

CHAPTER 4

PROCESSES LEADING TO THE EVOLUTION OF A ‘NORMAL STATE’

The main focus of this chapter is the processes that lead to constitutional revision and Japan's efforts and roles to improve regional and international problems. The bilateral dialogue and the multilateral cooperation of Japan to deal with the security environment in the region and in the global context are additionally examined. In order to rationalize the attempt of Japan to be more involved in the international security affairs which is indicative of Japan's progress towards becoming a 'normal state', the proactive role of SDF and the transition of the Defense Agency to become the Ministry of Defense are studied.

1. The evolution of constitutional revision

As discussed in chapter 3, the present constitution is one of domestic factors which obstructed Japan from playing a more active role on the global stage. The issue of constitutional revision particularly Article 9 has come to the attention of Japanese political parties since the 1960s. However, this issue has been widely discussed and become a major domestic issue in the post Cold War years. As discussed in chapter 3, Japan enacted a number of laws to expand the role of the Self-Defense Forces in order to deal with security challenges and be able to cooperate with countries dealing with security issues in the post Cold War era. However, enacting security related law challenged Japan since the process to enact these laws was not easy. To explain this, there was an ongoing debate amongst policy makers regarding constitutional interpretations. In order to eliminate the vagueness and legal constraints of the constitution, the constitution needed to be revised.

Constitutional revision has gained more support from politicians and intellectuals. However, among those who support the constitutional revision, there are

different perspectives regarding this issue. This chapter examines the processes and efforts of Japanese political parties, politicians and Japanese press to revise the constitution. In order to understand how constitutional revision is related to ‘normal state’, statements by political figures and leaders on this issue are included.

1.1 Japan’s effort to revise the constitution

Before studying the process of the constitution revision, it is important to understand the political parties’ stance towards this issue. The first party is the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) which is the dominant political party in the post Cold War era and the key player in foreign policy-making process. The LDP strongly supported the constitutional revision and the revision of Article 9. The second party is the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) which is the opposition party, successor to the Social Democratic Party of Japan. The DPJ supported constitutional revision but wanted to preserve Article 9 of the constitution. Third, the new Komeito Party, which was the coalition party, did not want the revised constitution to include the right of collective self-defense. The fourth party was the Social Democratic Party of Japan. This party was in contrast to LDP as it opposed the change of Article 9 and the Preamble.¹

¹ Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies, Harvard University, “Political Parties,” www.fas.harvard.edu/~rijs/crrp/web_archive/political_parties.html.

Table 4.1
The Positions of Political Parties on Article 9

Liberal Democratic Party	Democratic Party of Japan	Komeito	Social Democratic Party
Authorize military capability for self-purposes	Stipulate a limited right to self-defense based on Japan's strictly defense oriented policy	Uphold Article 9 with possible additional Clarifying language	Maintain Japan's independence by uphold Article 9; oppose any amendment to the constitution
Define the right of collective self-defense	Specify Japan's right to join collective security operations based on a UN Resolution		

(Based on position papers for the July 2004 upper house election)

Source: Rust Deming, "Japan's Constitution and Defense Policy: Entering a New Era?"

Strategic Forum, Institute for Strategic Studies, The National Defense University (NDU), (November 2004), http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF213/SF213_final.pdf.

The LDP has played a leading role on the issue concerning constitutional revision since 1960s. The party set up the Constitutional Research Group to consider the plans for constitutional revision. However, this issue did not gain much attention even though Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro stated the necessity of constitutional revision and Minister of Justice Okuno Seisuke suggested the debate concerning this issue in the elections for the House of Councilors.² However, constitutional revision was an issue that the LDP continued to pursue. In the post Cold War era where the world encountered diverse security issues, Japan faced difficulties changing its security policy due to the constitutional constraints. As a result, the issue concerning

² Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies, Harvard University, "Constitutional Revision Research Project," www.fas.harvard.edu/~rijs/crrp/chronology/index.html.

constitutional revision seemed to gain more support and at the same time the LDP put its effort striking to achieve this goal. In 1998, the general council of the LDP approved the revision of the Diet Law for the purpose of establishing a Constitutional Research Council. A remarkable step was further taken in the following year when Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi proposed the bill regarding establishment of Constitutional Research Councils to the Diet. The Constitutional Research Councils were set up in both Houses of the Japanese Diet in 2000 for the purpose of providing a forum for discussing and considering Article 9.³

