

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Despite this research focuses on glocalization, global governance and press freedom, as its title suggests, other relevant principles and concepts are brought up herein for sake of better understanding in overall presentation, for instance, values, policy implementation, media in Asia, etc.

2.1 Relevant Literature

2.1.1 Policy Implementation

Marvin S. Soroos, in a *Theoretical Framework for Global Policy Studies*, suggests that while policy studies have rarely been employed to analyze beyond the domain of nation-state, forms of international governance, in fact, have evolved through which public policies are formulated and implemented to address global problems. Before proceeding to the global policy process, the concept of policy problems needs elaboration. The term ‘policy problem’ is a set of circumstances that can potentially be improved upon by purposeful action (Soroos, 1990, p. 310). The circumstances, in this case can be an actual condition as in the problem of undernourished people worldwide, or a future possibility such as nuclear war. Based on this concept, global policy problems are problems which arouse concerns throughout the world community and are expected to be raised by international

organizations. Besides, Soroos added that most global policy problems fall into one of three categories: transboundary problems originate in one state but have ramifications for others; conflicting uses of international commons; and problems that are essentially internal to states, but which appear in international agendas either because they are common to many states, or because what occurs within a given state is of concern to the outside world (Soroos, 1990, p. 311).

To cope with policy problems, a global policy process will be utilized. The process includes many stages from recognition of problems, formulation of policy (regulations or programs), decision-making, implementation, to evaluation of policy. States, NGOs, international organizations or institutions, and specialized agencies are all involved in this policy process. In the initial stage of implementation, state governments are the major actors, complying with international commitments. States also put pressure on other states to comply with international rules. Other players are international institutions and specialized international agencies. International institutions generally have no authority or means to enforce regulations. However, in reality, specialized international agencies can facilitate long-term policy implementation.


The following article relates to this paper in the sense that it indicates which problems are global and which are not. Besides, it explains the overall process of global policymaking, which includes a brief overview of implementation and the actors involved in the process.

In *The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments*, David G. Victor says that the term implementation process combines not only numerous acts of governments, who will transmit international commitments

into domestic actions such as regulations and new laws, but also activities of non-state actors whose activities are stimulated by international institutions in order to fulfill international commitments. Regarding this point, Victor notes two perspectives on implementation: (1) how governments and non-state actors use international institutions and procedures to monitor and review implementation, and to handle problems of poor implementation (implementation review), and (2) how international commitments are translated into action—or implemented—at the national level (national implementation)¹.

Figure 1

Schematic view showing the formation and implementation of international environmental agreements (Victor, 1998, 5)



In national implementation, participation of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) must be observed. It is how NGOs (as well as other stakeholders) participate in implementing and enforcing policies; and how

¹ National implementation will be a focus in this research.

participation influences outcomes. Further, the author stresses that changes in target behavior are what matter in the end (Victor, 1998, p. 4).

Behavioral changes are the ultimate goal since it means objectives of international commitments are achieved. Different types of behavior contributing to the objectives are possible. Changed behavior in target groups also implies effectiveness of the agreements. Effectiveness, here, is defined as the extent to which the accord causes changes in the behavior of targets that further the goals of the accord (Victor, 1998, p. 6). Nevertheless, it does not equate with compliance, since strong compliance may be followed by a limited influence on behavior. Compliance is not the end in itself but rather a means to achieve effectiveness (Victor, 1998, p. 7).

While agreements consisting of binding and nonbinding commitments are the focus in Figure 1, there are, in reality, other factors that influence behavior and effectiveness of agreements as well. First, the nature of the problem varies: some problems are easier to address than others and some international agreements are easier to implement than others. Likewise, the ratio of costs to benefits, the distribution of costs and benefits, and strategic considerations such as international economic competitiveness are influential factors. Configurations of power, which means that powerful states may be able to use threats or inducements to ensure the implementation of international agreements, are the second factor. For example, the U.S. can apply sanctions or employ economic power to alter the behavior of target states. Third, international institutions can lead to more effective international cooperation. Institutions have established principles and processes for making decisions; they can formulate decisions that affect behavior directly, as well as shape expectations, which also influence behavior (Victor, 1998, p. 11). In other words,

institutions represent regimes where norms and mechanisms of cooperation are included. Fourth, public concern can also contribute to behavioral change and effectiveness. When public concern is high, altered behavior will follow from public pressure.

