

ภาคผนวก

## ผนวก ก

## รายการคำย่อ (List of Abbreviations)

- AMM การประชุมรัฐมนตรีต่างประเทศอาเซียน (ASEAN Ministerial Meeting)
- ARF ที่ประชุมอาเซียนว่าด้วยความร่วมมือด้านการเมืองและความมั่นคงในภูมิภาคเอเชีย-แปซิฟิก (ASEAN Regional Forum)
- Apodeti พรรคสมาคมประชาธิปไตยนิยมติมอร์ (The Timorese Popular Democratic Association)
- ASDT พรรคสมาคมแห่งประชาธิปไตยสังคมติมอร์ (the Timorese Social Democratic Association)
- ASEAN สมาคมประชาชาติแห่งเอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้ (Association of South East Asian Nations)
- BPK คณะกรรมการตรวจเงินแผ่นดินสูงสุด (Supreme Audit Board)
- CNRT สภาเพื่อการต่อต้านการยึดครองดินแดนติมอร์ตะวันออก (National Council of Timorese Resistance)
- CTF คณะกรรมการแห่งความจริงและมิตรภาพระหว่างอินโดนีเซียและติมอร์ตะวันออก (the Indonesia - East Timor Commission for Truth and Friendship)
- DPD สภาผู้แทนระดับภูมิภาค (Regional Representatives Council)
- DPR สมาชิกสภาผู้แทนราษฎร (People's Representative Council)
- DPRD สภาประชาชนระดับท้องถิ่น (Regional People's House of Representative)
- ETTA คณะรัฐมนตรีบริหารชั่วคราวของประเทศติมอร์ตะวันออก (East Timor Transition Administration)
- Fretilin แนวร่วมปฏิบัติเพื่อเอกราชติมอร์ตะวันออก (Revolutionary Front for Independent East Timor)
- GAM ขบวนการอาเจห์เสรี (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka)
- Gestapu ขบวนการ 30 กันยายน (gerakan September Tiga Puluh)
- Golkar กลุ่มทำงาน (Golongan Karya หรือ Functional Group)

INTERFET กองกำลังรักษาสันติภาพนานาชาติ (International Force in East Timor)

KKN การสมรู้ร่วมคิด การฉ้อราษฎร์บังหลวง และลัทธิพวกพ้อง (Collusion, Corruption and Nepotism)

Komnas HAM คณะกรรมการสิทธิมนุษยชนแห่งชาติของอินโดนีเซีย (Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia)

KPU คณะกรรมการกลางเลือกตั้งอินโดนีเซีย (General Elections Commission)

KPP-HAM คณะกรรมการสอบสวนการละเมิดสิทธิมนุษยชนในติมอร์ตะวันออก (a National Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights Violations in East Timor)

Militia กองกำลังอาสาสมัครพลเรือนฝ่ายนิยมอินโดนีเซีย

MPR สภาที่ปรึกษาประชาชน (People's Consultative Assembly)

NAM กลุ่มประเทศไม่ฝักใฝ่ฝ่ายใด (Non-Aligned Movement)

NU พรรคnahdatul Ulama (Nahdatul Ulama)

OIC องค์การประชุมโลกมุสลิม (Organization of Islamic Conference)

PDI พรรคประชาธิปไตยอินโดนีเซีย (Indonesian Democratic Party)

PKI พรรคคอมมิวนิสต์อินโดนีเซีย (Indonesian Communist Party)

PNI พรรคชาตินิยมอินโดนีเซีย (Indonesian Nationalist Party)

SARET เขตปกครองพิเศษติมอร์ตะวันออก (Special Autonomous Region of East Timor)

TNI กองกำลังทหารแห่งชาติอินโดนีเซีย (Indonesia National Army)

UDT พรรคสหภาพประชาธิปไตยติมอร์ (Union of Democratic Timorese)

UNMIT กำลังของสหประชาชาติในติมอร์ตะวันออก (United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste)

UNAMET คณะปฏิบัติงานแห่งองค์การสหประชาชาติในติมอร์ตะวันออก (United Nations Mission in East Timor)

UNSC คณะมนตรีความมั่นคงแห่งสหประชาชาติ (The United Nations Security Council)

UNTAET องค์การบริหารชั่วคราวของสหประชาชาติในติมอร์ตะวันออก (The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor)

ผนวก ข

หลักฐานแสดงการสนับสนุนอินโดนีเซียสมัยประธานาธิบดีซูฮาร์โตในการยึดครอง  
ติมอร์ตะวันออกเป็นจังหวัดที่ 27 ของสหรัฐอเมริกา

