

CHAPTER 3
FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO JAPAN'S MOVE TOWARDS BECOMING
A 'NORMAL STATE'

The end of the Cold War affected Japan's security policy and pushed Japan to change its security attitude to be compatible with the world environment after the Cold War. There are some important factors driving Japan to change its security role and be more proactive towards international security affairs. These factors can be classified as domestic, regional and international factors. Domestic factors are perceived as an internal catalyst pushing Japan to reconsider and change its security policy in response to global realities. Regional and international factors are the important external variables which put additional pressure on Japanese policy makers thus giving rise to a number of unprecedented laws. The aforementioned factors including Japan's path towards becoming a 'normal state', will be examined and analyzed in this chapter so as to elucidate Japan's strengthening security stance in the post Cold War era.

1. Domestic factors

Domestic factors are those concerning Japanese constitution, the Self-Defense Forces and national prestige. The present constitution eliminated Japan's pre war military power which made it difficult for Japan to actively play a security role on the global stage. Under the constitution, Japan faced difficulties when dealing with security issues and making international contributions as requested by the international community. For this reason, the constitution is an important factor that stimulated Japan to change its security policy in order to meet international community's demands. A number of unprecedented security related laws which were enacted when country encountered

security challenges and when Japan reinterpreted the constitution illustrated the progress of Japan towards becoming a 'normal state'.

The Self-Defense Forces are another important factor driving Japan to change its security policy. The inability to counteract security challenges caused Japan to assume a low profile on international security affairs and be criticized by international community. To be able to defend the country and to actively respond to security threats, the role of SDF needed to be expanded. For this reason, the SDF is a catalyst for the change in Japan's security policy.

1.1 The debate regarding Japan's constitution

Japan's constitution is different from the constitution of other countries as it conveys the principle of state pacifism.¹ The present constitution of Japan has never been amended since its enactment but it was reinterpreted in accordance with security situations. The constitution was enacted in May 3, 1947 under the supervision of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), headed by General Douglas MacArthur. After the end of World War II, Japan was restricted by three limitations which were stipulated by the victorious countries² including: symbolic emperor system, popular sovereignty, and state pacifism. The most controversial part of the constitution was 'pacifism' which was defined by Article 9. This Article triggered the intense domestic debate and became the controversial issue in Japan.

Article 9 was created for the purpose of turning Japan into a demilitarized state. It stated that Japanese people renounced war and the use of force as means of settling international disputes. For this reason, it was widely known that the constitution did not allow the possession of military force or any kind of war potential. In addition, exercising

¹ Glenn D. Hook and Gavan McCormack, *Japan's Contested Constitution: Documents and analysis* (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 8.

² *Ibid.*, p.1.

the right of self-defense was authorized only when the act of self-defense was within the limit of the minimum necessary level for the national defense.³

With the pressure from the US and the concern for national security, Japan reinterpreted the constitution and enacted the Law on the Establishment of the Defense Agency and the Law on the Self-Defense Forces in 1954.⁴ These laws led to the establishment of the Defense Agency and Self-Defense Forces respectively in the same year. As discussed earlier, the constitutional doctrine did not allow the possession of military force⁵ but the foundation of the Self-Defense Forces was constitutional. To explain this, the Japanese government interpreted Article 9 by arguing that armed force could be used for self-defense.⁶ Additionally, it was remarkable that the government avoided using the terms ‘army’, ‘navy’, and ‘air’ force.⁷

Constitution became an issue again when the Japanese government tried to dispatch the SDF to Iraq in the wake of the Gulf War in 1990. The UN Peace Cooperation Bill was submitted to the Diet with the reinterpretation of Article 9.⁸ In this

³ *Japan: A Pocket Guide 2002 Edition* (Japan: Foreign Press Center, 2002).

⁴ Peter D. Feaver, Takako Hikotani, and Shaun Narine, “The Case of Japan,” *Asian Perspective* 29 (2005): 245.

⁵ Article 9

1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

⁶ Three conditions when the right of self-defense can be used:

1) When there is an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression against Japan;

2) When there is no appropriate means to deal with such aggression other than by resorting to the right;

3) When the use of armed force is confined to the minimum necessary level.

For more information see Ministry of Defense, www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2007/21Part2_Chap1_Sec2.pdf and *Japan: A Pocket Guide 2002*, p. 50.

⁷ John K. Emerson, *Arm, Yen and Power: The Japanese Dilemma* (New York: Dunellen Publishing Company, 1971), p. 107.

⁸ Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, “Japanese Security Issues,” in *Japan: A New Kind of Superpower?*, eds. Craig C. Garby and Mary Brown Bullock (Washington DC: The Woodrow Willson International Center Press, 1991), p. 60.

regard, the government stressed that Japan could not use ‘threat or use of force’ to settle international disputes but Japan had the right of ‘collective self-defense’ as stated in Article 51 of the UN Charter.⁹ The effort of government on this issue was strongly opposed by the opposition and the public as it was contradictory to the pacifist concept of the constitution thus caused the bill to fail.

The concept of ‘collective security’¹⁰ was major hindrance for Japan to participate in the international efforts in order to deal with international security issues. The constitution underlined the passive role of Japan on the international stage and hindered the ability to make international contribution. After the end of the Gulf War in 1991, Japan reconsidered its low profile on the international stage and its inability to participate in ‘collective security’.