Elaborating on policy implementation and solving global environmental problems, this article can be applied to this research since it emphasizes the role of states as the leading implementers, bound by international commitments. Interestingly, states do not only enforce international agreements, but they also need to conform to the expected standards. As a result, in this article effectiveness refers to the changing of state behavior, not simply compliance, which is the main indicator measuring the successful implementation of global governance.

In *Researching Well-Being: Communication between the Needs of Policy Makers and the Needs of People*, J. Allister McGregor studies the difference in meaning and concept between “poverty” at international and at a local level, which must be understood in order to formulate policies and effectively solve the problem. The central argument is that effective poverty policies must best be founded on local understanding of how poverty is reproduced, and how we relate universal and local understandings, based on Stephen Gudeman’s model of local and universal models, which is described as a cognitive frame of reference (McGregor, 2004, p. 339). In other words, it tells how a person understands the process involved in what they are observing. Based on this explanation, a local model of poverty entails a view of what constitutes poverty and how it is reproduced from the perspective of a person who lives it (McGregor, 2004, p. 339). There may be a variety of such models depending on gender, age, and so on. On the other hand, a universal model transcends the local,

and seeks to explain phenomena and processes from a standpoint independent from a local context. That is, it is derived from a value position. Having elaborated these two models, McGregor stresses the constructive engagement:

While universal models offer a means of bringing order to the bewildering complexity and diversity of local models, it is an academic challenge not to lose sight of important dimensions of complexity and diversity. It is also a political challenge to bring more local understanding as a legitimate contribution to the global contestation (McGregor, 2004, p. 304).

Poverty in the universal model refers to deficits, material insufficiency (income, food, shelter) and how the conditions arise. However, poverty in local models can be wider than that, or different from that. It is noted that practitioners in the major agencies and governments have often taken recourse to universal models at the expense of local understandings. Universal understandings have been pushed down to inappropriate levels in the design of policies affecting the lives of real people in very different social contexts. While some of this ‘universalizing’ tendency may be driven in part by the compelling needs of bureaucracy for rules, principles and for comparability, it is argued that if policies are to be workable then it must be possible for them to be translated into meaningful local terms (McGregor, 2004, pp. 349-350). The article gives a success example of a debt and credit program developed under Bangladeshi Grameen Bank, which was designed based on the local model of poverty.

To comprehend the model, Grameen bank employed NGO fieldworkers² to gather information from local contexts. Also, the fieldworkers were central to a number of key decisions that shaped the Grameen Bank model from the outset (McGregor, 2004, p. 341). Based on their work, it was concluded that the poverty problem was not rooted in insufficiency, but because the poor rural people had a problem accessing loans and credit. As a result, to solve this issue the Bank's policies and programs were designed, formulated, and implemented based on this local reality and understanding.

Since glocalization, which is the major theme of this research, involves a contest between, and accommodation of, the 'global' and the 'local', this article, by using the term 'model', is intended to give an idea of where the 'global' and the 'local' groups are standing according to their value-based positions, and how differently they observe each other's issues. Although the interaction of differently defined poverty between the global and the local was studied in the article, this theme can also be adapted to represent freedom of expression in this research, since the term represents the global concept on one hand, and the local view on the other, rooted in a variety of historical backgrounds.

