

**CHAPTER TWO**  
**JAPAN'S ROLE AND POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR**  
**CRISIS DURING 1993-1994**

**A. Introduction**

After the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Communist Soviet Union, under the change of global security order, such international conflicts as regional instability, religious contradiction, and territorial disputes widely occurred. The Gulf War in the Middle East was a prominent case in a global level, while some development and changes in the Asian region were also remarkable, in particular the upheaval of the Soviet Union military posture; the increasing access of the U.S. army in the region, the Korean Peninsula issues, and the development as well as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).

In Northeast Asia, the stability of the Korean Peninsula was one of the significant security issues, in which lots of major states including Russia, the United States, China, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea got involved. In particular, the nuclear weapons program of Pyongyang caused mutual distrust among nations, military rearrangement, and the arms race, especially nuclear bombs and missiles. In early 1990s, an international community was concerned that North Korea had developed nuclear capability for the purpose of military use and inter-trade linking with other nuclear powers, under the Soviet and Chinese support on nuclear training and technology since the 1950s. Tokyo, Washington, Seoul, the United Nations, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) demanded that Pyongyang should allow the IAEA's agents to look around and verify the nuclear waste sites and the suspected facilities according to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement. At first, North Korea permitted that the IAEA could

only visit the nuclear plants without inspections. All efforts to induce the North to accept the facilities inspections failed. North Korea not only denied all of their demands, but also paved the way for national security options by restarting the nuclear plants and reprocessing the enriched uranium. The nuclear crises in Northeast Asia thus began and has continued until now.

Tension and instability of the Korean Peninsula had an impact on Japanese security because of the geopolitical reason. Importantly, Japanese economic and security interests relied on the stability of the Peninsula. As Japanese resources were under limitation, the natural resources of South and North Korea were important for Japan's economic development. In addition, North Korea was a significant market for Japanese trade and investment if their relations could be normalized successfully.<sup>1</sup> Under the security reason, the Peninsula became a buffer zone of Japan against China and Russia.<sup>2</sup> As a result, the Governments of Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa and Prime Minister Tsutomu Hata paid more attention on the peace building of the Korean Peninsula, particularly the North Korean nuclear issue.

This chapter traces a historical security issue over North Korea's nuclear tension during 1993-1994 in reference to two significant areas. First, the study mainly focuses on the Japanese role and policy in response to the 1994 nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Next, the Japanese policy decision-making as well as a bilateral policy implementation against North Korea and a multilateral policy with other players in dealing with the crisis is simultaneously discussed.

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<sup>1</sup> Michael J. Green, "Japan and the Future of the Korean Peninsula," Korea and World Affairs (Summer 1996): 204.

<sup>2</sup> Ming Liu, "An Obsessed Task: Prospects, Models and Impact of Korean Reunification," East Asia 17, no.4 (Winter 1999): 32-36.

## **B. An Overview of the 1994 North Korean Nuclear Crisis**

The 1994 nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula initially started on March 12, 1993 when Pyongyang decidedly announced its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).<sup>3</sup> The intelligence sources of Moscow, Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul believed that Pyongyang had extracted enough plutonium to produce small amounts of nuclear weapons. Even though they had, presumably, photographic evidence of the nuclear reactors construction progress taken by surveillance satellites, the North Korean government still insisted that the mentioned nuclear sites were military bases. However, they sought other approaches to convince North Korea to make a re-consideration over the withdrawal from the NPT and the acceptance of nuclear facilities inspections. For instance, President Bill Clinton warned that it would be the end of North Korea unless the North terminated the manufacturing as well as the development of nuclear weapons. For Pyongyang's alternatives, however, the Clinton Administration offered the construction of the two light-water reactors (LWRs) replacing the North's graphite-moderated reactors in order to avoid putting too much pressures on North Korea. Nevertheless, shortly after the announcement on March 12, Pyongyang started testing various ranges of missiles by firing middle-range Nodong-1 ballistic missiles along with short-range Scud C missiles into the Sea of Japan on May 29, 1993 and followed by the Scud B missiles on June 5, 1993.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, the North assertively denied the IAEA's full inspections of the suspected nuclear sites. Originally, that harmful manner of Pyongyang was stirred up by the U.S.-ROK Joint Team Spirit Military exercises<sup>5</sup>, the U.S. hostile policy, and the international request for full inspections of the two suspected facilities in Yongbyon. According to Pyongyang, it was believed that Washington was behind the

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<sup>3</sup> Jung-Hoon Lee and Chung-In Moon, "The North Korean Nuclear Crisis Revisited: The Case for a Negotiated Settlement," *Security Dialogue* 34, no.2 (June 2003): 140.

