

CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND AND ISSUES

A. The Origin of Nuclear Crisis

By 1945, only the United States had the technological capability of nuclear weapons production. To balance global security order, since then, other four countries including the former Soviet Union (1949), the United Kingdom (1952), France (1960), and China (1964) became nuclear states respectively.¹ Because of the mutual concerns on one another's threat, the U.S. and the former Soviet Union increasingly accumulated weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), in particular, nuclear weapons in terms of national defense options. As regards, President Harry Truman believed that superpowers like the U.S. and the Soviet Union at that moment regarded nuclear arms as a competitive mechanism.² Both states manufactured not only nuclear weapons but also other destructive tools such as chemical weapons and biological weapons. Inevitably, this movement raised arms race in the context of strategic stalemate, under which each country collected weapons in order to exert influence to control and limit others' power so finally no one could win. According to the mutual distrust among nations, nuclear technological and manufacturing skills were then proliferated to other regions.

During the Cold War, regional conflicts had occurred in Asia, for example, between China-Taiwan, India-Pakistan, and North-South Korea. The nuclear states like China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea exploited nuclear weapons as strategic security

¹ Darryl Howlett, "Nuclear proliferation," in The Globalization of World Politics, eds. John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.419.

² Richard J. Harknett, "Nuclear weapons and territorial integrity in the post-Cold War world," in New Studies in Post-Cold War Security, ed. K.R. Dark (England: Dartmouth Publishing, 1996), pp.29-33.

equipment. India and Pakistan developed nuclear and missiles to counterattack each other while North Korea tested missiles to alarm its neighbors such as South Korea, Japan, and the United States, showing that it was impossible for anyone to invade its territory and collapse its regime. Accordingly, an argument that the region undoubtedly faced the nuclear war was reasonable as far as these adversaries still regarded the destructive weapons as bargaining chips.

Insecurity concerns stemming from the nuclear development and proliferation obviously occurred in Northeast Asia in the 1990s. On December 31, 1991, North and South Korea agreed on the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula which was later enforced on February 19, 1992. Together, they promised not to manufacture, produce, accept, and possess nuclear weapons, nuclear reprocessing and uranium enriched facilities. In addition, the declaration consisted of the obligation of mutual inspections between these two countries and the enforcement of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) created by Japan, South Korea, and the U.S.³ In spite of the existing declaration, Chairman Kim Il Sung of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (famously called North Korea) caused nuclear a threat perception on the Korean Peninsula. The crisis caused by North Korea remarkably occurred in the two different periods: 1993-94 and 1998-99. In the early 1990s, the North violated the declaration by denying the IAEA's inspection at its two nuclear sites in Yongbyon as a response to the U.S. protection and military base in South Korea. Moreover, Pyongyang later declared its decision of withdrawal from the NPT on March 12, 1993, due to the US ignorance of Pyongyang's 1992 proposal for the replacement of nuclear reactors and the restarted joint exercise of the Team Spirit military between Washington and Seoul.⁴ Significantly, North Korea tested short-ranged missiles twice in May and June in 1993 in the Sea of Japan.⁵ Japan perceived that the

³ Hideya Kurata, "North Korea's Renewed Nuclear Challenge," Japan Review of International Affairs 17, No.2 (2003): 87.

⁴ Guangyao Jin, "The Changing Situation of the Korean Peninsula and Its Impact on Security Future," <http://www.nautilus.org/archives/nukepolicy/workshops/shanghai01/jinpaper.txt>.

⁵ "Asia Yearbook," Far Eastern Economic Review (1994): 145.

Northeast Asian region was instable. Under this light, The Government of Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa suddenly condemned and protested North Korea's action, but the North ignored Japan's reaction. Pyongyang's nuclear development program was continuously kept on. After meeting with the U.S. in June 1994, however, North Korea agreed to halt the nuclear program and signed the Agreed Framework, so called the *Geneva Agreement* on October 12, 1994. The reason why Pyongyang signed this agreement was for the exchange of Light-Water Reactors (LWRs) for the replacement of the previous graphite-moderated reactors which could produce lots of nuclear warheads.

