

## CHAPTER 7

### CONCLUSION

#### 7.1 Introduction

The study examines agrarian transformation through organic and fair trade rice production and certification in the context of flexible accumulation and agricultural restructuring in northeastern Thailand. The agrarian transformation in northeastern Thailand here focuses on question of flexible accumulation and question of standardization in relation to industrialization. A summary of the main findings of the dissertation is presented in the following section, followed by a discussion of how these findings can contribute to: the current debates on agrarian transition, the agro-food study, the governmentality study, and the practices of politics.

#### 7.2 Principal Findings

##### *7.2.1 Emergence of Organic Agriculture in Northeastern Thailand as the Outcome of Twin Processes of Flexible Accumulation and Agricultural Restructuring*

The first research question is “Why have local farmers and natural environment in northeastern Thailand been incorporated into global organic and fair trade networks in the context of flexible accumulation and agricultural restructuring?” To answer this research question, it is important to understand the relationship between the twin processes of flexible accumulation in advanced capitalist countries and agricultural restructuring in Thailand. Let me start with the association between organic agriculture and flexible accumulation. The growth of organic agriculture is closely related to increasing demand for high quality food and the rise of flexible specialization. Organic agriculture is an alternative path of development associated with small-scale producers, offering environmental friendliness and satisfying

specialized demand. As a result, it is hoped that organic agriculture may help overcome the problems of capitalism such as environmental destruction, as well help accelerate capital accumulation.

The expansion of organic food markets in advanced capitalist countries has encouraged the shift in national policy in developing countries toward export-oriented organic agriculture. Consequently, the Thai government encourages the shift to organic agriculture in the hope that it would help Thailand to develop flexible specialization in the production of high value food in the context of trade liberalization and the internationalization of food. Thailand's agricultural restructuring policy aims to promote modernized and standardized agriculture and to encourage the internationalization of organic rice. Therefore, the rise of organic agriculture in northeastern Thailand is a response to emerging niche markets and to the national agricultural restructuring policy.

To develop flexible specialization in organic rice production, the re-arrangement of the organization of production is needed because it helps to reduce transaction costs, increase bargaining power, and enlarge market opportunities. Here, contract farming is used as a principal means to recruit conventional farmers to grow organic rice for export, and to link between producers and other actors in organic and fair trade rice network. The contract used in organic jasmine rice scheme is resource-provided contract; the development project who acts as a contractor and provides the farmers necessary production inputs and acts as a buyer who controls overall production practices and quality of rice in accordance with international regulations.

Through resource-provided contracts, the contractor also specifies operational decisions which include those regarding the type of rice seeds to be used, quantity and quality of inputs, choice of production regime, design of farms, and decisions concerning when and how to intervene in production, and off-farm processing firms. Lastly, the resource-provided contract specifies marketing decisions. It covers when, where, at what price, in what quantity, at what quality, and to whom the product is sold. The resource-provided contract represents a vertical integration of small-scale farmers into the international markets for fair trade and organic rice. Moreover, it is an important tool to facilitate the re-arrangement of agricultural practices, the re-

organization of production unit at the firm level, and the re-rationalization of production along industrial lines.

Apart from the re-arrangement of farm management, flexible specialization in organic and fair trade rice scheme is created through the re-arrangement of internal organization management to comply with fair trade standards, focusing on participation, democratic decisions, fair pay for the producers, and workers' rights. Moreover, flexible specialization in organic jasmine rice scheme is created through re-arrangement of the farmers' relations with suppliers or buyers within organic rice commodity chain to bypass the local rice merchants and to strengthen the producers' capacity to export rice. It is to say that although the organic jasmine rice commodity chain is initiated by the local NGO, the chain is driven by international institutions and global actors. Ideally, the organic food networks rest on production inputs which are derived from on-farm resources and local-based suppliers. However, in practice only some production inputs of fair trade and organic rice are derived from on-farm resources and local-based suppliers, but other production inputs are obtained from non-local suppliers. Moreover, organic and fair trade rice is sold through the channels generally used in conventional trade. For this reason, I argue that organic and fair trade rice network does not fit with the concept of alternative food networks as it is often assumed. Rather, it is horizontal and conventional food network.