<sup>4</sup> "Asia Yearbook," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (1994): 145.

<sup>5</sup> The United States and South Korea started the exercises for the first time in June 1976. Under this activity, apart from the joint movement of the troops, the practice in using nuclear weapons was relevant in a large scale.

scene of the IAEA's demand for the special inspections by which North Korea argued that it was the IAEA's interference in its internal affairs.

On May 28, 1994, the North began to remove spent fuel rods from the unverified reactors so the IAEA inspectors could not trace North Korea's past plutonium production. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) immediately warned that if North Korea processed the removal of spent fuel rods, it was going to approve economic sanctions against the North.<sup>6</sup> However, China disagreed with the sanctions. Beijing argued that this tough measure should be the last choice. In addition, this matter required an international diplomatic negotiation to seek a peaceful resolution. The IAEA, U.S., Japan, and South Korea seriously demanded the North's permission for the complete inspections of the nuclear plants, however.

As his political strategy, the former leader Kim Il Sung drew the U.S.'s attention by proposing on June 12 that North Korea would halt the plutonium production if the U.S. agreed to improve the relations, to provide financial assistance, and to establish new nuclear reactors.<sup>7</sup> Accordingly, the former President Jimmy Carter, who represented a special envoy, visited North Korea to negotiate with the leader Kim. After the dialogue, Pyongyang agreed to freeze the nuclear operations in exchange with technology and financial contributions for the construction of light-water reactors.<sup>8</sup> The hope of peace building on the Peninsula almost collapsed along with the death of President Kim on July 8, 1994. In spite of his death, the antagonistic character, the Stalinist regime, and the self-reliance ideology still existed. It was clear that Kim Jong-Il, who succeeded him as the new head of state, did not only persist on the unique attitude like his father, but also applied a more aggressive manner in shaping the state's policies. The hard-line stance of the two North Korean leaders alarmed all the major players in Northeast Asia as well as the United States, due to the fact that the nuclear development

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<sup>6</sup> "Asia Yearbook," Far Eastern Economic Review (1995): 150.

<sup>7</sup> Stephen Kriby, "The Effects of Regional Power Factors on Inter-Korean Relations and Implications of the Nuclear Issue for the Northeast Asian Security Order," in North Korea in the New World Order, eds. Hazel Smit and Chris Rhoder (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p.60.

<sup>8</sup> Washington Times, 17 June 1994, A1, A16.

program of the North was a direct threat and a challenge toward regional security and stability.

### *Japan*

It was remarkable that the Government of Japan conducted post-Cold War policy toward North Korea in accordance with threat perceptions and national interests. In terms of security concerns, Japan perceived that North Korea's nuclear brinkmanship was a national threat from, first of all, the secret nuclear reprocessing and the denial of the IAEA inspections of the nuclear waste sites. The refusal of North Korea over the nuclear sites examination could imply that Pyongyang really had secret plants as other parties believed. Pyongyang's decision on the withdrawal from the NPT and its violation against the provisions under the Safeguards Agreement also caused uncertainty and instability in East Asia. Very importantly, North Korean missiles were launched twice in May and June 1993, challenging Japanese security and regional stability. In lights of national interests, peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula served Japanese economic and security interests. To reach the goals, on one hand, the Japanese governments made efforts to normalize relations with the two Koreas and to promote a nuclear-free zone on the Korean Peninsula. On the other hand, Japan cooperated with the US in the study project of the Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) to deter the missile attacks of the North. As a non-nuclear state, Japan sought a peaceful resolution on the North's nuclear issue in order to fulfill the NPT and the disarmament regime. Because of these nuclear threat perceptions and national interests, Japan inevitably got involved in this issue.

