

**THE PARADIGMS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THAI BUREAUCRACY**

PARIN PENGSUWAN

**A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
(PUBLIC POLICY AND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT)
FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
MAHIDOL UNIVERSITY
2016**

COPYRIGHT OF MAHIDOL UNIVERSITY

Thesis
entitled
**THE PARADIGMS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THAI BUREAUCRACY**



.....
Mr. Parin Pengsuwan
Candidate




.....
Assoc. Prof. Sirirat Choonhaklai, Ph.D.
(Public Administration)
Major-advisor



.....
Assoc. Prof. Somboon Sirisunhirun,
Ph.D.
(Education Administration)
Co-advisor



.....
Asst. Prof. Nopraenu Sajjarax
Dhirathiti, Ph.D.
(Politics and International Studies)
Co-Advisor



.....
Lect. Chokchai Suttawet, Ph.D.
Industrial Sociology (Labor and
Organization)
Co-advisor



.....
Prof. Patcharee Lertrit,
M.D., Ph.D.(Biochemistry)
Dean
Faculty of Graduate Studies
Mahidol University



.....
Assoc. Prof. Sirirat Choonhaklai, Ph.D.
(Public Administration)
Program Director
Doctor of public Administration Program
in Public Policy and Public Management
Faculty of Social Sciences and
Humanities
Mahidol University

Thesis
entitled
**THE PARADIGMS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THAI BUREAUCRACY**

was submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies, Mahidol University
for the degree of Doctor of Public Administration
(Public Policy and Public Management)

on
February 5, 2016



Mr. Parin Pengsuwan
Candidate



Asst. Prof. Rachda Dhnadirek, Ph.D.
(International Business)
Chair



Lect. Chokchai Suttawet, Ph.D.
Industrial Sociology (Labor and
Organization)
Member




Assoc. Prof. Sirirat Choonhaklai, Ph.D.
(Public Administration)
Member



Asst. Prof. Nopraenu Sajjarax
Dhirathiti, Ph.D.
(Politics and International Studies)
Member



Assoc. Prof. Somboon Sirisunhirun,
Ph.D.
(Education Administration)
Member



Prof. Patcharee Lertrit,
M.D., Ph.D. (Biochemistry)
Dean
Faculty of Graduate Studies
Mahidol University



Assoc. Prof. Wariya Chinwanno, Ph.D.
(American Studies)
Dean
Faculty of Social Science and
Humanities
Mahidol University

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

“I am impressed with struggle and patiently endeavoring”

The research is deeply grateful to all pushes in this long journey.

Deep thanks are rendered to all advisors who steer me without fail like Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sirirat Choonhaklai; Assoc. Prof. Dr. Somboon Sirisanhirun; Dr. Chokchai Suttawet; Asst. Prof. Dr. Nopraenue Sajjarax Dhirathiti; Asst. Prof. Dr. Rachada Dhnadirek and Professor Horie Masahiro.

Gratefulness is extended to informants who contribute useful information to this work like Prof. Dr. Tin Pratchayapruet; Prof. Dr. Suphachai Yavabhas; Assoc. Prof. Dr. Suchitra Punyaratabandhu; Asst. Prof. Dr. Wattana Pattananphong; and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Somboon Sirisanhiran; including the OPSDC, and frontlines in the Ministry of Justice.

Gratitude is extended to Dr. Sukree Jaroensuk who never fail in his encouragement and thank to The dissertation fund from the Royal Golden Jubilee (RGJ) Ph.D. Program: The Thailand Research Fund.

Thanks to National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), offering opportunities and fully supported on contents and facilities in developing this dissertation.

Thanks to the Office of Policy and Strategy: Office of the Justice Permanent Secretary for the 5-year studies.

Finally, revere gratitude is extended to my father, my mother, Ann, EED and Min for their spiritual supports with perseverance and this dissertation will not be accomplished without my wife who always understand me in each span of time.

To end, I would again thank Arjarn Sirirat Choonhaklai.

Parin Penguwan

THE PARADIGMS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THAI BUREAUCRACY

PARIN PENGSUWAN 5338481 SHPP/D

D.P.A. (PUBLIC POLICY AND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT)

THESIS ADVISORY COMMITTEE : SIRIRAT CHOONHAKLAI, Ph.D.
SOMBOON SIRISUNHIRUN, Ph.D., CHOKCHAI SUTTAWET, Ph.D.,
NOPRAENUE SIJJARAX DHIRATHITI, Ph.D.**ABSTRACT**

This study was 1) to investigate the paradigms of public administration linked with the development of the Thai bureaucracy during 1959-2006; 2) to investigate factors influencing the changes of each paradigm of public administration; 3) to investigate innovations applied to developing the Thai bureaucracy after 2002, and 4) to investigate impacts of applying the result-based management (RBM) innovation to developing the Thai bureaucracy. A qualitative approach was implemented through documentary research and in-depth interviews conducted with 2 groups of purposive samples, i.e., eleven government agents from the Ministry of Justice and five scholars. The data collected were approached by the method of content analysis.

The study revealed that the paradigms of public administration linked with the development of the Thai bureaucracy during 1959-2006 involved three paradigms, which were the development administration applied during early 1957 until the end of 1977; the new public management applied during early 1987 until the end of 1997 (currently active); and the good governance applied during the middle of 1987 until the middle of 1997. The economic factors and the domestic and international political factors incorporated with decision making of the administration influenced the applications of the paradigms of public administration in the development of the Thai bureaucracy. The paradigm of development administration (DA) was influenced by the economic and political factors whereas the paradigm of new public management (NPM) was influenced by the economic factors and the decision making factors while the paradigm of good governance (GG) was influenced by the political factors and the influence of international organizations. At the meantime, innovations found in developing the Thai bureaucracy after 2002 were institutional innovation, organizational innovation and process innovation. Besides, the research findings of applying the RBM were the centralized decision making of the central agencies regarding the standardization of criteria, the application of the tools, and the overlaps of the managerial tools among the central agencies. They were the roots affecting the works of the line agencies particularly with the collaboration of the members within the organizations, minimizing the importance of other missions, leading to the distortion of the spirit of RBM applications through deforming documents and devaluing targeted performances to below the standards, in order to ensure that the targeted values were achievable.

KEY WORDS : PARADIGMS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION / DEVELOPMENT OF THE THAI BUREAUCRACY / DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION / NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT / GOOD GOVERNANCE

254 pages

กระบวนทัศน์รัฐประศาสนศาสตร์กับการพัฒนาระบบราชการไทย

THE PARADIGMS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THAI BUREAUCRACY

พรินทร์ เฟ็งสุวรรณ 5338481 SHPP/D

รป.ค. (นโยบายสาธารณะและการจัดการภาครัฐ)

คณะกรรมการที่ปรึกษาวิทยานิพนธ์ : ศิริรัตน์ ชูณหคล้าย, Ph.D., สมบูรณ์ ศิริสรรหิรัญ, Ph.D.,

โชคชัย สุทธาเวช, Ph.D., นภเรณู สัจจรักษ์ ธีระฐิติ, Ph.D.

บทคัดย่อ

การศึกษานี้มีวัตถุประสงค์ 1) เพื่อศึกษากระบวนทัศน์รัฐประศาสนศาสตร์ ที่เชื่อมโยงกับการพัฒนาระบบราชการไทยในช่วงปี 2502 - 2549 2) ศึกษาปัจจัยที่มีอิทธิพลต่อการเปลี่ยนแปลงกระบวนทัศน์รัฐประศาสนศาสตร์ในแต่ละกระบวนทัศน์ 3) ภายใต้อกระบวนทัศน์รัฐประศาสนศาสตร์ ศึกษานวัตกรรมที่ถูกนำมาใช้พัฒนาระบบราชการ ภายหลังปี พ.ศ. 2545 และ 4) ศึกษาปัญหา อุปสรรคของการนำนวัตกรรมการบริหารมุ่งผลสัมฤทธิ์มาใช้พัฒนาระบบราชการไทย ใช้การวิจัยเชิงคุณภาพ โดยเก็บข้อมูลด้วยการวิจัยเอกสาร (Documentary Research) และการสัมภาษณ์เชิงลึก (In-depth Interview) จากกลุ่มตัวอย่างที่ถูกคัดเลือกแบบเฉพาะเจาะจง (Purposive Sampling) 2 กลุ่ม ประกอบด้วย 1) กลุ่มเจ้าหน้าที่ในสังกัดกระทรวงยุติธรรม จำนวน 11 คน และกลุ่มนักวิชาการ จำนวน 5 คน และนำข้อมูลมาวิเคราะห์ด้วยวิธีการวิเคราะห์เนื้อหา (Content Analysis)

ผลการศึกษา พบว่า กระบวนทัศน์รัฐประศาสนศาสตร์ที่เชื่อมโยงกับการพัฒนาระบบราชการไทย ระหว่างปี พ.ศ. 2502 - 2549 ประกอบด้วย 3 กระบวนทัศน์ ได้แก่ กระบวนทัศน์การบริหารการพัฒนา อยู่ในช่วงต้นทศวรรษ 2500-ปลายทศวรรษ 2520 กระบวนทัศน์การจัดการภาครัฐแนวใหม่ อยู่ในช่วงต้นทศวรรษ 2530-ปลายทศวรรษ 2540 (ปัจจุบันยังคงยึดถือกระบวนทัศน์นี้อยู่) และกระบวนทัศน์ธรรมาภิบาล อยู่ในช่วงกลางทศวรรษ 2530-กลางทศวรรษ 2540 ขณะที่ปัจจัยด้านเศรษฐกิจ ปัจจัยทางการเมืองภายในและระหว่างประเทศ รวมถึงปัจจัยการตัดสินใจของฝ่ายบริหารมีอิทธิพลต่อการนำกระบวนทัศน์รัฐประศาสนศาสตร์มาใช้พัฒนาระบบราชการไทย โดยกระบวนทัศน์การบริหารการพัฒนา (DA) ได้รับอิทธิพลจากปัจจัยด้านปัจจัยด้านการเมืองและด้านเศรษฐกิจ สำหรับกระบวนทัศน์การจัดการภาครัฐแนวใหม่ (NPM) ได้รับอิทธิพลจากปัจจัยเศรษฐกิจและปัจจัยการตัดสินใจทางการบริหาร และกระบวนทัศน์ธรรมาภิบาล (GG) ได้รับอิทธิพลจากปัจจัยด้านการเมืองและปัจจัยด้านอิทธิพลขององค์กรระหว่างประเทศ ขณะที่นวัตกรรมที่พบในการพัฒนาระบบราชการไทยภายหลังปี 2545 ได้แก่ นวัตกรรมเชิงสถาบัน 2) นวัตกรรมเชิงองค์กร และ 3) นวัตกรรมเชิงกระบวนการ นอกจากนี้ ข้อค้นพบของการศึกษานี้ต่อการนำการบริหารมุ่งผลสัมฤทธิ์มาใช้ปฏิบัติ คือ การรวมศูนย์อำนาจในการตัดสินใจของหน่วยงานกลาง (Central Agencies) ทั้งในการกำหนดมาตรฐานหลักเกณฑ์และการนำเครื่องมือมาใช้ปฏิบัติ และความทับซ้อนของเครื่องมือการบริหารระหว่างหน่วยงานกลาง ซึ่งเป็นสาเหตุหลักที่ส่งผลกระทบต่อการทำงานของหน่วยปฏิบัติ (Line Agencies) โดยเฉพาะความร่วมมือของคนในองค์กร การให้ความสำคัญต่อการกิจอื่นน้อยลง รวมถึงการนำไปสู่การบิดเบือนเจตนารมณ์ของการนำการบริหารมุ่งผลสัมฤทธิ์ไปใช้ ทั้งการปลอมแปลงรูปแบบเอกสารและกำหนดค่าเป้าหมายการทำงานต่ำกว่ามาตรฐานเพื่อให้ง่ายใจได้ว่าสามารถดำเนินการสำเร็จตามค่าเป้าหมายที่กำหนดไว้

CONTENTS

	Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iii
ABSTRACT (ENGLISH)	iv
ABSTRACT (THAI)	v
LIST OF TABLES	x
LIST OF FIGURES	xi
CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Background and Significance of the Problem	1
1.2 Research Questions	4
1.3 Research Objectives	4
1.4 Scope of the Study	5
1.5 Definition of the Terms	6
1.6 Expected Benefits	8
CHAPTER II LITERATURE REVIEWS	9
2.1 The Paradigm of Public Administration	9
2.2 The US public administration paradigms	15
2.3 The paradigms and the public administration education	18
2.4 The concepts and theories to explain the Thai public administration paradigms	21
2.5 Factors influencing the change of the public reforms	22
2.6 The Thai bureaucratic system development	29
2.7 Innovation and the Thai public sector development	44
2.8 Result-based management	52
2.9 Related Research	64
2.10 Synthesizing the Research Conceptual Framework	74

CONTENTS (cont.)

	Page
CHAPTER III RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	78
3.1 The Research Question 1	79
3.2 The Research Question 2	84
3.3 The Research Question 3	86
3.4 The Research Question 4	87
3.5 Summary of the Research Methodology	92
CHAPTER IV RESULTS	94
4.1 Response to the Research Question 1	94
4.1.1 The Development Administration (DA)	95
4.1.2 The new public management (NPM)	110
4.1.3 The good governance	120
4.2 Response to the Research Question 2	125
4.2.1 Factors influencing the stipulation of development administration	126
4.2.2 Factors influencing the design new public management (NPM)	132
4.2.3 Factors influencing the change of good governance	136
4.3 Response to the Research Question 3	139
4.3.1 The meaning of innovation	140
4.3.2 Types of innovation	140
4.3.3 Innovation applied to the Thai public sector development after 2002	140
4.3.4 Analysis of the type of innovation applied to the Thai public sector development after 2002	141

CONTENTS (cont.)

	Page
4.4 Response to the Research Question 4	156
4.4.1 The understanding of the Result-based Management (RBM)	157
4.4.2 Performance Agreement	158
4.4.3 The indicators in the performance agreement reduce the importance of other jobs	159
CHAPTER V DISCUSSIONS	170
5.1 The Public Administration Paradigm during 1959-2006	170
5.1.1 Development Administration	171
5.1.2 New Public Management	172
5.1.3 Good Governance	174
5.2 Factors Influencing the Change of Public Administration during 1959-2006	181
5.2.1 Factors influencing to indicate development administration	181
5.2.2 Factors influencing to indicate New Public Management of Thailand	190
5.2.3 Factors influencing to indicate good governance	193
5.3 Innovation under Public Administration after Bureaucracy Reform 2003	198
5.4 Limitations in Applying Innovation in the Thai bureaucracy in the Case of Result-based Management (RBM) Particularly in Applying Performance Agreement in Public sector development	198
5.4.1 Indicating the indicators of performance agreement irrelevant the goal of organization	200
5.4.2 Implementation process	209
5.4.3 Other impacts	212
5.4.4 The bias intent of result-based management (RBM)	218

CONTENTS (cont.)

	Page
CHAPTER VI CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	221
6.1 Research Methodology	221
6.2 Conclusions	222
6.2.1 Public administration during 1959-2006 in applying to the Thai public sector development	222
6.2.2 Factors influencing the change of public administration applied with the Thai public sector development	223
6.2.3 Innovation under public administration after bureaucracy reform 2002	224
6.2.4 Limitations in applying innovation in the Thai bureaucracy in the case of RBM	224
6.2.5 Other Impacts	226
6.3 Recommendation for policy	228
6.3.1 Inferring problems and indicating the framework in Thai public sector development	228
6.3.2 Structure and organization handling public sector development	229
6.4 Recommendation for practices	230
6.4.1 Structure of the Supervisory Commission on Performance Agreement Preparation	230
6.4.2 Content of Central Performance Agreement Framework	231
6.4.3 Implementations	233
6.5 Recommendation for Further Studies	235
BIBLIOGRAPHY	237
BIOGRAPHY	254

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
2.1 Waves of public management reforms	22
2.2 Factors influencing the change of the public management reform	22
2.3 The Thai Bureaucratic Reform Commission by each government during 1959 - 2006	31
2.4 The First - Ninth National Economic and Social Development Plan (1961 - 2006)	34
2.5 The government policies on bureaucratic development	36
2.6 The Thai bureaucratic reforms under each regime during 1959-2006	39
2.7 Barriers to applying innovation in the public sector	50
2.8 Factors supporting innovation application in public sector	51
2.9 Essence of the Royal Decree on the principles of good governance	56
2.10 Individuals to endorse the performance agreement	62
2.11 Waves of Public Management Reform	75
3.1 Summary the Research Methodology	92
4.1 The article information in the development administration journals during 1960 - 1969	105
4.2 The article information in the development administration journals during 1970 - 1980	106
4.3 Data of the development administration journal during 1981 - 1991	107
4.4 Articles in the Development Administration during 1992 - 2006	118
4.5 Academic articles on good governance during 1992 - 2006	124
4.6 Analysis of the type of innovation applied to the Thai public sector development after 2002	141
4.7 Endorsement of the performance agreement	150

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
2.1 Paradigm conceptual framework	19
2.2 The conceptual framework of the paradigm process	21
2.3 A model of public management reform	28
2.4 The structure of the Thai bureaucratic administration	30
2.5 Innovation process from formulation to application	48
2.6 Model for Result Based Management (RBM)	58
2.7 The committee mechanism in preparing the annual performance agreement	62
2.8 The process of performance verification petition	64
2.9 Research Conceptual Framework	74
2.10 Factors influencing the Thai public administration paradigm and bureaucracy	76
2.11 Types of innovation applied with public sectors	77
2.12 Result-based management	77
3.1 Research Methodology of Research Question 1	84
3.2 Research Methodology of Research Question 2	85
3.3 Innovation and interviews	87
3.4 Research Methodology by Research Question 3	91
4.1 The development administration, 1959 - 1987	109
4.2 The focus of new public management 1987 - 2006	120
4.3 The focus of good governance 1992 - 2006	125

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background and Significance of the Problem

Public administration is a process of production and public service to meet the social needs and social problem solving through the bureaucratic mechanism and under the public policy process. Public administration is the organization of the public agencies (Greene, 2004). Public administration is divided into two aspects, i.e. academic discipline emphasizing instructions and researches, and practical profession emphasizing services and solving public problems (Johnson, 1996); Thawat Wichaidis (1979) and both aspects are linked. Greene (2004:49) explains that the academic discipline helps design operations for bureaucracy while the bureaucratic practices help determine the academic service through researches of the researcher groups maximizing management of effectiveness, efficiency and economy. So, public administration is then government organization.

The studies of public administration officially began in Europe and in the United States. In Europe, it began in 1885 by Lorenz von Stein a German Professor who taught public administration in the University of Vienna (Sirirat Choornahaklai, 2012:65) while in USA, it began from a publication on “the Study of Administration” by Woodrow Wilson in 1887 (Denhardt, 2008). At the meantime, Leonard D. White has written the first text of public administration called “Introduction to the Study of Public Administration in 1926. They have been called the start of the public administration studies in the west and influential to the public administration in various countries including Thailand. Bowornwathana (2013) explained that the modern studies of public administration in Thailand have been using the establishment of the Faculty of Public Administration: Thammasart University in 1955 as the start. Later it has been transferred to be subject under NIDA (National Institute of Development Administration in 1966 and spread nationwide.

Besides, bureaucracy is another side of public administration but it is indispensable mechanism of the administration in determining policy and its application to meet public targets. Max Weber (1864-1920) a German social scientist, postulates an Ideal-Typical Bureaucracy in the end of the 19th Century. It is a form of organization (Jun, 1986). Johnson (1996) advises that any government organizations can be called bureaucracy. Lynn (2006) additionally explains that such public organization involve departments, agencies, bureaus and offices. Therefore, bureaucracy involves the state agencies driving the executive branch policies and the offices which provide services for people. However, there are different opinions in defining the current bureaucracy. Peters (1995) recommends that even though most state agencies are bureaucratic but it does not mean that all the government organization should be considered as bureaucracy even they are the major mechanism to public services and the important identity of the public administration.

In addition, there are critic issues on the bureaucratic problems on their strength and their weakness arisen from their system and the bureaucratic environments. Their strength involves the clear division of the line of command, its excellence in its routine jobs, technical works, and solving problems not concerning human and initiatives (Jun, 1986). On the contrary, the critique on problems and the bureaucratic limitations, such as inefficient system, and undemocraticness, centralization, and problems faced by system, i.e. degradation of public involvement in decision-making, lowering relations between people and bureaucracy, restriction in developing innovation, and degradation of individual capacity in the organization (Jun, 1986). The above critiques are corresponded with the work of Johnson (1996) indicating that bureaucracy is designed under rules and regulations to ensure effectiveness and fairness for the service recipients but oftentimes, those rules and regulations are inflexible for applications including the bureaucracy is hierarchical command (top down command) which allows their subordinate to be passive and lack of initiative. Finally, bureaucracy divides the job by expertise but public problems are complex and link many dimensions together. So, their works are not responded to the problems and the working process and decision-making are mainly appeared in papers while bureaucracy emphasizes authoritarianism and disregards the opportunity for people's involvement.

However, the bureaucratic problems come from its own system and political and social environments. Jun (1986) clearly concludes that to understand bureaucracy requires to understand both the political and social conditions. Considering the Thai bureaucracy in particular, after its endless development since WW II ends, it is found that its development has to face many problems especially centralizing authority at the line agencies and the central committee who develop the bureaucracy. They are just a small group of people who have power to develop bureaucracy in any dimensions and any levels from the central part, to the regional parts and the local parts as details below.

Centralizing authority is the critical problem and affects the Thai bureaucratic development since the past until today because decision-making power in determining the policy and the administrative tools are centralize with a small group of people even though these policies and tools are affecting a large number of stakeholders. The stakeholders are not involved in decision-making which affect the policy and tool are irrelevant to the real situations of the problem in the organizations and the acceptance of the persons involved. For example, the Thai bureaucratic centralization has been studied by Brewer (2003) and Rigg (1991) indicating that the Thai bureaucracy holds strong line of command and centralization. Hargensick (1970) explains that improving the bureaucratic structure has been determined by the centralized agencies under the Office of the Prime Minister and the Office of National Economic and Social Development Board. It is corresponded with the studies of Chai-anant Samuthawanich (1998:144) proposing that since 1961, the Bureau of Budget and the Office of National Economic and Social Development Board become the major agencies controlling other line agencies employing the framework of the national economic and social development and the consideration of budget. In addition, Bowornwathna and Poocharoen (2005) explain that the reform in Thailand is strongly influenced by the central bureaucrats and allowing the central agencies become the key players in the reforms while the line ministries play less part in the reform policies. It is corresponded with recommendations of Seksan Prasertkul (2010: unknown page) explaining that applying the national economic and social development plans through top-down command is the plan to use the local resources without consultation or people of the locality. It is the centralize authority and affects

much to the Thai people. The study of Painter (2006) proposing that CEO-base management is another form of centralized authority.

With the existing bureaucratic problems, the researcher is interested to investigate the problems of centralized authority through the bureaucratic development with the administrative tools call the result-based management which might characterize the problems and lead to the search of reducing the centralized authority from both the political party and the bureaucratic party. It is also to allow opportunity from other parties to involve in bureaucratic development particularly the line agencies and people sectors besides the executive politicians, the central agencies and the scholars. This includes decentralizing the bureaucratic development of each aspect rather than centralizing authority in the central agencies only.

1.2 Research Questions

The researcher has determined 4 research questions as follows:

1) What are the public administration paradigms applied with the Thai bureaucratic development during 1959-2006 and what are the essence of each clustered concept?

2) What are factors influencing the changes of the public administration paradigms linked to the Thai bureaucratic development during 1959-2006, what are the characteristics of such changes and what are the causes of such changes?

3) Under the public administration paradigms applied with the Thai bureaucratic development, what are the innovation applied in its development after its reforms in BE2545 (2002) and how many types of the innovation are classified?

4) What are the reasons that the result-based management (RBM) is applied in the Thai bureaucratic development after its reforms in BE2545 (2002); and what are limitations and impacts of the RBM in the Thai bureaucratic development?

1.3 Research Objectives

In this investigation, the researcher has determined 4 research objectives compatible to the research questions as below.

1) To study the essence of the public administration paradigms linked to the Thai bureaucratic development during 1959-2006.

2) To analyze factors influencing the changes of the public administration paradigms applied with the Thai bureaucratic development during 1959-2006.

3) To study the administrative innovation under the public administration paradigms being applied with the Thai bureaucratic development after its reforms in BE2545 (2002).

4) To investigate the limitations and impacts of the RBM applied with the Thai bureaucratic development as an innovation in the paradigm of the new public management (NPM) after the bureaucratic reforms in BE2545 (2002).

1.4 Scope of the Study

The researcher has scoped the study into 4 issues with reasons to complement the decision-making of each issue as details below.

1) The study of the public administration paradigms during 1959-2006 is to investigate the Thai bureaucratic development since the government of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (1959-1963) till the government of Pol. Lt. Col. Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2006). The reasons of selecting these periods because in 1959 the start of the administration of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (1959-1963) leads to many changes of economy, social and bureaucracy which drives different aspects of the national development, e.g. the establishment of the Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board and the Bureau of Budget. Whereas the study expanded to 2006 because the administration of Pol. Lt. Col. Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2006) has constructively reformed bureaucracy into the new public management (NPM) by enacting two laws, i.e. (1) the Public Administration Act (No. 5) BE 2545 (2002) and the Royal Decree on Criteria and Procedures for Good Governance BE 2546 (2003).

2) The study of the public administration paradigms is through 2 groups of information, i.e. 1) information from the journals of the Public Administration and the journal of Administration Development and 2) the information from public policies.

3) The administrative innovation selected by the researcher is RBM (result-based management) because it is stipulated in the Public Administration Act (No. 5) BE 2545 (2002) in Article 3/1 and the Royal Decree on Criteria and procedures for Good Governance BE 2546 (2003) in Section 3 on the bureaucratic administration for the achievement of the state affairs focusing on the performance agreement which is a complement in an administrative innovation of the RBM in this investigation.

4) The Ministry of Justice is selected to be a case study.

1.5 Definition of the Terms

The researcher has defined 13 terms linking with the concept and theories, i.e.,

1) **Public Administration** is referred to the government organization process to provide essential products, services, rules, regulation, resources and to solve conflicts under effective and fair obligations. This research is focused on applying the academic principles to build knowledge in order to efficiently develop the state performances.

2) **Paradigm** is referred to the concept allocated with proper theories, i.e. the concept applied to develop the bureaucratic administration.

3) **Public Administration Paradigm** is referred to the concept allocated with proper theories in order to improve the process of policy and administration, i.e. the concept of developing the Thai State Administration and changing the previous administration.

4) **Bureaucratic System** is referred to an organization containing the structure of authority in a pyramid form with most line agencies are bureaucratic, the Thai state agencies.

5) **Bureaucratic Development** is referred to (1) increasing ability and capacity of administration, (2) modernizing the bureaucratic system through the transition of technology and training, (3) improving the administrative organization and rationalization, (4) establishing agencies and the representatives of the administrative authority, (5) building individual professionalism and expertise,

(6) encouraging the administrators on leadership to motivate and to support the social and economic development projects, i.e. applying the concept of public administration and the administrative tools for bureaucratic development.

6) Political Factor is referred to the political system directly influencing the government organization reforms especially the roles of law that can be facilitating, shaping and restraining the state reforms including the compliance of the government with one party or with coalition. They can divert the reform of the government organization process i.e. influences of the leaders, top level of political groups, and the international organization which influence the governmental decision-making in accepting and determining the policy in the reforms.

7) Economic Factor is referred to the globalized economic model critically influencing the institutional change and intervention of reform, i.e. the international organization such as World Bank (WB) and International Monetary fund (IMF) and economic crises.

8) Social Factor is referred to the factors of social and demographic changes which are not establishing the specific model in the organizational change but these factors may indirectly influence through motivating politicians and bureaucrats to find solutions for the public administration.

9) Administrative Innovation is referred to the development of new policy design and new standard in the government performance process which influences solutions to the government problems. It emphasizes efficiency, creativity, being the answers to the new problems or the new answers to the old problems, i.e. the administrative tools used in developing the bureaucracy by the Office of the Public Sector Development Commission (OPDC) after BE 2545(2002).

10) Result-based Management is referred to a managerial method focusing on the organizational achievement compatible to the products and consequences really arisen as targeted through having constructive target and indicator which is the modern reform (Swiss, 2005). It contains 3 types of the administrative tools, i.e. strategic planning, performance agreement and performance measurement.

11) Strategic Planning is referred to the bureaucratic targeting to display the direction of the organizational operation complement with vision, mission, strategic issues, strategic goal, and strategies and all are linked.

12) Performance Agreement is referred to the tool leading to evaluating the performance through negotiation and common agreement between the OPDC and line agencies.

13) Performance Measurement is referred to the pursuit and evaluation of the operations by strategic plans targeting on the strategic plans.

1.6 Expected Benefits

There are two parts in the expected benefits, i.e.

1) This is to know the Public Administration Paradigm used in the Thai bureaucratic development since the decade of 1959 until the decade of 2007. The paradigms found would link to the real practices in developing the bureaucracy. This is different from the previous public administration which focuses only on academic surveys such as research works, theses, textbooks and articles and so on. They may not reflect the public administration conditions used in the Thai bureaucratic development.

2) The study is concentrated on explaining the administrative innovation model applied by the Ministry of Justice as the line agency through considering the process. It begins with studying the formulation of the reform policy from the central agency, i.e. the OPDC which is the key to modify and duplicate the foreign administrative innovation in order to be applied in 20 ministries as the line agencies. Therefore, the implementation of the administrative innovation enables to develop and improve the innovation process in developing the bureaucracy in the Thai social context in future.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEWS

The researcher has reviewed the literatures pervasive to the research questions in order to adopt the concepts and theories to conceptualize a framework for the study. The related issues and details are as below.

- 2.1 The paradigm of public administration
- 2.2 The U.S. public administration paradigms
- 2.3 The paradigms and the public administration education
- 2.4 The concepts and theories to explain the Thai public administration paradigms
- 2.5 Factors influencing the change of the public management reform
- 2.6 The Thai public sector development
- 2.7 Innovation and the Thai public sector development
- 2.8 Result-based management
- 2.9 The implementation of the result-based management in the Thai public sector development
- 2.10 Related researches
- 2.11 Synthesis of the conceptual framework

2.1 The Paradigm of Public Administration

Public administration has long been since China, India and ancient Egypt. China was the first in the world to have bureaucracy for over 2000 years (Heady (1996), Wren (1994 cited in Holzer, Gabrielyan and Yang 2007)). But the birth of tireless studies and official records of public administration with experiment and dissemination to academics has been found in Europe and in the U.S. Europe began in 1885 by Lorenz von Stein a German professor instructing public administration Vienna University (Sirirat Chunchaklaai, 2012). Meanwhile, in the U.S., it began with

an article of Woodrow Wilson in 1887 titled, "The Study of Administration". The researcher has reviewed the concept of public administration, its meaning, its scope and elements, its relationship with other disciplines with following details.

2.1.1 The Meaning of Public Administration

It has differently been defined and the researcher divides it into two major groups, i.e. first, it is meant the legislative, administrative and judicial affairs. Scholars supporting this concept are for example Bhagwan and Bhushan (1979); Pfiffner and Dimock cited in Bhagwan and Bhushan (1979); Henry (1989); and Rosenbloom and Kravchuk, (2005). The second group defines it as a process of the public sector to produce or to provide goods and services, rules, regulations, resource management and solving internal conflicts under the efficient command and fairness for people. The second group concentrates on running affairs under the executive branch only. Scholars supporting this group are for example Dimock, Dimock and Fox (1953); Johnson (1996); Peters (1995); Denhardt and Denherdt (2006); Choob Kanjanaprakorn (1966) and Uthai Laohawichian (2000).

Meanwhile, Wilson (1887) explains that the objectives of the Study of Administration is to help the confusing administration and with high cost to become stable principles. It is corresponded with the opinion of White (1926) suggesting that public administration is the management of personnel, raw materials, equipments, and tools to reach success as being targeted by the state which emphasizes agility, economy, and leads to the achievement of the public programs. It is also corresponded with the conclusion of Rosenbloom (1992) saying that public administration is focused on effectiveness, efficiency and economy. Similarly, Greene (2004) concludes that public administration is the very public management.

With the opinions of both scholar groups above, the researcher concludes that public administration in this study is a production process and public services to meet the needs and misery of people through the mechanism of public agencies or bureaucratic system. The concept of public administration can be divided into two (2) aspects, i.e. academics and practices and both are reciprocally influencing and linking each other.

2.1.2 Elements of Public Administration as Professional or Practice and as Academic discipline

Public administration can be divided into two aspects, i.e. the practice of the public sector and the academics related to study, instructions and researches on managing public affairs. Johnson (1996) explains that public administration is both professional administration and academic. The nature of being profession is obsolete since the 19th century and evolves to link the public purposes whereas its academic discipline has been developed to support the professional character through analyzing the past performance and creating knowledge for better effectiveness. Greene (2004:49) explains that academic principles respond to the shift of practice in both observations and researches on the areas of practices, whereas the practices create specific character and academic knowledge. It is corresponded with the opinion of Thawat Wichaidit (1979) identifying that public administration means both “academic discipline” and “administrative affairs or bureaucratic system”. Shafritz, Russell and Borick (2011) conclude that the “body of academic” and the “practical knowledge” of public administration are applied for social services.

Therefore, the studies of public administration development in a society require studying the dichotomy of academics and practices, which will spotlight the true dynamism of the public administration in the society.

2.1.3 The Scope of Public Administration

It is referred to the areas and the activities under the scope of public policy while the cycle of public administration contains three (3) elements, i.e. 1) setting the public policy which begins the alternatives of production and services; 2) managing the resources and authorities by the state agencies and 3) the outputs has to be for social.

2.1.4 The Connectivity between Public Administration and Bureaucracy

Public administration is a concept of the public sector in producing products and services for people through bureaucratic operation. Therefore, the bureaucracy plays the duties to produce products and services for people. Jun (1986) claims that bureaucracy is the important characteristics of public administration. On the contrary, Levine, Peters and Thompson (1990) contend that the state agencies are the important political players in every step of the policy process.

The concept of bureaucracy has been proposed by Max Weber (1864-1920) a German sociologist during the end of the 19th Century especially in the west where industrialized countries have been speedily developed (Jun, 1986:128). Weber believes that bureaucracy is necessary to handle the modern societies because they are complicated (Greene, 2004). The origin of bureaucracy Weber (cited in Denhart, 2008) identifies three major legitimate authorities: 1) legal authority, 2) tradition authority, and 3) charismatic authority. The legal authority is the birth of the bureaucratic organization because it is exercised by the bureaucratic administrative staff. Therefore, the legal authority and the bureaucratic staff are the critical issues of the bureaucratic organization.

In the characteristics of bureaucracy, Weber (1946) explains about the duties of the modern bureaucratic staff that they require the following exercises, i.e. 1) given formal principle which is specified in the form of laws or administrative regulations, 2) hierarchy of command of the offices and the authoritative levels to command from the immediate supervisors to the subordinates, 3) managing the modern offices adhering to stipulations in written documents, 4) specialization-focused in managing the offices through expert training, 5) after being developed, the staff must work in full potentials and as the main jobs, 6) managing the offices must follow rules and regulations. In addition, Greene (2004) concludes the key characteristics of the bureaucratic model, which involve 1) hierarchical structure, 2) chain of command, 3) division of labor and specialization of labor, 4) standardized procedures, 5) individual performance-based promotion, 6) focusing on efficiency and effectiveness of the goal, 7) productivity is set by rules and the specific procedures with impersonal implementation.

Besides, Weber specifies the personnel administrative system in bureaucracy as 1) non-privacy, 2) positioned by chain of command, 3) each one is specialist, 4) non-relation admission, 5) selection through contest, educational qualification, technical training, where they are appointed not elected, 6) ensured salary, 7) working is the main profession, 8) advancements are based either on seniority or achievement or both and also the decision-making of the immediate supervisor, 9) working without ownership of the organizational resources, and

10) given control system and disciplinary punishment system to monitor the works of the staff (Weber, 1947 cited in Denhart, 2008).

In conclusion, public administration is a study of a production process and public services to meet the needs and the troubles of people through the bureaucratic mechanism. This research is focused on investigating the concept of public administration used in developing the Thai bureaucracy in 1959-2006.

2.1.5 The relationship between public administration and other subjects

Public administration is the administration of the public sectors focusing on services and to solve the social problems with efficiency. To solve the public problems come from linking many dimensions of politics, economy, social, and belief. Public beliefs in each locality require knowledge in many disciplines for analysis, synthesis the arisen problems and to understand the needs of people. Therefore, the public sector administration needs to links with other subjects. Jun (1986) explains the relationship that public administration is a discipline in many disciplines to be conscious of people and organizations. The differences between the methodological study in each viewpoint of each discipline leading to clearer understanding public problems. Knowledge from various disciplines such as political science, history, economy, psychology, business administration, sociology, philosophy, laws and computer science lead to find possible exits. Both administration and social are characteristically complicated. The relationship between various sciences adds viewpoints to understand the phenomenon in public administration as follows:

- 1) Political Science is the master plan for public administration related to the works of the administration, legislation, judiciary, interest groups and civilians.
- 2) Historical Perspective helps understand the current situations which require understanding the development of the past administration and the historical analysis help avoid future errors by using the past experience to develop the present administration.
- 3) Economic Analysis help understand international trade, tax, price, finance and budget, unemployment, production and economic growth which are the information needed to set policy and the state missions.
- 4) Psychological Studies are to create consciousness the knowledge of human motivation, perspectives, personality,

behavior, action and individual and organizational values. 5) Business Administration Perspective is to propose technique in improving the public sector organization. 6) Sociologist Perspective provides social phenomenon such as the social classes, ethnic relations, family structure, and changes of values, of organization and of social institutions. 7) Anthropologist Perspective helps create understanding the problems of people's relation on cultural activities. 8) Philosophers help to understand basic issues such as social ethics, justice, fairness, public benefits (common good), ontology (the studies of being) and epistemology (the studies of knowledge). Perspective of Laws is conscious to rules, and regulations such as fairness, laws, government, court rules, and interpretation of policy and project orders and 10) Perspective of Computer Sciences is applied to public administration in order to improve the information processing, working process, organization, information system and action research.

Therefore, public administration being the public sector administration requires to link with other sciences which are necessary to understand nature of problems and public needs. They will be used in setting public policy and its application. Then the public administrators and state agents need to understand other sciences involved in order to apply the policy to achieve the goal.

2.1.6 Public Administration and Environmental Context

Public administration links with environments which mean the contexts of politics, economy, and social and so on. These contexts allows public administration or public sector administration in each society differ. Besides, public administration influences social too, for example, setting policies affecting societies in the form of laws, regulations, stipulations or projects solving problems and so on. Therefore, both the social contexts and public administration/state affairs administration have mutual interactions. Jun (1986) explains about the interaction that public administration is influenced by what exists and the evolution of the social and political conditions. Without the environmental perspectives, they limit the tenets of public administration but emphasize the technical duty in the organizations. Besides, Jun further explains that each society has its own unique idealism, and socio-values expressed in the process of administration. The public administration is then directed and controlled by the political ideas. Therefore, the democratic administration and decentralization

would be hard if it is amid the dictatorial ideology. The nature of dictatorship cannot be convergent to democracy particularly on rejections of personal rights and interests (Jun, 1986). Greene (2004) exemplifies that influences affecting the American public administration come for two factors, i.e., environments and politics such as the Federal House, political culture, public opinion and ideology and so on.

In summary, public administration is a public sector administration with the model and practices influenced by the political, economic and social environments.

2.2 The US Public Administration Paradigm

The start of the academic public administration is from an article of Woodrow Wilson on *The Study of Administration* published in 1887 which studied the development of the US public Administration. Many scholars have diversely proposed such as Greene (2005) who divides public administration development into 4 paradigms: 1) the Classic School (1900-1940); 2) the Behaviorist School (1940-1970s); 3) the Modern Public Administration (1968-980s), and 4) the Public Administration as Public Administration (1970-) and the Refunding Period (1980s-). Holzer and Gabrielyan (2007) group the concepts of public administration development into 5 groups, i.e., 1) the group of Honest, Neutral, Businesslike Government; 2) the group of classic organizational model; 3) the group of Politics and Policy Making; 4) the group of Human Behavior; and 5) the group of Project Efficiency. Nicholas Henry (2010) divides into 6 paradigms as below.

1) The Politics/Administration Dichotomy (1900-1926)

In 1887, Woodrow Wilson published an article called “*The Study of Administration*” which sparked the US public administration by proposing politics be separated from the administration (Henry, 2010:28). With the proposals of Wilson, there were two critic phenomena, i.e. 1) corruptions in USA were prevailing with conflict of interest in their duties especially during 1840s-1870s; 2) there was movement to claim for administration development in order to meet the challenges on the rise of population, industrialization and urbanization (Fry and Raadschelders, 2008). Besides, Wilson, demanded scholars to take interest in result-based policy

administration by advising to adopt business technology to be applied in the public sectors which became the landmark of the first era of public administration (Fry and Raadschelders, 2008).

2) Principals of Public Administration) (1927-1937)

This is an administration focused paradigm believing that administration with disregarding sectors, cultures, functions, environment, mission, institution - this principle is applicable in everywhere (Henry, 2010) or disregarding the context of the organization which applies this principle.

The academic works of this paradigm during 1927 were the “Principle of Public Administration” written by W.F. Willoughby containing 2 volumes. In 1937, an article was proposed by Luther H. Gulick and Lyndall Urwick entitled “Papers on the Science of Administration” proposing 7 principles, i.e. “POSDCORB” and was trusted by President Franklin D. Roosevelt (Henry, 2010) . In the 1939, the President appointed a Committee on Administration Management popularly known as ^{ที่} Brownlow Committee chaired by Louis Brownlow and having Luther H. Gulick as another committee member (Milkis, 2008). In addition, there was another book called The Functions of the Executive written by Chester I. Barnard in 1938. In 1947, the “Administrative Behavior” written by Simon was released.

However, during 1930-1950, there were challenges against public administration in the first paradigm – politics could not divorce administration. The argument of Waldo (1948) viewed that the theory of public administration is the theory of political sciences (Farazmand, 1997). The politics differ the administration on values. Public administration has its values connecting with community, pluralism, personality, loyalty, passion and ideology. On the contrary, public administration links with hierarchy, elitism, impersonality, professionalism, dispassion and neutrality (Henry, 2010). The 2 challenges of Waldo (1948) led to identity crisis in the public administration discipline.

3) The public administration paradigm as political sciences (1950-1970)

This paradigm heads to Comparative and Development Administration or the crossover culture which differs from the public organization in a country and in

the region. In 1950, the Comparative Administration Group (CAG) was introduced. In 1962, CAG was funded by the Ford Foundation which is accounted importance on the interest of developing administration but focusing on addressing public sector in the developing countries. Results were both the comparative administration and the development administration failed which led to the Ford Foundation ended its funds to support CAG in 1971.

4) The public administration paradigm as management (1950-1970)

It is called management or administrative science which adheres to sector, culture, institute, mission and less affects to the effective and efficient administration. Both paradigms 2 and 4 are called one-size-fits-all.

There were 3 forces of separation on public administration from political science and management in 1965-1970. 1) The force of opening science, technology and public policy in the US universities. All these three syllabuses dominated the science of public administration and they are the center of elitism whereas focused on pluralism and professionalism. Hierarchy was then replaced community. 2) Meeting of new public administration in 1968 - it was focused on Normative Theory rather than the Traditional Instrumentalities as efficiency, effectiveness and budgeting. The new public administration is free from political science and management which is focused on techniques rather than proposal for the necessity. 3) Public administration differentiates its concepts from the traditional concepts.

5) Public administration paradigm as public administration (1970-2010)

Public administration paradigm as public administration refers its success of its separation from political science and management. This 5th paradigm is to merge the strength of various ways between the professors' groups and the practitioners' groups which have never been found since 1930.

6) Governance paradigm (1990-present: 2010)

The enormous change of technology, communication, and world economy including power and the government roles led to self-assessments in the private sectors, Not-for-profit organization and the public sectors. Roles of each sector were

changing and the decline of government having globalization and internet becoming the oppressors to decline the public sectors. So, the separation between the public sectors, the private sectors and the not-for-profit organizations would be extremely separated as in the past. Previously, the government controlled and served public and people only but such model is moving towards governance which is institutionalization and network in distributing public services.

In summary, Henry (2010) divides the US public administration since Woodrow Wilson until today into 6 paradigms adhering to major incidents the areas of the public administration discipline as its divisions such as academics, articles and archives, opening learning programs and practices which lead to the change in the state administration and so on.

2.3 The paradigms and the public administration education

The researcher has adopted the paradigm concepts to develop the Thai public administration. They are divided into items, meaning, paradigm concepts and limitation in applying the paradigms to study public administration as following details.

2.3.1 The meaning of paradigm

The paradigm has been hypothesized on social reality and problem solving or some theories assumes on the hypotheses constructed from the main focus of public administration or the enterprise administration which maintains projects and functions to entrust its effectiveness and products.

The researcher argues that the public administration paradigm is the framework containing concept, theory, method, key actor, innovation, instrument and tools and values which link to the main concept interrelating into specific oneness in developing the bureaucracy. At the meantime, the change of the paradigm with the implication of the change from the traditional conceptual framework to the new paradigm based on encountering problems, limitations and disability to constructively solve the incidents become the rationale for people involved or the academic community to attempt developing new paradigm to solve the problems. Such problems might come from inefficiency, unfairness and absence of transparency in

solving problems. Jun (1986:58) explains that upon applying a paradigm with a social science research; it will be used as a conceptual framework and becomes a theory fit. At the meantime, Golembiewski (1977) explains that a perfect paradigm of public administration must be proved in details which are incidents of subjectivities in analysis. Besides, Jun (1986:58) adds that a paradigm will be used to solve a specific problem and becomes a theoretical exemplar, model and research (Jun, 1986:59) and they could be concluded as follows:




Figure 2.1 Paradigm conceptual framework

Source: Modified from Jun (1986)

2.3.2 Paradigm Conceptual Framework

The paradigm conceptual framework proposed by Thomas Kuhn (1970) (cited in Jun, 1986) that there are 5 stages, i.e.

(1) Pre-Paradigm Stage is the duration of theoretical approaches or the Schools of Thoughts compete to step into the leadership and being accepted by the community, scholars and practitioners.

(2) Paradigm Stage in Normal Science – it is the time without any challenges in the scientific communities: a time to accumulate knowledge and theories. Ostrom (1973) further proposes that it is the time when the scholar communities “agree with theoretical paradigms or frameworks”. Scholars use this paradigm to conduct or to use the method, and concept to view problems and to set criteria in working. It is therefore counted that it is the time to accumulate knowledge of the scholar communities.

(3) Crisis Stage or the time of challenging ideas – this is a stage that the traditional paradigm is facing new problems different from the normal stage or facing the hard time and disabling to deal with them or the new crises with efficiency. Ostrom (1973) contends that new problems are the alienated situation and disabling to satisfactorily explain within the traditional framework. It is then questioned and turns

the study under the traditional framework to new problems. At this moment, it is to enter the circle of contest to introduce new paradigms. When there are explicable natures; the scholar communities will experience such problems and their theoretical frameworks have displayed the scope of their common understanding to such problems.

(4) Scientific Revolution – on the post crisis of the traditional paradigm challenge; there will be questions about the existing traditional paradigm and consideration of the alternatives. If the alternatives of the paradigm have been proved their success more than the traditional paradigm; the community of scientists alter their interests and form new hypotheses based on the alternative paradigms. This is the new management transferred from alienation and provides more accountability with researches and experiments.

(5) New Paradigm Stage – the new paradigm exists in so far as the research evidences move in the same direction with prediction in using the paradigm (Jun, 1986). Besides, Jun (1986) identifies that the application of the new paradigm with public administration has been interested in the paradigm shifting when facing the social conditions and the improvements of the policy and the administration. The framework of paradigms could be summarized as the following chart.




Figure 2.2 The conceptual framework of the paradigm process

Source: Modified from The Diagram of Jun (1986)

2.4 The Concepts and Theories to Explain the Thai Public Administration Paradigms

In explaining the Thai public administration paradigm, the researcher has based on Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011)'s concept of Public Management Reform to explain the reform in the dimension of the Thai bureaucratic development. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) divide the direction of its reform into three (3) waves, i.e. 1) The first wave is the classic period of planning, rational, cost-benefit analysis, scientism and expertise which are during the middle of 1960s to the end of 1970s. 2) The second wave is the new public management (NPM) and business techniques to improve efficiency which begins at the end of 1970s until the end of 1990s. And 3) the third wave – the governance, network, partnership, joining up, transparency and trust, which are found during the end of 1990s until 2010s.

Table 2.1 Waves of Public Management Reform

Periods	Natures of Reform
Mid1960s - Late 1970s	- planning, rational, cost-benefit analysis, scientism and expertise
Late 1970s - Late 1990s	- the new public management (NPM), business techniques to improve efficiency
Late 1990s - 2010	- the governance, network, partnership, joining up, transparency and trust

Sources: Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011)

2.5 Factors Influencing the Change of the Public Management Reform

The researcher concludes the factors influencing the change of the public management reform based on the model of public management reform of Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) as the scope to understand its change. The model contains five (5) elements and each one has sub-elements as following details.

Table 2.2 Factors influencing the change of the public management reform

Variable Groups	Variables
A. socio-economic forces	B. global economic force C. socio-demographic change D. Socio-economic policies
E. Political system	F. New management ideas G. Pressure from citizens H. Party political ideas
I. Major incidents e.g. chance, events	- Side-effect situations affecting the reform policy-disasters, scandals, coups and so on.
J. Elite decision-making	- Interpersonal relationship between political executives and permanent public administrators.
J. Administrative system	K. Content of reform package L. Implementation process M. Results achieved

Source: Modified from Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011)

2.5.1 A Model of Public Management Reform

This model explains the scheme and tendency displaying factors influencing the reform especially the international organizations and networks would play the leading roles in various national reforms (Mahon and McBride, 2009 cited in Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). The decision-making on the public management reform will be pursued by the government but the government will resume under the influences of the international organizations and usually they are the OECD (the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) or World Bank. At the meantime, the center of decision-making of the elites will be the top-down order by the management and the top management and the elites. They would also be significantly influenced by the concepts and forces which includes also the international organizations.

The researcher will explain the model of reform based on Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) by dividing into each factor influencing the public management reform worked out by Prayote Songklin (2008) as below.

(1) Elite-decision Making

With the reform model, it is found that the elite-decision making has been framed to be the center of the model because the public management reforms in various countries were mostly top-down. Meaning, the birth of the idea came mainly from the management or the top bureaucrats. The possible reform could come from culture and techniques in administration too or depend upon the norms and the expectations of the key players. Therefore, projects introduced by the elites were usually met problems and limitations particularly political limitations, administration, and the change model inexperienced before.

(2) Socio-economic Force

It contains three sub factors, i.e. global economic force, socio-demographic change and socio-economic policies

(2.1) Global Economic Force

Due to the globalization of the capital market and the growth of the cross-international companies and international trade; they less equip each

government with potentials to control and resume their own economic policies while governments cannot maintain the level of public expenses for long-term during the volatility of the world capital market. Besides, the severity of the international competition mandates the government to pay more attention to increase the international competitiveness. Had any countries charged high rate of tax or red-tape; it reduces the efficiency of its international competitiveness. Therefore, the main reason to reform the public management is to organize the public expenses, to reduce the problem arisen from the bureaucratic inefficiency and the social policy improvement which the government cannot anymore support.

(2.2) Socio-Demographic Change

This change is the change of lifestyle of most people in each country. These fundamental impacts demand the government to take more burdens of finance and services of healthcare, social helps and social security, in particular. However, the socio-demographic changes do not lead to only management but their influences will lead to indirect impacts by the urges to politicians and bureaucrats to find approaches alleviating the systematic tensions and might lead to various measures such as reduction of the rate for people who have chances to gain benefits and to focus on providing services for those who are really in need or leading to improving the organization and their management. For example, it is to minimizing the size of the agencies in order to reduce their routine expenses or to support the business sectors or the philanthropic organizations to involve in the public services. All these are to provide services of the public sector for better save expenses while having better efficiency.