The conversion to organic rice farming is also a strategy employed by northeastern Thai farmers to cope with the problems of environmental deterioration and fluctuated rice prices. The emergence of niche markets in northeastern Thailand has brought about both opportunities and challenges. On the one hand, the farmers participating in the global niche markets benefit from the shift to organic rice farming in several ways. The farmers who grow organic rice for export can access technical knowledge, production inputs, credits, loans, and marketing information which are basic needs for the conversion to new crops. Moreover, they are assured about certainty of access to international niche markets; they are provided the guaranteed minimum price for organic rice according to fair trade standards; they are provided fair trade premium in addition to rice prices for supporting rural development. Apart from economic benefits and market enlargement, the farmers consider organic rice farming as helping to improve soil fertility and the natural environment, as well as



being good for their health. Moreover, organic rice farming can help the farmers obtain sensory pleasure and self-esteem because they are recognized as producers of safe and quality food.

On the other hand, the farmers participating in these global niche markets confront difficulties related to intensive labor use, tighter control by international regulations, increasing production costs, and high risk of loss. The emergence of global niche markets in northeastern Thailand brings about “new” forms of domination and subordination. It is new form of domination because the domination here is beyond economic exploitation. Yet it is based on the control of nature, the control of organization of production, and the creation of ideological domination. The economic exploitation is based on the extraction of surplus from the producers through low rice prices. It is correct that the guaranteed organic rice price is higher than that of non-organic rice. Yet, compared to other actors such as contractors, exporters, importers, and retailers, the northeastern farmers gain less from the production of the primary commodity or brown unpolished rice, while the importers, rice mills, and the retailers in developed countries gain more from the economic rent being created in the commodity chain.

### ***7.2.2 Significant Role of International Regulations and Governing Farmers’ Lives and Agricultural Practices***

The second research question is “How are the regulations of organic rice and fair trade standards enforced on farmers and the agro-ecological environment of the Northeast through certification?” To answer this research question, it is necessary to examine the mechanisms of governmentality. The organic and fair trade rice scheme is a project of governmentality which Tania Murray Li calls the “project of the will to improve” (Li, 2007: 5).

The organic rice farming project here aims to create well-being for poor farmers and to improve the natural environment in the Northeast in accordance with organic and fair trade standards. The principles of organic agriculture serve as guidelines for organic practitioners to formulate organic rice farming practices. The attempt to reformulate agricultural practices in the Northeast to respond to the organic

standards to comply international standards is a rationale of the government. To make sure local farmers have been trained to make sense of the organic principles and requirements of international standards, the training session is used as a mechanism for promoting the organization's norms, for producing and reproducing dominant ideologies, and for conducting agricultural practices in a scientific way. Moreover, the farmers are informed about benefits of organic rice production under certification systems because organic rice would be only recognized in the international markets if it is certified by internationally certifying organizations. Certification builds confidence in consumers that the organic rice has been produced and processed in accordance with international standards. Thus it creates added value for organic rice and enables the farmers to benefit from premium prices.

To receive certification by internationally recognized organizations, however, the producer's organization and international control systems have been established to ensure full compliance with organic regulations by participating farmers. The enforcement of international regulations onto northeastern Thai farmers allows global actors to control at a distance; it makes possible the re-arrangement of agricultural practices, the transformation of physical landscape, and the control of labor to be inserted into organic rice production system in order to enable greater accumulation.

