

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Significance of Issue and Background

Since the attack of airplanes to the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. the world has changed into the new era. The era of frightened, living side by side with the emergence of non state actor - the terrorist. Every part of this globe is full of insecurity, panic and anxious over the possibility of terrorist attack. The attack that might generate severe damage and could cross borders to every nations. Globalization phenomenon also accelerates the rapid growth of terrorist¹ especially with advanced information technology (IT) that minimized the role of state. Terrorist networks are all around the world and the state could do very little thing to follow or catch them.² They move far ahead of government, national security unit or intelligence division. The diffusion of advanced technology is facilitating acts of terror and rearing new forms of terrorism.³

The most important event that took place in 2003 in Bali when terrorist set car bomb and killed more than 200 tourists.⁴ Then this Bali Bombing in 2003 that make ASEAN realize that it is now happened in our own property. So the many

¹ Louise Shelly, **“The Globalization of Crime and Terrorism,”** in *The Challenges of Globalization: Global Issues (eJournal USA)* February 2006, The Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State: 42-45, <http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itgic/0206/ijge/ijge0206.pdf>.

² Shyam Tekwani, **“Media, Information Revolution, and Terrorism in Southeast Asia,”** in *Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability*, ed. Paul J. Smith (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), 227-247.

³ Brahma Chellaney, **“Fighting Terrorism in Southern Asia: Lessons of History,”** *International Security* 26, No. 3 (Winter 2001/2002): 96.

⁴ Ross Clarke, **“Retrospectivity and the Constitutional Validity of the Bali Bombing and East Timor Trials,”** *Australian Journal of Asian Law* 5, No. 2 (2003): 1-32. http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/alc/assets/ajal_clarke_bali.pdf.

scholars, universities gather and conduct study the problem of terrorism and seek strategies to combat and counterterrorism.⁵

Many studies have found that ASEAN faces many obstacles to counterterrorism. For instance, the explanation from each government that they claim the separatist as the terrorist vis-à-vis the separatists proclaim that they are the pro-independence not terrorist. And somehow the collaboration on this terrorist issue was driven by external factor like the US with bilateral agreement instead of combining ASEAN as one. Moreover, to define the means of effectiveness in counterterrorism in ASEAN is so vague due to many internal obstacles for example; the principle of non-interference and the behavior of non-criticizing other states internal affairs. Furthermore, by looking throughout ASEAN performance, it is found out that the organization still not enthusiastic to unite the cooperation of its members on this terrorism subject.

In examining the counterterrorism strategies, ASEAN has faced two fundamental limitations which highlighted on the common understanding of 'terrorism' and ways of 'effectiveness', especially within Southeast Asian states.⁶

A limitation to determining the effectiveness of current counterterrorism efforts is found in the inability to find a common position. The aim of counterterrorism is to prevent terrorist acts and diminish terrorist organizations, as opposed to eradication and destruction of the same. To strengthen the cooperation which strongly needed the tangible measures of the most desirable outcomes, such as the prevention of attacks and the dissolution of terrorist cells are difficult. Studies have highlighted other methods of gauging effectiveness of counterterrorism efforts ranging from government output of money, material and personnel on a per capita basis, the degree of cooperation between armed forces, police and intelligence

⁵ David Wright-Neville, "**Dangerous dynamics: activists, militants and terrorists in Southeast Asia,**" *The Pacific Review* 17, No. 1 (March 2004): 27.

⁶ Ellie O' Gorman, "**The 'War on Terror' – Prospect for debating terrorism in Southeast Asia,**" *Dialogue* 2, No. 2 (2004): 25-38.

organizations, the reduction of political support for terrorists, and the degree to which the strategy is within the realm of international law.

Another difficulty is the nature in finding the common understanding of 'terrorism'. The United States National Security Council (2002) has given the meaning of 'terrorism' as "the trans-national character of the jihadist manifestation of Islamic extremism that is the current focus of the US-led 'war on terror'".⁷ The causes of terrorism are varied as they are perceived, based on individual's understanding and thus are quite difficult to describe.

The most effective way to defeat terrorism is to employ a cooperative, multinational regional approach that recognize the complex nature of the problem and attempts to address the causes of terrorism by implementing sectoral reform. By this it is meant that wide reforms addressing the political, economic and social sectors be implemented, rather than simply focusing on a military response to a problem generated by ethnic and religious insurgency, and encouraged by weak political institutions and lethargic economies leading to impoverishment, instability, and lack of resources devoted to combating terrorism.