### *The United States*

With large-scale engagement in Japan, the United States could not ignore North Korea's activities. The main reason was that the Japan-U.S. relations remained core interests of the U.S.'s East Asia policy. Significantly, Japan became a major financial supporter of the U.S. foreign affairs such as the expenditure for U.S. troops in Okinawa

and the financial contribution for the construction of the two light-water reactors for the North Korean energy utility. In addition, the White House exploited Tokyo as a route to intervene in Asian affairs. For instance, the U.S. required Japan's support in coping with China who continued expanding its political and economic power in the region. Furthermore, U.S. viewed Japan as a strategic security point of the U.S. army. The existence of Washington's troops on Japanese land facilitated the U.S. regional control and psychologically threatened China, Russia, and North Korea as such. Consequently, the former U.S. leaders continuously maintained relationships with all Japanese governments since post war. According to Washington, Pyongyang's nuclear problem was a regional issue.<sup>9</sup> In this context, the U.S. cooperated with Japan in dealing with the North by strengthening their security ties. Washington also persuaded Tokyo to pose financial sanctions toward Pyongyang and to join the study of a missile defence system. At a global level, the U.S. enforced the economic sanctions proposal against North Korea's aggressive acts in the international community.

### *China*

Threat perceptions and national interests of China over North Korea's nuclear ambitions absolutely differed from Japan and the United States. The real threat toward Chinese security was the Japan-U.S. security arrangement and the U.S.'s East Asia policy. According to the reasons of historical, strategic, and cultural sharing, the Government of China included North Korea's issue as a major point in its foreign and security policies. One of China's goals was to help surviving the North Korean regime<sup>10</sup> by which Chinese security and economic interests on the Korean Peninsula were preserved. The existence of North Korean sovereignty belonged to Chinese political and

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<sup>9</sup> Wichian Intasi, "Comparison of the First and Second North Korea's Nuclear Dispute."

<sup>10</sup> Samuel S. Kim, "Sino-North Korean Relations in the Post-Cold War World," in North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival, eds. Young Whan Kihl and Hong Nack Kim (London: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), p.185.

military influences. It also guaranteed Chinese power on the Peninsula.<sup>11</sup> Since the 1950s, China had supported the North's nuclear training and cooperation.<sup>12</sup> It, thus, was hard for Beijing to blame or criticize Pyongyang's nuclear projects. To balance the power with Tokyo and Washington, Beijing disagreed with the economic sanctions against the test launches of North Korean missiles in May and June 1993 since it rather roused acceleration of North Korea's nuclear weapons process.

### *South Korea*

North Korea's nuclear threat had many impacts on South Korean interests. The launching of Pyongyang's missiles in 1993 broke the plan of improving the ROK-DPRK relations and the Korean reunification. The Kim Young Sam Administration proposed the provisional idea of a Korean Commonwealth for the time being as the preparatory process of the reunification.<sup>13</sup> Peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula was the most important point of South Korea's policy. With all efforts, Seoul also induced Pyongyang to open the suspected nuclear waste sites for international inspections. Moreover, Seoul decisively joined the military exercises and the missiles defense system together with Washington for the security assurance of the Peninsula. To strengthen peace and stability, the Government of South Korea offered assistance for the North's energy and the construction of new reactors. The South Korean government disagreed with the U.S. proposal of economic sanctions against North Korea's nuclear activities because it possibly affected the peace-building process on the Peninsula.

After the 1998 crisis, Seoul shifted its political strategy in dealing with Pyongyang. President Kim Dae-jung announced the "Sunshine Policy" which promoted peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas. This policy was seemingly a fundamental

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<sup>11</sup> Chusak Tangsakul, "Japanese Foreign Policy Toward Korean Reunification in the Post Cold War Era" (master's thesis, Thammasat University, 2002), pp. 124-125. (in Thai)

<sup>12</sup> Leonard S. Spector and Jacqueline R. Smith, "North Korea: The Next Nuclear Nightmare?" *Arms Control Today* 21: 2 (March 1991): 9.

<sup>13</sup> Chusak Tangsakul, p.5.

approach which brought about their future cooperation. President Kim aimed at improving Korean relations through cooperation and conciliation. In addition, he believed that this policy helped reduce military disputes and armament. More importantly, he wanted to enhance the trust-building measure between their countries. Moreover, this movement may lead to the establishment of a Korean economic community as well.