After the establishment of Constitutional Research Council, the official discussion concerning constitutional revision occurred in December 2001 at the House of Representatives. In the following year, the interim report was submitted by the House of Representatives calling for constitutional revision in response to changing domestic and international environment. Simultaneously, the ruling LDP continued to pursue this issue showing its determination to change the country's role in the global context. The move of LDP to propose the draft followed the then Prime Minister Koizumi's initiative to put Japan on a reform path to meet the challenge in the changing world. Koizumi believed that the constitutional revision was the only way for Japan to maintain its security in the world today.⁴ Even though its coalition partner addressed this issue from a different perspective,⁵ the LDP proposed the draft of a new constitution in 2005. In April, the concrete development of this issue was evident from the final report of the House of Representative. However, at the time of writing, this issue is still in the process.

The concern of constitutional revision had been widely felt in Japan. It was not only a point of attention to the political parties but also the Japanese press. In November 1994, the Yomiuri Shimbun which was a leading newspaper in Japan proposed the revised constitution which additionally suggested the revision of Article 9. In the proposal, Clause 2 of Article 9 was replaced with the right to possess

³ Chester Dawson, "Flying the Flag," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (August 1999): 18.

⁴ Justin McCurry, "Japan starts to rewrite pacifist constitution," *The Guardian*, January 19, 2004, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/japan/story/0,7369,1125987,00.html>.

⁵ Keizo Nabeshima, "Changing the Constitution," *Japan Times*, January 27, 2004, <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20040127kn.html>.

conventional armed forces. In addition, international cooperation was included in the new chapter of this proposal.⁶

As the constitutional revision attracted great attention and concern, it was also considered as the ultimate objective for Japanese nationalists.⁷ In 1999, Ozawa Ichiro, one of important nationalists and a leader of Democratic Party of Japan who also proposed a concept of ‘normal state’, proposed a new paragraph in Article 9 for a purpose of enabling Japan to exercise the right of self-defense.⁸ The additional clause which was proposed to be Clause 3 in Article 9 suggested that

3 The regulation in paragraph 2 does not prevent the maintenance of military power for the purpose of exercising Japan’s right of self-defense against military attack by a third country.

In addition, Ozawa suggested the revision of the Preamble of the constitution. He specified the ‘peaceful cooperation’ with all nations in the Preamble of the constitution as shown in the following paragraph.

In order to maintain, and restore, international peace and safety from threats to, the collapse of, or aggressive actions against, peace, the Japanese people shall contribute positively to world peace, through various means including taking the lead in participating in international peacekeeping activities, and supplying troops.

⁶ Glenn D. Hook and Gavan McCormack, *Japan’s Contested Constitution: Documents and analysis* (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 36.

⁷ Anthony Difilippo, *The Challenges of the US-Japan Military Arrangement: Competing Security Transitions in a Changing International Environment* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), p. 19.

⁸ Hook and McCormack, pp. 165-166.

1.2 The constitutional revision and a ‘normal state’

Since the main point of concern regarding constitution was the Article 9 which prohibited Japan from having any kind of military force, the constitutional revision was an important factor that supported the move of Japan towards becoming a ‘normal state’. To explain this, the concept of normal state as discussed in chapter 2 centered on the state which was equipped with military force. Regarding the issue of constitutional revision, the major point, as proposed by the ruling LDP, was to allow Japan to possess a military force. In this regard, the constitutional revision would pave the way for Japan to become a ‘normal state’. To support this, as stated in the Japan Times, Prime Minister Koizumi stated that the constitution would be revised in order to stipulate nation’s possession of military force for self-defense.⁹

2. The evolution of Japan’s national defense

As chapter 3 discussed the limited role of SDF which was one of factors that stimulated Japan to change the security policy, this chapter focuses on the expansion of missions and roles of SDF and the increase in military equipment. In order to see the evolution of Japan’s national defense, the Japan-US Strategic Dialogue is examined. In addition, this evolution of Japan’s national defense can be observed as the progress of Japan towards a ‘normal state’.