Recent studies have indicated negative prospects for regional cooperation in counterterrorism for Southeast Asia. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has demonstrated a lack of interoperability and cooperation, particularly in relation to intelligence services, highlighting doubts about the extent to which Southeast Asian governments will be willing and able to participate in the 'war on terror'. Currently, it appears that ASEAN states treat the regional terrorist that as an opportunity to disclaim responsibility for the growing sense of crisis in the region by 'pointing the finger elsewhere and condemning the failing of their partners', rather than implementing any countering strategies.

Furthermore, ASEAN as an institution is reluctant to violate the sovereignty of its members, and this priority of non-interference has diluted

⁷ Ibid., 25-38.

counterterrorism cooperation and any chance of a cooperative regional approach. Additionally, lack of regional cooperation is fuelled by the internal capacity of states due to limitations of structural institutions, political instability and lack of will, lack of resources and enforcement mechanisms, and failure to place terrorism as a priority in terms of national expenditure and security policy.

Since the October 2002 Bali bombing the presence of militant Islamic networks has become apparent, with international attention focusing on the connection between the Indonesian-based groups of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)⁸, Laskar Jihad, and the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, and their transnational sponsor, Al Qaeda.

The Philippines is battling at least two groups with connections to Al Qaeda⁹ - the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) – that is the reason for the US stationing six hundred troops in southern Philippines in 2002. Aside from the Philippines, the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (Malaysian Militant Group – KMM)¹⁰ aims to transform Malaysia into an Islamic state through violent means. Southern Thailand has a similar problem with the insurgency groups and could not end this unrest in the three southern most provinces of Thailand especially since early 2002. However, even in Singapore which has arrested members of JI disclosed that their original vision of an Islamic Indonesia had expanded into an Islamic archipelago consisting of Malaysia, Indonesia and Mindanao, into which Singapore and Brunei would be absorbed.

Southeast Asian states face major constraints on their ability to respond to terrorism owing to at least four factors that characterize the regional security environment. *First*, the region has porous borders and weak immigration controls,

⁸ Mohd Huzsaire Bin Jantan, “**ASEAN Combating Terrorism: A Comparative Study**,” (Master Degree diss., Universiti Kebangsaan, Malaysia, 2005), 35-36.

⁹ Clive William, “**The Question of ‘Links’ Between Al Qaeda and Southeast Asia**,” in *After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, ed. Kumar Ramakrishna and See Seng Tan (Singapore: World Scientific Printers, 2003).

¹⁰ Bin Jantan, 34-35.

with administrative requirements compromised due to entrenched official corruption. Unless checked by a determined political agenda, private and public sector corruption will undermine counterterrorism success and the consequences of this could prove inimical to the best of interstate counterterrorism efforts. *Second*, long standing economic links between Southeast Asia and Middle Eastern countries, many of which function outside financial channels monitored by governments, have been exploited as a means for facilitating funds transfers to radical groups in the region. *Third*, the region is marked by widespread transnational criminal activity that facilitates the availability of arms, providing a fertile training ground for terrorist groups. *Fourth*, the current socio-political environment reveals weak governance, internal instability and lack of national wealth and enforcement mechanisms, meaning that government is unable to exercise effective control and implement national strategies to address terrorism. These factors provide the foundation for terrorist groups to develop and flourish and also constitute the reason why current Southeast Asian governments find themselves obstructed in the current efforts to confront terrorism.

The overall target of this project is to study critically on ASEAN's performance on cooperation on counterterrorism via multilateral mechanism such as ARF and how did it develop the cooperation with major external power like the US on this matter. Lastly, the paper would come up with suggestion and recommendation that would hopefully fulfill the missing link of the present cooperation on counterterrorism in ASEAN.

1.2 Objectives of the study

1. To explore, explain and identify the terrorists in Southeast Asia and how they impact the security of the region.
2. To study the role of ASEAN, internal cooperation among ASEAN members and external powers on frameworks to cooperate on counterterrorism.
3. To elaborate the obstacles in implementing the ASEAN counterterrorism strategy and cooperation and explain how it affects ASEAN actions toward the emerging of terrorists within the region.