(2.3) Socio-Economic Policies

Factors of socio-economic policies come from the influences of the global economy (Box B) and the socio-demographic changes (Box C). the socio-economic policies will be improved and change to meet the economic situation and social in each period of time.

(3) Political System

The factors of political system will directly be influencing the public management reform particularly enabling facilitations and shaping or restraining the public management reform. Besides, political system is characterized in a single party

or coalition parties. They too diversely affect the process of the public management reforms. There are three (3) sub-factors in the political system, i.e. new management ideas (Box F), pressure from citizens (Box G) and political party ideas (Box H) which are detailed as below.

(3.1) New Management Ideas

New management ideas are mostly exchanged or adopted from the successfully developed countries or from being supported by the international organizations such as OECD, World Bank, writings of specialists, business institutions, presentations of the management counselors, and academic seminars. The new management ideas are usually implemented similarly to the original country but in the form of hybridization with many sources by the elites and the public top management within their agencies.

(3.2) Pressure from Citizens

Superficially, it would have been found that each public management reform; common citizens do not play their direct roles and without specific channel to support them to introduce their ideas constructively to such improvements. In fact, common citizens can pressure to create changes. For example, had the state agencies provide slow services, inflexible and unfriendly; they would be dissatisfied with the service standards and this would lead to complaints to their political representatives, and mass media. These are the channels enabling their opinions to the elites in setting the policy, particularly, had citizens at large believe that bureaucrats are corrupted or unfairly provide services. To such case, the public opinion can pressure for reform. Therefore, though the public opinion cannot drive to direct practices but it situation that citizens can pressure in the background until it can lead to significant changes in the public management reform.

(3.3) Political Party Ideas

In this point, political parties propose ideas, and the policy to change the bureaucratic development. All these involve structure, models and the process of bureaucratic development. For example, the political parties may reduce bureaucracy or decentralize more or propose specific projects such as establishment of ministries, and agencies and so on. The political party ideas may come from internal development of the parties or may come from the external ideas such as petitions of

citizens recognized during their election campaign (Box B), or the business sector, scholars and educational institutions (Box F) and so on.

(4) Unexpected Events/Chance Events

The unexpected events are such as scandals, natural disasters and so on. The features of unexpected event are so significant to be news and unpredictable events. Their consequences are unexpectedly affecting the reform and in some cases, they are ambiguous.

(5) Administration System

This factor is hard to change and mostly gradual because the culture and the traditional rules and regulation are deep-rooted in the bureaucratic lifestyles which might disable to eliminate or change overnight. In reform, the reformers need to ensure that bureaucrats would appropriately and convergent behave with the new model of reform. But, in practice, bureaucrats more incline to develop by their own wants. By in-depth reflection, it is clear that the administration system is hard to change because of too many details or odds and ends. For example, adoptions of computer technology for uses and theoretically; they provide speed in services and less personnel while increasing efficient process. In fact, reforms are complicated and needed to train staff of the new computer system and the station of public administration would become worry to the changes such as reduction of the staff and so on. This will lead to resistance in increasing efficiency.

The administration contains three (3) sub-factors, i.e. content of reform package (Box L), implementation process (Box M) and result achieved ((Box N) with following details.

(5.1) Content of Reform Package

The contents of reform are the outputs of what are desirable and feasible (Box J). The reform project announced is usually needed interpretation for practices and sometimes, and it is not really put into practices. March and Olsen (1995, cited in Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004) say most democratic countries have reform packages in administration, times and again having ad hoc committee or the initiatives of the parliament in order to overhaul the mechanism of the government

administration. Such attempts are usually welcomed and applauded at first but at the end, the reform projects are truly carried out (Prayote Songklin, 2008). It reveals that the announcement of a reform project and actualizes it might be the separable activities.

(5.2) Implementation Process

This stage is so important to the reform because in the management sciences are inflexible and the practitioners usually learn during reform. Besides, implementing reforms are complicated when they have to work through many networks rather than through an agency. In implementing the reform concept, besides implementing abstract into practice; the importance is the implementation process should be the feedback directly to the policy-makers at the elite level (Box J) to be the information for decision-making what should be further done. For example, the project should proceed or might be improved in some parts or in the entire project.

(5.3) Results Achieved

Results could be achieved or not achieved as targeted but the results would bounce back to the previous stage particularly the feedbacks moving to the elite level in order to realize which change is necessary and which one is possible (Box J). In practices, the end-result of the reform is hard to be evaluated or identified with confidence with details as in the chart, i.e.




Figure 2.3 A model of public management reform

Source: Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011)

2.6 The Thai Bureaucratic System Development

The researcher collects the concepts of the Thai bureaucratic system development containing meaning given, the Thai bureaucratic administration organization, the evolution of the Thai bureaucratic system development, the public policy of the Thai bureaucratic system development, and the results of the Thai bureaucratic system development.

2.6.1 Bureaucratic Concepts

Weber (1982, cited in Koven, 2011) characterizes the legal authorities as follows, (1) the works of the organization are endorsed by law; (2) works are divided by duty, (3) having line of command and clear control, (4) works are technically and legally controlled, (5) the organizational resources are separated their ownership from the organizational members, (6) the organizational owner cannot bring the organization for personal use, (7) administration must be in black and white, and (8) the legal authority system can be in many models but they must be the agents of the bureaucratic system only. In addition, Weber (1982) specifies the personality of the bureaucrats as follows: (1) the bureaucrats are free from privacy, (2) having clear line of command, (3) the organizational duties must be clear, (4) bureaucrats are appointed by being based on contract, (5) bureaucrats are selected by professional qualification using pre-bachelor certificate through selection test (6) bureaucrats earn salary and pension, (7) the position must be key profession, (8) having advancement route and supports from seniority and merit system, (9) bureaucrats could be fit for either position or resources, and (10) bureaucrats have unity of control (Albrow, 1970).

2.6.2 Thai Bureaucratic Administration

The Thai bureaucratic administration adheres to three models, i.e. (1) centralization – an administration from the central agency containing ministries, departments and divisions; (2) division of power – regionalization containing provinces and districts; (3) decentralization – a bureaucratic administration for the local administration containing various types of local administration organization. By principles, all the three models have been enacted in the Public Administration Act B.E.2545 (2002) (Saman Rangsiyokrit, 2003).

The Current Structure of the Thai bureaucratic Administration




Figure 2.4 The structure of the Thai bureaucratic administration

Source : Modified from Wongpreedee and Mahakanjana (2011)

2.6.3 Development in the Thai Bureaucratic Development

The Thai bureaucratic development during 1959-2006 has been through the Thai bureaucratic development mechanisms which were the Bureaucratic Development Commission or otherwise called differently in each government where individuals are appointed to develop and reform the Thai bureaucratic development as following details.

Table 2.3 The Thai Bureaucratic Reform Commission by each government during 1959-2006

Regimes	Appointment	Commissions
Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (1959-1963)	1959	1) The Advisory Group to the Principal Administrative Regulations of the State Agency
Field Marshal Thanom Kittikajorn (1963-1969)	1963	2) The Advisory Group to the Administrative Regulations of the Prime Minister
Field Marshal Thanom Kittikajorn (1969-1971)	1969	3) The Advisory Group to the Administrative Regulations of the Prime Minister
Field Marshal Thanom Kittikajorn (1969-1971)	1971	The Advisory Group to the Prime Minister (the new committee had been appointed in the same year due to the change of names in the bureaucratic divisions and duties of some incumbents)
Coup d'état under Field Marshal Thanom Kittikajorn (1971-1972)	1972	4) The Advisory Group to the Administrative Regulations of the Revolutionary Leader
Field Marshal Thanom Kittikajorn (1972-1973)	1973	5) The Advisory Group to the Administrative Regulations of the Prime Minister
Mr. Sanya Thammasak (1973-1974)	1973	6) The Advisory Group to the Administrative Regulations of the Prime Minister
Mr. Sanya Thammasak (1974-1975)	1974	7) The Advisory Group to the Administrative Regulations of the Prime Minister
M.R. Seni Pramote (1975-1975)	-	no committee appointed
Gen. Maj. M.R. Kuekrit Pramote (1975-1976)	-	no committee appointed
M.R. Seni Pramote (1975-1975)	-	no committee appointed
M.R. Seni Pramote (1976-1976)	-	no committee appointed
Mr. Thanin Kraiwichian (1976-1977)	1976	8) The Advisory Group to the Administrative Regulations of the Prime Minister
Gen. Kriangsak Chamanant (1977-1979)	1977	9) The Advisory Group to the Administrative Regulations of the Prime Minister
Gen. Kriangsak Chamanant (1979-1980)	1979	10) The Advisory Group to the Administrative Regulations of the Prime Minister

Table 2.3 The Thai Bureaucratic Reform Commission by each government during 1959-2006 (cont.)

Regimes	Appointment	Commissions
Gen. Prem Tinasulanont (1980-1983)	1980	11) The Bureaucratic Reforms and Administrative Regulation Commission
Gen. Prem Tinasulanont (1983-1986)	1983	12) The Bureaucratic Reforms and Administrative Regulation Commission
Gen. Prem Tinasulanont (1986-1988)	1986	13) The Bureaucratic Reforms and Administrative Regulation Commission
Gen. Chartchai Chunnahawan (1988-1990)		14) The Bureaucratic Reforms and Administrative Regulation Commission
Mr. Anant Panyarachun (1991-1992) 1 st .Term (1992-1992) 2 nd .Term		15) The Administrative System Improvement Commission
Gen. Suchinda Kraprayoon (1992-1992)	-	-
Mr. Chuan Leekphai (1 st .Term)(1992-1995)	1992	16) The Administrative System Development Commission
Mr. Banharn Silpa-archa (1995-1996)		17) The Bureaucratic Reform Commission
Gen. Chawalit Yongjaiyut (1996-1997)	1997	18) The Bureaucratic Reform Commission
Mr. Chuan Leekphai (2 nd . Term) (1997-2001)	1997	19)The Bureaucratic Reform Commission
Mr. Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2005)	2002	20) The Bureaucratic System Development Commission
Mr. Thaksin Shinawatra (2005-2006)	2005	21) The Bureaucratic System Development Commission

Source: Office of Bureaucratic Reform Commission: Office of Civil Service Commission (2001)

The bureaucratic reform during 1959-2006 has been proceeded through 22 committee mechanisms. The first committee was established during the regime of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (1959-1963). In 1959, the committee was called “The Advisory Group to the Principal Administrative Regulations of the State Agency”. Later, in the regime of Field Marshal Thanom Kittikajorn (1963-1969), he changed the name into “*The Advisory Group to the Administrative Regulations of the Prime Minister*”. Each regime called it respectively until the 2nd term of the regime of Gen. Kriangsak Chamanant (1979-1980), there were 10 committees and under the regime of Field Marshal Thanom Kittikajorn, there were 5 committees during 1963-1969.

When Gen. Prem Tinasulanont rose into the position of Prime Minister; he has established a committee of bureaucratic development called the Bureaucratic Reforms and Administrative Regulation Commission this included Gen. Chartchai

Chunnahawan (1988-1990). Whereas, Mr. Anant Panyarachun (1991-1992) established the Administrative System Improvement Commission but suspended during the regime of Gen. Suchinda Kraprayoon (1992-1992); the committee of bureaucratic development has been revived again in the 1st term of the regime of Mr. Chaun Leekphai (1992-1995) called the Administrative System Development Commission. Later in the regime of Mr. Banharn Silpa-archa (1995-1996), he has changed the name into the Bureaucratic Reform Commission. The name has been continued in use until the regime of Gen. Chawalit Yongjaiyut (1996-1997) and the 2nd. regime of Mr. Chuan Leekphai (1997-2001). A change had been made again during the regime of Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2006). In 2002, the Bureaucratic System Development Commission having its Office to support the work of the Commission and it is established as a permanent office under the Administration of the Kingdom Act (Amendment) BE 2545 (2002).

2.6.4 Public Policy of the Thai Bureaucratic System Development

The policy contains 1) the national economic and social development plans, 2) the government policies of the bureaucratic system development, 3) the law of the Administration of the Kingdom Act, 4) The Royal Decree of the criteria and method of good governance and 5) strategic plans of the bureaucratic system development with details as follows:

(1) The National Economic and Social Development Plans

The First National Economic and Social Development Plan (1961-1966) has been prepared under the advices and reports of the studies conducted by the World Bank teamwork who has dispatched specialist to survey the Thai economy during July 1957-June 1958. The team reported, “A Public Development Program for Thailand” (Phradhammapitaka, 2009). The report significantly influenced the contents of the First National Economic and Social Development Plan for 1961-1966. Thailand has 9 national plans with following details.

Table 2.4 The First – Ninth National Economic and Social Development Plan (1961-2006)

No.	Plans	Prime Minister	Contents of the Public Management
1	The First National Economic and Social Development Plan (1961-1966)	Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat	- Emphasize development only for economic growth
2	The Second National Economic and Social Development Plan (1967-1971)	Field Marshal Thanom Kittikajorn	- Emphasize economic development paired with rural development
3	The Third National Economic and Social Development Plan (1972-1976)	Field Marshal Thanom Kittikajorn	-Emphasize economic development
4	The Fourth National Economic and Social Development Plan (1977-1981)	Mr. Thanin Kraiwichian	- Accelerate the national economic recovery - Minimize the gaps of economic and social status among citizens
5	The Fifth National Economic and Social Development Plan (1982-1986)	Gen. Prem Tinasulanont	- Reform the action planning process, fiscal budgeting, harmonizing personnel administration through preparing action plans at the levels of ministries, and important development branches.
6	The Sixth National Economic and Social Development Plan (1987-1991)	Gen. Chartchai Chunnahawan	- Increase the roles of private sectors in developing the country particularly some basic services which were state duties.
7	The Seventh National Economic and Social Development Plan (1992-1996)	Mr. Anant Panyarachun	- Adjust the bureaucratic roles from inspection, and control into monitoring and promotion - resize and restructure to lean agencies by outsourcing private sectors in some affairs - Offer opportunity for the private to run the state enterprise when formerly the state monopolized. - Amend rules and regulations, approval procedure, permits to shorten and speed working process. - Adopt Managerial IT for application - Decentralize responsibility and power for decision-making to operational bureaucrats more
8	The Eight National Economic and Social Development Plan (1997-2001)	Gen. Chawalit Yongjaiyut	-Improve the public management system through developing civil state by promoting rule of law in public administration and offer opportunity for private organization, private sector, community and citizen to involve in the public management.

Table 2.4 The First – Ninth National Economic and Social Development Plan (1961-2006) (cont.)

No.	Plans	Prime Minister	Contents of the Public Management
9	The Ninth National Economic and Social Development Plan (2002-2006)	Mr. Thaksin Shinawatra	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Develop the action planning process in various levels which connect under the principle of area-based, mission, involvement, priority and results-achieved. - Coordinate and adjust roles of the central agency to support the operation of the operational levels - Develop system and mechanism to follow-up the evaluation and to create success index in all levels.

Source: <http://www.nesdb.go.th/>

The Development Plans 1-5 emphasized economic development as key. The Development Plan 5 began to pay importance to reform the action planning process, fiscal budgeting and harmonizing personnel administration more. The Development Plan 6 changed the public management through supports from the private sectors in public services more. Clarity was found in The Development Plan 7 by setting the approaches for the state as the monitor and supervision by having the private sector as the outsource while reducing working process and adopting IT for uses. The Development Plan 8 emphasized development by involvement from private development organizations, civil and state sectors adhering rules of law in administration. The Development Plan 9 emphasized public administration through implementing strategic plans, results-achieved, performance indicators and had mechanism of follow-up and assessment.

(2) Government Policy and the Performance of Bureaucratic Development

The government policies and the performances of bureaucratic development since Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (1959-1963) until Mr. Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2006); the researcher divides into two topics, i.e. the government policies on bureaucratic development and the consequences of bureaucratic development as following details.

(2.1) The government policies on bureaucratic development

Table 2.5 The government policies on bureaucratic development

Prime Minister	Period	Bureaucratic Development
Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat	1959-1963	- No contents about bureaucratic development
Field Marshal Thanom Kittikajorn	1963-1973 2506-2516	- Establish the Ministry of National Development by gathering various departments for supervision such as Departments of Irrigation, Highway, and Land Resources and so on.
Mr. Sanya Thammasak	1973-1975	- No contents about bureaucratic development
M.R. Seni Pramote	1975	- Reform bureaucratic practices and regulations of personnel administration
M.R. Kuekrit Pramote	1975-1976	1) Decentralize to local allowing the province to be the administration center 2) Promote Local Administration by Tambol Council
M.R. Seni Pramote	1976	- Reform bureaucratic practices and regulations of personnel administration
Mr. Thanin Kraiwichian	1976-1977	- No contents about bureaucratic development
Gen. Kriangsak Chamanant	1977-1979	- Support decentralization to the local agencies and offer opportunity for people's more involvement in the local administration
Gen. Prem Tinasulanont	1980-1988	1) Organize the unit mission without redundancy 2) Improve the budget system to meet the national economic and social development and the economic policies of the government 3) Reform bureaucratic system with speed and efficiency 4) Decentralize to regions and promote freedom of the local administration
Gen. Chartchai Chunnahawan	1988-1991	1) Change the government role from players to be supervisors by promoting private sector replacement 2) Shift idea of bureaucratic administration to the idea of administration development 3) Decentralize budgets, and personnel administration to the provinces. 4) Improve the structure of ministries, and departments to meet situations. 5) Regulate the regulations of the Office of the Prime Minister or working for people for the government agencies.
Mr. Anant Panyarachun	1991-1992	1) Improve laws to meet economic and social development 2) Improve structures of personnel administration and budget with speed and efficiency 3) Improve laws, regulations and statutes to decentralize to regions and local on personnel administration, budget and service more.

Table 2.5 The government policies on bureaucratic development (cont.)

Prime Minister	Period	Bureaucratic Development
Gen. Suchinda Kraprayoon	1992	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Decentralize power to regions and locals 2) Tune attitudes of bureaucrats to listen to citizens more 3) Increase efficiency more by distributing job to the lower levels, systematize with clear principles, set clear time frame in each procedure and notice citizen for acknowledgement. 4) Improve ministries and departments to prepare clear policies and plans to meet the national economic and social development with good control and follow-up. 5) Expand services to regions and locals including adopt IT for implementation.
Mr. Chuan Leekpai 1	1992-1995	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Speed justice administration for citizens 2) Decentralize power to local by having the local administrators 3) Improve the central and regional government agencies and central and regional state enterprises to create fairness and to reduce redundancy. 4) Counter corruption and malpractices through organizational and personnel development as such with efficiency
Mr. Banharn Silpa-archa	1995-1996	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Improve laws that hinder administration and people's services 2) Improve the central, regional and local bureaucracy to be modern and efficient 3) Improve the bureaucrats' salary and welfare 4) Decentralize power, policy, personnel, budget and income to the local administration organizations.
Gen. Chawalit Yongjaiyut	1996-1997	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Reduce the government roles from players to regulator, criteria-makers and promote private sectors to be players 2) Restructure agencies to meet the goal of national development 3) Improve the bureaucratic mechanism and budget managerial practices to meet the goal of national development 4) Tune the attitude of the bureaucrats from administration to good service for citizens 5) Adopt advanced technology to develop bureaucratic system and to create database of every level of agencies to link central database. 6) Restructure the local administration organizations and decentralize income to them 7) Citizens hold rights to access the bureaucratic information and heed public opinion through referendum and involve citizens, and mass media to inspect the state performances.

Table 2.5 The government policies on bureaucratic development (cont.)

Prime Minister	Period	Bureaucratic Development
Mr. Chuan Leekphai 2	1997-2000	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Improve bureaucratic system and state enterprises with people's involvement. 2) Improve the bureaucrats' quality to provide service quality, being honest and impartial. 3) Counter corruptions through establishing the National Counter Corruptions Commission and enacting laws of criminal proceedings for the political incumbents. 4) Speed to enact laws of decentralization to the local administration organizations and design them with 4 models, i.e. the administrations of 1) the provinces 2) municipalities, 3) Tambols (sub-districts) and 4) special model including the local council members must come from direct election while administrators must be directly elected by people or by the local council members 5) Reduce the state missions and open for private sectors to work with the state or to replace the state.
Mr. Thaksin Shinawatra	2001-2006	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Reform bureaucratic system with lean structure to meet economic and social development while speedily enacting law to restructure ministries, departments and divisions to meet changes. 2) Shift the bureaucratic roles from players and controllers into supporters and facilitators by increasing roles of the private sectors and people sectors 3) Apply IT for people to speedily receive information and improve the Bureaucratic Information Technology Act to meet the needs of people. 4) Speed to develop the quality of the bureaucrats to have facilitating attitudes of services and to improve laws, procedures, and administrative methods to be flexible, effective and transparent. 5) Speed to improve budgeting process to be the tool to manage resources with efficiency to meet the policies and strategies of the national development. 6) Promote decentralization to local and raise potential of the local administration organizations to manage their missions while supporting people sectors, civil sectors and private organizations to involve in their administration, inspection and evaluation 7) The government has to reinforce the efficiency of the integrated bureaucratic management system 8) Improve the service system for people through the central service center and the perfect e-government service center.

Source: http://library2.parliament.go.th/giventake/content_sp/spr29.pdf

(2.2) Results of Bureaucratic Development during 1959-2006

The results of the Thai bureaucratic development during 1959-2006 adhered mainly to the performances of the bureaucratic development of the Commission or the Commission holding duties to develop bureaucracy but they were known in other names. Details have been gathered from documentary survey in three major parts, i.e. 1) the Office of Bureaucratic Reform Commission: the Office of Civil Service Commission (1999; 2001); 2) Annual Reports of Office of Bureaucratic Reform Commission: the Office of Civil Service Commission during 2003-2006; and 3) Publication of the Office of Civil Service Commission; the Office of Bureaucratic Reform Commission and researches with following details.

Table 2.6 The Thai bureaucratic reforms under each regime during 1959-2006

Regimes	Commissions	Major Performances
Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (1959-1963)	The Advisory Group to the Principal Administrative Regulations of the State Agency	-
Field Marshal Thanom Kittikajorn (1963-1969)	The Advisory Group to the Administrative Regulations of the Prime Minister	-
Field Marshal Thanom Kittikajorn (1969-1971)	The Advisory Group to the Administrative Regulations of the Prime Minister	-
Field Marshal Thanom Kittikajorn (1969-1971)	The Advisory Group to the Prime Minister (the new committee had been appointed in the same year due to the change of names in the bureaucratic divisions and duties of some incumbents)	-
Field Marshal Thanom Kittikajorn (1971-1972)	The Advisory Group to the Administrative Regulations of the Revolutionary Leader	- Amendment of Ministry, Departments, and Divisions Improvement Act BE(2506)1963 into the Announcement of the Coup No. 216 - Amendment of the Administration of the Kingdom Act BE 2495 (1953) into the Announcement of the Coup No. 218

Table 2.6 The Thai bureaucratic reforms under each regime during 1959-2006 (cont.)

Regimes	Commissions	Major Performances
Field Marshal Thanom Kittikajorn (1972-1973)	The Advisory Group to the Administrative Regulations of the Prime Minister	-
Mr. Sanya Thammasak (1973-1974)	The Advisory Group to the Administrative Regulations of the Prime Minister	-
Mr. Sanya Thammasak (1974-1975)	Advisory Group to the Administrative Regulations of the Prime Minister	-
M.R. Seni Pramote (1975-1975)	no committee appointed	-
Gen. Maj. M.R. Kuekrit Pramote (1975-1976)	no committee appointed	-
M.R. Seni Pramote (1975-1975)	no committee appointed	-
M.R. Seni Pramote (1976-1976)	no committee appointed	-
Mr. Thanin Kraiwichian (1976-1977)	The Advisory Group to the Administrative Regulations of the Prime Minister	-
Gen. Kriangsak Chamanant (1977-1979)	The Advisory Group to the Administrative Regulations of the Prime Minister	- Amend Laws of Regulations of the Civil Service Personnel on Classifications
Gen. Kriangsak Chamanant (1979-1980)	The Advisory Group to the Administrative Regulations of the Prime Minister	-
Gen. Prem Tinasulanont (1980-1983)	The Bureaucratic Reforms and Administrative Regulation Commission	- Set measures to slow the number of civil service personnel growing not more than 2% a year and to slow the government agencies - Establish the Civil Service Personnel Institute in 1980 - Improve the budget system to meet the national economic and social development plans
Gen. Prem Tinasulanont (1983-1986)	The Bureaucratic Reforms and Administrative Regulation Commission	-
Gen. Prem Tinasulanont (1986-1988)	The Bureaucratic Reforms and Administrative Regulation Commission	-

Table 2.6 The Thai bureaucratic reforms under each regime during 1959-2006 (cont.)

Regimes	Commissions	Major Performances
Gen. Chartchai Chunnahawan (1988-1990)	The Bureaucratic Reforms and Administrative Regulation Commission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Regulate for the Office of the Prime Minister on official works for people in the state agencies BE 2532(1989) - Study the amendment of the law on the Announcement of the Coup No. 218 to be the Draft of the Administration of the Kingdom Act BE2534 (1991) and the Announcement of the Coup No. 216 to be the Draft of the Ministry, Department and Division Improvement Act BE2534 (1991)
Mr. Anant Panyarachun (1991-1992) 1st.Term (1992-1992) 2nd.Term	The Administrative System Improvement Commission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Enforcement of the Administration of the Kingdom Act BE2534 (1991: previously the Announcement of the Coup No. 218) and the Ministry, Department and Division Improvement Act BE2534 (1991) the Ministry, Department and Division Improvement Act BE2534 (1991: previously the Announcement of the Coup No. 216) - Issue the Civil Service Personnel Act BE 2535 (1992) - Privatization - Ease and deregulate private enterprise affairs and reduce procedures in permit approval for not less than 20 private affairs
Gen. Suchinda Kraprayoon (1992-1992)	-	-
Mr. Chuan Leekphai (1st.Term)(1992-1995)	The Administrative System Development Commission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Measures to specify the state personnel force - Issue the Tambol Administration Organization Act - Prepare proposal and on process such as <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) proposal of establishing the Administration Court (2) Proposal of laws on official information (3) Proposal to improve laws on counter corruption and malpractices in bureaucracy (4) Draft the regulations of the Office of the Prime Minister on cooperation between the public sectors and the private sectors to solve the economic problems (5) Proposal of decentralization of power
Mr. Banharn Silpaarcha (1995-1996)	The Bureaucratic Reform Commission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Announce 1996 the Year of Promoting Servicing People by the state agencies. - Prepare 12 manuals as guides for the agencies to improve bureaucratic system by themselves in 1996 - Regulate for the Office of the Prime Minister on public opinion through public hearing BE 2539 (1996)

Table 2.6 The Thai bureaucratic reforms under each regime during 1959-2006 (cont.)

Regimes	Commissions	Major Performances
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Enforce the Administrative Practices Act BE 2539 (1996) - Enforce the Liability for Wrongful Act of Official Act B.E. 2539 (1996)
Mr. Chuan Leekpai (2nd. Term) (1997-2001)	The Bureaucratic Reform Commission	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Plan public management reform in 1999 in compliance with new public management 2) Categorize the state missions into 6 groups, i.e. missions of the government affairs, state enterprise, public company, private body, local administration organization and private organization or public organization 3) Establish 8 public organizations 4) Standardize Thailand on public management and achievement (P.S.O) 5) Organize Prime Minister Award 6) Systematize one-stop service 7) Provide result-based management 8) Transfer state affairs through private outsources, e.g. 126 cleaning contracts 9) Change budgeting system to performance-based budgeting 10) Downsize the state personnel by terminating retirees not less than 80%; terminating permanent employee on their vacancy and reroute their life courses: early retirement – there were 39,516 applicants. 11) Systematize the administration of good governance according to the regulations of the Office of the Prime Minister on good governance BE 2542 (1999).
Mr. Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2006)	The Bureaucratic System Development Commission	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Establish the Office of Bureaucratic Reform Commission 2) Plan strategies of the Thai Bureaucratic Development 2003-2007 3) Issue Royal Decree on Criteria and Administrative Method of Good Governance 2003 4) Result-based management in public affairs without failing since 1999 5) Confer Prime Minister Award 6) Broaden integrating administration system 7) Develop public management system in abroad under the policy of CEO ambassadors 8) Manage the 9-mission groups within the ministries 9) Quality system assurance system on public management with the result-based management (PSO) 10) Adjust the bureaucrats' paradigm and values called "I AM READY" 11) Improve the performance of 13 public organizations

Table 2.6 The Thai bureaucratic reforms under each regime during 1959-2006 (cont.)

Regimes	Commissions	Major Performances
		<p>12) Motivate to promote good governance through mechanism of agreement with performance as motivation.</p> <p>13) Reduce procedures and time of work for people with 230 participated agencies</p> <p>14) Prepare the performance certificate allowing every agency at the levels of departments and provinces to enter the assessment system in order to gain motivation with 163 departments and 75 provinces.</p> <p>15) Establish the government counters service with the cooperation of 17 offices.</p> <p>16) Provide e-service under e-government project</p> <p>17) Maximize CEO governors by searching best practices</p> <p>18) Plan the administration of the Kingdom and 4-year action plans</p> <p>19) Prepare performance certification and evaluation of the fiscal year 2005</p> <p>20) Manage change through (1) prepare blueprint for change (2) Develop leaders of change management; (3) Form the change management teamwork through the bureaucratic knowledge management.</p> <p>21) Develop quality system of public management (PMQA)</p> <p>22) Develop GFMIS: government fiscal management information</p> <p>23) Develop new generation of change managers</p> <p>24) Develop knowledge through e-learning to develop the Thai bureaucracy and the government has developed modern public management : mini MPM</p> <p>25) Organize other non-government agencies to meet the public roles and missions which need high efficiency, i.e. (1) public organization and (2) service delivery unit (SDU)</p>

2.7 Innovation and the Thai Public sector development

Developing an organization by managerial innovation is an exploration, change the approach and new management process affecting the work system, products, designs and service with better efficiency (Gopalakrishnan and Damanpour, 1997; Cooper, 1998 cited in Boon-anant Phinaiasap, 2013). In this study, the researcher proposes system of innovation in the public sector as follows: (1) the meaning of innovation, (2) types of innovation, (3) sources of innovation, (4) mechanism to drive innovation, (5) process of public sector innovation, (6) innovation models, (7) sample of selecting public management innovation (8) barriers of implementing innovation, and (9) supports of implementing innovation with public sector. This information would help understand the concept, theory, innovation process and the conceptual framework leading to exploration and analysis of innovation in the Thai public sector under the lens of public administration especially after public sector reform in 2002. It leads to studies, exploration, and result-based management as innovation being adopted to develop the Thai bureaucracy.

2.7.1 The Meaning of Innovation

The researcher concludes the meaning of innovation from many scholars such as Halvorsen et al. (2005) who emphasizes that “innovation” is a creative idea leading to solving public problems with new ways which have been practically successful, with new elements or re-integration of the conventional elements of significant change from the traditional ways. Recalling the public sector management innovation, it could be summarized that it is the development of the new policy design and new standard in the public enterprise affecting the solution approached to the public problems. Therefore, the innovation of public administration is the effectiveness, creativity and the specific responses to the new problems or the new response to the conventional problems (Alberti and Bertucci, 2006). It is corresponded with Light (1998) cited in Bland, Bruk, Kim, and Lee (2010) who specifies the importance of expectation over the public sector innovation containing two (2) things, i.e. (1) the representative of the new idea or the new approach challenging the traditional intellectual; and (2) two purposes have to be achieve, i.e., the advancement of the public good and the creation of public values. On the contrary, The Innovation

Center of the Thai Public sector development defines the public sector innovation as the concept, the approach and the new ways in the organizational development, the work process and the service delivery which develop efficiency, effectiveness and values of working within the public agencies (Boon-anant Phinaiasap, 2003). It is also corresponded with the views of Chokchai Sutthaves (2013) defining innovation as new idea, new working, new organizing, new change and new initiative emerged from using information, initiative and imagination in managing resources and human competencies of individuals and groups incorporated with the existing technologies and tools which can better the benefits and quality of life of people.

The researcher views that innovation contains two parts, i.e., (1) newness which might new idea, new approach, new process, new instrument, new organization, new institution, new product, and new service; (2) effects found will lead to problem solving and both parts are in the form of policy, legal, strategic plan and working standards. Therefore, innovation in this research is the policy, the public institution, working standards and managerial tools with the implications of newness and targets to improve the public sector management.

2.7.2 Types of Innovation

Its types are presented as below

1) Osborne and Brown (2011) contends that the theory of the contemporary innovation is divided into 4 models which lead to change product and services with following details:

1.1) The Radical Innovation – it is a change through the social paradigm of the product such as the change from using canal transports into using trains during the Industrial Revolution and the creation of world wide web.

1.2) The Architectural Innovation – it is the achievement of both organizational skills and competencies and market/need being the innovation to solve problems under the conventional product paradigm.

1.3) The Incremental Innovation – it is the discontinuous changes of the product and services but such changes are still under the conventional product paradigm and affecting any aspects of the organizational skills and competencies or market/need.

1.4) The developing product or service – it is the creation of skills or market/need with significance to the organizational learning modeled irrelevant to newness and discontinuity.

2) Walker, Avellaneda and Berry (2011) divides innovation into 3 groups, i.e., service, process and ancillary with following details.

2.1) Service Innovation

Service innovation is defined to be the new service proposed by the public agencies to respond to the external users or market need and is in the form of product. Service innovation is divided into 3 types, i.e., (1) new service to new users, (2) existing g service to new user group which expand the groups of users such as the new user groups in other regions, and (3) evolutionary innovation linked to new service to existing users.

2.2) Process Innovation - Edquist et al. (2001) analyses the types of the innovation process affecting the internal organization and the number of the organizational changes in the public service at least for the past 2 decades, e.g. TQM (total quality management), contracting and pay by performance. In addition, the process innovation has changed the relationship between the organizational members and affected the ordinance, rules, roles, procedures and structure, communication and exchanges among the organizational members between the environments and the organizational members.

2.3) Ancillary or Partnership Innovation reflects the changes of partnership and networking in the new public services which differ from the previous innovation (service innovations and process innovations). By reasons, the partnership innovation prioritizes the cross boundaries with other service providers, recipients and other public agencies. Therefore, the success of the application is relied on trust with other sectors which are the external factors controlling the organization.

3) Alberti and Bertucci (2006) categorize four types of innovation in public administration, i.e.

3.1) Institutional Innovations – they focus on the recovery of creating new institutions or creation of new institutions.

3.2) Organizational Innovation – it includes the introduction the new working process or the techniques of new public management.

3.3) Process Innovation – it focuses on improving the quality of public services.

3.4) Conceptual Innovation – it concentrates on introduction the new forms of governance such as interactive policy-making, engaged governance, people's budget reforms, horizontal networking, area of innovation, human resource development and organization, public services, ICT (information and communication technology) in public works and decentralization.

4) Hartley-based Innovation (2005 cited in Patel, 2006) divides innovation into 7 types, i.e.

4.1) Product: new product such as televising training to teachers and nurses.

4.2) Service: new way to serve recipients such as on-line form.

4.3) Process: new way to design the organizational process such as reengineering business process.

4.4) Position: new context or new recipients such as The Tax Need of Informal Enterprises.

4.5) Strategic: new goal of an organization such as community policy.

4.6) Governance: new form of the citizen assembly and democratic institutions

4.7) Rhetorical: new language and new concept such as major city fees.

In this study, the researcher has applied the new public management (NPM) based on Albert and Bertucci (2006) containing (1) Institutional Innovations, (2) Organizational Innovation, (3) Process Innovation, and (4) Conceptual Innovation.

2.7.3 Innovation Mechanism

Applying innovations with public organization development demands to mechanize innovation into application. Borins (2000, cited in Patel, 2006) contends that innovations own 5 groups of mechanism, i.e. 1) political process and system including the election agreement or pressures of the politician groups; 2) leadership change which involves appointment of the outsiders or re-appointment of the insiders;

3) crisis; 4) internal problems and 5) new opportunities encountering such as technologies and other factors.

2.7.4 Process of Public Sector Innovation

It involves three steps, i.e. 1) idea generation, 2) acceptance and 3) application (Shepard, 1967 cited in Bland, Bruk, Kim, and Lee, 2010) with following details.




Figure 2.5 Innovation process from formulation to application

2.7.5 Barriers to Innovation

Barriers to apply innovation in the public agencies come from internal and external factors. To understand barriers and being prompt to respond to them comprehensively would be the approach to overcome them. The researcher gather barriers to innovation applied to public agencies from various scholars and follows: Albury (2005 cited in Patel, 2006) suggests that barriers to apply innovation to public agencies are (1) short-term planning and the government budgeting cycle (the government agenda is just middle-term while the budget is by annual); (2) shortage of risk management skills or managing changes and cultures; (3) shortage of reward or the incentive in applying innovation; (4) cultural or organizational limitations in using technology; (5) over trusting the small groups as the sources of innovation; (6) shortage of learning the failure from the previous innovation project, and (7) pressures on submitting the previous services and administrative mission. At the meantime, Borins (2001) divides limitations in applying innovation in public organizations into 3 groups, i.e., (1) limitations within the bureaucracy, pessimistic or non-accepting attitudes, difficulty of internal collaboration and conflict with the union group; (2) pressures from the political groups such as shortage of budget or other

resources, limitations of law, rules and opposite side with political parties; and (3) obstacles of the external groups in the organizational environment such as difficulty to access the targeted groups, and impacts with the interest of the private groups. At the meantime, Mulgan and Albury, 2003 cited in Micheli, Schoeman, Baxter and Goffin (2012) identify 3 barriers in applying technological innovation to increase efficiency and effectiveness in the public sectors : (1) resistance to change, (2) risk aversion – it is difficult for the public agencies to handle technical and market risk, (3) hierarchical structure – agents are likely incline to the ideas of the top management as the core concept resources which might create problems on being centralization and can reduce innovation.

Duivenboden and Thaens (2008) identify barriers in applying innovation in the public sector such as the cultural issues, the cultural problems with internal innovation within the public sector as the barriers on experiments and the organizational collaboration. These could be called the “non-invented hear syndrome”. This disease counters invention and development to apply innovation in the public agencies which is differed with the private sectors where creative innovations are aroused. The private sectors provide higher incentives and allowances if the employees’ ideas lead to cost-reduction or bring extra profit. Therefore, barriers in the public sector on innovation are lack of creativity, which differs from the private sectors where they arouse creativity in their organizations (Duivenboden and Thaens (2008). The appropriate stimulation is open culture by introducing reward system and allowances or incentive pays (Borin, 2001 cited in Duivenboden and Thaens (2008). The private sectors likely have common direction, i.e. financial reward for employees. The ideas of employees lead to constructively saving budget and reducing expenses or increasing profit for their organizations. Such approaches are different from the public sector. For example, in Canada, the personnel involved in innovation could save the budget or lead to setting budget exchangeable with budget at 65% for the organization and 35% for the personnel (Borin,2001 cited in Duivenboden and Thaens (2008). In England, there is a reward system for the innovation leading to saving with efficiency, which is the stand point in the English bureaucratic operation. This reward system has been applied in 1990s under Thatcher’s administration. In this case the reward is in the form of bonus or gift and recognized in the personnel journal.

The researcher summarized the barriers to applying innovation in the public sector as below.

Table 2.7 Barriers to applying innovation in the public sector

Scholars	Barriers to innovation
Albury,2005 cited in Patel (2006)	(1) short-term planning and the government budgeting cycle (the government agenda is just middle-term while the budget is by annual); (2) shortage of risk management skills or managing changes and cultures; (3) shortage of reward or the incentive in applying innovation; (4) cultural or organizational limitations in using technology; (5) over trusting the small groups as the sources of innovation; (6) shortage of learning the failure from the previous innovation project, and (7) pressures on submitting the previous services and administrative mission
Borins (2001)	(1) limitations within the bureaucracy, pessimistic or non-accepting attitudes, difficulty of internal collaboration and conflict with the union group; (2) pressures from the political groups such as shortage of budget or other resources, limitations of law, rules and opposite side with political parties; and (3) obstacles of the external groups in the organizational environment such as difficulty to access the targeted groups, and impacts with the interest of the private groups.
Mulgan and Albury, 2003 cited in Micheli, Schoeman, Baxter and Goffin (2012)	(1) resistance to change, (2) risk aversion (3) hierarchical structure
Duivenboden and Thaens (2008)	The cultural issues, the cultural problems with internal innovation within the public sector as the barriers on experiments and the organizational collaboration. These could be called the “non-invented hear syndrome”.

2.7.6 Factors supporting the innovation application in public sector

Duivenboden and Thaens (2008) advocate that supporting innovative culture with in public administration should have clear focus with freedom of experiment and knowledge of several actors. At the meantime, the key is the public sector has to change from hierarchical of top down steering and self-producing to facilitating, co-productive and partner in the network. In addition, conditions to increase power to apply innovation in an organization by Duivenboden and Thaens, (2008) are (1) organizational structure especially pressure on performance or competition; (2) freedom to experiment (paying interest and incentive in the case of success), (3) environment allows errors for the personnel, (4) clarity of decision-making to optimize the innovation application, (5) knowledge to link knowledge and

capacity, (6) management and leadership (support to face risk and achievement-based focus, and (7) continuity of reforms.

Borins (2001) proposes factors supporting innovation application in the public sector are (1) top management backup, (2) reward and awards for innovation – reward supports in successful innovation development, fairness of reward pays where the traditional public sector never pays monetary rewards for personnel, (3) resources for innovation, (4) diversity and innovation – supporting personnel to collaborate in solving problems from diverse skills and experiences, (5) learning from the outside, (6) supports from all insiders especially from the middle manager and front line, and (7) experimentation and evaluation.

The researcher summarizes factors supporting innovation application as the table below.

Table 2.8 Factors supporting innovation application in public sector

Scholars	Factors supporting innovation application in public sector
Duivenboden and Thaens (2008)	(1) Clear Focus (2) Freedom to experiment (3) Knowledge of several actors) (4) changing from hierarchical of top down steering and self-producing to facilitating, co-productive and partner in the network Conditions to promote applying innovation in public sector (1) organizational structure especially pressure on performance or competition; (2) freedom to experiment (paying interest and incentive in the case of success), (3) environment allows errors for the personnel, (4) clarity of decision-making to optimize the innovation application, (5) knowledge to link knowledge and capacity, (6) management and leadership (support to face risk and achievement-based focus, and (7) continuity of reforms.
Borins (2001)	(1) top management backup, (2) reward and awards for innovation, (3) resources for innovation, (4) diversity and innovation (5) learning from the outside, (6) supports from all insiders especially from the middle manager and front line, and (7) experimentation and evaluation.

However, the key is to clarify the innovation application in public sector which involves policy contexts and management to the different types of change and the innovation requirement. Certainly, it is not one-size-does-not-fit-all. Similarly, Walker, Avellaneda and Berry (2011) advocate the innovation application relying on the (1) role of central government policies to drive the English service improvement; (2) to increase rules and regulations as the tool to increase central control over public agencies.

2.8 Result-based Management (RBM)

RBM is a managerial tool paired with New Public Management (NPM) applied in public sector and private sector in USA, England, Australia, New Zealand and many countries in Asia like Japan, Singapore and Hong Kong (RBM Manual, 2003). RBM is a managerial method focused on operation that an organization achieves objectives and goals. Its main objective is to improve the efficiency and the effectiveness of an organizational performance, public responsibility and best responds to the needs of the service recipients. The management can use RBM as a tool to measure the work progress and to allow comparing the performance with goals whether the performance as the organizational achievement is good or not which is the co-responsibility of the management and the personnel. The benefits of RBM as a managerial tool (1) help the management know the position of the organization, (2) support the organization to achieve vision, (3) change strategies to practices, (4) provide information for communication and understanding, (5) create the responsibility commitment of the management, (6) allocate budget to meet real needs and real situation, and (7) provide information to set policy (RBM Manual, 2003).

Thailand has first applied RBM in January 1999 during the Chuan Leekhai administration (2nd Term: 1997-2001) as part of the Administrative Renewal Project (ARP) backed by World Bank under the Economic Assistance Project (EMAP). The ARP has the objective for the government agencies to develop goals and the performance indicators to emerge effectiveness and is measurable (Prayote Songklin, 2008; Punyaratabandhu and Unger, 2009). Later, the Cabinet under the 2nd Term of the Chuan Leekhai administration unanimously approved the plan of the management system reforms of public sector proposed by the Bureaucratic System

Reforms Commission: the Civil Service Office in May 11, 1999 focused on the reform of 5 key plans, i.e. (1) remodeling roles, missions and managerial approach of public sector, (2) adjusting the budget system, finance and supplies, (3) remodeling personnel management system, (4) amending laws and (5) adjusting unique culture and values.

Remodeling roles, missions and managerial approach of public sector (No.1) is to limit roles and missions of public sector and to encourage the private and people to the delegates while changing bureaucracy into RBM specifying that there must be the organizational strategic planning and the organizational performance indicators systematically in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and quality with constructive performance indicators (the Bureaucratic System Reforms Commission: the Civil Service Office, 1999).

RBM has been consecutively applied until 2002 in the administrative term of Thaksin Shinawatra (2002-2006) The Thaksin Sinawatra administration has amended the Public Administration Act (Copy 5) 2002 by stipulating RBM in the bureaucratic administration goal (Article 3/1) that:

“The public administration is for the benefit of people rising achievement of the public mission with effectiveness, worth for public missions, reducing work procedures, reducing missions and closing down unnecessary agencies, decentralizing missions and resources and responding to the needs of people including allocating budget and the appointment of personnel must meet all those mentioned approaches”.

The Public Administration Act (Copy 5) 2002 led to remodeling RBM into the bureaucratic practices through the issuance of the Royal Decree on Criteria and Procedures for Good Governance 2003 (The Cabinet has approved the Decree on May 19, 2003 and been enforced in October 10, 2003 ever since).

2.8.1 The Meaning of Result-based Management (RBM)

The Civil Service Office (2003) defined that the method of an organizational RBM is compared to the real product and the real outcomes with the set goal. Darunee Phaosuwan (2000) comments that it is a management focusing on the work achievement by specifying constructive goal and indicator. Swiss (2005) views that the reform of RBM is a modern evaluation specifying the common results which

is complying with outcomes and the meaning of outcome is the production line and the service affecting individual outsiders.

2.8.2 The Concept of Result-based Management (RBM)

RBM is a technique invented by Sweden to develop bureaucracy for effectiveness and efficiency with the bureaucratic works and service delivery. Its essence differed from the conventional management is the focusing on the work outcome through specifying products and outcomes have to meet the organizational missions and objectives including specifying Key Performance Indicators (KPI) to scale the work progress. It is differed from the conventional management which is focused on inputs or the service resources, i.e. man, money, material, stationeries and rules.

2.8.3 Factors supporting RBM

All perfect management system including RBM demands 3 factors, i.e. information, capacities and incentives (Swiss, 2005) as details below.

1) Information

Organizations applying RBM require to have the first information of what is their direction and how best to arrive there through information ways otherwise it would be impossible to expect results and best measuring program performance. Most essential organizational information is referred to strategic goals and short-term objectives. It is necessary to inform staff to know the result and push to achieve and the result-based measurement would display the progress to the result.

However the public agencies likely err on their hypothesis that RBM is only focusing on result and most agents would haste to measure themselves whether they follow their action plans. Adherence to only measurement system gains less impacts because the information of result is just a part of RBM but cannot lead to better result except it links to capacities and incentives.

2) Capacities

Applicable information is relying on the implementation of the front-line and the chiefs of the agencies are required to be capable to apply them. On the other hand, information is useless if the personnel are incapable, not understanding, without

autonomy and without equipment. The capacities of the front-line and the chiefs must be reinforced with autonomy to manage information, to study the workforce and specific training on the program in order to understand, analyze and adjust the work process in applying RBM including communicating the understanding and the information technology.

3) Incentives

RBM requires a preparation for the front-line and the chiefs on incentives to be used in applying information and capacities. If they do not have incentives; information and capacities are useless. As such, there are 2 causes; first the personnel such as resistance, misunderstanding, individual goal does not link with the possible achieved result. Second is the public institution which is unique such as less incentive pays when being compared with the determination of responsibility for the result, the short-term frame of political party, priority of the political party and absence of competition. Applying RBM to meet success demands to overcome all these barriers. Leaders of applying this tool have to create self-integrity to drive the chiefs of the agencies and the front-line to pay attention to the results. Swiss (2005:594) comments that RBM would fail if it runs short of either information or capacities or incentives.

2.8.4 Elements of RBM

Swiss (2005) introducing the elements of RBM mentions that though RBM with various names such as strategic management, performance-based management, outcome management and new public management but the RBM Approach has some common elements. The RBM prioritizes strategic planning and performance measurement, especially the program outcome, assessment of the customer satisfaction, submission of results across teamwork, reinforcement of the front-line and usages of tools to improve the business process. Swiss believes that RBM would demand an organization focusing on results, aggressive working, and agility which will lead to work efficiency. However, scholars like Streib and Poister, 2000; Berman and Wang, 2000; Poister and Streib, 1999 cited in Rivenbark (2006), Rivenbark and Menter (2006) view that the elements of RBM have been diversely applied and included with strategic planning, performance measurement, benchmarking and program evaluation.

In Thailand, the RBM has been applied under the announcement in the Royal Decree of Criteria and Good Governance BE 2546(2003) which includes 2 sections: Section 2 on “*Public Administration to Achieve the State Missions*” and Section 7 on “*Public Performance Evaluation*” and each Section contains the following essence.

Table 2.9 Essence of the Royal Decree on the principles of good governance BE 2546 (2003)

Sections	Essence
1) Public Administration to Achieve the State Missions	1.1) Strategic and Operational Planning contains (1) 4- year Administration Plans (2) 4-year Action Plans (3) Annual Action Plans (4) Legislative Action Plans
	1.2) Performance Based Budgeting
	1.3) Integrative Administration in the Bureaucracy: Governor CEO and Ambassador CEO
	1.4) Learning Organization
	1.5) Performance Agreement
2) Public Performance Evaluation	2.1) Evaluations of results, quality, satisfaction and worthiness
	2.2) Reward System

The literature reviews of RBM specify that there are varieties of the tools/ innovations supporting RBM, e.g. Strategic Planning, Performance Measurement, Benchmarking, Program Evaluation, Program Outcomes and Customer Satisfaction).

However, in this study, the researcher selects an innovation based on RBM focusing on performance agreement because it links the organizational strategic planning with performance evaluation in this tool. It is also corresponded with the recommendation that the common ground of RBM is the strategic planning and the performance evaluation focusing on result. This concept has been proposed by Streib and Poister, 2000; Berman and Wang, 2000; Poister and Streib, 1999 cited in Rivenbark (2006), Rivenbark and Menter (2006) Osborne and Plastrik, 1997; U.S. Commerce Development, 2004a, 2004b cited in Swiss (2005). It is also corresponded with the opinion of Prayote Songklin (2008) who indicates that a modified RBM for a constructive implementation in the form of the Royal Decree on Criteria and Good Governance BE 2546 (2003). He presents 3 performances illustrating the implementation of RBM, i.e. 1) the strategic planning, 2) the performance agreement and the annual performance evaluation, and 3) monetary and non-monetary incentive.

2.8.5 Model of Result Based Management

RBM is divided into 3 levels containing the organizational level, the department level and the programmatic level.

(1) The Programmatic Level

The RBM foundation is the performance measurement system at the department level. Its model is focused on determining the mission into the purpose and targeting the service delivery for the work direction, determining the quantifiable objectives for the performance standards and performance measurement in the forms of products, results and efficiency in order to pursue selecting services (Kelly and Rivenbark, 2003 cited in Rivenbark (2006)).