In terms of threat perception, it was believable that national interests were intervened and endangered by other countries.⁶ Under this light, President Kim Jong Il of North Korea continued the nuclear program and introduced again security threats to its neighboring countries by the end of the 1990s. On August 31, 1998, Pyongyang launched a Taepodong1 ballistic missile with a range of over 1,500 km. across Japan into the Pacific Ocean. This action not only threatened Japan, South Korea, and the United States, but also broke the 1991 Declaration and the 1994 Agreement. Moreover, it was anticipated that the inter-continental ballistic missile namely Taepodong 2, was produced for test firing in the following year. For North Korea, it was supposed to halt this test-firing mission on the condition that the construction of its nuclear reactors were finished rapidly and also if the sanctions were left. On September 12, 1999, the North agreed to terminate missile production, test, and distribution in a range of 300 miles and to freeze its trading of nuclear weapons, and its technological and skills flow. In exchange, North Korea demanded the compensation for any profit losses that resulted from the ending of the program. Of course, none of the involving countries fulfilled the North's requirements. They enhanced Pyongyang only in KEDO's energy project on the condition that North Korea was to follow the agreement. The North's demand was merely a bargaining strategy. Actually, North Korea unwillingly gave up its nuclear program because of state sovereignty, regime survival and financial stability. As a result, the

⁶ Raymond Cohen, *Threat Perception in International Crisis* (US: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1979), Chapter1.

nuclear weapons program was secretly accelerated. Meanwhile, North Korea permitted the inspection for food aid and the alleviation of economic sanction in return. However, the inspectors could not find the suspected weapons including any devices since all of these apparatuses were removed.⁷ Despite that the nuclear inspectors failure to discover the hidden nuclear sites, their efforts in requesting the renunciation of North Korean nuclear and missiles program has existed.

To some extent, North Korea developed the nuclear weapons program with some important reasons. First, nuclear weapons could be used to defend the country from the nuclear threat of the United States. Actually, the nuclear ambition and ideology of North Korean leaders challenged the U.S. more than the nuclear technology and quantity. Second, it could be applied to frighten and influence Seoul to give up the idea of one Korea governed by South Korea and to freeze its military collaboration with Tokyo and Washington on attacking Pyongyang. Third, after the Korean War, the U.S. protected South Korea from communist powers like North Korea, China, and the former Soviet Union by stationing its troops in South Korea. Under this circumstance, nuclear possession was served as Pyongyang's priority to counter the US army in Seoul. Fourth, Kim IL Sung and Kim Jong-II employed nuclear cards to preserve their Stalinist regime. Lastly, nuclear possession became a symbol of influential power, by which North Korea bargained with other states for the core interests such as food aid, financial assistance, and recognition from the international community.⁸

B. Japan and Nuclear Non-Proliferation policy

According to the severe destruction of atomic bombing at the end of World War II, all of the Japanese governments since then have adopted three principles supporting

⁷ Jung-Hoon Lee and Chung-In Moon, "The North Korean Nuclear Crisis Revisited: The Case for a Negotiated Settlement," in *Security Dialogue* 34, no.2 (June 2003): 142-143.

⁸ Michael J. Mazarr, *North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995 & 1996), pp.15-34.

Japan's peace constitution on the nuclear issue: no manufacturing, no possession and no permission of nuclear weapons entering into the country.⁹ Furthermore, Japanese policy-decision makers essentially took consideration on the administrations agenda, the national peace constitution, Ministry of Foreign Affairs' policy, and public opinion before enforcing the policy. In addition, Japan implemented foreign and defense policies differently. It consisted of a nuclear policy toward other countries which was dependent on the external factors such as international relations, other countries' attitudes, global systems, periods of time, situations, problematic areas, and the balance of power. These factors were to accomplish Japan's core interests. In this regard, her national interests here referred to security, stability, and economic prosperity.

To maintain peace and security, Japan agreed to join the NPT during the Cold War period. Under the NPT provisions, Japanese nationals were prohibited to develop and possess nuclear weapons that were consistent with the Basic Policy for national defense under Japan's defense policy. In the international level, Japan actively strengthened the anti-nuclear policy by supporting the activities of protesting nuclear development for military purpose of other countries. It definitely wanted to protect national and regional security. Besides the treaty, Japan also promoted the activities of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) which was initially formed under the process of the Agreed Framework by Japan, South Korea, and the United States in 1994. This organization has never promoted the nuclear development for weapons production but strengthened the development for the purpose of energy production.