After reinterpretation of the constitution in 1954 when the Self-Defense Forces were established, the constitution of Japan was additionally challenged. The Japanese government legitimated the overseas dispatch of SDF via the passage of the UN Peacekeeping Cooperation Bill (or the PKO bill) in 1992. This law allowed the SDF to be dispatched to a foreign country for the first time and the dispatch was constitutional. Prime Minister Miyazawa reaffirmed that the dispatch of the SDF to Cambodia was constitutional.¹¹ The government explained that the dispatch of SDF did not contradict the constitution because the actions were limited to ‘cooperation’ with the UN

⁹ Article 51 of the UN Charter

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent of individual or collective self defense if an Armed Attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

¹⁰ ‘collective security’ or ‘collective defense’ refer to the right to fight if an ally come under attack. See *Japan Times*, October 31, 2005.

¹¹ Kenneth B. Pyle, “Japan and the Future of Collective Security,” in *Japan’s Emerging Global Role*, eds. Danny Unger and Paul Blackburn (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), p. 107.

peacekeeping operations and did not pose a threat or use force to settle disputes as prohibited by Article 9.¹²

The constitution is a major obstacle for Japan to expand its role on the international stage regarding security issues. The debate among the policy makers when enacting the law expanding the security role of Japan stressed the frustration of lawmakers regarding the abnormal status of the country. To overcome this situation, Japan needed to revise the constitution as discussed in chapter 4.

1.2 The debate regarding Japan's Self-Defense Forces

The change in the role of Self-Defense Forces is another indicator demonstrated the change in Japan's security policy and can be regarded as an important factor that moved Japan towards a 'normal state'. After the end of the Cold War, the role of SDF had been expanded continuously and the scope of responsibilities had been enlarged to include overseas operations. The legitimacy of SDF in the post Cold War era was evident from the need for stronger national security. However, its expanding role challenged the concept of pacifism that has been embedded in Japanese society and led to the question of whether Japan was attempting to remilitarize.

The fact that Japan established the Self-Defense Forces derived from concern of national security and the pressure from the US when US forces were preoccupied with the Korean War in 1950.¹³ In the same year the Japanese government established the National Police Reserve (NPR) and it was later replaced by the National Safety Force in 1952. The National Safety Force was promoted to be a National Safety Agency and it was upgraded to be the Defense Agency in 1954. This progress led to a formation of Self-Defense Forces (SDF) which were subdivided into the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) and the Ground Self-Defense Force

¹² Okubo Shiro, "Japan's Constitutional Pacifism and United Nations Peacekeeping," in *Japan's Quest: The Search for International Role, Recognition and Respect*, ed. Warren S. Hunsberger (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), p. 99.

¹³ James I. Matray, *Japan's Emergence as a Global Power* (Westport: Greenwood, 2001), p. 47.

(GSDF).¹⁴ The origin of SDF was consistent with the constitution as the Japanese government interpreted the constitution to mean that the armed forces were allowed for the right of self-defense.¹⁵ However, the ban on overseas dispatch was imposed on SDF three years after its establishment.¹⁶ For this reason, Japan's ability to cooperate with other countries regarding security issues was limited.

The SDF's constraints have been eroded in the post Cold War era. This was facilitated by international security situations and unprecedented laws. The first incident which was an important turning point for the role of the SDF was the Gulf War in 1991. The US and its allies asked Japan to send military forces to fight in the war. The Japanese government could not respond to the request as the constitution of Japan prohibits the use of force to settle international dispute. As a result, Japan did not send military forces to fight in the war but made the financial contribution instead. The Japanese government provided \$13 billion to support the multinational forces but despite the size of the financial contribution, it did not fulfill Japan's international obligations. In addition, the country was strongly criticized by the international community for its late and inadequate contribution. After the end of the war, Japan reconsidered its role on the international stage which was limited by its constitution. The Japanese policy makers also approved the International Peace Cooperation Law which aimed to allow the SDF to be dispatched overseas.

In addition to the International Peace Cooperation Law, it could be considered as the beginning of a relaxation in the SDF's restrictions. After the enactment of the law, the SDF made more international contribution and participated in a number of United Nations peacekeeping operations as shown in the following Table 1.

¹⁴ J.W.M. Chapman, R. Drifte, and I.T.M. Gow, *Japan's Quest for Comprehensive Security: Defence, Diplomacy, Dependence* (London: Frances Pinter, 1983), pp. 20-21.

¹⁵ Ministry of Defense, Japan, "The Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense," www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2007/21Part2_Chap1_Sec2.pdf.

¹⁶ Pyle, p. 103.

Table 3.1
Record of Japan's International Peace Cooperation Activities Based on the
International Peace Cooperation Law

UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)

UN Missions	Dispatched	Period	Number of persons dispatched
United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II)	Electoral observers	Sep-Oct 1992	3 persons
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)	Military observers	Sep 1992-Sep 1993	8 persons x 2
	Civilian police	Oct 1992-Jul 1993	75 persons
	Engineering units	Sep 1992-Sep 1993	600 persons x 2
	Electoral observers	May-Jun 1993	41 persons
United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)	Staff officers	May 1993-Jan 1995	5 persons x 2
	Movement control units	May 1993-Jan 1995	48 persons x 3
	Electoral observers	Oct-Nov 1994	15 persons
United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)	Electoral observers	Mar-April 1994	15 persons x 2
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	Staff officers	Feb 1996-present*	2 person x 8
	Transport units	Feb 1996-present*	43 persons x 16
United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET)	Civilian police	Jul-Sep 1999	3 persons
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)	Engineer group	Mar-May 2002	680 persons
	Headquarters personnel	Feb-May 2002	10 persons
United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor	Engineer group	May 2002 - May 2005	680 persons x 2 + 522 persons + 405 persons
	Headquarters personnel	May 2002 - May 2005	10 persons + 7 persons

*As of December 2003

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/Bluebook/2004/chap3-a.pdf>.

