Muslims in Burma.<sup>9</sup> The Arakan didn't have any knowledge of Burmese language. The Indian "Mawlawis" regulated the religion (Islam), and the Arakan highly respected them for their religious services. Because of those Indian-Mawlawis, Urdu is used as a religious language at almost all of Islamic schools and the Burmese Muslims are unable to communicate in Burmese there. The Indian-Mawlawis and Arakan collaborated with the British for regulating all of the Islamic schools in Burma. This religious and cultural shifting also generated fear for the Burmese Buddhists that the Arakan will overrun the country, a fear that also created a sense of need for a nationalistic project to protect their "religion, race, and motherland." Burmese feelings of exclusion from commerce, industry, and administration were invigorated by the domination of Indians and turned their fear and animosity into the anti-Indian Muslim sentiment and later anti-colonialism.

Those historical facts argue that anti-colonialism was generated in the nationalist character characterized by xenophobia and anti-Indian sentiment, and later produced anti-Indian Muslim sentiment in Burma. More importantly, the British legacy of "divide and rule" in the period of colonial Burma resulted in every religious and ethnic group being separated and segregated by their identity, culture, and habitat. As the result of British colonization, Indian migration, oppressive British rule in Burma, and socio-economic changes, the Burmese majority adopted an anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism constructed by Burmese nationalism with xenophobic characteristics. Later, Burmese nationalism produced anti-Indian Muslim sentiment derived from this xenophobia. Burmese political figures and nationalists

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<sup>9</sup> Interview with a Muslim elder woman who was a victim of the riot against Muslim in 1938 and who is 97 years old now.

constructed the anti-Indian Muslim sentiment to hide their political desire and agenda to fight against British rule and imperialism (Yegar, 1972). It is interesting to note that Burmese Muslims fought heartily against the Indian way of Islam by assimilating into Burmese mainstream culture by measures such as adopting Burmese names and wearing Burmese clothes. Thus, the generalization of all Muslims categorized into a single group called Kalar is a form of discrimination against Bamar Muslims who have lived in Burma for generations. In this regard, the generalization of all Muslims in Burma contributed to the anti-Muslim sentiment and made it hard to distinguish between Bamar Muslims and those of Indian descent or migrants who arrived in Burma under the British rule (Yin, 2005).

### **3.3 Institutionalized Anti-Muslim Sentiment, Hate Speech, and Violence Under the Military Regime in Burma/Myanmar (1989 - 2010)**

In 1988, unrest over economic mismanagement and political oppression by the socialist regime led by General Ne Win resulted in six weeks of nationwide pro-democracy demonstrations throughout the country known as the 8888 Uprising (Fink, 2001). Security forces murdered thousands of protesters demanding democracy and human rights. After the brutal crackdown on the nationwide protests, General Saw Maung took over power by a coup d'état, and he established the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) (Fink, 2001). The SLORC declared martial law after six weeks of nationwide pro-democracy demonstrations in 1988. The SLORC led by General Saw Maung finalized plans for People's Assembly elections on 31st May 1989 (Pyithu Hluttaw Election Law, 1989). Famously, General Saw Maung said, "After the 1990 general election, the military will return to their bases, and the 1990 election must be free and fair."<sup>10</sup> In May 1990, the military regime held a "free and fair election" for the first time in almost three decades, the National League for Democracy (NLD), the party of Aung San Suu Kyi, prevailed over any political

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<sup>10</sup> See Naing, N. H., 2015. When the promise of 1990 election was nullified. Available at: <<http://www.elevenmyanmar.com/opinion/when-promise-1990-election-was-nullified>>.

parties in Burma winning 392 out of a total 489 seats (Fink, 2001). However, the military regime refused to hand over the power to the NLD and continued to rule Burma under the SLORC. General Than Shwe became a supreme leader of the military after overthrowing General Saw Maung in 1990. In 1997, the name of SLORC was replaced by the new name as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and the SPDC ruled the nation until its dissolution in March 2011.

On 23 June 1997, Myanmar was enlisted in the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN). Charney (2009) critiqued ASEAN while paying lip service to a policy of constructive engagement, generally accompanied a hands-off approach to problems in Burma for fear that it would coerce the military junta to be even more resistant to change. ASEAN has faced two main issues such as treatment of the Rohingyas (Muslim Arakanese) in Arakan State (Rakhine State) and Burmese border intrusions into Thailand. Regarding the Rohingya Muslims issue, Charney (2009) stated that:

In 1989, the SLORC began settling Burmese Buddhists in new towns it was building in the Rohingya-dominated areas of northern Arakan, while simultaneously doubling the number of Burmese troops in the area to over 20,000. In some areas, the new settlers displaced the Rohingyas and took over their lands and homes. Burma's relations with Bangladesh eroded further from December 1991, when the Army drove 145,000 Muslims out of Arakan in Western Burma. In pursuit of fleeing Rohingyas, the Burmese Army also attacked Bangladeshi border posts. Under the old BSPP citizenship law, the SLORC asserted that the Rohingyas were foreigners who did not have the right to live in Burma nor to own land or the property they held.<sup>11</sup>

Under the military junta, the Burma Citizenship Law of 1982 is solicited for discriminating Rohingya Muslims but also including Burmese Muslims. Fink (2009) articulated that "Besides the physical dismemberment of communities and

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<sup>11</sup> See Charney, M. W., 2009. A History of Modern Burma. Cambridge University Press.

individuals that has resulted from the civil war, the military has left a legacy of increased racial hatred.”<sup>12</sup>

In Rakhine or Arakan State, many Rakhine Buddhists view the Rohingya Muslim community with animosity. Throughout the socialist regime and the military junta, the citizenship of most Rohingya Muslims has been refused, and many have joined with the local Rakhine population in claiming that Rohingya Muslims are recent illegal migrants from Bangladesh. Sentimentalism also generalizes all Muslims – whether legal or illegal migrants – as a threat that will overrun the country. While some migrated to Burma after independence, there have been Muslims settled in what is now Rakhine State for centuries, with many more arriving during the British rule. The military junta has played on the Rakhine Buddhists’ fears of Muslims takeover to drive Muslims out of Rakhine State and recruit more Rakhine into the military (Fink, 2009).

The military regime has undertaken extensive propaganda work to promote the idea that the Tatmadaw (the Myanmar military) should play a pre-eminent role in the country’s political life, despite its loss of face in the 1988 pro-democracy demonstrations and the 1990 general election. Through its military training programs, the state media, the school curriculum and USDA (Union Solidarity and Development Association) which is later USDP (Union Solidarity and Development Party), the military leaders have sought to convince soldiers and civilians alike that the military is the only institution which can and does serve the country (Fink, 2009). Evidence from state media demonstrates that the military junta has tried to whitewash the military’s actions in the 1988-1990 periods by downplaying the shooting of unarmed civilians in 1988 and instead emphasized the violent actions of some of the protesters, asserting that it was acting only to restore order in a chaotic situation (Fink, 2009). The military regime also claimed that the 1990 elections were not held to elect a new parliament but just to elect some representatives’ national conventions. The military leaders have continued to spotlight the military and their essential role in holding the country together. From the military leaders’ perspective, the military played the most

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<sup>12</sup> See Fink, C., 2001. *Living Silence: Burma Under Military Rule*. White Lotus, pp. 127.

significant part in the independence movement and had overcome the civil wars in Burma (Callahan, 2005).

Many military officers worry that without a strong military to check and scrutinize the power of ethnic armed organizations, the country would collapse. Fink (2009) articulated that “This sentiment is repeated in regular proclamations on the front page of state-controlled newspapers: The Tatmadaw has been sacrificing much for its blood and sweat to prevent the disintegration of the union.”<sup>13</sup> Many new recruits and civilians are compassionate to this point of view. Only a few discern that part of the problem lies in the military regime’s refusal to consent to self-determination for the ethnic nationalities in Burma. The more the regime binds to absorb the ethnic nationalities, the more the ethnic nationalities feel they must institute the separate political entities to preserve their cultures and identities. Fink (2009) stated that “Moreover, few people in central Burma understand the extent to which the Tatmadaw has exacerbated tensions in minority areas. For instance, military authorities in some of the remote areas have torn down churches and Mosques and forced Christians and Muslims to work on the construction of Buddhist pagodas and monasteries. Most people living in the cities and villages of central Burma are not aware of such incidents.”<sup>14</sup> The military regime also continues to show a preference for Theravada Buddhism through official propaganda, state media and state support, including funding for monasteries and pagoda, and support for Buddhist monastic-schools and Buddhist missionary activities in the areas of ethnic minorities of Burma.<sup>15</sup>

In 1997, there was a visible incident that happened in Mandalay when one of the well-known holy Buddha images in Burma was inexplicably devastated. The Buddha sculpture in the Maha Myatmuni pagoda which is originally from the Arakan State was delivered to Mandalay by King Bodawpaya after he conquered Arakan in 1784 AD. He had had the statue Mahamuni Buddha image divided into pieces and relocated to a place nearby Mandalay where it was rebuilt and accommodated in a new pagoda. The sculpture of Mahamuni, which has become the image of Arakanese national identity, was worshiped by Arakanese, Mon, and Burmese alike for centuries

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid, pp. 143.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid, pp. 144.

<sup>15</sup> See International Religious Freedom Report for Burma, 2013.

(Fink, 2009). It was believed to contain a precious ruby called the Padamya Myetshin, which is a legendary ruby that assures success in war to those who possess it (Houtman, 1999). The authorities of Mandalay region insisted on renovating the Mahamuni pagoda. During the redecoration, a strange hole appeared in the belly of the bronze of Buddha, where the Padamya Myetshin was thought to be found. After this incident had happened, some senior Buddhist monks tried to investigate the situation, rumors, immediately propagated out that one of the two Buddhist monks who had a key to the building had been pressurized by a military official to open the building at night. As a result, the meeting of discussion on the situation was called by a senior Buddhist monk, and Buddhist monks from all the major Buddhist monasteries in Mandalay participated in that meeting. During the course of an all-day long meeting, the group of monks had sought unsuccessfully for answers about what had happened, a Buddhist monk and another man unexpectedly came into the room to announce that a Muslim man had raped a Buddhist woman (Fink, 2009).

On 16 March 1997 beginning at about 3:30 p.m., some of the already exasperated Buddhist monks made a decision to take action and headed to the Muslim man's house. There was a mob of 1,000 up to 1,500 Buddhist monks, and others shouted anti-Muslim slogans. One of the witnesses of 1997 incident said that "The mob firstly aimed at the Mosques for their attack, later damaging, destroying, looting, trampling, and burning Muslim businesses, shops, houses, and transportation vehicles in the vicinity of Mosques. They were also responsible for the acts of impiety. The place where the acts of harm, damage, destruction, and looting were perpetrated was "Kaing-Dan" in Mandalay."<sup>16</sup> As the news spread to different parts of Myanmar, an agitation of attacks on Mosques broke out in Mandalay and other major cities. The Buddhist monks could be seen wielding long sticks and desecrating Mosques over the next few days. It is interesting to note that the police passively watched the scene from a distance while the violence took place in Mandalay. Fink (2009) stated that, "There were also several reports of people seeing monks with walkie-talkies under their robes, and a few had very shiny heads indicating they had just been shaved. In other words, it was widely believed that military men dressed as monks were involved, although

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<sup>16</sup> Interview with a witness of 1997 riot against Muslim in Mandalay.

many real monks did most of the damage.”<sup>17</sup> Meanwhile, the hype surrounding the damage that happened to the Mahamuni Buddha statue was forgotten, and its belly was fixed. Later, the reports of an attempted rape of a Buddhist woman by Muslim men that instigated the unrest in Mandalay proved to be false, and this led to speculation that the military regime may have organized the incident to divert rage from the damage to the Buddha statue. As for the ruby stone, no one knows if it was in the stomach of the Buddha statue, and whether or not the thieves succeeded in obtaining it. Before the 1997 riot against Muslims in Mandalay, leaflets circulated prior to the violence against Muslims, urging Buddhists to boycott Muslims’ shops and not to marry Muslims (ICG, 2013).

In February 2001, violence broke out in Sittwe, a city located in Arakan State after an incident in which seven young novice monks refused to pay a Muslim stall holder for cakes they had just eaten. “The Muslim seller, a woman, retaliated by beating one of the novices, according to a Muslim witness. He attested that several senior monks then came to protest and a brawl ensued. One of the monks was hit over the head by the Muslim seller’s husband and started to bleed.”<sup>18</sup> Riots flared up. During the riots, Buddhists poured gasoline on Muslim houses and properties, and more than thirty homes and a Muslim guest house were burned down (Ahmed, 2012). According to witnesses, police, and soldiers reportedly stood by and did nothing to stop the rioting initially (Ahmed, 2012).

In 2001, four years after the riot against Muslims in 1997, a book was published called *Myo Pyauk Hmar Soe Kyauk Sa Yar*<sup>19</sup> or *Fear of the Elimination of Race and Faith*. This book concerns racial purification as well as religious purification propaganda. This book is a source of anti-Muslim sentiment, and propaganda which was supposedly written and distributed by the department of military intelligence. According to hearsay, this book has been written by a Rakhine Buddhist who dislike

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<sup>17</sup> See Fink, C., 2001. *Living Silence: Burma Under Military Rule*. White Lotus, pp. 219.

<sup>18</sup> See Ahmed, A., 2012. *Burma: Planned Religious and Racial Riots Against Muslims: A Historical Overview*. Eurasia Review [online] 24 July 2012. Available at: <<http://www.eurasiareview.com/24072012-burma-planned-religious-and-racial-riots-against-muslims-a-historical-overview-oped/>> [Accessed 2 May 2015].

<sup>19</sup> See “*Myo Pyauk Hmar Soe Kyauk Hal Tai*” (which mean The Fear of Losing One’s Race) published by Shwe Doe Be Aung in early 1950s which was known to be a source of anti-Muslim sentiment in Myanmar.

Rohingyas and Muslims, but there is no source to prove it. However, most of the people believe that it came out of the military intelligence for promoting “intense dislike” towards Muslims in Myanmar. Right after the distribution of the book and its copies, anti-Muslim riots erupted on 15 May 2001 in Taungoo in Pegu division that resulted in the deaths of about 200 Muslims, the devastation of 11 Mosques and the burning of 400 houses (Ahmed, 2012). The HRW (Human Rights Watch, 2002) reported that the March 2001 destruction of the Buddhist images in Bamiyan in Afghanistan seems to have instigated the violence. However, HRW (2002) claimed that *Fear of the Elimination of Race and Faith* was widely circulated in 2001, often by Buddhist monks in whom the anti-Islam feelings had been goaded by the destruction of Buddha images in Bamiyan. It is interesting to note that the distribution of anti-Muslim pamphlets in 2001 was conducted by the USDA (later USDP), a government-sponsored organization that carries out social and political affairs for the military (HRW, 2002). According to the HRW’s report (2002), Buddhist monks steered a mob of more than a thousand people who attacked shops and restaurants owned by Muslims in central and downtown Taungoo city. Nine Muslims were murdered during the riots, including three children (HRW, 2002).

Since 2001, *Myo Pyauk Hmar Soe Kyauk Hal Tai* has continued to inspire anti-Muslim sentiment. The HRW (2002) reported that many anti-Muslim pamphlets and leaflets had been distributed in Burma claiming that Muslims want to establish supremacy through intermarriage. This kind of claim has been part of the racial-purification movement ever since pre-independence Burma. The intense dislike of Muslims is based on intermarriage, which is seen as eroding Buddhists’ racial and religious purification. Traditionally, Burmese Buddhists are proud of their blood line which they call “Thargi-Twe.” It is racial superiority in that the bloodline is considered superior to others’, which is mentioned in the *Myo Pyauk Hmar So Kyauk Hal Tai*. Empirically, this book has been used as a tool to provoke Burmese Buddhists and nationalist Buddhists to get involved with anti-Muslim violence. According to facts and data from this research, Buddhism and racism play a great role in the anti-Muslim movement throughout the history of Myanmar. The State actively and passively sponsored anti-Muslim sentiment and propaganda to maintain their power and redirect anger and frustration from the people. By manipulating and escalating

anti-Muslim sentiment that instigated mass violence against Muslims, the military had a chance to show their importance for the country's security.

One narrator states that "The situation became tough again when the hate speech DVDs, religious teachings DVDs, '969' songs, and journals are distributed by the Buddhist nationalists. It's a true story. So, those Buddhists who want to come to the front but step back. For us, we can't tolerate such things. So, we become sarcastic, and we have misunderstandings towards each other, and the situation becomes tough again. So, like I said before, hate speech changes into violence. What Wirathu did last time, his speech caused the riots."<sup>20</sup>

The contemporary anti-Muslim sentiment has fueled the hate speech that has been circulating in the electronic media, print media, and particularly on social media in Myanmar. The inflammatory speech can be described as "dangerous speech," as it has a capacity to catalyze collective violence by conditioning its audience to accept, condone and commit violence against members of a group. According to Benesch (2013), inflammatory public speech commonly escalates right before outbreaks of mass violence. It is a portent or even a precondition for instigation of violence even when the rioters and groups of killers do not organize spontaneously. Benesch (2011) articulates that the term "hate speech" is remarkably broad to include (1) speech aimed to hurt directly by insulting or offending the person or people it asserts to describe, and (2) speech aimed to produce direct hurt, by inciting one person or group against another. Benesch (2013) has coined the term "dangerous speech," which she defines as a subset of hate speech that can catalyze violence. When an act of speech has a high potential of catalyzing and expanding violence by one group against another, given the contexts in which it was made for circulation, it becomes dangerous speech (Benesch, 2013). According to Benesch (2014), the intent of speech alone does not make the speech "dangerous," and she has mentioned five elements such as content, speaker, means of dissemination, context, and audience that in the amalgamation of them deepen the capacity of speech to enable collective violence. The content of all hate and dangerous speech commonly accuses the target community of conspiracy to harm the audience by highlighting the target group as an existential

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<sup>20</sup> Interview with a Muslim politician in Meikhtilar.

threat to the audience, in which collective violence against every member of the target group is justified as necessary self-defense to protect the audience group's survival (Benesch, 2014). When the relationship of the target audience to the speaker is significant, the power of dangerous speech colors its target audience.

Benesch (2014) articulates "When such speakers communicate the views of dangerous speech, audiences are more likely to accept, internalize and repeat those views, which can, in turn, create a norm that it is logical and acceptable to endorse and express those views." The impetus of "dangerous speech" upon an audience is enriched by its means of dissemination (Benesch, 2014). Benesch (2014) articulates "When outbreaks of collective violence have been preceded and accompanied by dangerous speech, a mean of dissemination has commonly been the principal source of information for the audience, such as state-controlled media." Some examples of contextual factors enhance the probability that dangerous speech will catalyze collective violence such as a history of group-targeted prejudice and savagery, deep-rooted conflict for resources, and a lack of institutions that people trust to resolve injustices fairly and peacefully (Benesch, 2014). Hate speech cannot be dangerous without an audience that is colored by its message to accept, condone, and commit collective violence against the group that the hate speech targets (Benesch, 2014).

"Hate" is viewed as a dangerous weapon of the mind. Dozier (2002) stated that "the detonation of hate can blow apart the social order and plunge nations into war and genocide. It shatters relationships, leading people who once loved each other into bitterness, violence, even murder. Blasts of hate sweep away civility and tolerance, spurring individuals to commit acts of savagery and pitting group against group in combat that can grow vicious and deadly."<sup>21</sup> As we have seen, human beings perpetrate the most traumatizing and revolting acts imaginable in the name of hate such as *oppression, torture, genocide, and terrorism* (Dozier, 2002). Elie Wiesel, a Holocaust survivor, and Nobel Peace Prize winner said that "Hatred is at the root of evil everywhere. Racial hatred, ethnic hatred, political hatred, religious hatred, and all seem permitted in its name."<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> See Dozier, R. W., 2002. *Why We Hate: Understanding, Curbing, and Eliminating Hate in Ourselves and Our World*. McGraw-Hill, pp. 1.

<sup>22</sup> See Elie Wiesel, "We Choose Honor," *Parade Magazine*, On 28 October 2001, pp. 4-5.

According to Dozier (2002), "Hate is a primitive emotion that marks for attack or avoidance those things that we perceive as a threat to our survival or reproduction, which are the prime directives of evolution."<sup>23</sup> Additionally, a lot of studies show that "hate" also comes from another powerful sentiment called "fear." Hate is a powerful form of antagonistic dislike that reflects an extreme form of fear; another word is "phobia." This article demonstrates that the mass violence against Muslim stems from the hatred that is blended with fear, particularly phobic fear. It is interesting to note that "hatred," when oriented towards individuals or communities, is a product of an imagined threat or pain-producing condition that causes us to typecast the genesis as the enemy to reject the others. Anderson (1991) explains how state and non-state communities' identities are built and how group identity discerns the "self" from the "other," and how this notion of the sense of belonging can lead to conflict with "others," and be manipulated by elites. Precisely, "us-them" segregations always have the potential to thrive on "hatred," especially in the divided society. Human nature has a tendency to create a distinction between them and us, and this us-them binary has a fearsome potentiality to turn off empathy (Dozier, 2002). The intense dislike, negative binary stereotyping and association of threat to a particular group, and promote a cardinal sense of hostility that can trigger antagonism which would be the fight reaction (Dozier, 2002). Dozier (2002) stated that "A wide variety of emotions and feelings can be the source of hatred: frustration, envy, grief, pain, fear, anger, disgust. Intense dislike in the context of hate means that the primitive neural system has marked a phenomenon as a significant threat to survival and reproduction."<sup>24</sup> The wisdom of Buddha teaches us that one needs to manage or get rid of the three poisons in our human being such as "Greed, Anger, and Delusion."<sup>25</sup>

According to the history of pre-independence Burma, views of hatred towards the Muslim population lie beneath the surface of more than a few Burmese which is caused by the British invigoration of Indian immigration that resulted in

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<sup>23</sup> See Dozier, R. W., 2002. *Why We Hate: Understanding, Curbing, and Eliminating Hate in Ourselves and Our World*. McGraw-Hill, pp. 15.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 140.

<sup>25</sup> See "*The Buddhist Society*" Patron: H.H. The Dalai Lama Founded 1924. And See "Following the Buddha's Footsteps," San Francisco State University. Available at: <http://online.sfsu.edu/rone/Buddhism/footsteps.htm>.