To govern farmers and agro-ecological environment in organic rice production system, I argue that six technologies of government are employed together. These technologies of government are the enforcement of regulations on the farmers, the detailed supervision for organic rice production, the use of contracting, the use of internal control systems, and verification through auditing work, the use of farm map making and farm records, and the making of self-regulated farmers. These technologies of government confer a certain ideological legitimacy for the capitalists and the state who claim that they are developing rural areas. The use of tactics of persuasion aims to construct a hegemonic rationality which produces the consent among participating farmers by making farmers unconscious of the conduct of conduct through the education of desires, awareness rising, and configuration of habits and practices. The construction of hegemonic rationality is the fundamental

way to encourage the re-configuration of farmers' beliefs and farming practices to fit with the neo-liberal agendas, focusing mainly on economic efficiency, transparency, and accountability. The construction of hegemonic rationality lends legitimacy to the use of intensive labor and the privatization of common resources.

Moreover, the operation of rendering technical refers to the attempt to identify problems relating to organic rice farming as a technical problem in order to screen social-and political aspects of organic rice farming out of the areas of intervention. As a result, the operation of rendering technical makes possible the use of calculation to solve the problem which is complex and it also confirms the role of the experts who identify the problems of others and rectify corrective measures to solve such problems. The use of farm map making is a technology of government which is employed to make visible the unknown object, to turn key characteristics of agriculture into a standardized category, and to make amenable scientific management, monitoring, assessment, and control at a distance. The farm map making aimed at making boundary of interventions which organic rice farm and agro-ecological environment of organic farms is made to be intelligible and countable.

Moreover, the production of intimated nature such as life-planted barrier, and protected area in organic agriculture indicates that the drive of sustainability initiative is far beyond the control of labors but it is also the control of nature, as nature is re-arranged and turned into things to be disciplined and controlled. The production of intimated nature rests on the enforcement of regulations and the use of scientific knowledge to assure the consumers about the safety and prevention of contaminations in the production processes. The production of intimated nature and biological characteristics of organic rice commodity is linked with the production of green and clean natural environment; this association can create economic rent.

The use of contract farming in the organic rice scheme is a technology of governmentality in organic rice scheme for two reasons. The first reason is that the use of contract farming in organic rice production makes practical the enforcement of codes of practice on the farmers. Another reason is that the use of contract farming in the organic rice production makes amenable the restructuring of the agro-food production system in response to new demands of consumers. Contracting represents disciplinary power because it represents the ideals of organic farming and fair trade to

be followed, and at the same time it specifies the penalties for those who break the rules. In reality, the claim of power and knowledge to upgrade food production has extended beyond the control of agricultural practices to cover other aspects of the farmer's life such as farm management in subsistence plots and in shared cropping plots which are required to be organic, despite the fact that production within subsistence plots and shared cropping plots lay outside contract production.

The use of the farm record is another technology of food governance. It is employed to create the subjectivities of modern farmers who recognize the importance of self-regulation and calculation. Through the training of farmers to learn about farm recording, the farmers are trained into the believing that expectation of higher productivity per farm and improvement of agro-ecological environments are their goals and benefits. So, they discipline themselves and agree to comply with international regulations, even if they would be undertaken by the farmers at their own expense.

Finally, the use of auditing work is technology of government. The practices of auditing are used to monitor and verify the degree to which the codes of conduct are actually enforced on farmers. The auditing work represents a technology of government employed to achieve the control of internal control system. In organic rice scheme in northeastern Thailand, auditing works on three related operations: sampling testing; risk analysis; and the evaluation of internal control systems. Through the practice of auditing, the farmers, extension service officers, accounting officers, and internal inspectors are turned into new subjects of scientific management and expert authority. They assess the efficiency, accountability, and transparency of the internal control systems of the organization. Moreover, the social conditions of production, organic methods, and production inputs are turned into new objects of scientific management. As the emergence of auditing and certification infers abstract systems and expertise systems, this study argues that it is a tool of governmentality employed to achieve the control of internal control systems. The use of auditing work represents the control of administrative management and a new form of domination in neo-liberalization.

