

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Significance of Issues

Japan's security policy after World War II was dominated by impact of defeat from the war. Japan was severely damaged and subsequently occupied by the United States. After the official surrender in August 1945, Japan signed a Security Treaty with the US in 1952 which marked the end of the occupation.¹ This Security Treaty provided Japan with a security guarantee which was important for the weak and powerless Japan.

Peace, security and cooperation with global community were necessary for Japan in the post war era. This attitude was reflected from the enactment of the Basic Policy of National Defense in May 1957 which centered on the cooperation with the UN.² The basic policy did not specify the action to counteract threats. In other words, it encouraged Japan to focus on maintaining domestic peace and seeking harmony and cooperation of all countries. The Security Treaty with the US which was included in this basic policy³ indicated that Japan was not capable of defending itself and needed the security protector.

The intention to take responsible for its own security appeared after Japan recovered from damage sustained during the war and had become economically

¹ Robert E. Ward, *Political Development in Modern Japan* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 478.

² The 1957 Basic Policy for National Defense

1. Support the United Nations' Activities and promote international cooperation to achieve world peace
 2. Stabilize the people's livelihood and establish the foundations for national security
 3. Establish effective defense capabilities
 4. Defend the nation on the basis of the Japan-US Security Arrangements
- Ministry of Defense, Japan, "Overview of Japan's Defense Policy,"

www.mod.go.jp/e/d_policy/pdf/english.pdf.

³ John K. Emmerson and Leonard A. Humphreys, *Will Japan Rearm? A Study in Attitudes* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1973), p. 20.

stronger. The new Basic Policy of National Defense which was proposed in 1970 by Nakasone Yasuhiro, the then director-general of Defense Agency reflected this attitude. The most important attribute of the new basic policy which contradicted the previous one was the principle of 'autonomous defense'. This concept aroused a debate on Japan's intention to be less dependent on the US and the implication of downgrading the Security Treaty.⁴ The new basic policy was eventually approved and the 'autonomous defense' shifted the priority back to the bilateral US-Japan security treaty.⁵ This issue demonstrated two significant perspectives of the Japanese. First, the bilateral security relationship with the US still gained substantial support although the protest against the US-Japan security alliance occurred sporadically. Another perspective was the change in Japan's attitude. Although the principle of 'autonomous defense' was reversed from its primary purpose, it illustrated the beginning of a strong Japan after recovery from the war.

Economic success strengthened the post war Japan but on the other hand it created an uneasiness for Japanese policy makers. In the 1980s, the US wanted Japan to increase its defense expenditures to share the security burden. The Japanese government led by Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira used 'Comprehensive Security'⁶ to respond to this demand. To explain this, Japan could not increase defense expenditures due to a limitation of the defense budget stipulated by the 1976 National Defense Program Outline⁷ and could not employ military to assist any countries due to constitutional constraints. The purpose of the Comprehensive Security was to employ a military to aid countries in conflict areas.

In the post war era, Japan slowly changed its security policy and limited the defense expenditure to 1 per cent of GNP. Japan's security was shouldered by the US after the signing of the Security Treaty. Although the attempts of the government to change the security policy could be seen in the beginning of 1970s and 1980s, the rising nation whose economic policy was a key to success turned the security policy

⁴ Emmerson and Humphreys, p.25.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Seizaburo Sato, "From National Defense to Security," *Gaiko Forum*, <http://www.gaikoforum.com/essay/seizaburosato.htm>.

⁷ The 1976 National Defense Program Outline limited the defense expenditure to 1 per cent of GNP

to be a subordinate. Apart from the aforementioned factors, in order to understand Japan's security policy in the post war era, the growth of country's economy which overshadowed the security issue needs to be reviewed.

1.1.1 Japan's economic growth

After the end of the war, the major focus of Japan was to rebuild the country and its economy. Japan started developing its economy under the Foreign Capital Law which was enacted in 1950. This law was later known as 'industrial policy'.⁸ In order to boost the growth of national economy, Japan promoted the export and had a strong restrictive import policy aimed at protecting domestic industries.⁹ In 1960, Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato put forward an 'Income Doubling Plan' which expected to double the national income in ten years.¹⁰ Ambition to rebuild the country pushed per capita disposable income to rise from \$421 in 1960 to \$ 1676 in 1970.¹¹

Another important contributor to Japan's economic success was technology advancements. Japan needed technology to support the industrial sector and expand its capability to manufacture products. For this reason, substantial technologies were imported from foreign countries between 1960-1970 to facilitate and support the industrial policy. (See Table 1) The shift of labor from agriculture to industry additionally supported the development of the country and economic growth. This change of labor pushed the Japanese TFP (Total Factor Productivity) to go up. To explain this, in 1971 Japan could manufacture products which it could not make ten year earlier such as color televisions, and air conditioners.¹²

After focusing on rebuilding the country, Japan was well rewarded with high economic growth. Its GDP continually increased every year from 1955 to 1993 as

⁸ Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy 1925-1975* (California: Stanford University Press, 1982).