2.1 The expanded role of Self-Defense Forces

After the Cold War, the role of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces had been significantly expanded. As discussed in chapter 3, the role of SDF until the early 1990s was limited to national defense. The expansion of SDF’s role emerged in 1992 when the government enacted the PKO Law which allowed the SDF to take part in


⁹ “Koizumi wants legal basis for military,” *Japan Times*, October 31, 2005
<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20051031a1.htm>.

the international peace cooperation operations in Cambodia.¹⁰ In February 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi mentioned at the 154th ordinary session of the Diet that Japan needed a concrete development of a legal system to build the nation that was strong in emergencies.¹¹ This statement led to the enactment of the Three Laws regarding Response to Armed Attacks. These laws empowered the SDF significantly. To explain this, under the law, Japan's SDF was able to take prompt action to terminate threats. Following these three laws, the SDF engaged in strategic dialogue with the US on security issues including strategic objectives, role sharing and military posture under the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines.¹²

In addition, the role of SDF was substantially enlarged to cooperate with numerous countries. As seen from Figure 1, Japan's SDF cooperated with 18 countries including NATO in order to improve international security environment. The defense cooperation which Japan established with these countries covered the range from staff level to the vice-minister level.

Figure 4.1

Role of SDF to Improve International Security Environment



Source: Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2007

Note: SDCF is the Security and Defense Cooperation Forum among Japan, USA and Australia.

¹⁰ Ministry of Defense, Japan, "Broadening International Peace Cooperation Activities by the SDF," www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2007/29Part2_Chap3_Sec2.pdf.

¹¹ Ministry of Defense, Japan, "Measures for Defense of Japan," www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2007/20Part2_Chap1_Sec1.pdf.

¹² Ministry of Defense, Japan, "Overview of Japan's Defense Policy," www.mod.go.jp/e/d_policy/pdf/english.pdf.

The Self-Defense Forces not only assumed a proactive role but also modernized and upgraded equipment. (See Table 2) The development of military equipment strengthened the role and capabilities of SDF particularly the air and sea operations. Japan's Air Self-Defense Force had capabilities for offensive operations and could compete with other leading military powers namely the US, Russia, and Great Britain.¹³ In addition, the greatest military capabilities of Japan were evident from the area of sea control which can be explained by its important position for the maritime traffic. The government of Japan regarded the maintenance of the security of sea traffic as extremely important task for the country.¹⁴

Table 4.2

Major systems and equipment for which development has been completed

Category	Item	Development Began (Fiscal Year)	Features
Aircraft	Observation helicopter (OH-1)	1992-1999	Small observation helicopter developed as follow-on to the OH-6D and used for observation by the GSDF
	Support Fighter (F-2)	1988-2000	Support fighter that is the follow-on aircraft to the F-1
	Patrol helicopter (sea-based)	1997-2004	Sea-based patrol helicopter enhanced with operational capabilities for anti-submarine and anti-ship warfare based on current SH-60J
Guided missiles	Type-99 air-to-air missile	1994-1998	Capable of effectively attacking aircraft which will become threats in air battles in the early 2000s
	Type-01 light anti-tank missile	1997-2000	Lightweight antitank missile that attempts a decrease in the number of operating personnel and improvements for survival as the successor to the 84 mm recoilless gun
	Type-03 intermediate-range surface-to-air	1996-2002	High-mobility, labor-and power-saving intermediate-

¹³ Jennifer M. Lind, "Pacifism or Passing the Buck?" *International Security* 29, no. 1 (Summer 2004): 97-98.

¹⁴ Ministry of Defense, Japan, "Characteristic of Japan," www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2007/29Part2_Chap2_Sec1.pdf.

	missile		range surface-to-air missile, replacement of the improved Hawk surface-to-air guided missile
	Type-04 air-to-air missile	1998-2003	Short-range air-to-air missiles which are capable of effectively attacking threatening aircraft in visual distance air battles expected in the early 2000s
Artillery, combat vehicles	Type-99 155 mm self-propelled howitzer	1994-1998	Self-propelled howitzer developed as a follow-on to the Type-75 155 mm self-propelled howitzer and used in a firepower battle over a wide range from far distances to close range
	Mobile armored light-armed carrier	1997-2000	Vehicle provided to ordinary regiments to be able to battle with maneuverability
	Improved conventional munition for the 155 mm howitzers	1996-2002	Improved conventional munition are shot from the 155 mm howitzers and mainly used to counter quite a number of light armored targets
Vessels submersible equipment	Type-97 torpedo	1989-1996	Aircraft and surface ship equipment for use in anti-submarine attacks developed as a follow-on to the MK46
	Next-generation submarine system	1997-2002	A new propulsion and integrated submarine control system installed in submarines to make their combat capabilities more effective
Electronic devices	Advanced technology to combat system for surface ship	1992-2000	Installed in destroyers to enhance their respective combat capabilities in the air, and on or under water
	Regimental command and control system for core regiments	2001-2004	Furnished for infantry and battle tank regiments to collect process and communicate information required in close combat, and carry out command and control of close combat units promptly and adequately

Source: Ministry of Defense, Japan, www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/wpaper/pdf/2006/7-1-3.pdf.