### *Russia*

As Russia exerted influential power over the Korean Peninsula since the Cold War, the Government of Moscow realized that the uncertainty and instability of the Peninsula had an impact on Russia's economic and security interests. In regards, North Korea's territory was only 75 miles far from Vladivostok. As a result, the North became an economic path through which Russia transferred the armaments to Vietnam.<sup>14</sup> In the 1990s, Moscow's policy was to keep closer relations with South Korea than the North.<sup>15</sup> Accordingly, the Russian government disagreed with the missiles tests of Pyongyang. Russia cooperated with the UN Security Council, the IAEA, U.S., Japan, and South Korea in seeking a resolution over North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Under the cooperation, Russia provided intelligence support to clarify whether the North intended to produce nuclear weapons. Despite the fact that lots of Russian scientists were working for the North's nuclear project for long periods, Russian leaders refused their support upon North Korea's nuclear weapons manufacturing. To assure this idea, Russia stopped exporting nuclear equipment and technology as a warning to North Korea that it must accept full-scope of the Safeguards Agreement. In addition, Russian officials did not allow Russian scientists to work in North Korea's nuclear lab anymore. Moreover, Moscow agreed with Seoul concerning the idea of the nuclear-free zone in the Korean Peninsula.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Chusak Tangsakul, pp.125-126.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., pp.126-127.

<sup>16</sup> Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, "North Korea Nuclear Crisis," <http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/nuc.htm>.

### C. Japan's Role and Policy Toward North Korea During 1993-1994

To have a better understanding of Japan's policy decision-making process and policy implementation over North Korea's nuclear crisis, it is vital to consider Japan's defence policy over global stability and the security policy toward North Korea's nuclear issue along with the influential factors over the policy decision-making.

#### 1. Japan's Basic Policy on National Security

In Section Two named "*Toward the Construction of a New International Framework*" upon the 1993 Diplomatic Bluebook, it stated that Japanese security policy relied on three major points: strongly preserving the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangement, properly protecting national defence capabilities, and actively providing diplomatic moves for international peace and security.<sup>17</sup> From the three pillars, it implied that Japanese security was essentially dependent more on the U.S.'s protection due to the legal limitations under the present Constitution. Based on the Exercise of Right of Self-Defense, it was conditional that the right of Japan's self-defence to take effect when there was a critical aggression against the country; no proper methods except the self-defense arrangement; and a minimum level of the armed strength.<sup>18</sup>

It was unavoidable that Japan's defense policy relied on the Japan-U.S. security arrangements.<sup>19</sup> Since Post War, all of Japan's prime ministers considered that the Japan-U.S. security alliance was very important for the maintenance of Japan's security interests. As a result, they admitted the existence of the U.S. troops in the country for

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<sup>17</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, "1993 Diplomatic Bluebook: Section 2-Toward the Construction of a New International Framework," <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1993/1993-3.htm#3.%20Diplomacy>.

<sup>18</sup> Japan's Defense Agency, "Conditions for Exercise of Right of Self-Defense," [http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index\\_.htm](http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index_.htm).

<sup>19</sup> Japan's Defense Agency, "Basic Policy for National Defense," [http://www.jda.go.jp/e/policy/f\\_work/frame21\\_h.htm](http://www.jda.go.jp/e/policy/f_work/frame21_h.htm).

purposes of the protection of national security and the maintenance of regional stability. Based on Japan's Defense Policy, the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan undoubtedly ensured the neighboring countries that Japan would not rearm its troops any longer<sup>20</sup>.

Japan does not only emphasize on national security, but also promotes regional and global peace, prosperity, and stability. It is noticeable that Japan's Constitution serves international peace and cooperation in peace-keeping operations. To maintain international peace, it is necessary that Tokyo has encouraged international cooperation with other countries and international organizations, in particular the United Nations. This attitude is also included in Japan's foreign and security policies toward the global situation. Additionally, Japanese policy makers realize that national values are vital for conducting policy. Accordingly, Japan's supreme interests, which includes national security, stability, and prosperity, are arranged in the first rank that shape Japanese policies. The preservation of these core interests is a fundamental principle of Japan's foreign and security policies.

In the early 1990s, Japan encountered lots of problems both internally and internationally. The significance of whatever issue based on how serious it was. The domestic and international matters that Tokyo faced included, for example, a territorial dispute with Russia, criticism over Japan's role in the Gulf War, the relationship between Japan and Russia, Japan and China, and Japan and South Korea, and the first defeat in its entire 38 years of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Among these problems, North Korea's threat in terms of its nuclear development program needed urgent resolution due to a wide linkage of most key players in the region and a great impact against Japan as well as international relations.