Regional instability was another problem that concerned Japan and stimulated it to expand the role of SDF. Following the revision of Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation, the Law on Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan was issued in August

1999. Under this law, the SDF's scope of operations was further expanded. Japan's SDF could participate in conjunction with the US military forces.

The need to expand the SDF's role and responsibility was intensified in the changing environment. In the wake of the terrorist attacks in the US on September 11, 2001, the role of SDF was significantly strengthened. Under the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law which was enacted to support the US led war against terrorism in 2002, and the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) were allowed to be dispatched outside their range to Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean for the first time and it was the first time that Japan provided direct assistance to the US in a combat situation.¹⁷ In this mission, the MSDF provided logistics, supply and communication assistance to US forces.

With the passage of time, a wide range of new emergency situations occurred and challenged the security of Japan. The Japanese government had to enact new laws to be able to encounter threats. The SDF's role was additionally expanded in order to be an instrument allowing Japan to respond to emergencies. The intrusion of a suspicious ship into Japanese territorial waters in 1999 alarmed Japan and became a major reason for Japan to strengthen its national defense capability. In 2003, under the set of Emergency Laws or the so-called Three Laws regarding Response to Armed Attacks,¹⁸ stipulated that the SDF could help build the defense facilities in the region and its actions could be facilitated by establishing special measures. In addition, the emergency laws illustrated a relaxation of the restrictions on the SDF.

The Self-Defense Forces were once again dispatched overseas in 2003. Under the law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, the Ground Self-Defense Forces were deployed in Iraq to provide the humanitarian and reconstruction assistance.

In the post-Cold War years, the change of SDF's role was in response to Japan's security challenges. Japan wanted the world to see that it was able to make international

¹⁷ See Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, "Japan's Dual Hedge," *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2002): 110, and *Japan Review of International Affairs* 8, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 14.

¹⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, "Diplomatic Blue Book 2004," <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2004/chap3-a.pdf>.

contributions. The expanding role of the SDF illustrated the change in Japan's security attitude and at the same time it indicated Japan's progress towards a normal country.

1.3 The desire to regain national prestige

National prestige can be perceived as one of the factors driving Japan to strengthen its security stance and change security policy. As a military power, the loss of the national army could be equivalent to the loss of national prestige. This can be explained by the military power that Japan possessed in the pre war period. Japan was a great nation which exercised its military power to conquer many countries. In 1894, Japan fought and won a war against China. Later, in 1905, Japan defeated the Russia over Korea and finally Japan was victorious and demonstrated its great military power in WWI in 1914.

Japan entered WWII in 1941 to pursue its policy of military expansion¹⁹ but it was not successful in this endeavor. Japan's national prestige severely diminished after World War II as the country was severely damaged by war. Moreover, Japan was stipulated to be incapable of fighting and preserving its own security²⁰ as the new constitution enacted after the end of the war removed its national army. Although Japan accepted military equipment from the US, it was not equivalent to its pre-war military force as Japan had to constrain the size of its military forces.²¹

Strengthening its security role would facilitate Japan to bring back national prestige. Being an economic power in the world stimulated Japan to expand its role into international security. Japan realized the accomplishment of economic growth does not contribute to security status on the international stage. For example, the huge financial

¹⁹ Richard B. Finn, "Japan's Search for a Global Role: Politics and Security," in *Japan's Quest: The Search for International Role, Recognition and Respect*, ed. Warren S. Hunsberger (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), p. 113.

²⁰ Toshio Nishi, "Japan's Last Stand in the 21ST Century," *Asia Program Special Report*, p. 17, wwics.si.edu/topics/pubs/Nationalism2.pdf.

²¹ "Japan's Historical Record," in *Japan's Quest: The Search for International Role, Recognition, and Respect*, ed. Warren S. Hunsberger (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), p. 26.

contribution it made to the Gulf War in 1991 clearly demonstrated that the economic assistance would not please the international community and did not bring compliments to the government of Japan. The world after the Cold War did not require only economic aid but also security contributions. To avoid a loss of national prestige and international embarrassment, Japan's efforts can be perceived from two aspects. First, the enactment of laws concerning security affairs was remarkable. The International Peace Keeping Cooperation Law enacted in 1992 or the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law enacted in 2001 significantly changed Japan's image of being a lukewarm actor. Even though the constitution was still one of major obstacles for Japan to amend its security policy, the intention to make an international security contribution was a priority.

Secondly, the permanent seat on the UN Security Council was another way to enhance Japan's national prestige. Japan was elected as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council several times. Its non-permanent membership of the Security Council was seen as its intention to raise its international profile.²² However, the permanent Security Council seat is Japan's ultimate goal since it could provide Japan with the international recognition and could open the gate for the SDF's full participation in the UN peacekeeping operations. As Prime Minister Koizumi stated that "Japan must think about what it can do to contribute to peace and global security".²³

2. Regional factors

Situations in the region and the movement of military buildup of neighboring countries concerned Japan. China and North Korea were the two countries in the region that had posed threats to Japan's security. The modernization of China's

²² Reinhard Drifte, *Japan's Foreign Policy for the 21st Century: From Economic Superpower to What Power?* (London: Macmillan in association with St. Antony's college, 1998), p. 138.