### *7.2.3 The Social and Environmental Consequences from the Governmentality and Certification of organic rice*

The third research question is “In what ways do local farmers perceive, negotiate and contest the rise of international regulations and certification of organic and fair trade rice?” To answer this question, it is necessary to examine the differential labor process among different groups of farmers engaged in organic rice scheme. Then, it can be possible to determine differential impacts of enforcement of regulations on farmers engaged in organic rice scheme.

It is correct that organic rice farming has high transaction costs and high production costs. The farmers producing under the contract bear all production risks, marketing risks, and risk of transitional period. Yet, different groups of farmers have differential capacities in access to land, labor and capital; this leads to differential impacts on farmers in organic rice scheme. The small-scale farmers are the most vulnerable groups because they have the less economic rent, but they have highest risk of loss. Poor farmers cannot survive by growing organic rice, but they cannot diversify crops, due to having limited land. Some poor farmers rent land to be able to diversify crops. The smallholders who grow non-organic rice in the rented the land are at risk of being forced to quit the project because they are not allowed to do so according to the regulations. However, the small-scale farmers earn mostly from off-farm jobs and wage laborers. The incomes obtained by the small-scale farmers from wage laborers and wage remittances help them to be able to invest in agriculture and to hire laborers to work on farms.

The medium-scale farmers have higher capacities in access to land, labor, and capital rather than small-scale farmers. They better diversified sources of income than small-scale farmers; they combine agricultural and non-agricultural activities such as wage labor, small businesses, and civil servant jobs. So, they can make higher profits from organic rice farming than small-scale farmers.

The large-scale farmers have highest capacities in access to land, labor, and capital. They acted as farm managers and did not use family labor to work on farms, but they earned the highest incomes from agriculture. Nevertheless, the large-scale

farmers have highest labor costs which comprise seventy percent of total production costs, so they have less incentive to grow organic rice.

The study of differential labor process among different group of farmers indicates that agrarian transformation in the Northeast is increasingly developed towards capitalist production. The farmers who have relatively greater land, labor and capital can make more profits from the capitalist-based production. Moreover, the recent development of organic rice production indicates the coincidence of two contradictory tendencies. On the one hand, the large-scale farmers benefit more from participating in niche markets. On the other hand, the small-scale farmers benefit less and are increasingly marginalized from participation in niche markets. Therefore, I argue that even if the fair trade aims to promote the well-being of small-scale farmers, they are increasingly excluded from niche markets.

The international regulations and market pressures have differential impacts on farmers. The farmers respond to international regulations and contractual relations in organic rice in different ways; these practices can be situated in Li's (2007) concept of "practices of politics". The practices of politics refer to the expression of a critical challenge. It often starts out as a refusal of the way things are, and thus opens up a front of struggle (Li, 2007: 12).

The practices of politics employed by the farmers of Na Sawan sub-district include questioning certified rice seeds, distrust of the expert judgment on the risks of contamination, distrust in the calculation method adopted by the experts, diversification of rice crops, modification of rice farming practices, hidden rice selling, harvest the crops in ways that maximize their wages.

The international regulations are formed in developed countries, but these regulations are imposed on growers in developing countries and certification are performed by the inspectors who are not accustomed to the cultural settings of rural communities in which these rules are enforced. These factors cause the farmers to not make much sense of the intention of the regulations and not accept these stipulations.

The farmers' questioning certified rice seed is an example of a challenge to the legitimacy of the standardization and certification; this practice of politics provides them the ground for contesting the legitimacy of one-percent rice sale deduction. Additionally, the farmers distrust of the expert judgment on the risks of contamination

is a practice of politics. The charge of chemical fertilizer use and spraying insecticide in organic plots is critical in organic rice scheme, but only the project experts have the authority to render judgment. The farmers recognize the limitation of field inspections and vulnerability of experts, the covert behavior relating to chemical fertilizer and insecticide use is a challenge to the regulations and authority of the experts. It challenges the power of the experts who try to create space of purification and space of exclusion.


