Accounting Conservatism and Management Earnings Forecast Errors of Listed Companies in Thailand

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ABSTRACT

ccounting conservatism prevents unverified good news from being quickly released and ensures that managers commit to more timely recognition of bad news in financial statements. This paper aims to investigate the relationship between accounting conservatism and management earnings forecasts errors. The sample comprises of listed companies that issued annual management earnings forecasts errors. The sample comprises of listed companies that issued using the Khan and Watts' (2009) none Results show that management earnings forecasts exhibit less errors when accounting conservatism is high. The findings suggest that conservative accounting mitigates information asymmetry by correcting management to disclose credible earnings forecast information, resulting in less error in forec stiny earnings.

Keywords: Accounting Conservatism, Management Forecast Accuracy, Voluntary Disclosure

ความระมัดระวังทางบัญชีกับความคลาดเคลื่อนในการ พยากรณ์กำไรโดยผู้บริหารงองบริษัทจดทะเบียนในประเทศไทย

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บทคัดย่อ

วามระมัดระวังทางบัญชีป้องกันการรับรู้รายการขัญดีที่ยังไม่ผ่านการพิสูจน์ได้อย่างน่าเชื่อถือในงบการเงิน และทำให้เชื่อมั่นได้ว่าผู้บริหารจะยึดมั่นในการรับรู้ข่าวร้ายที่เป็นรายการขาดทุนอย่างทันท่วงทีในงบการเงิน งานวิจัยนี้ทดสอบความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างาาม ะมัดระวังทางบัญชีกับความคลาดเคลื่อนในการพยากรณ์กำไร โดยผู้บริหาร ศึกษาข้อมูลบริษัทจดที่เบียนในตลาดหลักทรัพย์แห่งประเทศไทยที่เปิดเผยข้อมูลพยากรณ์กำไร ประจำปีในระหว่างปี พ.ศ. 2548–2555 การชักษา ซ้าวแบบของ Khan and Watts (2009) ในการวัดระดับของความ ระมัดระวังทางบัญชี ผลการศึกษาพบว่าความจากเคลื่อนในการพยากรณ์กำไรโดยผู้บริหารมีระดับความคลาดเคลื่อนลดลง เมื่อระดับของความระมัดระวังทางบัญชีในรายงานทางการเงินสูงขึ้น ผลการศึกษาแสดงให้เห็นว่า ความระมัดระวังทางบัญชี ช่วยลดความไม่เท่าเทียมกันของข้อมา จะทำให้ฝ่ายบริหารเปิดเผยข้อมูลพยากรณ์กำไรที่น่าเชื่อถือทำให้ความคลาดเคลื่อน ในการพยากรณ์ลดลง

คำสำคัญ : ความระมัดระวังทางขัญ ความแม่นยำในการพยากรณ์โดยผู้บริหาร การเปิดเผยข้อมูลตามความสมัครใจ

1. INTRODUCTION

Accounting conservatism is an attribute of verified earnings reports and has been a long and a convention in accounting, with its influence spanning for the past 500 years (Basu, 1997; Warts, 2003). Accounting conservatism is defined as "the accountant's tendency to require a higher force of verification for recognizing good news than bad news in financial statements" (Basu, 1997; 5, 4).¹ Core recently, conservative financial reporting is argued to assist in coping with management over retric disclosure incentives which helps alleviate value destruction associated with asymmetric information (Ball, Jayaraman, and Shivakumar, 2012; Guay and Verrecchia, 2007; LaFond and Watt, 2018). In addition, conservative reports have been found to influence the manager's decisions in issert earnings forecasts (Hui, Matsunaga, and Morse, 2009). These prior evidence are consistent with the argument that mandatory financial reports are used to confirm the credibility of voluntarily disclosure aformation (Ball et al., 2012), specifically management earnings forecasts. Conservatism in financial systements therefore affects the quality of management forecast information (Sun and Xu, 2012). This survy explores if conservative reporting reduces management earnings forecasts errors.

Corporate managers issue earnings forecasts to mitigate information asymmetry between corporate and outside investors (Lev and Penman, 1990). Management earnings forecasts represent one of the key voluntary disclosure mechanisms by which managers is blish or alter market earnings expectations, preempt litigation concerns, and influence their reputrice for transparent and accurate reporting (Hirst, Koonce, and Venkataraman, 2008). Studies identify factors associated with forecast accuracy or errors. Brown's (1988) analysis suggests that the degree accuracy of management earnings forecasts could be the result of deferrals, accruals, and the adoption of discretionary accounting changes that reduce forecast errors. On the other hand, more econt studies of Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta (2005) and Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) state that firm, with superior corporate governance tend to provide more accurate and less biased forecasts.