²³ Justin MaCurry, "An Uneasy Membership," *The Guardian*, September 10, 2004, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/elsewhere/journalist/story/0,,1301840,00.html>.

military capability and the development of nuclear technology of North Korea urged Japan to strengthen its security policy and cooperative relationship with the US.

2.1 Japan-China relations

In order to better understand Japanese perceptions towards China, the historical relationships between the two countries needs to be examined. Japan established diplomatic relations with China in 1972 during Prime Minister Tanaka's administration. However, the relationship between these two countries had not been smooth as they were disturbed by both historical and territorial issues. A problematic historical issue involves an apology for Japanese war atrocities. The events surrounding these atrocities as represented in Japanese textbooks are disputed by China. The most sensitive issue regarding this period involves visits to the Yasukuni Shrine which aroused political tension between Japan and China from time to time. This became a particularly sensitive issue when Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro paid an official visit to the shrine in August 1985.²⁴ From the Japanese perspective, as the Shrine was the enshrinement of 14 Class A war criminals and the souls of 2.5 million war dead,²⁵ the visit to the Shrine was a way to recognize past sacrifices of their ancestors but China perceived this Shrine as a symbol of Japanese authoritarian and protested the visit. In the post Cold War era, this issue developed into a serious diplomatic problem when it was intensified by the annual visit of Prime Minister Koizumi. During 2001-2006, Koizumi visited the Shrine six times despite protests from China.²⁶ Rectifying this issue would difficult to accomplish. These visits to the Yasukuni Shrine remained a sensitive issue between Japan and China and created a major hindrance for the establishment of political relations between the two countries.

²⁴ Caroline Rose, *Sino-Japan Relations: Facing the past, looking to the future?* (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), p. 110.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Yongwook Ryu, "The Yasukuni Controversy: Divergent Perspectives from the Japanese Political Elite," *Asian Survey* XLVII (September/October 2007): 711.

Another highly controversial issue between Japan and China involved the territorial dispute over Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. A statement made by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 stated that the dispute would be resolved by people of the next generation.²⁷ China, did not attempt to resolve this issue at this time. The Senkaku Islands issue was not resolved but both countries wanted to claim sovereignty of the islands which were rich in natural energy resource.²⁸ Later, Prime Minister Miyazawa raised this issue in a meeting with Jiang Zemin, when Japan became concerned about China's territorial claims in February 1992. China had enacted the Territorial Waters Law but had never addressed the sovereignty issue directly with Japan.²⁹ This was another factor that heightened security concerns between Japan and China.

2.2 Threats from China's rising military power

China's military capability has been developed since Deng Xiaoping period in 1978 and it was additionally strengthened in the 1990s. China had reformed the country and followed an open-door policy which focused on four modernizations: industry, agriculture, science and technology, and defense.³⁰ The growth of China's military capability was a source of concern for Japan. From the Japanese perspective, China may soon challenge Japan's current position in Asia. With the advantage that China was closer to Asian countries rather than Japan, China is a rapidly rising country in the region that posed serious threat to Japan.

²⁷ Tomoyuki Kojima, "Japan's China Policy," in *Japan and China: Rivalry or cooperation in East Asia?*, eds. Peter Drysdale and Dong Dong Zhang (Canberra: Japan Research Center, 2000), p. 40.

²⁸ Wolf Mendl, *Japan's Asia Policy: Regional Security and Global Interest* (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 50-51.


²⁹ Wenran Jiang, "The Japanese Assessment of the China Threat," in *The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality*, eds. Herbert Yee and Ian Storey (London: Routledge Curzon, 2002), p. 153.

³⁰ Hwei-ling Huo, "Japan and China: Collaborators or Rivals," in *Japan's Quest: The Search for International Role, Recognition and Respect*, ed. Warren S. Hunsberger (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), p. 159.

2.2.1 China's military forces

After China started reforming the country, China's military capability grew significantly. Chinese ground forces are the largest forces in the world with approximately 1.6 million personnel. In the light of military hardware, China's naval forces have approximately 780 ships including approximately 60 submarines compared with the US navy which has 70 submarines. China imported modern Kilo-class submarines from Russia and built new types of submarines to enhance the submarine capabilities of the country's navy. In order to improve its air defense force and modernize hardware, China plans to import high-performance S-300PMU-2 from Russia.³¹ The upgrade of China's military development contributed to its powerful military capability which drew attention from countries in the region. China's ground, air, and maritime forces are all larger than Japan's Self-Defense Forces as seen from Figure 1, 2, 3. China was perceived as a rising political and economic power³² and seen as competitor with Japan which was a major power in Asia and the world.

Figure 3.1
China's Ground Force



³¹ Ministry of Defense, Japan, "National Defense Policies of Country: China," www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2007/13Part1_Chap2_Sec3.pdf.

³² Ibid.

Figure 3.2
China's Maritime Force





Figure 3.3
China's Air Force



Source: Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2007.

However, despite knowing the extent of Chinese military hardware, Japan still believed that China did not disclose the actual information on its possession of military

equipment. In 1993 when Japan wanted to change the tone of the relationship with China, Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro and Foreign Minister Hata Tsutomu pushed China for more transparency regarding its military capability.³³ Following the bilateral security dialogue between the two countries in 1994, during a visit of Japan's chief of staff to China, the discussion of the transparency of China's military power was raised.³⁴ Moreover, the Japanese government tried to press China for transparency regarding military capability through a multilateral forum such as ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum).³⁵ China was aware of this problem and tried to increase transparency by releasing a white paper. In 1998, 'China's National Defense' was released and it was in response to the call for transparency in its military capability.