**East Timor revisited: Ford, Kissinger and the Indonesia invasion,  
1975-1976**

Ford and Kissinger Gave Green Light to Indonesia's Invasion of East Timor, 1975:

New Documents Detail Conversations with Suharto

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 62

Edited by William Burr and Michael L. Evans

December 6, 2001

**The New Evidence**

The Indonesian invasion of East Timor in December 1975 set the stage for the long, bloody, and disastrous occupation of the territory that ended only after an international peacekeeping force was introduced in 1999. President Bill Clinton cut off military aid to Indonesia in September 1999—reversing a longstanding policy of military cooperation—but questions persist about U.S. responsibility for the 1975 invasion; in particular, the degree to which Washington actually condoned or supported the bloody military offensive. Most recently, journalist Christopher Hitchens raised questions about the role of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in giving a green light to the invasion that has left perhaps 200,000 dead in the years since. Two newly declassified documents from the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, released to the National Security Archive, shed light on the Ford administration's relationship with President Suharto of Indonesia during 1975. Of special importance is the record of Ford's and Kissinger's meeting with Suharto in early December 1975. The document shows that Suharto began the invasion knowing that he had the full approval of the White House. Both of these documents had been released in heavily excised form some years ago, but with Suharto now out of

power, and following the collapse of Indonesian control over East Timor, the situation has changed enough that both documents have been released in their entirety.

Other documents found among State Department records at the National Archives elucidate the inner workings of U.S. policy toward the Indonesian crisis during 1975 and 1976. Besides confirming that Henry Kissinger and top advisers expected an eventual Indonesian takeover of East Timor, archival material shows that the Secretary of State fully understood that the invasion of East Timor involved the "illegal" use of U.S.-supplied military equipment because it was not used in self-defense as required by law.

Although Indonesia was a major site of U.S. energy and raw materials investment, an important petroleum exporter, strategically located near vital shipping lanes, and a significant recipient of U.S. military assistance, the country—much less the East Timor question—barely figures into Henry Kissinger's memoirs of the Nixon and Ford administrations. Gerald Ford's memoir briefly discusses the December 1975 visit to Jakarta but does not mention the discussion of East Timor with Suharto. Indeed, as important as the bilateral relationship was, Jakarta's brutal suppression of the independence movement in East Timor was a development that neither Ford nor Kissinger wanted people to remember about their time in power. That the two decided on a course of action of dubious legality and that resulted in the slaughter of thousands of Timorese may well have also discouraged further reflection, at least in public. No doubt the omissions from Ford's and Kissinger's memoirs also reflect the low priority that East Timor had during the Ford administration. For senior officials, the fate of a post-colonial East Timor paled in comparison to the strategic relationship with the anti-communist Suharto regime, especially in the wake of the communist victory in Vietnam, when Ford and Kissinger wanted to strengthen relations with anti-communists and check left-wing movements in the region.<sup>(1)</sup> But it is not simply a matter of omission; on several occasions Kissinger has explicitly denied that he ever had substantive discussions of East Timor with Suharto, much less having consented to Indonesian plans.<sup>(2)</sup> The new evidence contradicts Kissinger's statements: Indonesian plans for

the invasion of East Timor were indeed discussed with Suharto, and Ford and Kissinger gave them the green light. As Kissinger advised Suharto on the eve of the invasion: "it is important that whatever you do succeeds quickly" but that "it would be better if it were done after we returned" to the United States.

Although these new documents shed important light on U.S. policy toward the East Timor question in 1975, much more needs to be learned about U.S. policymaking during 1975 and 1976. Unfortunately, most of the relevant sources are classified. The large collection of Kissinger-Scowcroft office files at the Ford Library remains unavailable, as are the records of the State Department's Indonesia desk and the Bureau of East Asian Affairs for the 1970s. The State Department's recent acquisition of Henry Kissinger's telephone conversation transcripts might include important material, although they will probably reflect the relatively low priority that the policymakers gave to the East Timor question.