Prior research provide evidence mat conservatism influences managerial decisions in forecast earnings disclosures in terms of both quantitative characteristics and qualitative characteristics of forecasting (Hui et al., 2009; Sun and Xu, 2012). As the higher verifiability requirements of conservatism constrains managerial behave from withholding bad news and accelerating the announcement of good news (LaFond and Watts, 2005; Hui et al., 2009), it may establish an accounting system with more accurate ex-ante fore ast-based decisions and effective ex-post monitoring of managerial disclosure decisions that are made based on current earnings. In addition, since the purpose of an earnings

¹ This term is inved as news-dependent and referred to as 'conditional conservatism,' as opposed to the more news-i dependent 'unconditional conservatism.' Unconditional conservatism refers to the advanced recognition of expanses and revenue deferrals (Mora and Walker, 2015). In this paper, the term 'accounting conservatism' conservatism' are used to refer to 'conditional conservatism.'

forecast disclosure is to restrict asymmetric information (Lev and Penman, 1990) and managers have the incentive to make more accurate forecasts in order to avoid shareholder litigation risks, it is essible that conservative accounting could increase management motivation in issuing more accurate rolecast as a means of mitigating information asymmetry and litigation costs. This study posits that a counting conservatism would alleviate the degree of destruction on firm value which is a result of the inacco acy in disclosures caused by the aggressiveness of managers in voluntarily disclosing forecasts. The conjecture is consistent with Watts (2003) and Mora and Walker (2015), who contend that conservance accounting practices can mitigate moral hazard and adverse selection problems. If investors is a agency cost penalties on inaccurate earnings forecasts, then this study hypothesizes that o anagement earnings forecasts would carry more accuracy when conservative accounting is relative that o anagement earnings

To provide evidence on the negative relationship between conditional onservatism measure and management forecast errors, this study analyzes a sample of 1,016 firm-y ars of companies listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) that had issued annual management earnings forecasts during the period of 2005 to 2012. Noted that the disclosure of managemed earnings forecasts for listed firms in Thailand was voluntary. Thailand is an emerging market with an institutional environment that consists of complicated ownership structures and weak corpo at r_{35} cernance as compared to developed markets (Connelly, Limpaphayom, and Nagarajan, 2012). They it is essential for researchers and regulators to gain knowledge regarding the implications of mandated first cial information and voluntary disclosure information.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the discussions of previous literature and develops the hypothesis. Section 3 presents the research design, data definitions, and model specifications. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 presents the robustness test. Section 6 concludes on the over to approx.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

Accounting conservation is considered to be an influential and long-standing convention in accounting. Watts (2003) portrovs conservatism as an asymmetrical verifiability requirement for gains and losses that results in the asymmetric timeliness of earnings with respect to good news versus bad news on the income statement, and an understatement of net assets on the statement of financial position. Accounting convertism is viewed as a desirable recognition principle because it constrains the manager's at flity to hide bad news and accelerate the announcement of good news in financial statements. There offerential verifiability requirements inherent in conservative accounting thus reduce agency costs that would normally result from information asymmetry (García Lara, Osma, and Penalva, 2014; Lafont and Watts, 2008; Mora and Walker, 2015).

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According to more recent accounting literature, conservatism is found to influence managerial decisions in forecasting earnings and properties of earnings forecasts (Hui et al., 2009). Research by Huo et al. (2009) finds that conservatism is negatively related to the number of forecasts made by manager. Hui et al.'s (2009) findings indicate that a reduction in asymmetric information caused by the extly recognition of expenses as loss allows conservative accounting to act as a substitute for management forecast disclosures. In addition, Li (2007) suggests that managers issue forecasts more is use the to correct analysts' earnings expectations for accounting information on conservatism. The redings of Hui et al. (2009) and Li (2007) highlight the roles of conservatism and management forecasts in capital markets.

This study examines the relationship between conservatism and the magnitude of management earnings forecast errors. There are two proposed ways as to how conservatism orves as a mechanism that constrains the self-serving motivation of management in earning, forecasts. The first concerns management-shareholder conflicts of interests in which investors impose agency cost penalties on the market value of firms that voluntarily disclose information that are less occurate (Hui et al., 2009). All else equal, firms that have conservative financial reporting and policies are more likely to report losses on new projects or investments in a more timely manne (now those that have less conservative financial reporting and policies (LaFond and Watts, 2008; Watts, 2003). This inhibition on the manager's decisions will, in turn, constrain their self-serving motivation with voluntarily disclosing earnings forecasts because of the potential negative effects it will impose on shareholder value when less accurate management earnings forecasts are released.

The second way involves conflicts of interests between management and debtholders. Debt covenants have been argued to be the main driving force behind accounting conservatism (Watts, 2003), thus assuring that management dees not overestimate or underestimate earnings numbers when disclosing forecasts to the public. Using conservative report decreases information risks and sends out signals to the market concerning informatic and future performances which are important for debtholders when setting debt covenants (Artiach and Clarkson, 2011). These two mechanisms pressure managers to behave conservatively then voluntarily disclosing information. As a result, when conservative accounting is relatively high panesement forecasts tend to be more within the range of actual reported earnings, meaning that the na nitude of the difference between forecast earnings and actual earnings is smaller.

From the above discussion, this study expects that higher degrees of conservatism is associated with less management forecast errors. This leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis: There is a negative association between accounting conservatism and management earnings forecast error.