2.2 The transition of Japan Defense Agency to Ministry of Defense

A significant change in Japan's national defense was the transition of Japan Defense Agency to Ministry of Defense. This issue was raised at the Administrative Reform Conference in 1997. According to this conference, Japan realized the importance of new international circumstances. This was evident from the awareness of national defense that continued to increase after the end of the Cold War. (See Figure 3) The final report which was issued from the conference recommended that the Defense Agency should be separated in the political area meaning that Japan should have an organization that dealt with defense issues separately. In response to this initial idea, in 2001, the Legislative Bill concerning the draft Defense Ministry Establishment Law was submitted to the Diet. However, this Bill was not approved due to the dissolution of the House of Representatives on October 10, 2003. The Administrative Reform Promotion Headquarters of the LDP planned to submit the Bill concerning transition to a ministry to the Diet¹⁵ with the aim of enactment but this issue triggered a debate among the ruling parties, LDP, Komei Party and New Conservative Party. Eventually, all ruling parties had the discussion which one of directions was to call the new ministry the 'Ministry of Defense'.¹⁶ Figure 2 shows how different of the structure of Defense Agency and Ministry of Defense is. Since the transition to a Ministry of Defense is beyond the scope of the thesis, this chapter studies the overview picture of the transition but does not examine the detail of functions and roles of the Ministry of Defense.

¹⁵ Tetsushi Kajimoto, "LDP, at 50, goes after Constitution," *Japan Times*, November 23, 2005, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20051123a1.htm>.

¹⁶ Ministry of Defense, Japan, "Transition to a Ministry and Stipulation of the International Peace Cooperation as SDF's Primary Mission," www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2007/29Part2_Chap3_Sec2.pdf.

Figure 4.2
Transition from ‘Defense Agency’ to ‘Ministry of Defense’



Source: Ministry of Defense, Japan, January 9, 2007.


Table 4.3
Significant Post Cold War Security Related Legislation and Activities

Year	Legislation
1992	Passage of International Peace Cooperation Law
1997	Revision of Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation
1998	Revision of International Peace Cooperation Law (Addition of provisions covering the use of weapons on the order of a superior officer)
1999	Revision of SDF Law Passage of Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan
2001	Revision of SDF Law (greater authority granted for the use of weapons during maritime security operations) Revision of SDF Law (authority added for collection of

	<p>intelligence prior to receipt of orders for internal security operations, for guarding mobilization, and for use of weapons during peacetime to safeguard facilities)</p> <p>Passage of Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law</p> <p>Revision of International Peace Cooperation Law (lifting of freeze on core PKF operations)</p>
2003	<p>Passage of Armed Attack Situation Response Law</p> <p>Revision of Security Council Establishment Law</p> <p>Revision of SDF Law (facilitation of SDF operations)</p> <p>Passage of Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq</p> <p>Revision of Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (two-year extension of effective term)</p>
2004	Approval of National Defense Program Outline
2005	Revision to Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (validity extended by one year)

Source: Based on Ministry of Defense, Japan, "Transition to a Ministry and Stipulation of the International Peace Cooperation as SDF's Primary Mission," www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2007/28Part2_Chap3_Sec1.pdf.

Figure 4.3
The increase in a awareness of national defense in Japan



Source: Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2007.

3. Japan's effort to improve regional security environment

Security situations in the region aggravate the concern for the Japanese government. China and North Korea are the two main countries that pose security threats to Japan as discussed in chapter 3. In order to reduce threats from both countries and immunize the country against the unforeseeable threats, Japan has sought bilateral and multilateral cooperation. In addition, measures and efforts of the Japanese government in response to China's growing military power and to strengthen national capability to counteract North Korea's missile tests are examined so as to demonstrate Japan's proactive role in international security affairs.

3.1 Japan's effort to deal with threats from North Korea

North Korea's secret nuclear development posed a serious challenge to countries in the region and the world. The international community led by the US had been trying to stop North Korea's nuclear effort. Japan which is one of countries most concerned about the crisis in the region appeared to become particularly vulnerable. The Japanese government, while following its own policy towards the North, was expected by the international community to play a significant role in stabilizing Korean Peninsula. Japan's attitude towards North Korea was with regard to two concerns.