Bengalis and Indians expeditiously attaining prosperity and predominant statuses in Burma (Fink, 2001). However, the greatest threat to Burmese Buddhists is the idea of Muslim men marrying Buddhist women and converting them to Islam. Fink (2001) stated that “Throughout military rule in Burma, successive regimes have used the specter of a Muslim takeover to whip up nationalist sentiments. In particular, when anti-Regime tensions are running high, incidents of intolerable behavior by Muslims always seem to pop up and are used to channel anger into conflicts.”<sup>26</sup> Some evidence show that in July 1988 pamphlets supposedly written by Muslims which encouraged fellow Muslims to marry Buddhist women unexpectedly turned up in Taunggyi during a time when anti-military sentiment was flourishing after the student demonstration in Rangoon. As expected, anti-Muslim riots flared up, and the shops and homes of Muslims were attacked and looted (Fink, 2001).

Indeed, for many years’ anti-Muslim pamphlets and leaflets have been circulated immediately preceding mass violence against Muslims in Burma. In October 1996 in Rangoon, pamphlets and leaflets showed up that said in part:

“Burmese Citizen - Beware!

The Muslims living in Burma are attempting to expand their religion while destroying Buddhism in Burma by using the following ways:

- 1) Land: All the land in the country shall be owned by the Muslims.
- 2) Money: To organize Buddhists to become Muslims using the power of money.
- 3) Women: To organize Buddhist women to get married to Muslims using money and other ways.
- 4) Doctrine: To preach Muslim doctrine in every place.
- 5) State power: After successfully using these above methods and [the] majority of the people become Muslim, to take state power.”<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> See Fink, C., 2001. *Living Silence: Burma Under Military Rule*. White Lotus, pp. 225.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 225.

Regarding the Meikhtilar violence, one narrator states that:

“In the beginning, we regarded it as an accident. But we conclude the subsequent actions as a plan which was carried out systematically. There, some political organizations- the parties which are currently in power as well as the ones which are not- were involved. Some businessmen were involved. Also, some so-called religious men and monks were involved. We can see all those people’s involvement. We don’t know if they had gathered and discussed systematically before the case or not. But, later in the case, they all had a common aim. Before that, there were such provocations as sermons about hatred towards Muslims and objection of Muslims among the Buddhists. There were tapes and documents about it which were spread, distributed and preached. It was about two or three months before the case.”<sup>28</sup>

He also states that:

“About one month before the Meikhtilar case, some people- those who would become '969' members- distributed records of the Rakhine cases which were a mix of truth and made-up stories among the Buddhists. In those records, Rakhine Buddhists, Rakhine monasteries, and pagodas were said to be destroyed, set the fire and killed by Muslims. Another thing is that tapes were distributed on a large scale. Around the market, according to the 969's policy, there were such provocations as not to buy things from Muslim shops and not to sell anything to them. There was a gold shop near the gold shop from which the problem started. That gold shop owner was a rival in business with the gold shop owner from who the problem started.

And, since the Rakhine cases happened, he put up '969' slogans in his

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<sup>28</sup> Interview with a Muslim political activist who is a member of Meikhtilar NLD.

shop like not to buy things from Muslim shops and put up religious flags. That shop was the closest to the Muslim gold shop. The name of the shop is Maw Gyi Gold Shop. Ko Maw Gyi alarmed many people from villages and many community-based organizations and political organizations. He was involved in funeral service associations. So, he called those organizations and provoked, to be honest. His shop was the only Buddhist gold shop near there. But, he had '969' stickers and '969' flags in his shop even before the Meikhtilar case.”<sup>29</sup>

Fear of a Muslim takeover is the key ingredient driving widespread acceptance of the '969' Movement's claims that Muslims in Myanmar nowadays are potential terrorists. Many of the Buddhist people view Islam as a violent religion and Muslims in Myanmar as an existential threat to the Buddhism and the Buddhist society. Schissler, Walton, and Thi (2015) stated that “Firstly, Muslims were presented as an existential threat to race and religion. Narrators repeatedly referenced the vulnerability of Buddhism or a particular ethnic community to being erased or supplanted in Myanmar. Variants on the phrase ‘one people swallowing another’ were regularly used, for example, invoking the slogan of the Ministry of Immigration and Populations: “A nation will not disappear even if it is swallowed up by the earth. But a nation will disappear if it is swallowed up by another people.”

Secondly, Muslims were presented as the personal threat to the narrator or to the narrator’s local community of residence.<sup>30</sup> This is the cardinal organic fear of Muslims in Myanmar that the state and the military regimes have been persistently manufacturing: that Muslims are swallowing up Buddhism, the Burmese race, and Burmese lands. Since the rise of "Ma-Ba-Tha" and '969' or ultra-nationalists' movement, there has been increased mobilization to design a “Muslim Threat” message, warning that Buddhism and Buddhists are under an existential threat and calling for self-defense. The framing of Muslims as a threat requiring self-defense has become conspicuous in the fearful hate-speech in Myanmar. A critical question is

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> See Schissler, M., Walton, M., and Thi, P., 2015. Threat and virtuous defense: Listening to narratives of religious conflict in six Myanmar cities. M. MAS Working Paper 1:1.

when, how, and why the fearful hate speech catalyzed the anti-Muslim violence or instigated the collective violence against the Muslims in Myanmar.

Throughout the military regime in Burma, these pamphlets and leaflets were intended to incite unrest, in which anti-Muslim sentiment is always hidden. A lot of researchers pay attention to anti-Muslim sentiment and propaganda which has been spreading on social media such as Facebook, but most of the people in Burma cannot access the internet. Normally, the pamphlets and leaflets which are inciting anti-Muslim hatred have been distributed across the country, including by monks and monasteries. An example of pamphlets and leaflets follow.

### **3.4.1 Distribution of Anti-Muslim Pamphlet in Hpa-An City, Karen State**

Distribution of anti-Muslim pamphlets is a tactic to create rumors that play a great role in the instigation of anti-Muslim violence in Myanmar. One example of anti-Muslim sentiment and Buddhist nationalist extremist ideology is below:

“All-Alliance Group of Buddhists to Protect Buddhism produced four principles that (i) Buddhists who hold inherited houses, lands, compounds, and farms are not allowed to sell, rent, and pawn them to any Muslims.

(ii) Buddhist women are not allowed to marry Muslim Men.

(iii) Buddhists have to buy goods only from Buddhists' shops.

(iv) Buddhists are allowed to use their name to buy property, build or rent the property for Muslims.

If any one of the above principles has been violated, the forceful punishment would be given to anyone who violates these principles.

These four principles have been making the meeting decision from All-Alliance Group of Buddhists to Protect Buddhism on 10th September 2012, 9 Wa Khaung Last Quarter Moon, the Year 1374.

Monday, 1:00 PM. Mae Baung Monastery, Pha-An.<sup>31</sup>

This pamphlet was distributed in October 2012 during the time of anti-Muslim violence outbreaks in Rakhine State. There is no evidence of anti-Muslim violence instigation but it creates a strong anti-Muslim sentiment. The ideology in this pamphlet is also widely used in anti-Muslim movements in other parts of Myanmar.

### **3.4.2 Distribution of Anti-Muslim Letter in Meikhtilar**

One narrator states that "In 2013, the Turkish foreign affairs minister and his family came here. I also met with them. They prayed at "Kandawmin" Mosque or Turkey Mosque, did some donations, and met with the President in person. Then, during the Second World War, about 800 Turkish soldiers died here, and there is a cemetery where they were buried. They had documents and notes about that... such as Nashanhai. They got the permission to build the cemetery, and so they came and did it. There, the contractor bought some compounds from the Muslims as well as from other people. But they bought them mostly from Muslims because of the low price. Then, Dr. xxx, the one who had brought Wirathu, attacked them by words. They produced a written statement that buying compounds was for the Muslims to build a Mosque and they were planning to store weapons there. Another thing was that the bags of cement were imported from Saudi Arabia and had to be sent back there. So, he said the Muslim countries wanted to monopolize here and using that project."<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> See Burma Campaign UK, 2013. Burma Briefing: Examples of Anti-Muslim Propaganda. No. 21, March 2013.

<sup>32</sup> Interviewed with a lawyer in Meikhtilar.

Translation of Anti-Muslim Letter from Meikhtilar:

To Ashin Bawana Thunama

(Agah Mahar Panita)

(Agah Mahar Ganta Wasaka Panita)

President of Township Sanga Organization

Meikhtilar City

Subject: We are writing to report you that the Burmese Buddhists have been living under threat.

1. According to the above subject mentioned, Muslims in Meikhtilar, those “Tiger Kalar” are wearing their Kalar Mosque’s Dresses and going around in the town more than ever before.
2. Amongst those Muslim people (Kalar), there are some strangers Kalars who we have never seen before.
3. Although the time is not for Kalars’ Eid ul-Fitr or Eid ul-Adha period, they have been attending meetings at the Mosque (day and night).
4. Using money from Saudi which has been distributed to Mosques, Muslims have been buying lands, farms, and houses both in and out of the city with the incredible amount of money under the Burmese broker’s names.
5. Two Burmese women form North Pyi-Tharyar were married off to two Kalar under the responsibility of a Mosque.
6. Furthermore, Kalars are urging each other that only “Halal” labelling branded kids products such snacks, fizzy drinks, and tea are edible for Kalars.
7. With the money they received from Saudi, construction materials shop (Kalar Shop) is selling construction materials to the City’s officials with credits.

8. Some of the officials from government offices that happened to buy from the Kalar's shop are pretending that they do not see those Kalar's activities.
9. The officials who have been tied by those credits are not investigating the guest lists of the meetings carried out at Mosques.
10. Military Power look alike Mosques are willing to become a power over Burmese Buddhists' monastery.
11. The religion should be destroyed by bribery.
12. We are very terrified whenever we see a big crowd of Kalars who go to Mosque every day. Therefore, we would like to ask support from Buddhist monks who wouldn't take bribery.
13. Please investigate the above problems.

(Buddhists who feel helpless)

Meikhtilar City.”<sup>33</sup>

The above translation of the letter which was distributed right before the outbreak of mass violence against Muslims in Meikhtilar and shows the common claim that Buddhists from Meikhtilar have been living under a Muslim threat. In Myanmar, Muslims have been considered as an existential threat to Buddhists. One common claim in the letter concerns the dress of Muslims which looks like the appearance of Muslim terrorists around the globe. It is also discerning historic Burmese Muslims' dress and the current transformation of religious dress. The appearance of Muslims wearing religious dress generates a fear for the local Buddhists because they look like “Islamic Terrorists.” “Tablighi Jamaati” which means “society for spreading the faith” that is locally known as “Tablig Movement” among Muslims in Myanmar favors wearing traditional Arab religious dress, though some Burmese Muslims rejected this religious dress code. The letter above mentioned the claim that Muslims from Meikhtilar are buying lands, farms, and houses both in and out of the city by receiving money from “Saudi.” However, almost all Muslims are invested in

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<sup>33</sup> A Letter circulated in Meikhtilar right before the mass violence against the Muslim in March 2013.

lands and property because Muslims are not religiously allowed to save their money at the banks except “Islamic Banking”, which is severely under-developed in Myanmar. One of the biggest profitable investments in Myanmar is investing in real estate. For those reasons, Muslims are likely to buy lands like others. Another common claim is that Muslims only eat at Muslims’ shop. For religious reasons, Muslims are allowed only to eat “Halal” foods. Obviously, if the Buddhists can provide “Halal” foods, Muslims can eat at the Buddhists’ shop. Another common claim highlights that some Muslims who are doing construction material business in Meikhtilar sell their materials to local authorities on credit to influence the local authorities with money supported by “Saudi” or Islamic rich countries from the Middle East, and so Buddhism will be destroyed by bribery and Muslims’ influence.

Another common feature of anti-Muslim sentiment found in the letter is the anger it expresses about Buddhist women marrying Muslim men without acknowledging that Muslim women marry Buddhist men. Both communities, Buddhists and Muslims, have tried to convert their wives into their religion. However, the Buddhists only pay attention to intermarriage between Buddhist women and Muslim men. Another common feature of the letter is its implication that Buddhists are threatened by the Muslim practice of holding the five required daily prayers in a Mosque. Clearly, then, the above-translated letter claims that the Buddhists are under threat from Muslims and that religious leaders or authorities like Buddhist monks should pay attention to these kinds of issues and protect Buddhists who live in Meikhtilar.

### **3.4.3 Distribution of Anti-Muslim Pamphlets in Meikhtilar**

One narrator states that "On 18, 19, and 20 March 2013, the pamphlets were distributed considerably...in the market and here and there. So, I’m sure that it was a set-up. They just needed to find an excuse. The gold shop case was such an incident. But I’m sure that they were ready to create chaos if a problem occurred because they were spreading pamphlets continuously. The pamphlets came from U Wirathu. Another thing was that the discs were also U Wirathu’s. What’s worse, he distributed not only the discs about his speech in Meikhtilar but also the ones taken

during his speech in Rakhine."<sup>34</sup>

Another narrator states that "Before the violence, the anti-Muslim pamphlets were spread. It was after the matriculation exams. We guessed that a riot would happen after the matriculation exams. But, two or three days before the exams, the gold shop problem occurred. We got some information in advance that such a case would happen after the matriculation exams."<sup>35</sup>

The translation of the pamphlet is as follows:

"All Buddhists should be aware of these:

- (a) Muslims are egotists and setting up their personal economy.
- (b) Muslims are ardent to have authority and power.
- (c) Muslims are avid to monopolize all businesses.
- (d) Muslims are eager to monopolize lands, property, and mineral resources.
- (e) Islam is justified to eliminate all Buddhists what mentioned in their Quran.
- (f) Islam promotes violence and terrorism to kill all Buddhists what mentioned in their Quran."<sup>36</sup>

This leaflet presents the Muslims as demons with claims about business practices, domination and monopoly, their relationship with local authorities, sense of entitlement to lands, property, and mineral resources, and their association with terrorism around the world. The letter promotes a fear based on perceived threat, claiming all Buddhists will be wiped out soon in Myanmar and the nation of Myanmar will become an Islamic country. These are the commons claims which have been urged ever since the colonial era. This is the evidence of creating a new reality of insecurity towards Buddhists who need to urgently deal with this kind of threats. "Ma-

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<sup>34</sup> Interviewed with a lawyer in Meikhtilar.

<sup>35</sup> Interviewed with a Muslim from the Ward Administration Office in Meikhtilar.

<sup>36</sup> A pamphlet circulated in Meikhtilar right before the mass violence against Muslim outbreak in March 2013 (Remark: The owner of the pamphlet did not allow me to take a picture but allowed me to translate from Burmese to English). This pamphlet was also seen on "Wirathu" Facebook.

Ba-Tha" urge to protect "Race, Religion, and Motherland" that offers a new vision of eliminating their threats which are a factor to instigate the anti-Muslim violence.

#### **3.4.4 Wirathu's Anti-Muslim Hate Speech in Meikhtilar**

Wirathu's speech was recorded on DVDs, VCDs, and CDs which have been distributed in different parts of Myanmar as well as mainly in Meikhtilar. One eyewitness states that "On 20 October 2012, U Wirathu officially gave a hate speech here. That hate speech was spread by the group of "Ma-Ba-Tha" members. I saw it with my own eyes because, at that time, I was taking part in their activities. The Discs were given out free of charge when people want to have it."<sup>37</sup>

One narrator states that "It seemed as if we knew in our mind what would happen in Meikhtilar about one and a half months or two months in advance. This is because a case had happened in Rakhine. People were pulled out of the car and killed in Taungoke, Rakhine. They made up something in Rakhine starting from that time. A riot. Then, after the case happened in Rakhine, what reached the mainland was the spread of hatred towards Muslims. When we looked at the photos and video files they distributed, they mainly include dead people with a cut on their neck or with their arms cut off...both Buddhists and Bengalis. But, they say all the dead people are Buddhists killed by Muslims. And the Buddhists are being killed. They say such things and slowly spread that media here as a catalyst. We became worried at that time. Another thing was that on Sabbath days, the monks came, and they included such things in their sermons. They talked about the Rakhine case. Before the Meikhtilar case, there were two sermons by Wirathu during which he talked about the Rakhine case to spread hatred towards Muslims. Again, in my opinion, there were groups formed in villages and quarters...that's true. Such groups could be named as Ma-Ba-Tha, which is formed to protect race and religion. At that time, the name wasn't given to the groups yet. They formed groups, distributed documents, and we got some of them too. So, we warned our family and community of their intention to create riots, and so we should be more careful with our behavior. Some believed us, but others don't... even those among us. They didn't believe it because there had been no such case in their

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<sup>37</sup> Interview with a Buddhist eyewitness in Meikhtilar.

whole lives. For me, I'm fifty years old. So, they had such faith that, whatever had happened in other towns, nothing would happen in Meikhtilar because the residents wouldn't do anything harmful to one another."<sup>38</sup>

One narrator states that "They brought Wirathu here in October 2012, and even the title of the speech was "The Teachings to Enter Heaven and the Teachings to Protect Race." They placed so many speakers at the four-story building which was regarded as the main building of the city. Dr. San Hlaing's groups, the former NLD members, sponsored the event and the speech was given. What he said in that speech... there are DVDs of it... is what he is doing now... it was about his plans. It was in his manifesto."<sup>39</sup>

He also states that "U Wirathu said that all the Muslims in the whole country were Bengalis. He accused Muslims like that. They came from Bangladesh. They tried to be prolific, raped, and did businesses and monopolized our economy. So, at Priyati Monastery in Innsein-Ywama in 2001, U Wirathu started saying that all Muslims were Bengalis. Here, it's also the same. He said it plainly as usual, "All the Muslims in the whole country are the ones who came from Bangladesh through Rakhine. We must oppose them so that they can't live here or do business or stand on their own feet, and so on." I'll give you that disc... I'll find it. They used speakers. At that time, he was banned in every city, but they allowed him to give a speech in Meikhtilar. At that time, the Deputy Commissioner was Khin Maung Soe. So he gave a speech here and distributed the discs free of charge... there were tens of thousands of them. If their discs were out of stock, they were sent again from Mandalay... after 20 October, 2012."<sup>40</sup>

"Whatever you do, do it with nationalist's vision. When you are looking, look at with nationalist's point of view. When you are listening, listen with nationalist's ears. When you do business, do it with nationalist's vision. We are very weak at that at the moment."<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Interviewed with a political activist since 1988 in Meikhtilar.

<sup>39</sup> Interviewed with a Muslim political activist from Meikhtilar.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> Speech has been given by Buddhist Monk "Wirathu" right before the mass violence against Muslim in Meikhtilar. See Video File on YouTube with translated Version:

Ashin Wirathu delivered a sermon to the public in the City of Meikhtilar right before the Buddhist-Muslim violent outbreaks. In his sermon, he aroused nationalist sentiment to influence the public, and his call of nationalism aims to castigate Muslims in Myanmar. This was a very powerful speech act by a religious moral authority goads Buddhists into hatred and animosity towards Muslims. Evidently, intense dislike of Muslims and anti-Muslim sentiments increased in Meikhtilar after Ashin Wirathu's articulation of anti-Muslim sentiment blended with Buddhist nationalism.

“But for them (Burmese Muslims), they (Muslims) are very good at it. Before this government, the military was in control. They (Muslims) worked together with the military for the sake of their wellbeing, and now they control the construction market in Yangon. Don't think (Muslims) love the military but they worked together for the benefit of their people. Now when the time is good under this USDP government, they all became members and do politics with nationalist vision. They do politics not because they understand or love democracy and respect human rights, but they do it for their people. They are the people who have been breaking human rights. They have been brutally breaking rules of freedom of belief.”<sup>42</sup>

Ashin Wirathu has tried to accuse Muslims that work with the military of illicit practices for their business development. On this point, cronies from different religions work with the military for their profits. Not only are some Muslim cronies working with the government authorities, but also well-known Buddhist cronies. Cronyism and nepotism have been evident ever since the Burmese Kingdoms were established. The cronies have been making business and profits regardless of their religion and ethnic identity. Also, the various types of elite have come from different communities in Myanmar. According to Benesch (2014), the collectivization of the fault of one or a few people in a group to every member of a group is a fundamental tactic of hate speech. Almost all of Muslim communities in Myanmar do not support any forms of violence or terrorism even though some Islamic extremists from other countries have been involved with suicide-bombing and killing innocent people.

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<<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N7irUgGsFYw>>. See also English Translation at Burma Campaign UK, 2013. Burma Briefing: Examples of Anti-Muslim Propaganda. No. 21, March 2013.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

Almost of all Muslims in Myanmar reject and condemn Islamic extremism and terrorism. Throughout the contemporary history of Myanmar, there is no sign of Islamic terrorism. However, Ashin Wirathu claims that Muslims are a potential threat and danger to the Burmese Buddhists. He normally draws this argument on the life of “Buddhism, Race, and Motherland” which have been under the threat of Muslims in Myanmar. The emergence of transnational Islamic terrorism around the globe has impacted his line of argument and thinking. Muslim communities in Myanmar do not deny or ignore the fact of Islamic terrorism that has emerged in some Muslim communities on the world stage. But in contrast, Ashin Wirathu does not pay any attention to the local context and local knowledge of Muslims (which is complying with Islamic teachings and philosophy) who condemn and denounce Islamic terrorism. Wirathu stated:

Now NLD is in a better position, so (Muslims) are in NLD. If you look at NLD offices at any towns, you will see bearded people. When I went to Meikhtilar, one of the local people told me, “the NLD peacock is no longer peacock but a “Mootdaung” (meaning a Muslim person) NLD party is full of Muslims.” Now that they (Muslims) have places, they (Muslims) can work for their people and religion.<sup>43</sup>

Here, Ashin Wirathu has attacked the NLD (National League for Democracy), the party of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, during his sermon in Meikhtilar. To paraphrase, he argued that the NLD office of Meikhtilar was being run by Muslims, insinuating that sooner or later the NLD will be swallowed by Muslims. Clearly, these claims are designed to attack the NLD using racial and religious sensitivity. Most liberal Buddhist monks considered as Wirathu created a sense of fear and directed the hatred towards Muslims by attacking the NLD in Meikhtilar. After the Buddhist-Muslims riot in Meikhtilar, some Muslim members of NLD have faced direct and indirect discrimination by some Burmese Buddhists. He went on to remark:

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<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

“When I went to Meikhtilar, a lot of monks told me that they were not allowed to hold a Buddhist ritual on Martyr's day. I was furious and thought how rude it was for the authorities to do that. But they replied that it was coming from the Kalars from the NLD office, and (Muslims) own the property! Just think about it, they are from NLD, and (Muslims) didn't allow us to perform Buddhist rituals just because they own the property, what is going to happen when they (Muslims) become the leader of the party or minister or leader of the country. It is scary. It gets scarier the more you think about it.”<sup>44</sup>

As quoted above, Ashin Wirathu is claiming that if Muslims take part in the politics and political leadership of the country, Buddhists will be oppressed and Buddhism will eventually be abolished. He called on Buddhists to be proactive to prevent this type of situation which would be terrifying for them:

“(Muslims) do everything in nationalist's way, and that's why they keep buying lands and properties. They carried bags of money to propose girls for marriage, and they use those to manipulate girls...If they have power, even Ka Htein (Buddhist charity) will be gone from our country.”<sup>45</sup>

Historically, nationalist Buddhists have presented intermarriage and miscegenation as major threats in Myanmar. Throughout the history of Buddhist-Muslim riots, the rumors of Muslims raping Buddhist women played a great role in triggering the violence against Muslims in Myanmar. As the result of the intolerance of intermarriage and miscegenation, the law locally known as the “Saving Race Law” was adopted to prevent intermarriage which is demanding racial and religious purification. Ashin Wirathu articulated that the power should not be given to the Muslims, or the Buddhist charity act of “Ka Htein” will perish in Myanmar. This

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<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

claim also encouraged a sense of fear that the Buddhists need to protect Buddhism. He continues:

“Buy only from our (Buddhists) shops. If our money goes to enemies’ hands, it will destroy our whole nationality and religion. They will use that money to manipulate women, forcefully convert those women into their religion, and the children of them will become the enemy of the state. They will destroy the whole nation and religion. When their population grows, they will do the same thing as they did in Rakhine state: invading. They will take over the whole county. .... That is why by looking long term, use only places with the sign '969.' So if we win this one event, our people will win the future events. We need to target one by one of those to protect our religion.”<sup>46</sup>

Ashin Wirathu encouraged a “Burmans for Burma Campaign” also known as the “Dobamar Movement” and is based on the anti-colonial and the anti-Indian sentiment that emerged during the British colonial era. He urged that Buddhists buy only from Buddhists’ shops to prevent Muslim influence in the economy. His '969' Movement calls for boycotting Muslim businesses arguing that buying goods from Muslim shops will put profits into the hands of Muslims, and as a result, Buddhism and the race will be eliminated or extinguished by “enemies.” Muslims use those financial profits to manipulate Buddhist women to marry Muslim men. He did not pay any attention to the rights of women drawing from the CEDAW which was already ratified in 1997.