It was noticeable that Japan had rather treated the nuclear crisis in Northeast Asia more serious than in South Asia. Despite the higher risk of a nuclear and missile war between India and Pakistan, Japan paid more attention in a peaceful settlement on the Korean Peninsula by arranging cooperation mainly with the U.S., South Korea, China, and Russia. The first reason for this argument was that North Korea's middle-range as

⁹ Japan's Defense Agency, "Basic Policy for National Defense," http://www.jda.go.jp/e/policy/f_work/frame22.htm#c.

well as long-range missiles could easily reach Japan because of its geographical location. Second, Japan has been afraid of other missile launches from North Korea after it fired the Taepodong1 ballistic missile across Japan into the Pacific Ocean in 1993. Third, Japan had realized that North Korea's nuclear program undoubtedly caused the proliferation of nuclear weapons, technology and the arms race of the non-nuclear states such as South Korea and even itself in bargaining with the North for national security. Fourth, Tokyo wanted to balance the power with Pyongyang for peace and stability in the region and the international community. Finally, Japan required peaceful negotiations and normalization with North Korea relating to the abduction issue¹⁰ that happened in 1970s and 1980s.

After Pyongyang's missile tests in 1993, Japan changed its attitude immediately against North Korea because it perceived a national security threat. Since North Korea tested the Nodong and other short-ranged missiles in 1993 and denied the nuclear inspections despite the NPT agreement, as an NPT member, Japan determined that it should cut off the contribution of food aid and financial assistance through KEDO for North Korea's nuclear energy development in 1994. This decision affected the North directly because food and energy was very important for North Korea's military arrangement, its national daily consumption, and particularly for the secret nuclear program. Besides, Japan believed that under the suffering from the domestic economic crisis, the lack of foreign contribution probably forced Pyongyang to re-apply the NPT and to follow the 1994 Agreed Framework. Furthermore, Japan certainly dispatched its Self-Defense Forces to join the U.S.'s troops in a military action in order to suppress North Korea in case of an emergency. Japan's foreign and security policies essentially complied with the US-Japan Security Treaty, under which Japan froze the normalization process and admitted the U.S. troops to station on Japan's archipelago. Apart from the reason that Japan wanted to prevent North Korean attack, it preferred that the U.S. helped

¹⁰ About 15 Japanese consisting of adults and children disappeared during 1970s and 1980s. On the report of Japan, North Korean agents caught them and forced them to teach the Japanese language to the North's spy for military purpose. Some were alive but some were dead. Some Japanese nationals married North Korean men and lived with their families until now.

protect the country from other external threats, especially China and Russia. In this context, Tokyo believed that the Japan-U.S. security alliance showed that Japan was not alone but strong enough to balance the power with Beijing and Moscow.

Since 1997, the aggressive act under North Korean's nuclear power was faded because of economic and natural disasters. It was difficult for Pyongyang to make cultivation, trading, and infrastructure arrangements. Significantly, it affected the governmental fund for the state's military as the country lacked food, money, energy, and welfare. However, it did not mean that Pyongyang gave up its fundamental regime. In July 1999, the New York Times reported that North Korea developed a nuclear weapons program and established secret nuclear facilities to produce other related-grade plutonium and missile warhead. The North denied the inspection and argued that it was just a satellite launch. North Korea believed that this report intentionally uprooted Pyongyang's regime and threatened its sovereignty.¹¹ The U.S. gave priority to an economic sanction as a punishment, on the contrary, Japan continued its contribution for KEDO's activities in spite of the report. The reason why Japan performed such behavior was that, at least, the assistance helped relieve the tension that meant Japan's safety. Japan was concerned that the sanctions provoked the North to accelerate the development program of nuclear weapons in retaliation. Therefore, Japanese defense policy was shifted to more conciliatory manner in the 1998 crisis.