(2) The Department Level

The RBM model represents the annual work plan at the department level characterizing the common ground of the public agencies which will apply their annual budget as a tool to drive their annual work plan through anticipating success and strategies in the budget document. Selecting strategies is based on Cost of Experimentation or Imitation. Some strategies will be selected as the core strategy to expand the program capacity regarding efficiency and effectiveness. Other strategies will be selected to expand the program capacity and to drive the organization according to the strategic plans.

(3) Organization-wide Level

This level packs mission, vision, core values, goals and objectives. The strategic plan will be on the top of the model to prepare road map of performance, budget and strategic management.



<p>Organization-Wide Level Strategy Plan</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Mission - Vision - Core Value - Goal/Objective
	<p><i>Strategic and Financial Management</i></p>
<p>Department Level Annual Work Plan</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strategy Selection - Cost of Experimentation or Imitation
	<p><i>Performance and Financial Management</i></p>
<p>Programmatic Level Performance Measurement</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Mission Statement - Service Delivery Goal - Quantifiable Objectives - Performance Measures

Figure 2.6 Model for Result Based Management (RBM)

Source: Rivenbark (2006)

2.8.6 Performance Agreement

A performance management system is widely implemented in the developed countries such as Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and Canada and so on, in order to develop an organizational culture aiming at the performance achievement. Major element of the system is the negotiation of performance agreement with the objective to support the clear scope of work during agents work and to achieve the goal of the agency (GAO, 2002 cited in O’Donnell and Turner, 2005). The performance agreement begins from the top management and devolves to other positions of the hierarchy in order to ensure the performance targets of the all personnel in every level for clearly linking with organizational goals (O’Donnell and Turner, 2005). The US General Accounting Office (GAO), 200 cited in O’Donnell and Turner (2005 : 618) claims that the performance agreement allows agencies advance by focusing on achievement to deliver work as routine job, to support cross department working, and to facilitate work improvement with continuity, wherewith the performance agreement is characterized as below.

2.8.6.1 The characteristics of the performance agreement

The concurrence of the performance agreement is the goal-setting, specific, clear and measurable performance objective to serve key job and competencies. The acceptance of goal-setting supports the involvement in the negotiation of performance agreement through the process related to the teamwork or agents and might begin with discussions among the chiefs and the team members in order to set objectives which link with the organizational goal.

2.8.6.2 Problems and limitations in the application of the performance agreement and the public agencies

The study of Michael O'Donnell and Mark Turner (2005) on the inputs of the new public management, especially the performance agreement with the public health service in Vanuatu, they find difficulties in its application because of the shortage in incentive, unreceptive environment and the possible identification as being the donor-driven including the absence of efficient communication, trust between the agents in each level and the ministers, and between the ministers' advisors and the public agents.

2.8.6.3 Factors supporting the preparation of performance agreement

To complete the performance agreement, it requires (1) building the clear understanding with the organizational goal, the target and the approaches taken by the public agents in order to achieve goals; (2) effective communication between the management and the agents on the work objectives, and (3) employee acceptance on the organizational goals.

2.8.6.4 Preparing performance agreement in the Thai bureaucracy

Preparing the performance agreement is a tool leading to the performance evaluation and rewarding (Office of Public Sector Development Commission: OPSDC) given from the Royal Decree on Criteria a Governance and Good BE 2546 (20003) stipulating that agreement must be taken in written to express responsibility in working (Article 12) by the Cabinet approval with all public department and provincial agencies to prepare the performance agreement and evaluation by linking with incentive (Manual of Preparing Performance Agreement and Evaluation, n.d.:1).

Office of Public Sector Development Commission: (OPSDC) demands all public departments to prepare the performance agreement for the fiscal year 2004. The procedures begin with identifying the indicators taken from the government policy, strategy and goal of each agency leading to the negotiation for appropriateness with the indicators and the preparation of the performance agreement. Results of the preparation allow each public agency have anticipated work direction, which help agents the aim of collaboration. Significantly, it allows the management target the complete achievement, follow-up and self-assessment with system. Also, each agency owns the monitor of the indicators or host to supervise, coordinate, and follow-up the performance by the indicators. It allows every agent collaborate and is responsible to follow the strategy together. Importantly, the system of preparing the performance agreement allows very managerial level clarity on their responsible missions and enables them to supervise the performance with better clarity.

1) The scope of the performance evaluation

The scope of the performance evaluation in the performance agreement has been developed from the Balance Scorecard containing 4 dimensions, 1) effectiveness, 2) service quality, 3) efficiency and 4) organizational development which are discussed below.

The scope of the performance evaluation for receiving incentive as in the performance agreement contains 4 dimensions, i.e., efficiency by strategy, 2) service quality, 3) performance effectiveness and 4) organizational development with details as follows:

1) Dimension 1: Efficiency by Strategy – the display of performance in compliance with objectives and goals according to the budget allocation such as goal achievement as in the bureaucratic strategy, production achievement (by budgeting document) and so on.

2) Dimension 2: Service Quality – prioritizing recipients with quality service and contributing satisfaction for the recipients such as the levels of satisfaction and so forth.

3) Dimension 3: Performance Effectiveness – displaying capacity in working such as reducing expenses, shortening time of service process and worth money spending and so on.

4) Dimension: Organizational Development – displaying capacity in promptness to change such as knowledge management in the agency, IT management, and developing change management and so on.

2) The process of preparing the annual performance agreement (the Evaluation Manual as of Performance Agreement and Evaluation, Fiscal Year 2556, 2003).

2.1) The committee mechanism in preparing the annual performance agreement contains 2 sets, i.e.

1) The Supervisory Committee of Preparing Agreement and Evaluation holds duty to specify rules and the scope of performance agreement, target, evaluation method and incentive allocation; to supervise the agencies and the committee in negotiating the performance agreement and evaluation as of the rules with standards and to solve the problems in preparing the performance agreement and evaluation . There are 14 committee members and are divided into 4 groups, i.e. 1) two 2) members for politics, Chairperson and Deputy Chair person, 3) the members for central agency, and 3 experts and 10 scholars, and 4) a member from OPSDC to be the secretary.

2) The Committee for Negotiating Agreement and Evaluation – a committee appointed by PSDC to negotiate appropriateness of the indicators, weight, target value and scoring criteria in order to prepare the performance agreement. The committee will be divided as of ministries containing 19 committees containing 3 committees for the Office of the Prime Minister and a public sector independent from the Office of the Prime Minister or Ministries containing 23 committees.




Figure 2.7 The committee mechanism in preparing the annual performance agreement

2.2) Preparation of performance agreement

The performance agreement is copied for a year containing (1) working agreement, (2) indicators, (3) performance, (4) weight and (5) target /scoring criteria. There are 2 levels of endorsement, i.e., the ministerial level and the department level as below.

2.2.1) The performance agreement endorsement

Table 2.10 Individuals to endorse the performance agreement

Endorsers of the Performance Agreement		
Agency Chiefs	endorsement	Superiors
1. <u>Ministerial Levels</u> 1.1 Ministers 1.2 Ministerial Permanent Secretary	with with	Prime Minister Minister
2. <u>Department Level</u> 2.1 Ministerial agency chiefs independent to the missions 2.2 Ministerial agency chiefs dependent to the missions	with with	Ministerial Permanent Secretary Ministerial Deputy Permanent Secretary, chiefs of the mission group incorporated with Ministerial Permanent Secretary

2.2.2) The performance agreement documents

The performance agreement documents contain

(1) Double endorsers of the performance agreement: the endorsement in the performance agreement is between the department chiefs and their superiors.

(2) The performance plan: setting vision, mission, strategy and goal

(3) Details of the indicator, performance target and main mission: the performance indicators, weight, past performances, target/scoring criteria and specific condition of the indicators

(3) The follow-up method and the performance evaluation

There are four (4) characteristics of the follow-up methods and the performance evaluations, i.e.

(3.1) Exploring data, documents and various evidence, i.e.,

(1) The reports of the performance as of the performance agreement (Self Assessment Report: SAR) for 12 months round

(2) The reports of the performance as of the performance agreement (Self Assessment Report: SAR) for 6 months, 9 months and 12 months round

(3) Other complement documents and evidences such as minutes, appointment order, teamwork, action plans approved by the authorized persons, motion pictures and so on.

(3.2) Interviews of persons involved, e.g.

(1) Indicator supervisors

(2) Data keepers

(3) The stakeholders of the performance

(3.3) Observations: a consideration on performances such as site environment, document keeping and caretaking, the top management participation and the database.

(3.4) Seeking opinion from the expert panel through preparing the performance agreement and summarize as the chart below, i.e.




Figure 2.8 The process of performance verification petition

2.9 Related Research

Exploring related researches, the researcher has classified and concluded into 4 groups, i.e. 1st, the concept of public administration; 2nd public reforms; 3rd applications of new public management both domestic and international and finally, the concept of good governance as follows.

2.9.1 The Research Group on the concept of public administration

Bidhya Bowornwathana (2013) studies “Six Decades of Public Administration in Thailand” an investigation of the modern public administration since 1995 and the instituting the Faculty of Public Administration in Thammasart University. 10 years later, it has been mover to join with the National Institute of

Development Administration. Initiating the knowledge of public administration for the past six decades, Bidhya explains that the Thai bureaucracy has developed through 4 models and each one influences the Thai public administration cycle until today, i.e., (1) Personnel Administration Model, (2) Bureaucratic Development Model, (3) Bureaucratic Polity Model, and 4) Good Governance Model.

Nissachol Phrom-in (2009) studies “The Paradigm Evolution of the Thai Public Administration 1955-2008 with the objectives on investigating the status and the scope of the knowledge of the Thai public administration through documentary research, data collection through the public administration writings, which have been divided into 5 types, i.e., 1) textbooks and handouts of the public administration; 2) theses and dissertations of the public administration; 3) articles in the public administration journals; and 5) researches on the public administration. She finds that the paradigm of the Thai public administration during 1955-2008 has been divided into 5 paradigms, i.e. The Principles of Classic Public Administration (1955-2008) influenced by the western classic theories during 1887-1950; 2) the Management (1979-1994) sourced by the expansion of the public agencies, shortage of administrative tools and the “people-boss” behavior; 3) the Good Governance (1997-present) influenced by the modern pro- democracy focusing on people participation; 4) the Politics-Administration emerged by the interaction between the political side and the bureaucrat side; and 5) the Thai Paradigm (1955-present)sourced from the problems and development of the Thai bureaucracy should be understood , improved and solved by the local knowledge in the Thai context.

Anant Buabarn (1984) studies “The future Trend of the Thai Public Administration: Delphi Technique” to investigate the 1993 trend. 50 samples are the experts of the Thai public administration from universities and related institutes. He finds that 1) factors influencing the change of the future Thai public administration are politics, economy, social, education, and the development of the U.S. public administration as the strong influence of politics and economy. 2) The philosophy and the goal of the future Thai public administration targeting actual practicality in developing the country, emphasis on bureaucrat morality, efficiency, fairness, honesty, frugality, and alleviation of the miseries of the bureaucrats and the people . And 3) The future Thai public administration is the paradigm of development, of

human resource and social development, of policy-making, of system analysis and situational synthesis. The paradigm of development is possible to be the leading trend of the future Thai public administration.

Bidhya Bowornwathana (1983) studies “Paradigm of the Thai Scholars on Public Administration” and aimed to divide the Thai Public Administration Paradigm through analyzing their writings since 1954 to 1981. He finds that two paradigms can be divided, i.e., principle of administration during 1954 which emphasizes applying the classic principles and techniques to improve the efficiency of the Thai bureaucracy; and bureaucratic development which begins in 1966 which is supported by the Thai government and the needs to develop the country regarding the development of administration, politics, economy and social.

Settaporn Khoosriphithaka and Sompis Khoosreiphitak (1978) study, “Evolution of the Thai Public Administration during 1958-1977”; this is a documentary research through content analysis and divide the document into 4 groups, i.e., 1) textbooks or books of public administration; 2) thesis on public administration; 3) research papers on public administration; 4) article published in the public administration journals selectively only the public administration and development Administration journals. Results revealed that the public administration in Thailand can be divided into 4 phases, 1) the period before the government change in 1932; 2) post government change in 1932; 3) the phase of instituting the Faculty of Public Administration: Thammasart University; and 4) the phase of instituting the National Institute of Development Administration.

2.9.2 The Research Group of Public Reforms

M. Shamsul Haque (2007) collects *Theory and Practice of Public Administration in Southeast Asia: Traditions, Direction, and Impacts* and advocates that in South East Asia there are three models: Colonial Bureaucratic, Postcolonial Development and New Public Management at present. All these models come from the west and are borrowed or imported to be applied in this region. However, considering the vacuum between the Theory-Practices regarding the real management, it is found that they are distorted from the idealism or theory because of the social context and politics of each country. Haque proposes that the top policymakers need

to check the existing managerial approaches, principles and practices which link with the original models which are different from the western context. These policymakers need to evaluate the social context, people's expectation and form a realistic managerial model and need in order to bridge the gap between the theory- practices.

Pantharak Phookpan (2012) studies "An Analysis of Organization Culture of Integrated Public Organizations: The case of Thailand." The goal of the study is to analyze the organizational culture which is changed by the integration of Thai public organizations. He finds that by overview the public organization culture has been change by the organizational integration. The public agents believe that the hierarchy culture is difficult to change even by reforms. The clan-value culture is mostly reduced while the market and adhocracy values significantly rise within the new organizations.

Bowornwathana and Poocharoen (2010) studies, "Bureaucratic Politics and Administrative Reform: Why Politics Matters." An administrative reform is a political issue rather than the management. This study argues that an administration reform is strongly influenced by the bureaucratic politics. An administration reform is defined as a fight to win higher dominion over others. Evidences are found in the form of power of struggle between politicians and bureaucrats, including the rivalries between the public agents involving with the administration reform. The principle of the concept on bureaucratic politics is an administration reform is counted a political bargaining game. Had any side won either the bureaucrats or the politicians; the winner could have expand its power area through driving its concepts or the policy of administration reform into the government reform policy. The management tools are viewed as the mechanism to control the line agency behavior. There for the line agency, who will be receiving the management tools for taking action from the central agency might be perplex and dissatisfy to respond the similar questions from various central agencies.

Punyaratabandhu and Unger (2008) study "Managing Performance in A Context of Political Clientelism: The Case of Thailand." The research has been conducted during 1997-2007 on the Thai bureaucratic reform applying the paradigm of New Public Management focusing on the implementation of Resulted-based Management – RBM under the political patronage context. It prioritized the

organizational performance, output, outcome, strategic plan, key performance indicator (KPI) and performance evaluation through applying the Balanced Scorecard (BSC). The master plan was checked in 1997-2001 and the Thai bureaucratic reform plan was checked in 2003-2007 including analyzing the political patronage system. They found that the RBM had many weaknesses in applying with the Thai politics. They were (1) the performance evaluation system could not be integrated with the personnel administration system. The budget system and the personnel system should be independent but the appointment of a personnel disregarded the evaluation criteria as in the RBM criteria especially the appointment of the top management at the levels of the Permanent Secretary position and the Director General position. Politicians were free-hand in appointing anyone to a position and did not use any evaluation criteria of the RBM. The application of the patronage system was characterized in incentive for their supporters while punished their non-supporters. (2) The interference of the politicians to allocating resources and projects disregarded priorities of the nation as in the frame of RBM and the evaluation the RBM success was just evaluating output and not outcome. And (3) the major weakness of the RBM even though being applied to prevent dishonest and illegal practices in the public sector but the evaluation is not solving the root of the problem caused by the wrongdoing of politicians especially the process of the procurement and contracting. The performance indicators would fail to prevent dishonesty and malpractices and to evaluate the patronage practices. Therefore, the concept of the performance evaluation and the indicators of the RBM in Thailand cannot fill the pits of offenses of politicians and their patronage exchange is still active.

Panupak Pongatichat (2005) studies "The Alignment between Performance Measurement and Strategy in Central Government Agencies." This is a case in Thailand in order to check the alignment between the performance measurement and the strategy in the central government agencies. He finds that there 8 particularities irrelevant to the performance measurement even objected what are found in literature reviews. They are, 1) the increase of the measurement scope as in the terms of each agency rather than strategy, 2) linking strategy and practices; 3) changing policy/strategy too often from the political management which affects the measurement target; 4) the alignment of measurement by the objectives of the strategy

is for long-term but the measurement is a short-term evaluation; 5) increasing understanding between the performance measurement and the annual performance evaluation; 6) increasing fairness through broadened level of performance measurement is irrelevant to the strategy; 7) increasing the control of achievement in the performance measurement; and 8) the acceptance of learning from within the agency beside the strategic objectives specified by the deliberation of the strategy-makers only which could be erroneous.

Martin Painter (2006) studies “Thaksinisation or Managerialism? Reform the Thai Bureaucracy” an article analyzing the major elements of the public reform during the Thaksin government since 2001 in the context of the Thai public reform history and the political reform of Thaksin and the choice in selecting the tools in the new public management reform such as budgeting for results and performance management. They are subject to the period of improving the bureaucratic structure. However, there are some managerial tools used but not in the NPM agenda (new public management agenda). The reform is viewed as a political strategy targeting a political control at the center. The management reform is used to reshape the bureaucracy as a political tool of the Thaksin government. In such reform process; the traditional power of the bureaucracy is challenged and destroyed. Besides, the long-term effects of this bureaucratic reform give not much the management performance.

Mutebi and Sivaraks (2007) study “Public Management Reform Drivers in Thailand” and check the influence of the non-market mechanism influencing the Thai bureaucratic reforms during the end of 1980s to 1990s. They find that issues leading to the Thai bureaucratic reform are the obsolete ways of working, slow decision making, bribery, public irresponsiveness and responsibility and gaps with other groups of people beside the service recipient groups such as the private sectors and so on. This includes inadequate income of the government agents. As of the market mechanism pressing the Thai bureaucracy to reform is the competitiveness with other countries in investment and the economic growth. The Bureaucracy Reforms are then demanded. This also involved with the financial crisis in 1997 when the IMF pressures Thailand to take action with the bureaucracy reforms on increasing the managerial innovation, rationality, productivity and efficiency. At the same time, the cultural mechanism and the Thai bureaucratic values of centralization and the advantage-taken resource of the public sectors with conditions, and

limitations which could lead to bribery, poor transparency, and obsolete rules and regulations, absence of adequate monitoring and controls.

Ora-orn Poocharoen (2005) studies “Comparative public management reform: Cases of policy transfer in Thailand and Malaysia”. She aims to study the transfer of the public management reform policies and the performance-based budgeting from abroad into Thailand and Malaysia. The research is conducted with in-depth interview and participatory observation to respond the research questions of why and how the public reform policies have been transferred worldwide. She finds that 1) the internal bureaucratic politics are very critical driven by the central agencies in deciding to convey the policy and the managerial tools from abroad. 2) The central agencies seek ways to transfer policies as being confirmed by the samples. 3) It is found with both cases that it is necessary to involve the historical studies in order to understand the process of working.

Srirat Kowong (1998) studies “Reshaping the Public Administration: surveying the existing status and the future trends of the Thai civil bureaucracy”. Results reveal that 1) in surveying the existing status and the future trends in reshaping the Thai civil bureaucracy, it is found that the Thai civil bureaucracy has changed and inclined from conventional to marketing and involvement characterized with managerialism, political sciences and economics respectively. 2) The case study shows that the Department of Industrial Promotion has evidently reshaped from conventional to marketing and involvement. It is witnessed with the separation of policy jobs from the service jobs and allowing the private business sector and/or civil and community sectors to run the services replacing the Department of Industrial Promotion. There is also an improvement of the production capacity and the service delivery of the Department through measures referring to applying the concept and the techniques of modern management.

Pornchai Thavornvisuthikul (1998) studies “The Thai Bureaucratic Reforms.” He finds that the problem of the public administration is the bulginess and complexity of the Thai bureaucracy which allow the managerial agility while the control and the performance follow-up mechanism are impossible because the bureaucracy monopolizes almost all governances. A cause of corruption and dishonesty in the bureaucracy and the rising the political, economic and social

problem is the public management intertwines the entire system. There are three (3) approaches to reform bureaucracy to solve the above problems. 1) The bureaucracy has to be opened and transparent through developing the efficient checking mechanism, improving budgeting with transparency and fair in policymaking and abiding in law. 2) Adding more alternatives in providing public services for people – it is decentralization to locality, encouraging association of people for community service and bureaucrats are just in necessary duties. And 3) improving the efficiency of bureaucratic jobs through reducing red-tape, structure and personnel administration for the efficient government agencies in working and adjusting themselves to meet the present global environment. The success factors in the bureaucratic reforms are the sincerity of the Prime Minister to reform bureaucracy. The Prime Minister must be strong and ready to counter problems and limitations in reforming the bureaucracy especially the bureaucrat resistance. As part of the people, they should follow-up the performance and provide opinion to prevent distortion of the principles and the designed approaches to reform the bureaucracy.

Bidhya Bowornwathana (1993) studies “The Thai Bureaucratic Reforms”. The aims are to investigate the application of the policy and the mechanism in reforming the bureaucracy in the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan and Thailand during 1980s. The data collection is through documents, articles, seminar handouts and interviewing front line agents and bureaucratic experts as well as the direct experiences of the researcher. He finds that the agency of reforms is directly dependent to the Prime Minister or the President and the national leaders appoint the Bureaucratic Reform Commission. 2) The bureaucratic reforms in UK, USA, and Japan are similar, i.e. 1) customer-driven, 2) small government that costs less, 3) decentralization and top-down decision making. The findings show that the Thai bureaucratic reform lacks the focus on serious efficiency but to improve the structure (increase of ministries and departments) and to take interest in amendments of the Civil Acts rather than taking interest in developing service quality or customer or recipient- driven. Upon comparing the three countries, it is found that there are three areas that fall behind and the critical barriers of the reform are the resistance from bureaucracy which does not support the government policy because such approaches depower, and the agency kingdom. With the experiences from the three countries, it is

found that the reform jobs must be carried out by politics with special mechanism to handle the bureaucratic reform. It cannot be successful by the bureaucrats alone and the public agencies have to involve and to be the academic to support politics. Significantly, decision making on reform must be the power of politics: the Prime Minister or the President.

2.9.3 The Research Group of New Public Management (NPM)

Mongkol (2012) studies “Globalizing New Public Management: A Pilot Study from Thailand”. The results show that the application of NPM in improving the structure of roles and duty is successful but some NPM areas such as downsizing and competition are not implemented in corporate with some environments of the Thai public sectors are likely different from the OECD the original such as the cultural norms, centralization, and the deep-rooted corruption in Thailand. Therefore, it is difficult to apply NPM in the Thai public sector.

Willy McCourt (2002) studies “New Public Management in Developing Countries” a study of the application of NPM in the developing countries. He explains the roots of difficulties in its application that the exercise of top-down approach, corruption and inefficiency of the public agency supports, the understanding why NPM is difficult to be implement in the developing countries which needs to understand their political context first.

Jurairat Jullakjakkrawat (2004) studies “The Thought of Performance among the Thai Bureaucrat on New Public Management.” The research objectives are 1) to investigate the international concept of the principles on NPM, 2) to investigate the levels of thought of the Thai bureaucrat performance and the principles of NPM and 3) to compare the thoughts of the Thai bureaucrat performance with the principles of NPM. She finds that the level of thought of the Thai bureaucrat performance and the principles of NPM is in the medium level. Their thought about customer-driven is at high level followed by finance and accounting improvement, result-based performance, decentralization and downsizing into varieties of public agencies to meet the different public work conditions. 3) Comparing the Thai bureaucrats working and the principles of NPM, it is found that the Thai bureaucrat thought is at moderate level. Examining their thoughts on the NPM principles of customer-driven is high

followed by the financial and accounting improvements, results-based driven and decentralization to other sub-agencies not meet variety of public works in various situations. Comparing the Thai bureaucrats working and the principles of NPM by level of education, positions, classifications/C and officiated agencies; there is significant difference by statistics. But when examining the program of courses, educational institutions and educational excursion, it is found that there is no significant difference by statistics.

Prayote Songklin (2008) studies “The Public Administration Reform: a case of new public management (NPM) in Thailand and in Singapore”. The research objectives are to study and to analyze reform experiences based on NPM with 2 issues, i.e., 1) factors leading to reform by NPM in Thailand and in Singapore; and 2) the reform contents and process by NPM in both countries. The scope of the study is during 1997-2006. In Thailand, it is found that there are three (3) major factors leading to a reform by NOM, i.e. 1) the 1997 crisis, 2) pressures from international organizations, and 3) decisionmaking of the political elites and the management. In Thailand, the NPM contents contain three (3) applications, i.e. 1) the result-based management, 2) the citizen-centered management, and 3) the privatization. Such concepts have been transited to laws and regulations in the 1997 policy and implemented clearer since 2001 during the Thaksin regime.

2.9.4 The Research Group of Good Governance

Bidhya Bowornwathana (2008) studies “Importing governance into the Thai polity: competing hybrids and reform consequences.” The objectives are to investigate the concept of governance implemented in Thailand with variety of interpretations. The knowledge of governance in Thailand has not been well developed because of chaos and contradictions of this concept. 1) The research defines it into 6 meanings – new democracy, democratic governance, good governance, and efficiency perspective, the Ten Guiding Principles for the King, the Thaksin system and the ethical issue interpretation. 2) Impacts of importing the governance involve 4 issues, i.e. (1) difficulties to specify the correct prototype, (2) distorted duplication, (3) encountering competition and (4) appropriateness in analyzing the governance concept.

2.10 Synthesizing the Research Conceptual Framework




Figure 2.9 Research Conceptual Framework

The researcher has synthesized the conceptual framework in studying the public administration paradigm and the Thai public sector development with following frameworks linking with the research questions.

1) The Conceptual Framework of the Thai Public Administration Paradigm

The researcher has applied the public reform concept of Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) to explain the Thai public administration paradigm in the dimension

of the Thai bureaucratic reforms. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) have divided the direction of a public reform into three (3) waves. 1) The First Wave – the classic era of planning, rational, cost-benefit analysis, scientific and expertise during the middle of 1960s-the end of 1970s, 2) The Second Wave - New public management (NPM), business technique to improve efficiency during the middle of 1970s- the end of 1990s, and 3) the Third Wave - governance, network, partnership, join-up, transparency and trust during the middle of 1990s-2010. The researcher figures as below.

Table 2.11 Waves of Public Management Reform

Period	Natures of Reforms
Middle of 1960s-the end of 1970s	- Rational, planning, cost-benefit analysis, scientific and expertise
Middle of 1970s- the end of 1990s	- New public management –NPM, business technique to improve efficiency
Middle of 1990s-2010	Governance, network, partnership, join-up, transparency and trust

Source: Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011)

2) The Conceptual Framework on Factors Influencing the Change of the Thai public Administration Paradigm applied to the Thai Bureaucratic Reforms

The researcher has synthesized the influences toward the public management applying the Pollitt and Bouckaert-based public reform (2011) to understand the change of the Thai public administration paradigm applied to the Thai bureaucratic reforms as below.

Factors influencing the change of the Thai public Administration Paradigm




Figure 2.10 Factors influencing the Thai public administration paradigm and bureaucracy

3) The conceptual framework in studying the types of innovation applied with Thai public sectors

The researcher has synthesized the Alberti and Bertucci-based innovation types (2006) and grouped into four types, i.e. (1) Institutional Innovations, (2) Organizational Innovation, (3) Process Innovation, and (4) Conceptual Innovation as figured below.




Figure 2.11 Types of innovation applied with public sectors

4) The concept of the Result-based Management

In this research, the researcher has selected the concept of RBM (result-based management) adopted first in January 1999 during the government of Mr. Chuan Leekphai (2nd Term) with the assistance of the World Bank and allocated in two laws: The National Government Organization Act, BE 2534 (1991) (the 5th Amendment) and the Royal Decree on Criteria and Good Governance BE 2546 (2003) focusing on RBM. The researcher selects the sub-innovation: the performance agreement which links strategies which adopt the targets of the public agencies to specify the performance indicators and evaluate the performance by the set indicators for success assessment ad following figure.




Figure 2.12 Result-based management

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This research design is critical to be the process of responding the research questions attempting each step of the data collection has to link each other (Denscombe, 2010). This is a qualitative research with mixed –data-collection methodology containing documentary research and in-depth interview from the purposive sampling. A content analysis has been applied based on content analysis matrix in clustering, factoring and linked the content cluster for explanation-building. In order to respond to the research questions, the researcher will explain the details in the research design as the following topics.

1. What are the public administration paradigms applied to develop the Thai bureaucratic system during 1959-2006 and what is the essence of each clustered concept?

2. What are factors influencing the changes of the public administration paradigms linked to the Thai bureaucratic development during 1959-2006, what are the characteristics of such changes and what are the causes of such changes?

3. Under the public administration paradigms applied with the Thai bureaucratic development, what are the innovation applied in its development after its reforms in BE2545 (2002) and how many types of the innovation are classified?

4. What are the reasons that the result-based management (RBM) is applied in the Thai bureaucratic development after its reforms in BE2545 (2002); and what are limitations and impacts of the RBM in the Thai bureaucratic development?

The researcher separately explains as below.

3.1 The Research Question 1

What are the public administration paradigms applied to develop the Thai bureaucratic system during 1959-2006 and what is the essence of each clustered concept?

The data collection for this question has been through documentary research and in-depth interview with semi-structured interview form and the data was analyzed with the content analysis with the following details.

3.1.1 The research tool

There are two (2) types in these tools: the documentary research and the in-depth interview, i.e.

3.1.1.1 The documentary research

The documentary research was divided into the meaning, the documentary sources, reasons of selecting the documents and the explanation is as follows:

(1) The documentary sources

There are two sources, i.e. 1) the articles from the public administration journals during 1960-1966 and the development administration journals during 1967-2006; 2) the documents of public policy in the forms of the government policies, laws, strategic plans, and reports of the Thai public sector development during 1959-2006.

(2) Reasons on selecting the resources from the articles in the journals and the documents from the public policies:

(2.1) Data from articles

Articles published in the public administration journals and the development administration journal with the following rationale.

a) The duration of their publication

The Thai Journal of Public Administration was first published in 1960 by the Faculty of Public Administration: Thammasart University in quarterly. It was published from 1960-1966 and later it was changed to the Thai Journal of Development Administration and began publishing from 1967 until today (2015). Its contents have been broadened but focused on public

administration and the government administration to economy and business and other areas. The academic patterns would be researches, research articles, academic writings, reviews articles and commentaries.

b) The journal intention

The public administration journal has the intention to disseminate the knowledge of public administration for the bureaucrats, students and the persons of interested. Therefore, this journal is the critical evidence expressing the interest of the scholar community and the revolutionist community since the birth of the modern Thai public administration and continuing to the public administration in 2006.

c) Contents and writers

Most contents are related to the public administration academics about the problems of the government administration, the knowledge of public administration from abroad especially from the USA and activities related to the bureaucrat trainings, seminars, learning and instruction of public administration in the universities. As of the writers, they are the civil servants, military, police and the university lecturers who are interested in disseminating knowledge. Therefore, the journals are all focused on the academic knowledge and the public administration practices.

However, the early journals in 1960, Thailand had other journals related to public administration too. The information of other journals has been summarized from the works of Setthaporn Khoosriphitak and Sompis Khoosriphitak (1978). Therefore, the public administration journal of Thammasart University is the direct journal of public administration while others related are the journals of the administrators in the training center (Thammasart University) NIDA published during 1965-1973, the administration journals of the Faculty of Political Sciences: Chulalongkorn University published during 1969-1972, the civil servant journals published since 1954 until today and the municipality governance journal of the Ministry of Interior published since 1955 until today too. In addition, the social science journals of the Faculty of Political Science: Chulalongkorn University published since 1961 until today and the Ratthabhirak journals of the National Defense College of Thailand (NDC) published since 1959 until today. The contents of

the above journals are related to public administration or the government administration and have been published since the decades of 1957s which are in the same period of this study.

On this account, to collect all this information from the journals is hard in terms of restricted time and their access. They are the critical reasons that the researcher decides to choose the public administration journals and the development administration journals only.

(2.2) Information from public policy

Reasons to select information from public policy are they are the documents prepared by the government agents specified in the real inputs and the real outputs in the government administration. Therefore, these documents could display the phenomena in the management of the public sectors and enable to be used for checking the movements of the public sector management whether they are harmonious or disharmonious to the interest of the academic community (the journal articles). Besides being the evidence, they add the concepts stipulated in laws, and in the national economic and social development plans. This information is significant to weigh clustering the phenomena of the bureaucratic system development when the journal articles cannot provide clear information.

(3) The process of data collection from documents

Data collected from both resources: data from the journal articles and data from public policy are detailed as follows:

(3.1) Data from the journal articles

The researcher collected data from the Thai Journal of Public Administration during 1960-1966 and from the Thai Journal of Development Administration during 1967-2006. The journals during 1960-2006 are loaded in the electronic database of NIDA and any interested persons could access them.

(3.2) Data from the public policy

1) The National Social and Economic Development Plan 1 (1961-1966) – Plan 9 (2002-2006)

2) Laws contain (1) the National Government Organization Acts during 1959-2006; (2) The Royal Decree on Criteria and Good

Governance BE 2546 (2003) and Regulations of the Office of the Prime Minister on Public sector development.

3) The government policies presented to the parliament during 1959-2006

4) the performance of the public sector development of various Public sector development commissions established by the governments as the mechanism in developing bureaucracy during 1959-2006 by studying the annual reports and the progress reports of each Commission.

5) Strategic plans which contain The First Plan of Public sector development BE 2540-2544 (1997-2001); the Public Sector Development Plan BE 2542 (1999), the Strategic Plan of the Thai Public sector development Be 2546-2551 (2003-2008).

3.1.1.2 In-depth Interview

The in-depth interview with semi-structured form has been used as a tool conducted with 3 interviewees who are the distinguished experts on public administration and the Thai public sector development. They are scholars from (1) Thammasart University, (2) NIDA and (3) Chulalongkorn University.

3.1.2 Data Analysis

The content analysis has been applied with the qualitative research and the content analysis matrix with the aim to respond to the research questions. The analysis process is as follows:

3.1.2.1 Content Analysis

The content analysis has been applied with the qualitative research and the content analysis matrix with the aim to respond to the research questions. It is divided into 2 parts. First, it is to conclude the concept of the content analysis and second, it is the actual practices. Its core principles have 2 elements, i.e. 1) pattern-matching of the behavior or the phenomena, and 2) explanation -building of the behavior or the phenomena.

3.1.2.2 Qualitative data analysis

(1) The pattern-matching of the behavior – this is to find the repetitive information until they become a pattern. Yin (2009) explains that the pattern

might relate with the independent variables or the dependent variables or both. If a descriptive research is conducted with an incident; the pattern-matching would be the estimation of a specific pattern of the variable which will be identified before the data collection.

(2) The explanation-building and interpretation

This is the step to understand behaviors found in the first step how they happen (Patton, 1990). What are the factors identifying the behaviors or phenomena or how do those behavior/phenomena relate to the factors/behaviors/phenomena in society and what are their meaning in society?

3.1.2.3 Practices in content analysis to respond Question 1

The content analysis has been applied with the qualitative research and the content analysis matrix from journals is with following procedures, i.e.

(1) The researcher collected the qualitative data from the articles in the public administration journals and NIDA journals and the public policy documents containing reports of the public sector development, the government policies presented to the parliaments and the national economic and social development plans.

(2) The researcher systematized all those data distributed the articles into 10 groups and each group is by 10 years using the following table for clustering, i.e.

(2.1) The Row table is the attitude of the article or called coding which are divided into 3 coded, i.e. 1) plans, establishing the institution and training; 2) techniques of developing bureaucracy and 3) the principles of good governance

(2.2) Whereas the column table divides the period into a period of 10 years during 1960-1969; 1970-1979; 1980-1989 and 1990-2006 (see Appendix).

(a) When the data are clustered, they will be the origin and the search for additional data for from the public policy documents and they will be the guidelines to identify questions in the semi-structured interview forms along with the research questions to find additional data from the scholars.

(b) the researcher submitted the interview forms and the draft of the research to 3 experts to check its reliability over the interview whether they are harmonious and comprehensive with the research questions. After improvements and before using for data collection; the researcher has interviewed 3 experts with recording. All data were later decoded into documents. The researcher took notes by the question used in the interviews. Then the data of interview have been categorized which will lead to creating theme. They will later link in each theme to build a story, responding the questions with the following summary in the figure 3.1, i.e.




Figure 3.1 Research Methodology of Research Question 1

3.2 The Research Question 2

What are factors influencing the changes of the public administration paradigms linked to the Thai bureaucratic development during 1959-2006, what are the characteristics of such changes and what are the causes of such changes?

3.2.1 Research Tool

The documentary and interviewing experts have been used to address this question and the model has been modified from Model of Public Management Reform of Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) as the conceptual framework. Analyzing factors influencing the changes of the public administration paradigms linked to the Thai bureaucratic development has been as following details.

3.2.1.1 The Documentary Research

The researcher used the same data as in the Research Question 1 in corporate with additional exploration in academic papers, researches, textbooks which have been focused on politics, economy and social during each period of the public administration paradigm applied in the Thai bureaucratic development.

3.2.1.2 In-depth Interview

The same group of the targeted population as in the Research Question 1 has been interviewed through a semi-structured interview form which was approved by experts before real interview.

3.2.2 Data Analysis

A content analysis was applied with the qualitative data to respond what are factors influencing the changes of the public administration paradigms by applying Factoring of Miles and Huberman (1994). It is a technique used in analyzing a framework synthesized Model of Public Management Reform of Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011). The factor analysis was divided into 2 ways, i.e. 1) digesting the large data into small ones and 2) decoding the data plan. The next step is to analyze what allows such happening of the data plan and what is the process as the chart below.




Figure 3.2 Research Methodology of Research Question 2

3.3 The Research Question 3

Under the public administration paradigms applied with the Thai bureaucratic development, what are the innovation applied in its development after its reforms in BE2545 (2002) and how many types of the innovation are classified?

3.3.1 Research Tool

Two tools have been used in these data collection, i.e., the documentary and in-depth interviews as follows:

(1) In the documentary research, it was to collect the innovation data used in the Thai bureaucratic development and the resources were the annual reports, strategic plans, laws/regulations, regulations, cultural promotion manual, books and other documents of the Office of Public Sector Development Commission (OPDC) disseminated through websites and in documents and the OPDC is the core agency responsible for the Thai bureaucratic development after 2003.

(2) The semi-structured form was used in the in-depth interview and conducted with a representative of the Section of Follow-up and Evaluation: OPDC. The interview was to question the cultural specifications, the application of innovation and the innovation evaluation.

3.3.2 Data Analysis

A qualitative description was used to display what innovation the OPDC has used with the Thai bureaucratic development and its categories which was based on the model of Alberti and Bertucci (2006). There are four categories, i.e. institutional innovations, organizational innovation, process innovation and conceptual innovation. The researcher has briefed the innovation and the interview was as figured below.




Figure 3.3 Innovation and interviews

3.4 The Research Question 4

What are the reasons that the result-based management (RBM) is applied in the Thai bureaucratic development after its reforms in BE2545 (2002); and what are limitations and impacts of the RBM in the Thai bureaucratic development? This question has been treated with a case study method with the multiple case studies as following ways.

3.4.1 Case Study

3.4.1.1 The meaning of a case study

It is based on Yin (2009:4) and there are 2 indicators, i.e. 1) response to “How?” or “Why?” with the social phenomena; 2) treating the extensive and in-depth social phenomena.

3.4.1.2 Selecting the case

Yin (2009) explains that it is necessary to adequately access the information regardless to interview people, to review documents or the chronicles, and to conduct field observations. Besides selecting the accessible case; one should

select the case responsive to the research question. The researcher select RBM (result-based management) focusing on performance agreement to treat a case of the Ministry of Justice with multiple-case through studying the ministerial agencies, i.e., (1) Office of the Permanent Secretary, (2) Office of the Justice Affairs, (3) the Forensic Institute, (4) the DSI (Department of Special Investigation), (5) Department of Rights and Liberty Protection, (6) the Legal Execution Department, (7) the Probation Department, (8) PACC (Office of Public Sector Anti-Corruption Commission).

3.4.1.3 Reasons to select the case study

Reasons to select the case study on performance agreement of the Ministry of Justice are:

(1) The Ministry of Justice

The Ministry of Justice is a pilot ministry in applying the performance agreement after the bureaucracy reform in 2003 (OPDC, 2004) and the researcher could diversely access the data: the document of performance agreement, and in-depth interview because the researcher has experiences to work with some responsible agents of the performance agreement and with each government agencies in the ministry. These are useful in the terms of reliability of the study, the interview, and the requests for necessary documents which best align with the real situations or the real phenomena. Therefore, with the reason of diverse information accessibility; it is the key for the researcher to decide in studying the performance agreement in the Ministry of Justice as the case.

(2) Reasons to select the performance agreement

The public reform in 2003 was focused on applying the RBM (the result-based management focusing on the performance agreement as enacted in Article 3/1 of the Public Administration Acts (5th Amendment) BE2545 (2003), which concentrated on the result-based public management where the responsible persons had been specified. In addition the managerial tools are stipulated in the Royal Decree on Criteria and Procedures for Good governance BE 2546 (2003) in Section 3: Government Administration to achieve the state missions. The core elements are strategic planning, and monitoring and evaluation through the performance agreement as the tool between the minister, chief of the public agencies and personnel. This is also allocated the performance agreement in the strategic plan of the Thai bureaucratic

development BE 2003-2007 which is focused on RBM for application through demanding to prepare strategic plans and having performance measurement with the indicators in from the organizational scorecard to the individual scorecard. It is therefore seen that preparing the performance agreement is a managerial tool demanded after the Thai bureaucratic reform after 2002. The public sector has allocated this tool in the document of the policy in the public sector development.

3.4.2 Data collection

They have been collected from 6 sources, i.e. 1) documents, 2) chronicles, 3) interview, 4) direct observation, 5) participatory observation and 5) physical invention (Yin, 2009). This research has collected data from 2 sources, i.e. documents and interview with following details.

3.4.2.1 Documentary sources

1) The documents from the OPDC (Office of Public Sector Development Commission) containing the manual and guides to follow the Royal Decree on Criteria and Procedures for Good Governance BE 2546 (2003), the evaluation manual of performance agreement at the level of the department or equivalent by fiscal year, the annual reports, the 4-year performance reports, the technical manual and RBM techniques by good governance, evaluation document of front line under the Ministry of Justice evaluated by the OPDC, PPT (power point) and other database online of the OPDC.

2) The documents of the Ministry of Justice

The data of strategic plans and the annual action plans, the annual data of performance agreement, and the annual report of the Ministry of Justice.

3) The data from books, journals, theses and dissertations and other related researches.

3.4.2.2 The in-depth interview form

The semi-structured form of in-depth interview has been used and 3 issues have been questioned on

1) Knowledge and understanding the performance agreement.

2) The application of the performance agreement beginning from the OPDC from the central agency to the Ministry of Justice as the line agencies; and

3) Limitations and impacts in the application of the performance agreement.

3.4.2.3 Sampling

The purposive samples were implemented and Chai Bhodhisita (2006) explains that the purposive sampling was not to gain representatives but to gain appropriate samples to the concept, goal and objectives of the research. The researcher has divided the samples into three groups, i.e.

1) The samples from the central agencies from the OPSDC, there was one sample represented the Section of Follow-up and Development who was responsible for specification process and conveyance of the management innovation to be applied in the ministry, department and divisions.

2) The line agencies, i.e. the Ministry of Justice by interviewing the responsible person for policy and strategies of each agency (department) containing (2.1) Office of the Permanent Secretary, (2.2) Office of the Justice Affairs, (2.3) the forensic Institute, (2.4) DSI (Department of Special Investigation), (2.5) Department of right and Liberty Protection, (2.6) the Legal Execution Department, (2.7) the Probation Department, (2.8) Department of Juvenile Observation and Protection, (2.9) Department of Corrections, (2.10) Office of the Narcotics Control Board, (2.11) the PACC (Office of Public Sector Anti-Corruption Commission).

3) Two scholars with experiences on being the advisors in preparing the strategic plans and the performance agreement or evaluation of the public sector performance.

3.4.3 Content Analysis

Analyzing the qualitative data (interview) was through the content analysis with the tool of content analysis matrix by following details.

1) After each interview given recording; the data have been decoded to disclose data as each individual has been interviewed.

2) Categorize the data after decoding with tables and distributed by individual and the clustering criteria by individual has been referred to the variables found in the research objectives and by interest points.

3) Collect all data from 11 interviewees to be spread in overview and link the convergent group or to jigsaw data with common standpoints.

4) Gaining data from all categories in pattern by behavior and the happenings from the preparation of the performance agreement in the Ministry of Justice; they were all analyzed the causes and factors influencing the rise of behavior or the phenomena and how does the emerging pattern create impact?

3.4.4 Research Verification

After the data collection, the researcher analyzed the data to find the behavioral pattern/ barriers/ impacts in applying RBM. Then the researcher defined the behavioral pattern/ barriers/ impacts above in order to find the hidden reasons of the actions and analyzed their linkages with the concept, theory, and the related results.

At this stage, the researcher drafted the results and checked their verification with managerial personnel who were not the population ever interviewed through interviews adhering with the drafted results and re-analyzed the results again in order to attempt checking them and to reflect the phenomena as close as to the real happenings.




Figure 3.4 Research Methodology by Research Question 3

3.5 Summary of the Research Methodology

Table 3.1 Summary of the Research Methodology

Research Questions	Methodology	Tools	Sources	Data Analysis
1) What are the public administration paradigms applied to develop the Thai bureaucratic system during 1959-2006 and what is the essence of each clustered concept?	Qualitative research	1) Documentary research 2) In-depth interview	(1) The Thai Journal of public administration and development administration (1960-2006) 2) Documents of policy, laws and strategic plans of bureaucracy reform 3) books, theses and dissertation, researches and research articles 4) Three scholars	1) Content analysis 1.1) Clustering 1.2) Patterning
2) What are factors influencing the changes of the public administration paradigms linked to the Thai bureaucratic development during 1959-2006, what are the characteristics of such changes and what are the causes of such changes?	Qualitative research	1) Documentary research 2) In-depth interview	The same sources as in Research Question 1	1) Content Analysis through Factoring
3) Under the public administration paradigms applied with the Thai bureaucratic development, what are the innovation applied in its development after its reforms in BE2545 (2002) and how many types of the innovation are classified?	Qualitative research	1) Documentary research/ 2) In-depth interview	1) Documents of policy, strategic plans, manuals, annual reports , laws, regulations of OPDC 2) the OPDC personnel , Division of Follow-up and Evaluation (public sector development)	Exploratory and descriptive

Table 3.1 Summary of the Research Methodology (cont.)

Research Questions	Methodology	Tools	Sources	Data Analysis
4) What are the reasons that the result-based management (RBM) is applied in the Thai bureaucratic development after its reforms in BE2545 (2002); and what are limitations and impacts of the RBM in the Thai bureaucratic development?	Case study	1) Documentary research/ 2) In-depth interview	1) Documents within the OPDC 2) Books, researches, theses and dissertations 3) the OPDC personnel , Division of Follow-up and Evaluation (public sector development) 4) Representatives of the Ministry of Justice from 11 Departments 4) Two scholars with experience and being the public advisors of RBM	1) Content Analysis 1.1) Pattern-Matching 1.2) Explanation-Building

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

The researcher raised four questions in this study, i.e.

1. What are the public administration paradigms applied to develop the Thai bureaucratic system during 1959-2006 and what is the essence of each clustered concept?

2. What are factors influencing the changes of the public administration paradigms linked to the Thai bureaucratic development during 1959-2006; what are the characteristics of such changes and what are the causes of such changes?

3. Under the public administration paradigms applied with the Thai bureaucratic development, what are the innovation applied in its development after its reforms in BE2545 (2002) and how many types of the innovation are classified?

4. What are the reasons that the result-based management (RBM) is applied in the Thai bureaucratic development after its reforms in BE2545 (2002); and what are limitations and impacts of the RBM in the Thai bureaucratic development?

They are convergent to the four objectives and the researcher would present the results by each question.

4.1 Response to the Research Question 1

What are the public administration paradigms applied to develop the Thai bureaucratic system during 1959-2006 and what is the essence of each clustered concept?

The researcher finds three schools of the Thai public administration, i.e. 1) the development administration, 2) the new public management and 3) the good governance. With each school, the researcher would present 1) the public sector development policy containing the national economic and social development plans, the government policy, and the strategic plans of public sector development; 2) the

results of public sector development and 3) the interest of the school of public administration through the Thai journal of public administration and the Thai journal of development administration. Each paradigm essence is discussed below.

4.1.1 The Development Administration (DA)

DA during the decades of 1957s -1977s has been focused on instituting the public sector on the national development especially on economy. The 3 economic development has been planned in association with public sector development through training, instituting public administration education, sponsoring scholarship of master degrees and doctoral degrees, publishing academic journals and skills development through educational excursion in the country and abroad. It was expected that the civil servants who had been through these processes would adopt knowledge and skills to further administrate and develop the public agencies. This paradigm was characterized the public sector development, results of the development, the school of public administration and their essences were as below.

4.1.1.1 The public sector development policy

This policy has been divided into 1) the national economic and social development plans, 2) the government policy, 3) the public sector development plans and 4) the related laws.

1) The national economic and social development plans

For the first 20 years of the National Economic and Social Development Plan 1 (1961-1966) to the National Economic and Social Development Plan 4 (1967-1981), they were focused only on economic development and very little development of bureaucracy. On the contrary, the National Economic and Social Development Plan 5 (1982-1986) it began to prioritize the reforms of planning process, the national budgeting, personnel administration to meet the national economic and social development plans with each ministry to prepare “Action Plans” the ministerial levels and their key departmental levels.

2) The government policy

For almost 30 years during 1959-1988, the government policies have been divided into two phases: the first one was concentrated on economic development only and none for the public sector development, for examples

during the regimes of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (1959-1963), and Field Marshal Thanom Kitikachorn (1963-1973). The second phase was focused on decentralization to the regions and rural areas, for example, the government of MR Kukrit Pramote (1975-1976), the regime of Gen. Kriangsak Chamanant (1977-1979), the regime of Gen. Prem Tinnasulanont (1980-1988), in particular, the policy of Gen. Prem administration has specified the first bureaucracy reform as being noted “... *expeditiously and efficiently reform the bureaucracy...*”

4.1.1.2 The public sector development results

The results during 1957-1977 beginning from the regime of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (1959-1963) until the regime of Gen. Prem Tinnasulanont (1980-1988) with 18 governments and for 30 years; the action taken were first, the financial development and in 1956, the American government has assigned its Public Administration Service of Chicago (PAS) to help overhaul financial reform and budgeting. The Office of Budgeting was instituted in 1959 and transferred from the Ministry of Finance to the supervision of the Office of the Prime Minister under the immediate supervision of the Prime Minister (Abhichart Sathitniramai, 2013). In 1960, the budget system has been changed from Line-item Budget to the Program Budget (Sukhothaithammathirat University, 1991:856). Second, the personnel administration: the US government has flown Ernest J. Barbour, an expert and USOM also offered experts from the Personnel Administration Commission of California to improve the Divisions in the Thai Bureaucracy during 1965-1974 which led to the amendments of the Civil Service Act BE2528 (1985) (Sukhothaithammathirat University, 1991). During the government of Gen. Prem Tinnasulanont (1980-1988), he has slowed down the number of the civil servants at not more than 2% a year. However, the three decades of public sector development were focused on institution, paving the national economic and social development, educating public administration, training and excursion with the following details.