4. To recommend the future strategy to combat the possible actions of the terrorism.

1.3 Research Questions

1. How did ASEAN response toward terrorism since the 9/11 incident?
2. What is ASEAN recent cooperation on counterterrorism?
3. What are the major obstacles on implementing ASEAN counterterrorism strategy? How did they affect ASEAN actions toward terrorist groups?
4. Does ASEAN make any success or failure?

1.4 Hypothesis

The hypothesis of this research is ASEAN members could not achieve their goals on counterterrorism due to the principle of non-interference, reluctance to lose their sovereignties and rejection of any criticism from other members.

1.5 Research Methodology

Primarily, two methods of research would be served as a tool: documentary research and qualitative methodology. In documentary research, by look into the records of declaration and statements issued by ASEAN.

In terms of source, primary source is gathered from the statements and declarations on ASEAN counterterrorism cooperation which have been obtained through ASEAN's website. Secondary source will be used to portray the in-depth analysis and recommendation parts as to crystallize how ASEAN did with this terrorism issue.

1.6 Scope of study

The study would base on the cooperation of ASEAN as an organization. I would examine how ASEAN conduct strategy and gather cooperation from each member. Moreover, I would also emphasize on the notion of non-intervention, state-sovereignty, national interests and globalization theory that hinder the real support from the members.

The time of study starts from 9/11 incident up until the year 2006. In addition, I would also provide the historical background of how ASEAN foresee the acts of terrorist.

1.7 Theoretical Framework

ASEAN Way and **Cooperative Security Theory** will be primarily employed to explain the study of ASEAN Cooperation on Counterterrorism since 9/11 incident.

1.7.1 ASEAN Way (non-interference, non-intervention)

Since its formation in 1967, ASEAN has developed into one of the most important institutional manifestations of an effort towards collective identity and an institutionalized cooperative vehicle for intramural conflict avoidance and management, renowned for its ability to maintain peaceful relations and address regional security concerns by accommodating the diversity of culture, religion, ethnicity, tradition and political systems, as well as the variety of leadership styles and leadership types, of its ten member countries. The ASEAN Way is a normative framework, translated as the observance and practice of a set of principles and norms of interstate conduct and modes of cooperation and decision-making by the ASEAN member states. The ASEAN Way not only constitutes an important contribution as a tool of international statecraft, but also operates as a new approach for bringing about world peace through the establishment of bonds of cultural affinity. The ASEAN Way

represents an operational code that explains how Asian statesmen ideally prefer to conduct their affairs at the international level and has thus served to define a new political culture within which ASEAN diplomacy and security cooperation have been pursued.

The behavioral norms of the ASEAN Way are self-inhibiting and regulatory practices seeking to specify the accepted and expected behavior for inter-state conduct, and are manifested in ASEAN's political documents; in particular, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) signed in 1976, the first treaty since the association's formation nine years before. The principles enunciated in the TAC include mutual respect for state sovereignty, independence and integrity, non-interference in the internal affairs of another, abstention from the threat or use of force, and the settlement of disputes or differences by peaceful means.¹¹

Although these are seemingly unspectacular basic international norms and are thus fundamentally not a unique ASEAN construct, they were initially adapted to suit regional circumstances and have since taken root in Southeast Asia in a particular context. Much of ASEAN regionalism and the concept of a Southeast Asian regional identity are founded on the special significance given by ASEAN to these norms. Historical conditions have contributed to shaping a common interest by ASEAN states to retain state sovereignty and strengthen national resilience with the assurance that external powers, and even ASEAN's own member states, could not interfere with the way individual sovereign entities managed their domestic affairs. Non-interference stems from the traditional notions in international relations of equality of the sovereignty of states and the consequent right to exclusive sovereignty. The respect for non-interference in each other's internal affairs has been a prime principle and characteristic of ASEAN concord since its creation.¹²

¹¹ Sueo Sudo, "Forging an ASEAN Community: Its Significance, Problems and Prospects," *Graduate School of International Development of Nagoya University (GSID) Discussion Paper No. 146* (September 2006): 3, <http://www.gsid.nagoya-u.ac.jp/bpub/research/public/paper/article/146.pdf>.

¹² Robin Ramcharan, "ASEAN and Non-interference: A Principle Maintained," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 22, No. 1 (April 2000): 60.