⁹ T. David Mason and Abdul M. Turay, ed., *Japan NAFTA and Europe* (London: Macmillan Press, 1994), p. 136.


¹⁰ Richard KaTz, *Japan: The System that Soured: The Rise and Fall of the Japanese Economic Miracle* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), p. 118.

¹¹ Ann Waswo, *Modern Japanese Society 1868-1994* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 118.

¹² KaTz, p. 151.

shown in Figure 1. In addition, Japan's economy surpassed West Germany and was ranked as the third largest economy in the world.¹³

Figure 1.1
Japan's GDP 1955-2005



Source: IMF and Statistics Bureau, Director-General for Policy Planning and Statistical Research and Training Institution, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Internal Communications, <http://www.stat.go.jp/English/data/zuhyou/03-07.xls>.

¹³ Waswo, p. 104.

Table 1.1
Japan's Trade Balance in Technology 1960-1970
(in millions of US dollars)

Year	Receipts	Payments
1960	2	95
1961	3	113
1962	7	114
1963	7	136
1964	15	156
1965	17	167
1966	19	192
1967	27	239
1968	34	314
1969	46	368
1970	59	433

Source: Based on Terumoto Ozawa, *Japan's Technological Challenge to the West, 1950-1974: Motivation and Accomplishment* (Cambridge: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1974), p. 80.

However, the growth of economy did not contribute to increase in the defense budget as the Japanese government limited the defense budget at 1 per cent of the GNP. For this reason, the defense expenditure had been decreased in the post war period.


1.1.2 Japan's military budget

After the end of WWII, Japan's military budget significantly dropped from the pre war period. During 1938-1942, a few years before WWII erupted; Japan's

military spending was 38 per cent of gross national expenditure.¹⁴ In 1962-1966, after the end of the war, the government decreased the defense budget from 1.01 to 0.94 per cent of the gross national product and it was further decreased from 0.90 to 0.80 during 1967-1971.¹⁵ The decrease in the military budget demonstrated that Japan's security policy in the post war era did not focus on strengthening the country's military power. In 1976 when the first National Defense Program Outline was adopted by the National Defense Council and Cabinet, the defense expenditure was limited to 1 per cent of GNP. Figure 2 shows Japanese defense expenditures during 1955-2006. From the graph, the defense budget of Japan almost remained the same after 1996 due to one per cent of GNP limitation on defense expenditure. In other words, the defense budget would never exceed one per cent of GNP. This was consistent with the GDP shown in Figure 1 which the growth rate became constant in 1998.

Figure 1.2

Defense Expenditures on General Account Budget (Original Budget Basis)



Source: Ministry of Defense, Japan, www.mod.go.jp/e/pub/w_paper/pdf/2007/44Reference-1-63.pdf

¹⁴ W. G. Beasley, *The Rise of Modern Japan* (London: Butler & Tanner, 1990), p. 189.

¹⁵ John K. Emmerson, *Arm, Yen and Power: The Japanese Dilemma* (New York: The Dunellen Publishing, 1971), p. 138.

1.1.3 Japan's security policy after the Cold War

In the 1990s, Japan's security policy has dramatically changed which was in contradictory to the post war period. The constituents of this change can be classified as domestic, regional and international factors. The most significant domestic factor was the constitution of Japan which has long affected Japanese security policy and it continued to be a controversial issue in Japanese society. The existence of Article 9 is the most critical part which limits the state's military role and has distinguished Japan from other states that can fully exercise their military power. As stated in the Article, Japan renounces war as a legitimate instrument to settle international disputes. The constitution has not only handicapped Japan to exercise its military power but also hindered Japan's ability to make a contribution to international security affairs. Japan had been criticized for its inactive role but was not a 'normal state'.

The regional factors which will be examined in this research are the threat from Japan's neighboring countries namely China and North Korea. China's potential military capabilities have been growing since the 1980s. Even though China has pledged not to attack a non-nuclear country with nuclear weapons, it is uncertain that such promise includes Japan.¹⁶ China's missile tests in the Taiwan Strait in 1995 caused Japan to recognize the threat from China and motivated Japan to strengthen its security policy. China was a major factor that motivated Japan to strengthen the relations with the US, particularly the revision of Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation and the cooperation in research on the Theatre Missile Defense (TMD).¹⁷

Japan perceived North Korea as the biggest security threat.¹⁸ North Korean Rodong and Taepo Dong missile launched in 1993 and 1998 over Japanese territory sent the signal to Japan that the threat and danger are close. In response to North

¹⁶ Reinhard Drifte, "Engagement Japanese style," in *Chinese-Japanese Relations in the Twenty-first Century: Complementary and conflict*, ed. Marie Soderberg (New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 53.