### **Background**

The leftist military revolt that overthrew Portugal's authoritarian regime in April 1974 encouraged nationalist movements in the Portuguese colony of East Timor calling for gradual independence from Lisbon—a position also initially favored by the new Portuguese government. One of these groups, the Timorese Democratic Union (UTD), had greater support among Timorese elites and senior Portuguese colonial administrators, while the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin), with its left-leaning, social democratic program, had the support of younger Timorese and lower-level colonial officials. In January 1975 the two groups formed an uneasy coalition. Increasingly, Fretilin enjoyed the greatest public support and led the push for rapid independence.<sup>(3)</sup>

Early signals from the Indonesian government indicated that it was prepared to support East Timorese independence,<sup>(4)</sup> but Jakarta soon became interested in turning the region into the country's twenty-seventh province. Fears that an independent East Timor

could be used as a base by unfriendly governments or spur other secessionist movements in Indonesia had convinced hardliners in the military to press for annexation of the territory. In February 1975 the Indonesian military conducted a mock invasion of East Timor in South Sumatra.<sup>(5)</sup> Military hardliners also backed the pro-integration Timorese Popular Democratic Association (Apodeti) with financial assistance and launched a propaganda campaign against the pro-independence groups.<sup>(6)</sup> Apodeti, however, never had the popular support enjoyed by Fretilin or UDT.

The new regime in Lisbon was preoccupied with its own internal political controversies and could do little to ensure a steady transition toward independence. During 1974 and 1975 Indonesian authorities hoped that the Portuguese would acquiesce in Jakarta's plans to acquire East Timor. At first the Portuguese seemed responsive, but by mid-1975 it had become evident that Lisbon supported self-determination for the people of East Timor. In July 1975 Lisbon rebuffed Jakarta with the issuance of Constitutional Law 7/75, setting forth a timetable for home-rule, including the election of a popular assembly that would determine East Timor's future, with Portuguese sovereignty ending no later than October 1978.<sup>(7)</sup>

Events in East Timor, however, did not proceed in accordance with Lisbon's schedule. The delicate UDT-Fretilin alliance had fallen apart in May, in part due to a propaganda campaign launched by the Indonesian government to inflame UDT concerns about Fretilin's alleged communist tendencies.<sup>(8)</sup> UDT's fears were bolstered in June when Fretilin refused to attend an all-party conference on decolonization hosted by Portuguese officials on Macao due to the presence of Apodeti representatives.<sup>(9)</sup> To Fretilin the issue of independence was not up for discussion, least of all with Jakarta. The extent of Fretilin's popularity—and thus popular sentiment for independence from Indonesia—became evident in July when the party won 55 percent of the vote in local elections.<sup>(10)</sup> Convinced by Indonesian intelligence that Fretilin was planning a coup, UDT staged its own in August 1975 in the Timorese capital Dili in an effort to drive out Fretilin supporters. A Fretilin counterattack pushed UDT forces out of

the city, however, and by September Fretilin controlled nearly all of East Timor, the Portuguese administrators having fled to the island of Ataúro.(11) Despite having gained de facto control of the territory, Fretilin ended its call for immediate independence and now supported a plan similar to the gradual independence program proposed in June by the Portuguese.(12)

The Indonesian government did not seize the opportunity to move troops into Dili on the premise of restoring order. Suharto was still concerned about the reaction from the West and needed more time to get the UDT and other anti-Fretilin groups to support integration.(13) The UDT, now refugees on the Indonesian side of Timor and in need of food and shelter, had no choice but to sign a pro-integration petition drawn up by Indonesia. Meanwhile, in October Indonesian special forces began to infiltrate secretly into East Timor in an effort to provoke clashes that would provide the pretext for a full-scale invasion. When these incursions—including the murder by Indonesian forces of five journalists employed by Australian TV—failed to elicit any noticeable reaction from the West, Indonesia stepped-up its attacks across the border.(14)

While Indonesian airborne troops—outfitted with American equipment—prepared to take Dili, Fretilin petitioned the United Nations to call for the withdrawal of the invading forces. Four days later, on November 28, Fretilin declared East Timor's independence—apparently in the belief that a sovereign state would have greater success appealing to the UN, but also thinking that Timorese soldiers would be more likely to fight for an independent state. Indonesia countered the next day with a “declaration of integration” signed by Apodeti and UDT representatives and coordinated by Indonesia’s military intelligence service.(15) The invasion, originally scheduled for early December, was apparently delayed by the visit of Ford and Kissinger to Jakarta on December 6.

Operation Komodo, a general invasion of East Timor, commenced the next day. In the following weeks a series of United Nations resolutions—supported by the U.S.—called for the withdrawal of the Indonesian troops.(16) An estimated 20,000 Indonesian troops

were deployed to the region by the end of the month. While casualty estimates vary, anywhere from 60,000-100,000 Timorese were probably killed in the first year after the violence began in 1975.(17) In 1979 the U.S. Agency for International Development estimated that 300,000 East Timorese—nearly half the population—had been uprooted and moved into camps controlled by Indonesian armed forces. By 1980 the occupation had left more than 100,000 dead from military action, starvation or disease, with some estimates running as high as 230,000.(18) .