Next, the procedural norms of the ASEAN Way consist of three inter-related elements: first, informality, incrementalism, and an aversion to or avoidance of excessive institutionalization; second, non-confrontation and quiet diplomacy which allows ASEAN members to subdue any bilateral tensions;¹³ and third, a consensual and consultative decision-making approach to conducting intra-regional relations. ASEAN has the gradual, evolutionary approach, never taking drastic turns or decisions that by a stroke of the pen clearly changed the course of the association or of Southeast Asian history. Such incrementalism, in essence the desire to move ASEAN forward through a series of small steps, is seen by its leaders as vital to ASEAN's development, as any great leap forward would have been the last leap forward. Similarly, potentially controversial issues are compartmentalized, avoided or swept under the carpet, passed over for later resolution--or until they have been made either irrelevant or innocuous by time and events.

The central practice of the association, and perhaps the most closely identified with ASEAN's corporate culture, is the informal decision-making process that may be traced back to a particular style of decision-making within traditional Javanese village society based on consultation (*mustawarah*) and consensus (*mufakat*).¹⁴ The mode of decision-making is also similar to the Malay village system, and is designed to prevent the majority or the most powerful from imposing their views on the whole group.¹⁵ In the context of ASEAN, decision-making is very much process oriented, with the emphasis on dialogue mechanisms and the process of negotiations, rather than the outcome or conclusion. Although decision-making via the ASEAN Way of reaching consensus through consultations is invariably a slow

¹³ Hiro Katsumata, "Reconstruction of Diplomatic Norms in Southeast Asia: The Case for Strict Adherence to the 'ASEAN Way'," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 25, No. 1 (April 2003): 107.

¹⁴ Shaun Narine, "Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia," (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publisher, Inc., 2002), 31.

¹⁵ Tobias Ingo Nischalke, "Insight from ASEAN's Foreign Policy Cooperation: The 'ASEAN Way', a Real Spirit or a Phantom?" , *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 22, No. 1 (April 2000): 90.

process, it has at least the effect of protecting the interests of the smallest and weakest member states.

Taken together, the procedural norms have significantly increased the number of contact points between ASEAN leaders. This much-broadened surface of contact has been extremely important to the learning process which is always the base for multilateralism and regional cooperation. Existing dialogue mechanisms are improving and widening channels of information gathering, sharing, policy consultation and coordination, resulting in a greater understanding of each other's problems and peculiarities and a greater tolerance for each other's predicaments in a region where, for historical reasons, neighbors often were largely ignorant of each other and had more extensively developed contacts with states external to the region. The procedural norms thus represent a unique style of ASEAN diplomacy and mode of negotiation, where developing a collective identity among ASEAN governments has been a conscious attempt, and has claimed for itself an exclusive role in the promotion of regionalism in Southeast Asia. The ASEAN Way has increasingly developed into an important issue, especially in the last decade when ASEAN had to deal with emerging non-traditional security pressures in an era of globalization where the domestic has both regional and international consequences. It is in this light that debates and controversies surrounding ASEAN as a regional institution, and its viability as a framework for establishing and maintaining regional order have recently materialized.¹⁶

This norm, ASEAN Way, afterward become major obstacle for utilizing ASEAN strategy on counterterrorism. I will elaborate with some criticism from well-known researchers and also include my analysis and opinion on this norm too.

¹⁶ Beverly Loke, "The 'ASEAN Way': Towards Regional Order and Security Cooperation?," *Melbourne Journal of Politics* 30 (Annual 2005): 8-38.

1.7.2 Cooperative Security, Functionalist Approach

Cooperative security as a term is often used rather loosely in the international relations literature. The term often simply means that states will work together to solve common problems, and is often used synonymously with *collective security* – that is, to mean simply that states work collectively together. However, collective security also often has a more specific meaning in the international relations literature, in which it is used to describe a kind of security system in which states agree to act together against one of the members of the system that takes aggressive actions against another.

The terms *common security* and *comprehensive security* are also often used, where common security means that states are affected equally by a common threat, such as nuclear war in which the threat being more the effects of the war rather than the country that uses the nuclear weapons, and where comprehensive security means a security regime that encompasses both the so-called traditional threats associated typically and specifically with state actors, and non-traditional threats, which mean everything else. To minimize confusion, I have reserved the term *cooperative security* to describe cases where states work together to deal with non-state threats and challenges¹⁷ in this case, the terrorists.