"Approved programme and Budget 2006-2007" issued by UNESCO states that the central role of the Communication and Information Programme is building a knowledge society, which in turn requires free exchange and broad diffusion of information, ideas and knowledge through both traditional channels and ICTs. In this

² Besides a good understanding of the local model, Merilee Grindle added that policy effectiveness requires skilled implementers who are able to work with a detailed understanding of 'content' and 'context' as well as 'resources' to assure effective implementation (McGregor, 2004, p. 350).

context, freedom of expression, free flow of information, opinion and knowledge, as well as free and equitable access to information and knowledge are essential elements for empowering people and ensuring their participation in a knowledge society (UNESCO, 2006, p. 188). To achieve this objective, the “empowering people through access to information and knowledge with special emphasis on freedom of expression” (UNESCO, 2006, p. 188) is the principle priority in implementation of the WSIS Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action. The priority is based on the idea that there can be no access without freedom, or freedom without access. Action will be initiated along four main thrusts: (i) promoting freedom of expression, (ii) creating an enabling environment which is conducive to and facilitates universal access to information and knowledge, (iii) developing effective “infostructures,” and (iv) stimulating the development of, and access to, diverse content. The actions under the first thrust are geared towards attaining the objectives of promoting freedom of expression and freedom of the press, establishing internationally recognized standards for freedom of expression and freedom of information, developing accountability, ethics and professional standards in journalism as well as enhancing the role of the media in democratic governance (UNESCO, 2006, p. 191).

Since concrete implementation is a concern of UNESCO, some main focuses were detailed. Creating legislative, regulatory and policy conditions conducive to freedom of expression and freedom of the press will be targeted. Also, a discussion about professional standards will be fostered, including the accountability of news and information agencies, professional ethics together with monitoring of working conditions. UNESCO and its partners will continue to play a leading role in sensitizing the international public and governmental authorities about press freedom,

and promoting the rights of media professionals through international and regional alert networks, especially the International Freedom of Expression Exchange (IFEX) network. Additionally, UNESCO will focus on the creation of an international strategic partnership to reduce the digital divide and build inclusive knowledge societies. Member states will be assisted in developing legal and policy frameworks promoting universal access to information. (see Appendix II)

This article provides the overall scope of WSIS follow-up, or the implementation process of UNESCO. Details and objectives involving actors are elaborated.

2.1.2 Media in Asia

Shelton A. Gunaratne, in the *Media in Asia: an Overview*, is a study of the concept and values of western-oriented human rights and media freedom in Asian—South, Southeast and East—regions. The study utilizes the report from Freedom House, which sets criteria based on Article 19 to show the different levels of press freedom in the region: Thailand is partly free, and Singapore and China are not free. Laws and regulations in these countries are the most important factors affecting freedom of the press. Nevertheless, since the Freedom House report used a western lens to observe Asian media, the author also touched upon ‘Asian values’ of press freedom from an oriental viewpoint to clarify the term human rights from another aspect.

There is a real need to re-examine Western theories and practices in the light of Asian cultures and traditions. However, the search for an Asian

perspective does not imply rejection of the Western perspective. It should take whatever is useful and put this in the context of that society's social structure, cultural values and religious beliefs (Gunaratne, 1999, p. 206).

In contrast to Western human rights values, which praise individualism, democracy and liberalism, Asian values emphasize communities and groups more. Moreover, influential Confucian philosophy, cooperation and consensus have long been rooted in East and Southeast Asian countries. Based on these epistemological differences, the 'Asian values' school equates press freedom with press-government harmony (Gunaratne, 1999, p. 206). Some ASEAN journalists proposed an Asian model of journalism in which the press works with the government to build a national consensus. Yet, a concern is that, in the final analysis, the press in the model of press-government harmony can be used as a governmental public relations agency in communist countries. Additionally, Asian values should be viewed as an idea which tries to safeguard national identity and cultural distinctiveness in the face of domination or monopoly by Western media, cultures and values (Gunaratne, 1999, p. 209).