2.2.2 China's nuclear and ballistic missile

Japan had been challenged by the growth of China's missile forces which has been strengthened over a period of time. China had approximately 30 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) and a substantial number of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) which covers the Asian region including Japan.³⁶ (See Figure 4) In addition, China signed arms agreement with foreign suppliers worth almost \$2.8 billions. This expenditure turned China to be the third largest arms recipients among developing countries. China's military technologies continued growing since China planned to obtain military technologies from other countries by both legal and illegal means.³⁷

³³ Michael Jonathan Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an era of Uncertain Power* (New York: Palgrave, 2003), p. 78.


³⁴ Nishihara Masashi, ed., *Old Issues, New Response: Japan's Foreign and Security Policy Options* (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 1998), pp. 18-19.

³⁵ Drifte, p. 59.

³⁶ Ministry of Defense, Japan, "National Defense Policies of Countries," www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2007/13Part1_Chap2_Sec3.pdf.

³⁷ The US Department of Defense, "Annual Report on Chinese Military Forces," www.defense.gov/pubs/pdf/076523-china-military-power-final.pdf.

Figure 3.4
Range of Ballistic Missiles from China



Source: Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2007

The vulnerability of Japan's national security towards China's rising military power was heightened during missile tests conducted over international waters in the Taiwan Strait in May 1995 and March 1996. In 1996, China fired four missiles, one landed in the sea of Taiwan which was approximately 60km from Yonaguni, Prefecture of Okinawa. China was intent to modernize its missile force in order to penetrate enemy defenses and to have more advanced command, control, and communication systems.³⁸ These Chinese military exercises further intensified Japan's concerns towards Chinese growing military power. The Press Secretary Terusuke Terada protested the actions of


³⁸ Brad Roberts and Robert A. Manning, "China: The Forgotten Nuclear Power," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 4 (2000): 55.

China in his statement regarding China's nuclear testing in May 1995.³⁹ Japan seriously considered the vulnerability of the country and its humble stance.

2.2.3 China's defense budget

Since 1989, China increased its military budget to strengthen its military capabilities. From 1989 to 1993 Chinese defense expenditure increased about 15 per cent every year.⁴⁰ China considered the buildup of military capability as important as economic development. Its defense budget had never decreased since 1988 as shown in Figure 5.

Figure 3.5
Changes in China's Official Defense Budget from Japanese Ministry of Defense



Source: Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2007, www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2007/13Part1_Chap2_Sec3.pdf


However, the issue concerning many countries is the lack of transparency in China's military. It was difficult to estimate China's real defense budget. According to

³⁹ Terusuke Terada, "Statement by Press Secretary/Director-General for Press and Public Relations of the Foreign Ministry on China's Nuclear Testing," (Statement, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, May 15, 1995).

⁴⁰ Weixing Hu, "China's Security Agenda after the Cold War," *The Pacific Review* 8, no. 1 (1995): 132.

the 2005 Annual Report on Chinese Military Forces issued by The US Department of Defense, the IMF estimated the annual defense budget growth of 11 per cent during 1996-2006 compared with average annual GDP growth of 9.2 per cent. This was consistent with China's own White Paper which showed the defense budget of 9.6 per cent while its GDP grew 9.7 per cent during 1990-2005. In the report, it was stated that China did not include expenses for strategic forces or military related research and development.


Figure 3.6
The range estimates for China's defense budget



Source: The US Department of Defense, "Annual Report on Chinese Military Forces 2005," www.defense/MK.mil/pubs/pdf/076523-china-military-power-final.pdf.

Figure 3.7

The range estimates for China's defense budget from various organizations



Source: The US Department of Defense, "Annual Report on Chinese Military Forces 2005," www.defense/MK.mil/pubs/pdf/076523-china-military-power-final.pdf.

In summary, the growth and modernization of China's military indicated that China has the potential to become a military power in the region. This created the uneasiness in Japan since the position of Japan as a major power would be challenged. China's military modernization and the increase in its military budget were a source of concern in Japan. The increase in defense budget which further supported the Chinese military strength and the apprehension of China becoming major power in the region pushed Japan towards becoming a 'normal state'.

2.3 Threats from North Korea

North Korea is another country which has posed threats to Japan's security. It has been believed that North Korea produced nuclear weapons as evidence of plutonium reprocessing was discovered in 1984.⁴¹ The suspicion of Pyongyang's nuclear processing was further intensified in 1994 when North Korea attempted to obstruct the inspection from the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). North Korea was perceived as destabilizing regional factor as the 2003 Japanese Bluebook stated that North Korea's nuclear and its missiles development was the most critical issue for security to the international community.⁴²

What posed a direct threat to Japan's national security and intensified security concern were missile tests of North Korea. In Japanese Defense Agency's white papers, North Korea was placed ahead of China for the country which posed threat to Japan's security.⁴³ North Korea conducted missile tests which posed threats to Japan twice. In 1993, the Nodong missile was fired over the Sea of Japan. This missile had the capacity to reach targets throughout Japan with a range of between 1,300 kilometers and 1,500 kilometers.⁴⁴ In August 1998 North Korea launched the Taepodong 1 missile across Japanese territory that landed in the Pacific Ocean.⁴⁵ Japan's anxiety was intensified by China's and North Korea's missile tests. They were the decisive factors that persuaded Japan to join the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) project with the US.