This important cooperative security theory will be used to explain how to succeed in counter the threat of terrorist. Moreover, it would also be employed to recommend the better understanding of the present time of fighting the rise of terrorism in ASEAN.

¹⁷ Michael Mihalka, “Cooperative Security in the 21st Century,” *The Quarterly Journal* (Winter 2005): 113-122.

1.8 Literature Review

The followings are the literature reviews of five selected articles on the topic. The main content of each article pertaining to the topic is summarized and the review of the whole picture of the study in this topic will be given.

1.8.1 Interstate and Intrastate Dynamics in Southeast Asia's War on Terror¹⁸

The authors explain the recent studies which has highlighted the relative dearth of counterterrorism cooperation between member nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Acknowledging that more can and should be done by Southeast Asian governments in interdicting terrorism, the writers nevertheless argue that collaboration between and among security agencies are effective, as evidenced by the capture of key Jamaah Islamiyah militants. On the other hand, weak state capacity and legitimacy as well as bureaucratic competition and rivalry prolong to weaken rather than facilitate national and regional counterterrorism efforts. Moreover, the apparent alertness of regional responses to terrorism is partly a reaction to the highly militarized counterterrorism strategy embraced by the United States. Lastly, the authors contend that radical Islamist terrorism can only be successfully countered by the adoption of a comprehensive approach that addresses a host of real or perceived social, economic, political and ultimately, ideological challenges.

¹⁸ See Seng Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna, “**Interstate and Intrastate Dynamics in Southeast Asia's War on Terror**,” *SAIS Review* 24, No. 1 (2004): 91-105.

1.8.2 ASEAN Counterterrorism Cooperation Since 9/11¹⁹

Chow has illustrated two major arguments from his article which are; firstly, through multilateral counterterrorism cooperation in ASEAN is based on common threat perception. As each member states of ASEAN are differing in their domestic political situations and the cooperation and relations both with outside powers and each other formulated dissimilar perception of friend and foe that constructing the regional cooperation hard to achieve. Very clear evidence was the bilateral cooperation with major external powers such as the US on the cooperation on counterterrorism as within ASEAN it has shown that individual member select to pursue bilateral commitment with the US instead of pushing ASEAN-US counterterrorism cooperation. Furthermore, Chow also demonstrated that for Southeast Asian nations it seems to be that within ASEAN much concern still on that possibility of violating each other's sovereignty and accordingly advance domestic instability.

1.8.3 Addressing International Terrorism in Southeast Asia: A Matter of Strategic or Functional Approach?²⁰

The writer reviews the evolution of the American-led global campaign against international terrorism in Southeast Asia. During the initial stage of the campaign, the United States was pragmatic and circumspect as it cooperated with its Asian allies in neutralizing terrorist groups and other transnational criminals. The campaign generated a positive trend towards cooperative security as Washington provided military and intelligence assistance to several countries threatened by homegrown and international terrorist movements. However, this article contends that the Bush administration's 2002 national security strategy has radically transformed the war on terror in Southeast Asia and might create a major problem in America's

¹⁹ Jonathan T. Chow, "ASEAN Counterterrorism Cooperation Since 9/11," *Asian Survey* 45, No. 2 (March/April 2005): 302-321.

²⁰ Renato Cruz De Castro, "Addressing International Terrorism in Southeast Asia: A Matter of Strategic or Functional Approach?," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 26, No. 2 (2004): 193-217.

efforts to foster cooperative security since states in the region seem averse to the strategy of pre-emptive defense. The bottom line of this article concludes that the best way to counter terrorist organizations is through the cooperative security or functionalist approach rather than the strategic/military mode, which tends to generate conflict among state actors who are faced with a common security challenge, the international terrorism.

1.8.4 Combating Terrorism in East Asia – A Framework for Regional Cooperation²¹

The title of this article seems to focus on East Asia region instead of Southeast Asia area. But more than eighty percents of the content highlighted on Southeast Asia countries. As the article stated the nature of the East Asian terrorist threats is obviously most acute in Southeast Asia. In dealing with that threat there are three levels of action to pursue. The first level relates to the domestic developments nations can all be expected to take individually within their respective countries. Secondly, there's the broader international cooperation that nations undertake through organizations such as the UN, ASEAN, ARF and APEC. The third area for action and cooperation is the support given directly to individual countries in Southeast Asia, and in particular, the aid and assistance to develop and enhance their own domestic capabilities to combat terrorism. This article also provide vivid example of the bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta which emphasizes that priorities for assistance and cooperation are in the field of intelligence namely to gain a better understanding of the terrorists and their motives and the requirement for the exchange of intelligence between regional countries.