¹⁷ Marie Soderberg, ed., *Chinese-Japanese Relations in the Twenty-first Century: Complementary and conflict* (New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 4.

¹⁸ Anthony DiFilippo, *The Challenges of the U.S.-Japan Military Arrangement: Competing Security Transitions in a Changing International Environment* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), p. 123.

Korea's missile tests, Japan decided to join the US TMD project in December 1998.¹⁹ Moreover, North Korea's suspicious ongoing nuclear program also aroused Japan to hastily strengthen its defensive forces and seek effective measures to expand the country's capability. The North Korean threat was one of the critical factors that cause Japanese government to enact the emergency law²⁰ which was controversial and criticized since the law allows Japan to respond to the national emergency situations.²¹

In terms of international factors that cause the change in Japan's security policy, included: the relationship with the U.S., international situations namely the Gulf War, the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the quest for the permanent seat on the UN Security Council were influential to changes in Japan's international security role. Protection provided by the U.S. was important to Japan. After World War II, under the peace constitution, Japan did not have a national army. It signed the security treaty with the U.S. in 1951.²² The US-Japan Security Treaty guaranteed the national security of Japan. However, this bilateral security treaty caused Japan to be dependant on and follow the U.S.'s policy since then.

The original purpose of the US security treaty was to utilize their presence in Japan as protection from the communist threat from Soviet Union in the post-war era. However, the treaty had gradually shifted away from the original aim to closer security cooperation with Japan. The bilateral treaty was revised but it was sometimes ambiguous whether the bilateral alliance was equal.

The relationship between Japan and the US developed and expanded to include the military relationship as seen from the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation in November 1978.²³ The presence of the US troops in Japan after the signature of the Security Treaty had benefited Japan and helped lower Japan's security expenditures. As a result, Japan had maintained its defense budget at less

¹⁹ DiFilippo, p. 19.

²⁰ Emergency Legislation was enacted to ensure the safety of the nation and Japanese people. The Emergency Legislation consists of three laws regarding Response to Armed Attacks.

²¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, "Japan Foreign Policy in Major Diplomatic Fields," www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2004/chap3-a.pdf, p.139.

²² Glenn D. Hook, et al., *Japan's International Relations: Politics, economics and security* (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 124.

²³ Glenn D. Hook, *Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan* (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 47.

than 1 percent of its gross national product.²⁴ With regard to less defense expenditures, Japan was criticized as a ‘free rider’ as it could focused mainly on economic development.

In spite of the presence of US troops in the country, Japan established Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in 1954. The SDF has played a critical role in Japan’s security policy as it could serve as an instrument for Japan to make international contribution to security affairs. Expansion of SDF’s role drew criticism suggesting that the SDF was an indicator of an increase in Japan’s offensive capacity.

In addition, the Gulf War in 1990-91 was another international factor that led to the change in Japan’s security policy. After the end of the Gulf War, Japanese government promulgated the International Peace Cooperation Law (PKO law) in 1992, allowing Japanese SDF to be dispatched abroad for the first time. In accordance with the law, the SDF participated in the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)²⁵. At the same time, Tokyo could make human contributions to the United Nations peacekeeping operation (UNPKO), thus contributing to international security. However, Japan was able to dispatch the SDF²⁶ abroad in peace time only.

The Gulf War aroused Japan’s awareness of its inactivity regarding its own international security role. Due to its reluctance to send personnel and the slow reaction to the war, Japan was strongly criticized by the world community. For this reason, in spite of making the financial contributions totaling \$13 billion,²⁷ Japan suffered the international embarrassment. With the strong criticism from many countries, the Japanese government seriously reconsidered its role during the Gulf War and scrutinized its participation in the international society. Tokyo recognized this expensive lesson from the Gulf War and started reviewing its security policy and its “abnormal status”.

Terrorist attacks in the US on September 11, 2001 had also marked a dramatic change in Japan’s security policy since Japan’s response to the 9/11 attacks

²⁴ James I. Matray, *Japan’s Emergence as a Global Power* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2001), p. 9.

²⁵ Hook, et al., p. 325.

²⁶ The despatch consisted of 600 SDF personnel employed as engineers. Their responsibilities were to repair the road and bridges which was damaged as a result of the war.

²⁷ Hook, p. 84.

contrasted sharply with its response to the Gulf War. As the US's close ally, Japan quickly reacted and strongly supported Washington's anti-terrorism campaign. As a result, the unprecedented Japanese law, the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law, was enacted in October 2001.²⁸ Following the law, notwithstanding the constitutional restriction, Japan surprised the world community by sending the Maritime SDF to provide the logistic, supply, transportation, and communication assistance to U.S. force in the war in Afghanistan.²⁹ Japan's SDF could be dispatched overseas during war-time.