1) Building institution

Since Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (1959-1963) led the government, he has attempted to improve many agencies in the Office of the Prime Minister to become his consultants such as the National Economic Development council, the National Education Council, the Research Council, Office of Budget, and

transferred all public universities to be under the supervision of the Office of the Prime Minister (Siffin, 2503). Juia Amaranant (1962) explains that the Office of the Prime Minister has proliferated its agencies from 12 units into 23 units within 1959 under the administration of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (see Appendix). In addition, there were many development agencies instituted to support the national development agenda. For example, in 1962, the Department of Rural Development was instituted, in 1963, the Ministry of National Development was instituted and in 1964, the Office of Accelerated Rural Development was instituted (Phra Dhammapitaka, 2009). These included the Foreign Investment Commission, the Department of Technical and Economic Cooperation and the Industrial Finance Corporation of Thailand (Supoj Kowittya, 2005).

2) The national economic planning

The World Bank team has surveyed the Thai economy during 1957-1958 and reported in “A Public Development Program for Thailand” and its contents became the springboard for the National Economic and Social Development Plan 1 and Plan 2. In addition, there was a World Bank report called EAP-28 founding the National Economic and Social Development Plan 3. Then the reports called “Thailand: Toward a Development Strategy of Full Participation and Industrial Development Strategy in Thailand”, both founded the National Economic and Social Development Plan 5 (Krit Permtanjit, 1985) and Phra Dhammapitaka, 2009).

3) The public administration education

The public administration education involved (1) instituting the public administration, (2) personnel training, (3) scholarships for higher education, excursion and seminars and (4) publishing the Thai journals of public administration and the Thai journal of development administration with following details.

3.1) Instituting public administration

The School of Public Administration: Thammasart University has been instituted in 1955 beginning from Public Administration Service (PAS) under supervision of United State Operation Mission (USOM), which studied the administration of Thailand in 1951 and reported in “A Program for Strengthening Public Administration in the Kingdom of Thailand” to the Thai government. This

report presented the problems of the organization and the public administration and it created awareness to the Thai government. Then in 1954, Edgar Kale the chief of Public Administration Division of USOM has discussed with Malai Huwanant, Dean of Political Science: Thammasart University to establish the Institution of Public Administration having Walter Laves, Dean of Government Department from Indiana University to design the lesson plans. The negotiation ended with academic supports from the USA and from Indian University to Thammasart University. The first joint agreement was signed in May 3, 1955 and the School of Public Administration: Thammasart University was instituted in June 15, 1955 aimed to promote the government administration, to provide knowledge of public administration for students and civil servants enabling them to apply in their agencies and to improve the education standards of public administration to meet the international level. Then four departments had been imposed, i.e. 1) Instruction Department, 2) Research Department, 3) Library Department, and 4) Civil Servant Training Department (Khattitya Amorntat, 1959; Thanom Kititkachorn, 1962). Later the School of Public Administration has been moved to the National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA) in 1966 and its aims of institution were 1) the public agent development, 2) the training center and 3) disseminating administration academic and training having Dr. Boonchana Attakorn as the first President (at that time being the Minister of National Development) and having Dr. Choob Kanjanaprakorn as the first Vice President.

3.2) The civil servant training

The training was the consequences of the studies conducted by a survey team on economy of World Bank during 1957-1958 and the following actions were taken.

1) Forming three commissions, 1.1) the advisory committee on the civil servant training chaired by the Prime Minister, every ministerial permanent secretary, OPSDC, and experts with Dr. Boonchna Atthakorn as a member and the secretary. 1.2) forming three advisory committees for civil servant training at the ministerial level and 1.3) forming three advisory committees for civil servant training at the departmental level having the School of Public Administration :

Thammasart University as the training center to promote the civil servant training and to provide consultation and assistance on academic affairs for various public agencies.

2) The training was divided into 7 models:
2.1) training the trainers for ministries, ministerial affairs, and departments,
2.2) training the teachers of the trainers, 2.3) training the leader, 2.4) training to conduct orientations, 2.5) training the technical disciplines, 2.6) training the regional civil servants, and 2.7) developing administrators.

3) Training courses were such as work control, work command, problem solving, complaints and interviews, human relation, work design, work planning, creativeness, work improvement, motivation and morale support, leadership, public presentation, deliberation and empowerment and so on.

3.3) Education, excursion and training

There were numbers of students taking the higher education of master degree and doctoral degree in the US universities such as Indiana, Michigan, Hawaii and so forth. Robert J. Muscat (1993:4) indicated that the assistance plans to attend short-course training and graduate studies in USA began with 14 participants in 1951. There were 77 participants in 1952 and almost 8,000 participants in 1970. This was the peak period of assistance program on training. After these years, the training scholarship for scholars and civil servants dramatically receded. There were only 29 participants in 1979. When head-count of both short-course training and extensive course training, there were only 11,181 participants in 1987.

3.4) The public administration journals and the development administration journals

The public administration and the development administration are consistent. The former is published by the School of Public Administration: Thammasart University to disseminate its knowledge for the interested persons and published quarterly. The first issue was in July 1960. Later when the School was transferred to join with NIDA in 1966, the journal has changed its name to the new institute called NIDA Journal. The first issue was the Journal Year 7, Vol. January 1, 1967 but the pattern and contents were still simultaneous with additional contents such as the economic and social development, business administration, techniques to accelerate social development and modern human, social and science studies. The NIDA Journal is still on publication until today.

4.1.1.4 The academic community of public administration

The researcher has studied the movement of the academic community of public administration from the public administration journals of 1960-1966 and the development administration journal of 1967-2006 by dividing them into 4 periods of 10 years, i.e. 1) 1960-1969, 2) 1970-1980, 3) 1981-1991, and 4) 1992-2006. Then their contents were explore on what the community took interest in or any focuses to support the divisions of the public administration paradigm which linked between The school and the practitioners or the public sector development .

It was found that trends of the public administration journal and the development administration journals took interest in the development administration since 1960-1987as following details.

1) Administration capacity development

There were articles of the administration capacity development in public sector like the articles of Amornrat Raksasat (1963) on “*Development, Development Science and Development Public Administration*”. The word “Development” has been popular after the end of WW II and its nature was the economic, social and academic assistances by the UN and USA. The UN wanted people’s welfare by issuing “the UN Charter for People’s Development on Economy, Politics and Social.” The article of Sawat Sukhontharangsri (1968) on “*Administration Science Development and the Accelerated Developing Countries*” which the UN General Assembly announced in 1961-1971 that it was “The Era of the UN Development”. It showed the leading priority of the world while the fourth Program of President Truman was to leverage the people’s wellbeing. Also, in the article of Fred Peterson (1960) on “*Administration in Thailand Concerns You*” detailed that Thailand needed to improve the technological knowledge and the government personnel needed to apply modern administration technique to improve its services and to save cost. It was also an article of Rashid Ibrahim (1961) on “*Public Administration in Thailand*” explaining the Thai administration system. Empowerment was restricted and inflexible regulations. The over-centralization created time and labor wastes. Thomas E. Ton being the director of USOM wrote an article titled “*Planning*” which explained limitations of investment in Thailand that there was absence of planning and expertise and he proposed to recruit more personnel on such areas. An article of Field Marshal

Thanom Kittikachorn (1962) on "*Exercising Power in Government Administration*" proposed modern technique to develop the Thai bureaucracy through the application of PAPSDCORB. In addition, an article of Amorn Raksasat (1969) on "*Administration Development and National Development*" proposed models of improving the public agencies by exemplifying that USA occasionally improved its public agencies by forming a committee to study it and propose it to the President, e.g., the Brownlow Committee (1936-1937), the First Hoover Commissions (1947-1949), and the Second Hoover Commission (1953). While in UK, its administration reform was through a committee to examine problems by their areas and the same article has proposed that Thailand should form a committee to improve its ministries, ministerial affairs, and departments, which would have authority to form a sub-committee and team-works to analyze problems in details. There should be around 100 committee members to spend two full years to work and report them to the Cabinet. An article of Amorn Raksasat (1974) on "*The Simultaneity of Government Administration Improvement through Network Coordination and the Sub-system Improvement*" indicated that the major improvement of Thailand was usually focused on amendment of the government administration laws. Therefore, Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat formed a committee called "Advisory Committee on Administrative Rules of the Prime Minister" to propose balanced and prudent comments. However, in most practices, the proposals were mostly about internal agency development. Therefore, the government administration reforms were not seriously examined. Similarly, an article of Amorn Raksasat (1975) on "Institute and the Process of Policy Development in Thailand" explained that the action taken by the advisory committee to the Prime Minister was enormously easing and flexible to the needs of the political parties and resistance from the government personnel. The advisory committee was mostly focusing on organizing the public agencies and allocating personnel to the new public agencies or the existing agencies but needed work-expansion. No major reform has been taken. Reforms were then gradual.

2) Problems and limitations of Thai public sector development

In the mid decade of 1977s, problems and limitations of Thai public sector development have been studied. An article of Charke Hagensick (2513: 562) on “*Administrative Reorganization Proposal in Thailand*” explained the limitations of bureaucratic structural improvement that they were flagged by the central agencies of the Office of the Prime Minister and the Office of the National Economic and social Development Board. At the same time, the structural improvement was examined as a routine job. An article of Patom Manirojana (1975) on “*Development with an Emphasis on Change*” explained the critical issues of administration that they were referred corruption, bribery, institutionalized formalism and nepotism, which hindered the success of development administration. An article of Thinapan Nakata (1977) on “*The Thai Bureaucrat Corruption: opinion survey among government personnel and people*” revealed that most personnel and the Thais knew the right-wrong deeds of corruption and were truly conscious of its destructiveness and impacts. For example, people distrust the government personnel. Development failed. The State lost revenues. People suffered and met with shortages of justice, efficiency. People did not rely on the government personnel. It was corresponded with another article of Thinapan Nakata (2520) on “*Corruption in Thai Bureaucracy who gets what, How and Why in Its public Expenditures*” revealing that the crucial cause of the bureaucratic corruption in Thailand was “the bid riggings”. Private sectors had to pay more than 30% to the public sector, which the government would receive, products or constructions with poor quality or low standards. Besides centralization and corruption, Thinapan Nakata (1980) also proposed the problem that bureaucracy dominated the national political system. In his article of “*Problems of the Thai Political system in the Decade of 1980s*”, he claimed that the government personnel and political parties were cronyistic. Dominion of cultivating traditional political cultures and monopoly attempts to recruit personnel for leading political position, information and media controls, bureaucrat dominion on enactment, national government administration, and justice administration was rather than being the instrumental to apply the policies or the political decisions (see additional detail in the article). Thinapan Nakata (1984) proposed in his article on “*The Thai Politics and Administration in the Decade of 1980s: problems and development approaches.*”

Prakorn Preeyakorn (1977) also proposed in his article of “*The State Policy Design: analysis of the problems and exits of the developing countries*” that Thailand was flourished with overpowering bureaucracies and ready to change anything as the bureaucrats wanted rather than being conscious of the needs of people. The policy designs were then just for a small group of people.

In addition, a group of scholars found that problems and limitations in the Thai public sector development were caused by the bureaucratic context difference and the national environment of the country of the original concept and the countries, which adopted the concept for application such as Thailand. For example, an article of Kattiya Kannasut (1985) on “*The Problems of Different Cultural Transfer in Changing Societies*” claimed that limitations of transferring theories and experiences learnt from abroad especially USA involved the difference of values, and the embedded behavioral pattern in society. An article of Uthai Laowhavichien (1983) on “*Public Administration Instruction in Thailand*” contended that an organizational development was a technique used in USA or in the administration involvement countries it was useless with the countries with undemocratic attitudes, belief and culture. Arnuphap Thiralarp (1984) explained the problems and the approaches to apply western techniques in Thailand through his article on “*OD: values needed re-evaluation.*” He explained that adopting new technique; the Thai bureaucrats were enthusiastically welcoming but gradually fading out to the old techniques. In summary, there are two natures of the problems: 1) not beginning at the problem or the real needs of the system but the feasible or appropriate needs, and 2) fashioning – counted a modern but not surveying the real problem of the agencies.

3) Socio-economic development

An article of Boochana Atthakorn (1960) on “*The Project of the National Economic Development*” explained it began in 1958 and seriously carried out after the coup d'état through the announcement of the National Economic Development Council Act BE 2502 (1959). The Prime Minister chaired the council but the Cabinet involved in every meeting. Another article of Boochana Atthakorn on “*the 10 Year National Economic Development of Thailand (1950-1960)*” led to institute the Office of the National Economic Development Council in 1959 to

improve and promote the economic design of the State by drafting a 6-year national project (1961-1967) and the draft was accomplished in 1960.

The economic articles during 1970-1980 were focused on problem solving and addressing economy especially the oil crisis and poverty. For example, an article of Plaiphol Khoomsap (1980) on "*The Domestic Situation and Oil Policy Year 1979*" disclosed that Thailand ran short in some oil products and the price hike of crude oil and all oil products affected the oil price in 1979: trade deficit and payment and expensive goods and service. Another articles were from Roengchai Marakanont (1980) on "*Monetary Crisis of 1979*"; Chaiwat Wibulsawat on "*The Thai Economic Trends*", Phiphit Supaphiphat (1980) on "*Instability of Agro-products*"; and Methi Krongkaew on "*Effects of Income Distribution by Raising Tax and Oil Price in the Country: research method and primary results.*"

Exploring the focuses of the school of public administration with the academic articles and research papers in the public administrative journal and the development administrative journals, it was found that the first two decades (1957-1977) there were the bureaucracy capacity development, planning, and the bureaucrat development through training at first. Later, after over a decade, the school of public administration found out that problems and limitations of public sector development was caused by the Thai bureaucracy itself; e.g. the institutionalized formalism, overpowering bureaucracy to apply the policy from the political or the dominion of bureaucracy. The bureaucracy here meant military too. The second cause was corruption. The school of public administration also mentioned about the difference between the Thai bureaucracy context and the US context especially democracy and authoritarianism which included process of applying the technique with the absence of prudence and not adhered to the internal problems of the Thai bureaucracy but took over interest in the technical content. With the above articles, they could indicate trends of the article and the focuses of the development administration paradigm during 1960-1991 as below.

1. The public administration journals and the development administration journals during 1960-1969

Table 4.1 The article information in the development administration journals during 1960-1969

Journals	Development Administration					NPM	GC
	Institution	Administrative capacity development	Bureaucrat development/ training	Economic and social development	Learning, instruction, and research		
Total	4	83	10	8	24	-	-
1960	1	3	2	1	2	-	-
1961	1	16	3	2	3	-	-
1962	1	11	2	1	2	-	-
1963	-	11	1	-	4	-	-
1964	-	9	-	-	3	-	-
1965	-	8	1	1	2	-	-
1966	-	5	1	-	1	-	-
1967	-	7	-	1	5	-	-
1968	-	4	-	2	2	-	-
1969	1	9	-	-	3	-	-

From Table 4.1, there are, in the first phase, 129 articles during 1960-1969 of the development administration or more than 60% are about the Administrative capacity development, followed by learning, instruction, and research on public administration at 18%, bureaucrat development/ training, bureaucrat development/ training, economic and social development (Urban, rural) and instituting.

2. The article of development administration journals during 1970-1980

Table 4.2 The article information in the development administration journals during 1970-1980

Journals	Development Administration					NPM	GG
	Institution	Administrative capacity development	Bureaucrat development/training	Economic and social development	Learning, instruction, and research		
Total	0	82	5	42	19	1	0
1970	-	14	1	2	2	-	-
1971	-	9	1	-	1	-	-
1972	-	8	1	7	2	-	-
1973	-	10	-	10	1	-	-
1974	-	6	1	6	3	-	-
1975	-	6	-	11	2	1	-
1976	-	2	-	2	3	-	-
1977	-	13	-	-	3	-	-
1978	-	5	-	1	2	-	-
1979	-	9	1	3	-	-	-
1980	-	-	-	7	1	-	-

From Table 4.2, the academic articles during 1970-1980 accumulated 149 articles of public sector development. The articles of the administrative capacity development was 55% followed by 42% of the articles about economic and social development and less than 1% of the articles about learning, public administration instruction and bureaucrat development. They were evidently reduced from the first decade (1960-1969). On the contrary, the articles of institution building were none. In addition, there were articles of the new public management. In 1975, the modern public sector: new way of doing the government's business has been proposed even having just the only article.

3. The development administration journal during 1981-1991

Table 4.3 Data of the development administration journal during 1981-1991

Journals	Development Administration					N.P.M	G.G.
	Institution	Administrative capacity development	Bureaucrat development / training	Economic and social development	Learning, instruction, and research		
Total	2	50	1	38	14	6	0
2524	-	4	1	8	2	-	-
2525	-	8	-	8	2	-	-
2526	1	8	-	6	4	-	-
2527	-	7	-	2	-	-	-
2528	-	3	-	-	-	2	-
2529	-	3	-	4	1	1	-
2530	1	3	-	2	4	-	-
2531	-	3	-	5	1	1	-
2532	-	1	-	1	-	1	-
2533	-	10	-	2	-	1	-
2534	-	11	-	5	-	1	-

From Table 4.3, there were 111 articles during 1981-1991 about public sector development. 49.5% were about administrative capacity development, followed by 34.2% about economic and social development 12.6% were about learning and public administration instructions. 1-2 articles were about public sector development and institution building and 5% or six articles were about new public management.

In this research, when examining literature reviews of strategic policy, the public sector development achievement and The school of public administration; it was found that the Thai public sector development was adhered to the development administration with special characteristics of first, the institution building of the public sector such as Office of the National Economic Development Council in 1959, the Office of National Education Council in 1959, Office of the National Research Council in 1959 and Office of Budget in 1959 and so on. Second, the economic development plans have been designed: the National Economic Development Plan 1 (1961-1966). Third, the Public Administration Institute has been

established, i.e. School of Public Administration: Thammasart University in 1955 and transferred to NIDA in 1966. Fourth, the public administration journals have been instituted in 1960 and the development administration journal in 1967 and not only published the public administration knowledge but also being the academic platform for scholars and bureaucrats who were interested in proposing their ideas for public sector development. Fifth, trainings especially seminars were organized by Thammasart University and the US advisors for the first batch of Administrative developers in April, 1960 targeted at the chiefs of the public agencies. Sixth, extended higher education for master degree and doctoral degree and excursions were provided to the US universities in Indiana, Michigan and Hawaii under the sponsorship of the Indiana University, the Ford Foundation, the UN, the UNESCO and USOM and so on.




Figure 4.1 The development administration, 1959-1987

4.1.2 New Public Management (NPM) Paradigm

The NPM is divided into three issues, i.e. 1) the bureaucrat development policy involving the national economic and social development plans, the government policy and the bureaucrat development strategy; 2) results of the bureaucrat development, and 3) The school of public administration with details below.

4.1.2.1 The bureaucrat development policy

The essence of the bureaucrat development policies involve, 1) the national economic and social development plans, 2) the government policy, 3) the bureaucrat development plans, 4) the results of the bureaucrat development and 5) related laws.

1) The national economic and social development plans

During 1987- 2006 for almost 20 years during the period of the National Economic and Social Development Plans 6-9 except Plan.8 (1997-2001) which emphasizes Good Governance; the rest emphasizes the government administration linking with the NPM by increasing the roles of private sectors in the national development especially, in some fundamental services as in Plan.6 (1987-1991). Plan.7 (1992-1996) emphasizes adjusting the roles of the public sectors from controlling and checking into monitoring and promoting, downsizing and restructuring for lean organizations by hiring private contractors to work out some affairs. This is to allow opportunities for the private to run the state enterprises, which the government formerly monopolizes, them or privatization including amendments of rules and regulations, shortening and speeding the formality process through IT system. As of Plan.9, it is focused on adjusting the roles of the central agencies to support the front line agencies aiming at achievement and success indicator building.

2) The government policies

The administration of Gen. Chartchai Chunchawan (1988-1991) emphasizes turning from the front liners into monitoring and promoting the private sectors to operate while the administration of Anant Panyarachun (1991-1995) improves the structure of personnel administration and budgeting, amendment of laws, rules, and regulations in order to decentralize them to locality, and improving the government agencies and the state enterprises. Similarly, the administration of Banharn Silpa-archa (1995-1996) tries to focus on improving the central, regional and

local agencies through decentralization. The administration of Gen. Chaowalit Yongjaiyuth (1996-1997) holds the convergent policies like Gen. Chartchai Chunhawan by reducing the government roles from being the front liners into the designers of criteria, rules and promoting the private sectors to operate. In addition, it was to supporting the modern technologies applied with the bureaucrat development and creating database or every level of agencies to link each other. The administration of Chuan Leekphai (1997-2000) converges the government policy to the previous governments: attempting to improve bureaucracy and the state enterprises given the involvement of people including to reduce burdens of the state in operations by allowing private sectors as the collaborators or as delegates. Similarly, the administration of Dr. Thaksin Shinawatr (2001-2006) emphasizes bureaucracy reforms to engage lean structure, changing the roles of front line and control into being supporter and facilitator by applying IT in order to improve the public services so that people would speedily access information. He emphasized the integrated administration system, acceleration of budgeting, improving people service systems through one-stop service center and e-government system.

During 1987-2006 that the government policies on public sector development was divided into two parts, i.e. 1) reducing the roles of the public sector while delegating private sectors by the public sector changes its roles to monitoring and supporting and the private sectors become the front liners and decentralization; 2) applying IT (information technology) to improve the public sector administration.

3) The public sector development strategic plans

There are three plans of the public sector development strategy during 1987-2006, i.e.

3.1 The Master Plan of public sector development

1997-2001

The administration of Gen. Chaowalit Yongjaiyuth (1996-1997) approved the plan in June 16, 1997 and emphasized two areas. They were 1) adjusting the mission roles and the size of the government agencies, i.e. privatization, downsizing personnel and applying IT, 2) improving the government jobs, conducting public hearing, service standardization, promoting volunteer in the public sector works,

rewarding distinguished agencies and personnel, establishing the permanent agency to run bureaucracy reform, and the decade of servicing people promotion.

3.2 The public administration system reform plan 1999

During the second term of Chuan Leekpai administration (1997-2000), a resolution of this reform was in May 11, 1999, which emphasized 5 areas. They were 1) the role changes, public missions and methods such as establishing public organizations or privatization, contract out from outsource and result-based services. 2) it included plans of changing budgeting system into result and outcome-based budgeting system; 3) changes of personnel administration system such as contract hiring, job-hiring, downsizing public personnel; 4) amending laws of NPM; and 5) changing the cultures and values of the public administration.

3.3 The Thai public sector development strategic plan 2003-2007

The administration of Dr. Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2006) approved the resolution of this plan in May 19, 2003 and improves seven areas. They were 1) changing the process and the method, result-based administration and preparing the performance agreement. 2) restructuring the administration through decentralization to the local and the local organization and the integrated administration; 3) reengineering financial and budgeting system by focusing on strategy-based budgeting; 4) building the personnel administration emphasizing public entrepreneurship; 5) shifting paradigms, cultures and values; 6) modernizing bureaucracy and e-government; and 7) allowing people to involve in public affairs.

4.1.2.2 Results of public sector development

The results of applying concepts and the tools of NPM with the public sector development are detailed as follows (additional details of the results during 1959-2006 through the public sector development in Chapter II).

1) The administration of Gen. Prem Tinsulanont (1980-1988) sets three teams of the Commission of Bureaucracy Reform and the Regulations of the Government Administration and changes the Administration Regulation Advisor of the Prime Minister into the Commission of Bureaucracy Reform and the Regulations of the Government Administration. Major results are 1) standardizing the

slow-down of the number of the civil servant for not more than 2% a year including the slow-down of the public agency expansion.

2) The administration of Gen. Chartchai Chunchawan (1988-1990) set a Commission of Bureaucracy Reform and the Regulations of the Government Administration and the major results. They were 1) issuing the Prime Minister Regulations of the Government Action for People in the Public Agencies BE 2532 (1989) by improving the services for people in the government agencies in specifying the procedures and duration of the service; 2) approving the QCC (quality control circle) approach of the government agencies.

3) The administration of Anant Panyarachun (1991-1992) set the Commission of the Government Administration System. It was by working out 1) privatization, 2) deregulating the government criteria for the private enterprises and allowing the small-size private enterprises to compete with the large-size private enterprises privileged in the state monopoly of the past called liberalization including deregulating procedures of permits for not less than 20 activities.

4) The administration of Chuan Leekphai (1992-1995) (First Term) sets a Commission of the Government Administration Development System with the result of issuing measures to allocate the public workforce.

5) The administration of Gen. Chaowalit Yongjaiyuth (1996-1997) sets a Commission of the Bureaucracy Reform by working out 1) the master plan of bureaucracy reform (1997-2001) approved by the Cabinet in June 17, 1997; 2) drafting an Act of the Non-government Public Organization; 3) developing and applying IT to improve working in the public sector.

6) The administration of Chuan Leekphai (1997-2000) (Second Term) set a Commission of Bureaucracy Reform. It was by working out 1) planning the public sector system reform in 1997 with NPM. 2) He established eight public organizations according to the Public Organization Act BE 2542 (1997). 3) the government establishing the Thailand International Public Sector Standard Management System and Outcomes (P.S.O) under the Prime Ministerial Regulations on the Approval of the Management Performance and Public Sector Achievement BE 2543 (2000). 4) The government set rewards system for agencies and public personnel in servicing people, i.e. the Prime Minister Award while 5) systematizing one-stop

service. 6) the government rewarded for Suggestion Box Award and 7) Result-based Management given the Office of Civil Service to hire Andersen Counseling as an advisor by dividing into 2 phases. The first phase was in 1999: the ministerial prototype of Ministry of Commerce and the departmental prototype of Department of Insurance while the second phase in 2000 was to expand the agencies in the Ministry of Commerce and in every department (Prayote Songklin, 2008). 8) He transferred the public jobs to outsource such as 126 agencies of cleaning. 9) He changed budgeting into the performance-based budgeting. 10) The government downsized public personnel through various measures, i.e. dissolving the retirement position not less than 80%, dissolving the employee vacancy position and organizing the life redirection project: early retirement with 39, 516 participants. 11) Privatization of Bangjak Petroleum Limited (Plc.) and Thai Airways Limited (Plc), selling shares of the Ratchaburi Power Plant Holding had been imposed and dissolved three state enterprises, i.e. Frozen Industry Organization, Ready-made Food Production Organization and Weaving Organization and selling out 2 state enterprises, i.e. Sugar Factory, and Glass Factory.

7) The administration of Dr. Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2005) set a Commission of Public sector development according to the Public Administration Act BE 2545 (2003) and constructively working out with 1) planning the Thai public sector development strategy for 2003-2007. 2) He issued the decree on Criteria and Procedures for Good governance BE 2546 (2003), Result-based Management in the public agencies to continue the process since 1999 until 2003 where 49 agencies involved. 4) He improved the services for people and rewarding the Prime Minister Award to the public agencies and the distinguished public personnel; 5) systematizing the Managerial Quality Assurance of the Public Sector with managerial system and result-based management (P.S. O.), 65 agencies were certified with Quality Assurance Certificates. 6) He changed the paradigm and values called I AM READY. 7) He improved the performance of 13 public organizations. 8) He motivated the creation of good governance through performance agreement in order to be rewarded the incentive. 9) He improved the services for people by ending red-tape and duration of procedures for people and 360 agencies participated while the follow-up and evaluation for the award of “Quality of People Service”. 10) He preparing

performance agreement by allowing the departmental and provincial agencies enter the evaluation system to receive incentives - 163 departments and 75 provinces involved. 11) He deregulated the service of people with reward of “Quality of People Service” since 2003 and in 2005, rewards have been divided into 3 types, i.e. working process, working process in general, and interrelated multiple agencies. 12) He provided e-service under the e-government project. 13) He prepared Government Fiscal Management Information (GFMIS). 14) He planned the government administration and the government performance for 4 years, 15) He prepared the performance agreement and performance evaluation for the Fiscal Budget 2005. 16) He regulated other non-government organizations to certify their roles and missions of the public sector demanded higher efficiency, i.e. a) public organizations, b) service delivery unit (SDU). 17) There are four Service Links, i.e. 8 public utility service links, a small enterprise service link, 11 ministerial service links, and 17 government counter service (GCS). 18) Public Sector Management Quality Award: PMQA was improved from Malcolm Baldrige National Award: MBNQA and Thailand Quality Award: TQA. 19) He privatized (1) Thailand Petroleum to be Thailand Petroleum Limited (Plc), the Airport Authority of Thailand into Airport of Thailand Co. Ltd (Plc), Communication Authority of Thailand into CAT Corporation Limited (Plc) and Telecommunication of Thailand Limited (Plc), instituted Thai Post Co. Ltd. and merged 4 privatization enterprises; and (2) traded shares of the state enterprise in the SET, i.e. the Internet Thailand Co. Ltd. (Plc); Thailand Petroleum Limited (Plc); Thai Military Bank and Krungthai Credit Co. Ltd. (Plc).

4.1.2.3 The school of public administration

The community has begun to take interest in NPM since 1987 and more evident in 1997. NPM has influenced scholars with difference from the 2-previous decade especially in innovation or the managerial tool of private sectors, which has been, applied the public administration such as QCC (quality control circle), privatization, MIS (management information system) and do on. With the work particularly of Nopamass Dhiravagin (1981) studying on “*Japanese Culture and Quality Control Circle*”, she explains that the success of QCC in Japan has been influenced by the Japanese traditional culture. Similarly, Manit Sammaphan (1987) studying “*Quality Control Circles (QCCs)*” explains that applying QCC requires

human development to continuously work. In addition, the model of privatization has been introduced through the work of Pranee Juttakornkijsilp (1988) in her studies of “Approaches in Privatization”; she explains that competition is a special mechanism which is likely high efficient. It gains consumers’ trust to shop the low-cost services but speedily satisfies them. Privatization reflects the belief that the state enterprise inefficiently works. At the meantime, Somboon Sattayarakwit (1990) introduces “Information System” in developing rural areas through his article of “*Information system in Managing Rural Development under the MIS Concept*” and today no public agencies and no state enterprise have applied it.

Towards the end of the 1990s, the article of Watana Patanapongse (1996) on “*The changing world of the executive in the Thai management environment*” explains that the world becomes globalization and the Thai management has adjusted to the change of the world. Therefore, the Thai managers have to take interest in the social and cultural structures as taking interest in the change of the managerial system, i.e. the change of data and information, costs of resources, managerial process, and models of performance evaluation. This is corresponded with the work of Sombat Thamrongthanyawong (1996) in his article of “Public Administration in the Next Decades”. He explains that globalization leads to social, economic and political changes. Therefore, the Thai bureaucracy has to change its managerial cultures such as regulation-based or regulation-targeted adherence, bureaucrat values. In addition, he introduces administration shift through the models of Osborne and Gaebler (1993) and Hammer and Champy (1993). In addition, the article of Boonlert Phailin on “*Reengineering*” explains that it is a radical redesign such as the changes of process, IT, organization and technology, managerial strategy of the management, evaluation, rewarding and values. Similarly, the article of Watana Patanapongse (1994) on “*Application of Benchmarking to Improve Productivity*” introduces benchmarking in order to compare the performance between organizations through evaluation performance of best practices. This includes the article of Chindalak Yadhanasindhu (1994) who introduces an employment contract in the public sector in her works on “*The Use of Contracting in the Public Sector: Experiences from some Asian Pacific Countries*”. She indicates that hiring by contract is the consequence of privatization. Its benefits is to save cost and the employer has

choice of contractor, expertise and flexible in public administration. As for the article of Voradej Chandarasorn (1995) on “*Privatization: A new trend and a revolution in public administration*” explains the model of privatization inclines to the change of the public administration today in order to improve efficiency and adds flexibility in management. It counts “this era is the new public administration for the country”. Similarly, Nit Sammaphan (1994) writes an article on “*Strategization for the Enterprise*” and explains that the benefits of strategy are to help identify the direction and the approach to allocate resources of the organization. It contains 1) analysis of mission statement, 2) analysis of corporate culture, 3) SWOT analysis, 4) objectives and strategy designs to meet the happening opportunities and threats. Also, the article of Suchart Prasitrattasin (1995) on “*The Appropriate Performance Indicators to Check the Performance and Plans*”; they are used for evaluation. In addition, the article of Watcharee Songprathoom introduces IT to be used in administration through the works on “*IT and Organizational Development*”.

The above academic articles and research papers awakens awareness and interest in NPM among The school of public administration especially adopting the techniques of the private sectors such as QCC, MIS, and reducing roles of the public sector in order to support private sectors to run the state affairs such as privatization. This includes priority in identifying the directions of an organization gained from SWOT analysis, which leads to strategization with constructive indicators. With such phenomenon, the researcher ensures that during early 1967, the school of public administration has paid attention to NPM to be applied to the Thai public administration.

Table 4.4 Articles in the Development Administration during 1992-2006

Journals	Development Administration					N.P.M	G.G.
	Institution	Administrative capacity development	Bureaucrat development/training	Economic and social development	Administrative capacity development		
Total	-	17	4	5	5	23	3
1992	-	2	-	1	-	-	-
1994	-	-	1	-	-	1	-
1995	-	1	2	-	-	5	-
1996	-	3	-	1	2	6	-
1997	-	2	1	-	-	2	-
1998	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
1999	-	-	-	2	1	3	-
2000	-	4	-	-	1	-	-
2001	-	4	-	-	1	-	-
2002	-	1	-	1	-	4	1
2003	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
2005	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2006	-	-	-	-	-	1	1

From Table 4.4, it is found that academic articles of NPM rise clearly from six articles 23 articles or almost four times.

Therefore, with the literature reviews both from public documents of the government policy, the national economic and social development, achievements of public sector development and The school of public administration; the researcher could conclude that the NPM in Thailand has drawn attention during 1987-1997 by forming this concept from problems and barriers in the public sector development linked to the development administration. It is corresponded with the interest of The school of public administration which comments on the barriers to the process of the Thai public sector development such as the problems of the differences between the US models applied to the Thai public sector development characterized centralization, bureaucratic polity and corruption. These are clearly found in the National Economic and Social Development Plans 6, 7 and 9 by changing the roles of control and check

into monitoring, supporting, downsizing, and lean organization through allowing private sector to be hired as contractors or allowing private body to run the state enterprises. At the meantime, the government policy is convergent to the national economic and social development plans. This begins with The administration of Gen. Chartchai Chunhawan (1988-1991) until The administration of Dr. Thaksin Shinawatr (2001-2006), including the three strategic plans of public sector development : the master plan of bureaucracy reform 1997-2001; the plan of public administration reform 1999; and the strategic plan of the Thai public sector development 2001-2007 and all the plans are founded on the NPM.

Constructively, the current public sector development like establishing public organization, Thailand International Public Sector Standard Management System and Outcomes (P.S.O), Result-based Management (RBM), Prime Minister Award (PMA) for distinguished agencies and servicing people, Performance Agreement (PA), Public Sector Management Quality Award (PMQA), e-Government, Government Fiscal Management Information-GFMIS, and privatization. Specially, the administration of Dr. Thaksin Shinawatr (2001-2006) has amended the Government Administration Act (Copt 5) BE 22545 (2002) by instituting the Office of the Commission of Public sector development to become the permanent organization in developing the Thai bureaucracy. A decree has been issued on criteria and good governance in 2003. It is compared to the action plan in the public sector development enforced for every public agency to follow this law. Similarly, the school of public administration is interested in NPM and practices community such as QCC, MIS, privatization and strategization and so on.




Figure 4.2 The focus of New Public Management 1987-2006

Notes: P.S.O: Thailand International Public Sector Standard Management System and Outcomes
 PMQA: Public Sector Management Quality Award

4.1.3 Good Governance

The good governance is divided into three (3) issues: 1) the policy of public sector development containing the national economic and social development plan, government policies, and the constitutional laws, 2) the performance of public sector development, and 3) the school of public administration. Details are as below.

4.1.3.1 The policy of public sector development

It links with good governance, which contains the national economic and social development plans, government policies and strategies of public sector development.

1) The national economic and social development plans

The National Economic and Social Development Plan 8 (1997-2001) is set to improve good governance reinforced by rule of law and allows private organizations, private sectors, communities and people to involve in the public administration.

2) The government policies

The policy of the administration of Gen. Chaowalit Yongjaiyuth (1996-1997) supports the rights of people to realize the government information and the public agencies have to listen to the opinion of people through public hearing and involve people, and media to check the public works. Whereas, the administration of Chuan Leekphai (1997-2000) (Second Term) encouraged people to participate with the public agencies as well as establishes the National Anti-Corruption Commission, enacts laws of criminal procedures for political office holders, and accelerates decentralization while modeling the local administration in to 4 models: 1) provincial administration organization, 2) municipality, 3) sub-district administration organization and 4) special public administration. The administration of Dr. Thaksin Shinawatr (2001-2005) promotes decentralization and encourages people, civil societies, and private sectors to involve in administration and check the works of the local administration.

3) The BE2540 (1997) Constitution

The school of good governance has been formed during the time of Black May 1992 claiming for political reforms and increase the role of people, civil societies and the network of private development organization which led to the Constitution BE2540 (1997) and it has been enclosed in the concept of good governance.

3.1) Check and Balance the management both politicians and the top management – it demands to establish the institute of check and balance the executive politicians (electoral government) and Top Civil Servants, i.e. 1) Ombudsman later the Constitution BE 2550 (2007) called the “Ombudsman” 2) Election Commission, 3) National Human Rights Commission, 4) Constitutional Court, 5) Administrative Court 6) The National Anti-Corruption Commission, 7) State Audit Commission (SAC).

3.2) Establishing Participatory Politics – This constitution enclosed the concept of participation and check the executive politicians and public agencies, e.g. people with election rights of not less than 50,000 in number hold the rights to propose laws and the local codes of law (Articles 170 and 287); rights to remove the political office holders and the senate top executive (Article 304); to remove the local council members and the local executive (Article 286). In addition, people hold rights to group as an association, correlated union, corporative, agricultural group and private organization (Article 45). People can group to conserve, maintain, recover and utilize the natural intellectual, arts and culture and environment (Article 46), rights to participate with the government and taking lawsuit against public agencies in managing the natural resources (Article 56). Moreover, people hold the rights to receive information non-affecting the state security and other people (Article 58). Further, people hold the rights to receive information clarification and reasons before any public projects taken into action, which affect environment quality, and quality of life (Article 59). People hold the rights to participate in the consideration process of the public personnel (Article 60). People hold the rights to take lawsuit against the public agencies on taking action or avoidance of taking action of the public personnel (Article 62), and so on.

3.3) The local administration and decentralization – the Constitution demands the state to allow autonomy to local administration by the governance principles as in the intention of the local people (Article 282). The local administration has liberty to design its governing policy, administration, personnel, and finance (Article 283) after the announcement of the Plan and Procedures of Decentralization Acts BE 2542 (1999).

4.1.3.2 Results of Public sector development

The Thai public sector development has linked with the concept of good governance, and the researcher concludes here below as follows:

1) The administration of Chuan Leekphai (1992-1995) (First Term) sets a Commission of the Government Administration Development System to take action on 1) proposing the draft of Administrative Act BE..... the draft of the Act of Liability of Wrongful Act of Official BE..., the draft of Official Information Act BE... to the Cabinet and the Cabinet has approved the principles of

the first two (2) laws in November 30, 1993 and the third one was in January 25, 1994 (Pittaya Borwornwattana, No Date: 71). 2) proposing instituting, 2.1) Administrative Court, 2.2) proposing The National Anti-Corruption Commission; 2.3) proposing the approaches of decentralizing managerial power; and 2.4) improving decentralization to local.

2) The administration of Banharn Silpa-archa (1995-1996) forms a Commission of Bureaucracy Reform and the actions taken are 1) proposal drawn in 1996 the year of servicing people promotion of the public agencies by the Cabinet resolution in March 19, 1996 in order to arouse speedy and transparent servicing people to meet the people needs, 2) regulating the Regulation of the Office of the Prime Minister for Public Hearing BE 2539 (1996); 3) announcing the enforcement of the Administrative Act BE 2539 (1996); and 4) announcing the enforcement of the Act of Liability for Wrongful Acts of Official BE 2539 (1996).

3) The administration of Gen. Chaowalit Yongjaiyuth (1996-1997) forms a Commission of Bureaucracy Reform and actions taken are 1) announcing the enforcement of Public Information Act BE 2540 (1997); 2) stipulating 1997-1998 being the year of servicing people in the state. It was extended from 1996 in order to speedily and transparently servicing people and to meet the people's needs including mobilizing people to participate in the public activities; and 3) drafting the Non-Government Public Organization Act.

4) The administration of Chuan Leekphai (1997-2000) (Second Term) forms a Commission of Bureaucracy Reform and the actions taken are 1) Plans and Decentralization Procedure Act Be 2542 (1999); 2) systematizing good governance according to the regulations of the Office of the Prime Minister on Good Governance BE 2542 (1999).

4.1.3.3 School of public administration

The School pays less interest during the decade of 1997s. BY surveying academic articles, there are just the works of Chindalak Vadalak Vadhanasindhu (2001) on "*Good corporate Governance in Thailand*" and Wirat Wiratchaniphawan (1977) on "*the Thai Administrative Court: analysis and comparison of model, structure, power, duty and personnel administration of UK, France and Germany*".

Trends of additional academic articles on good governance though there were few:

Table 4.5 Academic articles on good governance during 1992-2006

Journals	Development Administration					N.P.M	G.G.
	Institution	Administrative capacity development	Bureaucrat development/training	Economic and social development	Learning, instruction, and research		
Total	-	17	4	5	5	23	3
1992	-	2	-	1	-	-	-
1994	-	-	1	-	-	1	-
1995	-	1	2	-	-	5	-
1996	-	3	-	1	2	6	-
1997	-	2	1	-	-	2	-
1998	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
1999	-	-	-	2	1	3	-
2000	-	4	-	-	1	-	-
2001	-	4	-	-	1	-	-
2002	-	1	-	1	-	4	1
2003	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
2005	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2006	-	-	-	-	-	1	1

Therefore, the information about the policies, achievement of public sector development and the School of public administration claim that good governance has been applied to develop the Thai bureaucracy since 1992 during the Black May when civil societies claim political reforms by adding the roles of people, civil societies and the network of private development organizations. They are key players leading to the Constitution BE 2540 (1997). The constitution provides political rights for people in order to participate with the public sector, involving in NGO to check the work of the political executive and top civil servants. On the contrary, the national Economic and Social Development Plan 8 (1997-2001) evidently encourages civil societies and leads to the regulation of the Prime Minister Office to conduct public hearing; the Administrative Procedure BE 2539 (1996); the Act of Liability of Wrongful Act of Official BE 2539 (1996); and the stipulation 1996 becoming the Year

of Servicing People Promotion by Public Agencies. During the administration of Banharn Silpa-archa (1995-1996) followed by the administration of Gen. Chaowalit Yongjaiyuth (1996-1997) enact the Public Information Act BE 2540 (1997) and stipulates 1997-1998 the Year of Servicing People Promotion of the government continuing from 1996. During The administration of Chuan Leekphai (1997-2000) (Second Term); he create good governance system according to the Regulations of the Prime Minister Office on Good governance BE 2542 (1999).




Figure 4.3 The focus of good governance 1992-2006

4.2 Response to The Research Question 2

What are factors influencing the changes of the public administration paradigms linked to the Thai bureaucratic development during 1959-2006; what are the characteristics of such changes and what are the causes of such changes?

The researcher analyzes factors influencing the changes of the public administration paradigms applied in the Thai bureaucracy development and divides the paradigm as below.

4.2.1 Factors influencing the stipulation of development administration

The development administration was disseminated after WWII given the USA and the international organizations were the key players. Thailand was a country among many influenced by this paradigm because of the relation with the USA and it was recovered since 1946, immediately after WWII ended in 1945. The USA supported Thailand to be a member of UN in the same year. Later in 1950, both relation was closer. The USA was worried about the communist spread in ASEAN and seeing that Thailand was a strategic location to counter communism. This led to bilateral cooperation and there were three agreements to be endorsed, i.e. Educational and Culture Exchange Agreement (backed by Fulbright Foundation). 2) Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement was endorsed in September 1950; and 3) Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement was endorsed in October 1950 (Jullacheep Chinnawanno, 2001). The first two agreements were the critical factors allowing the Thai bureaucracy and the public administration have been developed according to the development administration paradigm. Thak Chalermtiarana (2009) explained that the Fulbright scholarship allowed Thailand to ship students for further higher education in the USA. Chai-anant Samutthawanich (1998) explained that previously the Thai bureaucracy hired few personnel graduated from abroad and most hired graduates were from UK and Europe. By this change, many more were graduated and attended excursion from the USA. Nevertheless, the economic and academic agreement were focused on free trade, reducing tariff, FDI (foreign direct investment) or monopoly by the Thai government through the state enterprises and the cooperation and facilitation from the technical advisory board and the US economy were compared to the USA had privileged and protection for diplomats would deserve from the Thai government. With is agreement, the World Bank team had visited and conducted surveys on the Thai economy during 1957-1958 and presented a report on "A Public Development Program for Thailand". This report was focused on 1) critiques on the actions taken by the Thai state enterprises; 2) standardization of the private investment promotion ; and 3) the Thai bureaucracy improvement (Kritch Permthanjit, 1985).

It is seen that the relation between the USA and Thailand continued through common agreement especially the Fulbright scholarships, economy and academic. This allows the Thai bureaucracy and the public administration change to

the concept of development administration. Particularly, a central agency has been instituted to engage in the national economic development plans; preparation of the plans, instituting the Office of Budgeting separated from Comptroller General's Department: Ministry of Finance to be under the Prime Minister Office as an immediate subordinates. Analyzing the backgrounds and incentives that formed the relation between Thailand with the USA and the World Bank after WWII and it led to the dissemination of the development administration in Thailand, which was divided, into two major factors, i.e. 1) internal and external politics, and 2) economy.

4.2.1.1 Political Factors

They were influencing in specifying the development administration containing two factors: internal politics and external politics with following details.

1) The alignment of power in internal politics

After WWII in 1945, a coup led by Field Marshal P. Phibunsongkram pressured Mr. Kuang Abhaiwong, Prime Minister to resign in April 6, 1948 and became the Prime Minister for his second term (1948-1957). At the same time, Field Marshal P. Phibunsongkram wanted to align power among the political powerhouses between the Soi Rajkru Group led by Pol. Gen. Phao Sriyanont and the Sisaothewes Group led by Field Marshal Sarit Thanatat. Alignment of both polar was the keys that Field Marshal P. Phibunsongkram built the relationship with USA because he had no arm force of his own unlike Pol. Gen. Phao Sriyanont who commanded the police force and Field Marshal Sarit Thanatat who commanded the army as their backups. Field Marshal P. Phibunsongkram reasoned on anti-communism in the country, which was spread in the ASEAN group to exchange with the US assistance. The US supports became the condition to survive politics of Field Marshal P. Phibunsongkram. The pattern of the US supports was divided into military, economy and public sector development, which he could use these supports to foster his political power group (Aphichart Sathitniramai, 2013). Thak Chalermtiarana (2009:105) claimed that after the coup 1947 until 1951, Pol. Gen. Phao Sriyanont and Field Marshal Sarit Thanatat held opportunities to reinforce their political merits and powers through the US aids that Field Marshal P. Phibunsongkram had initiated. It strengthened and stabilized his political mechanism more. In addition, Thak

Chalermtiarana (2009) concluded the phenomenon that the success of Field Marshal P. Phibunsongkram during 1947 was relied on his capacity to attract the US to help economy, military, loans from World Bank and the advancement of the international trade. It could be said that the policy of anti-communism as a foreign policy was advantageous for Field Marshal P. Phibunsongkram in order to bargain with the US aids. Thak Chalermtiarana (2009) added that the political status of Field Marshal P. Phibunsongkram after the coup of 1947 created him instability and without political support (force) while having to rival with Pol. Gen. Phao Sriyanont and Field Marshal Sarit Thanatat, he had to turn to the US for supports and acted as a broker between the US and his rivalries. He expected that the US would support him with finance and arms as the exchange for the close cooperation in the international and internal affairs. As such, it stabilized his political status more. Phasook Phongphaijit and Chris Becker (2003) estimated that the US budgets to support the Thai military during 1951-1975 was around 2.5 billion Baht.

2) The international politics in deploying Thailand as a base of anti-communism

After WWII ended in 1945, it entered Cold War between two powerhouses like the US and the USSR. During 1947-1950, Thailand joined the Cold War and gave the importance in designing the US policy according to the Domino theory, which was necessary to be protected and not to fall under the communist countries. In corporate with Thailand was a critical strategic location for the US base in Indochina. The US believed that to counter communism was to help Thailand to have a strong government and economic growth founded on private funds. Since 1937, the Thai military leaders found out that the more they counter communism; the more they would be remunerated from the US. It was found that during 1951-1975, the US support the Thai military for more than 2.5 Billion Baht (Phasook Phongphaijit and Chris Becker, 2003).

Entering the administration of Field Marshal Sarit Thanatat (1959-1963) The US and Thailand had close tie. The US supported his coup in 1958 and supported funds and technical personnel to modernize the country. With the US aids, he responded to the US policy of counter communism (Likhit Theerawekin, 2011:174). Ukkrit Patthamanant (1985) explained that the relation between Thailand

and the US was through Field Marshal Sarit Thanatat had met President Eisenhower (1953-1961) with his military and economic teams during his recovery in the military hospital of Water Reed in May 7, 1958. Field Marshal Sarit Thanatat pleaded assistance from the US to support himself to return to the Thai politics immediately and proposed the approach to counter communism to the US. It much satisfied the US and needed him to applied this principles and the approaches in Thailand. Ukkrit Patthamanant (1985) asserted that the case of Field Marshal Sarit Thanatat travelled for medication was a personal guest to President Eisenhower and it began the formulation of the coup and the Thai economic development.

4.2.1.2 Economic factors

The economic factors on the relation between World Bank and Thailand were through loan and techniques to develop economy as detailed below:

World Bank is an international economic organization to help develop countries in the third world in the form of the development loan and technical advice for the developing countries and significant influence to design the uses of those loans. Thailand was another country having relation with World Bank and it had its first loan in 1950.

The goals of World Bank were 1) promoting capitalism states to eliminate the state capitalism of Thailand since 1932 until 1957 and to pave ways for foreign investment in Thailand; 2) needed Thailand to be the sample of the successful country in developing through capitalism in order to block the expansion of communism in Asia region. Kritch Permthanjit (1985) concluded that the impacts of foreign assistance that the foreign assistance regardless in the form of technical aids or loans. They were from the international financial institutes or from foreign governments, which holding the importance not only building relation or bond between the Thai economic system and the global capitalism only but also having the influence to design directions in developing the national economy, designing the state model, and organizing the Thai bureaucracy. World Bank had more influence in providing advice or technical assistance to Thailand. It was corresponded with Ukkrit Patthamanant (1985) indicating that World Bank shipped experts to design economic development in 16 countries at the same time and included Thailand aiming at enlarging the capitalist economic for foreign investment.

World Bank first helped technique for Thailand through a study on A Public Development Program for Thailand A team from World Bank visited and studied the Thai economy during 1957-1958. This report was divided into 3 parts, i.e., 1) critiques on action taken by the Thai state enterprise; 2) measures to promote private investment; and 3) the Thai bureaucracy improvement (Kritch Permthanjit (1985:178-183). The world Bank's report became the foundation of the National Economic Development Plan 1 (1961-1966) and Plan 2 (1967-1971). The Thai development plan became the spending plan for capital to develop the economic infrastructure and public utilities with the money received from the international capital institute and foreign government.