Why did Japan's diplomatic stance during 1998-99 become softer than that in 1993-94? The major point was the various factors such as the situation, the leaders' decision, the Asian economic crisis, the perception of threats, and the others' attitude. Japan learned from the experiences of the 1994 crisis that the cancellation of economic and food aids in 1994 was an inapplicable method for this situation because it possibly led to a new Korean War. However, Tokyo and other relevant countries could not let Pyongyang develop and proliferate nuclear weapons and missiles to attack others. For North Korea, the aggressive approach of the major countries was a drastic challenge. The different perspectives of Japanese leaders between the two periods varied the way of

¹¹ Asia Yearbook. "Power Game," Far Eastern Economic Review (1999): 16-21.

policy-making. It was necessary that the leaders carefully weighed how serious the tension was. With regards, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, for instance, prioritized the financial crisis as an emergency case that the country should take seriously on and find a solution. Unless Japan solved its economic problems, it could not balance power with North Korea because of its role as a financial contributor for the reactors that were being built for the North. The perception of Pyongyang's nuclear threat of Japan during the two periods was different because of the dissimilar situation, public opinion, and leaders' attitude. Furthermore, the perspective toward the crisis of Russia, China, South Korea, and especially the U.S. was a significant factor of the Japanese decision-making process.

C. Multilateral Framework

In dealing with the nuclear crises caused by North Korea, five main actors have made cooperation on a negotiated settlement. The U.S. provided protection for Japan and South Korea by reasons of long close ties and common interests. Moreover, the U.S. wanted to democratize Pyongyang's regime and supported the reunification of the two Koreas for a peaceful co-existence. For South Korea, the North's nuclear development remained a national and a regional threat. Therefore, Seoul required Washington's and Tokyo's active role in persuading Pyongyang to consider a nuclear-free Korea. Actually, China was a key player in the peaceful settlement, who strove for the most influential power in the region. In addition, China has long been a major supporter of Pyongyang's economy, food, oil, and importantly the nuclear skills. They shared the common threat perception, namely the United States. By the reasons, China did not suppress nor enforce North Korea as others required it to do. Russia, who had provided nuclear devices and technology for North Korea, wanted Pyongyang to open its nuclear facilities for the IAEA inspection. Russia froze the assistance for North Korea after the missile launch as a disagreeable stance. However, both China and Russia had never agreed with the U.N.

economic sanctions, Japan, and the U.S. against North Korea since this would push Pyongyang to its earlier decision of its nuclear weapons and missiles production.

As Pyongyang had refused the normalization talks, Japan cooperated with the United States to set up a working group to study the strategy of opposing the nuclear power of North Korea. Alternatively, both bilateral and multilateral negotiations were held for the purpose of peaceful settlement and regional stability on the Korean Peninsula. For Japan, the multilateral negotiation would be the mix of rigid and an adjusted manner, which would lead to an end of the conflict. In other words, if Pyongyang followed the conditions of the negotiation table, every party would offer peaceful help. Unless the agreement was abided, Pyongyang would face an aggressive pact such as economic sanction and military action. Significantly, the multilateral framework would create mutual trust and help every party to maintain national interests without any disputes in the international community.

In order to preserve peace and stability of the region, the United States, and South Korea demanded for a peaceful agreement with North Korea. When the North accepted this idea, in August 1997 the U.S., China, North Korea and South Korea had held the multilateral negotiations, called the Four-Party Talk in New York. Pyongyang required that Washington must withdraw its troops from Seoul, which was unacceptable for both Washington and Seoul. They did not believe that Pyongyang would really end the WMDs and nuclear programs. For Pyongyang, the cancellation of the nuclear program might lead to the collapse of the national regime and sovereignty, which would be replaced by democracy under the control of the U.S. and its allies. Although Japan did not participate in this framework, Japan helped persuade North Korea to join the conference by giving some money for peaceful energy use in KEDO.