In addition, the scope of SDF's role was further expanded by the promulgation of the Maritime Safety Agency Law and the revision of the International Peace Cooperation Law in 2001. The former allowed SDF to shoot at suspicious boats within Japanese territorial sea and the latter permitted SDF to participate in core units of UN peacekeeping forces.³⁰ To make the contribution toward postwar reconstruction in Iraq, Japanese government also enacted the Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq in 2003.³¹ Under this law, Japan's SDF was able to participate in the humanitarian and reconstruction activities in Iraq.³²

Apart from the aforementioned reasons, Japan's national interest was a very important factor influencing change in Japan's security policy. For Japan, national interest is national security. A good example of the concern regarding the country's security of Japanese leader was the enactment of the Emergency Law as indicated in Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's statement on April 16, 2002:³³

²⁸ "Japan's Defense Policy: Terrorist Attacks in the United States and Debate on Defense Policy," *East Asian Strategic Review* (2002): 319.

²⁹ Bates Gill, "September 11 and Northeast Asia Change and Uncertainty in Regional Security," *Global Politics*, www.brookings.edu/press/review/summer2002/gill.htm.

³⁰ "Japan's Defense Policy," 309, 326.

³¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 2003, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/iraq/issue2003/law_o.html.

³² Junichiro Koizumi "The Basic Plan regarding the measures based on the Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq" (Statement, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, December 9, 2003).

³³ Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on Preparedness to Respond to National Emergencies," <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/koizumi/state0204.html>.

“Responding to emergency situations is the most important responsibility of the state...the incident involving an unidentified vessel...with the potential to threaten the security of our nation. This caused great concern among our people.

Recognizing this reality, the Government of Japan is in the process of conducting a comprehensive review of its preparedness to respond to emergency situations and is taking steps so that as a state, we can ensure our security and respond to any situations or events that may arise”.

Another important factor that aroused the change in Japan’s security policy is Japan’s desire to bring back its ‘national prestige’. The intention to revive prestige of the country caused Japan to reconsider its security role and try to play more significant role in the international arena. To demonstrate Japan’s efforts to regain its national prestige by helping other countries, Japan has made a substantial contribution toward postwar reconstruction in Iraq and was the second largest donor to the United Nations.

As a big donor to the UN, second only to the US, and a country that makes a considerable humanitarian assistance in Iraq, Japan attempted to show that it would be a suitable member of the Security Council. The admission to the UN Security Council is considered as a way to achieve international credibility. In addition, to be a member of the UNSC, Japan needed to have a military force as it is required for the UN peacekeeping operations. This would allow Japan’s SDF to join the UN peacekeeping force officially. Permanent membership of Security Council would enable Tokyo to fully participate in the international community.

Japan’s international security role has gradually changed over a period of time. In accordance with the aforementioned factors, notwithstanding the legal constraint, the Japanese government has enacted a number of unprecedented laws some of which expanded the scope of SDF’s role to become more like a military force. Therefore, it is interesting to study and research how and why Japan’s security policy changed as well as how Japan can respond to the external pressures under the limit security role and whether Japan can become a ‘normal state’ according to the observations above.

1.2 Objectives

The purpose of the thesis is to study changes in Japan's security policy and analyze Japanese potential desire to be a 'normal state' after the Cold War. The thesis will provide rationale for Japan's attempt on this matter.

1.3 Definition

'Normal state' is a state that can possess the military force to defend itself and employ that military force to make international contribution. According to Watanabe Akio,³⁴ a professor at the University of Tokyo and Aoyama Gakuin University and the president of the Research Institute for Peace and Security, when the international community imposes collective sanctions on a country that has been judged to have violated international rules, a state that has the option of using force to enforce its position or the international communities stance on this issue is said to be a "normal country".

1.4 Hypothesis

In spite of the legal limitation on its military, it is believed that Japan is preparing for the remilitarization and assuming a status of a 'normal state' in the near future due to domestic factors, the pressure from the US, the desire to be a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, threats from China and North Korea and the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

³⁴ Watanabe Akio, "The UN and the Japanese Constitution," *Japan Echo* (2005): 22.

1.5 Research questions

1. How has the security policy of Japan changed after the Cold War?
2. What are factors which contribute to Japan's move towards becoming a 'normal state'? To what extent does a 'normal state' benefit Japan?
3. How can Japan develop its military role under the limitation of Constitution Article 9 and the protection provided by the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty?

1.6 Conceptual framework

The conceptual frameworks which will be applied to this thesis will be strategic realism and neo-realism. These two theories will be used to analyze the changes in Japan's security policy in order to understand and rationalize the move of Japan towards becoming a 'normal state'.

Strategic Realism

Strategic realism focuses mainly on foreign policy decision making. State leaders are required to think strategically when they have to deal with basic diplomatic and military issues. According to Thomas Schelling,³⁵ states can use the coercive means to threaten an adversary or bring it into a bargaining relationship.