²¹ Aldo Borgu, “**Combating Terrorism in East Asia – A Framework for Regional Cooperation**,” *Asia-Pacific Review* 11, No. 2 (2004): 48-59.

1.8.5 The War on Terror: Implications for the ASEAN Region²²

This article examines the nature of the challenge posed by the terrorist attacks of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and discussed the implications of ASEAN's role in the war on terror. It is generally argued here that ASEAN's participation in the campaign against terrorism in Southeast Asia and beyond has been characterized by significant ambiguity. The war on terror has offered ASEAN governments the opportunities to extract and draw on external assistance to deal with domestic economic and transregional security challenges. Regional governments have found it difficult to demonstrate their collective capacity to act as an effective diplomatic community and security regime, and their last hopes that ASEAN could yet emerge as a manager of regional order have once again been exposed as having only limited substance. This has not been without effect on its international standing. ASEAN is also facing up to the fact that security cooperation with the major powers to stem regional terrorism is a double-edged sword in part because such cooperation fuels an emerging struggle for regional influence by the major powers.

1.8.6 The 'ASEAN Way': Towards Regional Order and Security Cooperation?²³

Beverley Loke from the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies in Singapore has elaborated that ASEAN is often regarded as the paragon case of successful regional security cooperation, and attributes its achievement to its political formula: the behavioral and procedural norms that have now become the bedrock of the organization, that of the ASEAN Way. As part of an institutional culture that helps to avoid and control conflicts, the ASEAN Way reflects a common cultural approach to international security management as embedded in the minds of ASEAN policy makers. Yet much criticism and defense have recently surrounded the ASEAN Way concept. This article examines the ASEANisation of Southeast Asian security

²² Jürgen Haacke, "The War on Terror: Implications for the ASEAN Region," in *Asia Pacific Economic and Security Cooperation: New Regional Agendas*, ed. Christopher M. Dent (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 113-135.

²³ Loke, 8-38.

cooperation and questions the effectiveness of the ASEAN Way in working towards a regional order. *Loke* has exhibited main emphasis of this article as that the strengths of the ASEAN Way are, ironically, also its major weakness. Lastly, through this interplay between the strengths and weakness in turn causes the great dilemma that ASEAN is currently facing on whether an ardent adherence to, or flexible interpretation of the ASEAN Way norms should be adopted.

1.8.7 Southeast Asia in 2004: Stable, but Facing Major Security Challenges²⁴

Tim Huxley provided the background of the year 2004 as Southeast Asia's political and security scene featured significant domestic developments in several of its states (notably Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Singapore), the continued salience of internal security challenges including a new outbreak of separatist-inspired violence in Thailand's Muslim South as well as the threat from the pan-regional Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network, the growing interest of extra-regional powers in the sub-region's security, and continuing efforts to make ASEAN a more useful vehicle for security cooperation. Furthermore *Huxley* pointed out on the massive impact of the tsunami generated by the earthquake off Sumatra created humanitarian crises for Indonesia and Thailand, raising the question of whether government in the region had paid sufficient practical attention to 'human security' issues.

²⁴ Tim Huxley, "**Southeast Asia in 2004: Stable, but Facing Major Security Challenges,**" in *Southeast Asian Affairs*, ed. K Kesavapany, Chin Kin Wah, Daljit Singh and Dayaneetha De Silva (Singapore: ISEAS Publications, 2005), 3-23.