3. DATA AND METHODS

3.1 Data Source and Sample Development

The sample in this study is comprised of non-financial Thai listed firms that issued management earnings forecasts during the testing period of 2005–2012. Accounting and financial data re obtend from the DATASTREAM database by Thompson Financial. The management earnings forecasts freeach fiscal year are obtained from the NEWSCENTER databases. In Thailand, aside from the STT (e.g., the SETSMART database and SET website), the NEWSCENTER database serves as an alternative channel for collecting public management forecast disclosures data because most firms in the rase their forecasts through business press, newspapers and business journals. In the sample electron process, only point and range forecasts are included in the study because, in comparison to other types of forecasts, quantitative earnings forecast information are the most well-defined.

The collection method in this study follows that of Gong, 1, and Xie (2009) and Jarutakanont and Supattarakul (2012, 2013). The key criteria used in collecting measurement earnings forecast issued data are: (1) the earnings forecast must contain keywords including "expected earnings", "estimated earnings", "predicted earnings"; (2) the earnings forecast rust be based on the company's official news; (3) the earnings forecast data are limited to initial anagement forecasts; and (4) the earnings forecast must be found in at least two different data sources. The first and the second criteria are based on those by Jarutakanont and Supattarakul (2012, 2013), while the third is from Gong et al. (2009) and Rogers and Stocken (2005).

The first criterion ensures that the news discloses management earnings forecast information, not the actual performances of companies. The purpose of the second criterion is to ensure that company forecasts that are found in exceed news are estimated by the firm's management rather than by news reporters or financial analysts. The third is strictly directed towards the initial earnings forecasts rather than updated annul. Grecasts or earnings pre-announcements because an initial forecast captures managers' expectations and true believe about corporate' future prospect. Finally, the fourth criterion confirms that the number retrieved from the management earnings forecasts are valid and can be used in the analysis.

Based on the riter above, the selection process of the sample is as follows. An initial number of 1,267 firm-years we drieved from the databases. These data include annual earnings forecasts disclosed during the fiscal years of 2005–2012 and meet the specified selection criteria. Next, 178 firm-years are eigen ated because the earnings forecasts are disclosed prior to the year's t earnings announcement date (before April 1 of current year) or after the year's t+1 earnings announcement date (after march 31 of the subsequent year). Consequently, 73 firm-years with insufficient financial date (after march 2000–2012) to be able to calculate the conservatism measure and all control variables of Listed Companies in Thailand

in the regression model are later excluded from the collection. A final sample of 1,016 firm-years (233 distinct firms) are included in this study.

3.2 Measure of Accounting Conservatism

To test research hypothesis, this study uses firm-specific conservatism (C_SCORE), so is to that of Khan and Watts (2009), as the primary measure of conservatism. Khan and Watts draclope to somyear measure of conservatism, the C_SCORE , with the purpose of examining events that involve changes in accounting conservatism. They show that conservatism rises in response to the invease in asymmetric information, idiosyncratic uncertainty and the likelihood of litigation, which are neasured by firm characteristics of size, market-to-book ratio, and leverage. Thus, Khan ard W_{ares} (20.9) modified Basu's (1997) by incorporating the firm-specific characteristics, i.e., firm size, market-to-mok ratio and leverage into their own study. It is the model developed by Khan and Watto that has used in the current study.

The decision to use firm-specific conservatism is grounted in three reasons. First, the firm-specific measure model (Khan and Watts, 2009) was developed from Basu's (1997) asymmetry timeliness of earnings. Here, the operationalized definition of conservation is the higher verification threshold used to recognize good news regarding expected future of hows as gains rather than the recognition of bad news as losses (Basu, 1997; Watts, 2003). Secondly, that and Watts' (2009) approach is consistent with the report made by Ball, Kothari, and Nikolae (2013) who had stated that estimates of asymmetric timeliness tend to vary across firms due to diversity in size, market-to-book ration, and leverage. These characteristics are argued to influence the expected earnings and returns, thereby, making them basic factors to be used when empirically studying systematic variations of bias. Ball et al. (2013) had indicated that systematic variations in this case, the characteristics mentioned above are normally set as proxies when studying economic consequences is conservatism (Khan and Watts, 2009). Thirdly, the nature of events in this study requires a firm-year level conservatism measure. By applying Khan and Watts' (2009) *C_SCORE* measure, the *C_SORE* in the multiple regression model can be used and statistical significance can be attained.

To calculate the enservatism level, this study estimates Equation (1), the cross-sectional model, for each year of the same period using all observations that possess the necessary financial data.

$$\frac{X_i}{P_t} + \beta_1 DR_i + RET_i(\mu_1 + \mu_2 SIZE_i + \mu_3 MB_i + \mu_4 LEV_i) + DR_i RET_i(\lambda_1 + \lambda_2 SIZE_i + \lambda_3 MB_i + \lambda_4 LEV_i) + (\delta_1 SIZE_i + \delta_2 MB_i + \delta_3 LEV_i + \delta_4 DR_i SIZE_i + \delta_5 DR_i MB_i + \delta_6 DR_i LEV_i) + \varepsilon_i \qquad \dots\dots\dots(1)$$

where X_i is the earnings per share reported by firm *i*, P_{t-1} is price per share at the beginning of year of firm i; RET, is a proxy for the news concerning each firm's performance, which is calculated from the cumulative buy-and-hold stock returns of firm *i* over 12 months, beginning from the tev nonthe prior to the end of the fiscal year; DR, is the indicator variable that takes the value of "1" veturns (RET_i) are negative, and "0" if otherwise; $SIZE_i$ is the natural logarithm of market value coronon equity; MB, is the market-book ratio, defined as the market value of equity dividend by value of equity; and LEV; is the leverage ratio, calculated as the total liabilities divided by the parket value of equity.