In this regard, strategic realism is able to explain relations between Japan and North Korea. After North Korean missile test in 1998, Japanese leader had to think strategically in order to deal with this issue. In response to North Korea's aggressive acts, the then Japanese prime minister made an announcement that Japan decided to join the US's TMD project. This decision demonstrated how the Japanese leader

³⁵ Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 81.

considered the TMD project as an effective mean to strengthen national capability to counteract threats.

Even though Japan did not possess the nuclear weapon, the joint missile development between Tokyo and Washington worried North Korea and China. Both countries learned that they could not underestimate Tokyo's military growth as Japan has been protected by American nuclear shield. What would make China and North Korea more concerned was that the Japanese government had not formulated the three non-nuclear principles into law.³⁶ Therefore, Japan's potential desire with relation to the nuclear weapons was unpredictable and that caused China and North Korea to be uncomfortable about Japan's military build-up.

Simultaneously, Japan was also concerned about North Korea's nuclear program and the increase in China's military capability. The missile launches from China and North Korea stimulated Japan to be more aware of the threat from both countries.

Schelling explains that "diplomacy is bargaining which seeks outcomes that are better for both parties. The bargaining can be polite or rude. It can assume a status quo or ignore all rights and privileges and assume mistrust rather than trust. But there must be some common interest." This can best explain the relationship between Japan and the US. Both countries seek outcomes which benefit them both. For example, the Security Treaty forced Japan to lease the base for the US force but on the other hand this Security Treaty provided Japan with security guarantee.

Neo-realism

Neo-realist theory will also be used to analyze changes in Japan's security policy. The theory focuses on the structure³⁷ of the system and changes of the system.

³⁶ DiFilippo, p. 164.

³⁷ A structure is something which exists independently of the actor (e.g. social class) but is an important determinant in the nature of the action (e.g. revolution). For contemporary structural realists, the number of great powers in the international system constitutes the structure. (from Baylis and Smith, 2001).

For neo-realists, structure is anarchy since there is no ‘higher power’ to prevent the use of force. “Security can therefore only be realized through self-help.”³⁸

Japan is the US’s closest ally but, North Korea’s missile tests over Japan’s territory in 1993 and 1998, demonstrated there was no guarantee that Japan would not be attacked by other states. Therefore, Japan has to defend itself. According to neo-realists, “international relations are a struggle for survival, and in every interaction, there is a chance of a loss of power to a future competitor or enemy.”³⁹ Japanese government’s decision to join the US’s TMD project and the enactment of the Emergency Legislation resulted from the threat from North Korea.

Neo-realists believe that structure compels the actor to act in certain ways. International structure comes from the interaction of states.⁴⁰ The structure of the international system determines the state’s behavior. States coexist in the international system and the international system forces them to seek power and security.⁴¹

This could explain Japan’s behavior as Japan’s security role had changed over a period of time due to the international situations effecting the country. As part of the international system, Japan could not afford to ignore the international situations and caused Japan to be more aware of national security. Consequently, Japan has to enact laws to strengthen its security operation, thus fortifying the country’s security role. For example, international criticism of Japan’s contribution to the 1991 Gulf War drove Japan to reconsider its international security role. As a result, Tokyo expanded the role of the SDF by issuing PKO law in 1992 and participating in the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia.

The threat from North Korean missile tests and nuclear program also influenced Japan’s behavior. Japan decided to join the theatre missile defense project with the US after its national security was threatened by North Korea. In this regard, it could explain that Japan realized that weapons could support its survival and served as instrument to counteract the threat. Moreover, Japan’s strong and quick response to

³⁸ John Baylis and Steve Smith, *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 153.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 191.

⁴⁰ Charles W. Kegley Jr, *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), p. 74.

⁴¹ Jackson and Sorensen, p. 51.

9/11 demonstrated the lesson learned from the Gulf War. Accordingly, the unprecedented Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law was enacted. For this reason, Japan's responses to the situations were influenced by the interaction of states and circumstances in the international system.

Neo-realist theory tries to explain international relations by referring to unequal capabilities of states—power. Power differentiates states in the system and gives states a position in the international system. The differences in policy in each state come from the differences in its power or capabilities.⁴²

In terms of military power, Japan has less military power than other countries. Japan cannot participate in the UNPKO effectively due to the legal limitation, Article 9. However, if Japan were a member of UN Security Council, Japanese troops could participate in the UN military actions under the UN command and this participation would not violate the national constitution. “The inclusion in the UNSC is the right and natural direction for Japan in the process of becoming a ‘normal state’ which is able to exercise military power unhindered by the norm of anti-militarism.”⁴³

Neo-realism is able to explain Japan's aspiration to be a permanent member of the UNSC. The permanent seat can bring Japan more power in the international community. Japan would have an opportunity to exercise veto power and its position in the international system would be strengthened. According to neo-realists, “power gives a state a place or position in the international system and that shapes the state's behavior.”⁴⁴

1.7 Scope and methods

The main focus of the thesis is the changes in Japanese security policy after the Cold War to the end of 2005 and the possibility of Japan becoming a ‘normal

⁴² Baylis and Smith, p. 185, 192.