William Atkins, in the *Politics of Southeast Asia's news media*, studies the emergence of a new political development regarding media, television, satellite and cable and state censorship in post-colonial Southeast Asia during 1990-2000, when radical changes in the media landscape took place. Interestingly, the governments are trying to promote an 'information society' on the one hand, but on the other hand they also seek channels to control these media and information in order to sustain national development and nationalism. For this purpose, 'Asian values' is the means employed by the government to promote the idea of a unique set of consensual, non-threatening

information practices in contrast to confrontational Western media approaches (Atkins, 2002, p. 3).

Since most Southeast Asian countries were colonized, and later gained independence, the foremost underlining sentiment has been nation building, nationalism, and harmony in multi-ethnic societies, especially Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines. Interestingly, Anderson (1983) has defined a nation as:

‘An imagined political community – and imagines as both inherently limited and sovereign’ In case of Southeast Asian states the element of imagination is of great importance. ‘Nation-ness’ as well as nationalism are ‘cultural artifacts’, which are distilled from discrete historical forces and became capable of being transplanted to a variety of political, ideological, geographical loci (Atkins, 2002, pp. 18-19)’.

This means ‘the nation exists as much in people’s minds as it does in the world’ (Atkins, 2002, pp. 18-19). Television which was pioneered during post-colonization has been used by governments claiming the process of national development. Television and national development are often paired concepts in historical accounts of the post-colonial period in Southeast Asia. Nation building became a central plank in media policy, and television worked both to educate and promote national identification in the interests of national development and cohesion (Atkins, 2002, p. 15). Undoubtedly, it was the cornerstone of state power and authority. Centralization of media for political and economic purposes was evident. Pessimistic or oppositional political discourse was prohibited. The television sectors remained consistently more a voice of the state than did the press (Atkins, 2002, p. 15).

In Singapore, nation building and communal harmony is a priority at the expense of media freedom. As a result, a raft of laws and regulations, some dating back to the colonial period, remain in force (Atkins, 2002, p. 23). This situation is not applied only to domestic media but also foreign media as well. The Newspaper and Printing Press Act empowers the government to ‘restrict the sale or distribution of foreign publications which have been declared as having interfered in the domestic politics of Singapore. (Atkins, 2002, p. 24)’

Unlike other countries in the region, Thailand has never experienced colonization. Consequently, nation building is not strongly rooted in the media culture. Moreover, the media are relatively liberal despite military-influenced politics. Nonetheless, it is obvious that television and radio are strictly controlled compared to print media. Regulations of 1974 stress the need to encourage national development—both economic and cultural. Besides, the royal family, the Thai nation and Buddhism are not allowed to be criticized on television (Atkins, 2002, p. 26).

Yet, the state-centric mediascape in Southeast Asia became challenged when satellite technology spread into the region during 1991-1993. The economically liberal ideology that fostered the environment for satellite television and online services came into conflict with the long-established position of sovereignty over broadcasting held by most regional governments (Atkins, 2002, p. 69). However, governments sought adaptive strategies for co-existence with international media corporations by employing the private sector as mediators of program content and distribution arrangements. However, there were a variety of outcomes in each country. It appears that the Singaporean government enforced a set of means for reassertion of state control, while Thailand took a softer stand toward international

services. Broadly speaking, states adopted five stages of reasserting control during this period.

- 1) Prohibition – Neutralizing access to international services by ensuring removal of – and prohibition of further installation of – reception antennae, or encouraging encryption of international services;
- 2) Information Society policies – Central-led construction of regional ‘information hub’ facilities that resulted in low-cost national delivery platforms (satellite or cable) which both competed with – and ultimately co-opted – international services;
- 3) ‘Sultans of satellite’ – accommodating private sector partners connected to the ruling national elite;
- 4) ‘Multi-channel alternatives’ – Developing commercial free-to-air multi-channel local language systems as mass television systems, whilst resisting the development of public broadcasting principles in a diminished state broadcasting sector;
- 5) Reinforcing national ideologies and concepts of Asian values as a strategy for managing public issues (Atkins, 2002, p. 73).