For each firm-year observation, the estimated coefficients λ_1 , λ_2 , λ_3 , λ_4 derived from Equation (1) are used to calculate firm-year specific conservatism, C which is calculated as Equation (2):

$$C_SCORE_i = \lambda_1 + \lambda_2 SIZE_i + \lambda_3 MB_i + \lambda_4 LEV_i \qquad \dots \dots \dots (2)$$

The degree of conservatism of firm i was obtained from the OSCORE in Equation (2). Firms with a higher C SCORE are considered to have a greater degree of accounting conservatism (Khan and Watts, 2009).

3.3 Measurement of Management Earnings Forecast EDr

This study aims to measure the error of magement forecasts which is interpreted as the greater accuracy, the less magnitude of error. Management earnings forecast error (MEF) is measured as the absolute value of the difference between the management earnings forecast per share of year t+1 and the actual earnings per share of year t+1, divided by the closing share price at the end of year t (Gong et al., 2009; Karamanou Vars, 2005). Thus, this study measures forecast error with the following equation.

 $MEF_{t+1} = \frac{|(earnings forecast per share of year t+1) - (actual earnings per share of year t+1)|}{|(earnings forecast per share of year t+1)|}$

closing share price at the end of year t

3.4 Regression Model

This study test (the research hypothesis by regressing management earnings forecast error (MEF) on accounting conservatism (C SCORE), as shown in Equation (3). The regression model includes accounting construction and control variables – all of which have been identified in previous studies to be associated with management forecast errors.

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$$\begin{split} \mathsf{MEF}_{i,t+1} &= \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 C_SCORE_{i,t} + \alpha_2 \mathsf{ROA}_{i,t} + \alpha_3 \mathsf{UE}_{i,t} + \alpha_4 \mathsf{SIZE}_{i,t} + \alpha_5 \mathsf{BM}_{i,t} + \alpha_6 \mathsf{EXFIN}_{i,t} \\ &+ \alpha_7 \mathsf{INDCON}_{i,t} + \alpha_8 \mathsf{TIME}_{i,t} + \alpha_9 \mathsf{RETURN}_{i,t} + \alpha_{10} \mathsf{CFOVOL} + \alpha_{11} \mathsf{PINST}_{i,t} \\ &+ \alpha_{12} \mathsf{OUTDIR}_{i,t} + \alpha_{13} \mathsf{DUAL}_{i,t} + \alpha_{14} \mathsf{BRDSIZE}_{i,t} + \alpha_j \Sigma_j \mathsf{YEAR}_{i,t} + \varepsilon_t \end{split}$$

In Equation (3), the dependent variable, *MEF*, is measured as the absolute value of matrix earnings forecast per share subtracted by the actual earnings per share, divided by the diving share price at the end of the year. The variable of interest is the conservatism measure, $t = C_{-}$, C_{-} . In testing the hypothesis, it is expected that there will be a negative relationship between conservatism and forecast errors. In other words, the coefficient α_1 is expected to have a negative sign and to be statistically significant. All control variables are discussed in Section 3.5.

3.5 Control Variables

Prior studies suggest that several forecast environment and forecasts' characteristics influence a firm's forecast disclosure information on both forecast errors and base. (Hirst et al., 2008). The study includes two broad categories of explanations for the presence of error in management earnings forecasts: firm characteristics and corporate governance as corrol variables. Firm characteristic factors are the firm's operating performance, firm earnings, firm size, from growth, external finance, industry concentration, forecast horizon, stock returns, operations visativy, and institutional holders. The measure of corporate governance used in this study is the structur of the firm's board of directors, including outside director, CEO/chairman duality, and board for the study adds year dummy variable to control for year effects.

Previous studies find that there is a undercy for managers of firms with poor performance or financial difficulties to announce optimistic precasts as a means of meeting market expectations (Koch, 2002; Rogers and Stocken, 2005). Thus this study includes return-on-assets (*ROA*), defined as earnings before extraordinary items divided or lagged total assets, and current year unexpected earnings (*UE*) in order to control for the impacts of firm performance on managerial forecast errors. Unexpected earnings, as the proxy of firm earlings, is commonly measured as the difference between actual earnings and expected earnings (Bagii ski, Lonrad and Hassell, 1993). Unexpected earnings is measured as $UE_{it} = RE_{it} - E(RE_{it})$; where (E_{it}) earnings of firm *i* year *t*; $E(RE_{it})$ is expected earnings of firm *i* year *t*, which is earnings of year t.

Corporate environmental variables that have the potential to influence managerial decisions in earnings forecast errors and biases are added into the study. In this case, size of firm (*SIZE*) and firm growth (*BM*) are included in the model because larger firms and high-growth firms generally face greater public scrume for forward-looking information disclosures (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Hirst et al., 2008). Hence, hana ers in these firms have more reason to keep earnings forecasts from carrying excess errors (biginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough, 2002). Firm size (*SIZE*) is defined as the natural logarithm for the market value of equity for the year prior to the forecast disclosure date. Firm growth (*BM*) is measured as the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity. In Equation (2), this study expects a positive coefficient on *BM* which is consistent with the argument that high-growth firm are more inclined to make more pessimistic forecasts. In addition, Ball et al.'s (2013) suggestion stating that empirical research which employ the *C_SCORE* can control firm size, debt ratio, and market-to book ratio was followed. This is because failure to do so may lead to spurious correlations (Uncia) ara et al., 2014).