Therefore, it is seen that World Bank or International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) represented the ideal interest of the western imperialism and are significantly influenced the change of the Thai economy under the foundation of economic and technical assistances either in loan for development or technical advices through the studies of World Bank or its representatives teamwork. Both actions influenced to design policy and strategies in the developing the Thai economy, politics and public administration (Kritch Permthanjit (1985). In conclusion, World Bank employed loans and reports as the tools to direct Thailand to meet the goal of the western capitalism particularly the US. It needed to develop Thailand into capitalism: promoting the private roles particularly the foreign investors to replace manufacturing and the services of the Thai state enterprises through investment promotion measures of private sector and improving administration with instituting the central agency for planning. That was the Office of the National Economic Development Commission, which was compared to an order working out as taking order/ policy from World Bank for implementation. It began with the National Economic Development Plan 1 and Plan 2. All the content of development referred in the World Bank report of "A Public Development Program for Thailand". The Office of the National Economic Development Commission drove it through coordination with the Thai ministries, ministerial affairs and departments. The aids of World Bank through loans and technical advice were key mechanisms leading to the start of the Thai administration development. That is the loan offered to Thailand will be spent as in the loan condition advised by World Bank as in the report only. World Bank had

studied the Thai economic condition during 1957-1958 and released a report named “A Public Development Program for Thailand”. Later, It provided loan to follow the proposal aiming at the construction of infrastructures to meet foreign investment. In addition, the proposal on technical advice included the Thai public administration improvements to facilitate linkages of foreign investments, too. The important advices of the World Bank teamwork on instituting an Office of the National Economic Development as a central agency for planning and a coordination office between World Bank and the Thai ministries, ministerial affairs and departments. World Bank would be the decider on policy or any measures that the Office will implement the national economic planning, as an example in the National Economic Development Plan 1 (1961-1966 and Plan 2 (1967-19710. Both plans were referred to the World Bank report studied in 1957-1958. It could be then summarized that the relation between World Bank and Thailand was aimed in promoting capitalism emphasizing the roles of the foreign investors with approaches on policy/measures as in the reports and to improve the Thai public administration through instituting an Office of the National Economic Development. Planning the national economic development, instituting a budget office, ministry of development, office of investment promotion and the industrial corporate of Thailand are the construction of public organization to improve public administration in order to meet the expansion of foreign investment. Their targets were to privatize the Thai investments especially for foreign investors. Therefore, the improvement of the Thai organizations above were the keys in development administration. It is much influenced by the relation with World Bank and Thailand in the forms of loan and technical advice aids.

4.2.2 Factors influencing the design new public management (NPM)

Though Thailand adopted NPM to design a policy in the national economic and social development plan especially Plan 6 (1987-1991) emphasizing the increase of private roles in developing the country. It was clearer in Plan 7 and Plan 9 while the government policy was clearer in the administration of Gen. Chartchai Chuhawan (1988-1991) focusing the change of the government roles from the front lines to be monitoring and promoting privates to take action. However, the constructive results of the government policy were found in the administration of

Chuan Leekphai (1997-2000) and the administration of Dr. Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2006). Factors constructively influencing NPM used in the Thai public sector development are as below.

4.2.2.1 Economic factors

The economic factors are the driving force leading to the public sector development according to NPM: the 1997 crisis. The impact of this economic crisis made the government shortage of budget to administrate the country. The government had to reduce budget and dissolved some unnecessary agencies especially the foreign units representing various ministries. For example, some agencies of the Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Education had to close down or moved into the same place. In addition, the Thai embassies in the unimportant strategic location had to be closed down; scholarship to foreign countries had to be stopped as well as scholarship students waiting to travel abroad for studies. Such measures were the direct impacts of the 1997-crisis (Prayote Songklin, 2008). Downsizing especially for foreign units representing various ministries, was the tool for the School of NPM.

In addition, the crisis in 1996 during the administration of Gen. Chaowalit Yongjaiyuth (1996-1997) by seeking assistance for finance and academics from the IMF and the assistance by the IMF was under the emergency loan. This made Thailand to reform laws on the entire monetary system by open free trade, foreign ownership on properties and privatization. All conditions were found in many intent documents (Worraphol Sokhatiyaturak, 2001 cited in Prayote Songklin, 2013). Conditions for assistance in the form of loan had partially been used in the Thai public sector development according to the NPM especially the privatization when the IMF had used privatization as a measure to solve the Thai economy and it was imperative to follow. The IMF had specified privatization in the 7 LOI (Letter of Intent) to seek assistance of academics and finance. The contents of each No 1-7 (except 8) indicated privatization aiming at privatization during the administration of Chuan Leekphai. They contained 3 things, i.e. 1) to allow privatization becoming a tool of recovering the national economy and financial system in order to bring the income from privatization to the fund for repaying the capital, restituting the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) including to attract foreign investors to the

Thai economy; 2) to reduce the state-roles in running the state-owned enterprises by allowing private sectors to cooperate with the state or to replace the state; 3) to reduce the government burdens on budgets to support the state-owned enterprises and to reduce public debt which the government guaranteed the state-owned loan (Lerphong Yaemkot, 2004).

The tangibility of the Thai privatization during the 1997-crisis was 1) to prepare the master plan for privatization; 2) to enact the State-owned Enterprise Fund Act BE 2542 (1999); 3) to privatize Bangkok Petroleum Limited (Plc.) and Thai Airways Limited (Plc.); 4) selling out the shares of Ratchburi Power Plant Holding Limited; 5) dissolving three unnecessary and burdensome state-owned enterprises subsidized by the government. They were the Frozen Industry Organization, the Finished-Food Production Organization and the Weaving Organization including selling out two state-owned enterprises, i.e. Sugar Factory and Glass Factory (Lerphong Yaemkot, 2004).

Besides privatization a condition of the financial assistance for the Thai government by the IMF; there was World Bank which provided 400 M\$ loan for the Thai government under the (Public Sector Reform Loan (PSRL)). The amount was to improve the entire system of the public administration during February 2000-July 2001. The constructiveness of the bureaucracy reform under the WB-loan had been found in the Public Sector Reform Plan BE 2542(1999) and approved by the Cabinet in May 11, 1999. The five essences of the reform were (1) the plans of changing roles, missions and public administration method; (2) the plans of changing the systems of budget, finance and procurement; (3) the plans of changing personnel administration; (4) the plans of law amendments; and (5) the plans of changing cultures and values (Prayote Songklin, 2008).

In addition, WB provided aids of public sector development with Result-based Management (RBM) for the first time in 1999 during the administration of Chuan Leekpai (1997-2000). It was under the Administrative Renewal Project (ARP) under the Economic Management Assistance Project (EMAP). The ARP projected its objectives for enhancing the efficiency of public administration to enable its performance assessable founded on result-based and

performance-based measurement (Prayote Songklin, 2008; Punyaratabandhu and Unger, 2009).

The RBM was indicated in the Public Sector Reform Plan BE 2542 (1999) under the Sub-job 1 with the Cabinet resolution indicating, “the public sector must change its administration into the result-based management systematically having people-centered, strategic planning, identifying the performance indicators in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and quality having constructive performance assessment. This is to disclose the state performance to public and to confirm the responsibility and transparency in all activities of the public sector.” (Darunee Phaosuwan, 2000:4). The Bureaucracy Reform Commission: Office of the Civil Servants was responsible to apply the RBM by dividing into two phases, i.e., Phase 1: it was to set the RBM system by hiring Andersen Consulting Co. Ltd., as the consultant and divided the public agencies into three targeted groups. 1) the Prototype Group, they were Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Agriculture and Corporate, Ministry of Industry and Ministry of Finance. 2) the prototype ministry was Ministry of Commerce and 3) the prototype department was Department of Insurance having the teamwork from the Office of Civil Servant and personnel from public agencies to collaborate. This was a knowledge transferred from the consultant company and ready to proceed when the project ended. Phase 2 (2000): it was the expansion of the RBM to the rest departments in Ministry of Commerce. It was proceeded by the personnel from the Office of Civil Servant in collaborated with the department personnel under the consultation of Andersen Consulting Co., Ltd., for the appropriateness of the performance indicators. Later, in 2001, the RBM had been expanded to another 13 departments with additional 19 departments in 2002. So then, during 1999-2002; there were 40 departments applied the RBM (Prayote Songklin, 2008; Darunee Phaosuwan, 2000). In the administration of Dr. Thaksin Shinawatr (2001-2006), the Government Administration Act BE 2545 (2002) was enforced which was significant to the RBM aiming at the administration in Article 3/1, “... to rise the achievement to the state missions...”. The strategic plans for the Thai Public sector development BE 2546-2550 (2003-2007) were prepared under the Cabinet approval in May 19, 2003 indicating “demanding the public agencies seriously apply the Result-based Management by preparing strategic plans and identifying clear and constructive result-

based indicators for improving the evaluation system". This included the issuance of the Decree on Criteria and Good Governance BE2546 (2003) which was enforced in October 9, 2003 as the action plan under Section 3: Government Administration for Achieving the State Mission and Section 4: Performance Evaluation.

Therefore, the NPM such as privatization and the RBM were influenced by the international organizations particularly the IMF and the WB for loan and technical advices.

4.2.2.2 Factors of Administrative Decision-making

The Thai public sector development based on NPM was evident and constructive during the administration of Chuan Leekphai (1997-2000) and the administration of Dr. Thaksin Shinnawatr (2001-2006). However, The researcher chose only the government roles under the administration of Dr. Thaksin Shinnawatr because driving the public sector reform policy in the administration of Chuan Leekphai was adhered to loan assistance and technical advices of the international organization especially WB and IMF.

With the factors influencing the administrative decision-making during the administration of Dr. Thaksin Shinnawatr (201-2006), the NPM was systemically applied (Bowornwathana, 2008; Painter, 2007; Prayote Songklin, 2008). His administration set a policy aiming to reform bureaucracy with lean structure to meet the economic and social development. This was to change the government from front line and control into being the supporter and the facilitator and increasing the roles of the private sector and the people sector through employing information technology. This included the integrated management system while amending the Government Administration (Copy 5) BE 2545 (2002). This law set significant driving mechanism of public sector development, i.e. the Public sector development Commission and the Office of Civil Servant attributed into the permanent organization to improve the government administration. It included identifying the administrative goals of Section 3/1: administrating government must reach achievement, efficiency, reduce red-tape, reduce missions and dissolve unnecessary agencies, decentralize missions and resources, decision-making and facilitate and be responsive to people. The administrative goals were prepared into strategies of Public sector development BE 2546-2550 (2003-2007) distributed into

seven areas, i.e.1) changing the processes and working methods; 2) restructuring the government administration; 3) reengineering the finance and budget systems; 4) constructing the personnel administration; 5) shifting paradigms, cultures and values; 6) modernizing bureaucracy system; and 7) welcoming people involvement. The essence of such strategies was issued in a Decree on Criteria and Good Governance BE 2546 (2003); it was important to apply the NPM policy.

The constructive public sector development during the administration of Dr. Thaksin Shinawatra was preparing the performance agreement, PMQA, RBM, e-government and privatization.

4.2.3 Factors influencing the change of good governance

Applying good governance in developing the Thai bureaucracy began in mid-1987s and later active after the Black May in 1992. The influential factors were 1) politics: the public demands for political reforms after the Black May in 1992; 2) the influences of the international organizations in supporting good governance particularly the public reforms after the 1997-crisis as details below.

4.2.3.1 Politics: demands for political reforms after the Black May in 1992

The Crisis of Black May 1992 was the consequence of the National Peacekeeping Council (NPC) led by Gen. Sunthorn Khongsomphong ousted Gen. Chartchai Chunnahawan (1988-1991) in February 23, 1991 which very dissatisfied societies. When Gen. Sujinda Kraprayoon was the Prime Minister in April 7, 1992, there were resistance and leading extensive protest while destroying many properties and lives. The climate after Black May 1992 has tremendously heated the public political spirit particularly to improve political administration concentrated on decentralization to the grassroots. Such climate facilitated the civil politics, movement organization such as the Democratic League and NGO with the scholar opinions and erudite on the direction of democracy when it was intensely active (Seksan Prasertkul, 2005).

After Black May 1992, people demanded for new constitution. The administration of Chuan Leekphai (1992-1995) formed the Democracy Development Commission and in 1994. Its many proposals were enacted in the

Constitution BE 2540 (1997) particularly the concept of community rights, the grassroots democracy, the civil polity and civil society accepted by the NGO and people sector who joined to express their intent about the Constitution BE 2540 (1997) (Seksan Prasertkul, 2005). The administration of Banharn Silpa-archa amended the Constitution in 1991 dictated to enact new Constitution by the 99 Constitution Council members and completed within 240 days and announced for its enforcement of the Constitution BE 2540 (1997) in October 11, 1997 (Amorn Raksasat, 2001). Amorn Raksasat noted that it was the greatest political reform in Thailand. The constitutional issues involved with the principle of good governance. there were 1) a constitution with direct involvement of people, 2) evidently changing from representation democracy to participatory democracy, 3) endorsing the people's rights, liberty and compensation from the action of the state; 4) demanding the government to report its annual performance; 5) having election committee; 6) demanding the duty of people to attend election, 7) politicians and top civil servants would be transparent and under people's inspection, 8) having the first Constitutional Court, 9) having a parallel or the Administrative Court; 10) having an audit organization with high authority and autonomy, such as the Administrative Court, the National Anti-Corruption Commission, the National Audit Commission, the Parliamentary Ombudsman, 11) having important organization and committee, such as the National Human Right Commission, the Advisory council of the National Economic and Social Development; and 12) Decentralization to the local administration. Somkid Lertphaitoon (2001) explained that with the involvement of the large number of people in the drafting of the Constitution, it was caused by the Constitution BE 2540 (1997) with different structure and mechanism from the past constitutions. It reflected the motive of drafting the constitution for real political reform.

Therefore, with the incident of Black May 1992, it led to the demand for political reform and the public administration by drafting the Constitution BE 2540 (1997) adhering to the concept of good governance and creating impact to the public administration. Rationally, the constitution was the highest law of national government administration and the public administration demanded the involvement of people. Information was disclosed for public both in decision-making and action taken, the process of public hearing and the local communities on projects carried out

which might affect them. It included the inspection of the dishonest public actions. The laws must pass through the Parliamentary Ombudsman, the Human Rights Commission and the National Anti-Corruption Commission.

4.2.3.2 The influences of the international organizations in supporting good governance particularly the public reforms after the 1997-crisis

After the economic crisis in Asia in 1997, WB and IMF played key roles to drive good governance as the global agenda because the crisis came from the non-good governance countries. To a cause both international organizations propose the global governance by attempting to drive the Asian countries and other to follow the governance scope (Somboon Siriprachai, 2007). During the economic crisis 1997, Thailand had to spend loans from various organizations to stabilize its economy and support the sustainable economic recovery. Part was supported by WB in terms of Public Sector Reform Loan (PSRL) for 400 million US dollars. In 1999 (World Bank, 2006:3), this project supported the public sector reform within the period of three years from 1999-2001 with the target to improve the public sectors in three areas, i.e. 1) result-based approach to the resources, emphasize incentive by budget and result-based working; 2) better service delivery, improving service through outsourcing, decentralization and adding opportunities for public sector responsive to communities; and 3) creating responsibility and transparency, emphasis on budget transparency and building effective mechanism to support responsibility and transparency for long-term target and for public sector governance in order to build efficiency, effectiveness, fairness and transparency in public resource management and service delivery (World Bank, 1999).

After the PSRL was ended in 2002, there was a new technical support for development called Country Development Partnership on Governance and Public Sector Reform (CPD-G). This support was focused on technical supports, creating competency and the policy analysis from experts both in the country and from abroad. It was a budget support (not a loan) from the Asian-Europe Meeting Trust Fund (ASEM TF) and the Institution Development Funds) (IDF) for expenditure management, revenue management, civil service reform, decentralization and accountability and transparency with the duration from 2002-2006. It was divided into two phases. The first phase was focused on 1) to improve the expenditure supported

by performance-based budgeting and the expenditure reform, 2) to improve revenue supported by the IT application, 3) to improve administration supported by the result-based management, 4) to reform decentralization and 5) to build accountability and transparency supported by the responsible by NGO, parliament and civic society. The second phase began in mid-2003 prioritizing the expenditure management, civil service, decentralization and accountability focusing on the implementation of the Thai strategies, which involved 1) improving the resource management to alleviate poverty, 2) the service delivery and the vigor of governance, and 3) to strengthen the public supervision and the external evaluation (World Bank, 2006).

Consequently, the factors influencing the Thai good governance began from the complaints of people against political reforms caused by the overthrowing the administration of Gen. Chatchai Choonahawan in 1991 which led to the Black May 1992. The constructiveness of the political reform was the Constitution BE 2540 (1997) where there was direct people's participation in the process of drafting. It was focused on two things. First, it was the endorsement of rights and liberty of people regarding the citizen rights, human rights and the rights of political involvement. Second, the inspection of the public exercise of power and the public personnel. In addition, the factors influencing the promotion of good governance and the public sector reform were the international organization – WB provided 400 million USD loan during 1999-2001 with extended projects to support the public sector reform from 2002-2006.

4.3 Response to The Research Question 3

Under the public administration paradigms applied with the Thai bureaucratic development, what are the innovation applied in its development after its reforms in BE2545 (2002) and how many types of the innovation are classified?

The search of innovation to be applied for the public sector development since 2002-2006 and the bureaucracy reform was studied in 2002 by establishing a Public Sector Development Commission (PSDC) and its Office under the Government Administration Act (Copy 5) BE 2545 (2002). The researcher presented here in four

(4) parts: 1) innovation, 2) types of innovation, and 3) the performance of PSDC during 2002-2006 and analysis of classifying innovation.

4.3.1 The meaning of innovation

The meaning should be divided into two parts, i.e. (1) newness which might be new idea, new approach, new organization, new institution, new product, new service, new process, and new instrument or tool, and (2) the impacts leading to solution. Both parts would be in the policy, law, strategic plan and working standards. Therefore, the meaning of innovation in this research was the public sector institution policy, working standards, the managerial instrument with the implications of newness and targeted for solving problems while improving the public sector management.

4.3.2 Types of innovation

The researcher selected the Alberti and Bertucci (2006) based innovation in this study. They classified it into four (4) types. They were Institutional Innovations focusing on the institutional restoration and/or creation of new institutions, Organizational Innovation including new process or technique of new public management, Process Innovation focusing on quality improvement of the public services and Conceptual Innovation focusing on new forms of governance such as interactive policy-making, engaged governance, people's budget reforms and horizontal networking.

However, the study showed that the conceptual innovation a tool used in the public sector development after the public sector reform in 2002 was not found. Then the research modified new tools for this research, i.e. 1) the institutional innovation and (2) the process innovation.

4.3.3 Innovation applied to the Thai public sector development after 2002

The administration of Dr. Thaksin Shinnawatra (2001-2006) established an Office of PSDC to be the permanent organization responsible for public sector development. Innovation have been then on uses like 1) RBM (result-based management) and it was continuously used since 1999. 2) The integrated managerial

system (CEO Governor), 3) PSO: Thailand International Public Sector Standard Management System and Outcome, 4) performance agreement, 5) establishing service link in the form of government counter service, 6) e-service under the e-government, 7) PMQA: Public Sector Management Quality Award, and 8) other non-government organization like public organizations.

4.3.4 Analysis of the type of innovation applied to the Thai public sector development after 2002

The researcher selected the Alberti and Bertucci (2006) based innovation in this study. They classified it into four (4) types. They were Institutional Innovations focusing on the institutional restoration and/or creation of new institutions, Organizational Innovation including new process or technique of new public management, Process Innovation focusing on quality improvement of the public services and Conceptual Innovation focusing on new forms of governance such as interactive policy-making, engaged governance, people’s budget reforms and horizontal networking. However, the study showed that the conceptual innovation a tool used in the public sector development after the public sector reform in 2002 was not found. Then the research modified new tools for this research based on Alberti and Bertucci (2006) as below.

Table 4.6 Analysis of the type of innovation applied to the Thai public sector development after 2002

Types of innovation	Innovations
Institutional Innovations	Instituting the Office of Public sector development Commission Instituting Public Organization
Organizational Innovation	Result Based Management Thailand International Public Sector Standard Management System and Outcomes: P.S.O Public Sector Management Quality Award: PMQA Performance Agreement) CEO- governor
Process Innovation	Instituting Service Link as a form of government counter service) e-Government programme.

The researcher concluded the managerial innovation brief as follows:

1. Institutional Innovation

It contained the establishment of the PSDC Office and public organization as details below.

1.1 The Office of Public Sector Development Commission (the PSDC Office)

The Thai public sector development during 2002-2006 was mechanized through 19 PSDCs appointed by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (1959-1963) called “The Advisory Commission of the Core Administration of the Public Sector”. Its name had been consistently changed. Before 2002, the plan to establish a central commission for public sector development was characterized as temporal under the Prime Minister Office Order or Regulations. For example, Gen. Prem Tinnasulanont (1980-1988) established the Public Sector Reform Commission and the Government Administration Regulations. Gen. Chawalit Yongjaiyuth (1997) established the Public Sector Reform Commission while Chuan Leekphai established the Public Sector Reform Commission.

The term of office was by the cycle of the government. That is when the government has formed its administration; the Commission would be established. On the contrary, if a government ended, the Commission would automatically dissolve. Here was its life cycle since 1959-2001. After 2002, the Central Commission for public sector development has been established under the Government Administration Act (Copy 5) BE 2545 (2002) become permanent organization called “the Public Sector Development Commission (PSDC)”. A set of the Commission structure and its Office have been established to support its work with a Secretariat as the chief and directly subject to the Prime Minister Office. Its structure contained four (4) departments. They were first, the Administration Department having the Prime Minister or Deputy Prime Minister as the chairperson. Second, the Decentralization Department, here the Permanent Secretary of the Prime Minister Office is the chairperson. Third, the Expert Department, there are not more than 10 experts on law, economics, political science, public administration, finance, organizational psychology, and social science, and finally, the Office Department, which is the commission member and secretary.

The PSDC authority is first, to suggest and advise the Cabinet on public sector development, the structure of the public sector, budgeting system, personnel system, virtue and ethics standards and incentive. Second, it is to propose the Cabinet to set criteria and standards of establishment, merging, transferring, dissolving, nomination, name change, indicating authority and division of ministries, ministerial affairs and departments. Third, it is to follow-up, evaluate, and advise to abide with this Act. Therefore, establish the permanent organization of public sector development is a new thing different from the previous practices, which begin with establishing a central agency for public sector development since 1959.

1.2 Autonomous Public Organization

It was not begun with the common NPM but from the attempt to solve problems and limitations of public services through public agencies and state enterprises. Suraphol Nitikraipot (1999) explained that the limitations of public services by public sector were 1) hierarchical line of command and the high hierarchy was the decision-maker which an on-time immediate decision-making was impossible. Second, the public system was subject to many regulations, obligations and orders in working, which familiarized public personnel and a culture to strictly follow the regulations and obligations rather than conscious of agility, efficiency and benefits rose in the public agency. Finally, the public system had a single standard of remuneration based on education and experience regardless of any jobs and in any areas.

With such limitations, there were attempts to seek new approach to solve the problems through studies the experiences of working from abroad in order to improve working by applying the concept of non-government organization or the establishment public as being used in the French public laws and as a model to establish the Thai non-government organization (Suraphol Nitikraipot (1999)). It was thus designed as follows:

1. It is a public agency being a juristic person independent from public hierarchy.
2. It earns budget in a form of public subsidies creating high agility of spending.
3. It holds specific authority without overlapping with the public missions and the state enterprise affairs.

4. It earns autonomy with ultimate decision-making regarding establishing its institution, finance, accounting, personnel administration, allowance pays, procurement and inspections of internal job efficiency, and

5. It is subject to the public inspection characterized with the mission achievement assigned by a public agency and policy supervision.

The tangibility of setting criteria in establishing the establishment public was first found in the administration of Gen. Chawalit Yonngjaiyuth the then Prime Minister and the Chairperson of public sector reform having Phokin Pholkul a minister of the Prime Minister Office as a deputy chairperson. The first resolution of the Master Plan on Public Sector Reform BE 1997-2001 dated June 17, 1997. The concept of Establishment Public was allocated in the part of the public administration system. the Cabinet approved the principle to draft the Non-Government Organization Act BE.... . the Judicial Council has approved the master plan in August 11, 1997. After the political change and Mr. Chuan Leekpai took the helm of the country and Mt. Phichai Rattakul acted as the chairperson of public sector reform having Mr. Abhisit Vejjajiva as a deputy chairperson. The reform and the Act were pursued and driven to establish the NGOs from the previous administration until there was an announcement of the Non-Government Organization Act BE 2542 (1997) dated February 13, 1997.

The essence of the Act was 1) the NGO structure containing (1) the decision-maker group and the top executive which were the NGO Commission and Director, and (2) the lower positions were the front lines; and 2) the NGO efficiency evaluation.

2. Organizational Innovation

It contained RBM (result-based management), PSO (Thailand International Public Sector Standard Management System and Outcomes), PMQA (Public Sector Management Quality Award), performance agreement and integrated management (CEO Governor) as following details.

2.1 Result Based Management-RBM

The RBM is a managerial tool incorporate with the new public management (NPM) commonly used both in public sector and in private sector in

many countries like USA, UK, Australia, New Zealand and in Asia like Japan, Singapore and Hong Kong (the Manual of RBM, 2003:1). The RBM is focused on performance to achieve the organizational objectives and goals. Its main objective is to improve the efficient and effective performance of an organization along with social responsibility and to serve the need of the service recipients.

Thailand firstly adopted this RBM in January 1999 during the administration of Chuan Leekphai (the second term) as part of the Administrative Renewal Project (ARP) under the assistance of World Bank and the Economic Management Assistance Project-EMAP.

ARP was aimed to develop the goal of public agencies and to set the performance indicators for effectiveness and measurable performance (Prayote Songklin, 2008:97; Punyaratabandhu and Unger, 2009). Later the Cabinet under the leadership of Chuan Leekphai (the second term: 1997-2001) unanimously approve the Administrative System Reform Plan proposed by OPSDC in May 11, 1999. This plan indicated to use RBM, strategic planning, systematically setting performance indicators for effectiveness, efficiency and quality with the constructive performance indicators.

The RBM was undertaken until 2002 under the administration of Dr. Thaksin Shinawatr (2002-2006). He amended the Government Administration Act (Copy 5) BE 2545 (2002) indicated in Article 3/1 as of “... *to maximize the government administration for people, the achievement of the mission, efficiency, worth mission, reducing red-tape, reducing missions and dissolving unnecessary units, decentralizing missions and resources to the local, decentralizing decision-making power, facilitating and being responsive to the needs of people including budgeting allocation and admission to meet such approach...*” With the Government Administration Act (Copy 5) BE 2545 (2002), he modified the concept of RBM to practices through issuing a Royal Decree on Criteria and Good Governance BE2546 (2003) (the Cabinet approved the Royal Decree in May 19, 2003 and enforced in October 10, 2003 ever since).

2.2 Thailand International Public Sector Standard Management System and Outcomes: P.S.O

The PSO was modified from ISO (International Organization for Standardizations) practiced by private sector. This was an initiative of Chuan

Leekphai the Prime Minister (1998-2001) with the policy of Thailand to prepare the standards of developing public personnel. That was to have a central development in working. Later, each public agency had to upgrade their performance to the standards. This idea was raised in a meeting of the Sub-Commission for Civil Service Efficiency and Standards Promotion and under supervision of the Commission of Civil Services of the Public Agencies in September 14, 1998. The Cabinet approved it in October 27, 1998 and ordered the OPSDC coupled with the Commission of Civil Services of the Public Agencies to take action.

The objectives of PSO involved the entire public sectors and were focused on every agency to develop results targeted on the 10 ultimate outcomes. They were 1) service equality, 2) service fairness, 3) safety of life and property, 4) people's rights and liberty, 5) service availability, 6) people's satisfaction, 7) effectiveness of the service units, 8) saving for both public sector and recipients, 9) service and document quality and accuracy, and 10) retention of public benefits, happiness, and common quality of life as the gross of the national development. There must also be standard criteria and performance indicator with approaches for developing result-based standards of the performance on 1) performance/output, 2) outcomes, ultimate outcome and 4) prevention system of unintended consequences.

The PSO involved 10 system, which were 1) data system, 2) communication system, 3) decision-making system, 4) personnel development system, 5) check and balance system, 6) involvement system, 7) private sector and people service system, 8) evaluation system, 9) estimation system and crisis solving system and 10) cultural and professional ethic system.

2.3 Public Sector Management Quality Award: PMQA

The Cabinet approved the PMQA to be a tool in the public system development and allocated in the performance endorsement in 2006. The tool was modified from Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award (MBNQA) regarding an organization improvement and development. Currently, more than 70 countries modify the criteria of the national quality award (NQA) and MBQA has been adopted for their own national public sector. Canada develops the Canada Awards for Excellence (CAE) and Australia develops the Australian Business Excellence Award (ABEA), for example.

The OPSDC and the National Performance Institution have studied the approaches of Public Sector Management Quality in 2004 by modifying MBNQA and Thailand Quality Award (TQA) which was corresponded with the Royal Decree on Criteria and Procedures for Good Governance BE 2546 (2003). It was targeted to enhance the Thai public sector performance quality and standards to the international level. The cabinet approved to implement the criteria with public agency in June 28, 2005. The OPSDC promoted every public agency to implement the PMQA criteria as the indicators of the performance agreement in 2006.

The objectives of PMQA

1) It was to leverage the public sector quality performance to meet the Royal Decree on Criteria and Procedures for Good Governance BE 2546 (2003). 2) It was to allow the public sector to implement it as the guide to develop the public sector quality performance to the international level. Finally, 3) it was to be as the self-assessment framework and the norms for follow-up and evaluation of the public sector management.

The structure of the PMQA criteria involves seven sections. 1) Section 1 involves the organization lead (designing vision, values and work direction). Section 2 involves strategic planning (strategizing risk management, goal transfer and indicators leading to work-units/personnel and implementation of strategies). Section 3 involves prioritizing recipients and stakeholders (opinion hearing or public involvement, adjustment of public services and satisfaction surveys). Section 4 involves measurement, analysis and knowledge management (organizing information and managing knowledge). Section 5 involves Human resource-focused (HRM and HRD, adjusting paradigm, values, attitudes, morals and ethics and values building process). Section 6 involves process management (reducing procedures and procedural change). Section 7 involves performance results (performance by the four areas of evaluation dimensions).

2.4 Preparation of Performance Agreement

Preparing performance agreement is a tool leading to performance evaluation and incentive (OPDC: 4-16). It came from the Royal Decree on Criteria and Procedures for Good Governance, BE2546 (2003) indicating to have written agreement to express responsibility in working (Article 12). The Cabinet

approved that all public agencies and provinces had to prepare performance agreement and evaluation linking with the incentive measures (the Manual of Performance Agreement and Evaluation, date unnoted 1).

The OPDC ordered all public agencies to prepare performance agreement since 2004. The procedures of preparing the performance agreement began with the public agencies to identify the indicators from the government policy, strategies and goals of every public agency and led to the negotiation for the appropriate indicators and preparation of the performance agreement. The results of performance agreement preparation could anticipate every agency to know their working direction before working. It helped the personnel to have their common working goals. Significantly, the executives could completely identify the goals to be achieved while enable them to follow-up and evaluate the performance by themselves, systematically. In addition, each public agency owed supervisor to control the indicators or host to supervise, coordinate, and pursue the indicators. This allowed the personnel in every level to participate and to be responsible to pursue the common organizational strategies. Significantly, the systematic performance agreement affected all the level of executives were clearer with the responsible burdens and enabled to supervise the performance.

In the performance agreement, there was the scope of evaluation indicate in the performance agreement. It was modified from the Balance Scorecard, which involved four dimensions. They were 1) effectiveness, 2) service quality, 3) efficiency, and 4) organizational development, i.e.

1) Dimension 1: The Strategic Effectiveness – the public agency displayed its objective and goal-led performance as budgeted such as achievement as in the government strategy, and result-based achievement by the budget document and so on.

2) Dimension 2: Service Quality- the public agency prioritized recipients with quality service, and satisfaction such as the levels of satisfaction.

3) Dimension 3: Performance Efficiency – the public sector displayed ability in working such as reducing expenses, reducing red tape and worthiness of expenses.

4) Dimension 4: Organizational Development – the public agency displayed promptness with change such as knowledge management, information management, and change management and so on.

2.3 The process of preparing the annual performance agreement (the Manual for Fiscal Budget of BE 2556 (2013): 1-19)

1) Two mechanisms of the Annual Performance Agreement Commission for the annual fiscal budget – they were the Supervisory of Agreement and Evaluation, which specified criteria and the negotiation of agreement, goals, evaluation method and incentive. The Second was the commission to follow the criteria with standards while solving problems of the agreement and evaluation preparation. The commissions had 14 members and were divided into four (4) groups, i.e. 1) Two committee members for politics to act as the chairperson and deputy chair persons; 2) One central agency, 3) 10 experts and scholars; and 4) one representative from OPDC to act as a secretary. The commission was appointed by the PDC to negotiate the appropriation of the indicators, weight, goal values and score allocation in order to prepare the performance agreement. This commission would be formed in every ministry, which were 19 commissions. There are three-(3) commission from the Prime Minister Office, a commission from the NGO. There were 23 commissions in total.

2) Preparation of Performance Agreement

Preparing the performance agreement was restricted within a year and involved 1) the performance agreement plan, 2) indicators, 3) performance results, 4) weight, and 5) goal/criteria of score allocation. Endorsement contained two (30 levels: ministry, and department with the following endorsement model, i.e.

a) Endorsement of the performance agreement

Table 4.7 Endorsement of the performance agreement

Endorsers of the Performance Agreement		
Agency Chiefs	Endorsement	Superiors
1. Ministerial Levels		
1.1 Ministers	with	Prime Minister
1.2 Ministerial Permanent Secretary	with	Minister
2. Department Level		
2.1 Ministerial agency chiefs independent to the missions	with	Ministerial Permanent Secretary
2.2 Ministerial agency chiefs dependent to the missions	with	Ministerial Deputy Permanent Secretary, chiefs of the mission group incorporated with Ministerial Permanent Secretary

Documentation of performance endorsement

They were:

The manual of performance agreement: the endorsement between the department chiefs and their immediate supervisors.

The public action plans: the designs of vision, missions, strategies and goals.

The details of the indicators and the goals of the action plans and the core missions: indicators of the performance, eight, past performance, goals/criteria of score allocation and specific conditions of the indicator.

3) The methods of follow-up and performance evaluation

They were (1) report of the performance by performance agreement for 6-month round and 12-month round, (2) the follow-up of the performance progress on site visit, (3) the performance evaluation through 1) the study of information, documents and evidence, 2) interview of persons involved, 3) observation and 4) comments of the experts.

4) Incentive allocation

The results of performance would be the information complemented to consider the incentive allocation in order to encourage good governance.

5) CEO Governor

The chief executive officer governor was referred to the top executive of the public agency at the provincial level who came from appointment and under supervision of the regional administration empowered to the ultimate provincial administration. This was the idea during the administration of Dr. Thaksin Shinnawatra. The pilot project was organized for a year during October 2001-September 2002 in five provinces of Srisaket, Chainat, Lampang, Phuket and Narathiwat. There were also five comparative provinces of Surin, Angthong, Pitsanulok, Phannga and Pattani.

2.5.1 The approaches of the CEO Governor

1) Adjusting the province to be similar to the strategic business unit (SBU) which could deliberate information, problems and limitations, solutions and taking action by decision-making in full cycle within the province;

2) Changing roles and authority of the governor into the chief executive officer who was ultimately empower to directly command the chief of public departments within the province for the expedition according to the CEO policy and to meet the needs of each province;

3) Allowing the Minister of Interior to choose the person equipped with appropriate knowledge and capacity, with creativity and can-do attitude to take the helm;

4) Advisory Board was appointed in the central agency in order to follow-up and provide consultation for the CEO Governors; and

5) Demanding follow-up and evaluation in association with the public educational institutions and public agencies related to the missions and the results were studied for further improvements and development.

2.5.2 Mechanisms to supervise the five pilot CEO Governors were:

- 1) Establishing the steering committee to pursue the pilot provincial project;
- 2) Having the follow-up and evaluation system for the pilot provincial project through educational institutions;
- 3) Employing Thailand International Public Sector Standard Management System and Outcome: PSO as the preliminary criteria to check the performance;

Authorities of the CEO Governor

Besides being empowered, the CEO Governor, he/she was empowered as the provincial governor under the Government Administration Act BE2534 (1991). In addition, the Cabinet approved the CEO Governor hold the ultimate authority to administrate a province in three levels, i.e.

- 1) The strategic leadership;
 - 1.1) Applying the national agenda to stipulate as the area agenda;
 - 1.2) Adopting problems and need of the local to stipulate approaches for solution and to develop the area as the targets for collaboration of all sectors; and
 - 1.3) Allocating the success indicators which reflected the targets, method and performances.
- 2) The Strategic coordinator and facilitator – taking directorship and coordination for all sectors to meet the designed strategies
- 3) The implementation – creating the efficient and effective managerial system while supervising the managerial system.

In addition, the CEO Governor was supported by the central agency through:

- 1) Empowerment of judgment, command, consideration, approval, and permit
- 2) Empowerment of personnel administration-the CEO Governor was authorized to appoint, transfer, promote or punish the regional personnel as follows;

2.1) Public personnel at Classification 8 and below who were not the chief of the agencies

2.2) Transfer the commanding police officers and below

2.3) Transfer personnel within the CEO province for proposal to transfer across the province

2.4) Promote salary within the CEO province for 1.5 to 2.0 rate

2.5) Impose disciplinary punishment public personnel with the CEO province.

3) Absolute Empowerment of budget management to the CEO Governor to enable to solve problems of management, development and the integration of development between the provincial units

4) Develop the CEO provincial database

5) Increase efficiency of the CEO provincial office to act as direct the preparation of the provincial database, the solution system planning, developing the CEO province, and the follow-up and evaluation system.

3. Process Innovation

It involved the establishment of service link in the form of government counter service, e-government and the government fiscal management information-GFMIS

3.1 Service Link

The service link was referred to a service point with collective service types or from diverse agencies to facilitate people in applying for services through approaching any service centers. It saved their time and expenses to contact many offices. It was the link and adopted many procedures from many public agencies in various ministries or provinces in a service center so that the contacted people or the recipients could receive expedite service at a center. The service link was stipulated in the Royal Decree on Criteria and Good Governance BE 2546 (2003) the a common ministerial service link must be instituted to facilitate people for their contact, inquiries, for information, for permit, for approval in any affairs under the authority of the same ministerial affairs through contacting a service link.

The fundamental concept of a service link involved four (4) things, i.e. 1) citizen-centered, 2) service integration, 3) result-oriented and 4) market-based.

The approach to drive each ministry to institute a service link was the OPSDC stipulated to institute a common ministerial service link in the performance agreement BE 2549 (2006). The OPSDC specified the evaluation scope of instituting a service link at five levels. 1) It needed to survey the entire services within the ministry to select the service job for planning a service link center from the need survey of the service recipients and /or related agencies to find out which jobs could be integrated for a service link center. 2) It was to complete the plan to institute a service link and submit it to the OPSDC. 3) The progress of instituting the service link as plan and procedures had to be not less than 60% of the fiscal budget year 2006. 4) At least, a service link had to be opened within the fiscal budget year 2006. And, 5) it needed to prepare a report of success evaluation by following the plans and the performance of the service link including information from people, recipients and /or agencies involved such as number of service recipients, opinion, suggestions, results of satisfaction surveys and so on. The ministerial service link has been then active since 2006 until today.

3.2 e-Government

The e-Government project was a public service through e-network in order to increase the service efficiency particularly accessing the public service (Thippawan Lhorsuwannarat, 2005:53). The e-Government project was corresponded with NPM (new public management) concept. It was to improve public sector on services through IT to meet the customer needs. In Thailand, the administration of Dr. Thaksin Shinawatra set a clear policy to support the e-Government project. A teamwork of creating the e-Government Committee was appointed and in December 7, 2001, an e-Government was projected to drive and support the public agencies to prevail various e-services equally. Its constructive results were found within 2 years in the form of a pilot project with the following scope.

1) It was to providing public services focusing on driving the public agencies to provide information services with standards and quality for people, business sector and public sector under the maxim of only once, immediate, nationwide and timeless.

2) In the public management, it needed to provide services for monetary management between public sector and private sector, organize e-procurement with speed, transparency, justice, and the management of public sector data and resources.

3) There must be communication and coordination between public agencies through the link with the central agency, regional agency and the local administration.

The benefits of thee-Government were 1) focusing on services for people and private enterprisers to access information and service better concentrating on one-stop service with multiple channels of communication and more expedite.

The approaches of the public sector on e-Government involved five steps, i.e.

1) The organization was uploaded in the computer network and providing data service only online. 2) The organization could allow service recipients to inquire data and input in the format and online dissemination and provide interactive communication system such as email. 3) The organization could interact with the service recipients or other organization in order to access data in the database while also having special data services. 4) It enabled to list by request, transferable, list about finance and processing data by the needs of the recipients. 5) There were automatic exchanges by lists between organizations, accessing and checking the rights for systematic services.

3.3 Government Fiscal Management System: GFMIS

In 2002, the structure of ministry, ministerial affairs and departments were remodeled under the public sector reform. The Ministry of Information Technology and Communication was established and it was assigned to be responsible for supervising the e-government development. A master plan of IT and Communication of Thailand has been designed in 2002-2006. In 2003, the government has announced its policy that every agency must own e-procurement and each agency must own at least an e-service list. The significant example in this project was Government Fiscal Management System: GFMIS. This was a modernized financial management of the public sector with better efficiency by applying IT to

improve a process and public sector management. They were focused on debit and credit, reserved fund, financial accounting on an accrual basis, fixed asset accounting, cost accounting, managerial accounting, procurement, documentation, approval, reimbursement, improvement, and follow-up of spending budget focusing on efficiency and effectiveness on results and outcomes. It abode with the public sector reform, which was focused on efficiency, and expedite to action taken under the e-Government. The Cabinet approved to design the e-finance in July 22, 2003. All public agencies could use on October 1, 2004 when GFMIS was once under the responsibility of the Prime Minister Office but was later transferred into the responsibility of Ministry of Finance.

It is concluded after the analysis that the innovation applied to reform the Thai public sector after 2002 are mostly organizational innovation by adopting the public management (NPM) such as the result – based management, Thailand International Public Sector Standard Management System and Outcomes (P.S.O), Public Sector Management Quality Award: PMQA. This includes performance agreement, process innovation focusing on the quality of public service such as establishing the government counter service, e-government project, Government Fiscal Management Information-GFMIS. Then they were followed by institutional innovations, creation of new institution, i.e. establishing Office of Public Sector Development Commission, and public organizations.

4.4 Response to The Research Question 4

What are the reasons that the result-based management (RBM) is applied in the Thai bureaucratic development after its reforms in BE2545 (2002); and what are limitations and impacts of the RBM in the Thai bureaucratic development?

The researcher has studied the RBM (result-based Management) particularly performance agreement given the Ministry of Justice as a case study. It is presented here below.

4.4.1 The understanding of the Result-based Management (RBM)

Most respondents understand the intention of RBM and the indicators as in the following interviews.

“Thought, it is a management stressing on achievement but to achieve that it needs to use many factors economically.”

“RBM stresses on follow-up and evaluation under specific time by watching the process of work and leading to reducing procedures.”

“RBM aims to achievement with indicators and it is evident in 2002 regarding the achievement of the entire budgeting system under the Royal Decree on Criteria and Procedures for Good governance BE 2546 (2003). The measurement is by its indicators. Measuring achievement is by measuring performance. The new performance evaluation will have its indicators. Any performance evaluations are in this system but they have the same goal.”

“The intention of RBM is focused on evident achievement by its indicators and brings them for evaluation.”

“The RBM is recognized as the best tool but strategy is important to help an organization driven to the right direction, reduce costs, reduce time but increase efficiency to meet the jobs which is the important mission and enable the organization members to create innovation too because the achieve goal can improve the process too. Under the concept of RBM, it measures output and outcome.”

“RBM is developed by the Civil Servant Office but mentioned just only the uses of knowledge. At that time coercions were not clear. BY RBM principle, it is similar to MBO (Management by Objective), which also focuses on results, impact and indicators. In fact, at that time the Civil Servant Office has used RBM but if unlikely affected our office: non-coercion condition. It is differed with the OPSDC which begins with coercion for application with incentives which ties with a 4-year government administration and BSC (Balanced Scorecard) has been implemented.”

“It is a modern management focusing on success, worth, saving, transparency and good governance but its main objective is for success and efficiency of work.”

4.4.2 Performance Agreement

The problems and laminations are found as below

4.4.2.1 Indicators do not reflect solving the organizational problems

The interviews show that most informants have the same direction of the indicators do not reflect the solution for the organizational problems.

“The strategic plan and the performance agreement link each other in term of paperwork but targets are not specified which affects the success of the strategic plan and the evaluation of the performance cannot reflect the success of the strategic plan” (J1: 24/3/2014).

“It unlikely agrees with the OPSDC. Would the indicators and an organization become burdens or dynamism? The KPI indicated do not reflect the target or the organizational success. There is no analysis what success the KPI reflect? There are no impacts on an organization. Here, the roles of the OPSDC are in trouble. For example, the indicators beginning with the Success Level of... are characterized as 1) Commission Appointment, 2) meeting not less than 2-3 times, 3)meeting not less than 6 times, 4) summary-made from analysis, 5) the management has been reported. Just a report gains 5 scores. Some organization has written like this. It is shit. Could they better this tool?” (J8:24/3/2014)

“If viewing it can solve the problem; it doesn't. If viewing satisfaction; people are satisfied with counter narcotics. But if viewing addicts and traffickers; it fails” (J10:19/3/2014)

“The public agency does not offer the challenging indicators. Now, they are over using to measure the process. Some agency takes simple measurement and gains more money. Some meet tough work and difficult to measure; they gain little amount of money. Besides, some indicators cannot directly measure the agency but just supervision.”(J10: 19/3/2014)

“Reflect or not for example, the number of the cases the Office of Public Sector Anti-Corruption Commission (PACC), identifying the cause, loaded of cases but too much corruption. It needs analysis and synthesis what do they indicate? They indicate our corruption increases. They do not indicate that our

organization is efficient but they reflect that corruption boom when time goes by. In fact, corruption should decrease.”(J11: 1/3/2014)

“Preparing strategies and planning; it requires finding people who look around. It intends to respond to the problem: 4-5 useable but it does not reflect the success of solving problems” (J6:14/3/2014)

“The OPSDC wherever is the same: just give signature to get bonus but it is not aimed to solve the problem of an organization. Some unit and some ministry earn bonus with their high scores at levels 4 or 5 but many problems still exist. The success of the indicators is to reach 4-5 but solving problems are separately existing. They are different. Some earn 1,000 Baht Bonus, or some earn 2,000 Baht Bonus but problems exist. In the past, we wrote to earn bonus. For example, the nature of the indicators specifies Level 3 for organizing meeting and Level 4 specifies having minutes of meeting.”(J8:24/3/2014)

4.4.2.2 Nature of indicators: take everything to specify indicators

The interviews show that specifications of the indicators do not reflect the solution for the organizational problems.

“Our KPI today is taking everything and every factor to write in KPI. I disagree with these KPI but no jobs are better. They measure tiny things and mess everything up. They do not reflect the uses of the tool and disqualified. Cause is the seriousness of the top management. If they really know and in deep; I think if they really know, they will not do like this.” (J8:24/3/2014)

“Previous, they measure over miniatures. There must be something to support such as research paper. Recently, humans learn more; they exhausted and fatigue.”(J6:14/3/2014)

4.4.3 The indicators in the performance agreement reduce the importance of other jobs

The data showed that the indicators affect the works of the personnel that they focus only on jobs identified as the indicators. On account of being the direct responsibility and a factor used in considering the feats of performance which affect the existing tasks beyond the system. The indicators are less interested.

“The performance agreement in the RBM indicates success but they are just the important issues but they reduce the importance of other jobs. Therefore, personnel focus on the indicators or prioritize specific matters and other matter become less importance. What is not indicated in the performance agreement; its importance will be reduced because the performance agreement involves evaluation of feats and salary rate. It leads all to focus on the performance agreement otherwise; they will be reprimanded, remarked and pursued. When doing things, some think they are not the indicators.” (J6:14/3/2014)

“Personnel try just the indicators, if not, they decline. Collaboration between divisions is reduced because all focus on their own indicators because they affect their salary rate consideration. It makes personnel selfish. Therefore, petty jobs are ignored because they are not the indicators such as coordination for information to support other agency or jobs requested for supports by other agencies will become insignificant. For example, information job is then difficult and not their jobs, which turn personnel selfish and disparity.”(J3:27/3/2014)

4.4.3.1 Some indicators are specified by the OPSDC and irrelevant with the task

The data show that some indicators are specified by the OPSDC as the general indicators and all agencies must complete them.

“Some indicators are specified by the OPSDC and not the need of the department such as some dimension of organizational development. The question is whether I give importance. Yes. Nevertheless, it weight so little and the OPSDC gives it heavier weight but just to attract it importance in the internal process of each unit. Here, it does not reflect the real job. In measurement, sometimes, or evaluation, it has been worked out carelessly and it may not reflect. Some indicators are not specified by the internal agency but from the top or other units. Some jobs might be allocated just only some indicators. They do not fit. Sometime, what they want and what we want are not convergent. Some time the OPSDC fixes the indicators with high weight and be used in every agency but each agency plays different roles.” (J6:14/3/2016)

“I see all items of command from the Big OPSDC is like tailoring One-Size-Fits-All. Can dress but cute dress is not the same. For example,

Comparing the Corrections Department and Rights Protection it reduces service procedures for contacted people and the Land Department reduces procedure ; people are happy. However, in the Corrections Department and if we do not screen the relative visitors or truly secure. If we do not search the inmates and catch their visitors as hostage; what shall we do? And so on.”(J9:13/3/2014)

“There is misunderstanding of the job in the OPSDC and the real job of the department. The department has specified the indicators. We know the OPSDC has specified them. In fact, it doesn’t work because the personnel works, they know it but the OPSDC just look by overview.”(J11:1/3/2014)

“I think, if efficiency is needed from the agency, it is necessary to know the real job and understand it rather than specifying indicators from outside or general indicators for evaluation. Each department has its own methods, procedures and process of work and laws enforce them to follow. Meaning, each department determines and becomes the goal for its efficient work. The OPSDC must come and talk to communicate contents with real process for negotiation. In fact, the OPSDC declines. If it doesn’t know generally we propose but the OPSDC command it what this year will be evaluated and inform the department with high criteria and when we negotiate the criteria will not be reduced.” (J11:1/3/2014)

“... fixing the indicators, do the main indicators have been fixed. Are they not important? If viewing the efficiency dimension; they are still reducing electricity bill, water bill, and fixing the central indicators which sometimes, it is necessary to consider the worth of the public mission”. (S5:11/7/2014)

“The public agency or the designers of the indicators do not deeply know the impacts...knowledge and understanding of the indicators. If not adequately know, it distorts KPI.” (J8:1/3/2014)

4.4.3.2 The indicators in the performance agreement should be worked out in team rather than individually responsible

The data show that the responsible person to design each indicator is individual comprising the supervisor of the indicators, individual to retain the indicator but the public affairs require collective work.

“This principle is good. Some indicators must be worked out in team but after evaluation, some earn distinguished scores. Some earn good scores though they work in the same workplace. It disunites them. As it is, the responsibility should then be under the office (agency): if you can do, the office earns reward. It indicates that the KPI by individual creates disunity.” (J10:19/3/2014)

4.4.3.3 The OPSDC’s knowledge and understanding of the departmental missions modified into the indicators

The data show that the understanding to specify some indicators cannot modify the public mission into the indicators.

“Sorry, how does the OPSDC know better than the department on what is difficult or what is easy in the process of negotiation but we can say that how difficult we handle a case? It is so tough. The OPSDC may try one. In fact, in our work life it is easy (clear speech and ease fix). None knows better than we do on specific job. We say it is difficult but we achieve it.”(J8:19/3/2014)

“the OPSDC does not understand the public task. Sometimes, they want the indicators in their way. Naturally, the roles of the department create no effect because the OPSDC want to think in their own way but in the task, it is not yet reached. Some indicators we also do not reach such as, 1) no database. The reason of not yet reach is we do not work out entirely by our own such as we work with PACC with the Ministry of Interior and it does not then work. If we work alone, but our friends decline; it is so bad then. I think those who work in the OPSDC should understand the missions of each department well.”(J11:1/3/2014)

“The task in the OPSDC is misunderstood. The real job and the department specify them and the department really knows that what the OPSDC specifies, it cannot work out. Those who work they know but the OPSDC see just the overview.” (J6:14/3/2014)

4.4.3.4 The attitude of the practitioners on the performance agreement: “pressure” not “promotion”

The data show that there is the attitude of the practitioners on the performance agreement.