Though some Asian countries, for example, India and Pakistan, also developed nuclear weapons, Japan never took their threats seriously since it did not directly challenge Japanese interests. In contrast, the nuclear program of North Korea was very harmful due to the nearby location and the aggressive posture of Kim Il Sung and Kim

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<sup>20</sup> Japan's Defense Agency, "Basis of Defense Policy," [http://www.jda.go.jp/e/policy/f\\_work/frame22.htm#c](http://www.jda.go.jp/e/policy/f_work/frame22.htm#c).

Jong-II. In addition, the Japanese people still feared and suffered from the bad experiences that resulted from the bombing of the U.S. at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in World War II. Thus, they did not want to wage war anymore. Japan attempted to convince other states to end the conflicts and to make peace with each other instead.

After the ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1976, Japan has continuously engaged in the disarmament and nonproliferation activities since the early 1990s.<sup>21</sup> In order to achieve an active role over the nuclear nonproliferation, Japan convinced the nuclear states to accept the NPT regime, including disarmament and a nuclear test ban as much as it could. For instance, in 1993 the Government started consulting with India and Pakistan and then persuaded them to participate in the NPT.<sup>22</sup> In addition, the former Prime Minister Hosokawa made a statement in a conference of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) that Tokyo willingly continued the promotion of the NPT.<sup>23</sup> These movements showed that Japan strongly insisted on the nuclear-free ideology as a key national security policy.

## **2. Japan's Foreign and Security Policies toward North Korean Nuclear Crisis**

In post-Cold War, Japan's domestic policy was based on economic reformation due to the financial slowdown, which later caused a bubble economy that affected internal affairs both in economy and politics. The Government launched a number of policies including some measures to solve the problem, for example, the proposal of increasing a special budget twice in 1993 for financial growth.<sup>24</sup> In early 1993, the financial difficulties had an impact on political activities, in particular the re-election in 1993. Due to the economic problems, private sectors had no more contributions to

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<sup>21</sup> Masako Toki, "Sixty Years After the Nuclear Devastation, Japan's Role in the NPT," [www.cns.miis.edu](http://www.cns.miis.edu).

<sup>22</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "1993 Diplomatic Bluebook: Section 2-Toward the Construction of a New International Framework," <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1993/1993-3.htm#3.%20Diplomacy>.

<sup>23</sup> "Asia Yearbook," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (1994): 144-145.

<sup>24</sup> Institute of Asian Studies, *Asia Yearbook* (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University, 1994), p.216. (in Thai)

support the campaign as usual. The multi-parties system or coalition parties reduced an effectiveness of the policy-making process since the leader had no absolute power to run the policy. It showed that under the coalition government ruled by the Japan New Party (JNP),<sup>25</sup> the real power belonged to Ichiro Ozawa who influenced other factions in the government.<sup>26</sup>

The domestic problem also had an effect on the decision-making process of Japan's foreign policy. Prime Minister Hosokawa viewed economic problem as an emergency case needed to be healed. In the security field, Japan had military limitation according to an Article 9 of Japanese Peace Constitution which stated that the use of force was not allowed. At the same time, the peace-keeping operations as well as the international cooperation in peaceful means were served as the objectives of Japanese defense under the Basic Policy for National Defense.<sup>27</sup> Furthermore, Japan pursued the three non-nuclear principles, which prohibited the possession, the production, and the admission of nuclear weapons into the country.<sup>28</sup> These factors limited Japan's defense capability in dealing with the external attack. Japan's security depended on U.S. protection. Thus, Japan's foreign and security policies relied on Japan-U.S. relations, particularly, the North Korean nuclear crisis.

The Japan-DPRK ties continuously stagnated because of Pyongyang's nuclear ambition. Moreover, the security concerns and mutual distrust between the two countries were eventually deepening under the external pressure by the confrontation between the United States and North Korea. Japanese people were worried and, at the same time, condemned Pyongyang's nuclear development program. The Government refused to continue the diplomatic relations with Pyongyang. Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa demanded that the North Korean government should reconsider its decision regarding the NPT withdrawal. He also emphasized that none of normalization discussions could occur

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<sup>25</sup> Established in May 1992 by former Kumamoto governor Morihiro Hosokawa and competed in a Lower House election for the first time gaining 35 seats.

<sup>26</sup> "Asia Yearbook," pp.141-142.

<sup>27</sup> Japan's Defense Agency, "Basic Policy for National Defense."