The first concern of Japan's attitude towards North Korea was the attempt to establish the diplomatic relations. The request for solving historical issues from either side had sporadically eroded diplomatic tie between the two countries. It caused the proposed diplomatic normalization talks to fail several times since the early 1990s. The relations between the two countries went from bad to worse in 1998 when Japan assumed an aggressive stance towards North Korea after the missile tests from North Korea threatened Japan's security. Following these incidents in the same year, Japan developed a surveillance satellite system of its own and claimed that it was designed to facilitate Japan's ability to judge future threats.¹⁷ To illustrate Japan's capability to defend the country from missile weapons, Japan took a big step to join the US TMD by the end of 1998.

Following the National Defense Program Outline which eased the restriction on the ban of arms exports,¹⁸ the government of Japan decided to begin the joint development stage of the TMD project with the US. Significant progress on this project had been made steadily (See Table 4) while the threat from North Korea continued to be a major factor pushing the TMD progress. After North Korea's missile tests in July 2005, the government of Japan allocated 3.7 billion yen to enhance its ability to collect information. Additionally, the Security Council and the

¹⁷ Michael Jonathan Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an era of Uncertain Power* (New York: Palgrave, 2003), p. 127.

¹⁸ Nao Shimoyachi, "SDF Set to Shed Its 'Nonmilitary' Shell," *Japan Times*, December 11, 2004, <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/news/nn12-2004/nn20041211a5.htm>.

Cabinet approved the Japan-US Cooperative Development on advanced interceptor missiles for Ballistic Missile Defense (in Japan TMD is known as BMD).¹⁹

Table 4.4
Japan's efforts for BMD development

Year	Activities
1995	Commenced a comprehensive study on the posture of the air defense system of Japan and a Japan-US joint study on ballistic missile defense
1998	North Korea launched a ballistic missile over Japanese territory
	The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved a joint Japan-US technical research on ballistic missile defense (BMD) aimed for a part of a sea-based upper-tier system
1999	Started the joint research on four major components for advanced interceptor missiles
2000	The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approve the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2001-FY 2006) with a decision to continue the joint Japan-US technical research on a sea-based upper-tier system and to take necessary measures after the review of its technical feasibility
2002	Decision by the United States of the initial deployment of BMD
2003	The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the introduction of BMD system and other measures, and the deployment of BMD in Japan started
2004	The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the National Defense Program Guidelines and the Mid-Term Defense Buildup Program, with a decision to take necessary measures after examining possible transition of joint technical research to a development stage, together with continued efforts of buildup to establish a necessary defense posture including development of the BMD system
2005	The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved a Japan-US Cooperative Development on advanced interceptor missiles for BMD

Source: Based on Ministry of Defense, Japan, "Effective Response to New Threats and Diverse Contingencies," www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2007/32Part3_Chap1_Sec2.pdf.

¹⁹ Ministry of Defense, Japan, "Ballistic Missile Defense," www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2007/32Part3_Chap1_Sec2.pdf.

The second characteristic of Japan's attitude towards North Korea was the moderate approach which Japan employed through the multilateral cooperation with a purpose of addressing this regional destabilizing factor. Japan was invited by the US to participate in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)²⁰ in 1994. The government of Japan regarded the KEDO project as the most realistic and effective framework to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons.²¹ This project served as legitimate background for Japan to play a proactive role dealing with North Korea. However, the Taepo-dong missile launch in 1998 provoked Japan to suspend financial support for KEDO and negotiations with North Korea. With pressure from the US and South Korea and the concern that the suspension could cancel the existence of KEDO, Japan finally agreed to sign the financing agreement with KEDO to share the financial support. Under this KEDO project, Japan contributed approximately \$43 million in 2000.²²

In order to support the international effort to solve North Korea's nuclear crisis, Japan participated in the 'Four-Party' Meeting which was proposed by the United States and the Republic of Korea in April 1996. Additionally, Japan initiated a call for a 'Six Party' regarding North Korea.²³ The forum was agreed and expanded to include China and Russia in 2003.

Japan regards North Korea as military antagonist and seeks measures to strengthen its national capability. In this regard, North Korea promoted the Japanese government to review the US TMD project and started the joint research which was then upgraded to development stage. The decision of the Japanese leader in this issue was consistent with the concept of strategic realism which stated that when state leaders confronted military issues they were obliged to think strategically.²⁴ Prior to North Korean missile tests, the Japanese leader was reluctant to join the US TMD

²⁰ KEDO consists of three countries: the US, South Korea, and Japan.

²¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, "Diplomatic Bluebook 2001," [www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2001/chap1-c\(1\).htm#1](http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2001/chap1-c(1).htm#1).