“If I were assigned to handle the indicators, and I didn’t earn 5 scores but 3; I should feel my life is not damaged. Unlike today, I feel damaged. Therefore, the personnel play self-protect and earn 5 scores. This is a conflict of interest. It never promotes techniques to implement the tool but it never helps to use the tool maximizing efficiency, today. Good tool but poor implementation – this is what really happening. And if any days, the KPI fixes at 5 scores and I can do just 3. I would accept it. Then we have to consider the dimensions of support, the organizational supports, encouragement for training and return to work out in the same duty but earn more scores. Then one would think the organization builds him/her and rewarded. Later it has been disclosed that we have more opportunities for development, intensive tuition, foreign excursion, and intensive excursion.

These allow us to improve our skills and improve more and more and then we are promoted. It shows that the content of the tool is really on practices. Therefore, one must be masterly in using the tool. If not, one cannot see and in the nature of “pressing” or seeing the tool as the immediate boss. If that I, it is too bad. The tool must provoke to bring the inner dynamism for uses. Now, we see as pressing and pressing like a mountain is pressing. It never draws anything out from a person.”(J8:24/3/2016)

“He must be clearly assigned and transferring the KPI cannot use just science but arts too. He must have opportunity to develop himself and earn appropriate reward. All theses must facilitate each other. It needs integration. For example, if I were a probation regulator and have been assigned to accept the KPI but I fail 5 scores but earn just 3. I can accept it that I have poor expertise on the job. I found out that there is competency gap and in it I should have been develop at this point. And I have been developed one day. Then I earn 4 scores. This means that ownership is gradually emerged. It must be a process.” (J8:24/3/2016)

4.4.3.5 Impacts of performance agreement

The data show that:

“What is the final result? Mine is intention in arranging the performance agreement and is not for efficiency? The department or the unit would cheat and foxy or would it demand for 80%? The department will demand its office / divisions to reach the target, number management, paperwork management to reach

the target of the OPSDC to gain 5 scores but it loses reality dimension and its authenticity. The purpose is to develop public sector system, is it not? If all agencies gain 5 scores, it is not the truth and might not reach the target or just 50-60 %. See, if all departments together gain 4.8 or 5. However, why does the Thai public system just struck here? It rises a dichotomous target-conflict. It may not but the department wants to show off. Nevertheless, the result is fake. It is not a development. Why are we still here? This is the main cause and not just only here but the entire Thai public system.”(J8:24/3/2014)

“The problems are with the two starting agencies on their being the bureaucracy. The policy unit has to understand here first and informs that truly an excellence must see the truth with what they are doing too. A bit easing is needed during negotiation otherwise at the end there will be fraud data. All must be based on truth. It begins with the OPSDC policy. If that scores satisfy them but the Thai public system will never be developed but cheaters and cheating paperwork. I also cheat because I want 80 marks and some Director Generals want to save faces demanding more indicators and approve. When documenting, it fails the true efficiency and we are happy with the number.”(J9:13/3/2014)

“Cooperation and assistance from different divisions will be minimized because personnel will concentrate with their own indicators first which affect their salary promotion. Any petty job, none would do because it is not their indicator. For example, the information coordination to support other unit or other unit request supports; it will be disregarded and more difficulties to request information. Besides, it makes personnel selfish and more disunity.” (J3:27/3/2014)

4.4.3.6 Overlapping of tool implementation between the OPSDC and the CSO

The data show that the managerial tool / innovation from both agencies are overlapping for uses.

“DPIS will be the KPI of the CSO (Civil Servant Office) and working with computer. It involves salary promotion and some of its contents are taken from the OPSDC but some cannot.”(J10:19/3/2014)

“The indicators in the performance agreement and the indicators in DPIS should be the same and the personnel should not twice work. Now

the DPIS and OPSDC are almost the same but just few indicators from the OPSDC cannot be transferred to all the personnel but now they are 90%.”(J10:19/3/2014)

“The central agency where it disseminates the tool must be clear on who is responsible and clear with command otherwise it will overlap.” (J10:19/3/2014)

“Using both KPI and competency, the latter is destructive and deteriorating. Instrument in my view and if measurement needed; KPI is enough and never intervene with competency.”(J8:24/2014)

4.4.3.7 Performance Incentives

The data show that allocating incentives as rewards in fulfilling performance agreement is still unfair.

“Appropriateness in allocating incentives should be annually but more money should be allocated more than now.” (J2:10/3/2014)

“This matter is unfair in the bureaucracy. Some units work hard with more impacts but little bonus such as the director gets only 1,200 Baht a year while being a regional director got just 800-900 Baht a year. On the contrary, the local administration is rewarded many ten of thousands. This is not a second class but multiple classes on fairness within the OPSDC bureaucracy. It’s too bad in money allocation and deteriorating the organization!” (J8:24/3/2014)

“There are two types of allocation. First, it is by distinguished performance, which I do disagree and the second, it is equally allocated. Here I do agree because all share in working. Even more or less but all involve – a job must be working out together; only one cannot not finish it in the scope of the personnel. In the scope of monetary reward for the management would have another round. Some years, the management organizes training and remains fewer bonuses. Therefore, motivation is worsened because of little money but just for good sake. Each year they get 1,000 Baht each. The second type fit the personnel (front line).” (J3:27/3/2014)

“There are no proper criteria to calculate with the recipient such as long division or short division but I am responsible for this indicator with 20 personnel. It should be equally division as in long division by the management decision. However, some intention of the indication is to reward the person responsible for this indicator who has to admit more burdens but there may me

accusation. Because the higher position gains higher pay; some units earn up to ten thousand or hundred thousand.”(J10:19/3/2014)

“What does the supervisor do? The working person is the data collector but allocating the incentive the supervisor earns more. On the contrary, the front line does not do alone but in team. If only the named person on KPI earns individually, it bring disunity.”

“The doer and the not-doer earn similar pay of 520 Baht. It is not a reward and the reward system is still problematic.”(J8:24/3/2014)

4.4.3.8 Recommendations to improve the performance agreement

Persons involved explain problems and limitations arisen and recommend solution as below.

NATURE OF THE INDICATORS

“Good tools must twice work, 1) arousing creative competition and 2) increasing human relations. Both create collaborative culture. A good tool must create both things together and must increase both things. Whenever, the tool create just one thing; the performance will be poor. Whenever competition is created only, the relation within an organization will be dropped. Therefore, the tool must do two things together.” (J8:24/3/2014)

“In fact, to specify KPI and KPI attributes, it needs 1) to reflect the big success of an organization. 2) It needs to reflect the change in productivity and satisfaction of the service recipients. Moreover, 3) it must create impacts on internal management. These are the qualifications of KPI. 4) KPI provides commitment in persons, enjoying at work, challenging and makes all happy. All these 3-4 factors identify the nature of quality ... but the KPI of the department is still loose...the KPI principle is the success of an organization must be less than KPI, then it will be challenging. Today, the organizational success is overwhelming KPI, it does not influence the organizational success. I believe that all organizations think it as a burden rather than dynamism.”(J8:24/3/2014)

TIME CONDITION

“When the OPSDC evaluates; it should clearly announce and take round between departments. There should be meeting with the unit. Meaning, documents we do have but they are difficult to understand (intangibility) and calling is so difficult to connect.”(J8:24/3/2014)

“Recommendations in improving strategies and follow-up, targeting, and time condition: the more prolonging the difficult the work is. The time condition of the OPSDC is prolonging or shortened and within the departments; it is necessary to adjust themselves, too.”(J6:14/3/2014)

INDICATOR PROCESS

“The OPSDC should believe in the front line and recognize them but not just create criteria and all must reach them. Sometimes, it cannot. For example, cases must be closed within ...months or closed..... cases. Some cases take time and sometimes they cannot be controlled. Beginning from the petitioners, investigations, inquiries and submission to the public prosecutors and the Cause Identification Committee to the public prosecutor; just the committee members they cannot be controlled. If sometimes a new evidence found, we have to inquire more. Many time we have extend time. When sometimes we have 100 cases and to close 50 cases, is impossible.”(J11:1/3/2014)

THE MANUAL

“The manual (the administrative manual of the OPSDC) gives concept but does not know technique. It may be translated from English. It still floats-non-change of concept to practices. The OPSDC is yet to know its duty and public system. The first one is Dr. Tossaporn from Chulaongkorn University but we do not know his team members while the coordinator who educating us confuses us.”(J11:19/3/2014)

4.4.3.9 Factors affecting the success of performance agreement

The data could be synthesized on factors affecting the success of performance agreement as below.

(1) LEADER

“The leader pays no interest to seriously implement the tool, no action to take logical understanding. The limitations of each tool affect its applications but just a model. This fails the application of all tools in developing the public sector.” (J8:24/3/2014)

“Leadership affects success. If a leader pays importance to common meeting for consideration in each issue in each time in proposing the action plans And pay importance to the application; the plans would have been seriously implemented.” (J6:14/3/2014)

The leader, the management, and in a time the leader went along with the government leader (Dr. Thanksin Shinnawatr). He intervened with the performance agreement strategies. When the Prime Minister moved, the Ministers, the Permanent Secretaries, the Director-Generals had to intervene. At sometimes, the Permanent Secretary had to sit won to find the indicators. At the time, the Director-Generals paid much importance to the indicators. The Office Directors had to sit down and find “and/or”. At the time when the permanent Secretary had to chair the commission and the deputy had to find the indicators. Next, when the chief of the OPSDC had to chair the commission and the Class 5-6 had to sit down to find the indicators. In conclusion, leaders are bound to the organizational culture, power culture and others are non-involvement. It relies only with the organizational leader alone.”(j9:13/3/2014)

“The policy leader, close attention of the top leader, the sub-unit leaders , the sub-unit system, database are inevitable.” (J4:25/3/2014)

(2) COMMUNICATION FOR UNDERSTANDING

“Factors affecting success is the management, communication, and understanding within an organization. It must be in deep to practices rather than preparing performance agreement to call for motivation but consciousness in working. If the management is not conscious to its importance and targeting; the lower level cannot work on.”(J6:14/3/2014)

(3) EDUCATING KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING

“The personnel’s attitudes, response and acceptance today are not clarified for their knowledge and understanding so that they could work on. Even sometimes what they do they do not even know the real objectives. To convince them to accept, it requires educating knowledge, understanding, rationale, and necessity why they have to be carried out. Then they would accept the origin not just sometime made by order.”(J9:13/3/2014)

“Knowledge, understanding and mastery of the tool like KPI, PMQA, and competency require deep understanding and is able to integrate them. by the ignorant management cannot use the tools (J8:24/3/2014).

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSIONS

The researcher discusses based on the research objectives, i.e.

1) To study the essence of the public administration paradigms linked to the Thai bureaucratic development during 1959-2006.

2) To analyze factors influencing the changes of the public administration paradigms applied with the Thai bureaucratic development during 1959-2006.

3) To study the administrative innovation under the public administration paradigms being applied with the Thai bureaucratic development after its reforms in BE2545 (2002).

4) To investigate the limitations and impacts of the RBM applied with the Thai bureaucratic development as an innovation in the paradigm of the new public management (NPM) after the bureaucratic reforms in BE2545 (2002).

5.1 The Public Administration Paradigm during 1959-2006

The characteristics of the public administration to develop the Thai public sector during 1959-2006 have been divided into three major paradigm, i.e. 1) development administration during early 1957-1977 end, 2) the new public management (NPM) during early 1987-1997 end (currently active) and 3) good governance during mid 1987-mid 1997. The Thai public administration paradigm links with the public sector development. It is corresponded with the opinion of Pollitt and Bourckaert (2001) advocating that the wave of public sector management involves three groups, i.e., planning group, NPM group and governance group. It is corresponded with the studies of Cheung and Scott (2003) indicating that the Asian public sector reform involves three paradigms, 1) building state capacity, 2) NPM, and 3) social network. The paradigms used in developing the Thai public sector are as follows:

5.1.1 Development Administration – it is characterized as (1) building institution which is the establishment of the National Economic Development in 1959, the Bureau of the Budget in 1959, Ministry of National and community Development and the Department of Accelerated Rural Development. (2). It is to institute a Public Administration Institution which is The School of Public Administration: Thammasart University in 1955 and later it has been transferred to NIDA (National Institute of Development Administration) in 1966. (3) It is to improve the government administration method such as changing from the line-item budget to the program budget in 1960. (4) There is planning of the first national Economic Development Plan in 1961-1966. (5) There is supports of graduate schools and foreign training particularly in USA. (6) there is domestic training for public personnel. It is corresponded with the idea of Swerdlow (1975) cited in Siffin (2001) who mention about institution –building as important in the discipline of the development administration. Chakrabarty and Chand (2012) indicate that the popular techniques and structure during 1960s is called the technical assistance era, which involves a 5-year planning, budgeting agenda, training and community development. This is corresponded with the idea of Pollitt and Bourckaert (2011) who indicate that the approach in the public sector reform during mid1960 -1970s end involve planning, rational, cost-benefit analysis, science and expertise. Farazmand (2002) explains the trend of management reform and restructuring an organization in the fall of 20th century and the trends are 1) building management capacity after WWII to respond the political target in counter communism and USSR, to counter the socialism-orient labor groups. The management system has been developed in the developing countries related to the western power and the global capitalism characterized with security development, police force, management training on capitalist development and the bureaucracy controls politics. 2) institution-building in 1960 –there are supports to public sector development in the less-developed countries under the western influences and to be the tool in applying the national policy. It is corresponded with Cheung and Scott (2003) indicating that the approach to build capacity in the public sector is to focus on strengthening the institution so that he policy is rational and independent from special privileges. Bowornwathana (2013) indicates that public sector has been developed to apply the national development policy for its efficiency.

It is corresponded with Farazmand (2001) who guides that the development administration applied after WWII links with various issues as follows: 1) economic-based development, 2) the differences between the developed countries and the developing countries, 3) the management possibilities, 4) development-based management transferred, 5) the change of condition of politics, social, economy and culture of the less developed countries, 6) the developed countries are the model. They are the targets the developing countries must move like the western countries. In addition, the recommendations above are corresponded with Haque (2007) who studies development administration in Thailand. He explains that during 1960s-1970s the government plays the roles through establishing many state enterprises. It is witnessed with the phenomenon of allies hand check between the public sector and the private sector. At the same time, the political elites and bureaucrat elites expand their power under the arms of Development Agenda. At the mean time the Thai government established NIDA in 1966 to provide service in education and training on public administration. During 1970s, the programs of NIDA prioritize economic development and development administration. At the same time, Bowornwathana (2013) explains that there are three major factors leading to the bureaucratic development model. This is the model of development administration and they are 1) the birth of NIDA in 1966, 2) the start of the government in preparing the national economic and social development plan, and 3) the birth of the Thai Journal of Development Administration as the platform for scholars to express their opinions developing the Thai public sector and the nation. All the three factors have been under attention of the Thai scholars in both instruction and researches in the topic of development administration focusing on educating the government personnel on administration such as planning and organization skills in order to develop the government system and so on.

5.1.2 New Public Management: NPM

The Thai NPM is characterized as 1) setting performance standard such as building the Thailand International Public Sector Standard Management System and Outcomes (PSO), Public Sector Management Quality Award (PMQA), and arranging performance agreement. 2) Agencification – it is the stem from the government units

(ministry, ministerial affairs, and departments) and the state-owned enterprise through establishing public organization and the Public Organization Act BE 2542 (1997). And, 3) Privatization – this is an approach of developing the government system by school of thought. It is corresponded with NPM of Hood (1991) who emphasizes standardization and performance measurement and decentralization. In addition, such idea is corresponded with NPM of Haque (2007) which add autonomy and flexibility in human resource and finance management by establishing the autonomous agencies, performance standard and privatization. It is corresponded with Borin (1995 cited in Borins, 2002) who emphasizes measuring and performance target.

The NPM has been allocated in the sixth National Economic and Social Development Plan (1987-1991) when private sector has more roles in managing the public sector basic services and it become clearer in the seventh National Economic and Social Development Plan (1992-1996) when the state downsizes its structure, changes its roles of operation into monitoring. At the same time, private sector was invited to run the state missions more as contract out and privatization. While the government appears the NPM in the administration of Gen. Chatchai Chunnahawan (1988-1991) and continued by the administration Gen. Chaowalit Yongjaiyuth (1996-1997) and the administration of Dr. Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2006). At the mean time, the strategy of developing the government system counted on the master plan of the government reform in 1997-2001, the government administration reform 1999, and the strategic plan of the Thai government development 2003-2007, which all are founded on the NPM. It is corresponded with Haque (2007) who explains that the case of Thailand adopting NPM under the Public Administration Act BE 2535 (1992), the Public Sector Management Reform Plan 1999 and the Administrative Renewal Project 1999 which are handled by the Civil Servant Office. Painter (2005 cited in Haque, 2007) notes that the NPM-based development has been applied in the master plan of the Public Sector Reform 1997, the Public Sector Management Reform Plan 1999, the Royal Decree on Criteria and Good Governance 2003 and the strategic plan of Public Sector Development in 2003. Haque (2007) adds details that Thailand pays importance to follow the NPM model through decentralization, empowerment the executive and the chief of the unit, reducing employment, dissolving unnecessary units, outsourcing, result-based management (RBM), role changes into the facilitator

and not control. In addition, the government adopt performance based budgeting system, and RBM adherence to autonomy of personnel administration and finance, result-based performance and building autonomous public organization. Painter (2006, cited in Haque, 2007) mentioned about result-based budgets, service targets and performance agreement, which represent the popular NPM in Thailand.

However, the results of development based on NPM are more evident during the administration of Dr. Thaksin Shinnawatr (2001-2006) emphasizing the information technology. It is corresponded with the study of Painter (2006) and Mongkol (2012) indicate that the administration reform of Dr. Thaksin Shinnawatr is evidently based on NPM prioritizing IT while Prayote Songklin (2008) indicates that the reform trend with NPM begins in during the administration of Chuan Leekphai (1997-2000) particularly, the public sector reform plan in 1997 but most evident during the administration of Dr. Thaksin Shinnawatr. In conclusion, the tangibility of the Thai government development links with the concept of NPM begins in the administration of Dr. Thaksin Shinnawatra by amending the Public Administration Act (Copy 5) BE 2545 (2002) and leads to the government development plan (2003-2007) while adopting the content of the Royal Decree on Criteria and Procedures for Good governance BE 2546 (2003) with details on the government development by allowing all the agencies to take action. It is different from every previous government which stipulated the government development plans but without enforcement. Meaning, the development plans have no power to enforce every agency to take action. This is a factor that the previous development finds no constructive results.

5.1.3 Good Governance

The important characteristics of good governance are 1) establishment of check and balance institution of the administrative (government from election or executive politicians and top civil servant, 2) supporting the people involvement politics, 3) decentralization. The good governance has been stipulated in the 8th National Economic and Social Development Plan (1997-2001). The establishment of public hearing through the regulation of the Prime Minister Office on public hearing in 1996, accessing information under the Government Information Act BE 2540 (1997), building Good Governance under the regulation of the Prime Minister Office

BE 2542 (1999). Significantly, good governance has been evidently allocated in the constitution BE 2540 (1997) in terms of endorsement of rights for political participation, citizen rights and human rights and the checking of the state power. It is corresponded with Mutebi (2009), and Parin Pensuwan (2005) cited that Thailand is a country with awareness and supporting the concept of good governance in order to build good governance in Thailand especially transparency and responsibility through the Constitution BE 2540 (1997). Thailand institutes NGO to align equilibrium and control the executive power of the Ngo through the Constitutional Court, Administrative Court and Human right Board, the National Audit Commission, the Parliament Ombudsman, the Election Board, the Public Sector Anti-Corruption Commission (PACC) and elected senators without any supervisions of political party. In addition, improving governance in Thailand, it is regulated in the Prime Minister Regulations on building Good Governance BE 2542 (1999) supporting transparency, improving service quality and honesty in public life. Bowornwathana and Poocharoen (2010) propose that the governance principle by the Constitution BE 2540 (1997) and in theory, The Constitution had reduce the power of executive politicians (the Cabinet) and the top civil servants while indirectly increase power to people to monitor and pursuance through the new governance institution or any NGO offices by constitution. It is corresponded with the work of Brewer (2003) reasoning that the Thai Constitution BE 2540 (1997) inclines to change the national political paradigm. The Constitution BE 2540 (1997) is the foundation of the changes in the Thai politics to meet the elements of the governance regarding responsibility, predictability, transparency and involvement. The same Constitution has design the institution supporting the governance principle adherent to the principle of responsibility and transparency. It is witness with the establishment of the Public Sector Anti-Corruption Commission (PACC), Office of the National Audit, the Constitutional Court, the Administrative Court, the Ombudsman Thailand. Painter (2006) indicates that the eight National Economic and Social Development Plan has allocated the content of governance development in order to solve the problem of recovering the state capacity, too.

The researcher observes that the supports of NPM are more than good governance by examining the Royal Decree on Criteria and Good Governance BE

2546 (2003). The researcher find that contents and legal name are contradict with following details.

The Royal Decree on Criteria and Procedures for Good Governance BE 2546 (2003). This law is called “Criteria and Good Governance” (Good Government Administration = governance) in corporate with the contents of (1) people-centered, (2) result-based management with target and indicators by preparing performance agreement, (3) improving efficiency and worthiness by production cost accounting, (4) provide service link, (5) government mission improvement, (6) facilitating and responsive to people’s needs by service deadline, and IT network systematization, and (7) performance evaluation.

Contents of governance emphasize accountability, transparency, openness, predictability and participation (ADB, 1998 cited in Cheung and Scott, 2003). However, Bowornwathana (2008) explains that the contents of such law turns to focus on improving the efficiency of the government administration and when checking the reason of the enactment of this law is “ there will be the government administration reform that the work of the government serves the national development and more efficiently provide services for people and this administration and performance need good governance...” from this data , it shows that “the name of law” called the Royal Decree on Criteria and Procedures for Good Governance BE 2546 (2003) which emphasizes good governance but the content turns to efficiency and managerial tools as in the NPM. Therefore, “name and content” of this law contradict. Bowornwathana (2008: 12) mentions that the Royal Decree on Criteria and Procedures for Good Governance BE 2546 (2003) inclines to the efficiency problem but less prioritizes responsibility, transparency and anti-corruption.

An interested question is why do the name and content of the law contradict? The researcher explain these two issues as 1) the conceptual differences by good governance and NPM, 2) what are reasons behind inconsistency of the content and name of the law?

(1) The conceptual differences by good governance and NPM

The target and approach of NPM and governance are different. The NPM targets efficiency, effectiveness and economizing or 3Es and the key players are the

private sector. Its basic theory is the New Institutional Economics, Public Choice theory and Business Management (Ormond, 2003 cited in Haque, 2007). Its managerial tools are such as downsizing through outsource, contract out, autonomy, flexibility, and agencification. It institutes autonomous public agency emphasizing results, performance standard and privatization, deregulation and service for people as criteria. While the concept of good governance targets equity and equality (Chakrabarty and Chand, 2012). Its key players are civil societies and private development organization (Farazmand (2004), changing analysis from single unit into organizational network and prioritizes cooperation rather than competition within the organization and between the organization and the implication of link between the civil sector and the public sector (Fattore, Dubois and Lapenta, 2012). The good governance model contains 1) accountability, 2) participation, 3) legal framework and 4) transparency or openness related information in the rules, regulations and decision-making of the government (ADB, 1999 cited in Brewer, 2003).

Farazmand (2004) points out the differences of both concepts. Good governance claims dethroning the authoritarian and bureaucratic government, which decide and apply policy only in on-sidedness (bureaucratic mechanism). Good governance is by nature a thought, philosophy and new approach, which related to citizen leading to linkage with the role of civil society and non-governmental organization. On the other hand, the NPM is based on public choice theory proposing to resist bureaucracy and service through the public sector. Its tools are privatization. The NPM does not care or avoid to discuss on the problems of equity and fairness and accountability. At the same time the NPM is based on marketing, which adopt business techniques to be applied in the state agencies. Critiques are such efficiency, responsibility, quality and fairness. All these concepts have become the major content in good governance. It is corresponded with opinion of Haque (1998, 1999) cited in Bowornwathana (2000) that public service reform adhered to marketing reducing the confidence of the state in public service. Therefore the weakness in fairness is the market value such as efficiency, products, cost-effectiveness, competition and profit dominate the government value which emphasize responsibility, neutrality, responsiveness to needs, morals, fairness and justice. All these issues have been minimized. In addition, the study of Rhodes (1998) cited in Bowornwathana (2000)

supports the above claims that the unexpected impacts by applying NPM in England are increased fragmentation, loss of accountability, increased difficulties of coordination and decline in public service ethics.

(2) Reasons behind the Thai public sector support NPM rather than good governance

Thailand has ever enacted the Prime Minister Regulation on good governance BE 2542 (1999) to support good governance in the government administration with six major principles, i.e. rule of law, virtue, transparency, participation, responsibility and worthiness. Later during the administration of Dr. Thaksin Shinawatr (2001-2006) applied NPM (Bowornwathana, 2008; Painter, 2006; Prayote Songklin, 2008) enacted a Royal Decree on Criteria and Procedures for Good Governance BE 2546 (2003). Bowornwathana (2008) comments that this law emphasizes efficiency improvement but the importance paid to responsibility, transparency and corruption is less. The researcher collects data and analyzes the reasons why the Thai executive chooses NPM rather than good governance.

2.1 Adopting techniques to improve efficiency under the concept of NPM is easier and more constructive than applying good governance such as the techniques of reengineering, the project of market testing, the performance measurement and evaluation, and cost-analysis per unit and so on. The NPM techniques can display success or failure of the reform, which is easier to claim success by display in the forms of data, and statistics before clients or service recipients. In addition, the power of the public agencies is retained and without threats or transits to the customers or other groups (Haque, 1998 cite in Bowornwathana, 2000).

2.2 The government leader particularly during the administration of Dr. Thaksin Shinawatr (2001-2006) adheres to NPM because of 1) his success and wealth of his family from telecommunication industry and mobile phones, which make Dr. Shinawatr, trust in business approach. 2) His business kingdom has Dr. Shinawatr as CEO, therefore he applies as such in driving Thailand as the CEO of the country. 3) Trends and movement of NPM is internationally accepted particularly the international organization such as World Bank and UN which support this concept. And 4) the complexity of business knowledge applied in the public sector

is another reason to allow the government leader to choose any technique as want amid confuses of the knowledge. It includes to exchange power in the hand of ministers and top civil servants (Bowornwathana, 2004).

2.3 The principles of good governance, which emphasizes responsibility, transparency, an small central government; the responsibility and transparency require check and balance from the external unit such as The Public Sector Anti-Corruption Commission, the National Audit Commission, Senate, and the Administrative Court. Therefore, the principle of good governance become another reason that the political parties demanded not to support adopting the principle of good governance for the Thai public sector reform(Bowornwathana and Poocharoen (2010).

2.4 The principle of good governance has to increase power to the civil sector and private development organization to be its network in public services and synergize to bargain benefits with the state. Meaning, the public sector includes executive politicians and top civil servants have to transfer their powers to the local administration and other parts, which are not the public sector. At the same time the Thai public sector is familiar with centralization and top-down approach. They have to change their management approach to openness when working. Creating climates and conditions to facilitate involvement, it emphasizes organization network and the people sector is not as the customers only but participants too in organizing public service and welfare under the supports of the state agencies. Significantly, the public sector and it personnel have to be prompt to meet checking from the mechanism of the NGO and the civil sector under the principle of responsibility and transparency. Therefore with the conflict of the principle do good governance and the practice model of the Thai government agencies since the era of development administration during 1957 until today; it is then another reason that the support of good governance is less than NPM. Chai-ana (1987 cited in Painter, 2006) explains that the Thai public sector norms prioritize personal relations of patronage and dependency. Loyalty is greater than merit system. The consequences are nepotism and corruption. It is corresponded with scholar group that there are two major problems in the Thai bureaucracy, 1) high hierarchy and centralization and 2) patron-client relationship (Rigg, 1991; Brewer, 2003; Jingjit and Fotaki, 2011). Such

relationship leads to nepotism and destructive to professionalism of the public personnel, merit system, bureaucracy inefficiency and ending at corruption (Mutebi and Sivarak, 2007), (Bowornwathana, 2011). Brewer, Choi and Walker (2008) claim that responsibility and corruption control have significant relationship toward the government effectiveness of the country. Meaning, a country with high score of responsibility and corruption; its government has high effectiveness too. To such problem, Seksan Prasertkul (2005) explains that patronage culture from slavery holds relationship by hierarchy like superior –inferior or senior-junior and each has commitment to each other by being dominated by religious morals and virtues and customs and traditions. In such system, though having law enforcement but everything relies on deliberation of the master, which have many levels and link from the captain to the king. Such patronage relation is not transferred directly to democracy used today. They are adapted for so long under the military authoritarian regimes since 1947. Finally, the patronage culture existing today is reproduced by the power relation having the bureaucratic state as the core. Therefore, the patronage culture destroys the merit system and the ideal-type bureaucracy of Max Weber which based on the impersonal, rules and regulation-attached without personal deliberation. It also emphasize capacity and professionalism but they are eroded when being used with the Thai public sector. Therefore, there is no surprise of failure in anti-corruption, which is the core of good governance and cannot be used in the Thai sector system. Komin (1990) claims that the model of grateful relationship orientation become the cause that the PACC fails. Mutebi (2012) added that the Thai government has poor responsibility about Administrative Corruption and State Capture and it is the most critical barrier in addressing corruption.

In conclusion, the four reasons above help explain why the Thai public sector prioritize NPM rather than good governance. With empirical evidence in enacting laws and the Royal Decree on Criteria and Procedures for Good Governance BE 2546 (2003) but the essence of law adheres to NPM.

5.2 Factors Influencing the Change of Public Administration during 1959-2006

Employing the three schools of public administration thoughts to develop the Thai public sector but each group holds backgrounds differently driving the application. The researcher analyzes the factors influencing each group as follows.

5.2.1 Factors influencing to indicate development administration

Factors influencing the formulation of the concept in the development administration in Thailand involve at least two factors, i.e. 1) politics classified into domestic politics on check and balance of power and the international politics on anti-communism; and 2) Economy on the capitalist economic policy. The researcher explains them through the policymaking process, as below.

5.2.1.1 Politics

After the coup on April 6, 1948, Field Marshal P. Phibulsonhram became the Prime Minister (second term : 1948-1957), he employed check and balance between the group of Soi Rajkru and the group Si Sao Thewes by starting relation with the US by seeking military assistance. Such assistance has been distributed between both powerhouse groups. At the same time, he deployed the policy of anti-communism to seek assistance from the US. With such measures, his political stability was stronger during 1947. With his foreign policy above, it was the efficient key of his check and balance of the domestic politics. At the same time, the US attempted to encourage Thailand to use free market policy more. This economic assistance led to the improvements of bureaucracy, instructions and public administration courses or they could be called a tool kit for development administration, which the US exported to the developing countries. The US aimed at free economy and it pushed between the political scientists and public administration scholars with World Bank. Both divided their duties, World Bank played the roles of development by promoting free market economy with two assistances. 1) It was to study the economic condition in the form of a teamwork. Later, it reported the results and this report would be proposed as the measure to develop the country regarding improving the free market economy policy emphasizing foreign investment, reducing monopoly of the state-owned production and adjusting the mechanism of the

bureaucracy with various institutions based on the US bureaucracy. The aim was to allow the new constructed public agencies to be the mechanism driving the economic policy that World Bank dominated through the study reports along with the foreign consultants. 2) World Bank would provide loan to be spent as the recommendation from the study. This was the key condition in the loan of World Bank. Such phenomenon arose tangibly with the study team from World Bank during 1957-1958. The report was named "A Public Development Program for Thailand." This report made critique on the Thai monopolized economy by the state through the production of more than 100 estate-owned enterprises. The industrial development has been proposed in order to meet the foreign investors and proposed to establish an Office of the Economic Development Advisory Council, and Bureau of the Budget, and preparing an economic development plan. Therefore, it was not surprised the study report became the essence of the first National Economic Development. Such model has been pursued until the fifth Plan.

It is concluded that the Thai politics that drives and lead the development administration a part of the measures is used in targeting economy the main target. The results above is corresponded with Waldo (1992, cited in Farazmand 2001) that the concept of development administration was designed by the western government elites to support the western economic values, politics and cultures to the developing countries. The plan of the Comparative Administration Group (CAG) was to construct and support the local leaders in the developing countries to climb up to power but citizens were least attended to. This is the concept in the Cold War context and the export of the American Public Administration to the third world.

5.2.1.2 Economy

Economy is the critical influence to apply the concept of development administration with the Thai bureaucracy development, as below.

1) Policy formulation

The first National Economic Development Plan (1961-1966) and the second Plan (1967-1971) – their contents were stipulated in the study report of World Bank named "A Public Development Program for Thailand" the WB teamwork surveyed the Thai economy during 1957-1958. After the negotiation of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat and President Eisenhower (1953-1961) and the team of

security and economy in USA which was the same time that Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat was medicated in a military hospital Eater Reed. He claimed the US to support him to enter the political power and he also proposed an anti-communism policy in Thailand as an exchange. Later, he returned and made a coup in 1958 and stepped up as the Prime Minister.

The World Bank report contained three major parts: 1) the critique of the Thai state enterprises, 2) measures to promote private investments and 3) improvement of the Thai bureaucracy (Kris Permtanjit, 1985). In addition, this report is so critical to direct the Thai economic development. The content in the report has bemused in stipulating the first and the second National Economic Development Plans. Both contents in the plan emphasize the laissez-faire policy and the government has to support services and infrastructure for the private sector (Rangsan Thanaporpan, 1980 cited in Ukkris Pattamanont, 1985). It is seen that the WB reports on economy had strong influence to stipulate the development content in Plans 1 and 2. In addition, evidence to witness the WB influence over the policymaking and strategies on the Thai economy was to consider the linkage of the WB report and the national economic development of Thailand. Apart from the report on “A Public Development Program for Thailand” which critically founded the Plans 1 and 2, there was another report called No.EAP-12 with six sub reports. They founded the third Plan and the two reports named “Thailand: Toward a development Strategy of Full Participation” and “Industrial Development Strategy in Thailand” which founded the fifth Plan (Kris Permtanjit, 1985). The key player to stipulate the economic development policy was World Bank rather than Thailand, Office of the National Economic Development Council and other social sectors. It was corresponded with the opinion of Setthasiam (1998:88) indicated that the US took action on the bright side through World Bank in loan to develop a country with conditions and approaches wanted by USA and World Bank. As the meantime, Ukkris Pattamanont (1985) added that WB sent experts to plan economy in 16 countries so that those countries would have laissez-faire economic policy to welcome foreign investments. Kris Permtanjit (1985) further explained that the WB influence in stipulating the economic policy that WB or the IRBD to represent the idealism of the western imperialism and critical influence in the change of the Thai economic development under a technical assistance and loan for development.

2) Content of Policy

The content of the policy in developing Thailand and the key player in stipulating the policy/direction in the Thai economic development is World Bank supported by the US. It is not surprise on the content of the policy or the content in the national economic development is tended to meet the want of the World Bank and USA rather than the Thai society. It emphasizes laissez-fair economy to replace the nationalist economy that Thailand has invested through its state enterprises. They are under the dominion of the political group of Soi Rajkru led by Field Marshal Phin Chunnahawan and Pol. Gen. Phao Sriyanont (Riggs, 1966 cited in Ukkris Pattamanont, 1985). The policy content is widely opened and supporting measures to boost and to facilitate foreign investors and reducing tariff. The foreign investors prohibited the government to compete production with the private sector including the government had to construct infrastructure to meet the investment too, for example, hydroelectric dams to produce electricity and roads and so on. In addition, there were measures to boost investment to facilitate foreign investors enacted in the Industrial Investment Promotion Act BE 2503 (1960) such as import tax break from machines and production distribution and permit to carry money out of the country (Ukkris Pattamanont, 1985). In addition, the policy content of the government announced before the parliament during 1959-1979 since the administration of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (1959-1963) until the administration of Gen. Kriangsak Chamanant (1977-1979) were focused only on economy. The government policy began to talk about the bureaucracy reform for the first time during the administration of Gen. Prem Tinnasualnont (1980-1988) which emphasized speedy bureaucracy reform and with efficiency. The constructive appearance was just to slow the number of the public personnel not more than 2% a year. Therefore, for almost three decades during 1959-1988 both the government polices, the national economic and social development plans and the results of the national development were focused on economic development alone. None was found on the constructive bureaucracy development but just improving the organization or establishing the central agency institution such as the Office of National Economic development Council, Bureau of the Budget, Department of Accelerated Rural Development and Department of Community Development. These establishments were questioned on their intention whether to

really develop the country or just being the unit to coordinate benefits or the mechanism to apply the WB policy and USA. Consequently, it is witnessed that the national development policy of Thailand has been determined by the international organization and the foreign governments were focused on responsiveness to meet those organization. It is not surprise when the first two Plans have been implemented there are growing gaps between the poor and the rich, the urban and the rural. It is corresponded with Schmidt (1996, cited in Kelly; Yutthaphonphinit, Seubsman and Sleigh, 2012) indicated that though economy grows with gigantic leap particularly during 1980s by the gaps between the rich and the poor are enlarged, too. In fact, the development policy of Thailand is useful to improve the rural areas (Darlington (2000, cited in Kelly et al., 2012). Only some groups reaped benefit from the development policy. Similarly, the economic inequality came from centralized development, and the local cultures and diversity of the regions have been devalued. In addition, there is centralization in Bangkok and reducing autonomy of the regional administration (Jory 1999, cited in Kelly et al., 2012). Baker and Phongpaichit (2000, cited in Kelly et al., 2012) noted that development becomes the symbol of justification for the authoritarian government at the time. Moreover, Haque (2007) mentioned about impacts of development administration during 1950s-1970s in the SEA countries that while Malaysia and Singapore pursue the model of development administration well but authoritarianism in Indonesia, Thailand, Myanmar, and the Philippines gain the contradictory results, expansion of power, state interference, loan debts and foreign dependency more.

3) Implementation

The relation between Thailand and USA after WWII and the relation has been revived in 1950 with endorsement of three agreements: Fulbright Fund, Cooperation of Economy and Academics, and Military. The Fulbright Fund and the Cooperation of Economy and Academics influence the formulation of the School of Development Administration particularly the establishment of the central agency for planning. They are the Office of National Economic Development Council in 1959, Bureau of the Budget in 1959 and transferring Department of Comptroller General: Ministry of Finance to under supervision of the Prime Minister Office directly under the Prime Minister. Ministry of Development has been established in

1963. In addition, the first instruction of public administration has been established in Thailand called the School of Public Administration: Thammasart University in 1955 focusing on instructions, training, research and library. Students, scholars, civil personnel, military arms force and police were sent for graduate studies, training and excursion abroad under the agreement of the Fulbright fund including other education funds from other international organizations.

The Office of National Economic Development Council is the central agency proposed to be established by World Bank according to the report of A Public Development Program for Thailand. It is a unit to coordinate between the Thai government with World Bank leading to the first and the second National Economic Development Plan. At the same time, it is the unit, which drives the economic development plan by coordinating with different ministries, ministerial affairs and departments to apply the policy/ the economic development plans. Regarding personnel development with students, scholars, civil personnel, military arms force and police were sent for graduate studies abroad and return to work; they would be allocated into this office. They play the roles to stipulate development policies and teaching in educational institutions.

The administration development is another element of the development administration defined by Riggs (1970, cited in Chakrabarty and Chand, 2012). It is focused on to leverage the administration capabilities such as 1) modernizing bureaucracy by technology transfer and training, 2) improving administration organization and rationalization, 3) building units and delegate of administrative power, 4) professionalism and personnel expertise, 5) encouraging the management to acquire leadership to stipulate and support project of social and economic development. As such, they are the model of development administration which the Comparative Administration Group (CAG) has developed and disseminated during 1960s. The researcher notices that:

Whereas the administration development has established a central agency particularly the Office of National Economic Development Council and Bureau of the Budget, they were influenced by model arranged in the Executive Office of President (EOP) of USA accommodates with the advisors of economy and Bureau of the Budget immediate under supervision of the President. The two offices

were established in Thailand, they controlled and commanded ministries, ministerial affairs and departments to apply the plans and the budgets. They centralized their commands. Chai-anant Samuthwanich (1998) explains that since the first national economic development plan in 1961; both offices become the core unit to control the public jobs by virtue of the scope of development plan and budget consideration. It is corresponded with the opinion of Hagensick (1970) saying that to improve the bureaucracy has been determined by the centralized agencies within the Prime Minister Office and the Office of National Economic and Social Development Commission. In addition, the technical advices were under the US team and allocated to major central agencies such as 1) Dr. John A. Loftous (1956-1962) was allocated to the National Economic Development Council. 2) G. B. Beitzel (1959) was allocated to the Investment Promotion Board. 3) Public Administration Service (1956-1960) was allocated to Bureau of the Budget. All the US advisors support the economic policy of foreign investment (Ukkris Pattamanont, 1985). Rangsan Thananpornphan (1989) explains the relation between international organizations with the US government is through the advisors to the central agencies of Thailand as follows. After WWII, the US and international organizations particularly World Bank and IMF directly interfered the domestic economic policy on market in Thailand during 1950-1960 by coordinating with some Thai technocrat and pressured the Thai government to follow the regulations of the international economy during 1961-1972. The US had influence to determine the Thai economic policy through advisors allocated in the related agencies. World Bank supervised the strategies of economic and social development in Thailand using loan as the tool while IMF supervised the policy of the Thai currency exchange rate.

In addition, Rangsan Thananpornphan (1989) explains the model to intervene in stipulating the economic policy of Thailand from IMF, World Bank and the US. They penetrated through the Thai technocrats. The US was through top civil servant and executive politicians particularly the Prime Minister and Ministers but did not overlook the technocrat. World Bank and IMF created connect with the middle personnel who played the roles in stipulating economic policy. World Bank documents stated clearly that it could push the administration of Field Marshall P. Phibunsongkram to change the economic policy after WWII because it created

connection with technocrats in the Thai agencies. In addition, education background could promote both parties closer relation because both were graduated from the west particularly USA. The School of Neoclassical Economics and the School of Keynesian Economics influenced both parties. Both parties (Thai technocrat and the US advisors of WB and IMF) accepted some common values and cultures, which brought them relation between groups. In addition, the US education system could turn students, scholars, civil personnel, military arms force and police who were sent for graduate studies, particularly on public administration and economics. International organization and foreign government sponsored them. These are the key factors affecting them rather than academic development. Wiwatchai Atthakorn (1985) explain that such academic assistance in the form of technical and educational funds to study and training abroad particularly in USA for the civil personnel, police and military and after their return from studying abroad, most prefer the western way of life, faith and confidence in the western development style and liberalism. They have thinking methods and view problems as the west or called western spirit. This group of people significantly influence the way of thinking towards the Thai society because they are in the university cycle ready to disseminate knowledge, learning, teaching and producing books and textbooks without aware that those knowledge are relevant to the Thai society and to serve the Thai society or not and to what extent. Personnel in the public agencies of planning process, policymaking and implementation of plans would be conscious of convergence to the west strategy and development. Therefore, academic assistance is important to fruitfully change consciousness. Wiwatchai Atthakorn (1985) views that acceptance of advisory assistance allows foreign experts impose Thailand to use more western technology by the assistance projects. It leads to technology dependency, foreign capital dependency. In some cases, they westernize the structure of syllabuses, learning, instructions and educational philosophy by the wants of the sponsors and experts. For example, it is witnessed with the US influence, the Ford foundation and MUCIA in organizing NIDA (Juasiripukdee, 1983 cited in Wiwatchai Atthakorn, 1985). It is corresponded with Rangsan Thananpornphan (1989) noted that the process leading Thailand to deep Americanization comes from educational assistance after the endorsement on the agreement of educational exchange (Fulbright Fund). In July 1950, the US provided

more on educational assistance and there was an establishment of Education College in 1954 (School of Public Administration: Thammasart-the researcher). Critically, it deep-rootedly Americanized philosophy and educational organization in the Thai society. Americanizing process over the Thai society through educational organization was so successful and allowed the Thai elites to accept the US values and cultures.

The process of applying the policy through the central agencies established by the recommendation of the WB teamwork with the public personnel and the scholars sponsored to study abroad particularly in USA became the prominent players playing the roles of the process to stipulate public policy, particularly economy. At the same time, the central agencies like the Office of National Economic Development Council and Bureau of the Budget are the mechanism to coordinate and to apply the policy from the international organizations to drive through recommendations in the study report. In addition, the consultancies and condition loan indicated Thailand to follow the recommendations and the study report. In association with the public personnel graduated from abroad attached to the School of Thought as the approach of the international organizations, particularly doctor of public administration, economics, the School of Neoclassical Economics and the School of Keynesian Economics, study report, condition loan, public personnel and scholars graduated from abroad all are linked and influencing in stipulate the policy of developing Thailand by being based on development administration. This included politics of exchanging benefits between the government leaders aimed to stabilize their government.

To conclude, the concept to development administration comes from the political factors attracting the entry of the US to have influence over economy which Thailand has not open laissez-fair economy to meet foreign investments. A mechanism is to improve administration, which is focused on institution in order to be the mechanism to coordinate in stipulating policy and to apply the policy of World Bank and USA. They also use study report and consultancies, and the public agencies. The benefit of USA is exchanged by the political leaders for their political benefits. Therefore, the administration development is just an activity demanded to improve capabilities to meet the economic investment rather than building capabilities of the Thai bureaucracy as in the real purpose.

5.2.2 Factors influencing to indicate New Public Management of Thailand

They are 1) the economic crisis in 1997 and 2) the administrative decision-making as details below.

Though the NPM is focused on promoting the private sector roles in public services and adopting the managerial tools, the private technique of management to be used in the public sector, this concept has already been in the first National Economic Development Plan (1961-1966) such as privatization. It has been developed respectively. However, the NPM was constructively used after the 1997-crisis as following details.

1. Economy

Due to 1997-economic crisis, the economic situation in Thailand during 1998 brought 2 million jobless. Consumption spending was immobile and taxation of the government was dim. Public sector has then cut fiscal budget down to 800,000 million Baht or 13.5% (Bangkok Bank 1998, cited by Yutthana Waroonpititkul and Supista Rerngjit, 1999). Impacts were:

1) Unnecessary public agencies were dissolved on reasons of public sector budget saving. It was like downsizing particularly the foreign agencies, which represented various ministries such as Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Industry and Ministry of Education including the Thai Embassy located in non-strategic locations (Prayote Songklin, 2008).

2) Privatization was carried out by the condition loan from IMF evidently found in the seven LOIs (Letters of Intent) to seek assistance in academics and IMF. There was enactment of the State enterprise fund Act BE 2542 (1999) emphasizing transfers of the state missions to private sector, reduction of monopoly and welcomed competition. Another Act was Foreign Business Act Be 2542 (1999) allowing competition and reducing monopoly (Prayote Songklin, 2008). The constructive performances were 1) the master plan of privatization, 2) privatization of Bangkok Petroleum Limited (Plc.) and Thai Airways Limited (Plc.) (Lerphong Yaemkot, 2004).

3) Public Sector Reform was backed by World Bank under the project of Public Sector Reform Loan-PSRL for 400 M\$ leading to planning its reform in 1999.

Reforms were focused on 1) shift of roles, mission and administration approach of the public sector, 2) changing system of budget, finance and procurement, 3) changing personnel administration system, 4) law amendments, and 5) shifts of cultures, values and adopting RBM (result-based management) under the project of Administrative Renewal Project (Prayote Songklin, 2008).

2. Administrative decision-making

The decision-making particularly during the administration of Dr. Thaksin Shinnawatr (2001-2006) was systematic under the guide of NPM (Bowornwathana, 2008; Painter, 2006; Payote Songklin, 2008). There were the government policies and strategic plans of bureaucratic development 2003-2007. Being the targets and having the legal tool of the Royal Decree on Criteria and Procedures for Good Governance BE 2546 (2003), it included mechanism to drive the bureaucracy development through the Public Sector Development Commission (PDC) and its office as the permanent organization stipulated in the Public Administration Act (Copy 5) BE 2545 (2002) to improve the administration. Consequences were performance agreement, PMQA: Public Sector Management Quality Award, RBM: result-based Management, public organization, e-government, and privatization.

The critical causes leading Dr. Shinnawatr to focus on bureaucracy development based on RBM was explained by Bowornwathana (2004) that causes were 1) his success and wealth and his family from telecommunication industry and mobile phone business made him confident in business approach. 2) Such business kingdom made him CEO, so he deployed RBM to drive the country as the national CEO. 3) Trend and movements of NPM were internationally accepted particularly by international organization such a WB, and UN. 4) Confuses of business knowledge to be applied in public sector allow the government to pick up any tools by his wants amid the turmoil of the knowledge including the shift of power in the hands of the executive politicians and top civil servants to his hands.

In addition, from a study of factors influencing the stipulation of New Public Management (NPM); it was found that the claims of USA and WB since 1950 and the condition loan of the IMF in 1997 revealed that they had the same aim: need the Thai government to use lasses-fair economic market, allowing private sector to

replace public sector. For example, there were the Industry Promotion Act BE 2497 (1954) during the administration of Field Marshall P. Phibunsongkram (1948-1957) but no constructive action was taken. There was also the Industrial Investment Act BE 2503(1960) during the administration of Field Marshall Sarit Thanarat (1959-1963) with incentive measures for foreign investors. In addition, there were examples to reveal the backdrop of the concept of development administration when the US wanted Thailand to employ the opened economic policy to replace the closed economic policy exercised through 140 state-owned enterprises. Witness was Field Marshall Thanarat met President Eisenhower and team in May 7, 1958 to support him to political power in Thailand. He announced the anti-communism policy and laissez-faire economic policy as the exchanges (Ukkris Pattamanont, 1985). It is seen that the proposals of USA and International organization during 1957 are adhered to development administration. During 1997, it is adhered to NPM without different target for four decades. It is the demand that Thailand has to use laissez-faire economic policy, private sector promotion, reducing roles of public sector particularly what have done by the state enterprises. It is just having different approaches. The School of Development Administration claims the Thai public sector to promote private sector-oriented policy through incentive measures for private investments while the state has to provide infrastructures and fundamental utilities.

During the phenomena of driving the School of NPM in the 1997-crisis; IMF provided condition loan of privatization for Thailand and to draft a master plan to reform the state enterprises and the State Enterprise Fund Act BE 2542 (1999). Therefore, it is seen that actually, the target behind both drives of the Thai bureaucratic reform for four decades is similar but different pattern. The first drive is through development administration and demands Thailand to welcome foreign investors to play economic roles specified in the build-in model of NPM: business-based public sector and privatization. Consequently, the Keynesian-based development administration and the Neoclassical Economics-based NPM contradict with the Thai phenomenon. In fact, the international organizations attempt to drive laissez-faire market since 1957 through the School of Development Administration and not during the NPM thoughts proposed by many scholars. For example, Chakrabarty and Chand (2012) mentioned that Keynesian is an instrumental theory for

administration and the popular government while it has strongly influenced the development administration model during 1950s and 1960s.