Prior research suggests that external financing has the potential of driving managers to forecast earnings that are optimistically biased (Frankel, McNichols, and Wilson, 1995; Lang and Lundholm, 2000). This study thus controls for external financing (EXFIN), defined as net debt financing plus net equity financing divided by the beginning-year total assets in the year prior to the issued management forecasts. In addition, the regression model includes the industry concentration ratio INDCON) to control for pressure of market competition. This is supported by prior literative which suggests that industry competition influences management judgment to conceal firm contractive fita ity, further leading to more pessimistic forecasts (Newman and Sansing, 1993). The industry concentration ratio is measured as the sum of squares of the firm's market share in each industry (,) forecast horizon (TIME), defined as the number of calendar days beginning from the forecast ofte to the end-date of the fiscal year being forecasted, is added as a control variable. The inclusion of the forecast horizon variable is based on a prior study which concludes that management forecasts are less optimistic when released near the end of the forecast period (Johnson, Kasznik, and Velson 2001). This study adds stock return (RETURN) in the regression because forecast errors are negatively associated with past stock returns, suggesting that earnings forecasts provided by managened on ot fully reflect information contained in historical stock prices (Gong et al., 2009). Stock returnes measured as the buy-and-hold 12-month market-adjusted stock returns for year t.

In addition, prior studies suges that under uncertain business environments, managers tend to generate more forecast errors due to their imperfect assessments of the firm's future prospects (Gong et al., 2009). Following Gons et al. (2009), the corporate operational uncertainty in this study is measured by using cash flow vocatility (*CFOVOL*). This variable is measured as the standard deviation of operating cash flows divided by lagged total assets during the past five years, scaled by the magnitude of average operating (ash) low (divided by lagged total assets) over the same period. Furthermore, prior empirical studies suggested that firms with greater number of institutional holders tend to display more accuracy, the centers (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005), and have less optimistically biased forecasts (vinkya et al., 2005). This study includes institutional holdings in the test. Institutional holding (*PIRST*) is measured as the percentage of total common shares held by institutional investors divided by the total outstanding common shares.

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This study adds the structure of the firm's board of directors in the model as suggested by a previous study (Ajinkya et al., 2005). The board of directors is a governance mechanism that clays a significant role in increasing the effectiveness of the firm's internal control system when dealing when both motivational and monitoring problems. These problems can make an impact on the firm's performance and, subsequently, the firm's financial reports and disclosure decisions. Based on An kya et al. (2005), the number of external directors, the distinct positions of CEO and board covirment and the size of the board of directors are expected to be negatively associated with overestime ted earnings forecasts.

To test the effects of corporate governance, the measure of the board of virectors structure is defined as follows. First, outside directors or non-executive director *O(-D/R)* measured as the percentage of external directors on the board of directors. Next, CEO/chairmo duality (*DUAL*) is an indicator variable coded "1" if the CEO is the chairman of the board and "0" if otherwise. Third, board size (*BRDSIZE*) refers to the number of directors on the board of yea end. Consistent with prior research, this study expects that higher *OUTDIR* and *BRDSIZE* are essoci. Ded with lower forecast errors, while *DUAL* is associated with higher forecast errors.

4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS

4.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the cross-sectional regression analysis of management earnings forecast error on accounting conservatism. The mean and median values of management earnings forecast error (MES) of 1,016 firm-years are 0.051 and 0.020, respectively. The findings indicate that the annual an ings forecasts of Thai listed firms, on average, deviate from actual reported earnings during the period of 2005–2012. The findings are consistent with the notion that corporate managers have the Genoency to overestimate or underestimate their firm's future performances (Healy and Pale, u. 2001; Kothari, 2001). This study finds that the mean and the median values of conservatism, $C_SC(RE, a) = 0.112$ and 0.109, respectively. This indicates that financial reports made by Thai listed firms reject conservative accounting method choices.

Table 1 also presents that the average estimated return on assets (*ROA*) and unexpected earnings (*UE*) for the sample firms are positive at about 11.7% and 0.013 baht, respectively. These results suggest that, in average, the sample firms are profitable. The mean (median) value of market value of equity (5125), book-to-market ratio (*BM*), and external finance (*EXFIN*) are 10,024.28 million baht in which the natural logarithm is 22.688 (5,017.38 million baht in which the natural logarithm is 22.569), *p*.85.9 (0.674) and 76.9% (76.2%), respectively. The average estimated industry concentration

ratio (*INDCON*) is approximately 0.150. The mean and median time range of forecasts to fiscal year end date (*TIME*) are 201 (5.190 times a year) and 189 days (5.241 times a year), respectively. The mean and median values of stock returns (*RETURN*) of the samples are 64.10% and 38.20%, respectively.