²² See Green and "Diplomatic Bluebook 2001," [www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2001/chap1-c\(1\).htm#1](http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2001/chap1-c(1).htm#1).

²³ Green, p. 126.

²⁴ Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and approaches* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 81.

project but after North Korea launched the Taepo dong 1 over Japanese airspace, Prime Minister Obuchi made the decision to participate in this project.

3.2 Japan's response to China's growing military power

China was not only a rival to Japan but also a threat to Japan's security. This perception has driven the Japanese government to employ effective measures to deal with rising China which started from economic approach in the post war period and moved towards political approach after the end of the Cold War.²⁵ Efforts of the Japanese government to seek effective measures to deal with threats posed by China put Japan on the path of becoming a 'normal state'.

In the beginning of the 1990s, the Japanese government used economic power to influence the security policies of other countries.²⁶ China which was suspected of using foreign aid to support its military capabilities was one of those countries that was affected by this policy. Under the ODA (Official Development Assistance) Charter issued by Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu in 1992,²⁷ the use of ODA for military purpose was not allowed. In this regard, China's missile tests in May 1995 contradicted article 3 of the 1992 ODA charter.²⁸ In response to these acts of aggression, Japan used its economic power to exert pressure on the Chinese government in 1995. The concern towards national security caused by China's nuclear

²⁵ Kenneth B. Pyle, *Japan Rising: The resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose* (New York: Public Affairs, 2007), pp. 313-315.

²⁶ David Arase, "New Directions in Japanese Security Policy," in *Post Cold War Security Issues in the Asia-Pacific Region*, ed. Colin McInnes and Mark G. Rolls (London: Frank Cass, 1994), p. 58.

²⁷ The ODA Charter in 1992

1. Environmental conservation and development should be pursued in tandem.
2. Any use of ODA for military purposes or for aggravation of international conflicts should be avoided.
3. Full attention should be given to trends in recipient countries' military expenditure, their development and production of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, and their export and import of arms.
4. Full attention should be given to efforts for promoting democratization and the introduction of a market-oriented economy, and to the situation regarding the securing of basic human rights and freedoms in the recipient country.

²⁸ Marie Soderberg, ed., "The Role of ODA in the Relationship," in *Chinese-Japanese Relations in the Twenty-first Century: Complementarity and Conflict* (New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 121.

tests convinced Japan to suspend the grant aid to China, the largest recipient of Japanese ODA during the 1990s. Japan's decision to suspend the aid followed the approach of the 'Comprehensive Security' which the ODA was utilized as an instrument to conduct security policy.²⁹

Although the suspension of economic aid was a small part of Japan's overall aid to China, it demonstrated Japan's sensitivity regarding Chinese military power.³⁰ In order to seek political approach to respond to China, Japan used the US-Japan security alliance as a stable basis for providing political weight to cope with the rising China.

3.3 Japan's response to China's growing military power through the US-Japan security alliance

In response to China's aggression, the Japanese government also opted for strengthening its capability to counteract China through the US-Japan security alliance. In 1997 during the administration of Prime Minister Hashimoto, Japan decided to revise the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation. These new Guidelines offered Japan a wide range of expansion of military capability. It additionally set forth for a strengthened role of the SDF in response to situations in 'areas surrounding Japan'. This movement of bilateral security alliance stressed the importance of the US-Japan Security Treaty which had ensured Japan's security and provided Japan a channel to expand the role of its Self-Defense Forces.

In addition to measures in response to China, the missile tests in 1995 and 1996 encouraged Japan to consider the research on the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) project with the US. Japan had been persuaded by the US to participate in this project and was proposed the early-warning satellite information to enable Japan to assess the threat. Japan realized the vulnerability of the country but due to the

²⁹ The "Comprehensive Security" emerged during the administration of Ohira Masayoshi (1978-80) and was adopted as national policy by Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko. It was the use of security policy in the form of economic power.

³⁰ Donald W. Klein, "Japan and Europe in Chinese Foreign Relations," in *China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium*, ed. Samuel S. Kim (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1999).

financial constraints, it postponed the final decision to join the project.³¹ However, both countries started a comprehensive study on theater missile defense in 1995.

Security threats from North Korea and China woke Japan up to the reality that its security policy was not effective to counter diverse new dangers. According to Waltz, a leading neorealist thinker, the fundamental concern of states was security and survival.³² In this regard, Japan changed its security policy and strengthened its security role to ensure the security of the country, despite constitutional constraints.