⁴³ Hook, et al., p. 314.

⁴⁴ Baylis and Smith, p. 185.

state'. Causes and factors of the change in Japan's security policy will be examined in relation to the strategic realist and neo-realist theories.

The thesis will be based mainly on documentary research. It will be conducted by the content analysis from the following sources.

- **Primary source:** public papers such as speeches, statements and declarations made by Japanese Prime Ministers, Ministers of Foreign Affairs and people involved.
- **Secondary source:** updated news from newspapers, journals, websites, academic articles from periodicals, textbooks, books, and relevant research papers and studies.

1.8 Literature Review

Japan's progress to becoming a 'normal state' involved diverse factors. The transition in Japan's security role in the post Cold War years has brought the attention of researchers and scholars to study causes and factors resulting to the change in Japan's security policy. It is important to study how Japan, a country without national army, can adjust its security policy and respond to the global security environment. A number of significant studies are selected for the review of literature. They are categorized into two groups.

1. The evolution of Japan's security policy

The study of changes in Japan's security policy is based on the relationship between Japan and the US. Anthony Difilippo viewed the change in Japan's security in "*The Challenges of the U.S.-Japan Military Arrangement: Competing Security Transitions in a Changing International Environment*"⁴⁵. He stated that during the Cold War Japan needed the protection from the US as Japan realized that the United Nations could not effectively provide the international security to the international

⁴⁵ Difilippo.

community. After the end of the Cold War, the US attempted to dominate the East Asia-Pacific region and it needed Japan's assistance. Japan decided to continue the bilateral security alliance even though threat from Soviet Union no longer existed. The agreement between Japan and the US to maintain the bilateral security alliance came from the apprehension that other countries would dominate the East Asia-Pacific region if the US moved out. Moreover, Japan perceived that the bilateral security relations with the US had helped maintain the stability in the region. Difilippo believed that Japan revised the mutual security treaty because of the concern of threats from China and North Korea. Additionally, he argued that Japan maintained the bilateral security alliance in order to establish credibility as a world power and be protected by the US's nuclear umbrella.

Difilippo observed that Japan was urged by the US to accept greater military responsibility in the world after the Cold War. Japan's close tie to the U.S. obstructed the opportunity to establish normal relations with China.

According to Difilippo, the Japan-US security alliance was viewed through two camps, the 'incrementalist' and 'structuralists'.

1. The incrementalist wanted to retain the bilateral security relationship and support Japan's dependence on the U.S. on security affairs. Their major concern was survival and strengthening of the security relationship.
2. The structuralist wanted to see the reconstruction of the bilateral alliance. They perceived that the relationship between Japan and the US was not free from political tensions. In addition, the most important structural change was the decrease of US troops in Japan.

Morimoto Satoshi studied the conditions for maintaining the bilateral security alliance in the post Cold War years. His article "*The Japan-U.S. Alliance and Conditions for Its Ongoing Redefinition*"⁴⁶ explained the US's role in East Asia to balance the power among major nations, namely Japan, China and the Republic of Korea. According to Satoshi, tensions in East Asian region could be harmonised by

⁴⁶ Morimoto Satoshi, "The Japan-U.S. Alliance and Conditions for Its Ongoing Redefinition," *Gaiko Forum* (Spring 2005).

the US-China relations but the greatest factor influencing this relationship would be the Japan-US security alliance.

Satoshi believed that the increase in Chinese influence in the East Asian region was a catalyst for Japan to expand the Japan-US alliance as Japan's national strength would gradually decline in the coming years. Therefore, a strong tie with Washington could help lessen threats from China and avoid the danger from regional conflicts. He also believed that the revision of US-Japan Security Treaty after the constitutional revision would make the Japan-U.S. alliance even stronger.

In addition, Satoshi proposed the upgrade of coordination centre in the Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation to a "Japan-US joint central command and control centre" in order to facilitate the action of both sides. He viewed that effective means to promote Japan-US defence cooperation was to establish close cooperation in defence command, control, coordination, and intelligence. Additionally, a formal plan of operation between Japan and the US should be established in order to respond to armed conflicts in the region. Moreover, the change in Japan's policy must be done in the framework of bilateral security alliance. Japan still needed to remain underneath the US's security umbrella which could enable Japan to counteract regional threats.

Kevin Cooney viewed the relations between Japan and the US in "*Alternative Visions of Japanese Security: the Role of Absolute and Relative Gains in the Making of Japanese Security Policy*".⁴⁷ He stated that Japan depended on the US in order to protect its overseas interests. If Japan took an independent role, it would lose the benefit of relationship with the US and it would have to change its security policy.