The idea of the Six-Party Talk was agreed in 2003 by the U.S., Japan, South Korea, China, and Russia as an alternative means for a peaceful settlement. The meeting of the six countries has been held many times until present. Japan preferred the negotiation with North Korea about the historical issues including the abduction of

Japanese citizens during the Cold War and the nuclear program.¹² Japan talked about these issues every time, but North Korea did not want to refer to these issues. The North asked for the reparation of the victims during the Japanese colonial era. Most of the time, Pyongyang avoided talking about its nuclear program by holding the meeting and signaling that there were lots of nuclear and missiles hidden in the facility. This manner was seemingly the way to demand the contribution from other five countries, the KEDO and the United Nations. In the Twenty-first Century, the Japanese governments of Junishiro Koizumi and Shinzo Abe not only kept eyes on this matter but also promoted peaceful negotiation.

D. Objectives

1. To understand Japan's role and policy toward the nuclear crisis in 1993 comparing it with 1998.
2. To point out the complexity of international relations and Japan's policies toward North Korea's nuclear crises, which was surrounded by various factors.
3. To benefit students and other people who are interested in Japanese studies by focusing through Japan's historical politics and its role on the multilateral negotiations.

E. Hypothesis and Research Questions

Japan has implemented an aggressive as well as a conciliated posture as its mechanisms for nuclear tension reduction of the Korean Peninsula between 1993-1994 and 1998-1999. The different perceptions of threats and conflict resolution of all major

¹² AFP, "Japan Vents Great Concern Over Missiles," Bangkok Post, 27 September 2004, Section 1, p.6.

actors, including the U.S., China, Russia, South Korea, and Japan itself, were possibly important factors in the decision-making process, which concentrated on the roles of Prime Ministers, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and other bureaucracies.

Accordingly, to analyze and clarify the mentioned hypothesis, the following questions will be answered in this thesis.

- ♦ Why did Japan treat the 1993 crisis differently from that of the 1998?
- ♦ What role does Japan play in the Six Party Talks?
- ♦ What has been the expectations of Japan in the agenda of multilateral negotiations?

F. Conceptual Framework

In the analysis of Japan's active role and prospect in the nuclear crises on the Korean Peninsula, the concepts of *Threat Perception* and *Balance of Power* were applied accordingly.

“Threat Perception”

‘Threat perception’ or ‘Perception of threat’ under Raymond Cohen’s view is *an anticipation on the part of an observer, the decision makers, of impending harm usually of a military, strategic, or economic kind to the state.*¹³

It was believed that threats were especially harmful to the interests of states. Japanese national interests include security, stability, and prosperity. In politics, Japan’s core interests refer to the security of Japanese people, who live in the country and abroad, through sovereignty of the country that the leader must protect and maintain. Japan has decided to participate in the nuclear tension reduction on the Korean Peninsula to secure Japanese citizens and its state from North Korea’s military and nuclear threats. Inevitably, the state’s insecurity also affects the economic sector which, in fact, helps

¹³ Cohen, p.4.

strengthen the state's stability. Since people feel unsafe, the mutual distrust among countries is widened and the economic relationships became less. Accordingly, Japan has thus found out ways to prevent regional disputes and to relieve the tension of the conflicts in order to maintain its economic interests. Besides, state and regional stability is also some of Japan's major concerns since international conflicts and disputes politically and economically affect the inter-relations and interdependence between Japan and the others.

In short, the concept of threat perception is applied to explain what is the indicator of the perception of North Korea's threat for Japan; why Japan has decided to take part in the nuclear program alleviation; why Japanese defense policies in 1993, 1998, and the early 2000s were different; and why Japan preferred the multilateral negotiation instead of the bilateral one.

“Balance of power”

To understand the concept of *balance of power*, the definition of ‘power’ should be firstly explained. *Power*, according to the idea of Joseph S. Nye, *refers to the ability to attain the purpose and goals with the possession of the resources: population, territory, natural resources, economic size, military forces, and political stability*. He added that a balance-of-power system is a way that states choose various actions such as the broadening of alliance to strengthen power in order to prevent other states from becoming dominant and influential actors over the others in the global system.¹⁴

Similarly, Morton A. Kaplan argued that states should pursue the balance-of-power in an international system, which is characterized as follows; increasing capabilities by the negotiation; fighting for the capabilities; ending disputes; preventing the predominance of other groups or single actor; controlling the members of supranational organizational principles; and allowing other actors into the system.¹⁵

¹⁴ Joseph S. Nye Jr., Understanding International Conflicts: an Introduction to Theory and History (New York: Longman, 2003), p.58.