4. Japan's efforts to improve international security environment

Japan has cooperated with countries to solve numerous international problems. As discussed in chapter 3, the permanent membership on the UN Security Council will further facilitate Japan to tackle international security issues and obtain international recognition. The inclusion in the UNSC was perceived as the right direction for Japan to move towards becoming a 'normal state' which would be able to exercise military power.³³ In order to understand that the permanent membership was an important factor that supported the progress of Japan towards becoming a 'normal state', the efforts and roles of the Japanese government to support the reform of the UN needs to be examined. Moreover, Japan's expanded role to counter terrorism which was significant after the 9/11 terrorist attacks is examined so as to illustrate Japan's security role on the international stage which is also one of the factors that move Japan to the track of becoming a 'normal state'.

³¹ Nishihara Masashi, ed., *Old Issues, New Response: Japan's Foreign and Security Policy Options*, 1998, p.107.

³² Jackson and Sorensen, p. 85.

³³ Glenn D. Hook, Julie Gilson, Christopher W. Hughes, and Hugo Dobson, *Japan's International Relations: Politics, economics and security* (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 311.

4.1 The permanent membership on the UN Security Council

For the purpose of enlarging an international role regarding security affairs and being recognized as a first class country, permanent membership on the UN Security Council has been Japan's goal. Realizing that the reform of the UN would strengthen UN functions and at the same time provide Japan an opportunity to be integrated in the Security Council, Japan strongly supported the reform of the UN.³⁴

To achieve this goal, Japan made great efforts during Millennium Summit and the Millennium Assembly in 2000 with the intent of gaining support from member states. As a result of the summit, 98 of 169 countries supported the reform issue, in addition Japan had the backing of the US.³⁵ In 2004, Japan claimed that the US supported Japan's membership on the UNSC unconditionally.³⁶ At the 2005 World Summit held in New York, the issue of UN reform gained substantial attention from country leaders. Following this summit, Foreign Minister Kawaguchi proposed to hold a summit-level leaders meeting to consider reform of UN and the Security Council. In addition, he established an Eminent Person's Group on UN Reform to provide a forum for domestic discussion on this matter.³⁷

Struggling for international support for UN reform, Japan saw an opportunity to achieve its goal. Japan and other three countries namely Brazil, India, and Germany, or the so-called "Group of Four" proposed the draft solution on revising the Security Council. The draft recommended six additional permanent seats on the Security Council and four additional non-permanent seats.³⁸

Japan's effort to obtain a permanent seat on the Security Council demonstrated Japan's determination to commit itself to making a contribution to international security.

³⁴ See statement by Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi at the 52nd Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, September 23, 1997.

³⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, "Diplomatic Bluebook 2001."

³⁶ Justin McCurry, "An uneasy membership," *The Guardian*, September 10, 2004, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/elsewhere/journalist/story/0,,1301840,00.html>.

³⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, "Diplomatic Bluebook 2004," <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2004/chap3-a.pdf>.

³⁸ Osamu Kawakami, "G-4 Seeks Early Vote on UNSC Reform," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, July 10, 2005, <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/world/20050710TDY01001.htm>.

4.2 Measures to counter international terrorism

The determination of Japan to promote counter-terrorism measures was apparent after the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law. From the speech by the Senior Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs in February 8, 2003, Japan clearly stressed its stance to fight against international terrorism from the significant three points. The first point was to deny the terrorist groups to be sheltered in any country. The second point was to deny the means of the terrorist groups to conduct terrorism. The last one which was extremely important was the ability to overcome the vulnerabilities against terrorism.³⁹ It was believed that a terrorist built a secret network in many countries. To fight against international terrorism was a big task that required coordinated efforts from many countries. Regarding terrorism as its own security issue, Japan played an important role in encouraging the cooperation among countries.

Following the speech, Japan attempted to encourage G8 members to seek effective measures to eradicate terrorism. Japan, working in cooperation with the US, proposed the draft of the Building International Political Will and Capacity to Combat Terrorism: A G8 Action Plan. As a result of this effort, the G8 adopted the draft and the Counter-Terrorism Action Group (CTAG) was then established in response to the mentioned Action Plan setting the clear approach to encounter international terrorism.⁴⁰

Japan significantly demonstrated its determination to engage itself with international cooperation to eradicate terrorism. (See Table 5)

³⁹ Toshimitsu Motegi, “The Global Challenge of International Terrorism” (Speech, Munich Conference on Security Policy, February 8, 2003).

⁴⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, “Diplomatic Bluebook 2004.”