Civil society organizations and particularly women’s rights organizations from Myanmar have rejected and condemned the "Saving Race Law" which was supported by the '969' Movement and "Ma-Ba-Tha." Ashin Wirathu claimed that Muslims use their money to persuade Buddhist women to marry Muslim men and their generations will be the enemy of the state. Again, this point is also going back to the

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

colonial period that Burmese Buddhists condemned miscegenation out of concern for racial and religious purification. He also provoked fear over the security of religion by claiming that Muslims will overrun the country and Buddhism will be wiped out soon, and so the Buddhists have a righteous responsibility to eliminate an existing threat to the security of religion. Ashin Wirathu referenced a case of “Rohingya Muslims” in his sermon that those Muslims have been invading our “Rakhine” State and he said again that Muslims will take over the country. Finally, he highlighted '969' sticker campaigns that all Buddhist businesses have to use the sign of '969,' in which the Buddhists can easily recognize those signs and buy goods at the Buddhists' shop. The underlying idea of the '969' sticker campaign is boycotting Muslims' businesses.

### **3.4.5 '969' Movement Before the anti-Muslim Violence in Meikhtilar**

Stickers with a logo of '969' calling for the boycott of anything related to Muslims have been distributed to Buddhists' businesses that portray intense dislike towards Muslims.<sup>47</sup> Translation: “For the security of our religion (Buddhism), let's buy at '969' shops. The usage of '969' refers to '9' Special Elements of Buddha, '6' Special Elements of Dhamma (Buddha's Teachings), and '9' for the elements of Buddhist Sangha.”<sup>48</sup>

### **3.4.6 A Source Book of Anti-Muslim Sentiment and Hate Speech in Myanmar**

As described previously, a book titled "*A Myo Pyauk Hmar Soe Kyauk Hal Tai*"<sup>49</sup> (*The Fear of Losing One's Race*) has played a great role in contributing to anti-Muslim sentiment and propaganda in Myanmar. Over the past three decades, nationalist Buddhists monks and nationalist Buddhists have cited, quoted, and referred to ideas and doctrines from the book while delivering sermons, speeches, and interviews. A respondent for this research paper who frequently attended meetings

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<sup>47</sup> A copy of Logo is at the hand of the researcher, and it can also be seen on social media.

<sup>48</sup> See Burma Campaign UK, 2013. Burma Briefing: Examples of Anti-Muslim Propaganda. No. 21, March 2013.

<sup>49</sup> See “Myo Pyauk Hmar Soe Kyauk Hal Tai,” (which mean The Fear of Losing One's Race), published by Shwe Doe Be Aung in early 1950s, which was known to be a source of anti-Muslim sentiment in Myanmar.

with high-ranking leaders from USDA (later known as USDP) spoke of a former general, U Aung Thaung, and his fondness for this book. "U Aung Thaung, who was a former general of the Burmese military, ex-Minister at the Ministry of Industry-1, currently an MP and a senior advisor to the USDP. He has held prominent leadership position in the USDA as well as in USDP, and has been sponsoring and backing the '969' Movement and Ma-Ba-Tha. He has a strong relationship with U Wirathu and always recommended people to read *The Fear of Losing One's Race*. Some of his followers, who own that book and have espoused strong anti-Muslim sentiment were promoted to higher positions within the USDA."<sup>50</sup> U Aung Thaung was later sanctioned by the US government because of his involvement in the anti-Muslim riots, and for funding "Ma-Ba-Tha."<sup>51</sup> *The Fear of Losing One's Race* has been circulated and distributed in various forms including verbal delivering of speeches based on its text, preaching, training, discussions, CDs, VCDs and DVD recording, printed pamphlets and leaflets, and journals.<sup>52</sup> Al Jazeera (2015) reported on this issue in its documentary "Promoting the 'Muslim Threat' in Myanmar."<sup>53</sup>

Rianne ten Veen (2005) emphasizes the significance of this book. She states, "A book entitled, *The Fear of Losing One's Race*, which first appeared in print in 1997 or 1998 by an unknown author, has contributed to the anti-Muslim sentiment among Burmese Buddhists. The book describes how Muslims will displace Buddhists in the country unless actions are taken against them. Distribution of the book appeared to increase during 2001 and 2002, although it was not clear who published it. The book was cited as one factor that contributed to the rioting in early 2001 in Sittwe and Taungoo."<sup>54</sup> The ideology from *The Fear of Losing One's Race* continues to be used as a text to legitimize the current-day anti-Muslim movement in Myanmar.

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<sup>50</sup> Interview with a Buddhist man who has been working as a political activist since 1988 in Meikhtilar. He is also a witness of the event.

<sup>51</sup> See Announcement of Treasury Sanctions Against Aung Thaung from the U.S. Department of The Treasury [online] 31 October 2014. Available at: <<http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/JL2680.aspx>> [Accessed 4 May 2015].

<sup>52</sup> Interview with a Member of Parliament from NLD Party.

<sup>53</sup> See Aljazeera, 2015. Promoting the 'Muslim Threat' in Myanmar. Available at: <<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/10/cloneofpromoting-muslim-threat-myanmar-151025123-151025132207025.html>> [Accessed on 1 January 2016].

<sup>54</sup> See Rianne ten Veen and Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2005. *Myanmar's Muslims: The Oppressed of the Oppressed*.

Al Jazeera states that "Among the cache of evidence obtained by Al Jazeera's Investigative Unit are documents that analysts say prove the Myanmar government has sought to incite anti-Muslim sentiment. One of the most significant items is a presentation used by members of the armed forces at a training session in Naypyitaw, Myanmar's capital city."<sup>55</sup> The lecture aid instructs army cadets to view the state's Muslim population as a threat to the nation as a whole, as well as to Buddhism itself. Also entitled *The Fear of Losing One's Race*, the document emphasizes the danger posed to Myanmar by Islam, in part by making the case of the "probability of racial extinction" as a result of the maneuverings of Bengali Muslims in particular.<sup>56</sup> The term "Bengali Muslims" is used by the military regime and current nationalistic movement to describe Rohingyas in general and Muslims in particular. Al Jazeera (2015) also stated that the book instructs its audience that Rohingyas intend to "infiltrate the people to propagate their religion" and that their "population increases by way of mass illegal immigration." These claims are contained on a page headed by a well-known Burmese xenophobe saying: "A race does not face extinction by being swallowed into the earth, but from being swallowed up by other peoples." A heading on another page asserts that Muslims "take advantage of Myanmar people whenever there is an opportunity." The conclusion reads: "We need to protect our race and religion as much as possible...Otherwise, Buddhism may vanish."<sup>57</sup> Al Jazeera (2015) quoted former military insider and regime defector Sai Thein Win, who remarked, "They recruit the propagandists and create rumors, which spread among the people. In this way, they influence the policy of the country," with the aim to "make the people worry, spread fear, hatred and create conflicts." Sai Thein Win told Al Jazeera that "he recognized the name of the college where the lecture was given, as well its military function, as a center for psychological warfare."<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Received an original document from a military officer to analyze it in this study.

<sup>56</sup> See Aljazeera, 2015. Promoting the 'Muslim Threat' in Myanmar.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

### 3.4.7. A Letter of Anti-Muslim Sentiment and Nationalist Mobilization

A letter was distributed in several parts of Myanmar calling and mobilizing Buddhists with anti-Muslim sentiment for protecting race and religion.<sup>59</sup> A translated excerpt calls upon and mobilizes Buddhist populations to see that “it is time for new Myanmar’s generation to know how to prevent a heart-breaking condition”<sup>60</sup> which has been affecting the whole nation. In summary, the letter states that Muslims or so-called “Kalars” are applying various strategies to wipe out Buddhism and Myanmar’s Buddhist ethnic nationalities. Historical examples are cited as evidence, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. These are all places where Buddhism was once harmoniously practiced, but now those countries are ruled by Muslims (so-called “Kalars”).

The letter claimed that “Muslims have been living on our (Buddhists’) land, drinking our (Buddhists’) water, eating our (Buddhists’) rice but plotting inexcusable ideas to wipe out Buddhism and our Myanmar’s nationalities.” The aggressive tone of the letter is derived from a popular saying which translates to: “No extinction of human being can happen from being swallowed by earth but will happen when one human kind swallowed up another.”<sup>61</sup> The official translation of this motto according to the Ministry of Immigration and Population is “The Earth will not swallow a race to extinction but another will.”<sup>62</sup> This motto has been hung on the wall of every immigration office in Myanmar since the socialist regime. This basic doctrine refers to the protection of Buddhist ethnic nationalities and is used to discourage Buddhists from marrying Muslims for money, gold, and wealth. The letter, cited from a well-known monk, Mingun Sayadaw U Vicittasarabivamsa, states that “You (Buddhists) should still purchase from the shops of (non-Muslim) Myanmar ethnic people’s shops even if they are profiting ten kyats per item whereas Muslims (Kalars) shops are profiting one kyat per item. Because that 10 kyats from Myanmar ethnic’s

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<sup>59</sup> The researcher has a copy of the letter.

<sup>60</sup> A Letter which was distributed in several parts of Myanmar calling and mobilizing Buddhists with anti-Muslim sentiment for protecting race and religion. Also See Aljazeera, 2015. Promoting the "Muslim threat" in Myanmar. Available at: <  
<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/10/cloneofpromoting-muslim-threat-myanmar-151025123-151025132207025.html> > [Accessed on 1 Sep 2016].

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> See the Motto of the Ministry of Immigration and Population. Available at: <  
<http://www.modins.net/myanmarinfo/ministry/population.htm>>. [Accessed 4 May 2015].

shops are going towards building pagodas and monasteries whereas Muslims' (Kalars') one kyat is going towards destroying our religion and nationalities."<sup>63</sup>

The letter also states:

If you (Buddhists) cannot discipline your children, our nationalities and religion will no longer exist. Therefore, please follow the four principles: (i) Teach Buddhism and Buddhist culture to our children from a young age, (ii) Do not purchase from Muslims' shops, (iii) Discipline your children not to communicate with Muslims, and (iv) Discipline your children not to marry Muslims.<sup>64</sup>

The letter concludes by using a quote from a very famous monk named Ashin Zanakarbiwintha, also known as Maha Gadaryong Sayardaw, delivering a "message to the new generation. When a pot was branded while making, that brand is still visible long after it has been broken. Similarly, only when we cast a brand of religion in our children, Buddhism will last in them until they die."<sup>65</sup>

### **3.4.8 A Letter to Urge the Whole Nation: Nationalist Ideology**

This nationalist's letter mobilized Buddhists to take action against Muslims in Myanmar to save their race, their religion, and their lands. This letter was circulated largely in October 2012 in Karen State right after the outbreak of violence in Rakhine State. Many people believed that this letter could have instigated anti-Muslim violence in Karen State, but that did not occur. Translation from Burmese into English is below:

Dear Myanmar people,

To wipe out our religion and nationality, bad Muslim Kalars are employing several strategies such as using business and the

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<sup>63</sup> A Letter which was distributed in several parts of Myanmar calling and mobilizing Buddhists with anti-Muslim sentiment for protecting race and religion.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

humanitarian sector as leverage. Using such strategies, they have won over Indonesia, Malaysia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, where Buddhism was once widely practiced. In India in AD 11 (Buddhist year 700), they brutally burned and destroyed recordings of Buddha's teachings, killed over 100,000 monks and issued rewards to those who found and killed monks who had escaped.

In our country, Myanmar, they have done appalling things such as throwing King Narathu off the throne in the Bagan Era, invading Hantharwaddy, forcefully involving Mohammedans in national politics in the era of the Bagyidaw Empire, raping many Burmese women while depending on U Pain in the era of the Pagan Empire, instigating the Kalar-Bamar riot of 1930, and the 1938 Kalar-Bamar riot based on religious papers written by Mawlawi Shwe Phi. They were responsible for raping many young women in the 1940-41 Kalar-Rakhine riots, involving Mujahid Kalar rebels in the era of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL), and demanding more rights after a Muslim married Colonel U Maung Maung Kha's daughter in AFPFL's era. They plotted to invade Buu The Taung and Maung Taw townships with the help of Pakistan and Bangladesh during the times of both British Colonial and SLORC rule demanded autonomy for Maymyo and Yangon Mogul Street and requested ethnic identity for children who were born to Muslim fathers and Myanmar ethnic mothers.

Therefore, to get out those Kalars who have been living on our land, drinking our water, and eating our rice while plotting heinous ideas to wipe out Buddhism and our Myanmar nationality:

1. Stop shopping in Kalar-owned shops bearing a 786 or Halal sign. Stop using their cars and carts, and cease dealing with them in business and household matters.
2. "No extinction of human kind can happen from being swallowed by earth but will happen, when one human kind swallows up another human kind" Remember this saying and to protect our nationality, do

not marry Muslim Kalars for money, gold, and wealth.

3. Please place pictures of Buddha and monks in Buddhist shops and homes to pay respect; place signs of Buddhism and sell various goods with reasonable prices. Please don't raise prices to earn higher profits.
4. Only buy from Buddhist shops.
5. To improve knowledge on nationality, townships and villages' religious leaders are to help and form religious youth groups, organize discussion groups and encourage reading religious texts. "<sup>66</sup>

However, the letter also warns Buddhists against instigating riots or political instability in Myanmar, declaring that it was published so that the Burmese nationality and Buddhist religion to prosper indefinitely.<sup>67</sup> Despite its peaceful overtones, this kind of nationalist mobilization has played a role in fueling the anti-Muslim movement in Myanmar.

### 3.4.9 Posters of "Muslim-Free Zones" in Myanmar

Collectivization and nationalistic mobilization of the anti-Muslim campaign were manifested in various parts of Myanmar. One poster that appeared in Yatsouth Township in Shan State declared a "Muslim-Free Area (1)" in the township.<sup>68</sup> According to a local Muslim, there was a local population of 1,200 Muslims 900 households in this township.<sup>69</sup> Yet according to the poster, Muslims were not permitted to live in the area and not even allowed to sleep overnight. Selling land and property to Muslims remains strictly prohibited in Yatsouth, and there is a prohibition against marrying Muslims.<sup>70</sup> Various posters stating "No Muslims allowed" appeared in several parts of Myanmar, mainly in extremist nationalists' villages and wards. The Guardian (2016) reported, "At the entrance to Thaungtan

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<sup>66</sup> See Burma Campaign UK, 2013. Burma's Treatment of the Rohingya and International Law. Burma Briefing, no. 23, April 2013.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> The researcher for this study possesses a photocopy of this poster.

<sup>69</sup> Interview with a local Muslim from Yatsouth Township.

<sup>70</sup> A Poster; "Muslims Free Area" that Muslims are not allowed to stay and sleep, selling lands and property are highly restricted, and Buddhist women are not allowed to marry Muslim men. Another example of poster circulated on social media.

village there's a brand-new sign, bright yellow, which bears the message: No Muslims allowed staying overnight. No Muslims allowed renting houses. No marriage with Muslims."<sup>71</sup> McPherson (2016) reported in the Guardian an article entitled "No Muslims Allowed: How Nationalism is Rising in Aung San Suu Kyi's Myanmar"<sup>72</sup> that since the poster incident, "a couple of other villages across the country have followed suit. Small but viciously insular, these 'Buddhist-only' outposts serve as microcosms of the festering religious tensions that threaten Myanmar's nascent experiment with democracy."<sup>73</sup>

The idea of "Muslim-free Zones" is not a new ideology recently developed by extremists in Myanmar. *International Religious Freedom Report 2005* states that "Certain townships in Rakhine State such as Gwa and Taung-kote were declared as "Muslim-free Zones" by some extremists in 1983 and Muslims are no longer permitted to live in those townships."<sup>74</sup> Rianne ten Veen (2005) states that "There are credible reports that the SPDC authorities have systematically repressed and relocated Muslims to isolate them in certain areas. For example, Muslims in Arakan State have been forced to donate time, money and materials toward buildings for the Buddhist community, and certain townships were declared "Muslim-free zones" by a government decree in 1983. In Thandwe Township in Arakan state, for example, there are still some Muslims who were original settlers in the area, but new Muslims are not allowed to buy plots or houses or move in. In Gwa and Taung-gut Muslims are no longer allowed to live in the area; Mosques have been destroyed and lands confiscated. To ensure that these are not rebuilt, they have been replaced with government buildings, monasteries and Buddhist temples."<sup>75</sup> The ideology of "Muslim-free Zones" was widely used in Rakhine State to oppress Rohingya Muslims. Nowadays, this ideology and practice are tactically used throughout mainland Myanmar.

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<sup>71</sup> See The Guardian, 2016. 'No Muslims allowed': how nationalism is rising in Aung San Suu Kyi's Myanmar. Available at: < <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/23/no-muslims-allowed-how-nationalism-is-rising-in-aung-san-suu-kyis-myanmar> > [Accessed on 1 October 2016].

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> "Abuse of Religious Freedom," *International Religious Freedom Report 2005 - Burma, U.S.* Department of State.

<sup>75</sup> See Rianne ten Veen and Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2005. *Myanmar's Muslims: The Oppressed of the Oppressed*.

### **3.4.10. Documented Source of Institutionalized Anti-Muslim Sentiment**

Received the document from a military officer that titled as (See Appendix C)

"Nay Pyi Taw Divisional Military  
Headquarters  
[Star Sign/Army Badge]  
No (13) Combatants Organizing School  
Combatants Organizing (Officer) Training Batch No. 102  
Organizing Public Lecture  
Fear of Extinction of Race  
Page 2"<sup>76</sup>

This 40-page document is extracted from the book titled "A Myo Pyauk Hmar Soe Kyauk Hal Tai" and provides further evidence that the military has directly contributed to the manufacturing and institutionalization of anti-Muslim sentiment. The document serves as a comprehensive overview to the rhetoric of the current-day nationalistic movement and provides insight into the arguments being articulated by nationalists at present. The document is written to deliberately generate fear and insecurity amongst Buddhists that they are living under a so-called "Muslim threat." This evidence endorses the fact that the military manufactures institutionalized anti-Muslim sentiment in Myanmar. In this document, Muslims are considered as an existential threat, always associated with terrorism, and quoted as "taking advantage of Myanmar people whenever there is an opportunity."<sup>77</sup>

The document (See Appendix C) is a source of how the military uses propaganda to brainwash and indoctrinate fellow officers during training sessions held for promotions in rank. To complement this document, there is another source of

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<sup>76</sup> Received an original document from a military officer to analyze in this study. See Aljazeera, 2015. Promoting the 'Muslim Threat' in Myanmar. Available at: <  
<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/10/cloneofpromoting-muslim-threat-myanmar-151025123-151025132207025.html>> [Accessed on 1 January 2016].

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

corroborative evidence in the form of a recent statement by Myanmar's Home Affairs Minister Lieutenant General Kyaw Swe, of the military-controlled Home Affairs Ministry. He stated, "For us, one man only marries a woman. For them, a man marries four women. If one woman is breeding ten children, there can be forty people in a family."<sup>78</sup> His interview on Democratic Voice of Burma (2016) underscores how officers have been brainwashed and indoctrinated by the manipulation of anti-Muslim sentiment and by the mischaracterization of Islamic teachings and history.<sup>79</sup> This is the fact that the contemporary nationalist movement and their leaders articulate in the same way as the Home Affairs Minister. Empirical evidence is that Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, appointed in 2011 as the current commander-in-chief of Myanmar Armed Forces, told the Burmese media in 2016 that the purpose of the military is not only to protect national security but also to protect "Race and Religion." Similar claims have been made by ultranationalist monk Wirathu and other leaders from the "Ma-Ba-Tha" movement.<sup>80</sup> Senior General Min Aung Hlaing's speech demonstrates a correlation of institutionalized anti-Muslim sentiment and the rise of Buddhist nationalism. All of these facts support the idea that anti-Muslim sentiment implanted in Buddhist nationalism has been manufactured and institutionalized by the military.

These and other acts of inflammatory speech have succeeded in producing a certain level of hatred and fear, in which Muslims have been viewed or considered as a threat to the Buddhist society in Myanmar. As evidenced by anti-Muslim pamphlets, leaflets, interviews, and sermons, Muslims in Myanmar have been viewed as demons, egoists, rapists, and potential threats connected with Islamic terrorism. The framing of anti-Muslim sentiment is generated in the hatred, fear, insecurity of religion, societal security, identity, religious and racial purification, seniority, and superiority. The framing of contemporary anti-Muslim sentiment also originated in the history of pre-

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<sup>78</sup> See Coconuts Yangon, 2016. Rights Groups Condemn 'Blatantly Inflammatory' Comments by Myanmar Minister on Rohingya 'Invasion.' Available at: < <http://yangon.coconuts.co/2016/10/19/rights-groups-condemn-blatantly-inflammatory-comments-myanmar-minister-rohingya-invasion> > [Accessed on 22 October 2016]. Also see DVB's interview with Lieutenant General Kyaw Swe, Available at: < <http://burmese.dvb.no/archives/172420> > [Accessed on 22 October 2016].