Table 1 reports that the mean and median values of cash flow volatility (*CFOVOU*) of the samples are 0.003 and 0.004, respectively. In addition, the mean of the percentages of institutional holdings (*PINST*) for all firm-year data is 45.1%, while the mean of the percentages of outside Goard directors (*OUTDIR*) is 74.8%. There are 254 firms with CEO/chairman duality (*DUAL*) and 700 firms with non-duality, which is approximately 25 and 75 percent of the total sample firms, respectively. In addition, the average number of directors on the board (*BRDSIZE*) is approximately 11 persons.

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Median	Maximum
MEF	0.051	0.086	0.000	0.020	0.687
C_SCORE	0.112	0.056	0.0(1	0.109	0.278
ROA	0.117	0.099	- (7.51.3	0.106	0.809
UE	0.013	0.268	-0632	0.004	8.504
SIZE	22.688	1.589	19.163	22.569	27.689
BM	0.852	0.670	0.002	0.674	5.610
EXFIN	0.769	0.325	0.069	0.762	0.998
INDCON	0.150	0.065	0.038	0.136	0.395
TIME	5.190	0.48>	2.833	5.241	6.768
RETURN	0.641	211	0.084	0.382	1.240
CFOVOL	0.003	0.126	-1.933	0.004	3.011
PINST	0.451	0.291	0.000	0.444	0.998
OUTDIR	0.748	0.157	0.250	0.778	1.000
DUAL	0.2.0	0.014	0.000	1.000	1.000
BRDSIZE	10.751	0.082	5.000	11.000	21.000

 Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

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


Table 2 reports the pairwise correlations, Pearson correlations, between the main variables used in the regression model. As expected, *MEF* is negatively correlated with *C_SCORE* (Pearson correlations) = -0.143), indicating that high degree of conservatism is correlated with smaller magnitude of forecast errors. For the control variables, *MEF* is negatively correlated with *ROA*, *UE*, *TIME*, *PINST* and *UTNR*, whereas *MEF* is positively correlated with *EXFIN*, *RETURN* and *CFOVOL*.

A weak correlation of less than 0.150 in magnitude is found between C_SCORE and the control variables. The variance inflation factors (VIF) of the regression independent variables in model specifications are below two (between 1.004–1.705).² Thus, the multicollinearity problem among the regression variables is unlikely to affect empirical inferences.

4.2 Regression Analysis on the Relationship Between Accounting Concervatism and Management Earnings Forecast Errors

Table 3 reports the cross-sectional regression on the relationship between accounting conservatism and management earnings forecast errors after controlling for other factors that affect management forecast errors. Table 3 presents the multiple regression results from estimating Equation (3) using the full sample (1,016 firm-years). The results show that the overvice odel is significant at *F*-value = 10.260, p < 0.000, while the model's explanatory power is not low or reflected by the adjusted R² of 0.182.

As demonstrated in Table 3, the coefficient on *C_SCORE* is significantly negative (coefficient = -0.120, *t*-statistic = -2.920) which supports the esea on hypothesis. Specifically, the result suggests that the magnitude of management forecast errors is smaller when conservative accounting is relatively high. The impact of conservatism on forecast errors also show to be economically significant. For instance, with a price-to-earnings ratio of 13.35, a 1 percent increase in conservative report would decrease the errors in forecasts by approximately 1.602 percent of reported earnings (13.35 × 0.120 × 1 = 1.602).

The finding, as reported in Table 3, shows a significantly negative coefficient on return on assets (*ROA*). Furthermore, this studies finds a significantly negative coefficient on unexpected earnings (*UE*), reflecting the tendencies or managers of firms that have negative unexpected earnings to announce forecasts that are relatively enoneous or biased. The findings are consistent with prior studies that conclude that firms with poor performance or financial difficulties are more likely to release forecasts that are overly high a means of meeting market expectations (Koch, 2002; Rogers and Stocken, 2005).

² aseo on the rule of thumb, there is a multicollinearity problem if VIF is higher than ten (Montgomery, Peck, od Vir ng, 2006).

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Table 3 reports that the coefficients on external financing (*EXFIN*) are found to be significantly positive (coefficient = 0.019, *t*-statistic = 1.900), which suggests that earnings forecasts are more likely to be erroneous in firms with higher external financing. This finding supports the one by Frankel et a (1995) and Lang and Lundholm (2000). In addition, the result shows a significantly positive coefficient on cash flow volatility, *CFOVOL*, (coefficient = 0.131, *t*-statistic = 4.510) which suggests that under uncertain business environments, managers tend to generate more forecast errors which is consister with prior research findings (Gong et al., 2009).

As reported in Table 3, the firms' percentage of institutional holdings (WNST) is negatively associated with forecast errors (coefficient = -0.095, *t*-statistic = -1.430). This suggets that institutional holdings do in fact appear to lower managements' forecast errors, supporting the findings of Karamanou and Vafas (2005). The finding reveals that the coefficients on the percentage of outside committee (*OUTDIR*) is found to be significantly negative (coefficient = -0.114, *t*-rotistic -2.500), suggesting that the increased proportion of outside directors reduces management's overest nated and underestimated future earnings considerably, resulting in lower forecast errors.