North Korea's nuclear development was another threat to countries in the region including Japan. Although, North Korea's suspicious nuclear production heightened

⁴¹ Christopher W. Hughes, *Japan's Economic Power and Security: Japan and North Korea* (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 63-64.

⁴² Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, "Diplomatic Bluebook 2003," www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2003/chap3-a.pdf.

⁴³ Hughes, p. 89.

⁴⁴ Larry A. Nicksch, "North Korea's Weapon of Mass Destruction," in *North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival*, eds. Young Whan Kihl and Hong Nack Kim (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), p. 107.

⁴⁵ Nishioka Tsutomu, "North Korea's Threat to the Japan-US Alliance," *Japan Echo* 30, no. 2 (April 2003): 41.

Japan's anxiety, Japan did not use draconian measures to deal with this problem. In order to deal with this issue, Japan opted for multilateral cooperation. Bilateral negotiation was occasionally used when it was perceived to be more effective. Moreover, Japan cooperated with the US when it was asked to shut down the Chosen Soren⁴⁶ financial institutions which were believed to be a financial channel which money from Japan flowed to Pyongyang to support its nuclear production.⁴⁷ The effort of Japan opened the way for broader initiatives in dealing with crisis management in the region.

The aggression of North Korea was exacerbated when a ship which was believed to be a North Korean ship intruded Japan's territorial waters in March 1999.⁴⁸ Japan's coast guard vessel sank that suspicious ship which was suspected of being a spy ship from North Korea. In December 2001, another suspicious boat was identified to be a vessel of North Korea which was found to the southwest of Kyushu.⁴⁹ These incidents challenged Japan's Maritime Self-Defense and its capability to respond to the maritime threat. As a result, the Japanese government issued three laws or the so called Three Laws regarding Response to Armed Attacks in 2003 in order to enable Japan to respond to the suspicious armed vessels.

The above discussion illustrates that China has a strong military forces which can challenge the position of Japan as a major power in the region. North Korea's missile technology has also brought about security concern in Japan. The missile tests conducted in 1993 and 1998 were indicative of North Korea's growing missile technology. The threat from North Korea's and China's missile tests hastened Japan to start the research on missile defense system with the US. The strong military capability of the two countries pushed Japan forward on the course of a 'normal state'.

⁴⁶ 'Chosen Soren' is the pro-Pyongyang General Association of Korean Residents in Japan.

⁴⁷ Michael Jonathan Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an era of Uncertain Power* (New York: Palgrave, 2003), p. 121.

⁴⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, "Security Environment Surrounding Japan," www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2007/28Part1_Chap1_Sec2.pdf.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

3. International factors

International factors were also influential in inducing Japanese policymakers to change the security policy. This section will examine the most significant international factors that had a major impact on Japan's security policy and discuss the normalization of the country. The relationship with the US, the desire to be a permanent member on the UN Security Council and Japan's response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks are major international factors that will be studied and analyzed.

3.1 Bilateral security relations with the US

Japan's national security has been under the protection of the US. Both countries have been bound with the Security Treaty since 1952 when the security alliance was officially established. After the establishment of the security alliance the expectation from the bilateral relations also emerged. Japan leased military bases to the US forces in return for the protection. In addition, Japan was pressured by the US to be more actively involved in international security affairs and to share the security burden. However, Japan's legal constraints stipulated in the constitution prevented Japan from participating in the 'collective security'. As a result, Japan was in the difficult position when responding to US's demands.

The US exerted pressure on Japan to make a 'human' contribution during the Gulf War. In other words, the US wanted Japan to send troops to Iraq in order to assist the US forces in the war. The US president and the US Ambassador to Japan additionally sought to influence the Japanese prime minister and other key Japanese politicians but with the constitutional constraints and public opposition to the overseas dispatch of Japanese troops, Japan did not send troops or make 'human' contribution to the Gulf

War.⁵⁰ Being strongly criticized for being ‘too little too late,’⁵¹ Japan suffered the international embarrassment and learned the lesson from this unforeseeable circumstance.

During the US led-Afghanistan war, Japan’s stance towards security issue had changed. The security alliance with the US substantially contributed to this change as in the previous war Japan did not actively respond to the US’s request. Realizing its mistake from the Gulf War in 1991, Japan provided the US with both ‘human’ and materials contribution in the Afghanistan war in 2001. The Ground Self-Defense Force provided humanitarian and reconstruction assistance involving medical services, water supply, and rehabilitation and maintenance of public facilities in Southeastern Iraq.⁵² The Maritime Self-Defense Force was additionally dispatched to Indian Ocean to provide fuel for coalition warships. This was the first time in the post war era that the SDF participated in an ongoing military campaign.⁵³ The Air Self-Defense Force transported members of GSDF and provided assistance to the US and multinational forces.⁵⁴ As a result, Japan additionally provided the relief materials from the stockpiles of the Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters of the Cabinet Office to help the Afghan refugees who were affected by war.⁵⁵

However, Japan’s reaction to the Afghanistan war was strongly criticized. The critics pointed out that Japan supported the US preemptive attack strategy.⁵⁶ In response to this, the government argued that Japan’s stance was related to the US military

⁵⁰ Glenn D. Hook, *Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan* (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 82-85.

⁵¹ Reiji Yoshida, “Koizumi’s Foreign Policy: US Always Comes First,” *Japan Times*, June 25, 2006, [www. http://search.japantimes.co.jp/mail/nn20060625a4.html](http://search.japantimes.co.jp/mail/nn20060625a4.html).