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

<sup>80</sup> Senior General Min Aung Hlaing's interview with Burmese Media in 2016. Also see his Facebook, Available at: < <https://www.facebook.com/seniorgeneralminaunghlaing/?fref=ts> >, and also see the military Facebook, Available at: < <https://www.facebook.com/seniorgeneralminaunghlaing/?fref=ts> >.

independence Burma; particularly during periods of Indian migration to the Arakan region. The issue of racial and religious purification relied on opposing “inter-marriage” and children of mixed religious descent born to Muslim fathers and Buddhist mothers. There was far less attention paid to Buddhist men who married Muslim women and converted them to Buddhism.

Because of Islamic terrorism outside of Myanmar, Burmese Muslims have long been viewed as a potential threat to the Buddhist society. At the same time, Islam and Muslims have been considered as inferior and subordinate to Buddhism and Buddhists. The following chapter will discuss in greater detail how these conditions led to the activation of the anti-Muslim violence that took place in Meikhtilar, Myanmar in 2013.

## **CHAPTER IV**

### **A CASE STUDY OF VIOLENCE AND RECOVERY IN MEIKHTILAR, MYANMAR**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

This Chapter explores the geographical location and demographic nature of the city of Meikhtilar. Later, this chapter explores how the anti-Muslim rioting that occurred in Meikhtilar in March 2013 was generated, local people's perceptions of what caused the violence, the state's response to the violence against citizens and the state's obligations under both the 2008 Constitution and international human rights law. This Chapter also explains how Anti-Muslim sentiment and hate speech were distributed right before the outbreak of violence in Meikhtilar. The promotion of anti-Muslim sentiment and hate speech is institutionalized through the military institution and "Ma-Ba-Tha" which is the religious institution. Distribution of anti-Muslim sentiment and hate speech manufactures an irrational fear of Muslims which has instigated the anti-Muslim violence in Meikhtilar, Myanmar.

#### **4.2 Meikhtilar: A City in Mandalay Region**

Meikhtilar City is located in the Mandalay region, total 475.34 square miles, and reaches out East-West 30 miles, and North-South 22 miles. The Meikhtilar Township neighbors Tharzi Township in the East, Wundwin and Mahlaing Townships in the North, and Pyawbwe Township in the South. In the Meikhtilar Township, there are 58 village-tracts, 14 wards, and 379 villages.<sup>1</sup> The total population is about 309,663 and 111,522 people live in the city with average 22,304 households, and

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<sup>1</sup> The 2014 Myanmar Population and Housing Census – The Union Report; Ministry of Immigration and Population, May 2015. Available at: <[www.dop.gov.mm](http://www.dop.gov.mm)>.

198,141 people live in the village-tracts.<sup>2</sup> Meikhtilar City is at the heart of highway hub of a central part of Myanmar that connected with five highways such as Mandalay-Yangon-Taunggyi highways, Kyauk Pa Daung-Myin Chan highway. In Meikhtilar township, there 54,994 acres of paddy fields, 97,002 acres of plantation, and 633 acres of vegetable plantation, all together 152,629 total acres of agricultural lands.<sup>3</sup> In Meikhtilar, there are 40 government offices all together with the division, district, and township levels.<sup>4</sup> It is interesting to note that Meikhtilar is surrounded by 26 various military camps and arm forces.<sup>5</sup>

The education sector is well represented in this region. Meikhtilar University, Technological University, Computing University, College of Education, Meikhtilar University of Economic, and Myanmar Aerospace Engineering University (MAEU) are located in Meikhtilar Township, including several high schools, middle schools, and primary schools.<sup>6</sup> One of the historical landmarks is Meikhtilar Lake which was continually maintained by 17 kings of the Burmese kingdom.<sup>129</sup> There are 32 historical pagodas. Economically, Meikhtilar City is one of the more prosperous cities in Mandalay Division, producing rice and various types of beans, large production of grape, and a huge production of vegetables.<sup>7</sup> One of the most well-known local products is cotton, and there is a prominent cotton factory.<sup>8</sup> There is an industrial zone nurturing small and medium enterprises, which fills a gap in the economic development of Myanmar. There are several private banks that provide financial transactions and assistance for the public. During the current political transition in Myanmar, the city of Meikhtilar is seen as a good place to establish various kinds of businesses, and the economy of the city is growing. The fresh graduates from various universities are eager to find jobs as well as acquire entrepreneurship skills by establishing their businesses. This is evidenced in the many newly opened shops for mobile phones and IT which are currently in demand now that

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<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> The history of Meikhtilar township published in 2014, written by U Htun Lwin, and got National Literature Award.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

the price of SIM cards has dropped down significantly, allowing people to afford private ownership of mobile networks recently permitted by the elected civilian government of 2011 led by the President Thein Sein. All in all, Meikhtilar is known to be a good city for business and economic development.

### **4.3 Activation of Anti-Muslim Violence in Meikhtilar (March 20-22, 2013)**

There was a gold shop (goldsmith) at the Meikhtilar market's Eastern line, and the gold shop (New Wait Sein) was owned by "U Tun Tun Oo" and "Daw Myint Myint Aye." On 20 March 2013, "U Khin Maung Win" and his wife; "Daw Aye Aye Naing," and their friend; 'Daw Nyo Than' came to the gold shop named "New Wait Sein Gold Shop" to sell "a golden hairpin" at 9:00 AM in the morning. After testing "a golden hairpin" at the Goldsmith, gold shop owners clashed with customers. It is of interest to note that a mob of approximately 60 people immediately rallied in front of the gold shop during a clash. At 11:30 AM, police officers from the No (2) Police station in Meikhtilar arrested the gold shop owner, his wife and an employee and took them to the police station. At that time, the mob was over 100 people, and they also came to the police station. In Meikhtilar and on social media, a rumor was spread that Daw Aye Aye Naing passed away at the hospital and she was a mother of a Buddhist monk. A mob of an estimated 300 people then appeared in front of the gold shop and destroyed it, a four-story building, along with two other three-story gold shop building.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Interview with a Buddhist man who has been working as a political activist since 1988 in Meikhtilar, and he is also a witness of the event.

A witness described how the mob not only attacked gold shops but also looted gold, money, and other items. In this study, dozens of movies and 100 of photos<sup>10</sup> were documented by eye witnesses. Analyzing these movies and photos, the mob's destruction of the three gold shops is clear. In fact, the shops were looted right in front of police officers. Police officers stood near by the incident and watched without taking any measures to stop the mob during the incident. This failure of law enforcement, in which police officers did not protect citizens and their property, signifies a violation of the 2008 constitution and international human rights standards. One eyewitness recounted, "Around 4:00 PM on 20 March 2013, a Buddhist monk named U Thawbeta from Moe Kaung monastery in Hanzar village from Tharzi Township, was murdered by some Muslims near the bus station of Meikhtilar. This situation instigated the violence against Muslims in Meikhtilar."<sup>11</sup>

Interestingly, another narrator recounted that "before the Buddhist monk was killed, the Myo-Oo Mosque was set the fire at 3:00 PM on 20 March 2013. Yes, the Myo-Oo Mosque was burnt first. After the gold shop was destroyed... most of it was demolished by 12 or 1 PM. One Muslim was beaten up. There, a group of monks came in a red double cab, put down their sticks, and encouraged the rioters. There were two witnesses, known KMA and MSWS who were taking photos. "A" came and stopped them saying, 'You two don't take photos. Go away. If you don't listen to me, you'll get beaten up.' He said it plainly."<sup>12</sup>

Another eye witness of the incident testified that "What I mean is before a monk was killed, they set the fire to Myo-Oo Mosque. After that, they burnt down the Muslim tea shop which was situated next to the Thiri-Mingalar Mosque. Until then, the monk hadn't been killed."<sup>13</sup>

Another eye witness of the incident testified that "The Meikhtilar violence started simply. The gold seller and the gold shop owner had an argument, didn't reach agreement on the price, and got into a fight. Who started the fight... since it happened

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<sup>10</sup> Photos and Videos collected from the field trip to Meikhtilar are at the hand of researcher for analyzing them to understand what, when, where, and how violations happened.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Interview with a Muslim man who is from Meikhtilar and he is an eye witness to the incident.

<sup>13</sup> Interview with a Muslim political and social activist who also helped victims and IDPs after the violence, and he is also an eye witness of the incident.

in the shop, one side may have said words which provoked anger, and the other side may have reacted physically in anger. One thing for sure is that there was some hitting. Then, an old woman had come along with the two gold sellers. She is known to be the mother of a monk in a village in Meikhtilar. When the woman saw the hitting, she fainted. Based on her faint, it was uploaded on Facebook (Social-Media) that the monk's mother had died, which was a false rumor. Later, the crowd destroyed the gold shop. The crowd also destroyed the Muslim-owned shops nearby. The authorities could have controlled the situation in time, but they didn't. Only they will know whether they were waiting for an order or they let things happen on purpose. When the situation worsened, and the people started destroying houses, the case was almost finished in the afternoon. In that situation, a monk from a village in Meikhtilar Township came to Meikhtilar to buy some necessary things. We could say that situation was the fate of Meikhtilar. Four or five people from the Mosque came out, pulled the monk down from the motorcycle, hit him, poured petrol on him and set the fire. This happened. In that situation, not only the Meikhtilar public but also the monks and the Buddhists in the whole country went out of control. Their mind controlled their physical actions, and so they set the fire and killed people. These happenings led to the biggest incident in Meikhtilar.”<sup>14</sup>

Another eye witness of the event testified that “It all started from a mistake in trading. From that... the owner of the building rents out the room to the gold shop owner. So, when the problem occurred, they may have had some grudge regarding business before... these days there is a lot of competition in business. Politically, the government almost lets the public starve. So, youths these days do not learn well and are not so polite. The government has been ignoring everything for years. Under the military rule, the people in this country have to struggle for food and clothing, and so they can't learn well and lack knowledge and politeness. Since they were made to lack such things, they are easily tricked. If we look at it inadvertently, it will be seen as a religious conflict. But, we don't see it like that. I see it in such a way that it is just a caption in their project which will be carried out without fail regarding the religion, or economy or social affairs. This is because the situation could have been controlled if

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<sup>14</sup> Interview with a Buddhist man who is from Meikhtilar and was an eye witness to the incident.

they had decided fairly, quickly, and exactly according to law and had controlled the riot so that it would not grow since the beginning of the riot. But, they let it happen on purpose with a trick. That's how I see it. If the authorities had controlled the situation, there is no reason that it would get that worse. The citizens suffer because of their trick. They have lots of plans like Plan A, Plan B, Plan C and so on.”<sup>15</sup>

Another narrator reported that “A monk was killed and Buddhists got angry after some disputes at the gold shop between Muslim gold shop owner and the Buddhist customer. The murder of a Buddhist monk provoked Buddhists to kill Muslims and burn down their houses and religious buildings in Meikhtilar. As a result, over 100 Muslims were massacred including 40 Muslim students plus their teachers at an Islamic school. The problem for determining the exact death toll is that the local authorities did not allow the dead bodies to be buried. So, the estimated death toll is over 100 Muslims. The killing of Muslims and burning of their houses and religious buildings happened right in front of U Wirathu after he delivered a speech full of anti-Muslim hate in Meikhtilar. He was in Meikhtilar on 20 March with prominent members of the 1988 student movement including well-known leader Ko Min Ko Naing. The murder of the Buddhist monk caused Buddhists killing Muslims and burning down their houses in frenzy, and appearing as though they were losing their minds.”<sup>16</sup>

Another narrator reported that “The violence was started after some disputes at the gold shop on 20 March 2013. When Buddhists heard about a dispute between the gold shop owner and the Buddhist customer, a group of people assembled near by the gold shop. After a dispute at the gold shop was solved, that group was mobilized and active to riot Muslims and their houses nearby them (mob) in Meikhtilar. At that time, the dispute between the Muslim gold shop owner and his Buddhist customer was already over. The dispute was over unpleasant business between the gold shop owner and the customer. In the evening of 20 March 2013, a monk was murdered near by the Da Hat Tan Mosque when he and his fellow drove a

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<sup>15</sup> Interview with a Buddhist Monk who is a head of Monastery in Meikhtilar and saved 4,000 of Muslim lives at his monastery during the violence. He is also a winner of “LawKaTharRa” Prize given to those who serve the public good.

<sup>16</sup> Interview with a Muslim businessman who was working on inter-faith peace and helped IDPs for humanitarian assistance after the violence.

motorbike into the Muslim mob. The murder of a Buddhist monk mobilized and activated the Buddhists to riot. The quarreling and dispute at the gold shop between the Muslim shop owner and Buddhist customer generated and mobilized Buddhist people to gather near by the gold shop. However, it wasn't a trigger to start the violence. The killing of the Buddhist monk was the real trigger that started the rioting. No one knows why a monk and his fellow drove a motor bike to where Muslims were gathered at Da-Hat-Tan Mosque to protect it.”<sup>17</sup>

Another eyewitness described a scene with person's unknown to the community committing seemingly premeditated arson. This witness reports that "The Buddhist group set the fire to the houses in the street. Then, at night, monks came along when the firefighters came to put out the fire because they were afraid that the Muslims would beat the firefighters. But, there was no one else in the quarter. Only six of us remained until the last day of the riot. We went out only at 11 AM the next morning. We saw everything including the monk case. We saw who did that. They just arrested whoever they could. The one who hit the monk ran away. The other people just helped him. It was he who hit the monk. When all the other people fled the quarter, only six of us stayed in an upstairs room, looking outside. And we watched it. They came and set the fire. I think they might have something they had prepared to set the fire because it was strange. The buildings caught the fire immediately. They might have something which triggered the fire. The government might have prepared something for them. It was not gas either. If it were gas, we would have heard the noise of the explosion. There was something which looked like a flambeau made from gasoline and coconut. And they shouted orders to one another like "Guys, it is 10:00. Let's go." They even blew the whistle. Only a few of them were residents. We didn't know the others at all. They were strangers. We'd heard some news they took some men from villages like Nyaung Yan by saying they'd give them money. Some Buddhists cry and talk about it when their family members don't come back. There are some Buddhists who died too. They died while setting the fire because they lost the way and there was the shortage of oxygen. Many people don't know about that. Not even the residents of Meikhtilar. They might think I'm crazy when I say such things.

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<sup>17</sup> Interview with an Islamic scholar and a former Government teacher who lived in Meikhtilar for 15 years.

But I learned about it while talking to the Moazen at the cemetery. He told me that about Buddhists died. There were also a dozen Buddhists' bodies which were found when the houses were dug up with bulldozers or cleaned after the fire. I don't know why. They hold a grudge against this quarter a lot. It's the truth. Most of the people were not there in the quarter during the incident. We remained here until the end. We saw who did what, how many people died."<sup>18</sup>

Another witness suspected that the military might have been operating under orders to allow the violence to escalate to a certain level. He testified that "Another thing is the regiments which were sent there (to Meikhtilar). Those who came here were between Unit (601) and (610). From near Phoo Gyi...this is near Hmawbi, Yangon. There were ten regiments. They are special units for defeating terrorism in Myanmar. That time, they were not told anything. The battalion commander was one of my school mates from Meikhtilar. So, when I saw him, he told me that they were only told which way to go. They came to realize that they were heading towards Meikhtilar only when they came near it. Another point is that a three-star army officer and a three-star official and a corporal were counting dead bodies. So, I wonder if they had any orders about that. Were there any orders such as they would take control only when 100 or 200 people were dead? If they had, were they letting violence happen to reach their target?"<sup>19</sup>

Regarding the question of what instigated the violence, there were two competing narratives from both Muslim and Buddhist communities. Buddhist narrators told that the outbreak of violence was instigated right after the murder of the Buddhist monk. Narratives from Muslims show that the violence had in fact already started before the murder. Analyzing photos and videos from eye witnesses and both communities, the nationalist Buddhist mob was already organized before the murdered of a monk. They already destroyed three gold shops and buildings in the morning and were ready for next steps. One key question here is whether or not the violence could have been prevented by the law enforcement agencies in Meikhtilar. One narrator testified that "I think they wanted it to get more... what shall I say? I think they had

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<sup>18</sup> Interview with a Muslim who witnessed the event in Meikhtilar.

<sup>19</sup> Interview with a Buddhist man who has been working as a political activist since 1988 in Meikhtilar and is also a witness of the event.

planned it in advance. The situation could have been prevented from getting worse. But they didn't stop it, and they made it continue. In spite of the presence of all the authorities-township administrator (Ma-Ya-Ka) and district administrator (Kha-Ya-Ka), the chaos went on. It could have been stopped. But they didn't do so."<sup>20</sup> According to photo and video evidence, police officers did not attempt to stop or crack down the mob by any means. Clearly, they remained watching it and let it happen right in front of their eyes. Almost all of narrators from both communities believe that the violence against the Muslim in Meikhtilar could have been prevented, but the authorities and law enforcements flunked to counteract the ultra-nationalistic mob. Unfortunately, this study could not reach any authorities and officers from law enforcement agencies to obtain their perspectives. This study is instead based on collected narratives from both Muslim and Buddhist communities.

#### **4.4 People's Perception of What Caused the Violence in Meikhtilar**

People's perception of what caused the violence in Meikhtilar varies between the Muslim and Buddhist communities based on various issues. One narrator articulated that "I once went to Industrial Zone to take wood, and there was a surprise check near "Taw-Win." So, I drove into the lane beside the cemetery and saw a '969' car coming... a light truck... and my car happened to scratch that car. I didn't have a beard, but since I looked like a Muslim, they put me into trouble. They stopped my car and said that I couldn't go. I had to tell them that I'd solve this problem. Later, I had to go back home, get some money from my relatives and had to give it to them. So, I brought a guy. He took me on his motorcycle. When they saw him, a Muslim who looked a bit like a Buddhist, they said they would ask for only 10,000 kyats since they were 'Buddhist fellows and the problem were solved. If they had known we were Muslims, that problem wouldn't have been solved."<sup>21</sup> The emergence of '969' movement in Meikhtilar, the anti-Muslim movement, and campaign, had a significant impact on the life of Muslims; accordingly, similar narratives have been repeated by

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Interview with a Muslim man who is from Meikhtilar and he is an eye witness of the incident.

various Muslim narrators in this study. A Since the emergence of the '969' movement in Meikhtilar, there have been various forms of communal tensions based on social discrimination and double standards of the law and its implementation. The '969' movement is the major process to activate the anti-Muslim violence in Meihtilar.

A female Muslim narrator stated that “My husband also experienced like that once. When he was about to return to his home, a tractor driven by a Buddhist hit his car from behind, and the tractor turned over. So, the Buddhist said he’d punch him, and people gathered around them. And false news spread that the Buddhists had surrounded my home, etc. But, it wasn’t that serious. But those involved in such cases are some of my friends. The tractor had buckets of petrol on it. When we arrived at the police station together with our family members, we explained to them that our car was on the right track. It was their car that lost control and hit the front of our car. They hit our car, turned over, and there were six bottles of petrol and five buckets of it. We talked about it at the police station. After hitting our car, since my husband grew a beard, the driver got out of the tractor, kicked our car, and hit it with his helmet. The car lights got broken. He also intended to hit my husband. He was only about the age of our son. My husband was 60 years old. He pulled my husband’s beard, and then those near us said, “Hey, man! You’re wrong. They turned on their indicator. It hasn’t even been turned off. And you’re wrong to hit an elder person.” A neighbor stepped in and told my husband to go into a shop nearby and that they’d solve the problem. The owner was our friend--we bought petrol from their shop. He was also a Buddhist. The policemen were Buddhists, so they wanted to discriminate against us. And the other people wanted to threaten us by saying they would bring this monk and that monk. At last, I brought the well-known people in our city and solved the problem between us, but the police tried to prolong it. I think the police are never good people from the time we were born until now. Although there were no casualties and the two drivers gained understanding between them, the police kept our car at the station for about 15 days. The police officer reported the case to the court by acting as the complainant. We had to spend a lot of money. The case was negligible. Violating Act (279) demands only 1,000 kyats as fine. But, as you know, there were costs at the court, lawyer fees, and also bribes to give to law officials and the judge. At the station, our car was kept for 15 days while the Buddhist’s tractor could be taken out during the night of the incident.

So, laws are ambiguous-they have one practice for the Muslims and the other for the Buddhists. Finally, the Muslims dare not go out with a beard.”<sup>22</sup> This testimony demonstrates that Muslims in Meikhtilar had faced the harassment made by the locally mobilized religious extremists.

According to the narrative above, double standards of law and their implementation towards Muslims in Meikhtilar showed that legal abuses committed by the police officers and judicial harassment towards Muslims were seen as justifiable even before the 2013 anti-Muslim violence. This situation would be considered as the enormous impacts of the emergence of '969' movement that enhanced anti-Muslim campaign which has been camouflaged with the Buddhist's collectivization and protection of “Race, Religion, and Motherland” by the ultra-nationalists. Evidently, some Muslims in Meikhtilar have been visibly persecuted right after the rise of '969' anti-Muslim campaign. No concrete, tangible legal measures have been exercised to counteract the '969' anti-Muslim campaign that enabled the nationalist movement to persecute the minority Muslim of the country.

The same narrator continued that “that’s why we had to tell the young people doing Dawat and Tablik activities to take off their long shirts when they go on motorcycles. If they want to wear them, they can wear them at the Mosque. When they leave the Mosque, they should take them off again. I shared knowledge as much as I could to them as I also took part in interfaith events. Some people don’t listen to us while others do. We had to talk some stubborn people into it with great effort. These days, they take more care. But, they still wear such costumes. As far as we know, Islam is a very peaceful religion. If we want to follow Sharia rules, we can pray if we wear a long-sleeved shirt and a longyi which reaches under our knees. Wearing other costumes different from our culture may lead people to think that we are part of the ISIS group. But they do not avoid such things. So, we had to tell Muslims not to wear such costumes. That’s why if we see Muslims in such costumes, and women wearing burkhas, we ask them to take them off. Wearing a hat does not cause much trouble. The main thing is the Kurtha- a long dress shirt common in India - I don’t think we need that in Myanmar. We have basic religious knowledge. When we discuss this

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<sup>22</sup> Interview with a Muslim woman who is from Meikhtilar, and she is also an eye witness to the event.

issue with our mentors, some say we don't need to wear them while others say we do. Since they are also followers of their mentors, I think there may be some mistakes in their assumptions."<sup>23</sup>

The Islamic missionary practices known as "Tabilik" have increased in Meikhtilar in recent years, which exacerbated Buddhists' fear of Muslims. Rumors and doubt played a critical role in the production of fear, hatred, and insecurity. Wearing Arabic cultural style of dress is seen as mimicking the appearance of terrorists from the public news and journals in Myanmar, in which Buddhist society has been perceived as under threat. This has encouraged Buddhists to get involved with the anti-Muslim campaign under the ultra-nationalist movement.