The farmers' questioning legitimacy of regulations imposed on them reflects the peasant mistrust in the abstract systems of regulations, risk assessment, standardization, certification, and expert authority which are important institutions of modernization in agriculture. Dialogues and contestations between the farmers and experts concerning issues of certified rice seeds, risk management, and estimation of yields in the processes of inspection and certification point to areas of tensions, contingency, and vulnerability within the abstract systems of regulations and certification.

Interestingly, the Laotian laborers under contract production also adopt the practices of politics. Laotian laborers always get lower wages than do Thai laborers, although they work harder than the Thai ones. Therefore, they harvest the crops in ways that maximize their wages. Getting the work done in the shortest time without caring for the interests of employers or the extent of potential loss is a way of taking advantage of the piece-rate system by the Laotian laborers.

### **7.3 Theoretical Reflections**

#### ***7.3.1 Rethinking Agrarian Transformation, Contract Farming, and Industrialization in Agriculture***

As mentioned in Chapter 1, Marxists, modernization theorists, and post-modernists share an assumption that agrarian transition is developing towards industrialization, where processes of “de-agrarianization” and “de-peasantization” cannot be avoided. Scholars of “de-agrarianization” such as Rigg (2001, 2002, 2005 and 2008) and Elson (1997), argue that rural livelihoods have been increasingly de-



linked from farming, as rural lives more and more become detached from the land and depend upon non-farm wages instead. Within this perspective, wealth is accumulated independent of land, and poverty cannot be determined by land-based production (Rigg, 2006). Therefore, the analysis of agrarian transition may shift its focus from the production domain to other domains such as consumption and migration.

This study finds that migration has greatly affected livelihoods of farming households and off-farm wages are becoming more important to the livelihoods of farming households in northeastern Thailand. The household survey finds that incomes derived from wage labor and wage remittances by farming households in the Northeast are higher than incomes derived from agricultural activities. Moreover, it is correct that a small amount of family members within farming households are engaged in agriculture. The majority of them engage in non-agricultural wage labor. Yet, it does not lead to the process of “de-peasantization”.

I confirm Bryceson’s (2001) argument that the process of “de-agrarianization” cannot be treated as equivalent to the process of “de-peasantization”. This study argues that the process of “de-peasantization” does not emerge in the Northeast because northeastern farmers spend a large amount of their incomes derived from wage labor and waged remittances to invest in land improvement, in both conventional and organic agriculture, and in hired laborers to work on farms.

Moreover, Watts and Goodman (1997) examine the agrarian question in the context of globalization. They argue that once farmers are incorporated into global commodity production, agricultural production has shifted to commercialization and agro-industrial production (Watts, 1997). This analysis points to the linear development of peasant society from de-peasantization towards industrialization.

The analysis of contract farming in relation to agro-industrialization emphasizes the process of proletarianization, and real and formal subsumption of labor under capital cannot be avoided. Within this perspective, farmers engaged in contract farming tend to lose their autonomy. They are tighter controlled by the capitalists. They are turned into “disguised labor” who work in contract production but are not paid. Finally, they use the means of production to serve the demands of and to make profits for capitalists. This line of analysis also echoes the belief in a

linear development from peasant society towards de-peasantization and industrialization (Watts, 1994a; Watts, 1994b).

However, this study argues that it is correct to say that the farmers engaged in export-oriented organic rice farming are more tightly controlled by the capitalists. Laborers within farming households such as children and women work but are not paid, and most of the surplus from the value added created in the organic rice scheme is extracted from the farm level toward contractor. I argue that the processes of proletarianization and formal subsumption of labor under capital do not occur because the organic farmers still own the means of production, but they do not use the means of production to serve the demands of and to make greater profits for the capitalists only.