¹⁵ Morton A. Kaplan, “Some Problems of International System Research,” in Classics of International Relations, ed. John A. Vasquez (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1990), pp.277-278.

In this sense, Kenneth Waltz argued that *great powers always balance each other, while smaller and weaker states aligned with great powers due to their autonomous*.¹⁶

In this research, the balance of power is the strategic means that Japan has applied to the 1994 and 1998 nuclear crises on the Korean Peninsula, to lessen the aggressive acts of North Korea and the tension in the region. Japan has strengthened good relationships with South Korea, the U.S., China, and Russia for the purpose of their assistance to balance the nuclear and military power of the North. Moreover, Japan attempted to persuade the two Koreas to make a peaceful co-existence for security and stability in the region by the cooperation with the above four states to set up the meeting. However, Japan concerned that the U.S., China, and Russia would overwhelm the two Koreas. Thus, Japan joined the multilateral negotiation in order to keep balance with these states and to protect the two Koreas.

To achieve this goal, multilateral negotiations would be effective and an appropriate measure in accordance with the crisis. The discussion would provide an opportunity for peaceful negotiations with North Korea. For instance, in the trilateral security dialogue (among Japan, Korea, and the United States) and the two plus four negotiations or so called the six-party talk (among the U.S., Japan, China, Russia, and the two Koreas),¹⁷ the five states would be able to bargain with the North for the dismantlement of its nuclear program and the nuclear non-proliferation. In exchange, North Korea would call for food, oil, and financial assistance for its survival. Eventually, the balance-of-power strategy would be the effective foreign policy that brings about Japanese core interests. This concept helps explain Japan's decision-making in the bilateral and multilateral negotiations, the influential factors for Japan's foreign and security policy decision-making, and Japanese policy implementation toward the nuclear crises during the different periods (1993, 1998, and 2000s).

¹⁶ Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen, Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p.51.

¹⁷ Yoichi Funabashi, Japan's International Agenda (New York and London: New York University Press, 1994), p.20.

G. Literature Reviews

North Korean nuclear crisis has long been a questionable issue in which many scholars and researchers have been interested to seek for the best solution. Mostly, the studies focused upon international cooperation bilaterally and multilaterally, in particular, among the concerned parties including Japan, the United States, the two Koreas, China, Russia, and the United Nations Security Council as well.

As an alliance of the United States and a major actor of the nuclear tension reduction on the Korean Peninsula, who had behaved brutally against Korean people and other Asian countries during World War II, Japan has been criticized an active role over North Korean nuclear resolution. In addition, it has been suspicious if Japan has had the hidden agenda behind her foreign and security policy in the peaceful negotiation, specifically, in the multilateral framework. This thesis, thus, focused on Japan's role toward North Korean nuclear crisis, particularly, since 1990s. The study analyzed the difference of Japan's policy decision-making process as well as policy implementation toward nuclear North Korea during the former two significant situations and the current issue. Moreover, Japan's perspective and active role on the peaceful settlement under multilateral framework was also analyzed to make understand Japanese diplomatic strategy and the evolution of Japan's North Korea Policy in the post-Cold War era.

In general, Japan's North Korean nuclear policy has been widely studied in several aspects. The following substantial literatures were categorized into three main topics including *Japan's Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy*, *Japan's Foreign and Security Policy on Nuclear North Korea*, and *the Role of Japan on the Peaceful Settlement against North Korean nuclear crisis*.

Japan's Nuclear Non-proliferation Policy

Under this topic, the recent study was the *Nonproliferation as a Goal of Japanese Foreign Assistance*¹⁸ written by William J. Long. This article was the study of Japan's mechanisms for independent policy through the cases of foreign aid for nonproliferation. He analyzed Japan's national security interests in terms of economic, peace, and stability. From the study, the significant mechanism Japan relied on was the guidelines for distribution of official foreign assistance (ODA Charter). Under the guidelines, Japan responded to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), nuclear, and missiles proliferation by providing incentives and punishment to the recipient nuclear countries. For instance, Japan has supported some amount of the replacement of the existing graphite moderated nuclear reactors with the light-water reactors construction in order to persuade North Korea to end the nuclear projects. On the other hand, Pyongyang would not receive food and financial aid as Japanese response for the agreement violation.