Cooney's observations shared some common points with Difilippo and Satoshi regarding Japan's dependence on the US. He viewed that Japan depended on the US-Japan Security Treaty for its security interest. The 9/11 terrorist attacks and the threat from North Korea significantly moved Japan closer to the U.S. Cooney

⁴⁷ Kevin Cooney, "Alternative Visions of Japanese Security: the Role of Absolute and Relative Gains in the Making of Japanese Security Policy," *Asian Perspective* (2005).

additionally observed the personal relationship between the Japanese leaders, Junichiro Koizumi and the US's leader, George W. Bush.

According to the aforementioned reviews, Difilippo, Satoshi and Cooney had studied the change in Japan's security policy in relation to the Japan-US relations and effects of the bilateral security alliance. However, how the change in Japan's security policy, which was influenced by the US, moves Japan to become a 'normal state' was not analyzed. This issue will be examined and further discussed in the thesis.

2. Factors contributed to the change in Japan's security policy

Japan's security policy in the post Cold War era has changed in response to a changing international environment. Numerous scholars studied the process of change in Japan's security policy. These changes could be classified into three groups of factors: domestic factors, regional factors and international factors.

2.1 Domestic factors

The domestic issue regarding constitution and military power was a major concern in Japan. Effective measures to improve the issue are not easy to understand due to different perspectives and interpretations. Kamiya Mataka suggested that Japan should clarify the role of its military force to make a contribution to peace. He wrote "*Learning to Live with Military Power*"⁴⁸ and stated that if the policy makers have to conduct security policy which has national's interests as priority, the military action should be considered as one of the key means to guarantee peace. Kamiya viewed that Japan's national policy involved as little as possible on military issues because of the belief that military and peace were opposing concepts. Japan should be more flexible on the military issue when the country came under attack. Moreover, Japanese policy makers had to consider maintaining regional and international stability as the security of Japan. Both military and nonmilitary are two options that Japan should be ready to use to stabilize global security and protect its interests. Kamiya additionally stated

⁴⁸ Kamiya Mataka, "Learning to Live with Military Power," *Japan Echo* 20 (October 2003): 55.

that Japan may have to consider offensive capability for its own defense as the country was threatened by North Korea's missile tests.

2.2 Regional factors

Michael Green studied the relations between Japan and China in "*Japan-China Relations*"⁴⁹. He viewed that China was an important factor driving Japan to upgrade the National Defence Program Outline (NDPO) in April 1996 and in 1997, Japan agreed to revise the Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation. When these new guidelines were released, it caused tensions between Japan and China as a result of an ambiguous geographic location stated in the new guidelines. The reaction of China to the guidelines caused Japan to be seriously concerned about China's hidden intentions.

Green stated that Japan-North Korea relations was another factor that caused Tokyo to change its security policy. Japanese national security had been challenged by North Korean nuclear programme and missile launches. These missile tests set back the relationship between the two countries.

Nishioka Tsutomu viewed North Korean influence on Japan's security policy through the Japan-US relations. He wrote "*North Korea's Threat to the Japan-U.S. Alliance*"⁵⁰ Tsutomu stated that North Korea's nuclear missiles had been supported by the illicit flow of funds from Japan. Japan was pressured by the US to shut down this unofficial financial channel. As a result, a project team was set up to deal with the North Korean situation. The attempt to impose economic sanctions on Pyongyang by the US could threaten Japan. In addition, the Japan-US alliance could be less amenable if Japan did not act in cooperation with the US to impose sanctions on North Korea.

Tsutomu stated that the purpose of the visit of North Korea's leader to Japan in 2002 was to use negotiations as a shield for North Korea to prevent the attack from the US in the war against terrorism. The only option that Japan had to deal with North Korean threat was to continue close ties with the US. He also supported the

⁴⁹ Michael J. Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 77.

⁵⁰ Nishioka Tsutomu, "North Korea's Threat to the Japan-U.S. Alliance," *Japan Echo* 30 (April 2003): 38.

strengthening security role of Japan and suggested that Japan should get rid of all obstacles and to its exercise of the right of ‘collective self-defense’ as soon as possible.

Chester Dawson stated in *“Flying the Flag”*⁵¹ that North Korea gradually appeared to surpass other factors that caused the debate regarding the Japanese constitution. The threats from North Korea urged Japan to strengthen its security role and drove Japan to join the US ballistic-missile-defense system.

Chester Dawson also mentioned in his *“In the Firing Line”*⁵² that tensions between the two countries could be a serious obstacle to financial transactions. It is known that there was a flow of funds from Japan to North Korea. The fund was used to support North Korean nuclear project. Masahiko Komura, Japanese Foreign Minister, warned that North Korean missile launches would cause a freeze in the flow of foreign-currency remittances to North Korea.