The first two strategies will be a focus in this paper, since prohibition impacts directly on journalistic professions and news consumers. The creation of an information society is the ultimate goal of the WSIS Conference, but unfortunately it has been distorted to accommodate individual state interests.

The initial response by states to DTH satellite television was one of prohibition. A key feature limiting the spread of satellite reception dishes was that they were the preserve of the wealthy. Those consumers with the economic strength to

afford DTH equipment are a minority – and less likely to be involved in anti-government activity (Atkins, 2002, p. 74). In the case of Thailand, private ownership of parabolic antennae required a government permit until 1992. When the requirement was lifted in response to free trade competition, there were an estimated 15,000 already installed, mostly among the military, administrative and socio-economic middle class in Bangkok. Additionally, the new regulation led to a conflict between military who desired to maintain information as a monopoly, and the Ministry of Communication who pursued neo-liberal policies. As a result, tension was obvious until the Black May street-protest incident, which resulted in bloodshed.

In Singapore, the government released a statement before the arrival of DTH satellite in Southeast Asia, saying that “Singapore has yet to allow the installation of the satellite dishes because such equipment would provide ultimate access to foreign programmes...some of which purvey values and lifestyles which are unacceptable to the majority of our people...we must also be careful of programmes which may be offensive on racial or religious grounds (Atkins, 2002, pp. 77-78).” Yet, the government faced the dilemma of preserving its nation-building ideology and utilizing business opportunities through television broadcasting. In the end, some institutions and organization, such as financial institutions, embassies and ministries were given parabolic antennae licenses. This reflected reconciliation of the dilemma and reflected the Singaporean government’s attempt at also being an information society.

In a pretext to being an information society, Singapore opened itself as a location for up linking facilities to relay programming on the satellite. By this scheme, the state could both dictate standards and take punitive action against transgressors (Atkins, 2002, p. 80). Furthermore, the IT2000 plan to become an ‘Intelligent Island’

(Atkins, 2002, p. 80) was initiated. In the State's effort to create an information society, the national ideology was unlikely dropped. As the minister of information and the arts emphasized "In this information age, the problem is how to maintain our sense of self among Singaporeans in the face of external influences that cannot be kept out. If we lose our distinctiveness as Singaporeans, we will lose our position in the world... We need a kind of semi-permeable membrane to preserve our own bubble in Singapore (Yeo, 1994, p. 81).

This statement is important in the sense that it explains the intertwined historical relationship of media development and post-colonized states in Southeast Asia, hence the origin of Asian values—media for nation building—is implied. It gives a clue as to why the media culture in Asian contexts is different from the Western one, despite the fact that the region received media technologies from the West.

The Voice of China: the Interplay of Politics and Journalism, edited by Chun-Chuan Lee, studies the Chinese political nature which affects journalism. In "commandism"³ during the Mao Zedong regime, Chinese media were loyal servants of the state, the Party, but not of the people. They were used by the state commandism to create a "total institution" and impose ideological hegemony on the civil society (Lee, 1990, p. 5). However, the bottom-up structure reached its epitome during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Later, when the economic revolution policy was pursued under Deng Xiaoping, Mao's totalitarianism was transformed into more

³ Lee has explained "commandism" as an embellished Leninism-Stalinism built on traditional feudalism that intrudes into every facet of social life and puts individual thought and behavior under scrupulous control. National power is totally centralized in what Su Shaozhi, a reform Marxist scholar, has called a unified "Party-state-military-economic-ideological complex in which a small corps of senior leaders atop the pyramidal structure make final decisions (Lee, 1990, p. 5).

relaxed authoritarianism. Three differences were notable: first, the State was less intrusive and the Party withdrew from some social aspects, second, the state did not impose an all-encompassing ideology, and finally, the state maintained a more stable political atmosphere so the media would focus more on economic issues. In brief, Chinese society became more pluralistic (although civil society was still weak) and long-established national ideology was deemphasized. Yet, the desired stable politics could not be created without any obstacles. On the contrary, Weber analyzed that post-Mao period failed to yield legal-rational authority whereby all power players abide by the rules of law rather than bow to personal qualities of an individual leader (Lee, 1990, p. 7). In addition, there were struggles between advocates of accelerated change and openness versus defenders of a more centrally planned economy. This political circumstance affected the media as well, since the fate of media reform followed the swing of the political pendulum during 1980s; press freedom gained ground when economic and political reform surged ahead, but it lost momentum when reform retreated (Lee, 1990, p. 7).