This document records a conversation between Suharto and Ford at Camp David on July 5, 1975, five months before the invasion of East Timor. Speaking only a few months after the collapse of the Thieu regime in South Vietnam, the two presidents shared a tour d'horizon of East Asian political issues, U.S. military assistance to Indonesia, international investment, and Portuguese decolonization. Fearing greater political and ideological ferment in the region following the Communist victory in Vietnam, Suharto saw his ideological concoction "Pancasila" (possibly misspelled "Pantechistita" in the document) as useful, no doubt because its emphasis on consensus excluded any oppositional political activity.(19) Not taking "consensus" for granted, Suharto wanted U.S. help in building up his military machine to increase its mobility for dealing with insurgent elements, noting that, "Especially at this moment, intelligence and territorial operations are very important." Ford proposed setting up a joint commission to scrutinize Suharto's military request but wanted Kissinger to settle the details.

Suharto brought up the question of Portuguese decolonization in East Timor proclaiming his support for "self-determination" but also dismissing independence as unviable: "So the only way is to integrate [East Timor] into Indonesia." Without mentioning Fretilin by name, Suharto misleadingly characterized it as "almost Communist" and criticized the group for boycotting the decolonization meeting in Macao. Suharto claimed that Indonesia did not want to interfere with East Timor's self-determination but implied that it might have to because "those who want independence are those who are Communist-influenced."

While Lisbon still had legal sovereignty over East Timor, apparently neither Ford nor Suharto discussed the implications for Indonesian policy. Although Washington had worked closely with the Salazar dictatorship that ruled Portugal for decades, it was now deeply suspicious of the new social democratic regime in Lisbon; with its exaggerated concerns about a Communist coup, the Ford administration considered the possibility of expelling Portugal from NATO and supporting an independence movement in the Azores (where the U.S. had important military facilities). Thus, from Ford's and Kissinger's perspective in 1975, Portugal's role in the region was of little interest and did not pose an important obstacle to Indonesian action. That some left-leaning Portuguese officers had contacts with Fretilin undoubtedly made the White House even less inclined to concern itself with Portugal's response to Indonesian action in East Timor.(20)

Apparently encouraged by his meeting with President Ford, Suharto returned from Washington on July 8 and made his first public statement suggesting that an independent East Timor was not viable. Only days later, UDT leaders launched their coup with the hope that they could suppress Fretilin. During an August 12 discussion of the coup, Henry Kissinger and his close advisers were not altogether sure what was happening, but did not disagree with Assistant Secretary Philip Habib's statement that the Indonesians would not let a "communist-dominated group," i.e., Fretilin, take over. Kissinger, in particular, assumed that an Indonesian takeover would take place "sooner or later." Believing that Australia, a key regional ally, would feel "impelled" to support self-determination for the Timorese, Kissinger and his advisers wanted to avoid controversy over the issue. They quickly agreed that the State Department should make no comment on the coup or related events.

A few days later, the Australian ambassador in Jakarta relayed a statement by U.S. ambassador John Newsom that summarized Washington's approach but alluded to a problem that Kissinger and his advisers had not specifically discussed on August 12. The message noted Newsom's August 16 comment that if Indonesia were to invade

East Timor, it [should] do so “effectively, quickly, and not use our equipment.”(21) The U.S. ambassador recognized that there was a congressional prohibition on Indonesia’s use of military gear financed by U.S. aid for anything but defensive operations. Kissinger would come to understand the problem, if he did not already, but as document four suggests, he was not willing to let it tie Jakarta's hands.

This Kissinger memorandum, prepared for President Ford some two weeks before the two were to visit to Jakarta, indicates that the administration's larger strategic interests in Indonesia made it unlikely that Washington would make a fuss over East Timor. The eventual fate of East Timor was evidently a relatively low priority for Kissinger and his staff—it was the twelfth and final item mentioned in the memo.(22) While Kissinger, in the memo, acknowledged that the Indonesians have been “maneuvering to absorb the colony” through negotiations with Portugal and “covert military operations in the colony itself,” he apparently did not expect an overt invasion using U.S.-supplied military equipment. Indeed, his memo and the briefing paper on “Indonesia and Portuguese Timor” both indicate that to do so would violate U.S. law, suggesting that this consideration had induced “restraint” on the part of Jakarta. Moreover, and in contrast to Habib's view (23) that Fretelin was “Communist-dominated,” the author of the briefing paper more accurately characterized the Front as “vaguely left-wing.”