One narrator articulated that "The violence against Muslims in Meikhtilar did not occur spontaneously and the violence against the Muslims is not about inter-communal violence. The violence towards Muslims in Meikhtilar was organized and collective. In Meikhtilar, the Tabalik movement in the Muslim community had been increasing and holding various religious activities before the violence. Some Mosques had been repaired and expanded by wealthy Muslims. Those religious activities from Muslims generated some doubts and fear towards Buddhist community. Both communities were segregated. Muslims who lived on the main street of Meikhtilar became successful in business, and their community's economy had been thriving. Along with the Muslims' business development, they maintained and repaired Mosques in Meikhtilar. That was one of the reasons which generated jealousy amongst the local Buddhists. Business development among Muslim community also created jealousy for the local Buddhists in Meikhtilar. There have been several street fights between Buddhist and Muslims among youths and some adults. It is not about religious conflict between Buddhists and Muslims. This friction can be considered as a potential precursor to conflict to produce the massive violence against the Muslims. In 2010, the government ordered all cemeteries to be relocated and shut down all the old cemeteries while setting up new ones. However, Muslim businessmen and leaders from the Muslim community bribed the government authorities for getting permission for the old Muslim cemetery to still be used. That also generated jealousy for the

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

Buddhist community. In Meikhtilar, there was an old Turkish military cemetery from World War II. When the Turkish embassy asked Myanmar to repair and maintain it, local Buddhists from Meikhtilar were angry."<sup>24</sup>

“So, a number of factors combined to create the political preconditions for the tension and outbreak of violence: Muslims’ business development, the friction and street fights between Buddhists and Muslims, the Muslim community’s carrying out of various religious activities, bribes of government authorities to prevent moving Muslim cemetery to new place, repairing and maintaining old Turkish military cemetery, and spreading of fearful and hate speech from Buddhist monks. One week before the violence and rioting occurred, Wirathu traveled to Meikhtilar to deliver a public hate speech that encouraged Buddhists to take action against the Muslims. After just one week, the violence against Muslims took place in Meikhtilar.”<sup>25</sup>

The same narrator claimed that “During the violence, no police or military forces came to prevent the rioting and violence towards Muslims in Meikhtilar. Destroying Mosques and Islamic-schools showed us that Muslims in this country have no security and no protection from the government as well as from the Buddhist community. After Mosques, Islamic-schools, houses were burned down, but authorities did not grant or give permission to rebuild them. This situation showed us that we did not have religious freedom in this country. Without government permission, Muslims cannot rebuild their houses, Islamic schools, and Mosques. Destroying religious buildings and Muslims’ houses is a mechanism to oppress religious minority from the religious majority. The violence against Muslims happened in several places in Myanmar. That violence seems to me like it is systematic and organized to oppress Muslims. That violence should be controlled and cracked down. What I mean is that nobody can do any activities lawful or unlawful without government permission in Myanmar.”<sup>26</sup> This testimony shows that the military and the State oversee any political and social movement in Myanmar but they did not intentionally prevent the anti-Muslim violence outbreak in Meikhtila.

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<sup>24</sup> Interview with a Muslim businessman who was working on inter-faith and helped IDPs for humanitarian assistance after the violence.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

The same narrator went on to state that “Anti-Muslim sentiment has spread along with rumors and hate speech that Muslims can officially get married to four wives. There is a perception that Muslims aim to marry Buddhist girls to convert entire Buddhist communities, eventually rendering Myanmar an Islamic country. The number '786' is feared to refer to Muslims changing Myanmar into an Islamic country within 21 centuries. The '969' Movement encourages Buddhists to do business among Buddhists, not with Muslims. When Muslims gain business growth, the '969' leaders tell people that Muslims enslave Buddhists to work at their shops or businesses, so Buddhists need to prevent it. In the history of pre-colonial Myanmar Kingdom, Muslims had no problems with Buddhists. We lived together under one king and one nation. After British colony, Burma received so-called Kalar immigrants - Indian natives. During British colonial times, the "Kalar" had a good relationship with British officials to conduct business activities, and they worked for British. In this regard, Burmese Buddhists hate Kalars for their affiliation with the colonial rulers. During British colonial times, there were Kalar-Bamar conflicts not because of religion, just because of employment opportunity.”<sup>27</sup>

It is worthwhile to further examine the role of hate speech in instigating conflict. One important role of hate-speech is to create rumors that intentionally mischaracterize Islam or Islamic-teachings. Another function of hate speech is to purposely reference history and historical trauma to legitimate ultra-nationalist arguments and ideology to mobilize Buddhists. These uses of hate speech contribute to the manufacture of the Buddhist nationalists' political project based on the anti-Muslim sentiment in Myanmar. Manufacturing the '969' movement is the process of institutionalized anti-Muslim sentiment to activate the anti-Muslim riot in Meikhtilar.

The same narrator remarked that “from the socialist regime to present, the anti-Muslim agenda from the government suggested that a slow genocide of Rohingya was happening and the Rohingya were discriminated to get their citizenship in Myanmar, even though their whole families had lived here for countless generations. During the socialist regime, General Ne Win enacted 1982 citizenship law that excludes Rohingya ethnic from '135' official ethnicity list. That 1982 citizenship law is

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

enacted because of the idea of protecting the Buddhist race and advocating for the purification of ethnicity or blood line based on race. The Rakhine-Rohingya issue is itself also rooted in anti-Muslim sentiment. The main reason for this is that Rakhine Buddhist monks gained elite positions at Buddhist monasteries and institutions. They organized and spread anti-Muslim hatred and sentiment by using their positions. In Burmese Buddhist tradition, “Buddha, Dhamma, and Monk” – the three pillars of the religion – are each granted the same high, sacred status. When religious Buddhist monks spread anti-Muslim sentiment and hatred, many people believed the ideologies and arguments they put forth in their preaching and speeches. Most nationalistic Buddhist monks delivered anti-Muslim speech embedded within their religious Dhamma talks (Buddhist teachings). At these public Dhamma talks, the monks carried out anti-Muslim hate speech by mischaracterizing Islamic teachings in an inflammatory and fear mongering way. At the same time, a lot of Rakhine people hold high positions within various media outlets. Since the Rakhine-Rohingya conflict in 2012, the Rakhine who work at various media circulated and published anti-Muslim hate speech in the different journals and mainstream media. On this point, the government failed in its obligation to take action to stop the circulation of anti-Muslim hate speech appearing on the news and mainstream media. Some journal articles even mobilized Buddhists to kill Muslims in Myanmar, claiming that no more Muslims should be allowed to live in the country. It is a terrible situation; what this country’s Muslims are facing right now. We want religious pluralism and government needs to protect their citizens under the existing law.”<sup>28</sup>

Legalized discrimination under the 1982 Citizenship Law oppressed the minority Muslims to be a second-class citizen in Myanmar. In this point, protection of the second-class citizen from being violated by the violent mob refers to less obliged than protecting majority Buddhists in the understanding of the Thein Sein regime. Buddhist-monks and Buddhist-religious-institution played a great role in mobilization and collectivization of the anti-Muslim campaign. Hatemongers published anti-Muslim ideologies and stories on mainstream media to enhance nationalist movement to have public support. Quotes from powerful hatemongers including Buddhist monks

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

and elite nationalist politicians have been disseminated on social media, mainstream media, and pamphlets that enabled the momentum of the nationalist movement and anti-Muslim campaign. The government's non-fulfillment of its duty to protect Muslim-citizens produced a culture of impunity which has encouraged perpetrators to violate the minority Muslims in Myanmar. After the emergence of the '969' Movement in Meikhtilar, local nationalists played nationalistic songs which provoked hatred at a donation ceremony instead of usual donation songs which was local mobilization to increase anti-Muslim campaign. According to the Brass's IRS, the anti-Muslim rioting in India is activated under the intense Hindu nationalist movement.

One interviewee commented that "Myanmar Muslims have been living here for about 1,000 years for now. As far as I know, they started to arrive here since the establishment of the Second or Third Myanmar Nation. So, as time goes by, the way Muslims dress have changed over time. Especially, Muslims are accused of being similar to terrorists because of their way of dressing, especially the Middle East style clothes. Muslims are notorious for terrorism, and here in Myanmar because of their way of dressing, Buddhists accuse them of being the terrorists-to-be even if they are not terrorists right now. The Muslims also don't dress properly. So, when the government itself, religious leaders, and political leaders talk about this, the public become serious about it. Regarding the laws, it is not uniform as it discriminates Muslims. Since the Buddhists are not punished by the law, they assume they can do whatever they like, and they want to treat Muslims badly."<sup>29</sup>

A narrator referred to a long history of Myanmar-Muslims in the second and third dynasty under Myanmar kings. In the eyes of nationalists, Muslims' sense of belonging is tied to their cultural identity and way of dressing. After the rise of the "Tabilik" movement in Myanmar, the way of Muslim's dressing and cultural identity changed to look more like Arabic culture or Middle-East style. In this point, ultra-nationalists had an opportunity to claim that the cultural identity of Buddhists has been intimidated because of Muslims' enculturation toward assimilating Arabic culture into Myanmar. This claim is addressing the issue of cultural identity that the promotion of the anti-Muslim sentiment has required to construct the "Threat" towards the

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<sup>29</sup> Interview with a Muslim political activist, who is a member of NLD Meikhtilar township and who also worked for By-Election Wining Campaign for NLD.

Buddhists in Myanmar. When the irrational-fear is fully constructed by the anti-Muslim movement, the preparation of anti-Muslim violence is readiness to activate the rioting.

A Buddhist interviewee reported that “In our quarter Chan Aye, we heard that something would happen on 19 March... like bringing down buildings. Here, chaos happened only on 23 March. We had been living in villages since 19 March. So, Muslims asked us not to live there. We had co-existed for long, and there weren’t any problems between us. So, they said they would look after us. But, on 23 March, outsiders who were neither Muslims nor Buddhist residents of our quarter arrived and set the fire. So, those living in Chan Aye faced quite a loss. They had the great loss in the economy as well as social affairs.”<sup>30</sup> This eyewitness testifies that he has seen "outsiders" are not from Meikhtilar but no eyewitness knows who they are and where they are from. This is the big question for Meikhtilar people that leads to argue the anti-Muslim violence was organized by the extremists, and ignored by the State.

In this study, various narrators articulated that they had seen outsiders, who were neither Muslim nor Buddhist residents of Meikhtilar, who destroyed and burned down the buildings. They came from somewhere else, but no one exactly knew who they were, or where they came from. But eyewitnesses of the event reported that they looked like well-trained, not like normal people. Supposedly, a lot of native people from Meikhtilar believed that they were from the military. Also, various interviewees reported that they heard rumors saying that there would be an instigation of violence on 19 March 2013, though the actual violence was incited on 20 March 2013.

One Muslim interviewee commented that “So, before this case, there was some spark. There was some arrangement to put up a marble plate at Turkey Mosque. The Turkish diplomats came to the Mosque, made some agreements with Present Thein Sein, and then necessary things were done. About one month after the incident, during which period people submitted letters, and didn’t think well of others, they said such things as Turkey shouldn’t have done like this, and some said it should have. It

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<sup>30</sup> Interview with a Buddhist woman who was a victim of violence that her house was burned down during the violence and she was also a witness of the event.

was the beginning of instability, and when the gold shop incident happened, it all burst out.”<sup>31</sup>

Some Muslim narrators believed that the situation of Turkish diplomats repairing the Turkish Mosque and graveyard in Meikhtilar supported the '969' Movement to foster the anti-Muslim campaign. Local Buddhists from Meikhtilar distributed a letter which had rejected the repairing of the Turkish Mosque and graveyard. It was indeed a sign of fear and insecurity from local Buddhists when '969' leaders stimulated the situation to foster the anti-Muslim campaign in Meikhtilar. Circulation of anti-Muslim pamphlets and rumors played a great role to create more tensions and misinformation to instigate the anti-Muslim violence.

The same speaker continued to say that “Then, I saw something strange. I was there on the bridge when the incident happened. At that time, in my view, someone ran up the bridge. I was in the middle of it. I was on a motorcycle with another person on the backseat. We were going to see Seekhongyi. Then, a person ran up the bridge with five people running after him. They were holding sticks to hit him. As far as I remember, I had a beard and whiskers. And my beard was long since I hadn't shaved it for a while. And I thought I was in trouble. I thought I'd also be beaten up. The person running at the front pushed my motorcycle. The person sitting behind me was thrown away and fell onto a nearby bush. I held my ground, and so he couldn't push me and ran past me. What surprised me was that although those five people tried to hit the person, they missed him. I always talk about that. If so, people were killed easily. But how? Which plan did they have? It's politically involved. The five people were ordinary people. I know they're from "Oat-Kyinn." But they missed the man in trying to hit him. It's not easy to kill a man. It's not easy in reality because I went to "Oat-Kyinn" the next day and asked them questions. I asked them about the case of fire break-out. The people from "Oat-Kyinn" came towards me and asked 'What do you want to say? What do you want to ask?' I asked them about the whole process. I asked them what the other people had done and what they had prepared. When I asked them if they had any evidence about that, they said they didn't. 'Is there any evidence that the other people had piled bricks or collected knives?' 'No, there

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<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

isn't.' If so, I asked them what they'd do. They said they didn't want to co-exist. When they said so, I asked them what I was supposed to tell the government without any evidence. They didn't want to co-exist because they were afraid. Another thing is I asked them why they set the fire. They replied they didn't do it. When they negotiated, they went there with monks. They said they didn't set the fire. They went there to destroy the Mosque. But while they were demolishing the Mosque, somebody came and set the fire to it. They didn't know who he was, and couldn't catch up with him either when he ran away."<sup>32</sup>

The above testimony is noteworthy in the sense that '969' nationalists in Meikhtilar persuaded people from Oat Kyinn, not to co-exist in their neighborhoods. In this study, almost all of narrators from Meikhtilar claimed that they have seen a lot of strangers who they have never seen them before but those strangers set the fire to Muslims' houses, and destroyed the Mosques during the violence outbreak. A few days before the outburst of anti-Muslim violence, a letter included such information that the Buddhists were being bullied in Meikhtilar, was circulated among "Ma-Ba-Tha" monasteries and their supporters which were a kick-off to mobilize the nationalist Buddhists to take action against the Muslims in Meikhtilar.

One narrator states that "They had some implementation plans. About six or seven months before the case (violence outbreak), they asked for the list of people from Muslim families in Meikhtilar. They made a list of males and females and stuck it in our homes. They choose the Muslim houses only."<sup>33</sup> According to this narrative, members of "Ma-Ba-Tha" in Meikhtilar collected the information of Muslim population and households before the violence outbreak. Before the instigation of anti-Muslim riot, members of "Ma-Ba-Tha" in Meikhtilar prepared and planned it well enough.

One Buddhist monk states that "When the Meikhtilar case started, it was simple. The problem grew bigger because it was not stopped in time. To create this religious conflict...I think you remember that there was a Human Rights Forum held here in December 2012. A monk came to me and talked to me after that forum. He

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Interview with a Muslim man who lost his son during the violence outbreak in Meikhtilar.

told me about a statement which came from the conference of a particular party that they have prepared to create a religious conflict for 2015. But, we didn't hope for this because there was a three-year gap between 2012 and 2015. We didn't think such a thing would happen this quickly. But, such a thing happened in Meikhtilar so quickly. From what people know, and by considering the events, the people from the whole country know and understand that there is a powerful organization to use the religious conflict systematically from behind. But, it's very difficult to show particular evidence."<sup>34</sup> There is no strong evidence that who are backing "MaBaTha" and funding their activities. However, some facts have corroborated the relationship between the ruling party USDP (2010-2015) and "Ma-Ba-Tha."

One narrator states that "After the violence in Meikhtilar, the army came and asked us what effect we had when the army arrived. Personally, in a new democratic nation, since the role of army has shrunk in the Army-Public relationship due to transparency and cease-fire agreements, I think the army wants us to see them as being good at defeating terrorism. They asked 'How was the Army?' At that time, they asked us five questions. They included 'What benefits do you get when the army arrives in Meikhtilar?', 'What do you think of the arrival of the army?' And whether we like their arrival or not. So, I said 'It's good that the army arrived during the chaos, but there's one thing. We are afraid of the big weapons. So, don't stay here long. Go back.' At the time, people said that the army was something to rely on, and they should come early. But they had let the chaos and violence go on for a long time. If their intention had been sincere, they could have taken control earlier, and could have gone back. It's that simple. During the case, there were about 200 or 300 policemen. On both sides of the scene, there were about 200 policemen, and there were about 50 or 100 policemen in the middle. Altogether there were about 500 policemen. The people were moving and running among those 500 policemen. That's one-point worth-considering because the police were from the Home Affairs Department which means they were controlled by the army which took care of armed forces. So, we need to think whether the policemen did nothing because they didn't get orders from the army or not. It is said that the chief of the armed forces is the army. So, was it so because

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<sup>34</sup> Interviewed with a Buddhist Monk from Asia Light Foundation in Pyin Oo Lwin.

there was no order from the army? They asked one more thing...I told the battalion commanders 'Did you come here to get hold of the situation or to eliminate evidence?' We think that it's an incident in which the current government and the army balance bower between them. But we had to sacrifice quite a lot. Another thing is if the riots can create a business opportunity for our country. So, we don't know if there are such things as how much international aids will be given to Myanmar when there are a certain number of riots there. That's our thought. There might be such things. The main part I think is that they wanted us to know that the power of the army is above that of the government. They wanted people to want them and know that they were still important. They arrived at such time...when the people were looking forward to them thinking they were essential. It's the same as weakening the civilian government. That's what I think about the case."<sup>35</sup>

People's perception of what causes the violence in Meikhtilar is that it emerged from the '969' Movement in Meikhtilar, which fueled anti-Muslim movement and nationalist mobilization, and distribution of anti-Muslim sentiment, pamphlets, and letters which have been signaling to activate the violence. People believe that this violence could be prevented, but the state security forces did not take any measures against the extremist nationalist mobs in Meikhtilar. Inadequate responses to the gold shop's dispute led to the inciting of violence by nationalist extremists.

#### **4.5 People's Perception of a Culture of Impunity in the Case of Meikhtilar**

One eyewitness described the impunity around the Mekhtilar events: "Right after the violence outbreak in Meikhtilar, there were some criminal cases brought up to the court such as (i) In the case of disagreement and fight at the "New Waint Sein Gold Shop"; the owners of gold shop, Htun Htun Oo, Myint Myint Aye, and employee Nyi Nyi were sentenced to 14 years with hard labor, (ii) In case of murdering a Buddhist monk named "U Thawbeta", Myo Nyunt was sentenced to 17 years, Myo Htun was sentenced to 17 years, Rashi was sentenced to 2 years, Pho Cho

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<sup>35</sup> Interviewed with a Muslim eyewitness in Meikhtilar.

was sentenced to 28 years, Nyi Nyi Naing was sentenced to 7 years, Ahnawa was sentenced to 24 years, and Bajay was sentenced to 2 years, (iii) In the case of murdering a Buddhist named Aung Myat Min, Ah Kyu was sentenced to life imprisonment, Joe Joe was sentenced to 10 years, and Marmad Li was sentenced to 7 years, (iv) In the case of murdering 4 Muslims, Tar Tar Soe was sentenced to 7 years, and (v) In the case of murdering a Muslim, Ko Oo was sentenced to 2 years, Kyaw Swar was sentenced to 8 years, Maung Naing was sentenced to 1 year, Hein Min Zar was sentenced to 9 years, Aung Htun was sentenced to 2 years, Shunkhae was sentenced to 2 years, Aung San Yu was sentenced to 2 years, Myint Soe was sentenced to 2 years, and Lin Lin Aung was sentenced to 1 year."<sup>36</sup>

Analyzing above cases, Muslims were sentenced much higher than Buddhists. These cases lead to the question of impartiality, access to justice, and fair trial standards. Estimates from the Muslim community in Meikhtilar claimed that over 80 Muslims (See Appendix B) were murdered during the anti-Muslim riot and at least 61 people were brutally injured. As many as 12,000 were displaced, and more than 1,000 households and houses were destroyed.<sup>37</sup> The killing of 80 Muslims, burning and destroying of Muslim religious buildings and houses, looting of Muslim property in Meikhtilar, there were a lot of eyewitnesses who witnessed the real perpetrators, but less than a dozen of so-called perpetrators were punished by the law. Over 100 real perpetrators are still out there and going around in the city.<sup>38</sup> This study also opens up for another research to look into the issue of the impartiality, access to justice, and fair trial standards in the case of anti-Muslim violence in Meikhtilar.

A lawyer states that "As for the Buddhist perpetrators, they killed whole families. U Maung Maung, his son, his son-in-law, and grandchild were killed. It was mentioned in journals and broadcast on radio. The monks from Nagayone Monastery and the Buddhists killed people and burnt them. Only one of them was punished by Act 326 which was used for harming somebody seriously...not even 304 or 302. They killed the whole family- four people- and only one of them was sentenced seven years in prison. We got to read the court pleas. The four Muslims who had been killed only

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<sup>36</sup> Interviewed with a lawyer. Also see Ko Tin Hlaing, 2014. Documentary of Meikhtilar Conflict.

<sup>37</sup> The documents received from the Muslim community leaders of Meikhtilar.