1.8.8 Southeast Asia as the ‘Second Front’ in the War Against Terrorism: Evaluating the Threat and Response²⁵

Andrew Tan presented the following the seminal events of 11 September 2001, and especially 12 October 2002, Southeast Asia has come into focus as the so-called ‘second front’ in the war against international terrorism. However, *Tan* illustrated that the threat of terrorism to Southeast Asia emanating from radical Islam predated these events. So an emerging security concern in recent years has been the rise of extreme Islamic groups. In addition, there exist Islamic separatist groups within the region which envision separate Islamic states, and which have been actively engaged in long-running insurgencies against the central governments in the region. In evaluating the nature of the threat derived from militant Islamic terrorism, there is a need for better typologies to explain the complexity of home-grown Muslim militant groups, and the emergence of transnational linkages both among them and with international Islamic terrorism. Furthermore, with these complexities, coupled with the presence of fundamental grievances which long predated 11 September 2001, point to the necessity for a more broad-based strategy that takes into account the presence of fundamental grievances. However, the varied nature of these grievances, and the difficulties that have been encountered in meeting the challenges posed by militant Islam, mean that the war against terrorism will be long drawn-out. *Tan* proposed that using containment strategy, not victory, will be the most realistic outcome.

1.8.9 Southeast Asia and the U.S. War on Terrorism²⁶

On the article of ‘Southeast Asia and the U.S. War on Terrorism’ engraved by *Sheldon W. Simon* on the reaction by Southeast Asian state to the U.S. war on terrorism ranges from enthusiastic endorsement to quiet backing. Amidst concern

²⁵ Andrew Tan, “Southeast Asia as the ‘Second Front’ in the War Against Terrorism: Evaluating the Threat and Responses,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 15, No. 2 (Summer 2003): 112-138.

²⁶ Sheldon W. Simon, “Southeast Asia and the U.S. War on Terrorism,” *NBR ANALYSIS* 13, No. 4 (July 2002): 25-37.

over the domestic political sensibilities of the Muslim members of their populations, Malaysia and Indonesia are hesitant to unequivocally back U.S. efforts. The support of Southeast Asia is complicated by the quid pro quo terms under which U.S. activities are often structured, as well as the inability of ASEAN to function as an effective body to facilitate counter-terrorist efforts. Conversely, *Simon* believed that for the U.S., terrorist in Southeast Asia are largely homegrown, with few concerns beyond their own national borders and limited resources with which to achieve their aims. Furthermore, even though some ties to Al Qaeda, *Simon* strongly deemed that terrorist groups in Southeast Asia are not operating in a coordinated fashion in the region as they are elsewhere in the world. The challenge for U.S. government will be to operate effectively in a region where some states do not want the U.S. to cast too long for a shadow, while not compromising democratic governance. Ultimately the U.S. war on terrorism attacks only the symptoms of a much larger disease. Lastly, *Simon* suggested that the regional governments must do more to combat the economic and social conditions that give rise to terrorism in the first place.

1.8.10 Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah²⁷

On this article *Zachary Abuza* portrayed the connections before Al Qaeda's regional affiliate Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) developed its own terrorist capability and Southeast Asia became a theater of operations, the region was first and foremost a back office for Al Qaeda, providing important logistical and financial support. Southeast Asia remains an important financial center for Al Qaeda. At the same time, JI has developed its own funding mechanisms, including charities, front companies, donations, *hawala* (underground banking), gold and gem smuggling, and petty crime to support its operations. To date, none of these mechanisms have effectively been shut down. While terrorism is asymmetrical warfare and operations are relatively cheap, maintaining terrorist organizations does cost a significant amount of money.

²⁷ Zachary Abuza, "Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah," *NBR ANALYSIS* 14, No. 5 (December 2003): 1-68.

Shutting down terrorist funding is a difficult but not futile task. It is an important investigative tool and gives law enforcement officials a mechanism to deal with institutions, such as charities or remittance firms, rather than individuals. This is important because the primary success in the war on terrorism to date has been the arrest of leading operatives, while the institutions supporting terrorism remain intact. Whereas states have been willing to arrest known operatives, there tends to be less political will to pursue terrorist financing, and enforcement of sanctions and implementation of international agreements tends to be uneven at best.

1.9 Expected Results

I believe that this study will illustrate the in-depth study of how ASEAN cooperate on counterterrorism which would translucent the question of whether it is effective or not. Moreover, I strongly believe that the limitations of ASEAN cooperation on counterterrorism would pave the way in the near future as to realize the usefulness and value of being a member in a regional organization such as ASEAN. Furthermore, the possible success of the interaction within ASEAN members would intensify the low level of state-sovereignty concept and bring the national interests philosophy into a larger scale through ASEAN. Finally, I believe that the argument in this study will be the springboard for other students—both undergraduates and graduates—to further study on ASEAN and helping to come up with additional ways to counter terrorists with effectual and speedy response.