Rather, the farmers try to create flexibility and create a room for maneuver by diversifying their crops even though they are not allowed to do so. They avoid being tightly controlled. They choose to follow some rules which benefit them, but they ignore many rules which increase their burdens as well as the rules which require higher expenses. Moreover, they try to create negotiating spaces within the contract production in many ways. For instance, they modify rice farming practices, manipulate scheme rules, and among other practices. Because of these practices by the farmers, the attempt to govern farmers and agricultural practices and to install agro-industrialization has not proved successful. As such, I argue that the process of semi-proletarianization, not the process of proletarianization, occurs. In addition, the use of contract farming in the organic rice scheme does not lead to industrialization, but to multiple trajectories of agrarian transformation.

### ***7.3.2 Rethinking of Governmentality***

Foucault's concept of governmentality concentrates on a certain way of thinking and acting to know, to improve, and to govern the wealth, health, and happiness of populations. Foucault puts attention to the question of "how" power of government exercises to conduct the others' conduct and to produce consents among those who to be governed. Foucault's concentration on technologies of government implies a new idea about the exercise of power, focusing mainly on systems of

thinking about the practice of government (Foucault, 1991: 87-104). However, Foucault analyzes governmentality as the abstract notion.

Tania Li (2007) adapts Foucault's concept of governmentality to analyze the reality of the "Will to Improve" of well-being of population. Li highlights some aspects of the attempt to enhance biodiversity through community forest management projects. This study follows Li's analysis of governmentality in the sense that this study also analyzes governmentality through development project on organic and fair trade rice production.

However, governmentality in organic and fair trade rice schemes is further than the attempt to improve well-being of population and to enhance biodiversity, but it also involves with commercialization. The governmentality here aims to integrate rural development into commercialization in order to create greater flexible accumulation through commercialization, control of labor, control of administrative management, control of nature, endorsement of entrepreneurship, and certification. Therefore, the regulatory regime of organic and fair trade rice schemes consists of the control of production process and the control of agro-ecological environment.

Moreover, Li analyzes how the power of governmentality works through many development projects and creates intended and unintended consequences. Yet, Li does not touch upon an ethnographic analysis of what actually happened to community forest instantiated in a particular program in a particular place. However, this study tries to provide an ethnographic analysis of the "practices of governmentality" in order to know what actually happen to everyday life of farmers, rural communities, and natural landscape which are objects of government. Furthermore, this study tries to provide an ethnographic analysis of the "practices of governmentality" in order to know in what ways that those who are governed experience, interpret, and react to the attempts to govern and to improve their lives.

Another dimension of government is the capacity to act upon the other at a distance in order to conduct ways of seeing and perceiving things. The center can act upon others who live far away through the production of regimes of truth, the identification of problems by the experts and the specification of solutions to such particular problems in order to achieve desirable outcomes. In this study, there are some technologies of governmentality which are employed to install the capacity to

act upon the farmers at a distance such as making farm map, farm recording, and auditing work.

Despite the attempt to act upon farmers through the production of regimes of truth, the identification of problems by the experts, and the specification of solutions to such particular problems, I argue that the power of government is not totalized, but it is fracture. The rupture of power of government emerges because the use of technologies of governmentality to conduct the farmers' behaviors and to govern nature creates contingency, failure, and unintended consequences. The contingency, failure, and unintended consequences emerged in organic rice production and certification systems lead to the practices of politics by the farmers.

### *7.3.3 Rethinking of Practices of Politics*

Li (2007) employs the concept of “practices of politics” as the expression of a critical challenge by forest dwellers against the attempt to govern. Li uses this concept to describe how forest dwellers in a national park in Indonesia came to articulate a collective, critical position, and act on it. These practices of politics include forest dwellers' narratives of the injuries, broken promises, desperation, and hopes that persuaded them to take control of their food farmland and attempt to build a better future for their families. The practices of politics by forest dwellers are the outcome of the will to govern, as the forest dwellers have been displaced from their original land, instilled habits of calculation, and formed desires for education and a home near a road with good access to markets (Li 2007:12).