<sup>38</sup> Interviewed with a lawyer in Meikhtilar.

one person were sentenced to life imprisonment, 15 years in prison and 10 years in prison. Similarly, in cases where people set the fire, they sentenced their people only six months or one year in prison and the Muslims up to five years in prison, which was the maximum penalty. For example, Nyi Nyi and Ali...they were charged with arson, and they were sentenced five years in prison. And when many fugitives were caught, they released their fellows even at the stage of prosecuting. Provocation was vital, but those who provoked were also released at that stage. For Muslims, there were only two people who were released unconditionally. It was because there were no witnesses who said against them. They accused them of setting the fire to Chan Aye. But they were set free because a Buddhist said they weren't at the scene. Only those two were set free. For the other people, when the verdict was reached, they were given the maximum penalty like five or ten years in prison. There, the injustice was clear. Also, their appeal was never accepted. All our appeals until they reached high court were not considered. There was no one whose punishment was lessened. There was only one way. Maybe they do less time by national-amnesty. Another thing is that the judicial officials were biased in their investigating the cases because of the pressure by "Ma-Ba-Tha." And the wife of a major from Yangon, Daw KTT, she came here and acted as the Deputy District Judge. She wrote very badly of Muslims in her verdicts like the Kalars bullied, the Kalars took advantage of the situation and killed people brutally. And it can be seen that there is Ar Gar Ta or grudge in their verdict instead of the normal perspectives because she was a Buddhist."<sup>39</sup>

One eyewitness testified that "In the statement, it was said that when the two boys were taken out and about to be killed, some people tried to stop them. But the monk himself said, 'Don't you interrupt this. This is a project.' The information was included in the statement. This couldn't have been made up. U Tar's two sons, the footballers, were hidden in a Buddhist's house. When the Buddhists heard the news, they came and asked for them to be taken out...by force. Then, some people interrupted and said, 'The two boys have nothing to do with the case. They are only students- footballers.' Then, the monk said, 'Hey men! Just step back. Killing the Muslims was a project. You just ignore it,' and beat the kids up and burnt them. So,

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

what I mean is the things are included in the court statement until today. But, in spite of this, no monks, until now, have been regarded as fugitives, or taken to court, or arrested concerning the Meikhtilar case. No monk has been punished so far. In the photographs and video files, they are seen to be beating up, killing, setting the fire, provoking, supporting... in spite of all that evidence, none of them has been taken to court. The judicial officials and the police know it. But, as they said the monks are protected according to their project, and this information is kept hidden from the public. And most Buddhist culprits, including those who killed Ma Thin's husband, are back in town now. They also know it, but they don't arrest them. "Ma-Ba-Tha" assumed them as heroes and said they didn't need to be arrested. Here, from that moment until now, '969' and "Ma-Ba-Tha" have done anti-Muslim activities according to U Wirathu's rules and regulations. U Wayama from Waiponela Monastery, the Nagayone monk from Nagayone Monastery, and Waiyanbonemyint from Myolae Monastery- those three monks- and the Shwehmintin monk... those four monks are the most extreme ones and are always opposing Muslims. Until today, whenever a case between a Muslim and a Buddhist is heard at court, the monks from "Ma-Ba-Tha" come, give the Buddhist's batches, and ask those at court...they even question the judge. They do such things until now. Now, if a Buddhist wife and a Muslim husband have a fight and come to court, the monks from "Ma-Ba-Tha" tell the judge to sentence the husband to prison before the verdict is reached. It was just a fight between the couple... the wife was only punched... and they demanded the Muslim to be imprisoned. They had planned for it. That's all."<sup>40</sup>

One eyewitness states that "Later, the police came and asked if we'd like to report the case. Even if we'd like to report the case, at first, frankly speaking, we couldn't take anything back. We had to run for our lives. As for the case, my son was already dead, and we couldn't see him. The witnesses told the police who did what, and the suspects were called for and investigated. Although they looked into the case, they didn't ask the suspects thoroughly. They asked such things as 'Did you see it?' and 'Did you do it?' After that, they released the suspects saying their evidence against them was not reliable and the witness was a child. They did it themselves- with

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

the police as the complainant. At last, we didn't go to hear the case, and the witnesses were sent back by saying there was not enough evidence. We sent about five people as witnesses, and they turned down all of them."<sup>41</sup>

One eyewitness states that "Even if we respond, they do not do much... I mean the policemen. And, about my son's case, about five or six months after the incident, there were uploads on the internet about this case... photos which show he was murdered and burnt at the coach station. But they were not very reliable for the case. But, the police didn't do anything. They didn't even ask us questions again. We didn't do anything either since it was beyond our reach. Nothing will change even if we did something. So, we just prayed to Allah. Even if we did, we don't have enough evidence, and the witnesses no longer dare tell the truth. For us, we don't have the right to do anything as there are not many Muslims living here. Since the police come and take us even if there is a trivial problem, we do not want to go to the police station anymore."<sup>42</sup>

One eyewitness states that "When the Meikhtilar case occurred, I happened to be beside the school. So, I know about the school's case. The doors of the school were broken. And then, three students were taken out of the school and killed. Three students were killed in front of my very own eyes. It's my experience. When I talked about it at the court, it didn't go so well. Even the case of breaking down of the school was not dealt with properly. They put the blame on this person and that one even though the evidence was strong. After the case, our Muslims suffered. I witnessed the incident. There was strong evidence too. But when we prosecuted, the court didn't take it seriously. They were one-sided and biased. They oppressed our side. When we asked for permission to rebuild the destroyed buildings, they didn't do much for us. They gave priority to the other side. They didn't have any mercy on the Muslim side. They sentenced Muslims 20 or 25 years to prison but only 7 years to Buddhists. Those who killed the three students in front of my eyes...they were called for and got scolded. There was nothing serious. It's said that only two people got

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<sup>41</sup> Interviewed a Muslim woman in Meikhtilar.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

sentenced to prison. During the Meikhtilar case, when the students were being chased and killed, they had to shoot the gun to stop this chaos from continuing. Even those people are free now."<sup>43</sup>

One eyewitness states that "They came and asked us to sign. We didn't. We didn't steal anything. We didn't make trouble. Only our things got stolen. I asked them what they'd do about that. And they kept quiet. We feel bad about that. For us, the lawyer even asked us unsuitable questions. They had a lawyer with them. He asked me why I stood for the dead students even though they were not my children. The students were killed in front of the Buddhist adults. But they didn't do anything about it. Those are the things that I feel worst. They were killing kids cruelly. They also destroyed our possessions in front of our very own eyes. They destroyed them at a place very far from the city. Although we prosecuted them with exact and strong evidence, nothing was done seriously or effectively. Those people from nearby villages went out and did such things. There were ten people doing that. We knew them and prosecuted them. But, the court didn't do anything effective. I feel worse about that. I don't mean things that I didn't see. They didn't do anything about the things we knew and saw. The students were killed brutally in front of us. But they didn't do anything serious. I told them how they cut the kids' bodies...even the clothes color of the attacker. They showed many people, and I chose and pointed to the killer saying "This is him!" and telling them his name and how he killed the students. In reality, they didn't do anything."<sup>44</sup>

A lawyer states that "Police officers said the situation was out of control because the Muslims had killed a monk. This is what they have to explain later...to take responsibility. It started like that. What followed the incident is already known I suppose. They showed only dead of 43 people. But according to our list, there were almost 100. We're sure that there were at least 80 or 90 people. So, on that day...that happened on 20 March...on 21 March morning... Mandalay Division Prime Minister Ye Myint was already there. Advocate-General Ye Aung Myint, and Religious Affairs Prime Minister San Sint, who is currently in jail, and the Regional Police Officer were

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<sup>43</sup> Interviewed an eyewitness in Meikhtilar.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

there. Coincidentally, at that time, U Wirathu, Min Ko Naing, and Shwe-Nya-War Monk were also there...there were pictures of them. So, only after the officials arrived, the people from Mingalarzeyyon were killed about 50 of them...in front of their eyes. And it didn't happen during the night but in the daylight. Most people from Mingalarzeyyon who got killed were done so during the day...only 3 or 4 people might have been killed at night. They were killed in front of the police. In my opinion, according to law, if a person is going to harm someone's life, we have the right to even kill the attacker. If a person tortures another person to death, whether the victim is a relative or not, we have the right to kill the attacker to protect the victim. This is not for civil servants or armed forces or the police only. Since the police saw the scene, they had the right to shoot. If they had shot one or two people at that time...even if those were from both sides if both sides got violent, they would have taken control of the situation. And not so many people would have been killed. So, it can be assumed that they let things happen on purpose. I believe so."<sup>45</sup>

#### **4.6 Human Rights Violations during the anti-Muslim Violence Outbreak in Meikhtilar**

Burma 2013 International Religious Freedom Report reports that "There were reports of societal abuses or discrimination based on religious affiliation, belief, or practice. The emergence of the '969' Movement coincided with a series of violent attacks against Muslims, starting with attacks in Meikhtilar, on March 20. The violence in Meikhtilar, sparked by a dispute at a gold shop and exacerbated by the death of a monk, left between 44 and 87 dead, including 32 students at an Islamic boarding school, and destroyed an estimated 1,500 to 2,400 homes, shops, and religious buildings. This violence also displaced approximately 11,000 people, mainly Muslims. Both Muslims and Buddhists remained in IDP camps in Meikhtilar. Local

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<sup>45</sup> Interview with a lawyer in Meikhtilar.

authorities denied Muslim IDPs freedom of movement and reportedly refused to respect claims of Muslim land ownership."<sup>46</sup>

The report goes on to state that "In March, security forces failed to prevent or respond to violence in Meikhtilar that resulted in the deaths of between 44 and 87 persons, overwhelmingly Muslims. Heavy domestic and international criticism of the response by the security forces led to considerable efforts to bolster the ability of these forces to prevent and respond to such incidents, including the president's explicit delegation of authority to regional and state governments to respond to riots, the repositioning of forces in response to early signs of trouble, and quicker, more transparent action to hold perpetrators accountable."<sup>47</sup>

Physicians for Human Rights' paper entitled *Massacre in Central Burma: Muslim Students Terrorized and Killed in Meikhtilar* 2013 reports that a total of 12 Mosques were burned down and destroyed during the outbreak of violence in Meikhtilar. One interviewee states that the 12 Mosques included: "(1) Mingalar-Zayyone Mosque, (2) Jamae Mosque, (3) Myoma Mosque, (4) Bengali Mosque, (5) Nyein-Chan-Yay Mosque, (6) Hmanlone Mosque, (7) Pakistan Mosque, (8) Myo-Oo Mosque, (9) Pyi-Tharyar Mosque, (10) Turkish Mosque, (11) Chan-Aye-Tharyar Mosque, and (12) Nandawgone Mosque. And 3 Islamic Schools are (1) Mingalar-Zayyone Madrassa, (2) Hafiz Manone Madrassa, and (3) Azizia Arabic Institute."<sup>48</sup>

During this study, the researcher collected over 3,000 photos and over 500 video files that were taken during and after the violence in Meikhtilar.<sup>49</sup> 20 in-depth interviews were done to understand various forms of human rights abuses. Analyzing videos, photos, and witnesses' testimony, specific human rights abuses can be categorized, including (1) Violation of Right to Life, (2) Violation of Right to Freedom of Religion, and (3) Violation of Right to Property. Reports from a Muslim community from Meikhtilar allege that a total of 86 Muslims were killed during the violence. They included 15 young male Muslims under 18 years old, 40 male Muslims

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<sup>46</sup> See Burma 2013 International Religious Freedom Report. Available at: <<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/222331.pdf>> [Accessed on 1 Oct 2016].

<sup>47</sup> See Burma 2013 Human Rights Report. Available at: <<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220394.pdf>> [Accessed on 1 Oct 2016].

<sup>48</sup> Interviewed with a Muslim in Meikhtilar.

<sup>49</sup> The photos and videos are at the hand of the researcher.

who were over 18 years old, 2 female Muslims of unknown age, 1 female Muslim who was 33 years old, 1 young girl who was 9 years old, and 30 male Muslims who were of unknown age (See also Appendix B).<sup>50</sup>

#### **4.6.1 Right to Life**

The right to life is realized as the most inalienable right of all human beings. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948) Article (3) states that "Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of person." The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) Article (6) states that "Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No One shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life." The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) Article (6) states that "(1.) States Parties recognize that every child has the inherent right to life. (2.) States Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival and development of the child."

The 2008 Myanmar Constitution of Article (40/b) states that "If there arises, or there is sufficient reason to arise a state of emergency endangering life and property of the people in a Region, State or Self- Administered Area, the Defense Services has the right, in accord with the provisions of this Constitution, to prevent that danger and provide protection."<sup>51</sup> This constitutional provision indicates that the Defense Services have obligations to protect citizens, but they failed to provide protection in Meikhtilar because the victims were Muslims.<sup>52</sup>

In this study, all 20 key informants affirmed that the President Thein Sein Administration had full responsibility to prevent mass atrocity against the Muslims in Meikhtilar. The government's responsibility to ensure its citizens' right to life under International Human Rights Law, International Customary Law, and the 2008 Myanmar Constitution has visibly failed to be fulfilled, respected, and protected.

#### **4.6.2 Right to Freedom of Religion**

This study substantiates the issue of religious persecution towards

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<sup>50</sup> The Document from Muslim Community in Meikhtilar.

<sup>51</sup> See The 2008 Myanmar Constitution.

<sup>52</sup> Interviewed with a Muslim lawyer in Meikhtilar.

Muslims in Meikhtilar, Myanmar, which is equivalent to a violation of the universal human right to freedom of religion. The Article (18) of UDHR (1948) states that "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; this right includes freedom to change his/her religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance."<sup>53</sup> Article (18) of ICCPR (1966) also includes a similar provision. The Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981) Article (6/a) states that "To worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief, and to establish and maintain places for these purposes."<sup>54</sup>

Human Rights Council resolution (6/37)'s (9/e): The Human Rights Council urges States, "To exert the utmost efforts, in accordance with their national legislation and in conformity with international human rights and humanitarian law, to ensure that religious places, sites, shrines, and symbols are fully respected and protected and to take additional measures in cases where they are vulnerable to desecration or destruction;" and (9/g): The Human Rights Council urges States, "To ensure, in particular, the right of all persons to worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief and to establish and maintain places for these purposes [...]."<sup>55</sup> In fact, the right to freedom of religion is not only international law; the 2008 Myanmar Constitution also guarantees religious freedom. Article (34) states that "Every citizen is equally entitled to freedom of conscience, and the right to freely profess and practice religion subject to public order, morality or health and the other provisions of this Constitution."<sup>56</sup> Furthermore, as this study confirms, a total 15 of religious buildings were destroyed during the violence outbreak in Meikhtilar. When this study is conducted, 90% of Meikhtilar's Islamic religious buildings were damaged beyond repair and could not be reopened.

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<sup>53</sup> See The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).

<sup>54</sup> See The 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief.

<sup>55</sup> See Human Rights Council resolution (6/37)

<sup>56</sup> See The 2008 Myanmar Constitution.

### **4.6.3 Right to Property**

The right to property is another fundamental right of all human beings. The 2008 Myanmar Constitution's Article (37/c) states that "The Union: shall permit citizens' right to private property, right to inheritance, right to private initiative and patent by the law." The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) Article (17) states that "(1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his/her property."

The damage to property in Meikhtilar extended far beyond the destruction of religious buildings. This study documents that 920 Muslim buildings were burned down from March 20 to 22 during the outbreak of violence. Muslim leaders from Meikhtilar tried to conduct a survey of the total cost of financial losses to the Muslim community due to being looted and property destruction. But the District and Township Authority exhorted them to stop this survey, and it could not be completed. According to documentation from the Muslim community, an estimated 3,000 families became homeless out of a total population of 30,000 people. This study was conducted fully two years after the violence, but most displaced residents were still unable to reclaim their rights to their land and property in Meikhtilar.

## **CHAPTER V**

### **CONCLUSION**

The entirety of this thesis presents a case of the outbreak of anti-Muslim violence and the subsequent recovery in Meikhtilar, Myanmar. In this study, Brass's institutionalized riot system (IRS)<sup>1</sup> is applied to analyze two elements of anti-Muslim violence: Preparation and Activation. The preparation phase of anti-Muslim violence in Meikhtilar saw the rise of anti-Muslim sentiment and hate speech right before the instigation of actual violence outbreak. Chapter III (Preparation of Anti-Muslim Riot in Meikhtilar, Myanmar) indicates that the current day anti-Muslim sentiment and movement are deeply rooted in the history of pre-independence Burma. The Burmese Buddhist colonial history is a traumatic one, and it is used as a tactic to deepen the contemporary anti-Muslim movement. Under the military regime in Myanmar (1989-2010), the anti-Muslim sentiment was institutionalized through the military and religion (Buddhism). Chapter III also deliberates about the same patterns of instigating anti-Muslim riots in Myanmar such as the anti-Muslim riot in Mandalay (1997) and the anti-Muslim riot in Taungoo (2001). The tactic of hate speech in Chapter III demonstrates that nationalists' collectivization of protecting "Race, Religion, and Mother-Land" from the perceived Muslim threat is the key to foster their anti-Muslim movement in Myanmar.

By analyzing the distribution of texts, the spread of nationalist ideology, and the tactic of contemporary institutionalized anti-Muslim sentiment (such as hate speech, pamphlets, letters, and sermons), it is evident that by itself, anti-Muslim hatred cannot spontaneously create rioting. However, when these actions combine with the gradual manufacturing of a nationalist extremist ideology, the constructing of irrational fear based on the so-called Muslim threat, and the spreading of hate speech towards targeted audiences by powerful speakers, the result in Meikhtilar was that

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<sup>1</sup> See Brass, P., 2003. *The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India*. University of Washington Press.

anti-Muslim violence was readily activated. In this situation, the Preparation phase was jointly conducted by the State (Thein Sein's administration) and nationalist extremists. Visibly, Thein Sein's administration failed to take accountable actions for preventing anti-Muslim movement. "Ma-Ba-Tha" has been established nationwide, and the '969' campaign reaches its grip to almost every part of the country. The protection guaranteed by the "Race and Religion" law was enacted under the USDP majority parliament, which had been targeting Muslims. All these relational corroborations show that Thein Sein's administration has been responsible for the anti-Muslim violence in Meikhtilar, Myanmar.

Chapter IV, A Case Study of Violence and Recovery in Meikhtilar, Myanmar, mainly focuses on the issue of instigating the anti-Muslim violence in Meikhtilar, how the anti-Muslim riot occurred in Meikhtilar in March 2013, people's perceptions of what caused the violence, and also looks into the state's responses to the violence against its own citizens under the state's obligations of the 2008 Constitution and international human rights law. The activation of large-scale anti-Muslim violence in Meikhtilar took place under state sponsorship, and was well organized, most notably in a context of intense Buddhist nationalist extremist mobilization and collectivization of protecting "Race, Religion, and Mother-Land" from a constructed irrational fear of the so-called "Muslim threat," in which anti-Muslim rioting is instigated as a means to unify the support of "Race and Religion" by concentrating on the "Us-Them" binary polarization.

## **Recommendations**

1. The institutionalized anti-Muslim sentiment and hatred should be stopped by the affirmative action of the State, and civil society.
2. Freedom of speech is the fundamental right of all human being, and a value of democratic society. The State's restriction on freedom of speech cannot help the democratic development in Myanmar, but civil society initiative on combating anti-Muslim hate speech is highly recommended.
3. In this study, the rise of anti-Muslim hate speech is the early warning sign of nationalist mobilization and process of activating anti-Muslim violence.

Monitoring hate speech and building civil society network are required to work on early warnings to prevent the anti-Muslim violence in Myanmar.

4. This study demonstrates that law enforcement and security forces are obliged to protect the citizens under the 2008 constitution and international human rights law.

5. This study also suggests that a culture of impunity plays a role in protecting perpetrators of anti-Muslim violence in Meikhtilar; they were never brought to justice yet dozens of Muslims were convicted for their roles.

6. This study also shows that the State has failed to protect citizens and prevent from being violated.

These studies also highly recommend the government of Myanmar should ratify ICCPR to uphold the totality of human rights situations in Myanmar

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## **APENDICES**

## **APPENDIX A**

### **SAMPLE INFORMED CONSENT FROM**

#### **Consent to participate in Research**

**Introduction and Purpose:** My name is Ye Myint Win. I am a graduate student at the Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies at Mahidol University, Bangkok, Thailand. I am doing my thesis paper for my master degree. This study aims to provide better understanding of the inter-communal conflict between nationalist Buddhists and Muslims in Myanmar, to address human rights violations accordance with international legal framework such as CEDAW and CRC which are already ratified, and to be able to understand the rationale, nature and characteristic of the nationalist Buddhists violence against Muslims in order to fortify religious minority rights in Myanmar.

I would like to invite you to participate in my research interview, which concerns violence against Muslims in Meikhtilar.

If you consent to participate in my research and interview, I will conduct an interview with you at a time and location of where you prefer. The interview will involve questions about the violence against Muslims, Anti-Muslim sentiment and the rise of '969' Movement. It may take time about 1 hour. With your permission and consent, I will record and take notes during the interview. The audio recording is to accurately record the information you provide and will be used for transcription purposes only. If you choose not to be audio-recorded, I will take notes for your connivance. If you consent to be audio recoded but feel uncomfortable at any time during the interview, I can turn off the recorder at your request. Or if you don't wish to continue, you can stop the interview at any time.

I aim to conduct only one interview; however, follow-ups may be needed for additional clarification. If so, I would like to contact you by mail or phone for requesting this.

There is no direct benefit to you from participating in this study of violence against Muslims in Meikhtilar. It is aimed that my research will fulfill the all of its objectives above I mentioned.

Your information and data will be handled as confidentially as possible. If results of this research are published or presented, individual names and other personal and identity information will not be used. When the study is completed, I would like to save the records and notes for use in future research done by myself. I would like to keep these for up to 1 year after the research is over.

You are free to reject to take part in this interview. You can reject to answer any questions and are free to stop participating in the interview at any time. Whether or not you choose to participate in the research and whether or not you choose to answer a question for continue participating in the interview; there will be no penalty to you or loss of benefits.

If you have any questions about this research, please feel free to contact me. You can reach me at +66-09860290045 or [yemyint.win@student.mahidol.ac.th](mailto:yemyint.win@student.mahidol.ac.th)

**Consent:**

you will be given a copy of this consent form to keep for your records.

If you wish to participate in this study, please sign and date below.

Participant's Name Participant's Signature, Date -

If you agree to allow your name or other identifying information to be included in all final reports, publications, and presentations resulting from this research, please sign and date below.

Participant's Signature, Date -

### APPENDIX B

## A LIST OF MUSLIMS WHO WERE MURDERED BY THE RIOTERS DURING THE BUDDHIST-MUSLIM RIOT IN MEIKHTILAR, MYANMAR FROM 20TH TO 22ND MARCH 2013.