⁵² Watanabe Hirotaka, “Japan Dispatches the SDF to Iraq,” *Japan Echo online* 31, no. 1 (February 2004), <http://www.japanecho.co.jp/sum/2004/310103.html>.

⁵³ Brad Glosserman, “What is normal for Japan?” *Japan Times*, January 24, 2002, <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/e020020124bg.html>.

⁵⁴ Ministry of Defense, Japan, “MOD/SDF Activities Today,” www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2007/28Part2_Chap3_Sec1.pdf.

⁵⁵ “Donation of Relief Materials for Afghan Refugees based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law” (Announcement of the government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, December 12, 2001).

⁵⁶ Akahata, “Japan’s Military Expenditure in 2005 to Serve Bush’s Preemptive Attack Strategy,” *Japan Press Weekly* 2414, January 15, 2005, editorial.

‘transformation’ and would not lead to Japanese militarism.⁵⁷ Regardless of the criticism, this mission allowed Japan to make a significant contribution which was consistent with the determination of the government to eradicate terrorism.

During the war in Iraq which the US and its coalition forces, Britain and other countries started preemptive strikes, Japan action in accordance with US’s security alliance, sent Ground Self-Defense Force to provide the humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to Iraq in 2004. This mission was in accordance with the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq.

From the aforementioned discussion, it is conceivable that the US wanted Japan to become a ‘normal state’ which could utilize military forces when required. The influence of the US on the Japanese government to expand the defense forces and capabilities could be seen from the change in Japan’s security policy and Japan’s attitude towards international security issues. The revision of the US-Japan Defense Cooperation or the new Guidelines was an introduction of Japan’s strengthening its security role. According to the new Guidelines, Japan could play a role in cooperation with the US to deal with situations in the areas surrounding Japan.

Pressure from the US drove Japan to change its security policy and increased its capability to respond to the security issues. The International Peace Cooperation Law or the PKO Law partly resulted from the pressure from the US. In addition, the collaboration with the US strengthened Japan’s security posture to be more active concerning security affairs.

3.2 Japan’s quest for permanent seat on the UN Security Council

Japan has pursued permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council for years and it had become part of Japan’s foreign policy.⁵⁸ After the end of the

⁵⁷ For more information see *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 4, 2001, and *Japan Press Weekly*, January 15, 2005.

⁵⁸ Watanabe Hirotaka, “Japan’s UN Diplomacy: History and Current Issues,” *Japan Echo* 32, special issue (2005): 26.


Cold War, Japan's aspiration for permanent membership has been driven by the desire to make greater international contribution and to actively play a role regarding security affairs on the global stage.

There are two main reasons to explain Japan's ambition to possess the permanent seat on the UNSC. First, the permanent seat will assist Japan to obtain international recognition. Japan has been a strong economic power but in terms of security affairs, it is still far behind other major powers. Moreover, Japan provided approximately 20.6 per cent of the UN budget, second only to the US⁵⁹ (See Figure 8) and its economy is much stronger than China which is one of the five permanent members on UN Security Council but Japan is not a member of the Security Council.⁶⁰ Being a major power but lacking sufficient influence in this intergovernmental organization, Japan finds it difficult to gain international recognition regarding security affairs.

⁵⁹ Kavi Chongkittavorn, "Harsh reality check for Japan at UN," *The Nation*, July 19, 2005, 10A.

⁶⁰ Duncan McCargo, *Contemporary Japan* (New York: Macmillan, 2004), p. 180.

Figure 3.8
Japan's financial contribution to the United Nations



Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, "An Argument for Japan's Becoming Permanent Member," www.mofa.go.jp.

Second, Japan wants to play more active role on international security issues. The permanent seat on the UN Security Council will enhance Japan's effort in international peace building.⁶¹ The Gulf War in 1990 was one of the factors that contributed to Japan's determination to make international contribution. After being criticized by the international community during the Gulf War, Japan has changed its attitude towards global security affairs. In 1992 Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi officially stated for the first time that Japan is willing to actively play a role in UN activities relating to international security.⁶² The intention to play an active security role was also addressed in the Higuchi report that Japan's security policy should be conducted in the direction of active participation in UN activities for keeping and building global peace.⁶³

⁶¹ Embassy of Japan, Denmark, http://www.dk.emb-japan.go.jp/amb/let_10.htm.

⁶² Hirotaka, "UN Diplomacy," 29-30.

⁶³ Watanabe Akio, "Revising the Constitution and Reforming the UN: Japan's Parallel Agenda," *Japan Echo* 32, special issue (2005): 33.

However, to be a permanent member of the Security Council, Japan needs to have military force as an instrument to maintain international peace and security. According to Article 47 of the UN Charter, members of the UN Security Council have to participate in the UN peacekeeping operations to maintain international peace and security.⁶⁴ In this regard, the military force is one of the requirements for the member of Security Council to fulfill missions effectively.

From the above discussion, it appears that Japan wanted to increase its status in the international community. The path towards becoming a ‘normal state’ would be facilitated by becoming a permanent member of the UNSC since the permanent membership would legitimate the possession of military force which is a requirement to participate in UN peacekeeping operations. To achieve the permanent seat on the UNSC, the Japanese government strongly supported UN reform. This issue will be further discussed in chapter 4.