Izumi Hajime viewed the flow of the money from Japan to North Korea as the financial problem. He wrote *“Don’t Hastily Slap Sanctions on North Korea”*.⁵³ Hajime argued that there was a 5 stage proposal, allowing the LDP to impose the economic sanctions on North Korea. All of them involved the prohibition of remittances, cash exports and trade. The freeze in the flow of the remittance could possibly result in a financial problem in the nuclear project. It had been argued by Hajime that the illegal money that came from North Koreans living in Japan would become the income for North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong il and his followers.

The above studies concerning Japan’s relationship with China and North Korea focused on threats posed by these countries and the reaction of Japan to these threats. The analysis of these threats in relation to Japan’s steps towards a ‘normal state’ were not included. The relationship between Japan, North Korea and China which moved Japan forwards to becoming a ‘normal state’ will be analyzed in this thesis. In addition, Japanese public opinion will be included in order to illustrate how

⁵¹ Chester Dawson, “Flying the Flag,” *Far Eastern Economic Review* (August 1999): 18-19.

⁵² Chester Dawson, “In the Firing Line,” *Far Eastern Economic Review* (September 16, 1999): 24.

⁵³ Izumi Hajime, “Don’t Hastily Slap Sanctions on North Korea,” *Japan Echo* 32, no. 2 (2005): 23.

Japanese people feel towards these issues. The possible solution to solve the security problem and decrease tension will also be studied.

2.3 International factors

Japan's quest for the permanent seat in the UNSC is also an important factor contributing to Japan's move to become a 'normal state'. Masuzoe Yoichi stated in "*Linking UN Reform with Constitutional Change*"⁵⁴ that Japan would find it difficult to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) if it could not perform missions as a member of the international community. Moreover, without military power, it is difficult to become a permanent member of the Security Council and fulfil its responsibilities. Yoichi believed that the revision of the pacifist constitution, the ambition of Japan to be a permanent member and the reform of the Security Council could be regarded as a single set of reforms.

The issue of Japan's bid for the seat on the UNSC was also viewed by Inoguchi Takashi in "*What Does Japan Seek to Achieve at the UN?*"⁵⁵. He stated that to be able to achieve a permanent UNSC seat, Japan should develop its own vision of the ideal world, the ideal UN and its appropriate roles. In other words, Japan should be able to explain the benefit that it will bring to humanity if it becomes a permanent member of the UNSC. However, this issue was viewed by Hanaoka Nobuaki who wrote "*Japan's Case for a Permanent Seat*"⁵⁶ that as a second-largest economy, the permanent seat could allow Japan to make a greater contribution to the international community.

Japan's response to terrorist attacks on the US is also an important contributor to the change in Japan's security policy. The role of Japan in combating terrorism demonstrated Japan's willingness to change its security posture on the international stage. Akio Watanabe viewed Japan's response to these terrorist incidents in "*Has Japan Crossed the Rubicon? Defense Policy since the Higuchi*

⁵⁴ Masuzoe Yoichi, "Linking UN Reform with Constitutional Change," *Japan Echo* special issue (2005): 36.

⁵⁵ Inoguchi Takashi, "What Does Japan Seek to Achieve at the UN?" *Japan Spotlight* (2005): 38.

⁵⁶ Hanaoka Nobuaki, "Japan's Case for a Permanent Seat," *Japan Echo* special issue (2005): 45.

Report".⁵⁷ He observed the trends in Japanese security and defence policy from two aspects. First, 'national defence' can explain Japan's effort to establish the legal framework and defence capability. Second, Japan's response to terrorist attacks explains its attempt to increase Japan's contribution to international security.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks brought about Japan's political breakthrough and at the same time astonished the global community with its rapid response. Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels wrote in "*Japan*" in *Strategic Asia 2002-03: Asian Aftershocks* that the Japanese government gained considerable support from the public and the opposition party to respond to these incidents. The change in Japanese attitude towards the country's security role indicated the acceptance of Japan's proactive role in this era.

Japan has been protected by the US under the Security Treaty which was signed in 1952. To study the change in Japan's security policy in the post Cold War era, it is necessary to study the security policy of Japan in the context of security alliance with the US. The thesis will study relations between Japan and the US in the political and military aspects in order to rationalize the move towards a 'normal state' of Japan.

In order to understand how the security policy of Japan has changed and what factors that caused the change, the constitution of Japan and the SDF are two major factors that urged Japan to change its security policy. Japan's relations with China and North Korea and threats posed by these two countries were major concern for Japan. In order to rationalize Japan's move to enact laws and Japan's participation in the US TMD project, the relations and threats from these two countries should be examined. In addition, Japan's policy to pursue the permanent membership is important since one of the requirements of the Security Council membership was to have military force. For this reason, the permanent seat on the UN Security Council will also be studied in order to support the conclusion that Japan was moving towards becoming a 'normal state'.

⁵⁷ Akio Watanabe, "Has Japan Crossed the Rubicon? Defense Policy since the Higuchi Report," *Japan Review of International Affairs*, The Japan Institute of International Affairs (Winter 2003): 238.