Variables		Paran er Estimate	<i>t</i> -stat.
C_SCORE		-0.120	-2.920**
ROA		-0.073	-2.920**
UE		◆ -0.069	-4.290**
SIZE	A	0.107	3.410**
BM		0.007	0.130
EXFIN		0.019	1.900*
INDCON		-0.054	-0.530
TIME		-0.017	-1.150
RETURN		0.067	1.060
CFOVOL	V	0.131	4.510**
PINST		-0.095	-1.430**
OUTDIR		-0.114	-2.500**
DUAL		-0.002	-0.230
BRDSIZE		0.028	1.132
Constan		0.132	2.380**

			 \checkmark		
Table 2. Cross Costional	Degraciana	of Managana ant	Lorocost	Frrere e	n Conconvotions
Table 3: Cross-Sectional	Regressions o	or Management	FORECASE	ETTOIS O	n Conservausm

Variables	Parameter Estimate	t-stat.
Year fixed effect	Included	
<i>F</i> -value	10.260	
R^2	19.35%	
Adjusted R^2	18.21%	
Observations	1,016	

Table 3: Cross-Sectional Regress	ssions of Management Earnings	Forecast Errors on Conservatism (Cont
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*, ** indicates statistical significance at the 10 and 5 percent level, respectively. The t-statistics are corrected for heteroscedasticity.

Table 3 reports ordinary least squares regression results of management earnings forecast errors on conservatism (C_SCORE) and all control variables. The sample consists of 1,05 firm-years of Thai listed companies for the 2000–2012 period.

The regression model is as follows:

$$\begin{split} \textit{MEF}_{i,t+1} &= \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 C_SCORE_{i,t} + \alpha_2 \textit{ROA}_{i,t} + \alpha_3 \textit{UE}_{i,t} + \alpha_4 \textit{SZE}_{i,t} + \alpha_5 \textit{BM}_{i,t} + \alpha_6 \textit{EXFIN}_{i,t} \\ &+ \alpha_7 \textit{INDCON}_{i,t} + \alpha_8 \textit{TIME}_{i,t} + \alpha_9 \textit{RETURN}_{i,t} + \alpha_{10} \textit{ProvOL} + \alpha_{11} \textit{PINST}_{i,t} \\ &+ \alpha_{12} \textit{OUTDIR}_{i,t} + \alpha_{13} \textit{DUAL}_{i,t} + \alpha_{14} \textit{BRDSI} \textit{E} + \alpha_j \textit{SZ}_{j} \textit{YEAR}_{i,t} + \varepsilon_t \end{split}$$

Definition of variables: MEF measured as the management earnings forecast per share subtracted by actual earnings per share, divided by lagged closest are price; C_SCORE, values of the firm-year specific conservatism, estimated following the approach on Kh and Watts (2009); ROA measured as earnings before extraordinary items divided by lagged total accets; UE measured as the difference between the current earnings and the previous earnings, real by stock prices; SIZE measured as the natural logarithm of the market value of equity; BM measures as the book value of equity divided by market value of equity; EXFIN measured as net equity financing plus net debt financing scaled by lagged total assets; INDCON measured as the sum of the market shares of the firms' sales within each industry; TIME defined as the number of calendar days from the management forecast to the fiscal ending date of the year being forecasted; RETURN measured by and-hold 12-month market-adjusted stock returns; PINST measured as the percentage of common sharps held by institutional investors; CFOVOL measured as the standard deviation of operating cash fly s divided by lagged total assets during the past five years, scaled by the magnitude of average cash flows; PINST measured as the percentage of total common shares held by institutional investors divided by the total outstanding common shares; OUTDIR measured as percentage of outside vicectors on board; DUAL, dummy variable coded "1" if the CEO is chairman of the boards, and "" otherwise; and BRDSIZE measured as the number of directors on the board.

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In addition, this study divides the sample into two subgroups: first are firms with forecast earnings greater than actual earnings, called "optimistic forecast subgroup" (total of 596 firm year), and second are firms with forecast earnings less than actual earnings, called "pessimistic forecast subgroup" (total of 420 firm-years). Table 4 presents the multiple regression results from earnings Equation (3) using the optimistic forecast subgroup (Column 1) and the pessimistic forecast subgroup (Column 2).

In Table 4, Column (1) shows that the coefficients of *C_SCORE* are significantly newtive in the optimistic forecast subgroup (coefficient = -0.313, *t*-statistic = -4.510). The result indicates that the magnitude of management forecast error is smaller when conservative accounting is relatively high for the optimistic forecast subgroup. The empirical implication is that optimize forecast all firms with reports that are more conservative have the tendency to forecast more accurately. For pessimistic subgroup, results show that there is no statistical association between conservative financial report mitigates information asymmetry by committing corporates' managers to issue redible earnings forecasts in optimistic-forecasted firms.