3.3 Japan’s response to the international terrorism after 9/11

The terrorist attacks in the US in 2001 brought about fundamental changes in the international security environment. Japan was one of many countries in the world that condemned these acts of aggression. From the incidents, Japan’s attitude regarding international security affairs had significantly changed. To counter terrorism and show its determination to assist the US to eradicate the international terrorism, the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law was promptly enacted.⁶⁵ With the legal background, Japan took

⁶⁴ UN Charter Article 47

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council’s military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmaments.

⁶⁵ The government of Japan made an announcement of seven measures immediately after the terrorist attacks. (1) The government of Japan will promptly take measures necessary for dispatching the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) for providing support, including medical services and also transportation and supply, to the US forces and others taking measures related to the terrorist attacks, which have been recognized as a threat to international peace and security in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1368. (2) The government of Japan will promptly take

actions in cooperation with the US and the international community. The Maritime Self-Defense Force was dispatched to assist the US force in Afghanistan. Japan's reaction to these incidents was apparent and it was in contrary to its reaction to the Gulf War in 1991.

In addition, these terrorist incidents expedited a trend towards a 'normal state' which was evident from two observations. The first one was the expanding role of the SDF. Japanese SDF was empowered to perform the mission outside the country during the war. It provided supply of fuel to US and UK ships.⁶⁶ Even though the SDF did not fight in the war as prohibited by the constitution, the decision to send the Maritime Self Defense Force to support the US forces in the war indicated Japan's intention to expand the role of SDF.

Second, the quick response to the incidents helped explain the change in the view of Japanese legal bodies towards international security issues. It could be seen from the different response between the Gulf War and the terrorist attacks. During the Gulf War in 1991, the government proposed the UN Peace Cooperation Bill to the Japanese Diet twice (once in 1989 and again in 1991) in order to legitimate the overseas dispatch of SDF but in light of terrorist attacks in the US in 2001, the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law was passed by the Diet within two months.⁶⁷ Moreover, the government of

measures necessary for further strengthening the protection of facilities and areas of the US forces and important facilities in Japan. (3) The government of Japan will swiftly dispatch SDF vessels to gather information. (4) The government of Japan will strengthen international cooperation, including information sharing, in areas such as immigration control. (5) The government of Japan will extend humanitarian, economic, and other necessary assistance to surrounding and affected countries. As a part of this assistance, the government of Japan will extend emergency economic assistance to Pakistan and India, which are cooperating with the United States in this emergency situation. (6) The government of Japan will provide assistance to the displaced persons as necessary. This will include the possibility of humanitarian assistance by the SDF. (7) The government of Japan, in cooperation with other countries, will take appropriate measures in response to the changing situation to avoid confusion in the international and domestic economic systems. (www.mofa.go.jp_bluebook2002.pdf)

⁶⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, "Campaign against Terrorism-Japan's Measure," <http://www.mofa.jp/region/n-america/us/terro0109/policy/campaign.html>.

⁶⁷ Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on the passing of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law by the Diet of Japan on October 29, 2001, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/terro0109/speech/pm1029.html>.

Japan raised the importance of international terrorism in the Japanese Bluebook 2004. The terrorism was addressed as a grave threat to the international community and to Japan's own interest. Therefore the government of Japan regarded terrorism as its own security issue.⁶⁸

The government's determination to fight against terrorism was apparent from 9/11 terrorist attacks. In other words, the legal restrictions were further relaxed. According to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's statement on the day the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law was enacted, Japan declared that it devoted its effort to cooperate with the rest of international community to prevent and eradicate the international terrorism to ensure peace and stability of the international community including Japan.⁶⁹

Japan has been becoming more aware of its abnormal status and its inability to deal with diverse forms of threats in the changing global environment. International terrorism is a new security challenge for Japan. These terrorist incidents allowed the government of Japan to realize how hard the prevention and eradication of international terrorism will be under the country's limited capacity.

Conclusion

The above discussion demonstrates important factors that contributed to the change in Japan's security policy in the post Cold War era. Japan has been perceived as a country which is moving forward to become a 'normal state'. The internal and external factors contribute to this evolution. For the internal factors, the domestic debate concerning the constitutional amendment and the expanding role of SDF are the main focus. The major point of concern with regard to the constitution is the revision of Article

⁶⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2004/chap3-a.pdf>.

⁶⁹ Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on the Passing of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law.

9 which is a hindrance for Japan to possess the military force and play an active role with regard to security on the global stage.

The external factors can be subdivided into regional factors and international factors. North Korea and China are major regional threats that push Japan to change its security attitude. Japanese uneasiness increased with the growth and development of China's military might and the development of North Korea's nuclear program. In terms of international factors, the bilateral security relations with the US are important in supporting the change in Japan's security attitude and military role. The revision of the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation and the participation in US TMD project strengthened Japan's security posture on the international stage. Moreover, the terrorist attacks in the US in 2001 also demonstrated the shift in Japan's security policy. The active and rapid response of the Japanese government to these incidents was remarkable. The last international factor was Japan's ambition to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Japan is the second largest financial donor of the UN, which Japan expected to increase its status in the international organization. More importantly, the permanent seat of the UNSC would authorize Japan to possess the military force since the military force is required to perform UN peacekeeping operations.

Even though Japan is bound with legal constraints and has no military power, Japan in the post Cold War era can deal with the threats and security issues more effective than before. The laws which were enacted after the end of the Cold War enable Japan to respond to the regional, international threats and security challenges. The change in Japan's security policy and international security posture are significant that Japan is taking step towards a 'normal state'. The development of Japan's defense capabilities is important as it indicates Japan's intention and effort to become a 'normal state'.