Table 4.5
Japan's International Counter-Terrorism Cooperation

1. Global cooperation

Japan

- Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (approved on October 29, 2001), implemented refueling assistance activities for vessels engaged in the interception of ships as part of the “Operation Enduring Freedom” by US forces, etc. deployed in the Indian Ocean.
- Concluded all 12 counter-terrorism conventions and protocols.
- Contributed to the establishment of a broad cooperate system through utilizing international frameworks such as the G8, UN (especially the CTC) and FATF.*
- Based on Security Council Resolutions 1267, 1333 and 1390 or 1373, asset freezing measures against Taliban-related and non-Taliban terrorists have been carried out in accordance with the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law against a total of 423 individuals and organizations (as of the end of December 2003)

G8

- At the June 1-3 Evian Summit, Building International Political Will and Capacity to Combat Terrorism: A G8 Action Plan as well as Enhance Transport Security and Control of Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS): A G8 Action Plan was adopted with Japan's active participation.

2. Regional cooperation

- ARF: On the occasion of the 10th ARF Ministerial Meeting held in Cambodia in June, the Statement on Cooperative Counter-Terrorist Action on Border Security was adopted.
- APEC: Based on Leaders' Statement on Fighting Terrorism adopted at the Tenth Ministerial Meeting in October 2002, the Counter-terrorism Task Force (CTTF) was established, and a second meeting was held.
- ASEM: Based on counter-terrorism declaration adopted at the Fourth Summit Meeting in September 2002, the ASEM Seminar on Anti-Terrorism was held in September in China, and Japan participated as co-sponsoring country.

- ASEAN: The First ASEAN Plus Three Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (ammtc+3) was held in Bangkok in January 2004, and the institutionalization of activities concerning transnational crimes including counter-terrorism was agreed upon.
- Southeast Asia Counterterrorism Conference: In December, the ten ASEAN countries were invited and regional consultations on counter-terrorism hosted by Foreign Ministry and National Police Agency were held in Tokyo.
- Japan-ASEAN Commemorative Summit: Agreed in the Japan-ASEAN Plan of Action adopted at Japan-ASEAN Commemorative Summit in December to hold a joint meeting on counter-terrorism in the future.
- Japan: Program to accept trainees from developing countries was implemented in the following new areas to promote the conclusion of conventions and protocols related to the suppression of terrorism and to counter biological and chemical terrorism, in addition to six areas already pursued: (1) terrorist financing, (2) immigration control, (3) aviation security, (4) customs cooperation, (5) export control, and (6) police and law enforcement cooperation (total of approximately 280 people in 2003).

3. Bilateral and trilateral cooperation

- | | |
|--|------------------|
| • Japan-US Consultations on Counter-Terrorism | Held in Tokyo |
| • Japan-Russia Consultations on Counter-Terrorism | Held in Moscow |
| • Japan-US-Australia Trilateral Consultations on Counter-Terrorism | Held in Canberra |

* CTC is the Counter-Terrorism Committee. FATF is the Financial Action Task Force which was established in 1989 to promote international countermeasures against money laundering.

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, "Diplomatic Bluebook 2004," <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2004/chap3-a.pdf>.

Conclusion

The issue of constitutional revision has appeared since 1960s and it gained more attention in the post Cold War era. Japan has put forth an effort to revise the constitution as it realized that the present constitution is a major hindrance for Japan to deal with security challenges. The LDP which is a dominant political party in

Japan strongly supported the constitutional revision and proposed the revision of Clause 2 of Article 9. Concrete development on this issue appeared when the Constitutional Research Council was established in both Houses of the Japanese Diet. In 2005, the House of Representatives issued the final report which reflected the majority support revision of Article 9.⁴¹

In addition, the effort of the Japanese government to improve its national defense can be perceived from the movement to upgrade the Defense Agency to be a Ministry of Defense. According to neo-realists, the structure of the system compels state to act in certain way. To explain this, the changing environment forces Japan to establish the Ministry Defense. Japan needs an organization to deal with security issues directly since the security challenges has been increased and has emerged from diverse sources.

The expanded role of SDF is an indicator for the change in Japan's security attitude. The world after the Cold War brings about new security challenges such as missiles and terrorism. For this reason, Japan reviews the capabilities of its Self-Defense Forces and upgrades its military equipment. In addition, Japan expands the SDF's role to cooperate with many countries. The role of Self-Defense Forces does not limit to the national defense but was expanded to include the roles involving the improvement of international security environment.

⁴¹ Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies, Harvard University, "Constitutional Revision research project," www.fas.harvard.edu/~rijs/crrp/chronology/index.html.