Another point of the study was Japanese interests. The core interests in the context of Japanese ODA were economic and security. Japanese ODA strategy could bring about the advantages in trade and security sectors. In trade part, for example, Japan could get more shares of North Korean market and investment in exchange. In security relations, Japan contributed financial assistance to North Korea in order to achieve nonproliferation goal. Anyway, it is arguable that merely economic assistance would not be able to deal with the proliferations since Pyongyang has predominantly requested the guarantee of North Korean regime survival and the removal from list of axis of evil as the US has mentioned before. Shortly, this literature focused upon security strategy under financial policy that Japan could independently proceed in order to maintain peace, security, and prosperity.

¹⁸ William J. Long, "Nonproliferation as a Goal of Japanese Foreign Assistance," in Japanese Foreign Policy in Asia and The Pacific: Domestic Interests, American Pressure, and Regional Integration, eds. Akitoshi Miyashita and Yoichiro Sato (New York: Palgrave, 2001), Ch.7, pp.119-132.

Japan's Foreign and Security Policy on Nuclear North Korea

There were two interesting literatures regarding Japanese foreign and security policy on North Korean nuclear crisis in the post-Cold War era. They belonged to Dr. David Fouse and Nakato Sachio.

First, in the *Japan's Post-Cold War North Korea Policy: Hedging toward Autonomy?*¹⁹, Dr. David Fouse was interested in Japan's North Korea policy since the Cold War. It was not only the normalization relations, but also the nuclear issue. Dr. Fouse emphasized the important factors that impeded Japanese independent policy-making toward North Korean nuclear issue. From the study, the significant factors included close relations with the US and South Korea, the abduction issue, and Japan's past colonial rule. Due to security relations of Japan-US and Japan-South Korea, Tokyo has essentially pursued Washington and Seoul for security cooperation and military protection. Japan could not impose sanctions against North Korean nuclear launch closing to the country in 1998 since the US and South Korea disagreed with this idea. Furthermore, the abduction issue and the historical problem have affected the negotiations with Pyongyang in demanding nuclear abandonment. North Korea has always avoided discussing about abducted Japanese. This stance caused sluggish steps of the negotiation. Moreover, the North has always stressed Japanese army cruelty during World War II and requested formal apology in writing and the reparations from Japan.

In short, this literature found that Japan had no more freedom in making policy toward nuclear North Korea because of security dependence on the US and South Korea, the abducted Japanese citizens, and the past wrongdoing of Japanese army.

Second, the *Japan's Shifting North Korean Policy under Koizumi Administration: Toward Responsive Engagement*²⁰ of Nakato Sachio was the study of

¹⁹ David Fouse, "Japan's Post-Cold War North Korea Policy: Hedging toward Autonomy?," *Asia-Pacific Security Studies* (February 2004) www.apcss.org.

²⁰ Nakato Sachio, "Japan's Shifting North Korean Policy under Koizumi Administration: Toward Responsive Engagement," *Ritsumeikan International Affairs* 2 (2004): 141-157.

Japan's North Korea Policy in the periods of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi Government. Sachio analyzed policy-making process through the definition of responsive engagement. This approach was defined as a mix of multi responses which meant that Japan's North Korea Policy reacted to domestic concerns and other allied countries such as the US and South Korea. Sachio argued that Koizumi extremely took into accounts national interests. Moreover, Koizumi government could condition and made policy in accordance with North Korea policy of Washington and Seoul as well as internal political concerns without any disadvantages.

According to Sachio, responsive engagement toward North Korea under Koizumi administration was to normalize relations, to apologize for historical issue, to distribute economic assistance, to obey international law, and to strengthen Northeast Asian peace and stability. Accordingly, Japan's foreign and security policy toward North Korea was a sort of conciliatory posture. For North Korean nuclear issue, Japan responded to Sunshine Policy of South Korea by the cooperation for peace and security on the Peninsula. In addition, Japan agreed with the missile defense project of the US. The boundary of this study was quite limited in the current issue. Moreover, Sachio neither presented the proposal of new policy nor analyzed in-dept history.