No	Name	Age	Father Name	Addresses	Family Addresses	Object
1.	Mr. Mohamad Ahli မြတ်ဗျာဗိတလီ(ခ)မတ်စရန်းမင်း	22 years ၂၂ နှစ်	U HerShim ဦးဟာရှင်	Terimngalar State (3) သီရိမင်္ဂလာ၊ နယ်မြေ (၃)	YinTaw School ယင်းတော်ကျောင်း	KyiTawGone Town Die ကျိတော်ကုန်းရပ်ကွက်ထိပ်တွင် ရှုဟိန်းမြစ်သေဆုံး
2.	Mr. Khin Mg Hwe ကျိရွှေမင်း(ခ) ကျိမင်းမောင်ထွေး	50 years ၅၀ နှစ်	U Chei ဦးချေ	Terimngalar State (4) သီရိမင်္ဂလာ၊ နယ်မြေ (၄)	YinTaw School ယင်းတော်ကျောင်း	Died ရှုဟိန်းမြစ်သေဆုံး
3.	Mr. Mohamad Ahli မြတ်ဗျာဗိတလီ	14 years ၁၄ နှစ်	Mohamad Ramazam မိုဟာမဒ်ရမ်ဿာန်	Terimngalar State (1) သီရိမင်္ဂလာ၊ နယ်မြေ (၁)	YinTaw School ယင်းတော်ကျောင်း	MinGalazYon School within Died မင်္ဂလာဇယွန်ကျောင်းတွင် ရှုဟိန်းမြစ်သေဆုံး
4.	Mr. Zaw Htoo ဦးခေတ်စူး	70 years ၇၀ နှစ်	Mr. Sha Hied Ahmad ဦးရှုဟိန်းအိတ်မစ်	Terimngalar သီရိမင်္ဂလာရပ်	YinTaw School ယင်းတော်ကျောင်း	Died ရှုဟိန်းမြစ်သေဆုံး
5.	Htet Ar Kar ကျိအတ်အာကာ(ခ) ကျိတ်ယုတ်ခန်း	17 years ၁၇ နှစ်	Mr. Mying Thein ဦးမြင့်ထိန်း	Terimngalar သီရိမင်္ဂလာရပ်	YinTaw villiages ယင်းတော်ရွာ	MinGalazYon School within Died (student) မင်္ဂလာဇယွန်ကျောင်းတွင် ရှုဟိန်းမြစ်သေဆုံး
6.	Yue Min Khant ဖွေရှုလ်ရွှေအတ် (ဒ်) ယုမင်းခန့်	16years ၁၆ နှစ်	Mr. Shar Ban ဦးရှာဘတ်ခန့်	Terimngalar သီရိမင်္ဂလာ		MinGalazYon School within Died (stddent) မင်္ဂလာဇယွန်ကျောင်းတွင် ရှုဟိန်းမြစ်သေဆုံး
7.	Mr. Than Aung ကျိသန်းအောင်	40 years ၄၀ နှစ်	Mr. Htay Aung ဦးဌေးအောင်	Terimngalar State (B) သီရိမင်္ဂလာ (ခ)ရပ်	Terimngalar State (B) သီရိမင်္ဂလာ (ခ) ရပ်	Taw Win Nan Restaurant Near Died တော်ဝန်နန်းခန်းမရွေတွင် ရှုဟိန်းမြစ်သေဆုံး
8.	Yue Htet Kyaw ကရီးရှုလ်ယုတ် (ခ) နုထက်ကျော်	15 years ၁၅ နှစ်	Mr. Htut Kyaw ဦးထွဋ်ကျော်	Mingalar Zay Yon မင်္ဂလာဇယွန်		MinGalazYon School within Died (student) မင်္ဂလာဇယွန်ကျောင်းတွင် ရှုဟိန်းမြစ်သေဆုံး(ကျောင်းသား)
9.	Mr. Thet Naing Tin အရှုလ်(ဒ်)အလီ (ခ) သတ်နိုင်ထွန်း	21 years ၂၁ နှစ်	Mr. Win Thein ဦးဖိုးတာ (ခ) ဦးဝင်းထိန်း	Terimngalar State (B) သီရိမင်္ဂလာ (ခ)ရပ်	Terimngalar State (B) သီရိမင်္ဂလာ (ခ)ရပ်	KyiTawGone Town Died (student) ကျိတော်ကုန်းရပ်ကွက်ထိပ်တွင် ရှုဟိန်းမြစ်သေဆုံး
10.	Mr. Than Naing Myint အထီးဘွဲ့လွှာလ် (ခ) သန်းနိုင်မြင့်	27 years ၂၇ နှစ်	Mr. Maung Maung Myint ဦးမောင်မောင်မြင့်	Terimngalar State (A) သီရိမင်္ဂလာ (က)ရပ်	Terimngalar State (A) သီရိမင်္ဂလာ (က)ရပ်	Taw Win Nan Restaurant Near Died တော်ဝန်နန်းခန်းမရွေတွင် ရှုဟိန်းမြစ်သေဆုံး
11.	Mr. Zin Ko Ko ကျိပ်ယုတ် (ခ) ဝတ်ကျိ	17 years ၁၇ နှစ်	Mr. Hji Yuu Nut Lay ဟာရီးယုတ်(ဒ်)လေး	Terimngalar သီရိမင်္ဂလာရပ်	Terimngalar သီရိမင်္ဂလာရပ်	MinGalazYon School within Died (student) မင်္ဂလာဇယွန်ကျောင်းတွင် ရှုဟိန်းမြစ်သေဆုံး

**2013 March 20,21,22th violent in Meikhtila died and REF LISTS**

No	Name	Age	Father Name	Addresses	Family Addresses	Object
12.	Mr. Nyi Nyi Lwin ဦးညိုလွင် (ခ) ဦးညိုလွင်	43 years ၄၃ နှစ်	Mr. Myint Thein ဦးမြင့်သိန်း	Terimngalar သီရိမင်္ဂလာရပ်	Terimngalar သီရိမင်္ဂလာရပ်	Old Station Near Died ဘုတာဟောင်းလမ်းကွင်းကွက်တံတားနားတွင် ရှုဟီးဒ်ဖြစ်
13.	Mr. M.L.V Aukif မော်လာဘာအာရိပ်	26 years ၂၆ နှစ်	Mr. Chit Tee ဦးချစ်တီး	Terimngalar သီရိမင်္ဂလာရပ်	Terimngalar သီရိမင်္ဂလာရပ်	Died မင်္ဂလာလမ်းကွင်းတွင် ရှုဟီးဒ်ဖြစ်သေဆုံး
14.	Mr. Zaw MyoHet ဇော်မောင်မျိုးထွတ်	31 years ၃၁ နှစ်	Mr. Ah.Li Yar Kat ဦးအလီယာကတ်	Terimngalar သီရိမင်္ဂလာရပ်	Terimngalar သီရိမင်္ဂလာရပ်	MinGalZarZayYon Street (5) Died မင်္ဂလာလမ်းကွင်း ၅ လမ်းတွင် ရှုဟီးဒ်ဖြစ်သေဆုံး
15.	Mr. Maung Maung Naing ဦးမောင်မောင်နိုင်	37 years ၃၇ နှစ်	Mr. HJ Tin Myint ဟာချီတင်မြင့်	Terimngalar သီရိမင်္ဂလာရပ်	Terimngalar သီရိမင်္ဂလာရပ်	Old Station Near Died ဘုတာဟောင်းလမ်းကွင်းကွက်တံတားနားတွင် ရှုဟီးဒ်ဖြစ်
16.	Mr. Myint Wai ဦးမြင့်ဝေ	72 years ၇၂ နှစ်	Mr. Abhadullah ဦးအဗ္ဘဒူလ္လာဟ်	Terimngalar State (8) သီရိမင်္ဂလာ၊ နယ်မြေ (၈)	Terimngalar State (8) သီရိမင်္ဂလာ၊ နယ်မြေ (၈)	Died နေအိမ်တွင် ရှုဟီးဒ်ဖြစ်သေဆုံး
17.	Mr. Bar Bu ဦးဘာဘူ	55 years ၅၅ နှစ်	Mr. Mhai ဦးမဟို	Terimngalar State (13) သီရိမင်္ဂလာ၊ နယ်မြေ (၁၃)	မရိုင်တားကစားကွင်း	Khar O Rar Fiction Shop Near Died ခါဆိုရာဆိုင်ရွာတွင် ရှုဟီးဒ်ဖြစ်သေဆုံး
18.	Mr. Bo Lin ဦးပုလင်း	36 years ၃၆ နှစ်	Mr. Htil Lar Maung ဦးထီလာမောင်	Terimngalar သီရိမင်္ဂလာရပ်	Kha Yai Grounds ခရိုင်တားကစားကွင်း	Terimngalar Quarter Within Died သီရိမင်္ဂလာ(၁)ရပ် သံရိုင်သာရွာတွင် ရှုဟီးဒ်ဖြစ်သေဆုံး
19.	Mr. Kyaw San Htay ဦးကျော်စံဖွေ	25 years ၂၅ နှစ်	Mr. Kyi Myint ဦးကျိမြင့်	Terimngalar သီရိမင်္ဂလာရပ်	Kha Yai Grounds ခရိုင်တားကစားကွင်း	KyiTanGone Town Died ကျိဆွန်းဘုရားကျောင်းတန်းတွင် ရှုဟီးဒ်ဖြစ်သေဆုံး
20.	Mrs. Khin Cho Nu မခင်စိုးနု	33 years ၃၃ နှစ်	Mr. RamZam ဦးရွှေသွာန်	Terimngalar သီရိမင်္ဂလာရပ်	Kha Yai Grounds ခရိုင်တားကစားကွင်း	Died Family ထမင်းဆိုင်ရွာတွင် ရှုဟီးဒ်ဖြစ်သေဆုံး
21.	Mr. Kar Sim ဦးကာစိမ်	45 years ၄၅ နှစ်	Mr. Sein ဦးစိန်	Terimngalar သီရိမင်္ဂလာရပ်	Kha Yai Grounds ခရိုင်တားကစားကွင်း	Died ဝါကနုတန်တလီနားကွင်းတွင် ရှုဟီးဒ်ဖြစ်သေဆုံး
22.	Mr. Mohamad မိုဟမုဒ်	41 years ၄၁ နှစ်	Mr. May Yee ဦးမေရီ	Terimngalar သီရိမင်္ဂလာရပ်	Kha Yai Grounds ခရိုင်တားကစားကွင်း	Died ဟာရိပ်မနားကျောင်းတန်းတွင် ရှုဟီးဒ်ဖြစ်သေဆုံး

**2013 March 20,21,22th violent in Meikhtila died and REF LISTS**

No	Name	Age	Father Name	Addresses	Family Addresses	Object
23.	Mr. May Yi ဦးမေရီ	76 years ၇၆ နှစ်	Mr. Har Mad ဦးဟာမင်္ဂလေး	Terimngalar သီရိမင်္ဂလာရပ်	Kha Yai Grounds ခရိုင်တားကစားကွင်း	Died ဟာရိပ်မနားကျောင်းရွာတွင် ရှုဟီးဒ်ဖြစ်သေဆုံး
24.	Mr. Min Lwin ဦးမင်းလွင် (ခ) ဦးမင်းလွင်	30 years ၃၀ နှစ်	Mr. HJ Hla Maung ဟာချီဦးလှမောင်	Yan Myo Aung ရန်မိုးအောင်ရပ်	YinTaw School ယင်းတော်ကျောင်း	MinGalZarZayYon Quarter Within Died မင်္ဂလာလမ်းကွင်းနေရာတွင် ရှုဟီးဒ်ဖြစ်သေဆုံး
25.	Mr. Wai Yan Oo သွာရက်ရဲမီးဝင် (ခ) ဝင်ယံဦး	19 years ၁၉ နှစ်	Mr. Than Oo ဦးထန်းဦး	MinGalZarZayYon မင်္ဂလာလမ်းရပ်	YinTaw School ယင်းတော်ကျောင်း	MinGalZarZayYon Quarter Within Died (student) မင်္ဂလာလမ်းရပ်ကွက်တွင် ရှုဟီးဒ်ဖြစ်သေဆုံး
26.	Mr. Herfiz Sarjay Dul Raa Man ဟာရိပ်သာလွင်ထွတ်ရင်မာန်	18 years ၁၈ နှစ်	Mr. Than Tun ဦးထန်းထွန်း (ခ) ဦးဟာရွှန်	MinGalZarZayYon မင်္ဂလာလမ်းရပ်	YinTaw Villages ယင်းတော်ရွာ	MinGalZarZayYon Quarter Within Died (student) မင်္ဂလာလမ်းရပ်ကွက်တွင် ရှုဟီးဒ်ဖြစ်သေဆုံး
27.	Mr. Myint Lwin ဦးညိုလွင် (ခ) ဦးမြင့်လွင်	73 years ၇၃ နှစ်	Mr. Sham Sut ဦးရှင်စွတ်	MinGalZarZayYon မင်္ဂလာလမ်းရပ်	YinTaw Villages ယင်းတော်ရွာ	MinGalZarZayYon Quarter Within Died မင်္ဂလာလမ်းကွင်းနေရာတွင် ရှုဟီးဒ်ဖြစ်သေဆုံး
28.	Mr. Phone ဦးဖုန်း	60 years ၆၀ နှစ်	Mr. Sul Twan ဦးစွယ်သွာန်	MinGalZarZayYon မင်္ဂလာလမ်းရပ်	YinTaw Villages ယင်းတော်မင်းရွာ	MinGalZarZayYon Quarter Within Died မင်္ဂလာလမ်းရပ်ကွက်တွင် ရှုဟီးဒ်ဖြစ်သေဆုံး
29.	Mr. Myint San ဦးမြင့်စန်း	45 years ၄၅ နှစ်	Mr. Sul Twan ဦးစွယ်သွာန်	MinGalZarZayYon မင်္ဂလာလမ်းရပ်	YinTaw Villages ယင်းတော်မင်းရွာ	MinGalZarZayYon Quarter Within Died မင်္ဂလာလမ်းရပ်ကွက်တွင် ရှုဟီးဒ်ဖြစ်သေဆုံး
30.	Mr. Oo Mar ဦးဝေမာ	40 years ၄၀ နှစ်	Mr. Ha San ဦးဟမ်	MinGalZarZayYon မင်္ဂလာလမ်းရပ်		MinGalZarZayYon Quarter Within Died မင်္ဂလာလမ်းရပ်ကွက်တွင် ရှုဟီးဒ်ဖြစ်သေဆုံး
31.	Mr. Bo Bo Lat ဦးပုပုလတ် (ခ) ဘိုဘိုလတ်	19 years ၁၉ နှစ်	Mr. Dar Wit ဦးဒါဝတ်	Yan Myo Aung State (14) ရန်မိုးအောင်နယ်မြေ (၁၄)	Posat ပို့ဆက်	MinGalZarZayYon Quarter Within Died (student) မင်္ဂလာလမ်းရပ်ကွက်တွင် ရှုဟီးဒ်ဖြစ်သေဆုံး
32.	Mr. HJ Zaw Lin Maung ဟာချီဇော်လင်းမောင်	29 years ၂၉ နှစ်	Mr. Thar Cho ဦးသာချို	MinGalZarZayYon မင်္ဂလာလမ်းရပ်	Terimngalar သီရိမင်္ဂလာရပ်	MinGalZarZayYon Quarter Within Died မင်္ဂလာလမ်းကွင်းတန်းတွင် ရှုဟီးဒ်ဖြစ်သေဆုံး
33.	Mr. HerShim ဦးဟာရှင်	28 years ၂၈ နှစ်	Mr. Sein Win ဦးစိန်ဝင်း	MinGalZarZayYon မင်္ဂလာလမ်းရပ်	Kha Yai Grounds ခရိုင်တားကစားကွင်း	MinGalZarZayYon Quarter Within Died မင်္ဂလာလမ်းရပ်ကွက်တွင် ရှုဟီးဒ်ဖြစ်သေဆုံး

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No	Name	Age	Father Name	Addresses	Family Addresses	Object
34.	Mr. Chit Tun ဦးချစ်ထွန်း	33 years ၃၃ နှစ်	Mr. Kam Ma Look ဦးကမ္မလွတ်	Mingalar Zay Yon မင်္ဂလာဇေယျရပ်	Kha Yai Grounds ခရိုင်အားကစားကွင်း	Mingalar Zay Yon School Near Died မင်္ဂလာဇေယျ ကျောင်းအနီးတွင် ရှုဟီးဂိမြစ်သေဆုံး
35.	Mr. Maung Maung ဦးမောင်မောင်	63 years ၆၃ နှစ်	Mr. Ba Thein ဦးဘထိန်း	Mingalar Zay Yon မင်္ဂလာဇေယျရပ်	Kha Yai Grounds ခရိုင်အားကစားကွင်း	Mingalar Zay Yon School Near Died မင်္ဂလာဇေယျကျောင်းအနီးတွင် ရှုဟီးဂိမြစ်သေဆုံး
36.	Mr. Ah Ka Ram အစ်ရှ်ရာမ်	30 years ၃၀ နှစ်	Mr. Nyo Gyi ဦးညိုဦး	Mingalar Zay Yon မင်္ဂလာဇေယျ (၃)လမ်း	YinTaw School ယင်းတော်ကျောင်း	Mingalar Zay Yon School Died မင်္ဂလာဇေယျကျောင်းနေရာတွင် ရှုဟီးဂိမြစ်သေဆုံး
37.	Mr. Myint Aung အတိတ်လောင် (ခ) မိမြင့်အောင်	20 years ၂၀ နှစ်	Mr. Nyo Gyi ဦးညိုဦး	Mingalar Zay Yon မင်္ဂလာဇေယျ (၃)လမ်း	YinTaw School ယင်းတော်ကျောင်း	Mingalar Zay Yon School Died မင်္ဂလာဇေယျကျောင်းနေရာတွင် ရှုဟီးဂိမြစ်သေဆုံး
38.	Mr. HerFiz Mohamad Barrik ဟာမိန်မိုဟမ္မဒ်ဘာရိက်(ခ)ဘိုဘိုမိုဇ်	15 years ၀၅ နှစ်	Mr. Swar Lay ဦးဆွာလေး	Chan Aye Thar Yar ချမ်းအေးသာယာရပ်	Water Resource ရေအရင်းမြစ်	Mingalar Zay Yon School Died (student) မင်္ဂလာဇေယျကျောင်းတွင် ရှုဟီးဂိမြစ်သေဆုံး
39.	Mr. Ah Zi Zol Lar အစ်ရှ်လတ် (ခ) ဝိဋ္ဌအောင်	25 years ၂၅ နှစ်	Mr. Ha San ဦးဟမ်	Chan Aye Thar Yar ချမ်းအေးသာယာရပ်	Water Resource ရေအရင်းမြစ်	Mingalar Zay Yon School Died (student) မင်္ဂလာဇေယျကျောင်းတွင် ရှုဟီးဂိမြစ်သေဆုံး
40.	Mr. Ba Shi Rool Lar ဘစ်ရှ်လတ် (ခ) ဟင်ကိုင်း	years	Mr. M.L.V Kyaw Nyunt မောင်လာနုကျော်ညွန့်	Chan Aye Thar Yar ချမ်းအေးသာယာရပ်	Water Resource ရေအရင်းမြစ်	Mingalar Zay Yon School Died (student) မင်္ဂလာဇေယျကျောင်းတွင် ရှုဟီးဂိမြစ်သေဆုံး
41.	Mr. Moe Zaw တို့မိုးခေတ်	30 years ၃၀ နှစ်	Mr. Maung Maung Myint ဦးမောင်မောင်မြင့်	Thar Yar Gone (1)Garden သာယာကုန်း(၁) ဥယျာဉ်မြို့	Kha Yai Grounds ခရိုင်အားကစားကွင်း	Nagayon Monk School Behind Died နဂါးရုံးရန်ကြီးကျောင်းမြောက်ဘက်တွင် ရှုဟီးဂိမြစ်သေဆုံး
42.	Mr. Maung Maung Myint ဦးမောင်မောင်မြင့်	71 years ၇၁ နှစ်	Mr. Yar Koot ဦးယာကွတ်	Thar Yar Gone (1)Garden သာယာကုန်း(၁) ဥယျာဉ်မြို့	Kha Yai Grounds ခရိုင်အားကစားကွင်း	Nagayon Monk School Behind Died နဂါးရုံးရန်ကြီးကျောင်းမြောက်ဘက်တွင် ရှုဟီးဂိမြစ်သေဆုံး
43.	Zar Khyi Moe မေဝမြည်မိုး	9 years ၉ နှစ်	Mr. Moe Zaw ဦးမိုးခေတ်	Thar Yar Gone (1)Garden သာယာကုန်း(၁) ဥယျာဉ်မြို့	Kha Yai Grounds ခရိုင်အားကစားကွင်း	Nagayon Monk School Behind Died (child) နဂါးရုံးရန်ကြီးကျောင်းမြောက်ဘက်တွင် ရှုဟီးဂိမြစ်သေဆုံး
44.	Yee Pai Moe မောင်ပိုင်မိုး	7 years ၇ နှစ်	Mr. Moe Zaw ဦးမိုးခေတ်	Thar Yar Gone (1)Garden သာယာကုန်း(၁) ဥယျာဉ်မြို့	Kha Yai Grounds ခရိုင်အားကစားကွင်း	Nagayon Monk School Behind Died (child) နဂါးရုံးရန်ကြီးကျောင်းမြောက်ဘက်တွင် ရှုဟီးဂိမြစ်သေဆုံး