5.2.3 Factors influencing good governance stipulation

Good governance came to life firstly in 1989 in the report on Sub-Saharan Africa: from crisis to sustainable growth (Somboon Siriprachai, 2007). This report identifies the failure in developing Africa from erring strategization. Governments of the African countries focus on modernization through copying the western models but shortage of modification, industrial investment designs, abandonment of agriculture, distorted state interventions without entrepreneurial skill and least support the grassroots. The report further identifies that there is top-down approach, which disheartened the collaboration between people and the public sector (World Bank, 1989:3). In the same report, WB proposes seven 1990s strategies. 1) It is to restructure the African products particularly the budget increase for human resource, the investment of advancement development and sustainable evaluation. 2) The development strategy demands for people-centered, resource development orientation and basic needs. 3) Capacity creation demands the institutional reforms with all public sector levels including the supports from private sector, private development organizations and allowing the women groups to play more roles in economic and social development. 4) It is to create environment to facilitate private investment with infrastructure. 5) It is to overcome the weakness of agro-products, the increase of population, agro-researches, reinforcing the strength with family planning, and environment mission planning. 6) It needs regional integration and collaboration on trades, labor, education and natural resource management. Finally, 7) it needs persistent in special programs to help Africa in decade-round (World Bank, 1989). Leftwich (1993; cited in Somboon Siriprachai, 2007) explains the original rationale of governance that they come from four elements, i.e., 1) experiences of loaning under the project of economic restructuring, 2) the supports of neo-liberalist capitalism, 3) the collapse of communism, and 4) democracy promotion in the developing countries.

In the case of Thailand, the factors influencing the formulation of governance are 1) politics: the demand of civil sector on political reform after Black

May 1992 and 2) the influence of international organizations on supporting governance particularly after the 1997-economic crisis.

5.2.3.1 Politics: the demand of civil sector on political reform after Black May 1992

The Constitution BE 2540 (1997) is the key demanding for the application of governance specifically to allow the political spaces for people's involvement and the review of exercising government power through various institutions, i.e. the Constitutional Court, the Administrative Court, the administrative corruption and dishonesty, the political impeachment by the senate, the criminal proceedings in The Supreme Court's Criminal Division for Holders of Political Positions. This includes the reviews of exercising power affecting people, i.e. Institution of the Ombudsman of Parliament, the National Human Rights Commission. It is corresponded with Brewer (2003) indicating that there are at least two reasons leading to the paradigm shift in the Thai bureaucracy. They are 1) the Constitution BE 2540 (1997) that transit the Thai politics to the principles of good governance, accountability, predictability, transparency and participation. The most essential things are the institution framework by the government and the links with public services and it is evident that it links with the modern participatory principles. 2) It need not increase the institution capacity of people to participate in politics. Brewer concludes that restructuring and re-systematizing might display the paradigm shift to good governance in Thailand. He further explains that the Constitution BE 2540 (1997) institutionalizes and leverages good governance which links to responsibility and transparency through instituting the National Anti-Corruption Commission, the Office of the Auditor General of Thailand, the Constitutional Court and the Administrative Court and the Office of the Ombudsman of Parliament. It is corresponded with Bowornwathana (2000: 394), Bowornwathana and Poocharoen (2010) who view that the major drive in applying good governance in Thailand is the Constitution BE 2540 (1997) which reduces the power of the executive politicians (ministers) and the civil personnel but indirectly increasing power for citizen to monitor and to follow-up through new governance institution or NGO according to the Constitution. Bowornwathana (2008) further explains that in the time closed to the administration of Chuan Leekpai (1997-2000); TDRI (Thailand Development Research Institution) has

been asked to prepare a blueprint of good governance in public sector by Anant Panayalachun. The blueprint is called “Good Governance” to replace “state governance” and the name is used until today. Late the blueprint of TDRI has been improved by the Prime Minister Office regulation on the Social and Good Governance BE 2542(1999) and it later become the Royal Decree on Criteria and Good Governance BE 2546 (2003) in the administration of Dr. Thaksin Shinnawatr (2001-2006). It is corresponded with Mutebi (2009) who explains that creating good governance especially transparency and responsibility through the Constitution BE 2540 (1997) through instituting NGO to maintain balances and controls the administrative power. Reasons of political administration reform by enacting the Constitution BE 2540 (1997) is after Black May 1992 and people demand political reform. Such political reform is meant to design political restructure and re-system to focus on participatory politics rather that representation as in the past. It is corresponded with the opinion of Seksan Prasertkul (2005) saying that the climate after Black May 1992 is the key to extensively arouse political integrity of people, particularly on the government politics. It is focused on decentralization and expansion of democracy to grassroots. Such climate facilitates civil politics. The movement such as the democracy league and NGO and the opinion of scholars and the erudite of democracy intensely take actions. It is corresponded with Brewer (2003:186) that the Constitution BE 2540 (1997) displays the trends of the paradigm shift in the Thai politics into the framework of governance and integration of the participatory element in the public sector’s services. Ockey (2004) also indicates that though the Constitution BE 2540 (1997) is extensively supported as being the civil constitution but most supports are from the activists, scholars and the middle classes of various families and the middle class in Bangkok. The ordinary individuals less involve in the process of enacting the Constitution.

Though the Black May 1992 is constructive in the resistance of people who are dissatisfied with the junta who seize the power of the administration of Gen. Chartchai Chunnahawan in 1991 claiming the corruption of politicians; at the same time, the coup council who forms the government does not create confidence to society as it has claimed. It is displayed that the corrupted politicians are still in the junta government and not even including the behavior of dishonest for the country,

which is used to pave way to power. Such incident dissatisfied society particularly the middle class in Bangkok. However, Seksan Prasertkul (2005) explains the cause leading to Black May 1992 and the enactment to f the Constitution BE 2540 (1997) as follows. The weakness of the Thai democracy in the context of the Thai historical heritage and culture are characterized in the patrol and client relationship in association with authoritarianism by the military elites ever since 1947. It leads to the allocation of the economic and social resources to their own network even during the time of the coup and the later during the time of politicians in order to seek gains for political loyalty among people. The patronage relation heritage is then not convergent with the merit system, impersonal and regulation-oriented, which is the bureaucratic model of Max Weber. At the same time, the power structure and relation are characterized with high centralization and hierarchy of top-down among the central agencies and the line agencies both from the central lines to the regional lines. It also includes bureaucrats who command people where the patronage system, centralization, top command and the economic-social discrimination affect their unfair allocations on gain seeking of the elites (politicians, civil personnel and military), nepotism. Jurisprudence is resisted while being irresponsible or ignorant to the people's troubles. All these issues lead to the demand for political reform for people's direct participation. After Black May 1992 leading to the enactment of the Constitution BE 2540 (1997), it attempts to accept the rights of people regarding the rights of political participation, citizen rights, human rights and the establishment of institutions to check the illegitimate power and impacts on people.

5.2.3.2 The influences of the international organizations about the supports of good governance particularly the public sector reform after the 1997 - economic crisis

After the 1997-economic crisis, Thailand pleads monetary and academic assistance from IMF in order to recover the Thai economic system and other loans from the international organization and foreign countries such as World Bank, ADB and Japan government and so on. The 400M\$ loan has been used in bureaucracy reform under good governance and public service delivery under the public sector reform loan (PSRL). This project began in October 1999 and ended in 2001, which were focused on three issues, i.e. 1) the performance-based resource management,

2) better service delivery, and 3) greater accountability and transparency. Later in 2002-2006, there was a project of the Country Development Partnership on Governance and Public Sector Reform (CPD-G). The project was budgeted by the WB network and focused on income management, the public sector spending, result-base management, decentralization, responsibility creation, transparency and public sector inspections from NGO and civil sector. The improvement of good governance of Thailand was influenced by WB supports reading loan sources and techniques. WB permitted loan with condition of proving the public sector under the concept of good governance. The WB assistance came for the currency value crisis of Thailand in 1997, which the international organizations and foreign government provided assistance. World Bank played the leading role to improve the Thai public administration. It is corresponded with Somboon Siriprachai (2007) that after the 1997-monetary crisis in Asia, WB and IMF played the key roles in driving good governance agenda in to the global agenda. They find that the monetary crisis in Asia arose because these countries run short of good governance. With reason above both organizations proposed global governance, which tried to drive countries around Asia and other countries to follow good governance. The above relationship is corresponded with Suphawan Plainoy (2002) that the Black May lower the faith of people toward their government regarding economy and social. At the same time, the 1997-economic crisis was also accelerating social transition.

In conclusion, factors influencing the formulation of good governance in Thailand are the Black May 1992 arousing the integrity of civil sector, private development organizations demanding political administration reform on decentralization, political participation and the 1997-economic crisis is the key driver. They are not only affecting economy, and individual survival but also the weakness of people. The situations above are the accelerators to turn to reinforcing the community dynamism, which lead to the concept of good governance by policy and enacted in the Constitution BE 2540 (1997) including the eight National Economic and Social Development Plan (2001-2005).

5.3 Innovation under Public Administration after Bureaucracy Reform 2003

It was divided into three types, i.e. 1) institutional innovations such as establishing the Office of Public Sector Development Commission (OPDC), public organization and Service Delivery Unit (SDU). 2) It was organizational innovation by applying it as a tool for administration such as RBM (result-based management), PSO (Thailand International Public Sector Standard Management System and Outcomes), PMQA (Public Sector Management Quality Award), performance management, knowledge management, best practices, reward system, and CEO Governors. 3) it was the process innovation which are service link, government counter service and e-Government.

In conclusion, innovations applied with the bureaucracy development of Thai. All begin and stipulate by the OPDC, and most innovations applied is organizational innovation, which is to focus on introducing or applying an instrument/tools as the core approach.

5.4 Limitations in Applying Innovation in the Thai bureaucracy in the Case of Result-based Management (RBM) Particularly in Applying Performance Agreement in Bureaucracy Development

Thailand has employed RBM since 1999 and allocated in the public sector development in 1999. During the administration of Dr. Thaksin Shinawatr (2001-2006); the OPDC was established while amending the Public Administration (Copy 5) BE 2002 aimed at RBM. In addition, for best practices, he issued a Royal Decree on Criteria and Procedures for Good Governance BE 2546 (2003). He also prepared strategic planning on the Thai Bureaucracy Development 2003-2008. The laws and strategies above are the important tools to develop bureaucracy through adopting various administrative innovations to develop bureaucracy and one of them is RBM (result-based management).

The concept of RBM involves two parts, i.e. 1) strategic planning and performance measurement. The OPDC modified the Balance Scorecard (BSC) for

implementation and it is divided into four dimensions; 1) effectiveness, service quality, efficiency, and organizational development. The important tools supporting internal measurement under the concept of BAC were performance agreement (PA) or the OPDC called “performance certification”. It began in 2004 under the approval of the Cabinet in September 30, 2003 on principles and the details of approach and the method of building incentive to invigorate good governance introduced by the OPDC.

The application of RBM in the Thai public sector was divided into two parts by the OPDC. 1) The Performance Agreement Commission, which was the same commission of OPDC, and 2) the Performance Negotiation Commission, which was divided into 20 ministries with 3-5 members to take action on negotiation with public agencies. In addition, the OPDC provided the Central Measurement Framework (CMF) to be as the main framework in the performance measurement and prepared also the First Performance Agreement Draft or called “indicators” for 20 ministries and more than 140 departments, which includes the provincial offices and universities, too.

The CMF essence has been modified from BSC measurement, which all public agencies must apply as the commitment by endorsing the PA. It contains four dimensions, i.e. 1) effectiveness – the measurement is targeted on the public agencies by strategic plans or the annual public action plan targeted by ministerial levels, mission group levels, departmental levels and outcomes by budgeting documents. 2) Service quality –it is divided into the satisfaction survey conducted with service recipients and the annual budget saving, participation of people, and ant-corruption. 3) efficiency – it involves budget saving, and reduction of red-tape. 4) Organizational development – it involves knowledge management, It management, risk management, change management, blueprint for change, and PMQA. They are all modified from Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award (MBNQA). It includes also law development plans, there are rise and fall in each year of the tools allocated in the central framework for measurement but their essence is relatively the same.

When the CMF has been announced, the OPDC will formulate the indicators of the performance agreement in 20 ministries and more than 140 departments including the provincial offices and universities, too. After that, it will be the negotiation between the negotiation committee and the public agencies. Then it enters the common endorsement by line of command. It begins with the Prime

Minister with Ministers, followed by ministers with the permanent secretaries. Then the permanent secretaries endorsed with director – generals as the chief of the departmental levels. This is the overview of the process and steps in RBM, which the Thai bureaucracy aims at their measurements under the concept of BSC prioritizing with the agreement tool called the performance agreement (PA).

This study shows the challenges and limitations OF RBM as follows:

5.4.1 The indicators of performance agreement are irrelevant the goal of organization

The Central Performance Agreement Framework (CPAF) is the core of performance agreement in the Thai bureaucracy and the important condition leading to goal setting in the annual public action plans under the BSC measurement framework. It contains four dimensions, i.e. effectiveness, service quality, efficiency and organizational development.

The OPDC stipulates the performance framework and proposes through the central agency called “The Agreement and Evaluation Supervisory Commission”. Then it will be further introduced to the line agencies involving 20 ministries and more than 140 departments including the provincial offices and universities. The OPDC will also stipulate the indicators in the PA Draft for each agency and introduces these indicators for negotiation with various agencies. It becomes the important document for the negotiation between two parties. The CPAF and the KPI Draft from the OPDC disharmonize with the performance targets and objectives as well as the situation of the problem and the needs of each agency. Though there is negotiation to stipulate the organizational result target but the CPAF and the KPI Draft are all indicated from the OPDC since the beginning. The researcher has analyzed the problems, limitations and causes through examining the structure of committee and the content of CPAF as below.

5.4.1.1 The structure of the Supervisory Committee for Preparing Agreement and Evaluation

The committee takes full duty to stipulate the criteria of negotiation, target, method of evaluation and incentive but this committee has the same members from the OPDC (OPDC, 2003). There are 14 members involving four

parties, i.e., 1) Politics – the Prime Minister chairs the OPDC and the Deputy Prime Minister is the deputy chairperson. 2) A civil personnel: the Permanent Secretary of the Office of the Prime Minister is the chairperson and decentralizes the power to the local administration. 3) the experts – there are 10 experts divided into 7 disciplines of laws, economics, political sciences, public administration, finance, psychology and social sciences. Finally, 4) the OPDC acts as secretary by all the commission members work as part-time excepted 3-5 experts selected to work fulltime.

With the structural elements of the Agreement and Evaluation Committee, stipulating CPAF of 20 ministries, more than 140 departments, the provincial offices and universities, there is an absence of key player: line agencies, i.e. ministries, ministerial affairs, and departments which do not involve in the CPAF and do not involve in the committee structure. The CPAF is then stipulated by the OPDC and proposed through the committee for approval before ordering each agency for practices; therefore, the practices of the OPDC are distorted from the performance agreement. Locke and Latham (1990, cited in O'Donnell & Turner, 2005: 618) explain that preparing the performance agreement is then focused on negotiation with the involvement of the personnel related. The CPAF lacks the players of the line agencies and it is the one-side stipulation, and absence of discussions with the stakeholders. The performance agreement is centralized within the OPDC and the Agreement and Evaluation Committee. It is then a cause the evaluations unfit with problem situation and the organizational needs which are the organizational goals to improve performance. It contradicts with the implementation of the British performance agreement. James (2004) explains that the administrative agencies will prepare the Public Service Agreement Documents Draft in order to discuss and argue with the personnel of the Ministry of Finance (the performance agreement in England is responsible by the Ministry of Finance), which will prepare the details of the performance agreement for the administrative agencies. The personnel of the Ministry of Finance negotiate priority with the personnel of the line agencies rather than imposing orders even the Ministry of Finance is authorized to stipulate objectives and goals. In addition, if considering the process of applying innovation in the public sector; Sheppard (1967, cited in Bland, Bruk, Kim and Lee, 2010) explains that there are three steps, i.e. 1) idea generation, 2) acceptance and implementation. Bland et al.

(2010) find that applying innovation in the public sector is met with limitations particularly of the scatter and understanding. They advocate that in the step of idea generation, it should be opened, diverse and decentralized or structure looseness or low formalization.

The findings are corresponded with Albury (2005 cited in Patel (2006) who indicates a limitation in applying innovation with public sector. It creates over trust with a small group of people as the source of innovation. It is also corresponded with McCort (2002) who finds limitations in applying NPM with the developing countries: centralization of the central agency. It lacks decentralization which is the foundation concept of NPM because the central agency is worried about the loss of their power and their top-down approach. Similarly, Painter (2004, 2005, cited in Haque, 2007) argue about the limitations of the Thai government administration that it comes from the top civil personnel who oppose reform fearing to lose their power in the bureaucracy. Monkol (2012) indicates that the public agencies of Thailand partly apply the reform policy of NPM particularly the professionalism but they lack the reform of public culture and value. The environments of the Thai public sector are different from the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), particularly its centralization and corruption, which are deep – rooted and spread within the Thai public sector. OECD (1995, cited in Borin, 2002) emphasizes that the NPM is targeted to support the culture adhered to performance culture in the term of decentralization.

5.4.1.2 Content of Central Performance Agreement Framework

The OPSDC specifies the single content of evaluation as the central criteria for 20 ministries and more than 140 departments. It is irrelevant to the problem situation and the need which are the organizational goals. It is inflexible and too many indicators. The researcher has used the central evaluation documents called “*the Manual of Evaluation on Performance by Performance Agreement*” Years 2005, 2006 and 2007 as the foundation for reviews but focuses only on the line agencies as details below:

1. The contents of the CPAF are divided into four dimensions and their indicators are as follows:

1.1 The indicators of effectiveness contain the indicators of performance according to the strategic plans or the action plans, mission groups and administrative agencies or departments.

1.2 The indicators of the service quality are focused on surveying satisfaction of the service recipients, participation of people on bureaucracy development, transparency and anti-corruption and dishonesty.

1.3 The indicators of efficiency are focused on the measurement of budgeting management in terms of saving and reimbursement, energy saving and reducing red-tape.

1.4 The indicators of organizational development are focused on applying innovation/tool with bureaucracy. They are knowledge management, ICT, Change management and HRD, Public Sector Management Quality Award) (PMQA) and risk management.

The CPAF will negotiate just only one dimension: effectiveness whereas other three dimensions will be compulsory for 20 ministries, more than 140 departments to fulfill. Meaning, all public agencies can negotiate only on the dimension of effectiveness and the negotiation is under the indicators prepared by the OPDC based on the organizational strategies. On the contrary, the rest indicators of other three dimensions are forced to fulfill by the OPDC.

Such phenomenon shows that the similar indicators are stipulated for every line agency by the central agency. It is one size fits all for all 20 ministries and more than 140 departments. Also, they are inflexible for application. The researcher finds that the indicators are irrelevant to the needs and the situational problems of the organizations, which play different roles, and each legal mission, e.g. the security unit, the economic groups, the social groups and the justice administration groups and so on. The limitations then contradict with the principles of the performance agreement, which intends to support and create clarity in working between the achievement goals of the organization and achievement of the line agencies where they are linked. The goal of the organizational achievement will be disseminated to the goal of line agencies. Therefore, if the line agencies achieve their goals; the achievement would also drive to achieve the organizational goals (GAO, 2000 cited in O'Donnell & Turner, 2005).

The problems arisen in applying RBM in Thailand in the part of performance agreement are the organizational goals because of using the indicators, which are not their real goals but stipulated by the OPDC as the central agency and enforced all public agencies to fulfill particularly the dimensions of service quality, efficiency and organizational development. They are irrelevant to the needs/situational problems/organizational expectations.

With such phenomenon, the limitations of CPAF are the irrelevancy to the goals, needs and the situational problems of the central agency itself. Curiosity: why is the evaluation by the performance agreement stipulated by the central agency or the OPDC to the line agencies: 20 ministries and more than 140 departments irrelevant to the situational problems, needs for correction or organizational development, which are the organizational targets? The researcher finds two critical limitations as below.

1.1 Absence of participation stipulating evaluation frame

The annual performance evaluation is specified by the OPDC and proposed for approval from the “Agreement and Evaluation Committee” and found that the OPDC specification lacks the participation from other sectors particularly the line agencies who are key actors in its application. They have no opportunities to involve in preparing the evaluation, which is irrelevant to the goals and the needs of the organization. It includes the stipulation of the KPI Draft of each ministry, ministerial affairs and departments. Then, it is later found that the OPDC has been the only one who specifies the indicators, too. Though, these indicators are used in negotiation with the negotiation and agreement committee and administrative agency representatives of each ministry; the study shows that the negotiation adheres to the indicators stipulated by the OPDC without change. Locke and Latham (1990 cited in O’Donnell and Turner, 2005) comment that targeting performance agreement will support Participative Approach to Negotiation of Performance Agreement. It is corresponded with Borins (2001) indicating that impacts, which fail innovation, come from rigid central agency controls, which restrict the public personnel’s innovation.

1.2 Distortion of Performance Agreement

The OPDC provides performance agreement as a tool to drive innovation and administrative tools/techniques, which is beyond the principle or the

intention of the performance agreement. Meaning, if the OPDC wants to apply innovation and administrative tools/techniques; they will be allocated in the performance of the organizational development. For example, in 2005, knowledge management, IT management and change management have been used. In 2006, knowledge management, IT management, change management and HR development were used. In 2007, administration techniques were added and they involved knowledge management, human capital management, IT management and Public Sector Management Quality Award (PMQA). They were modified from Malcolm Baldrige National Award (MBNQA) from the US, Thailand Quality Award (TQA) and risks management. In addition, as above, it shows that the tool: performance agreement has been used to drive innovation and administrative tools/techniques for applying with the public agencies. Therefore, the performance agreement becomes the tool used in driving new administrative techniques to develop organization. This is critical and distorts the applications of performance agreement for the PA principles, as below.

1.2.1 Principle of Performance Agreement becomes the key organization goal only and the target links to the personnel performance. Meaning, success of achieving the target by the personnel would drive the success of an organization, too. Therefore, adopting the performance agreement tool to drive innovation, the administrative tools/techniques in the Thai bureaucracy has been distorted from the PA principle. The US General Accounting Office (GAO) (2000) explains that the PA principle is a tool to improve the organizational performance and responsibility. It will link the annual performance target and activities intended to be achieved as in the organization goal, breaking the cross function and achieving the managerial expectations. O'Donnell & Turner (2005) explain that the PA concurrence is the goal-setting, which involves specific objective, clarity, and measurability while being responsive to key job responsibilities and competencies. It is witnessed then that the practices of the central agency attempting to apply the modern administrative techniques or tools by allocating in the performance agreement are distorted from the PA principle because they are not the core target of each line agency.

1.2.2 The OPDC attempts to instrumentalize PA as the driver of innovation, and the administrative tools or techniques for its uses in the

public agencies. On the contrary, in practices the centralization in creating innovation and top-down approach cannot reach the target. By reason, the process of applying innovation and the administrative tools or techniques relies on the implementation process and cannot be through allocating in the performance agreement and demand 20 ministries and more than 140 departments to follow by using top-down approach. Due to applying the principle of innovation for public sector development demands it application process rather that centralized stipulation in the OPDC as it is the current approach. Shepard, (1967 cited in Bland, Bruk, Kim and Lee, 2010) advocates the innovation implementation in the public sector requiring three steps, i.e. 1) idea generation, 2) acceptance and 3) implementation. He proposes an approach to build idea generation that it should be opened, diverse and decentralized or having structure looseness or low formalization. In addition, Mulgan and Albury (2003 cited in Micheli, Schoeman, Baxter and Goffin, 2012) indicate limitations to apply innovation in the public sector. Besides being the resistance to change, risk aversion, it includes hierarchical structure. It is corresponded with Duivenboden and Thaens (2008) saying that supporting innovation culture within public administration, it needs to change the government role from the hierarchical line, top-down steering, and self-producing into the facilitator of co-productive and problem-oriented partner.

Therefore, it is witnessed that applying innovation or administrative techniques with the public sector is a process with steps of concept building, acceptance and implementation. Each step has its own different practices. Therefore, the practices of the OPDC, which centralizes the innovation, demand scholars in the educational institutions to study details and preparing handbooks. When the innovation is released, it will be allocated in the performance agreement by applying top-down approach and the line agencies are demanded 20 ministries and more than 140 departments to workout. But it is likely met the above limitations both in the absence of cooperation to stipulate innovation, absence of cooperation in negotiation and lading to rejection of the innovation concept or administrative techniques and bias to apply the performance agreement. It is corresponded with the study of O'Donnell and Turner (2005) investigating the application of the performance agreement with the Vanuatu and some limitations have been found from goal-setting, less flexible and opening gate for negotiation in stipulating less

appropriate performance goal. It is corresponded with the study of Greenberg (1996) cited in O'Donnell and Turner (2005) proposing that the public personnel should be added more perspectives in specifying the performance criteria with fairness. The public personnel are required to involve with the awareness of design, negotiation and implementation.

1.3 Too much contents of performance agreement

Not only the OPDC will apply performance agreement by using a tool to drive innovation, and administrative tool or technique but also there are other stipulations unrelated to the target achievement of the agencies, i.e. energy saving and law development and so on. The indicators of Performance Agreement Framework are divided into four dimensions and there are too many indicators. With such data, it is found that there were 14 indicators in 2005 and they have been increased into 20 indicators in 2006 but reduced into 17 indicators in 2007 (The OPDC, 2005, 2006, and 2007). In practices, the researcher exemplifies the Office of the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Justice, which is a department and it is one twenty department. There were 22 indicators in 2005 and increased into 34 in 2006 but reduced to 26 indicators in 2007 (excluded sub-indicators). Consequently, it is seen that there are too many indicators are the sub-indicators and they are not related to the core target of the agencies and disable to bring productivity success to the agencies. Large number of indicators come from the specification and wants of the OPDC but irrelevant with the target of the agencies. They could also come from using indicators as the innovation drivers, which demand each agency to specify large number of indicators but they do not reflect the success of the agency. Certainly, too many indicators twice affect the agency performance, i.e. 1) the loss of resources on time, personnel and budget to prepare the indicators in each year which require to collect data and evidences for report references with each indicator and it has to report within six-month round, nine-month round and twelve-month round. 2) Not only the indicators are irresponsive to the agency target, they are also creating confuses to the main target and the implementation. Such problems are corresponded with the study of O'Donnell and Turner (2005) indicating that the performance agreement applied with Vanuatu have been allocated with diverse objectives while added with sub-objectives which disable to separate their importance and the unimportance.

In the case of Spitzer (2007) explains on measuring too much, i.e. currently, some organizations conduct extreme measurement which is too much called measurement dysfunction. Another model is to measure too little. Measuring the wrong thing or unnecessary things leads to high cost and confusion rather than clarity to be arisen within an organization. It is corresponded with the study of World Bank (World Bank, 2011) investigating RBM in Thailand and indicates that the RBM indicators is specified with overproduction of KPIs and explains that the number of RBM indications is difficult to be measured. They have been used in many tools and their scopes are likely wide. Counting the indicators by average, they are in the BSC tool, which they must be reported to the OPDC at 20 indicators per an organization. If sum up at 20 ministries and 140 departments; they will be around 3,000 indicators. Besides, there are another 37 measurement under PART (Performance Assessment Rating Tool), which contains more than 3,000 indicators and they have to be collected and reported to the Bureau of the Budget.

5.4.1.3 The process-focused indicators

Some indicators are specified to measure the process and they are modeled in milestone or output measurement rather than outcome. By the RBM principle for example, the indicators begin with “Level of Achievement” are characterized with 1) the committee formulation, 2) meeting not less than two times, 3) meeting not less than six times, 4) summary of analysis, and 5) report to the management. It is counted that “report to the management” is the final success of the indicator. Such specification is then so distant from the RBM target and never helps solving the organizational problems. It is corresponded with the study of Punyaratabandhu and Unger (2008) on Managing Performance in A Context of Political Clientelism: The Case of Thailand during 1997-2007. The results evidently show that the success estimation by RBM in Thailand is just measuring output rather than outcome

In conclusion, there is no involvement in negotiation in designing the indicators and they are not raised for discussion in identifying target, solving problems and to improve performance, which is the core of performance agreement. On the contrary, it is found that it is the discussion of fixed evaluation from the central agency. Without authentic participation, the bias of the PA tool is

used to drive new administrative technique, which is not only having poor relation with the organization but also affecting the increasing number of the indicators and burdening the agency for collection and preparing reports to the OPDC. The critical impacts by the researcher's views are some indicators have been stipulated irrelevantly with the agency's authority, its problems and its needs of improving its performances. Following the indicators would be the success according to the PA indicators but such success has no relationship with solving problem in the agency and its improvement. In summary, the agency might be successful by target but the agency's problems still exist and are not solved.

5.4.2 Implementation Process

It is processed as below.

5.4.2.1 Centralization and to-down approach

The above process is the centralization and the measurement is stipulated by the central agency while employing top-down approach. Even though there is negotiation but it is adhered to the indicator drafted by the OPDC. Practically, in the measurement scope of the four dimensions, it is found that only effectiveness is negotiated which involves the indicator of working out to achieve the ministerial and the departmental strategies only. Other three dimensions: service quality, efficiency and the agency development are compulsory to be carried out. The researcher is certain that the process involvement in stipulating target does not come from the needs and expectation of the personnel. Consequently, to build the sense of ownership in the indicators as in the performance agreement is impossible because the process of drafting indicators is without participation but just centralization and with top-down approach. It contradicts with preparing performance agreement, which O'Donnell & Turner (2005: 618) explain that stipulating target will support Participative Approach to Negotiation of Performance Agreement.

Centralization and top-down approach are unique in the Thai bureaucracy since the past until present. Hagensick (2513) explains the limitations to restructure the Thai bureaucracy because it is demanded from the centralized agencies within the Prime Minister Office and the Office of the National Economic and Social Development Commission. Chai-anant Samuthwanich (1998) assert there is

centralization in the central agencies that since 1961, the bureau of the Budget and the National Economic and Social Development Commission become the core agencies to control other agencies under the scope of considering budget. Brewer (2003), and Rigg, 1991) identify that the Thai bureaucracy exists high hierarchical centralization. The study of McCort (2002) shows that the centralization of the central agency, exercising top-down approach, corruption, public naïve are the sheer limitations to apply NPM in the developing countries. Borins (1995, cited in Borins, 2002) similarly explains that the major characteristics of NPM are autonomy particularly less controls from the central agencies. Centralization in the central agency as it responsibility but another 20 ministries and 140 departments are eroded with inefficiency in working and counseling. Moreover, exercising top-down approach creates impacts of knowledge and the understanding of the middle manager and frontline about the origin, target, target links and approaches, which are important to the success and the acceptance of the personnel.

5.4.2.2 The RBM application and having overlapped administrative tools in the central agency

The administrative tools are overlapped in the central agency. They are the OPDC, Bureau of the Budget and the Civil Servant Office. The OPDC demands for the use of performance agreement (PA). The Bureau of the Budget demands the use of PART (Program Assessment Rating Tool), and the Civil Servant Office demands the use of HR-Scorecard. Their contents are relative with having target, indicators, measurement and trimester report to the central agencies. It means the line agencies (ministries, ministerial affairs and departments) have to fulfill the three instruments above even though the contents are relative and linking each other. If all these central agencies draft common and clear target and approach, the frontlines would not repeat in some works while having clear target and approach as well as lessening confusion while easing understanding. Rationally, some indicators, the frontlines have to report to the OPDC, Bureau of Budget and Civil Servant Office have relative contents.

In the issue of the instrumental overlapping between the above agencies, it is corresponded with the study of World Bank (World Bank, 2011) investigating the RBM application in Thailand by explaining that overlapping tools

with similar purpose, the central agencies have applied RBM with many approaches and with many agencies. There are 12 tools used in the central agencies, e.g. assess organizational aspect: strategic planning in PART (program assessment rating tool) and performance agreement or performance pay for individuals and agency. Such overlapping tools come from the Royal Decree on Criteria and Procedures for Good Governance BE 2546 (2003). It is the law stipulating roles and action taken by the central agencies in the RBM and its clarity taken by the central agencies to apply RBM but there is absence of discussion and cooperation among the central agencies. It is corresponded with the study of Marie, Holzer, Posner and Rubin (2006) indicating that the performance indicators by the Bureau of the Budget and the OPSDC are questioned on the differences of the indicators demanded by both agencies and they created confusion of their definitions and what they should be prioritized.

With such issues, Bowornwathana and Poocharoen (2010:) explain that the overlapping administrative tools proposed by the central agencies in Thailand become the central agencies' political instrument. They further explain that the administrative tools become the behavioral control of the line agencies and the central agencies incline to apply the innovation of managerial reform. These innovations leverage power of control and supervise the line agencies. In the case of Thailand, agencies of its applications are the Civil Servant Office has applied human resource management. The Bureau of the Budget applies performance-based budgeting with PART as its tool. The OPDC applies the concept of performance contract with indicators and balance scorecard. All these tools are expected to improve the efficiency of the line agencies demanding output and outcomes but the performance is distorted because the administrative tools applied for reform are not integrated in their thoughts or are not the formulating reform policy but disparity. Meaning, each agency differently think, and stipulate their reform tools. Therefore, applying the tools fails because they battle for leadership the public reform among the central agencies. In practices, PART and performance agreement/contract are rooted in the concept of evaluation. Their overlap affects the line agencies (20 ministries and 140 departments that feel confused and disappointed because they have to answer the similar question (report) from both central agencies. Such phenomena are corresponded with the study of Poocharoen (2005) revealing that before the

establishment of the OPDC, there was battles to dominate the reform policy between the Civil Servant Office and the Bureau of the Budget. After the establishment of the OPDC separated from the Civil Servant Office in 2002, the tension and battles to dominate the reform policy rose into three parties: the Civil Servant Office, the OPSDC and the Bureau of the Budget. The Civil Servant Office resists the OPDC on HR management. At the mean time, the OPDC resists the Bureau of the Budget on the entire reform policies particularly against PART and BSC. Their target of battle is to control the reform direction and movement. It affects the process of reform policy but creates absence of integration between the central agencies.

5.4.3 Other impacts

The study shows that besides problems and limitations of the RBM regarding the policy process; the application of the RBM affects other dimensions too.

5.4.3.1 Performance agreement affects the cooperation on less work and unfair allocation of incentives

Because of performance agreement is tied with the evaluation of beneficence; then the personnel focus only on what they are responsible. What are not involved, they will decline. For example, the data from interview, “These are not our indicators”. The cooperation and mutual assistance among groups, party or line agencies /offices will drop because the personnel are preoccupied with their own indicators. Petty jobs such as coordination to support other agencies, support request or job not indicated as the indicators because following the indicators links with incentives particularly individual and group bonus, the annual consideration of beneficence for salary increases and promotion. Such phenomenon makes personnel selfish and disunited and they become the barriers for internal cooperation and between agencies.

In addition, the process of working by the PA indicators requires teamwork, which the personnel cannot be ultimately responsible in some indicators alone. Therefore, applying the indicators with structural work requires teamwork for various parties to participate in the project on content and office affairs. However, this teamwork is differently remunerated. The rewarded such as individual bonus, salary increase or some agencies adopt it, as the criteria for promotion, will be

specially for individual listed for responsibility in the PA documents only even though they work together. When the r working process requires teamwork but rewards are differed; it becomes a cause affecting the cooperation and turns the work more difficult. It brings disunity and destroys work relationship, while bring less cooperation among the personnel in the agencies. All these come from the ill feeling of unfairness in working resulted from different incentive. Moreover, the unfair indicators by performance agreement are still questioned and worried in many aspects. For example 1), it is the different bonus between the executive and the personnel preparing the indicators. 2) There is no level of difference of the bonus level between the personnel preparing the indicators and the non-involved personnel. Moreover, 3) there are the differences of individual bonus in each type of agencies, i.e. public agencies, public organizations, NGOs, and regional administration organizations. For example, the director of the regional administration organizations earns bonus of 800-900 Baht a year while the executive of the sub-district administration organization earns many tens of thousands.

In summary, the unfair allocation of incentives in the public sector is suspicious at two levels. 1) it is within the agencies and it is divided into 1.1) the unfairness between the responsible teamwork on the indicators, 1.2) the unfairness between the executive and the individual who prepares the indicators, 1.3) the unfairness characterized on indifferent bonus between the personnel preparing the indicators and the personnel of non-involvement. 2) It is the level of unfairness between agencies, i.e. the public agencies and the local administrative organization. This unfairness of the personnel makes collaboration more difficult. It is corresponded with the study of Rhodes (1998, cited in Bowornwathana, 2000) on the Unexpected Effects in Applying New Public Management (NPM) in England. Rhodes finds that there is increased fragmentation, loss accountability, increased difficulties of coordination, and decline in public service ethics. It is corresponded with the study of Marsden and Richardson (1994), O'Donnell (1998, cited in O'Donnell and Turner, 2005) indicating that the top civil servants in Vanuatu believe the performance agreement is unfair from the ministers and the political advisors. It is corresponded with the findings in England and Australia that the personnel recognize the performance evaluation lacks justice in the process and such incident lowers moral

and motive. It is also corresponded the study of Mavhiki, Nyamwanza and Linnet (2013) on applying RBM in Zimbabwe. The results show that the public personnel lose faith in the government pay system. The government is remarked of its failure in performance relate pay. Its impacts of unfairness is explained by the study of Fehr et al. 2009; Camilleri and Heijden, (2007 cited in Bregen, 2013) that the performance relate pay has unfairly been evaluated. It might be turned into the mechanism of negative reaction particularly decreasing efficiency in work. In addition, there will be risk of unproductive reactions (passiveness). These risks arise with the personnel who feel they have been cheated or unfairly treated by the amount of money they should deserve on performance relate pay. The lead to the expression of indifference in the work and dissatisfaction would negatively affect the agency performance. Swiss (2005) recommends that the characteristic of effective incentive for results-based management involves two parts. First, the incentive must display the differences of the success such as if all receive increased salary; then the RBM is not important any more. Second, it must be fair incentive. If the incentive transgresses the feeling and allow the personnel to realize the unfairness, such incentive will become the cause of dissatisfaction rather than helping build the desired behavior.

The findings above are corresponded with the critiques of Pollit (cited in Chakrabarty and Chand, 2012) that the NPM emphasizes to identify a clear target, to develop the performance indicators, fir reward, promotion, and other incentives for those who can achieve the target. However, the acceptance of the personnel is distant from the complexity of the norms, belief and motivation or the complexity of fairness in the prejudice in decisionmaking and the dependency between institutions. Pollit explains that reform though NPM has been dominated by the values of efficiency, saving and effectiveness while other values such as fairness, justice and participation are viewed as hindrances of higher productivity. It s corresponded with the view of Farazmand (2004) explains about the concept of NPM branched from Public Choice Theory. The proposal of NPM never takes interested in or avoids the issues of equity, fairness and accountability. By the time, NPM is based on marketing concept. Haque (1998, 1999; cited in Bowornwathana, 2000) supports a public service reform by backing marketing diminishes public confidence in the public service. The market value such as the focus of efficiency, productivity, cost,

competition and profits dominate the government value, which emphasizes responsibility, neutrality, responsiveness, morals, fairness and justice. All these are minimized.

5.4.3.2 Given less precedence to missions beyond performance agreement

The indicators of performance agreement reduce the precedence to the jobs beyond the PA indicators and less cooperation. In fact, the mission is in the PA indicators as a part but there are other important missions of the agency, which are beyond the indicators and must be driven to success. This includes solving the immediate problem and the routine works. The PA measures some part of the mission but reduce the precedence to other works beyond the PA indicators and with less cooperation. This is because the personnel will be first preoccupied with the PA indicators, which link with the incentive system such as the beneficence evaluation, and salary rate evaluation. In addition, the PA indicators become the criteria for some personnel in decisionmaking to cooperate with some jobs /missions beyond the PA indicators which they are responsible for. Therefore, any job not specified in the PA indicators would be more difficult to gain cooperation upon request, for example, the coordination for information to support the group/department/other agencies or other agencies much requesting supports would not be precedent. Finally, an impact of the PA indicators is forming selfishness, fragmentation of some personnel who adhere to the PA indicators alone in working.

Such findings are corresponded with the opinion of Spitzer (2007) who call this phenomenon “the problem of measurement dysfunction”. In summary, by principle, measurement is just a means to gain information on performance in order to improve the working process. Nevertheless, if, the measurement is tied to reward and punishment; the informational value of measurement, which is the major target, will become the inferior target immediately. The personnel behavior on performance measures will turn to rewards and avoid punishment. Reward and punishment will become precedence and the ends rather than information. Upon prioritizing reward, it is difficult to be interested in other things. All personnel will do every thing to earn rewards. It becomes the weakness of the reward-based measurement system and a cause to dysfunction measurement. Reward

is then so powerful to lead to restriction, which rises significant probability. It raises weakness where it will be adopt to seek gains and dysfunction measurement. To this cause, the personnel are inclined to behave on self-gains particularly when the gains are greater reward than targeted information related to performance and to achieve the organizational target.

5.4.3.3 Distorting the application of performance agreement

The PA motive is applied for efficiency according to the RBM adherence to outcome or result in order to improve efficiency. However, when it is applied with the Thai bureaucracy and adhered to incentive especially reward and punishment system; this tool becomes the immediate supervisor and turns the personnel fear to earn low score (mostly 5 levels will be the top score and level 3 is moderate; level 4 and 5 are the expectation of the personnel). Because of some personnel apply the PA indicators focusing on rewards and punishment rather than the PA motive in improving performance. Such fear comes from “pressure” and not “enhancement”. The pressure might include the pressure rather than enhancement to draw intrinsic capacity of the personnel. When the PA indicators are bound with reward and punishment, they create distortion of performance in two models, i.e.

1) Fake documentation model

The fake documentation is used as evidence to complement the indicator measurement in order to meet level 5. All documents are prepared to meet the provisions. Causes leading to distortion by fake documentation to complement the assessment are from the KPI (key performance indicator) demanded by two central agencies: the OPDC and the public agency. The OPDC wants to build excellence and so it stipulates high level of the indicators and these indicators are beyond the missions of the agency as empowered by law. Therefore, considering the dimension of efficiency and just agility alone, it might affect the work. In fact, to abide by law especially with the working process, it must cooperate with other agencies, which are beyond the power to supervise and control. It is corresponded with the opinion of Marie et. al. (2006 cited in Mavhiki, Nyamwanza and Linnet, 2013) indicating that though the application of RBM has taken for over 10 years but the battle on the performance indicators are ongoing until today.

Consequently, such phenomenon leads to distort the scores and fake documentation. It is corresponded with the study of Marie, Holzer, Posner and Rubin (2006) on “Result-Based Management in Thailand” and they explain that applying KPI for reward or punishment might distort human behavior of “games”. The reward and punishment system leads to gain seeking inclining to distortion in performance.

2. Stipulating the target value lower than reality

Stipulating the target value lower than the capacity standards of an agency to ascertain that the agency can reach the success as targeted. If any questions are raised why these indicators are stipulated, they are answerable that the mission is characterized as specific job. The OPDC responsible cannot then realize the level of difficulties and easiness in working and its approach used. Therefore, some indicators might be upgraded to the level of difficulty beyond reality.

Consequently, the researcher is certain that the concept of RBM is aim to improve performance but when it is applied in Thailand, it is bound to the conditions of reward and punishment. It distorts the major objective focusing on improving performance as the outcome. Various agencies then aim to earn reward and avoid punishment. Spitzer (2007) explains the cheating here that when the personnel determine to earn reward, they will do everything to win. For example, the project personnel attempt to lower the scores with each indicator to guarantee that they can achieve. The team attempt to lower the target value as possibility and they can gain higher scores that they have targeted. In addition, the personnel become the very good manager on the numbers, the number reports, tweaking the numbers, fudging the number and accept the number in each trimester which are the techniques realized and accepted in the measurement.

5.4.4 The bias intent of result-based management (RBM)

The intent of result-based management (RBM) applied in developing the Thai bureaucracy has been distorted from the principle of RBM. However, the real phenomenon from applying the performance agreement is not from participation to stipulate target attract the interest of the personnel to follow the indicators in order to earn level 4 or 5 as targeted in order to gain reward or to avoid punishment. Therefore, the PA intent demanding the personnel to focus on target achievement of the agency

and to improve performance becomes the second issue with less attention than to achieve high scores. It is corresponded with the study of World Bank (World Bank, 2011: 16-18) revealing that applying performance information to improve projects and achievement is counted as the weak point. At present, applying RBM in Thailand is still prioritizing the process of producing reports (document) and information rather than the input all documents for usefulness to improve the work. In association with Thailand runs short of precedence to the users of performance information. In short, the information gained from the measurement is under suspicion on prioritizing to improve performance especially the key players related such as the project manager, the top executive, Cabinet, parliament members and people. To such issues, Thailand pays less priority and interest.

The cause of behavior that some personnel aims at the score level by the indicator rather than input the performance information to improve work is from the PA indicators are too much adhered to reward and punishment. They intend to earn high scores of 4 or 5 for their agencies and not being discredited, when the scores have been announced and compared with other agencies. At the meantime, the responsible personnel for the indicators do not want to discredit by having low scores. The cause that the researcher weighs much on ‘discredit’ is because the researcher finds that the incentive is applied with least personnel to follow the performance agreement in the form of bonus or called “not-incentive”. The frontline will earn individual bonus around 1,000-2,000 Baht (30-70 USD). This is critical that incentive influence less than discredit in the agency and the personnel. It is corresponded with the study of Mongkol (2012) on “Application of NPM in Thailand” and using the Ministry of Culture as the case study. He finds that the performance agreement is viewed less effective at the level of the middle manager and the frontlines because the top executive positively evaluates on reason that they do not want to be discredited and they are worried with the performance evaluation. Seeing the evaluation as a threat to their positions becomes a phenomenon in the Thai public sector for many years in association with the PA system is seen more as punishment: the personnel attitude in the OPSDC and the agencies applying the performance agreement with characteristic of “pressure’ rather than “enhancement”. If their performance is yet to reach the target; it affects or damages their lives. It might be called “*like being pressed by a*

mountain and it does not draw what is inside them for uses". The work is lacking the perspective of promotion and improving the personnel capacity. If the personnel fail their indicator targets; it is necessary to provide capacity development process for them and provide them with opportunity to take responsibility for those indicators. The capacity development process for the personnel is less discussed in the application of performance agreement in Thailand.

Therefore, from the phenomenon, it could be concluded that applying the RBM in Thailand focusing on performance measurement by applying BSC as a framework and performance agreement for practice. This would have been distorted from the principle arisen in the developed countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, particularly with the issue of process-based measurement and result-based measurement rather than outcome-based. On the contrary, the personnel behavior in the central agencies and the line agencies are focusing on success by the indicators rather than being conscious to improve the organizational performance. Focusing on gaining the score at level 5 (most indicator scoring 1-5) rather than paying attention to improve performance the conclusion of:

The agency achieves the score level 5 by the indicator but the success does not reflect the real success by the organizational goals. This is the core of the problem and limitations in applying the performance agreement with the public sector. The causes are the performance agreement is not convergent with the organizational goal but stipulating by the central agencies alone (One Size Fit All). At the same time, the central measurement adopts various administrative tools provided by the OPDC but modified from abroad to be allocated in the performance agreement. The practices are then distorted from the principle, which has to build the commitment between the management and the frontline or the personnel who have to drive major goals of the organizations to success. Nevertheless, the performance agreement instills many indicators and confuses understanding and priority of the organizational goals; in corporate with applying the performance agreement with practices has been centralized in the central agencies with the absence of participation in stipulating the indicators with the line agencies. Therefore, most indicators are stipulated by the central agencies while the indicators placed for negotiation for both parties are also drafted by the central agencies. The process of specifying the indicators is under the

climate of distrust between both parties. There is a trend in the central agencies to control the line agencies. Therefore, the success is just following the indicators with the score of level 5. However, the score level 5 do not guarantee or reflect the success in solving any problems of the agency. It could be said that the success by the indicators and the success of the fragmentation. Moreover, this indicators influence other impact especially decrease of cooperation in an agency, disunity within the agency, reducing the importance of other activities and building behavior of distorting information. IN summary there is distrust, absence of cooperation in formulation, implementation, deviation from the principle, which become the major barrier in applying the performance agreement with the public sector.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The study of “the Paradigms of Public Administration and the Development of Thai Bureaucracy” has been divided into 3 parts, i.e. 1) research methodology, 2) research results by objectives and 3) recommendation for future studies.

The research objectives are:

- 1) To study the essence of the public administration paradigms linked to the Thai bureaucratic development during 1959-2006.
- 2) To analyze factors influencing the changes of the public administration paradigms applied with the Thai bureaucratic development during 1959-2006.
- 3) To study the administrative innovation under the public administration paradigms being applied with the Thai bureaucratic development after its reforms in BE2545 (2002).
- 4) To investigate the limitations and impacts of the RBM applied with the Thai bureaucratic development as an innovation in the paradigm of the new public management (NPM) after the bureaucratic reforms in BE 2545 (2002).

6.1 Research Methodology

1) It was to explore the paradigms of the government administration were influenced by public administration during 1959-2006 and their essence through collecting information from documentary research and in-depth interviews with three scholars. The documentary research was to collect two groups of document, i.e. journals of administration development and policy archives. After the collection, all their essences were investigated and the results of bureaucratic development in each phase.

2) It was to search for factors changing the public administration paradigms and the researcher has conducted in-depth interviews with three scholars.

3) When results from the public administration paradigm and factors influencing the change of each school of thought; the researcher investigated innovation in each school of thoughts on public administration, which linked to the Thai bureaucratic reform in 2002 and categorized the innovation.

4) Finally, under the innovation paradigms of new public management (NPM), the researcher selected the result-based management (RBM) to be the case study and selected Ministry of Justice as the site. A mixed methodology research was applied in the data collection involving documentary research, and in-depth interview conducted with 11 personnel of Ministry of Justice with verification through another interviews again with scholars who were the consultants to the RBM of the public sector.

6.2 Conclusions

6.2.1 Public administration during 1959-2006 in applying with the Thai bureaucracy development

The characteristic of the public administration applied with the Thai bureaucratic development during 1959-2006 was divided into three paradigms, i.e. the development administration (DA) during early 1957- end 1977, the new public management (NPM) during early 1987- end 1997 (also currently active), and good governance during mid 1987- early 1997.

1) The essence of the public administration paradigm was:

1.1) The Development Administration was characterized as (1) building institutions, i.e. the National Economic Development council in 1959, The Bureau of the Budget in 1959, Ministry of the National Development, Department of Community Development, and Department of Accelerated Rural Development. (2) Public Administration Institution was established, i.e. School of Public Administration : Thammasart University in 1955 but later was transferred to NIDA (National Institute of Development Administration in 1966. (3) The Government Administration Approaches were improved, i.e. changing line-item budget into the program budget in 1960. (4) The first National Economic Development Plan 1961-1966 was drafted. (5) Scholarship for graduate studies and training abroad were

sponsored especially in USA. (6) Domestic trainings for civil personnel were organized to meet the opinion of Chakrabarty and Chand (2012) indicating that the popular techniques and projects during 1960s called the Technical Assistance Era, which were the 5-Year Plans, Budget Agenda, Training and community Development.

1.2) New Paradigm Management was characterized with 1) performance standard such as Thailand International Public Sector Standard Management System and Outcomes (P.S.O); Public Sector Management Quality Award (PMQA); and Performance Agreement. 2) Agencification was organized from public agencies (ministries, ministerial affairs, and departments) and state enterprises by establishing public organization through the Public Organization Act Be 2542 (1999) and 3) Privatization.

1.3) Good Governance was characterized by 1) an institution of check and balance in executive politician and top civil servant; 2) supporting people participatory politics; 3) decentralization, school of Thai good governance, the allocation of good governance in the eight National Economic and Social Development Plan (1977-2001), and establishing the public hearing system through the Prime Minister Office on Public Opinion with Public Hearing BE 2539 (1996), accessing the state information through enacting the Public Information Act BE 2540 (1997), and establishing good governance under the regulations the Prime Minister Office on Good Governance and Good social BE 2542 (1999).

6.2.2 Factors influencing the change of public administration applied with the Thai bureaucracy development

Factors influencing the change of public administration were:

1) Development administration: 1) the domestic politics needed USA to balance the powerhouses in the country, the Thai-US relation and the World Bank, and 2) economy.