The Role of Japan on the Peaceful Settlement against North Korean Nuclear Crisis

The following research regarding Japan's role on North Korean nuclear issue was the study of negotiated settlement for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

Kunyapachara Srisaksorachat, Nong-Napas Wichayanetinaya, Nawarat Klinnoy, and Nuannalin Chuanprasit conducted research of the six-party talks for nuclear reduction under the title of the *Nuclear Resolution of the Korean Peninsula under the Six-Party Talks*²¹ in order to study major factors that affected the achievement of the six-party talks. From the study, Japanese core interests were economic and security. Japan

²¹ Kunyapachara Srisaksorachat, et al., Nuclear Resolution of the Korean Peninsula under the Six-Party Talks (Thammasat: Faculty of Political Science, 2004). (in Thai)

has had cooperative role on the peaceful negotiations with the close alliance including the US and South Korea. The main reason was that Japan had no military bargaining power with Pyongyang.

The US and Japan has had the same objective, that was, to discard North Korean nuclear program. On the contrary, Japan has still created the normalization with the North since they has long been trade partners. Meanwhile, both Japan and South Korea demanded peace and security on the Peninsula. They collaborated in the reunification of Koreas. They, moreover, asked China for inducing the North to make discussion in the six countries negotiation. The impediment of the six-party negotiation, under this study, was mainly US-North Korea mutual distrust. For Japan's foreign and security policy-making, abduction and historical issue of Japanese colonial rule was major barrier of the peaceful settlement.

From these substantial literatures, it is noticeable that the studies of Japan's foreign and security policy toward North Korean nuclear crisis in the post-Cold War era were similar and different in some points. As shown in the study of Dr. David Fouse; Nakato Sachio; and the four scholars who studied about the six-party talks, the important factors that influenced Japan's foreign and security policy were security alliance of Japan-US and historical issues including abducted Japanese nationals and Japanese colonialism during World War II.

For the differences among these literatures, William J. Long explained Japan's policy-making in different point by focusing on the implementation of economic policy to achieve national security while the other directly emphasized foreign and security policy. Nakato Sachio pointed out the dominant attitude of Koizumi Administration over North Korean issue more than the other that studied wide length of Japanese policy-making process. Kunyapachara Srisaksorachat, Nong-Napas Wichayanetinaya, Nawarat Klinnoy, and Nuannalin Chuanprasit stressed the role of Japan in the peaceful settlement when the other focused on Japanese independent policy.

In sum, these points of the study on Japan's North Korean nuclear policy differed from this thesis since the thesis sought out the differences of Japan's policy-

making in 1993-94 and 1998-99 and Japan's role over nuclear North Korea in multilateral negotiation for peace and security on the Korean Peninsula in order to extend Japanese foreign and security study.

H. Scope - Method

This paper mainly focuses on the role of Japan as an important actor in the multilateral negotiation settlement of nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula in 1990s until the Government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The implementation of Japanese foreign and nuclear policies has depended on its core interests, threat perceptions, and both the internal and the external factors. From the timeframes, the Japanese government will be able to apply the experience as a lesson to provide resolution for the changed environment in the current and future nuclear issue.

To conduct the research, the Documentary Research and the Descriptive Analysis were mainly employed. Moreover, the concepts of *Threat Perception* and *Balance of Power* were applied in the analytical and the descriptive comparison of Japanese foreign and security policy on the Korean Peninsula. The documentary research, which was utilized in this research, was comprised of the following sources.

1. **Primary Source:** Statement by Japanese Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and Chief Cabinet Secretary, Japan's Declaration on Basic Policy for National Defense, News Report from newspapers and internet.
2. **Secondary Source:** Articles from textbooks, magazines, periodical issues, and research studies.
3. **Interview:** An unstructured interview was submitted to acquire the independent viewpoint from the scholars and the bureaucracies. The interviewees was asked, at least ten questions.

Finally, the data achieved from all of these sources was gathered and analyzed. This paper also touched upon the current nuclear situation on the peninsula for future study.