<sup>28</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "On the Three Non-Nuclear Principles," <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/nnp/index.html>.

until the North accepted the full inspections, including authentication, inspection, and verification of the nuclear weapons program by the IAEA.<sup>29</sup> Consequently, it caused the Japan's lack of progress and inevitably affected efforts to negotiate with Pyongyang regarding the nuclear-free arrangement and the abduction issue, which was another concern of the Japanese Governments.

As the aforementioned points, North Korean missile tests starting in May 1993 were a critical point that Japan suddenly perceived a security threat to the country and the region. According to the annual White Paper, Japan's Defence Agency stated that North Korea was a major threat to Japan.<sup>30</sup> For this reason, the Government carefully kept an eye on its move. Under the defence policy, the Japanese Government decided to strengthen its defence capabilities by purchasing some deterrent missile equipment from Washington and Moscow. Japan also acquired U.S. missile deterrent systems in order to deter North Korean missiles not to damage the Japan's archipelagos and the surrounding areas.<sup>31</sup> However, this determination raised critical debates in the region about Japan's rearmament. China, Russia, and North Korea worried about Japan's military movement. They were afraid that Japan was preparing to become a military power again.<sup>32</sup>

Although Japan was reluctant to negotiate with North Korea on the nuclear issue, it had to negotiate because it threatened Japan's national security. Japan participated in multilateral negotiations on this matter to protect its core interests. Hence, Japan's North Korea policy at the meantime mainly focused on national defence, disarmament, and nuclear non-proliferation in order to protect national security and prosperity as well as regional stability. In light of the 1993-1994 nuclear tension on the Peninsula or generally called the 1994 crisis, national security was Japan's supreme interest. Under a concept of national interest, Neo-realist Kenneth Waltz defined that

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<sup>29</sup> Center for Non-Proliferation Studies.

<sup>30</sup> "Asia Yearbook." p.146.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., pp.144-145.

<sup>32</sup> From the Interview with the high-ranking official from Thai Governmental Department.

each state planned the best choice for its interests. Moreover, the basic values including state security and survival were valuable that states should defend.<sup>33</sup>

It was essential that Japan also made more cooperation with other states in order to deal with Pyongyang's aggression. For instance, after the test-fire of Nodong-1 and Scud missiles, Tokyo cooperated with Washington in establishing a working group to study counter measures against Pyongyang. In the summer of 1994, the Japan's Defense Agency supported the research of a Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) system in cooperation with U.S. and South Korea for purpose of deterring North Korea's missile attacks.<sup>34</sup> In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan announced that Tokyo, Seoul, and Washington prepared to inform the UN Security Council about Pyongyang's denial of the special inspections, in order that North Korea abandoned its decision of withdrawing from the NPT.<sup>35</sup>

It should be noted that Japan's policy decision-making was likely proactive in international affairs. Japan was completely reliant on a multilateral framework as stated in the Constitution of Japan that no country could manage everything by itself alone.<sup>36</sup> To protect the country from any threats and invasions from the North, the best choice of the Japanese government was to make collaboration politically and economically with the alliances. Accordingly, Japan's North Korea policy continued to establish security cooperation together with U.S., South Korea, China, and Russia and major international organizations such as the United Nations and the IAEA. Japan, in cooperation with the U.S. and South Korea, encouraged North Korea to accept the negotiation for an establishment of regional peace and stability. Tokyo also joined with Washington and Seoul in establishing cooperation on the Korean Peninsula Energy Development

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<sup>33</sup> Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen, Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches (New York: Oxford University, 2003), ch.3, p.87.

<sup>34</sup> "Asia Yearbook," p.146.

<sup>35</sup> Center for Non-Proliferation Studies.

<sup>36</sup> Japan's Defense Agency, "The Constitution of Japan," [http://www.jda.go.jp/e/policy/f\\_work/kenpo\\_.htm](http://www.jda.go.jp/e/policy/f_work/kenpo_.htm).

Organization (KEDO)<sup>37</sup> for the purpose of an elimination of nuclear tension in East Asia. Japan also encouraged the North-South negotiations on the Korean reunification. In addition, Tokyo supported the U.S.-DPRK bilateral negotiation for the resolution of nuclear tension though it was doubtful whether Washington discussed only the matter of long-range missile capability without the terms of the medium-range missiles test which was Japan's concerns.<sup>38</sup>

#### **D. Summary**

In the early 1990s, Japan did not perform a proactive role over the first nuclear crisis of North Korea, except at the global level. The Governments of Prime Ministers Kiichi Miyazawa, Morihiro Hosokawa, and Tsutomu Hata had been less effective in coping with the crisis due to the domestic politics including the weakness of the national economy and the political change. In this context, although the North Korea's missile program threatened Japan's security interests, the government realized that the Japan-U.S. security alliance had capability to counterbalance with the North. Accordingly, Tokyo continued the maintenance of security relations with Washington as a fundamental of Japan's foreign policy.<sup>39</sup> In addition, Japan's foreign and security policies mainly relied on the Japan-U.S. security relationship as well as the multilateral means including the Japan-U.S.-South Korea cooperation and the international institutions coordination.