Similar to Li's analysis of the practices of politics, this study also uses concept of “practices of politics” to refer to the expression of a critical challenge by northeastern Thai farmers who produce organic rice under the contract. The practices of politics by farmers of Na Sawan sub-district include questioning quality standards, distrust in the expert knowledge, and neglect and manipulation of organic rice scheme rules. Various strategies adopted by organic farmers represent practices of politics point to areas of vulnerability and contingency in the production and certification processes of organic and fair trade rice schemes.

These practices of politics by northeastern Thai farmers are the outcome of the will to govern, since the farmers have been trained to become familiar with notions of calculation, efficiency, entrepreneurship, transparency, and accountability. They then can adapt these notions derived from the will to improve to question and challenge the system of government. Additionally, Li argues that the contingency in development programs concerning community forest management points out that the development interventions play a role in the process but mostly in ways that are unintended and indirect.

The northeastern farmers' responses also point to vulnerability, contingency, and unintended consequences that occurred in the organic and fair trade rice schemes, such as misuse of the fair trade premium, financial control through the group savings program, conflicts within family farms, and conflicts between organic farmers and their neighboring farmers. Therefore, this study goes further than Li's analysis of practices of politics in the sense that this study examines how the farmers who are governed perceive, interpret, and react to the attempt to govern in their daily lives. Moreover, it goes further to study how the farmers make use of vulnerability, contingency, and unintended consequences to question and fight back against the system.

However, I argue that the farmers' practices of politics here cannot be analyzed as resistance to capitalism, because farmers do not reject the capitalist production of which they are a part. Rather, the practices of politics by northeastern Thai farmers intend to balance power relations between the parties that aspire to govern and the farmers who are being governed. Moreover, the practices of politics by northeastern Thai farmers seek to create negotiating spaces within the capitalist production system to gain more profit and reduce tensions and conflicts emerging in the processes of standardization and certification.

#### **7.4 Concluding Remarks**

This dissertation provided an insight into the process of agrarian transformation from conventional toward organic rice farming in the context of flexible accumulation and agricultural restructuring. The export-oriented organic rice

production system by 2002 was part of Thailand's agricultural restructuring policy and a part of agricultural restructuring at the global level. The global agro-food networks try to create flexibility in regard to transaction costs, organizational re-innovation, farm management, resource management, labor recruitment and labor compensation. At the same time, the global agro-food networks try to make more profit through the creation of value added to organic rice commodities and the use of governmentality to control production processes and natural resources. The creation of value added in the organic rice and fair trade rice schemes is made possible by the constitution of semiotic meanings as exchanged value attached to fair trade and organic rice, and by certification.

This study focuses attention on the governmentality of the organic and fair trade rice scheme through rural development projects in such production. Various forms of governmentality used in organic and fair trade rice schemes represent the "Will to Improve" of the well-being of farmers and the ecosystem. Yet, ethnographic analysis of the "practices of governmentality" finds that the outcomes of development interventions have not proved successful or as intended. The ethnographic analysis of governmentality helps to reveal direct and indirect outcomes of development interventions. Moreover, it helps to shed light on the vulnerability, contingency, and unintended consequences emerging in such development interventions. The contribution of the ethnographic analysis of the governmentality is that it analyzes how the farmers who are governed perceive, interpret and react to the attempt to govern in their daily lives, and how the farmers make use of vulnerability, contingency, and unintended consequences to fight back against the system.

The practices of politics by the farmers point out that the attempt to govern farmers and agricultural practices is not totalized, and the attempt to create agro-industrialization in the organic rice scheme has not proved successful. As such, this study argues that the use of contract farming in the organic rice scheme leads to the process of semi-proletarianization and multiple trajectories of agrarian transformation.