Meanwhile, before proceeding to a discussion about press freedom, democracy must be explained in the Chinese context. Democracy has been an elusive goal in modern China (Lee, 1990, p. 7) because its leaders wanted to maintain the ultimate power. This is a reason why, in Chinese Confucian soil the Western ideology and other relevant values such as freedom, are uneasily rooted. On the other hand, democracy was used as a path to make the country free from further humiliation at the hands of the Western powers.

Yet, it does not mean that there is no struggle for press freedom in China. The struggle takes place under differences of Marxist interpretation. The most

cogently developed argument has been offered by Sun Xupei, saying that bourgeois “forms” of free expression (publishing, reporting, and criticizing) must not be dismissed lightly (Lee, 1990, p. 13). He then concludes by envisioning that bourgeois “forms” of free expression be incorporated into the “substance” of socialist press freedom, where the so-called public ownership of the media prevails (Lee, 1990, p. 13). Later, when the issue of political reform was placed on the agenda at the 13th Party Congress in 1987, the importance of “supervision (by government) of public opinion” was mentioned, sparking an avalanche of articles from reformist journalists eager to take advantage of the invitation (Lee, 1990, p. 14).

Besides showing the relationship of government and media, this article gives essential examples of the concept of press freedom and Marxism, which is different from Singapore and Thailand, as well as the development of freedom of the press. Thus, it would help to analyze the present situation of the press.

2.2 Conceptual Framework

In order to answer two research questions, globalization and values must be conceptualized.


2.2.1 Globalization

According to George Ritzer, globalization emphasizes diversity, hybridity, and interdependence. It can be defined as the interpenetration of the global and the local resulting in unique outcomes in different geographic areas. This view

emphasizes global heterogeneity and tends to reject the idea that forces emanating from the west in general, and the United States in particular, are leading in economic, political, institutional, and most importantly cultural homogeneity⁴ (Ritzer, 2003, p. 3). In conjunction with local realities, the globalization of so many commodities and ideas gives communities, groups, and individuals in many parts of the world an unprecedented capacity to fashion distinctive and ever-changing realities and identities (Ritzer, 2004, p. 75), as illustrated by Figure 2.

Figure 2

Economic, political and cultural globalization, homogeneity (globalization), and heterogeneity (glocalization) in each realm



In the glocalization process, there are four essential elements (Ritzer, 2003, p. 77), which are:

⁴ Equating it to homogeneity, Ritzer uses a term 'grobalization', meaning a growing worldwide ability, of especially, largely capitalistic organizations and modern states, to increase their power and reach throughout the world (Ritzer, 2004, p. 74).

- 1) The world is growing more pluralistic. The glocalization theory is exceptionally sensitive to differences within and between areas of the world.
- 2) Individuals and local groups have great power to adapt, innovate, and maneuver within a glocalized world. Glocalization theory sees individuals and groups as important and creative agents.
- 3) Social processes are relational and contingent. Globalization provokes a variety of reactions—ranging from nationalist entrenchment to cosmopolitan embrace—that feed back on and transform globalization into glocalization.
- 4) Commodities and the media, arenas and key forces in cultural change in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, are not seen as (totally) coercive, but rather as providing material to be used in individual and group creation throughout the glocalized area of the world.