In making the policy toward the 1994 nuclear crisis, it was certain that Japanese strategy was under a prudential move. In response to the incident, Tokyo assertively waited and saw what was the consideration of other parties, especially Washington and Seoul, towards Pyongyang's aggressive acts. Then, the Japanese Government could

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<sup>37</sup> The creation of this organization was initiated by Japan, South Korea, and the United States in December 1994 in order to support the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework.

<sup>38</sup> David Fouse, "Japan's Post-Cold War North Korea Policy: Hedging toward Autonomy?" <http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Ocasional%20Papers/OPJapansPost-ColdWarNorthKoreaPolicy.pdf>.

<sup>39</sup> Ministry of Foreign Policy, "Diplomatic Bluebook," [www.mofa.go.jp](http://www.mofa.go.jp) (1993).

launch its policy to comply with that resolution. For instance, when Pyongyang announced its decision to withdraw from the NPT in March 1993 and denied the facilities inspections by the IAEA, the Miyazawa's Government did not react against the missile tests until the U.S proposed the sanction measure to the UN Security Council. Accordingly, a sort of Japanese engagement to international security affairs remained unchanged under the non-aggressive attitude according to the present Constitution.

Japan's North Korea policy in the 1994 crisis was just to convince the North to re-consider the decision of withdrawal from the NPT. For Tokyo, it was believable that the tension could end with the soft measures such as diplomatic negotiations and the incentive package. The Government agreed to provide some amounts of financial contributions to the construction of the light-water reactors through the KEDO in exchange with North Korean renunciation of its nuclear weapons program. Under the bilateral framework, Japan failed to induce North Korea to make a discussion over national concerns, such as the normalization relations, abduction issue, and the nuclear problem because of North Korea's nuclear brinkmanship. In light of the multilateral framework, Japan performed an active role in the cooperation in the missile defence study and the KEDO as such. Japan's defence and nuclear deterrence policy were to set up a working group and to study the counter measures against North Korean nuclear threat. Moreover, Tokyo decided to strengthen its military capability by purchasing the interceptor system from Washington to deter Pyongyang's nuclear attacks. Besides, Japan's policy makers promoted the non-proliferation policy as a basis of Japan's security policy.

From the study, the major factors that had an influence on Japan's policy decision-making were identified as follows. First, the geographical reason and Pyongyang's aggressive manner had an influence significantly on Japan's decision in taking action carefully toward the security issue on the Korean Peninsula. Second, the capacity of Japan's Self-Defence Forces was limited by the Article 9 of the present Constitution. Under this circumstance, Japanese policy makers decided to cooperate with the U.S. in securing national peace and regional stability. Third, the Governments of

Japan continued promoting the Japan-U.S. security relations for the purpose of the protection of national security against Pyongyang's threat. As a result, Japan's foreign and security policies were based on the U.S.'s policy. Fourth, the Japanese government realized that the national economy was the supreme interest and needed to be resolved first. Moreover, the Government believed that the missile test in 1993 was just a political tactics of North Korea, which was able to arrange a peaceful negotiation to seek a resolution. Fifth, the political change of Japan had a major impact on Japan's foreign and security policies because there were many players in the policy decision-making process. Under this light, it took time to make a consensus that served the dependent policy upon the Japan-U.S. security treaty. Lastly, due to the worsening of bilateral relations between Japan and North Korea, the Japanese Government instead promoted the multilateral cooperation with the U.S. and South Korea to deal with North Korea's aggression.

It is questionable whether Japan will conduct the same role and policy as in the first crisis in dealing with the 1998 nuclear crisis. What kind of strategy will the Japanese governments use to deal with the second nuclear crisis? Hence, the next chapter will concentrate on Japan's foreign and security policies along with the bilateral and multilateral framework against Pyongyang's nuclear threat to maintain regional peace and security.