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45.	U Win Myint ဦးကျော်ကြီး (ခ) ဦးဝင်းမြင့်	40 years ၄၀ နှစ်	Mr. Ba Rar Mon ဦးဘရာမုန့်	Kan Taw Min State (9) ကန်တော်မင်ဂျိနယ်မြေ(၉)		Mingalar Zay Yon quarters Died မင်္ဂလာဇေယျကျောင်းနေရာတွင် ရှုဟီးဂိမြစ်သေဆုံး
46.	U Than Naing Oo ဦးတင်နိုင် (ခ) ဦးသန်းနိုင်ဦး	33 years ၃၃ နှစ်	Mr. Ah Zee ဦးအစ်	Aung Zay Yar အောင်ဇေယျာရပ်	YinTaw School ယင်းတော်ကျောင်း	War Sat office nearby Died ဝါဇော်ပေါက်တွင် ရှုဟီးဂိမြစ်သေဆုံး
47.	U Win Chit Soe ဦးဝင်းချစ်မိုး	35 years ၃၅ နှစ်	Mr Win Myint ဦးဝင်းမြင့်	Yatanar Man Aung ရတနာမာရ်အောင်	Kha Yai ခရိုင်အားကစားကွင်း	Yar Myo Aung quarters office nearby died ရန်မိုးအောင်ရပ်၊ ရ. ယ. ကရုံးရွာတွင် ရှုဟီးဂိမြစ်သေဆုံး
48.	Herfiz Nul Rul Ahsalam ဟာမိန်လူရွတ်အစ္စလာမ်	19 years ၀၉ နှစ်	Mr. M.L.V Maung Oo မောင်လာနုမောင်ဦး	Yin Taw ယင်းတော်	YinTaw School ယင်းတော်ကျောင်း	Mingalar Zay Yon School within Died (student) မင်္ဂလာဇေယျကျောင်းရှိရှုဟီးဂိမြစ်သေဆုံး(ကျောင်းသား)
49.	Herfiz Zaik ဟာမိန်ဇိုင်	16 years ၀၆ နှစ်	Mr. Ar Rif (teacher) မောင်လာနုအာရစ်	Taungyi Aye Ther Yar တောင်ကြီးမြို့အေးသာယာ	Taungyi Aye Ther Yar တောင်ကြီးမြို့အေးသာယာ	Mingalar Zay Yon School within Died (student) မင်္ဂလာဇေယျကျောင်းရှိရှုဟီးဂိမြစ်သေဆုံး(ကျောင်းသား)
50.	Mr. Osarmar တို့စာမာတ်	- years	Mr. Saiegyi ဦးစောဒီးဂိကြီး	Taungyi Aye Ther Yar သီရိမင်္ဂလာရပ်		Died (student) ရှုဟီးဂိမြစ်သေဆုံး
51.	Mr. Shafie တို့ရွှေမာတ်	- years	Mr. Kamlotdin ဦးကမ္မလွတ်ဦးနီ	Taungyi Aye Ther Yar သီရိမင်္ဂလာရပ်		Died ရှုဟီးဂိမြစ်သေဆုံး
52.	Mr. Nullbai ဦးနုလ်ဘိုင်	- years	-	Taungyi Aye Ther Yar ပြည်သာယာမြောက်ကမ်း		Died ရှုဟီးဂိမြစ်သေဆုံး
53.	Mr. Ar Rif အာရိန်ဘိုင်	- years	-	Taungyi Aye Ther Yar ပြည်သာယာမြောက်ကမ်း		Died ရှုဟီးဂိမြစ်သေဆုံး
54.	Mrs. Khon Yee ခန်းရီ	- years	-	Taungyi Aye Ther Yar ပြည်သာယာမြောက်ကမ်း		Died ရှုဟီးဂိမြစ်သေဆုံး
55.	Mrs. Ngwe Ni ဖုဖွယ်နီ	- years	Mr Yusuf နဂါးဦးယူစွတ်	မင်္ဂလာဇေယျရပ်		Died ရှုဟီးဂိမြစ်သေဆုံး

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56.	Mr. NAING TUN ကိုနိုင်ထွန်း	- years	Mr. Ahmi Ru တာအိုဦးအမိဇ္ဇမာမက်		Mingalar Zay Yon မင်္ဂလာဇေယျဝရံ	Died (student) ရွာတီးပိပြစ်သေဆုံး
57.	Mr. SAI SOE LWIN စတီခွင့်ရင်မာန်(ခ)ခိုင်ခိုင်စိုးလွင်	- years	Mr. Soe Win ဦးစိုးဝင်း	Pyitharyar ပြည်သာယာရပ်		Mingalar Zay Yon School within Died (student) မင်္ဂလာဇေယျကျောင်း၌ရွာတီးပိပြစ်သေဆုံး(ကျောင်းသား)
58.	Mr. NAY LA WIN အဘွားကန်(ခ)ခိုင်နေလင်း	- years	Mr. Nyin Lin ဦးညက်လင်း	Mandalay Town မန္တလေးမြို့		Mingalar Zay Yon School within Died (student) မင်္ဂလာဇေယျကျောင်း၌ရွာတီးပိပြစ်သေဆုံး(ကျောင်းသား)
59.	Mr. ZAW NAING သွားရင်(ခ)ခိုင်ခေလိုင်	- years	Mr. Zaw Win ဦးဇော်ဝင်း	Mandalay Town မန္တလေးမြို့		Mingalar Zay Yon School within Died (student) မင်္ဂလာဇေယျကျောင်း၌ရွာတီးပိပြစ်သေဆုံး(ကျောင်းသား)
60.	Mr. SEE THU အဖီထွာ(ခ)ခိုင်ညိုသူ	- years	Mr. Win Maung ဦးဝင်းမောင်	Mandalay Town မန္တလေးမြို့		Mingalar Zay Yon School within Died (student) မင်္ဂလာဇေယျကျောင်း၌ရွာတီးပိပြစ်သေဆုံး(ကျောင်းသား)
61.	Mr. AUNG MYO OO ရွာခေမာတ်မိ(ခ)ခိုင်အောင်မျိုးဦး	- years	Mr. Kyaw Aung ဦးကျော်အောင်	Mandalay Town မန္တလေးမြို့		Mingalar Zay Yon School within Died (student) မင်္ဂလာဇေယျကျောင်း၌ရွာတီးပိပြစ်သေဆုံး(ကျောင်းသား)
62.	Mr. PHYO KO KO အမှတ်(ခ)ခိုင်ဖြူကိုကို	- years	Mr. Mya Lwin ဦးရမိမက်(ခ)ဦးဖြူလွင်	Ther Chee Lte Town တာချီလိတ်မြို့		Mingalar Zay Yon School within Died (student) မင်္ဂလာဇေယျကျောင်း၌ရွာတီးပိပြစ်သေဆုံး(ကျောင်းသား)
63.	Mr. ABDUL GAFAR အထွန်းဌာမင်	- years	Mr. - ဦး-	Ther Chee Lte Town တာချီလိတ်မြို့		Mingalar Zay Yon School within Died (student) မင်္ဂလာဇေယျကျောင်း၌ရွာတီးပိပြစ်သေဆုံး(ကျောင်းသား)
64.	Mr. ZAW NAING အဖမိဌာမာတ်(ခ)ခိုင်ခေလိုင်	- years	Mr. - ဦး-	Village ဇီပင်ပေါက်ကျေးရွာ		Mingalar Zay Yon School within Died (student) မင်္ဂလာဇေယျကျောင်း၌ရွာတီးပိပြစ်သေဆုံး(ကျောင်းသား)
65.	Mr. MIN CHIT THU အလီလင်း(ခ)ခိုင်မင်းဆုသူ	- years	Mr. - ဦး-	Village ရွာမွန်သာကျေးရွာ		Mingalar Zay Yon School Died (student) မင်္ဂလာဇေယျကျောင်း၌ရွာတီးပိပြစ်သေဆုံး(ကျောင်းသား)
66.	Mr. MYINT MIN TUN မောင်မြင့်မင်းထွန်း	- years	Mr. Myint Han ဦးမြင့်ဟန်	KautSai Town ကျောက်ဆည်မြို့		Mingalar Zay Yon School Died (student) မင်္ဂလာဇေယျကျောင်း၌ရွာတီးပိပြစ်သေဆုံး(ကျောင်းသား)

**2013 March 20,21,22th violent in Meikhtila died and REF LISTS**

No	Name	Age	Father Name	Addresses	Family Addresses	Object
67.	Mr. Thet Naing Win နတ်စိန် (ခ) ငါးသတ်ခိုင်ဝင်း	- years	Mr. Zakariyar ဦးဇကာရီယာ	Latpan villages ရွာလေး/လက်ပံကျေးရွာ		Mingalar Zay Yon School within Died (student) မင်္ဂလာဇေယျကျောင်း၌ရွာတီးပိပြစ်သေဆုံး(ကျောင်းသား)
68.	Mr. Kyaw Lin Oo အာရှင်ကျော်လင်း(ခ)ခိုင်ကျော်လင်းဦး	- years	Mr. Musar ဦးမူဆာ	Suelaygone villages ဆူးလေကုန်းကျေးရွာ		Mingalar Zay Yon School within Died (student) မင်္ဂလာဇေယျကျောင်း၌ရွာတီးပိပြစ်သေဆုံး(ကျောင်းသား)
69.	Mr. Soe Win Tun အတိတ်လင်း(ခ)ခိုင်စိုးဝင်းထွန်း	- years	Mr. Than Maung ဦးသန်းမောင်	Yangon Town ရန်ကုန်မြို့		Mingalar Zay Yon School within Died (student) မင်္ဂလာဇေယျကျောင်း၌ရွာတီးပိပြစ်သေဆုံး(ကျောင်းသား)
70.	Mr. Kyaw Zay Oo အိုစိန်ခွင်လွင်(ခ)ခိုင်ကျော်စေတီ	- years	Mr. ARDAM ဦးအာဝမ်	Bamaw Town ဓနိုးမော်မြို့		Mingalar Zay Yon School within Died (student) မင်္ဂလာဇေယျကျောင်း၌ရွာတီးပိပြစ်သေဆုံး(ကျောင်းသား)
71.	Mr. Soe Moe Aung လှမာလွတ်စိုးမိုး(ခ)ခိုင်စိုးမိုးအောင်	- years	Mr. ARDAM ဦးအာဝမ်	Kambula Town ကန်ကလေးမြို့		Mingalar Zay Yon School within Died (student) မင်္ဂလာဇေယျကျောင်း၌ရွာတီးပိပြစ်သေဆုံး(ကျောင်းသား)
72.	Mr. San Lwin Oo စိုလှိုင်မာန်(ခ)ခိုင်စိုးလွင်ဦး	- years	Mr. ARDAM ဦးအာဝမ်	Sakui Town စတုမြို့		Mingalar Zay Yon School within Died (student) မင်္ဂလာဇေယျကျောင်း၌ရွာတီးပိပြစ်သေဆုံး(ကျောင်းသား)
73.	Mr. Hozai Phwer ဟိုစိုက်စွာ	- years	Mr. ARDAM ဦးအာဝမ်	Myitnge Town မြစ်ငယ်မြို့		Mingalar Zay Yon School within Died (student) မင်္ဂလာဇေယျကျောင်း၌ရွာတီးပိပြစ်သေဆုံး(ကျောင်းသား)
74.	Mr. Aung Soe Moe အဖိုးစိုစို(ခ)ခိုင်အောင်စိုးမိုး	- years	Mr. Hla Myint ဦးလှမြင့်	Yameethin Town ရမည်းသင်း		Mingalar Zay Yon School within Died (student) မင်္ဂလာဇေယျကျောင်း၌ရွာတီးပိပြစ်သေဆုံး(ကျောင်းသား)
75.	Mr. Myo Wuu မောင်လာနာရွှေအိ(ခ)ဦးမျိုးဝင်း	- years	Mr. Tin Soe Win ဦးတင်စိုးဝင်း	Mingalar Zay Yon မင်္ဂလာဇေယျ		Mingalar Zay Yon School within Died (teacher) မင်္ဂလာဇေယျကျောင်း၌ရွာတီးပိပြစ်သေဆုံး(ကျောင်းဆရာ)
76.	Zar Khyi Moe မောင်လာနာဇော်လှ(ခ)ဦးသန်းစိုစိုဦး	- years	Mr. Than Oo ဦးသန်းဦး	Mingalar Zay Yon မင်္ဂလာဇေယျ		Mingalar Zay Yon School within Died (teacher) မင်္ဂလာဇေယျကျောင်း၌ရွာတီးပိပြစ်သေဆုံး(ကျောင်းဆရာ)
77.	Mr. Maung Maung မောင်လာနာစိုစို(ခ)ဦးမောင်မောင်	- years	Mr. Aung Tin ဦးအောင်တင်	Mingalar Zay Yon မင်္ဂလာဇေယျ		Mingalar Zay Yon School within Died (teacher) မင်္ဂလာဇေယျကျောင်း၌ရွာတီးပိပြစ်သေဆုံး(ကျောင်းဆရာ)



**APPENDIX C**  
**AN EMPIRICAL SOURCE OF INSTITUTIONALIZED ANTI-**  
**MUSLIM SENTIMENT**

Translations from Burmese into English:

"Programme Arrangement

Part (1)

Introduction

Objective

Part (2)

Spread of Islam in Southeast Asia

Conclusion

Page 2"<sup>1</sup>

**"Part (1)**

**Introduction:**

- Although its vulnerable geographical position, Myanmar which began from the reign of King Aniruddha could still stand in the world due to great efforts of kings Kyanzittha, Bayinnaung, Alungpaya, and gallant heroes like Min Ye Kyaw Zwa, Mon warrior Thamin Baran, and Maha Bandula, and the great leaders General Aung San.
- The independence was achieved through bloodshed and struggles of the indigenous people of Myanmar, Mon, Karen, Chin, Kachin, and Rakhine, from the First Anglo-Burma War of Kunbaung Era up to the death of General Aung San. Without their protection, the remnants of the nation will have to live in humiliation under foreigners with a

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

different religion.

[Image: Statue of a King]

### **Objective**

As a Buddhist country of the world, Buddhism flourishes in Myanmar till today. To be aware that no race faces extinction from being swallowed up by the earth but by human beings and that race is primarily connected to religion.

#### For Major Religions

- Hinduism (1000 BC)
- Buddhism (567 BC)
- Christianity (2 BC)
- Islam (571 AD)

There are many religions in the world. Of them, four major religions are internationally recognized. They are Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, and Islam. As a religious belief, Hinduism is the oldest. According to researchers of religion and history, Buddhism is the earliest in the sequence of religion after Hinduism, followed by Christianity and then Islam, which is the youngest.

- The origins of the major religions were reckoned with the era of "Mahabharata War." Some historians considered it to have occurred around 1000 BC.
- It has been roughly estimated that there was the gap of 500 years in-between the four major religions.
- The Bodhisattva Prince Siddhartha was born in 567 BC, Jesus Christ in 2 BC, and Mohammad, who identified Islam, was born in 571 AD.
- To look at the places of origin of the four major religions, it has been found that Hinduism and Buddhism emerged in India whereas Christianity and Islam in the Middle-east.

- Two different kinds of faith are found among the four major religions.

Page 3"<sup>2</sup>

- "Whereas one kind of faith accepts the eternal God or deity, the other does not accept the eternal God.
- (Except Buddhism all other religions accept the eternal God. The eternal God does not play a role in Buddhism.)
- Eternal God means the God with infinite power and infinite love, and omniscient who creates the world and all living and non-living things in it. He lives forever in the universe with no beginning and no end.

### **The Origin of Islam**

- Islam was developed in 6 AD by Muhammad who would be called a prophet by its followers.
- Muhammad did not establish Islam but only identified it.
- The followers of Islam believe that he is a prophet who brought the message of the eternal God Allah to mankind.
- The believers of Islam state that it is incorrect to call the followers of the Islamic teachings of Muhammad as Mohammedan by some people.
- Islam states the teachings are directly from Allah and Muhammad was only a prophet.

### **You Need To Know These:**

In the world today,

There are 2000 million Christians (33% of the world populations), 1300 million Muslims (22% of the world population), 900 million Hindus (15% of the world population), and Buddhists 360 million (6% of the world population).

Don't be conceited saying, "I am a Buddhist." Of the four major religious groups, Buddhists are of the smallest number. Be aware of this. Don't be unobservant. Try to promote your religion.

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<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

(Extract from the "Book of Discourse and Sermons" by Lay-Ein-Zu Ashin Wiseittasara)

- Although Myanmar is rich in resources, it is second least populated among the neighboring countries, after Laos. The bordering China and India are the first and second most populated countries in the world.
- The probability of (population) Extinction: -
- As in the past, groups of people from populous China, Hindu India, and Muslim Bangladesh, in search of greener pastures, can infiltrate and cause extinction as a result of the mixing of blood.
- Out of 60 million present population of Myanmar, the number of Chinese and Indian Hindu population combined is about 2 million, and so it is currently not a situation to be concerned.
- Although they get married to the indigenous women, within two or three generations, they have assimilated within indigenous people and live peacefully without any notable problems. But, the danger of being swallowed up by Bangladeshi Cittagonian Indian Muslims (Translator's Note Using Derogatory Phrase 'KowTow Kalars') truly exists.

Page 4"<sup>3</sup>

**"No Race Faces Extinction from Being Swallowed Up By the Earth, But By Human Beings.**

**Bengali Muslims:**

- They infiltrate the people to propagate their religion.
- Their population increases by way of mass illegal immigration.
- Their population increases in Yangon, Mandalay, and other cities as well.

[Image: Houses on Fire]

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

### Five Pillars of Islam

1. There is none worthy of worship except Allah.
2. Regular prayers five times a day.
3. Zakat payment to the poor.
4. Fasting in the month of Ramadan.
5. At least once in a lifetime Haj pilgrimage to Mecca by those who can afford.

- It was stated in the Time Magazine of 16/3/79 that Muhammad had 12 legal wives and many lesser wives as well.

- For rapid spread of the religion he established, he asked the disciples to marry four wives each. He occupied countries by using military might and propagated his religion by asking whether they would sacrifice their lives. He asked them to wage holy wars. That is why there is no end to the religious wars till today.

[Image: Kaaba; scrip: (xxxxx)] [Image: Kaaba]

The pilgrims are required to make *tawaf* by seven circumambulations of the kaaba from the right side. Then they need to travel to Mina to pass the night.

[Image: A Mosque]

Page 5"<sup>4</sup>

"[Images: Camels; Hanging Meat]

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

## **Part (2)**

### **Islam's Arrival in Southeast Asia**

[Image: Map; Pepper Link, 1498, ACHE, 1520]

- Expansion of Ottoman Empire
- Portuguese Trade
- Arrival of Persian/Turkish Merchants
- Starting to set foot on Aceh Islam (1520)

### **The Spread of Islam in Southeast Asia**

The spread of Islam in Southeast Asia is said to have started with the religious expansionism carried out by the Persian traders during their trading. Although it was said to have begun in the 14th century. It is estimated to have occurred during the powerful time of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle-East.

It has been found in Turkish diplomatic correspondence that the Turkish traders had arrived in Aced Island, in the north end of Sumatra Island of Indonesia, in 1520. Therefore, it is concluded that the Turkish began to set food in Southeast Asia in the 16th century.

### **Indonesia**

- Has over 7,000 islands;
- The largest Muslim country; population 194 million;
- Mostly Sunni Muslims; only 15% Shilife;
- Prescribed new curriculum in religious schools with help from Saudi Arabia, creating extremism;
- Eager to establish an Islamic country
- Wahhabis became influential with money, and therefore, during Suharto's time, monetary support only from the government was allowed;
- Extremist organizations established under the leadership of Mujahedeen,

returning from Afghanistan war.

Page 6"<sup>5</sup>

### **"Malaysia**

- Malay populations is only 64%
- Turning towards severe conservatism from what it was once with majority mild Sufis. More Wahhabis entered.
- Al-Qaida network gets a foothold in extremist Jammah Islamlyah.
- The group is waging Jihad to establish Islamic State.
- In January 2001, some of the al-Qaida leaders held the discussion in Malaysia.

### **Philippines**

- Majority Muslims are Sunnis. In the country of numerous islands, the Muslim groups that call themselves Moro Muslims are the majority of the Muslims. Currently, they have signed the peace agreement with the government.
- There are more than 700 Mujahedeen war veterans. Jamal, the brother-in-law of Bin Laden, had established a network of terrorism in 1988 and set up a company for the show in 1991.
- There are many extremist religious organizations. The Abu Sayyal's group is the most well-known.

### **Thailand**

- Muslim population in three states of southern Thailand is 80%
- Carrying out separatist movement and terrorist activities
- The three accused of the Bali bomb explosion were arrested in these states.

[Image: Map of Southern Thailand Bordering Malaysia]

### **Brunei**

- It is a sultanate Majority are Sunnis. The King is the head of the religion.
- Islamic awareness is made under the king's supervision

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

- Only those who are licensed are appointed as religious teachers
- Supporting Muslim countries and organizations worldwide

### **Myanmar**

- "Muslims from 4% of the country's total population and majority of them are Sunnis
- RSO is a bad Indian terrorist group's Rohingya movement.
- After the death of Hazrat Ali, the 4th religious leader from Arabia, there was the power struggle between his two sons. Having been defeated in the war, the son Muhammad Ahmed was said to have escaped away to Rakhine's Wethali area where he fought against a savage queen in Maungdaw area and captured her and then lived in Mayu mountain range.

[Image: Map of Myanmar with Population of the Neighboring Countries]"<sup>6</sup>

"[Text in the Image:

Land Mass: 3828 Miles

- **India**  
Population: Over 1045 Million  
Boundary: 832 Miles
- **Bangladesh**  
Population: Over 133 Million  
Boundary: 153 Miles
- **China**  
Population: Over 1284 Million  
Boundary: 1355 Miles
- **Thailand**  
Population: Over 62 Million  
Boundary: 1314 Miles]
- Laos  
Populations: Over 5.7 Million

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

Boundary: 148 Miles

Coastline: 1385 Miles]

### **They take advantage of Myanmar people whenever there is an opportunity**

- Mosques were built in Myanmar's upland Mandalay.
- A Mosque rivalling Sule Pagoda was built within a distance 100 feet from it.
- Revered Ledi Sayadaw, without attacking anyone, asked the Buddhists not to eat beef; [people] went around and sought beef as the donation from Buddhists, and in the towns such as Pyinmanna and Yamithin, where there were substantial numbers of Muslim, people threw stones.

### **No Equality of Religions**

- There are many large Mosques in Myanmar. Every religion is allowed to practice freely.
- From the time of Prophet Muhammad until today, non-Muslims have not been allowed entry to Mecca.
- The large Borodudur Pagoda in Indonesia shows how Buddhism had once flourished in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore.
- It is due to their violence proselytizing, proselytizing by infiltration, and lastly because the religious practice is only at the level of traditions in those countries.

### **Do You know this?**

Page 8"<sup>7</sup>

- "A cosmic religion will appear sometime in the future
- It will transcend the concept of eternal God.
- It will be able to avoid dogmatism. It is based on a religious sense aspiring from the experience of all things, natural and spiritual, as the meaningful unity.

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

- **Buddhism** has the answer for these.
- If there is any religion that fulfills the modern scientific needs, it will be **Buddhism**.

The Greatest Scientist of the 20th Century

Dr. Albert Einstein

[Image: [Photo].....[Photo]]

Excerpt from the lecture delivered at Princeton University, United States of American,  
on 19th May 1939

[Image: Sule Pagoda]

### **Conclusion**

- We need to protect our race and religion as much as possible.
- We need to make our little sons and daughters religiously conscious from childhood.
- We ought to instill the concept of God in their hearts from childhood.
- Love the race, don't abandon religion.

**Thank you for your Attention"<sup>8</sup>**

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

## **BIOGRAPHY**

<b>NAME</b>	Mr. Ye MyintWin
<b>DATE OF BIRTH</b>	22 May1983
<b>PLACE OF BIRTH</b>	Mandalay, Myanmar
<b>INSTITUTIONS ATTENEDED</b>	Yadanabon University, 2001-2008 Bachelor of Arts (Economics) Mahidol University, 2013-2017 Master of Engineering (Biomedical Engineering)
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