Variables	Optimistic Forecast Subgroup (1)		Pessimistic Forecast Subgroup (2)		
variables	Parameter Estimate t-stat.		Parameter Estimate	<i>t</i> -stat.	
C_SCORE	-0.313	4.510**	0.089	1.180	
ROA	-0.108	-3.320**	0.010	0.320	
UE	-0.189	-0.760	-0.003	-1.560	
SIZE	-0.076	-2.110**	-0.010	-3.050**	
ВМ	0.03	3.360**	0.029	3.340**	
EXFIN	-0.115	-2.650**	-0.033	-1.650*	
INDCON	- 0.0/4	-0.700	0.386	1.660*	
TIME	0.017	2.380**	0.018	2.080**	
RETURN	-0.066	-5.120**	-0.067	-1.250	
CFOVOL	-0.104	-2.147**	0.022	0.853	
PINST	-0.013	-1.810**	0.005	1.930**	
OUTDIR	0.008	0.740	-0.015	-0.840	
DIAL	-0.010	-0.600	0.029	1.470	

 Table 4:
 Cross-Sectional Regressions of Management Eaking Forecast Error on Conservatism of Optimistic Forecast and Pessimistic Forecast Subgroups

Table 4:	Cross-Sectional Regressions of Management Earnings Forecast Error on Conservatism	of 🦳
	Cross-Sectional Regressions of Management Earnings Forecast Error on Conservatism Optimistic Forecast and Pessimistic Forecast Subgroups (Cont.)	7_(0

Variables	Optimistic Forecast Subgroup (1)		Pessimistic Forecast Subgroup (2	
variables	Parameter Estimate	<i>t</i> -stat.	Parameter Estimate	t-st.
BRDSIZE	0.004	0.290	0.010	0.480
Constant	0.139	1.810*	0.117	700*
Year fixed effect	Included		Included	\frown
R^2	24.00%		20.09%	K
Adjusted R^2	21.50%		16.79%	J.
Observations	596		420	

*, ** indicates statistical significance at the 10 and 5 percent level, respectively. The *t*-statistics are corrected for heteroscedasticity.

5. ROBUSTNESS TEST

In addition to the *C_SCORE*, this study employs the scaled decile rank of *C_SCORE* and non-operating accruals (*CONS_Accrual*) as measures of accruance conservatism. *CONS_Accrual* is the average non-operating accruals, scaled by total assets over the preceding five years prior to the management earnings forecast disclosures (Givoly and Hayn, 2009; Almed and Duellman, 2011).

The results also show that the negative coefficient remains highly significant (coefficient = -0.131, t-statistic = -3.160) when the scaled decide ank is used to measure accounting conservatism. Similarly, when the measure used is the non-orderating accruals (*CONSV_Accrual*), the coefficient is -0.492 and t-statistics is at -4.500. Thus, the result holds for alternative measures of conservatism.

6. CONCLUSION

The research topic in conservative accounting continues to be an interesting topic in accounting research. One reason is that there is still much debate surrounding the economic consequences of conservative financial reporting in empirical literature. This study concentrates on the relationship between accounting onservatism (mandatory financial reporting) and errors in management earnings forecasts (volunt v disclosure). Using Thai listed companies, this study finds that management earnings forecasts tend to report less errors when conservatism is relatively high, suggesting that conservative financial reports keep managers from overstating and understating further earnings. Empirical evidence from thi study supports LaFond and Watts (2008) and García Lara et al. (2014), who conclude that conservations is an efficient governance mechanism to mitigate information risks and control agency

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problems. The results are sufficiently robust to use the scaled decile rank of *C_SCORE* and non-operating accrual approach by Givoly and Hayn (2000) to capture the degree of conservatism in financial statements

The empirical analyses of this study provide several contributions to existing literature. First, the results contribute to current research on the implications of conservative reports. The moirical findings extend Hui et al.'s (2009) study by providing additional evidence concerning reclines in managers' inaccurate forecasts along with conservatism. Secondly, the research findings appoint conservation of prudence characteristics (no termed 'conservatism') in financial statements, as stated in the Conceptual Framework. FRS Exposure draft May 2015 (IASB, 2015). This study thus provides additional supporting evidence to policy-makers to consider and to evaluate the pros and cons of accounting conservation with developing conceptual framework and accounting standards.

Thirdly, the findings provide practical implications of manuatory onservative reports and voluntary management forecast disclosures for regulators and accounting standard setters in Thailand. After the 1997 Asian financial crisis, revisions involving corporate governance in Thailand has had a favorable influence on accounting conservatism practices and in timeliness of earnings (Vichitsarawong, Eng, and Meek, 2010). In the meantime, a guideline of disclosure was released in 2005 by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in Thailand with the objective of enhancing the information environment as well as the degree of transparency in firms. Since this, the Thai Accounting Standard (TAS) has fully complied with the IFRS. The goal of implementing conservative accounting policy was to mitigate the negative impact of moral hazard and adverse selection problems that are caused by the firm manager's opportunistic behavior. However, during ambiguous situations managers still hold the power of making decisions based on their own pofessional judgments when publicly announcing information that may affect the credibility of the firm earnings forecasts. Thus, Thai regulators should be concerned about these issues when developing voluntary disclosure rules for listed firms in Thailand in the future.

Finally, this study focuses on the consequences of conservative financial reporting on errors in management forecasts. A further tudy on conservative financial reporting and models of equity valuation should complement the findings of this study in understanding the implications of conservatism in valuation analysis. Furthermore, the dataset used in this study are acquired in Thailand. Additional studies in similar emerging market contexts should be beneficial in making comparative contributions.

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