2) The New public management: economy especially the 1997-economic crisis driving the administration of Chuan Leekphai (1997-2000) to follow the conditional assistance of IMF especially privatization, and 400 M\$ loan for bureaucratic reform, and 2) the administrative decisionmaking of the administration of

Dr. Thaksin Shinnawatra (2001-2006) arisen from the business experience needed to apply business administration to administrate the public sector.

3) Good governance was the politics after Black May and the trend of the international organization supporting good governance.

6.2.3 Innovation under public administration after bureaucracy reform 2002

Innovations applied after the bureaucracy reform in 2002 and are divided into three types, i.e.

- 1) Institutional innovations: the OPSDC and the public organization
- 2) Organizational innovations: the applications of RBM (result-based management), P.S.O (Thailand International Public Sector Standard Management System and Outcomes), PMQA (Public Sector Management Quality Award), performance agreement and CEO –Governor.
- 3) Process innovation: service link, e-Government and GFMS (Government Fiscal Management Information System).

6.2.4 Limitations in applying innovation in the Thai bureaucracy on the case of RBM

6.2.4.1 Central Performance Agreement Framework (CPAF)

CPAF was the key to prepare performance agreement and stipulating target. The evaluation and decisionmaking were acted by the Supervisory on Agreement and Evaluation Commission alone with the absence of the stakeholder especially line-agencies: 20 ministries, more than 140 departments. Therefore, the process of arguments, discussions on problems, barriers, want and expectations of line agencies were unfound. It could be commented that The CPAF is centralized in the central agencies and it was applied with the entire system of public agencies characterized in different roles, missions and context and with the differences of problems, needs, and expectations of the service recipients. However, the CPAF drafted a One-Size-Fit-All to be applied with the organizations with different empowerment and context.

6.2.4.2 The CPAF content with many indicators

The CPAF content instilled with many indicators. There were 14 indicators in 2005 and were increased to 20 indicators in 2006 while in 2008, they are reduced to 17 indicators (The OPDC, 2005-2007). In the line agencies of the Permanent Secretary Office in the Ministry of Justice, for example, there were 22 indicators in 2005 and increased to 34 indicators in 2006 and reduced to 16 indicators in 2008 (excluded sub-indicators). Among these indicators, they were related to the application of the administrative tools or techniques - the performance agreement applied by the OPDC with the bureaucratic development. Besides being the tool to be the commitment for the public personnel to improve their performance aiming at achievement and outcomes but also being the tool to be applied with the public agency. The OPDC allocated these techniques the indicators in the performance agreement. It was characterized forcing the ministries, ministerial affairs and departments to apply these techniques. Such approach did not follow the intent of the performance agreement focusing the public agencies to stipulate targets and transferred them to the hierarchical front lines through negotiation process in order to stipulate targets needed evaluation with the participation of the line agencies.

6.2.4.3 Implementation process

1) Centralization

Such process above is the centralized decisionmaking stipulated by the central agencies with top-down command approach. Though there was negotiation process but the negotiation was not significantly improved but still under the central agency framework. In practices, the four dimensions of evaluation framework were found that the negotiation was just for effectiveness. Measuring the performance to achieve strategic plans at the level of ministry and department only. However, another three dimensions: service quality, efficiency and organizational development. All agencies were forced to take action without any participation to stipulate targets from their needs and their expectations. Certainly, building the sense of ownership was the indispensable condition for performance agreement but it was unlikely happened because the process of stipulating the indicators is without participation but enforces centralization and top-down command approach.

2) Overlapped tools among the central agencies

The tools for RBM were overlapped within the central agencies, i.e. the OPDC, the Bureau of the Budget and the Civil Servant Office. The OPDC employed performance agreement while the Bureau of the Budget employed PART (Assessment Rating Tool). The Civil Servant Office employed HR-scorecard. The innovation contents applied here were relative. There were identification of target, indicators and follow-up and evaluation with trimester reports to the central agencies. It meant that the line agencies (ministers, ministerial affairs and departments) had to work with three tools in order to report to the central agencies. Though the contents of the report are relative and linked. If all these central agencies had clear common approaches, the line agencies would not be confused and simple to understand and clear for practices.

6.2.5 Impacts on other sides

6.2.5.1 Performance agreement affected the cooperation of people in an organization

Since the performance agreement was bound with beneficence evaluation, the personnel thus concentrated only the indicators they were responsible. If not, they would not. For example, "*Here is not my indicator.*" It lessened cooperation, assistance between groups, parties and divisions because all would be preoccupied with their own indicators. Any petty jobs such as coordination for requesting information and supports and other agency requesting supports would not be important. Such phenomenon turned people selfish and disunited within the organization.

6.2.5.2 Missions beyond performance agreement were important

The PA indicators reduced the importance of other jobs. All missions designed became the PA indicators and was a part of the agency missions. There were missions, action plans and other projects would be driven to success including the routine jobs. The PA indicators were specific for only the important point, which reduce the importance of other jobs because the personnel prioritized the

indicators which linked to the reward system either the beneficence evaluation and salary rate evaluation.

6.2.5.3 Distorted implementation

The intent of performance agreement was applied for the RBM efficiency based on outcome or result in order to improve efficiency. But when it was applied with the Thai bureaucracy development; it was bound with incentive especially “reward” and “punishment”. This created distortion of performance or cheating with two models, i.e.

1) The fake documentation was prepared to reach the target as the indicators at the score level 5 by provisions.

The cause leading to information distortion by making fake documents to complement the measurement with the source from KPI and the problems came from two central agencies: the OPDC and the public agencies. The OPDC wanted the approach to build excellence so it stipulated high level of indicators. On the contrary, the line agencies who stood on facts and knew some missions were unauthorized or uncontrollable; so they lead to cheat the numbers and faking documents.

2) The second is the distorted information – lower value than the standard value of the agency competency in order to ascertain that it could reach the target. If being asked why these indicators could be displayed and the response would be on specific job. With his approach, the central agencies had no opportunity to know the real details of performance and disable to guess the difficulties and easiness of the fulfilling the indicators.

Another cause was form the attitude of the personnel in the OPDC and the public agencies who applied the performance agreement in the public sector characterized as “pressure” and not “enhancement.” The performance agreement was like the immediate supervisor. If the performance failed, it destroyed worklife as stated, “It is *like being pressed by a mountain and it does not drawn what is inside them for uses*”. By the enhancement view, it was the promotion of improving the personnel’s capacity.

The researcher is certain that the RBM concept was aimed to improve performance but applying the RBM in Thailand was bound with reward-

punishment system. It distorted then the major objective, which was focused on performance improvement but as it was, all agencies were preoccupied with reward and avoidance of punishment.

6.3 Recommendations on policy

6.3.1 Inferring problems and indicating the framework in Thai bureaucracy development

Importing innovations and administrative tools from abroad either copying and being driven by the international organization such as Thailand International Public Sector Standard Management System and Outcomes (P.S.O.) was modified by the ISO, or Public Sector Management Quality Award (PMQA) was modified from Malcolm Baldrige National Award (MBNQA). Copying innovation and administrative tool to be applied in bureaucracy of Thailand paid less attention to the “FIT” between problems existing in the bureaucracy and the organizational culture context. The Thai context and the west were differed, e.g. centralization, personal relations of patronage and dependency, respect, loyal and merit. Consequences were nepotism, discrimination and corruption. In addition, the administrative tools supported by the international organization were usually in the model of One-Size-Fit-All for example, restructuring, privatization, measurement and evaluation, down-sizing and outsourcing and so on.

To develop the Thai bureaucracy requires 1) learning the experience of the past failure from copying or importing the development models from abroad but disregarding the real situation. 2) It is necessary to diagnose the problem to be solved from every stakeholder involved and must be through committee containing the parties of politics, central agencies, people, private sector, scholars, media and private development organization and so. This is to explore problems and report for proposal to reform rather than copying the model or the administrative tool from abroad to be applied and naïve to the real problems and the Thai bureaucratic and social context.

6.3.2 Structure and organization handling bureaucracy development

A problem to develop the Thai bureaucracy is over trusting a small group of people as the source or the stipulators of innovation and administrative tools which includes bureaucratic competition, the dominion of the central agencies over the line agencies through various administrative tools. Therefore, the structure of developing bureaucracy should be improved. Previously there were four groups, i.e., 1) the administrative, 2) the decentralization commission – the Permanent Secretary of the Prime Minister Office, 3) the expert, and 4) the OPDC. However, the players in the commission structure do not cover the stakeholders in the Thai bureaucracy. There is an absence of the line agencies (ministries, ministerial affairs and departments) and other central agencies: Bureau of the Budget, the Civil Servant Office and the indispensable is people sector. Therefore, It should improve another two parts, i.e. 1) the structure of bureaucracy development, and 2) the approach to develop the Thai bureaucracy, i.e.

1) The structure of bureaucracy development should include (1) politics, (2) scholars, (3) line agencies (ministries, ministerial affairs and departments), (4) people, and (5) central agencies containing the OPDC, the Civil Servant Office and Bureau of the Budget.

2) The establishment of the Advisory Body from the people sector for bureaucracy development.

The Advisory Body provide consultations and recommendation on bureaucracy development to the public sector to fulfill two things, i.e. (1) creating awareness and realization of the public sector on bureaucracy development through group discussions, seminars and public hearing; (2) organizing public relation on bureaucracy development coupled with the public sector and it must involve scholars, civil servant retirees, leaders of public sector, media, private development organization and leaders of people sector.

3) The approach of bureaucracy development should be divided in each aspect, i.e. (1) administration and personnel development of the public sector, (2) bureaucracy development and innovation, (3) public sector budget development, (4) morals and ethics, and (5) the organization culture of the Thai bureaucracy. Each aspect should involve politics, central agencies, line agencies and people sector to

collaborate in the development. For example, the [public sector budget development should have (1) Deputy Prime Minister of Economy or the Minister of Finance to be chairperson, (2) the Secretary should be the Bureau of the Budget and the Comptroller General's Department, (3) committees from line agencies, i.e. ministries, ministerial affairs, departments and public organizations and so on. Such structural organization will help solve monopolized authority in developing bureaucracy and centralization to solve problem in the OPDC alone. This approach adhere to the agencies as the host to be responsible for operation and the agencies involved are ministries, ministerial affairs, departments to cooperated in development, enhancing operation to replace the OPDC who is not the main host in the real action taken.

6.4 Recommendations for Practices

With the study the application of performance agreement with the government administration, the researcher recommends approaches useful for practices among the executive, i.e.

6.4.1 Structure of the Supervisory Commission on Performance Agreement Preparation

The commission stipulated the frame and criteria for the negotiation of performance, goal, evaluation method and incentive. This commission was the same commission of the OPDC. Its structure contained four parts, i.e. politics, public personnel, experts (scholars) and the OPDC acting as its secretary. Such structure still lacked important players: line agencies and people sector. It allowed the frame and criteria for performance negotiation were influenced by the central agency only or the OPDC without the line agencies and people sector. The performance negotiation could not respond to the necessary situation for improving performance and absence of the feedback channel of the line agencies. They were the factor affecting the PA indicator irresponsible to the organization goal.

In addition, the performance evaluation system of the public sector had three central agencies – the OPDC which applied the performance agreement. The Bureau of the Budget applied PART (Program Assessment Rating Tool). The Civil

Servant Office applied HR-scorecard. The contents of this entire administrative tool were relative – goal setting, indicators, and evaluation and trimester report to the central agencies from each line agency. In practice, the line agencies (ministries, ministerial affairs and departments) have to complete three tools in order to report to the central agencies thought with relative contents and linked each other. If these central agencies had the common goal with clarity, the line agencies needed not work repetitively in some matters while having clear goal and practices. It also reduced complexity and was simple to understand while lessening burdens in collecting information for preparing reports.

With the problems above, it is proposed that to improve the structure of the Supervisory Commission on Performance Agreement Preparation should involve the parties of politics, public personnel, experts (scholars), and the central agencies: the OPDC, the Civil Servant Office, and the Bureau of the Budget, the line agencies and the people sector. It helps to reduce the problem of centralization but increases participation, which allows the direction and the preparation of performance agreement gains feedback channel from the line agencies. Significantly, it reduces repetitiveness of the administrative tools and might lead to the integration of the PA contents and focus on necessary contents for improving and developing performance, budget and personnel of an organization.

6.4.2 Content of Central Performance Agreement Framework

The performance agreement was one of the tools to improve the performance of an organization and its responsibility. It connected with the goal of its annual performance and other activities expected to be successful according to the goals. It reduced restrictions of cross functioning and the expectation of the executive (General Accounting Office-GAO, 2000). The common points of the performance agreement were goal-setting, specific, clear and measurable objectives, capacities and responsiveness to the important missions. The goal setting would support the participation of PA negotiation (Locke and Latham, 1990 cited in O'Donnell and Turner, 2005). In addition, the PA principle was intended to support clarification in working between the success goal of the agency and the success goal of the frontlines, which were linked. The former would be conveyed to the latter. Therefore, when the

frontlines achieved their goals; the success would drive the organization goals to success too (GAO, 2000 cited in O'Donnell & Turner, 2005).

Barriers in applying PA system within the country were 1) the Central Performance Agreement Framework-CPAF which was determined by the OPDC alone and was imposed with 20 ministries and more than 140 departments. 2) the CPAF was instilled with innovations, new administrative tools or techniques which the OPDC copied from abroad or it used the performance agreement to be the tool to drive and to apply other tools such as knowledge management-KM, ICT, change management & HRD, public sector management quality award -PMQA and risk management. Therefore, to allocate administrative techniques in the performance agreement not only distorted the PA principle but also eased to confuse when put into the application among the line agencies. 3) Since the central PA framework has been modified from BSC and divided into four dimensions; they are effectiveness, service quality, efficiency and organizational development; the OPDC has to prepare the indicators to cover all the dimensions. It could be a cause to multiple the indicators and by necessity to prepare the indicators to cover all the four dimensions; some indicators were not necessary to be allocated in the performance agreement such energy saving and so on. This might have been made the performance agreement distorted from the principle. Therefore, with the above causes, it is recommended that:

1) Drop the central performance agreement but give freedom for the line agencies to draft their own KPI (key performance indicator) and just focus on three dimension: strategy, budget and personnel. In the past, the participation of the frontline was helpful for the approach in negotiating with the OPDC.

2) Focus to use the PA tool to improve the main performance rather than to use it to drive other techniques, which were millions. Duivenboden and Thaens (2008) indicated that condition for success in applying innovation in an organization was the decision to focus on an innovation from numbers of innovation for application.

6.4.3 Implementation process

1) Strong leadership

Previously the PA system was supported by the government leader (Dr. Thaksin Shinawatra) which allowed top civil servants in each agency became important. When the Prime Minister and the Minister seriously drove the top civil servant like Permanent Secretary and the Director-General were aware and involved in preparation and driving by themselves. When the political situation changed, and the government leaders paid less attention; the PA system met less important. It could be noticed that the players changed from the top civil servants to the lower civil servants.

Therefore, strong leadership is very important to drive the PA system to the goal especially the Thai bureaucracy context where elite culture played the important roles and all activities relied on the leader. Therefore, as such the executive has to pay importance to supervise, and drive the indicator allocated in the performance agreement into practices with consistent follow-up. This is to display for all department to recognize seriousness of the leader particularly being the chairperson in the meeting of follow-up the performance progress. In addition, the executive has to adhere to the PA goal as the main goal even though there is the intervention of new policy/other projects. They should not affect the main goal of the organization on what have been stipulated in the performance agreement.

2) Capacity development of the personnel

The study shows that sometimes the administrative tools with top-down command approach from the central agencies have made the frontline misunderstood and its real objectives. The central agencies usually disseminated handbooks and templates to the line agencies. To apply the administrative tools required to understand their intents, goals and enabled to link with the goals, strategies, missions, absence of knowledge, understanding and skills in preparing them. These created barriers in working. However, the frontline could complete them and return them to the central agencies on time but they were the success of formalism but not contents needed to improve performance. Therefore, the researcher recommend to improve the frontline involved on the knowledge by designing a program – specific training for their

practices. This is to create understanding with the tools by motive, contents and practices. It will be differed from the training organized just for explanation on the concept only and it lacks the weight for application and skills for the frontlines.

3) Attitude shift of the central agencies and the frontlines

The study shows that trust between the central agencies and the line agencies is another barrier and it is characterized by rigid controls from the central agencies, inflexibility and scarcity of cooperation from the line agencies. The study shows that though the indicator process allows negotiation but the central agency (OPDC) tries to adhere to the KPI Draft, which the OPDC has prepared only. Therefore, the negotiation was just a discourse ritual and became a cause affecting trust between the two parties. It is corresponded with the opinion of Marie et. al. (2006, cited in Mavhiki, Nyamwanza and Linnet, 2013) indicating that even though applying the RBM in Thailand for over 10 years; it is found that there is a battle in stipulating the performance indicators unit today. With such cause, the researcher recommends that:

1. Applying the performance agreement requires participation of the line agencies in negotiating the goal and the important one is the ability to improve their performance and their capacity.

2. It is necessary to change the attitude of the frontline with the perspective of using the tool to seek reward which is characterized by lower the values than the competitive standards to guarantee that they can reach the goal and also to prepare fake or distort documentation. Therefore, the negotiation, which allows for the participation of the line agencies, and information exchanges, would lead to the acceptance of the indicators. This includes the possibility of the indicator, which might link to laws, rules and regulations and the focus to mainly improve the performance. Consequently, creating participation in negotiation to stipulate goals and to accept the indicators would help create trust between the central agencies and the line agencies.

6.5 Recommendations for Future Studies

From this study, the researcher recommends three issues for future studies as below.

6.5.1 Public administration

This study is to investigate public administration through documentary research. The future studies should investigate the trend of public administration Thailand has applied to develop its bureaucracy through Delphi and conducted with three groups of samples: the executives, the scholars and the practitioners in order to know the trend of future public administration.

6.5.2 The Thai bureaucracy development

The study should be conducted between the central agencies in stipulating the bureaucracy development policy, i.e. the Bureau of the Budget, the OPDC and the Civil Servant Office with a case study by applying the policy process. It should begin from cultural formulation, innovation stipulation, innovation application, and innovation evaluation. It is necessary to study the work structure, the process, the development content, and the achievement through comparing the performance from development. It includes comparing them with budget for all spending in developing bureaucracy to what extent are they worth and to understand the structure and the working process of each organization. It will lead to the design a model to improve the working process of the central agencies, and reducing repetition and the confusion of the line agencies, which are the agencies to adopt the reform policy for application.

6.5.3 Innovation of the Thai bureaucracy development

1) Public sector innovation of Thailand should be investigation such as the projects of public organization, e-government, CEO-governor and so on using the conceptual framework of the innovation process beginning from the innovation formulation, the procedure of acceptance formulation and the process of application process. The investigation should be conducted with the middle managers and the frontlines in order to find the conclusion on innovation models to develop the public sector, and to find problems and limitations.

2) This study is to specifically investigate the result-based management (RBM) emphasizing the performance agreement. It is necessary to investigate other tools such as knowledge management, and Public Sector Management Quality Award and so on. This is to check the working process of the central agencies, which transfer these innovations to develop the Thai bureaucracy whether they are similar or different and are there any limitations and impacts?

3) The mixed method should be used in investigating the RBM. A qualitative research should be applied to study the attitudes of the line agencies towards the RBM including its problems and limitations in working especially targeting the frontline staff. Later, the problems and limitations should be investigated by applying a qualitative research in order to explain the challenging phenomenon and limitations arisen from applying the RBM in Thailand.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Alberti, A. & Bertucci, G. (2006). *Replicating innovation in governance: An overview*. In department of economic and social affairs, Innovation in governance and public administration: Replicating what work (pp. 1-21). NY: United Nations.
- Amornrat, K. (1959). Origin of Public Administration. *Thai Journal of Public Administration*, 1(1), pp.27-35.
- Atthakorn, B. (1960). The National Economic Development Project. *NIDA Development Journal*, 1(1), pp.65-78.
- _____. (1961). The Importance of the Government Administration System and the National Economic Development. *NIDA Development Journal*, 2(1), pp.74-79.
- _____. (1985). The Importance of the Government Administration System and the National Economic Development. In Uthai Laohawichian and Parthian Kongrittisuksa. (Eds.). *The Public Affairs Administration: Academic Article*. (pp.85-89).Bangkok: Pharbphim.
- Ayande, A., Sabourin, V., & Sefa, E. (2012). Managerial execution in public administration: Practices of managers when implementing strategic objectives. Retrieved from <http://www.dx.doi.org/10.5539/ijbm.v7n19p55>.
- Barnes, D. & Radnor, Z. (2008). Performance Measurement and Performance Management: The Operations Management Perspective. In Thorpe, R. and Holloway, J., (Eds.). *Performance Management Multidisciplinary Perspectives*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Barraza, M, F, S. (2013). Process innovation in local governments: an empirical study of its continuous improvement effects. *Review of Business Management*, 15, (204-220). Retrieved from <http://www.dx.doi.org/10.7819/rbgn.v15i47.1160>.

- Bland, T., Bruk, B, Kim, Dongshin & Lee, T. (2010). Enhancing public sector innovation: Examining the network-innovation relationship. *The Innovation Journal: The Public Sector Innovation Journal*, 15(3), pp. 1-17.
- Borins, S. (2001). *The challenge of innovating in government*. Arlington, VA: The Business of Government.
- Borins, S. (2002). New public management, North American style. In K. Mclaughlin, S.P. Osborne & E. Ferlie (Eds.). *New public management: current trends and future prospects*. 181-194. New York: Routledge.
- Borins, S. (2002). Leadership and innovation in the public sector. *Leadership & Organization Development Journal*, 23(8) 467-476. Retrieved from <http://www.dx.doi.org/10108/01437730210449357>.
- Borwornpattan, P. (1998). *Public Administration: Theory, and Educational Approaches (1987-1970)*. Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University.
- _____. (1998). *Public Administration: Theory, and Educational Approaches (1970-19780)*. Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University.
- _____. (2000). Country report governance reform in Thailand: Questionable assumptions, uncertain outcomes. *Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration*, 13, 393-408.
- _____. (2001). Politics of governance reform in Thailand. In A. Farazmand, (Ed.). *Handbook of comparative and development public administration* (2nd ed.). (pp. 421-443). New York, NY: Mareel Dekker.
- _____. (2004). Thaksin's model of government Reform: Prime ministerialisation through a country is my company approach. *ASIAN Journal of Political Science*, 12,. 135-153.
- _____. (2005). Managing reforms: The politics of organizing reform work". *Public organization review: a global journal*, 5, 233-247.
- _____. (2008). Importing governance into the Thai polity: competing hybrids and reform consequences, *Research in Public policy Analysis and Management*, 17, 5-20. Retrieved from [http://www.dx.doi.org/1016/So732-1317\(08\)17002-6](http://www.dx.doi.org/1016/So732-1317(08)17002-6).
- _____. (2011). History and political Context of Public Administration in Thailand. In Berman, Evan M. (Ed). *Public Administration in Southeast*

Asia: Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Macao. (pp. 28-51).
New York: CRC Press.

_____. (2013, January 17-18). *Six Decades of Public Administration in Thailand*. Paper presented at the Conference on The Paradigm Shift of welfare administration and social policy in Asia in the Seoul, South Korea.

Bowornwathna, B. & Poocharoen, O. (2005). Managing reform: the politics of organizing reform work. *Public Organization Review: A Global Journal*, 5, 233–247, Retrieved March 23, 2014,

<http://eds.a.ebscohost.com.ejournal.mahidol.ac.th/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=8&sid=0c6d22d8-6c1b-4eaf-986c-62a2a732c469%40sessionmgr4003&hid=4210>

_____. (2010). Bureaucratic politics and administrative reform: Why politics matters. *Public organiz rev*, 10, 303-321. Retrieved from [Http://www.dx.doi.org: 10.1007/s11115-010-0129-0](Http://www.dx.doi.org:10.1007/s11115-010-0129-0).

Bregn, K. (2013). Detrimental effects of performance-related pay in the public sector? On the need for a broader theoretical perspective. *Public Organiz Rev*, 13, 21-35. Retrieved from <http://www.dxdoi.org/10.1007/s11115-0191-x>.

Brewer, B. (2003). Thailand building the foundation for structural and systemic transformation. In A. B. L. Cheung & I. Scott, (Eds.). *Governance and public sector reform in Asia paradigm shifts or business as usual?*. 186-207. London: Routledge.

Brewer, G. A., Choi, Y. & Walker, R. M. (2008). Linking Accountability, Corruption, And Government Effectiveness in ASIA: An Examination of World Bank Governance Indicators. In B. Bowornwathana & C. Wescott, (Eds.). *Comparative Governance Reform in ASIA: Democracy, Corruption, and Government Trust*. 227 - 245. WA : Emerald Group.

Buaban, A. (1984). *The Future Trend of the Thai Public Administration: A Delphi-based study*. Master Thesis of Political Science: School of Political Science, Thammasart University.

Chalermtiaron, T. (2009). *The Politics of Despotism Paternalism*. (3rd Edition). Bangkok: Social Sciences and Humanities Project Foundation.

- Chandarasorn, V. (1995). Privatization: A new trend and a revolution in public administration. *NIDA development Journal*, 35(2), pp. 195-204.
- Charoensin-olarn, C. (1989). *Comparative Public Affairs Administration: surveying border of critique knowledge*. Bangkok: Thammasart University
- Cheung, B. L. A. (2002). The politics of new public management: Some experience from reforms in East Asia. In K. McLaughlin, S.P. Osborne & E. Ferlie (Eds.). *New public management: current trends and future prospects* (pp. 243-273). New York: Routledge.
- Chakrabarty, B. & Chand, P. (2012). *Public administration in a globalizing world: Theories and practices*. New Delhi: SAGE.
- Cheung, A.B.L. & Scott, I. (2003). Governance and public sector reform in Asia In Cheung, A.B.L. and Scott, I. (Eds.) *Governance and public sector reform in Asia*. 1-24. New York: Routledge.
- Chinwanno, C. (2001). USA and Thailand in the Context of Common Security in South East Asia. William L. Bradley and Chullacheep Chinwanno. (Eds.). *In the Route of Superpower. Document of the US Foreign Policy on Asia*. Bangkok: Project of Torch Printing.
- Col, J., Holzer, M., Posner, P. & Rubin, M. (2006). *Results-based management in Thailand*. Evaluation report.
- Denccombe, M. (2010). *Ground rule for social research* (2nd ed.). London: Bell and Bain.
- Denhardt, R, B. (2008). *Theories of public organization* (5th ed.). Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth.
- _____. (2000). *Theories of Public Organization* (5th ed.). CA: Thomson Wadsworth.
- Denhardt, R, B. & Denhardt, J, V. (2006). *Public administration: An action orientation* (5th ed.). Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth.
- Dhiravagin, N. (2524). Japanese culture and quality control circle. *NIDA Development Journal*, 21(4), pp. 604-616.
- Dimock, M.E., Dimock, G. O. and Fox, D. M. (1983). *Public Administration*. (5th). New York: CBS College Publishing.

- Dubnick, M, J. & Romzek, B, S. (1991). *American public administration*, New York. NY: Macmillan Publishing.
- Duivenboden, H, V. & Thaens, M. (2008). ICT-driven innovation and the culture of public administration: A contradiction in term?. *Information polity*, 13, 213-232.
- Fattore, G., Lapenta, A. & Dubois, H. F.W. (2012). Measuring new public management and governance in political debate. *Public administration Review*, 72, 218-227, Retrieved from <http://www.dx.doi.org:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2011.02497.x>.
- Farazmand, A. (2001). Comparative and development public administration: past, present, and future. In A. Farazmand, (Ed.). *Handbook of comparative and development public administration* (pp. 9-21). NY: Mareel Dekker.
- _____. (2002). Administrative reform and development: An introduction. In A. Farazmand, (Ed.), *Administrative reform in Developing Nations* (pp. 1-11). CT: Praeger.
- _____. (2004). Sound governance in the age of globalization: a conceptual framework. In A. Farazmand, (Ed.). *Sound governance: policy and administrative innovations*. (pp. 1-25). CT: Greenwood publishing group.
- Flynn, N. (2002). Explaining the new public management: the importance of context. In K. Mclaughlin, S.P. Osborne & E. Ferlie (Eds.). *New public management: current trends and future prospects*. (pp. 57-75). NY: Routledge.
- Frederickson, George. H. & Johnston, M. Jocelyn. (Eds.). (1999). *Public Management Reform and Innovation: research, theory, and application*. Alabama: The University of Alabama Press.
- Fry, B, R. & Raadschelders, J, C, N. (2008). *Mastering public administration: From Max Weber to Dwight Waldo*. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
- Greene, D. J. (2004). *Public Administration in the New Century: A concise introduction*. Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth.
- Hagensick, C. A. (2513). Administrative reorganization proposals in Thailand. *Thai Journal of Public Administration*, 10, pp. 552-562.

- Haque, S, M. (2007). Theory and practice of public administration in Southeast Asia: Traditions, directions, and impacts. *International journal of public administration*, 30, 1297-1326, Retrieved from <http://www.dx.doi.org:10.1080/01900690701229434>.
- Hart, C. (1998). *Doing a literature review*. London: Sage publications.
- Heady, F. (2001). *Public administration: a comparative perspective*. (6th ed.). New York: Marcel Dekker.
- Henry, N. (2010). *Public administration and public affairs* (11st ed.). New York: Pearson Education.
- Holzer, M., Gabrielyan, V., & Yang K. (2007). Five great ideas in American public administration. In Rabin, Jack Hildreth, W. Bartley. & Miller, Gerald. J. (Eds.). *Handbook of Public Administration* (3rd ed.). New York: CRC.
- Hood, C. (1991). A public management for all seasons? *Public Administration*, 69, 3-19. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9299.1991.tb00779.x
- Horie, M. (2011). Administrative reform in Japan: Subject, methods and results. AAPA Conference, Jakarta: n.p.
- James, O. (2004). The UK core executive's use of public service agreements as a tool of governance. *Public Administration*, 82, 397-419.
- Jantawanich, S. (2005). *Qualitative Research Methodology*. Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Printing.
- _____. (2004). *Qualitative Data Analysis*. (6th ed.). Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Printing.
- Jarnson, P & Berg, B. W. (2505). Executive development in Thailand. *Thai Journal of Public Administration*, 3, pp. 209-235.
- Jennings, D. & Disney, J. (2006). The strategic planning process and its context: the role of psychology type. *Journal of General Management*, 31 (3) 75-93.
- Jingjit, R. & Fotaki, M. (2010). Confucian ethics and the limited impact of the new public management reform in Thailand. *J bus ethics*, 97, 61-73, Retrieved from <http://www.dx.doi.org:10.1007/s10551-011-1073-9>.
- Johnson, W. (1996). *Public administration: Policy, politics, and practice* (2nd ed.). Dubuque, IA: Brown & Benchmark.

- Jullajakkrawat, J. (2004). *Ideas of Working among the Thai Bureaucrats and the New Public Management*. Dissertation of Doctoral Degree in Political Science, School of Political Science; Chulalongkorn University
- Jun, J, S. (1986). *Public administration*. New York, NY: Macmillan Publishing.
- Kannasut, K (1985). Problems of Imparting Different Mainstream Culture in Social Change. *NIDA Development Journal*. 25(2), pp.235-249.
- Karo, E. (2012). Modernizing governance of innovation policy decentralization: A new fashion or threat or a to state capacities?. *Innovation: Management, policy & practice*, 14(4), pp.495-509.
- Kelly, M., Yutthaphonphinit, P., Seubsman, S. & Sleigh, A. (2012). *Development policy in Thailand: From top-down to grass roots*. Retrieved from <http://www.dx.doi.org/10.5539/ass.v8n13p29>.
- Ketsuwan, R. (2010). *Basic Knowledge of Public Administration*. (3rd ed.). Bangkok: Borpitch.
- Khoomsap, P. (1980). Situations and Oil Policy in the Country 1979. *NIDA Development Journal*, 20(2), pp.175-208.
- Kittikachorn, T. (1962). Government Policy to Develop Civil Servants. *Thai Journal of Public Administration*, 2(30), pp.403-432.
- Komin, S. (1990). Culture and work-related values in Thai organizations. *International journal of psychology*, 25, 681-704, from Elsevier science publishers B.V. (North-Holland)
- Koven, G. Steven. (2011). Bureaucracy, democracy, and the new public management, in Macao, Berman, Evan M (Eds.). *Public Administration in Southeast Asia: Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, Hong Kong*. (pp. 140-). New York: CRC.
- Koosriphitak, S. and Koosriphiphat, S. (1979). Articles of Public Administration in Thailand. Uthai Laohawichian, Pratchaya Wesaratch and Chalermphol Srihong. (Ed.). In *Public Administration, Scope, Status and Development in Thailand* (pp. 156-194). Bangkok: Thammasart University Printing.
- Krongkaew, M. (1980). Impacts of Decentralized Income of the Rising Taxation and Oil Price in the Country: methods and preliminary results. *NIDA Development Journal*, 20(2), pp.163-174

- Kowittaya, S. (2005). *Development Administration*. Songkhla: School of Organization, Songkhlanakharin University (handouts).
- Kuhn, T, S. (1962). *The structure of scientific revolutions*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Laohawichian, U. (1978). Public Administration Change: a study on the influence of political science, behavioral science and administrative science. In Uthai Laohawichian, Patchaya Wesaratch and Choler Srihong (Eds.), *Public Administration – status scope and development in Thailand*. Bangkok: Thammasart University Printing.
- _____. (1987). Philosophy of Master Program in Public Administration in the Past and in Present. In Worradej Jantarasorn and Nattha Winijnaiphak. (Eds.), *Four Decades of Public Administration* (pp. 829-858). Bangkok: School of Public Administration, NIDA.
- _____. (1983). Doctoral Program of Administration Development. *NIDA Development Journal*, 23(1), pp.135-149.
- Lbrahim R. (2504). Public Administration in Thailand. *Thai Journal of Public Administration* 2(2) pp. 340-363.
- LeMay C. Michael. (2009). *Clashing values in the administration of public policy* (2nd ed.). United States: Thomson Wadsworth.
- Levine, C, H., Peters B. G. & Thompson, F, J. (1990). *Public administration: Challenges, choices, consequences*. Scott, Foreman and company.
- Lorsuwannarat, T. & Buracom, P. (2011). Performance management reforms in Thailand. In E.M. Berman (Ed.). *Public administration in Southeast Asia: Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Macao* (pp. 95-111). New York: CRC Press, Francis and Taylor.
- Lutrin, C, E. & Settle, A. (1985). *American public administration* (3rd ed.) Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
- Lynn, L, E. (2006). *Public management: Old and new*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Lorsuwannarat, T. (2005). *E-Government*. (2nd ed). Bangkok: Rattana-trai Printing.
- Marakanont, R. (1980). Financial Crisis of 1979. *NIDA Development Journal*, 20(2) pp.261-289

- Marie, J., Holzer, M., Posner P., & Rubin. M. (2006). *Results-based management in Thailand*. Retrieved November 10, 2014, From http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTHAILAND/Resources/CDP-G/392030-1163054967445/Jeanne_Marie_Results_based_management_in_Thailand.pdf
- Mavhiki, S., Nyamwanza, T., & Linnet, D. (2013). An evaluation of rbm implementation in the civil service sector in Zimbabwe. *European Journal of Business and Management*, 5(32), 135-139.
- McCourt, W. (2002). New public management in developing countries. In K. Mclaughlin, S.P. Osborne & E. Ferlie (Eds.). *New public management: current trends and future prospects*. 227-242. New York: Routledge.
- Micheli, P., Schoeman, M., Baxter, D. & Goffin, K. (2012). New business model for public-sector innovation. *Research - Technology Management*, 51-57. Retrieved from <http://www.dx.doi.org:10.5437/08956308X5505067>
- Milakovich, M. E. Gordon, G. J. (2001). *Public Administration in America* (7th ed.). Bedford/St. Martin's.
- Miles, B. M. & Huberman A. M. (1994) *Qualitative data analysis* (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, California: Sage publication.
- Milkis, S.M. (2008). *Theodore Roosevelt, the progressive party, and the transformation of American democracy*. University Press of Kansas.
- Mongkol, K. (2012). Globalizing new public management: a pilot study from Thailand. *Research journal of business management*, 6(1), 19-29. Retrieved from <http://www.dx.doi.org:10.3923/rjbm.2012.19.29>.
- Mutebi, A. M. (2009). Good governance and the constraints of local conditions: Thaksin and the breakdown of Thailand's public integrity system. In M. Ramesh. & Scott Fritzen (Eds). *Transforming Asian governance: Rethinking assumptions, challenging practices* (pp. 116-134). New York: Routledge.
- _____. (2012). Good governance and the constraints of local conditions: Thaksin and the breakdown of Thailand's public integrity system. In M. Ramesh and Scott Fritzen, (Eds). *Transforming Asian governance: rethinking assumptions, challenging practices* (pp.116-134). New York: Routledge.

- Mutebi, M.A. & Sivaraks, P. (2007). Public management reform drivers in Thailand. *International Journal of Public Administration*, 30(10), 1083-1102.
- Nakata, T. (1977). Corruptions in the Thai Bureaucracy: Opinion Survey with Civil Servant and People. *NIDA Development Journal*, 17(3), pp.355-405.
- _____. (1980). The Problems of the Thai Political System in 1980s. *NIDA Development Journal*, 20(3), pp.353-369.
- _____. (1985). The Thai Politics and Administration in 1980s. *NIDA Development Journal*, 24(1), pp.158-165.
- Nimpanich, J. (2007). *A qualitative research on political sciences and public administration*. Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Printing.
- Nitikraipoj, S. (1999). *Public organization: concepts, models, and administrative method*. Bangkok: Civil Servant Office Printing.
- Ockey, J. (2004). State, bureaucracy and policy in modern Thai politics. *Journal of contemporary Asia*. 34(2), 143-162.
- O'Donnell, M. & Turner, M. (2005). Exporting new public management: performance agreements in a Pacific microstate. *International Journal of Public Sector Management*, 18(7), 615-628. Retrieved from <http://www.dxdoi.org/10.1108/09613550510624077>.
- Oliver, P. (2008). *Writing your thesis* (2nd ed.). New Delhi: SAGE.
- Osborne, S. P. & Brown, L. (2011). Innovation, public policy and public services delivery in the UK: the word that would be king?. *Public Administration* 89, 1335-1350 Retrieved from <http://www.dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.2011.01932.x>
- Osborne, D. & Gaebler, T. (1992). *Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is transforming the Public Sector*. Englewood cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
- Osborne & E. Ferlie (Eds.). *New public management: current trends and future prospects*. 181-194. New York: Routledge.
- Otley, D. (2008). Performance Management: A Framework for Analysis. In Thorpe, R. and Holloway, J., (Eds). *Performance Management Multidisciplinary Perspectives*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Painter, M. (2006). Thaksinisation or managerialism? Reforming the Thai bureaucracy. *Journal of contemporary Asia*, 36(1), 26-47. Retrieved from <http://www.dx.doi.org: 10.1080/00472330680000031>.
- Patanapongse, W. (1994). Application of benchmarking to improve productivity. *NIDA Development Journal*, 34(1), pp. 119-170
- _____. (1996). The changing world of executive in Thai management environment. *NIDA Development Journal*, 36(3), pp. 109-128.
- Pongatichat, P. (2005). *The alignment between performance measurement and strategy in central government agencies*. (Unpublished doctoral thesis) University of Warwick.
- Pathmanand, U. (1985). Influence of International Organization and Foreign Government on Thailand's Economic Policy: A Case Study of American Influence. In Rangsan Thanaphonphan and Somboon Siriprachai (Editors). *Dependency Theory on Thailand's Socioeconomic Context*. (pp. 229-312). Bangkok: Thammasat University Press.
- Pattamanont, U. (1984). Influences of the international organization and foreign governments on the Thai economic policy: a case study on the US influences. In Rangsan Thanapornphan and Somboon Siriprachai (Eds.), *The dependency theory and the Thai socio-economy*. Bangkok: Thammasart University Printing.
- Pengsuwan, P. (2005). *Good Governance and Effectiveness of Municipality Administration*. Master Degree's Thesis, Mahidol University, Nakhon Pathom: Mahidol University.
- Permthanjit, K. (1984). The Influence of the International Organizations and Foreign Government on the Thai Economic Policy: a case of World Bank. In Rangsan Thanapornphan and Somboon Siriprachai (eds.). *Dependency theory and Thai socio-economy*. Bangkok: Thammasart University Printing.
- Petchko, Katerina. & Amoroso, Donna. (2012). *Academic writing for graduate study GRIPS*. Tokyo: National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS).
- Petel, I. (2006). Understanding innovations and practices. United Nations. *Innovation in governance and public administration: Replicating what works*

- (publication No.ST/ESA/PAD/SER.E/72). New York: A United Nations Publication.
- Peters, B, G. (1995). *The politics of bureaucracy* (4 th ed.). White plains, NY: Longman publisher.
- Peterson, F. (2503). Public Administration in Thailand. *Thai Journal of Public Administration* 1(1), pp. 36-51.
- Phairin, B. (1994). Reengineering New Public Management. *NIDA Development Journal*, 34(1), pp.215-228.
- Phookpan, P. (2012). *An analysis of organizational culture of integrated public organizations: The case of Thailand*. (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). University of Manchester.
- Phongphajit, P & Beker, C. (2003). *Political economy in bangkok era*. Silkworm.
- Photisita, C. (2006). *Science and arts of qualitative research*. Bangkok: Amarin Printing and Publishing
- Plainoi, S. (2002). *Response to economic crisis by the Thai civil society*. Bangkok: Wasin Printing.
- Poister, T., H. (2010). The future of strategic planning in the public sector: linking strategic management and performance. *Public Administration Review*, s246-s254
- Poocharoen, O. (2005). *Comparative public management reform: Comparative of policy transfer in Thailand and Malaysia*. (Unpublished doctoral dissertation) Syracuse University.
- Pollitt, C. & Bouckaert, G. (2011). *Public management reform a comparative analysis: new public management, governance, and the neo-weberian state* (3rd ed.). New York: Oxford university press.
- Pongatichat, P. (2005). The alignment between performance measurement and strategy in central government agencies. (Unpublished doctoral dissertation) The University of Warwick.
- Prasitratthasindhu, S. (1995). Proper Performance Indicators for Project and Plans Performance Audit. *NIDA Development Journal*, 35(3), pp.89-89.
- Pratchayapruet, T. (2005). *Development Administration: Meaning, Content, Approach and Problem*. Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University

- Preeyakorn, P. (1977). Stipulating the State Policy: Analysis of Problems and Exits for the Developing Countries. *NIDA Development Journal*, 17(1), pp.1-25.
- Program Assessment and Implementation Completion Report. (2006). *Thailand country development partnership: governance and public sector reform (CDP-G)*.
- Promrin, N. (2009). *The Thai public administration evolution 1955-2008*. Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University.
- Punch, K. (2005). *Introduction to social research: Quantitative and qualitative approaches* (2nd ed.). London: Sage publications.
- Punyaratabandhu, S. & Unger, D. (2009). Managing performance in a context of political clientelism: The case of Thailand. In C. Wescott, B. Bowornwathana & L. R. Jones (Eds.). *The Many Faces of Public Management Reform In The ASIA-PACIFIC Region*. 279 – 305. WA: Emerald Group.
- Raksasat, A. (1975). Institute and process to develop policy in Thailand. *Thai Journal of Public Administration*, 15, 18-75.
- _____. (1985). Introductions of Prof. Malai Huwanant and Prof. Choob Kanjanaprakorn. In Uthai Laohawichian and Prathan Kongritthisuksakorn. (Editors). *Public Affairs Administration: academic article*. (pp.9-15). Bangkok: Phapphim.
- Rebekkah S, & John J. (2010). *The Role of Path-dependency in public administration and economics and Implications for the future*. Annual Conference of the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration.
- Rigg, J. (1991). Grass-roots development in rural Thailand: A lost cause?. *World development*, 19 (2/3), 199-211.
- Rivenbark, W. C. (2006). Evolutionary theory of routine: Its role in results-based management. *Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management*, 18(2), 224-240.
- Rivenbark, W. C. & Menter, P, W. (2006). Building results-based management capacity in nonprofit organizations. *Public Performance & Management Review*, 29, 255-266. Retrieved from <http://www.dxdoi.org/1530-9576/2006>.

- Rosenbloom, H. D. & Kravchuk, S. R. (2005). *Public administration: Understanding management, politics, and law in the public sector*. NY: McGraw-Hill.
- Sammaphan, N. (1987). Quality Construct Cycle. *NIDA Development Journal*, 27(1), pp.40-83.
- _____. (1994). The Enterprise Strategization. *NIDA Development Journal*, 34(4), pp.68-86.
- Samudavanija, C. (1998). *100th Anniversary of Public Sector Reform, Evolution of State Power and Political Power*. (3rd Ed.). Bangkok: Sukhum and Son Publishing.
- Satitniramai, A. (2013). *Thai Government with Economic Reform: From the Origin of Banker Capitalism to Economic Crisis 1997*. Nonthaburi: Same Sky Books Publishing.
- Selaratana, S. (2009). *Accountability in the Thai public sector. Public Administration in Southeast Asia: Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Macao*. (pp. 113 – 137). New York: CRC Press.
- Setsiam. (1998). *The United States: Strategy of dominion*. Bangkok: Amarin Printing and Publishing
- Shafritz, J, M., Russell, E W & Borick, C. (2011). *Introducing public administration*. (7th Ed.) Pearson Education.
- Siffin, W, J. (2001). Problem of development administration. In Ali Farazmand (Ed). *Hand book of comparative and development public administration*. New York: Mareel Dekker.
- Siriprachai, S. (2009). Good Governance under Globalization: Thailand Implication. *Journal of Political Science*, 30, 1-112.
- Sivaraks, P. (2011). Civil Service System in Thailand. In Berman, Evan M. (Ed). *Public Administration in Southeast Asia: Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Macao*. (pp. 113 – 137). New York: CRC Press.
- Songklin, P. (2008). *Public Sector Management Reform: A Case Study of New Public Management in Thailand and Singapore*. (Unpublished doctoral dissertation) Thammasat University.
- Spitzer, R. D. (2007). *Transforming performance measurement: rethinking the way we measure and drive organizational success*. New York, NY: AMACOM.

- Subramaniam V. (1990). *Public administration in the Third World*. Connecticut: Greenwood Press.
- Suddhaves, C. (1996). *Thai labor relation: Building-theoretical development and reform*. Bangkok: The Thailand Research Fund.
- _____. (2001). *School of thoughts in Thai society: Preliminary critique evaluation and the case of school of historical politics economy and community culture in 60 years*. Chatthip Natsupha. Bangkok: P. Press.
- _____. (2013). Innovation: Scientific points of consideration with organization and innovation administration in Thailand. *Journal of Intelligence*, 8(2) pp. 52-77.
- Swiss, J. E. (2005). A framework for assessing incentive in result-based management. *Public Administration Review*, 65(5), 592-605.
- Thammasart University, School of Political Science, Research Institute. (2003). *A project study to collect information of politics and government administration of Thailand: Database of Bureaucracy and Politics*. Bangkok: printing unquoted.
- Thanaporphan, R. (1989). *The Process of stipulating economic policy in Thailand: a historical analysis of political economy 1932-1987*. Bangkok: Social Science Association of Thailand
- Thawornwisutthikul, P. (1998). *Bureaucracy Reforms of Thailand*. Thesis of Political Science, School of Political Science: Chulalongkorn University.
- Thiralap, A. (1984). OD-values needed re-evaluation. *NIDA Development Journal*, 24(2), pp.203-237.
- Thongthammachart, K & Phongphaew, P. (2008). *Thai bureaucrats: consciousness and idealism*. (4th ed.). Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Printing.
- Udomwisawakul, N. (2005). *Entering the agendas and the stipulations of public policy: a case study on the policy of agro-products and foods standards in Thailand*. (Unpublished doctoral dissertation): Chulalongkorn University.
- United States General Accounting Office. (2000). *Emerging benefits from selected agencies; Use of performance agreements* (GOA-01-115). Washington, DC: United States General Accounting Office.

- Vichit-Vadakan, J. (2011). Public ethics and corruption in Thailand. In E.M. Berman (Ed.). *Public Administration in Southeast Asia: Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Macao*. (pp. 113-137). New York: CRC Press.
- Vorakulpipat, C. (2008). Exploring knowledge value creation practices: An interpretive case study. (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). University of Salford.
- Waroonpittikul, Y and Rerngjit, S. (1999). *Citizen Sense: an essay of people on the civil society route*. Bangkok: The Foundation of Learning and Civil Society Development.
- Walker, R, M, Avellaneda, C., N. & Berry, Frances, S. (2011). Exploring the diffusion of innovation among high and low innovative localities. *Public Management Review*, 18(1), 95-125. Retrieved from <http://www.dxdoi.org/10.1080/14719037.2010.501616>.
- Watcharee, S. (1995). IT and Organization Development. *NIDA Development Journal*, 35(1), pp.1-16.
- Weber, M. (1973). Bureaucracy. Richard J. Stillman (ed.). *Public administration: Concepts and cases*. MA: Houghton Mifflin.
- Wichaidis, T (1978). An Analysis of the Thai Bureaucracy: a case study of the change on public administration. In Worradej Jantharasorn and Nattha Winijnaipak. (Eds.). *Four decades of public administration* (pp.475-512). Bangkok: NIDA.
- Wilson, W. (1887). The study of administration. Richard J. Stillman (ed.). *Public administration: Concepts and cases*. MA: Houghton Mifflin.
- Wolcott, H. F. (1994). *Transforming qualitative data: Description, analysis, and interpretation*. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage publication.
- Wongpreedee, A. & Mahakanjana, C. (2011). Decentralization and Local Governance in Thailand. In Berman, Evan M. (Ed). *Public Administration in Southeast Asia: Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Macao*. (pp. 53 - 77). New York: CRC Press.
- Worrathepphutti-phong, T. (1967). The administration of the advisory committee to the prime Minister and the Law Advisor Committee. *NIDA Development Journal*, 7(1), pp.56-89.

- Wiratchniphawan, W. (2003). *Provincial CEO: governors, CEO governors, Bangkok governor and the chairpersons of provincial administration organization*. Bangkok: V.J. Printing.
- _____. (1999). The Thai administrative court: a comparative analysis, models, structures, authorities, and personnel administration and the Administrative Courts of England, France and Germany. *NIDA Development Journal*, 39(2), pp.47-70.
- Wongwanich, S. (2005). *Research on needs evaluation*. Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Printing.
- World Bank. (1999). *Kingdom of Thailand public sector reform program*. East Asia and Pacific Region.
- World Bank. (2011). *Implementing results based management in Thailand*. Retrieved November 10, 2014, from http://www.opdc.go.th/uploads/files/GET_Results_Based_Management_Report.pdf
- Yadav, N., Sagar, & Sagar. (2013). Performance measurement and management frameworks. *Business Process management Journal*, 19, 747-970. Retrieved from <http://www.dxdoi.org/10.1108/BHMJ-01-2013-0003>.
- Yadhanasindhu, C. (1994). The use contracting in the public sector: Experience from some Asian Pacific countries. *NIDA Development Journal*, 34(2), pp.1-22.
- Yaemkot, L. (2004). *A Comparative study on privatization policy between the administration of Chuan Leekphai Second Term (1997-2000) and Thaksin Shinnawatr, First Term (2001-2004)*. Thesis of Public Administration, School of Political Sciences: Chulalongkorn University

BIOGRAPHY

NAME	Parin Pengsuwan
DATE OF BIRTH	June 8, 1980
PLACE OF BIRTH	Ban Thong Lam Jiak, Chian Yai District: Nakhonsithammarat
EDUCATION	Mahidol University, 2010-2016 D.P.A. (Public Policy and Public Management) Mahidol University, 2003-2004 M.A. (Public Administration) Prince of Songkhla University, 1999-2003 Public Administration
THESIS FUNDS	- The Royal Golden Jubilee Ph.D. Program B.14: 2013-2015 - Master and Doctoral Funds of 2004
WORK EXPERIENCES	Plan and Policy Analyst Bureau of Policy and Strategy The office of Permanent Secretary of Justice Ministry of Justice