Roland Robertson's glocalization portrays the constitutive relationship between the global and the local. The global, or even the regional or the national constitutes an undermining of control on the part of much smaller social collectivities (Ritzer and Smart, 2001, p. 465). Here, the local, home or community does not exist independently. In fact, local has been globalized and stress on the significance of the local or the communal can be viewed as one ingredient of the overall globalization process (Ritzer and Smart, 2001, p. 465). In this sense, there is the local in the global and the global in the local. Additionally, what is similar to Ritzer's model is that Robertson also explains a global market which requires products' with a calculated

sensitivity to local circumstances, identities, and practices. In brief, it is the differences-in-sameness.

To achieve the process of glocalization, many players are involved: cities or local authorities, organizations and associations of cities and the network bringing them together, civil societies and NGOs, the private sector at a global and local level, international organizations, and national governments.

2.2.2 Values

As Ritzer implies in his work, glocalization, the negotiation process between global and local forces, is operating to seek shared values which will ultimately shape practice and behavior in a certain state or community, and will create a new face of global force. As a result, values need to be conceptualized by employing Social Constructivism. Its central concern is how ideas, values, norms, and shared beliefs are constructed by society; and how they shape the way actors (individuals, states) perceive their world. In other words, constructivism adds a social dimension that is missing from rationalist approaches. What is rational is seen as a function of legitimacy, defined by shared values and norms within institutions or other social structures rather than purely individual interests (Oxford University Press, online resource center, ch. 9). Besides, actors will accept new norms, values, and perception of interest, which lead to value change by socialization.

It is difficult to seek a fixed definition of values because the definition varies depending on fields of knowledge. Folsom uses values to cover 'any general pattern, situation or aspect of human behaviour, society, culture, the physical environment, or

their interrelationships. (Deth, 1995, p. 23)' MacLaughlin discusses values as 'preferences', 'needs', 'motivators', 'concepts' and 'situational relationships' (Deth, 1995, p. 23). In addition, Nye proposes that a value is 'a high-level abstraction which encompasses a whole category of objects, feelings and/or experiences. (Deth, 1995, p. 24)' In political science, the concept of values is at the core of Easton's famous definition of politics as 'those interactions through which values are authoritatively allocated for a society. (Deth, 1995, p. 24)' Within these various definitions, there are several features of values described by MacLaughlin (Deth, 1995, p. 28):

- 1) Values cannot be observed directly,
- 2) Values engage moral considerations, and
- 3) Values are conceptions of the desirable⁵.


How do values relate to action? Taking the first feature, values are the desirability in the matters of actions (Deth, 1995, p. 30). This means they need to be studied in relation to action or behaviour. To further clarify, when an individual holds any specific value, he/she will select available modes, or means, and then behave in a socially acceptable way. Here, the term selection represents a process engaging evaluation, judgment, and decision (Deth, 1995, p. 30). In other words, we weigh the choices between good and bad. Nevertheless, values do not generate any particular type of action; values are not about action as such, but rather abstract principles with which action is to conform, and values do not constitute action. This implies that values are closely linked with other ideas, beliefs, concepts, and understandings before they become action. As a result, people need some definition of the situation.

⁵ According to MacLaughlin, desire refers to a simple wish or a preference, while desirable goes beyond the idea of wish and want to bring in considerations with moral content.

Here, attitude⁶, which consists of cognitive and behavioral elements (Deth, 1995, p. 31), is depicted in Figure 3.

Figure 3

Relation between values and attitude influencing action in a situation.



It must be noted that values and attitude are parts of the same. Moreover, this mutual influence provides an opportunity for change or adaptation of values at the individual level. These individual-level changes may provide a clue to the understanding of processes of social and political change (Deth, 1995, p. 33).

⁶ Thurstone notes that the concept of attitude is the sum total of a man's inclinations and feelings, prejudice or bias, preconceived notions, ideas, fears, threats and convictions about *any specific topic* (Deth, 1995, p.31). Other scholars also emphasize 'specific topic or object' as an important element in attitude.