On the eve of Indonesia’s full-scale invasion of East Timor, President Ford and Secretary Kissinger stopped in Jakarta en route from China where they had just met with Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. During his meeting with Suharto, Ford emphasized America’s continuing commitment to Asian affairs despite the “severe setback of Vietnam.” Discussion then turned to the problem of Communist influence in the Non-Aligned Movement and the insurgency movements in Thailand and Malaysia. Ford told Suharto that he would be “enthusiastic” about building an M-16 plant in Indonesia to provide small arms to help Southeast Asian governments counter regional insurgency movements. Kissinger also approved of the proposed arrangement “because of its indication of wider cooperation.”

On 4 or 5 December, while still in Beijing, Kissinger received a cable from the State Department suggesting that the Indonesians had "plans" to invade East Timor.<sup>(25)</sup> Thus, Ford or Kissinger could not have been too surprised when, in the middle of a discussion of guerrilla movements in Thailand and Malaysia, Suharto suddenly brought up East Timor. Suharto noted that while Indonesia "has no territorial ambitions," Fretilin has not cooperated with negotiations and has "declared its independence unilaterally." The current situation, he said, "will prolong the suffering of the refugees and increase instability in the area." Suharto then assured the Americans that "the four other parties" favor integration, with the apparent implication that a mere majority among the "parties" to the conflict—absent a popular referendum—alone constituted an act of self-determination. "We want your understanding," Suharto continued, "if we deem it necessary to take rapid or drastic action."

Ford and Kissinger took great pains to assure Suharto that they would not oppose the invasion. Ford was unambiguous: "We will understand and will not press you on the issue. We understand the problem and the intentions you have." Kissinger did indeed stress that "the use of US-made arms could create problems," but then added that, "It depends on how we construe it; whether it is in self defense or is a foreign operation." Thus, Kissinger's concern was not about whether U.S. arms would be used offensively—and hence illegally—but whether the act would actually be *interpreted* as such—a process he clearly intended to manipulate.<sup>(26)</sup> In any case, Kissinger added: "It is important that whatever you do succeeds quickly."

Indeed, timing and damage control were very important to the Americans, as Kissinger told Suharto: "We would be able to influence the reaction in America if whatever happens happens after we return. . . . If you have made plans, we will do our best to keep everyone quiet until the President returns home." Kissinger also asked Suharto if he anticipated a "long guerilla war," apparently aware that a quick military success would be easier to spin than a long campaign. Suharto acknowledged that there "will probably be a small guerilla war" but he was cagey enough not to predict its

duration. Nevertheless, his military colleagues were optimistic; as one of the architects of Indonesian policy, General Ali Murtopo explained to a U.S. scholar some months before the invasion, "the whole business will be settled in three weeks."(27)

With the U.S. position on the East Timor "business" settled, Suharto turned to economic problems, especially petroleum investments. With the recent bankruptcy of the state oil company, the regime needed more revenue and Suharto wanted to get it from the oil companies that invested in Indonesia. Noting that the oil companies were sharing larger shares of their profits with Middle Eastern states than they were with Indonesia, Suharto told Ford and Kissinger that he wanted to negotiate an "understanding" with them. Both Americans were sympathetic and said that he would have their support. Kissinger, however, noted carefully that whatever Suharto did he should "not create a climate that discourages investment." The possibility that the East Timor affair could prove to be a disaster for Indonesia and someday impair the "climate for investment" never seems to have occurred to either Kissinger or Ford.

This brief schedule details Secretary Kissinger's two-day visit to Indonesia with President Ford. So far, no record of Kissinger's meeting with Adam Malik has been found.

Washington's initial response to the invasion was to delay new arms sales to Indonesia pending an administrative review by the State Department, ostensibly to determine whether Indonesia had actually violated the bilateral agreement stipulating that U.S.-supplied arms could only be used for defensive purposes. Military equipment already in the pipeline continued to flow, however, and during the six-month review period the U.S. made four new offers of military equipment sales to Indonesia including maintenance and spare parts for the Rockwell OV-10 Bronco aircraft, designed specifically for counterinsurgency operations and employed during the invasion of East Timor.(28) The administrative delay and the subsequent offers were the subject of a December 18, 1975, meeting between Secretary Kissinger and his advisers in which he chastised his

staff for writing a memo recommending that arms sales to Indonesia be cut off for violating the end-use agreement. While the memo was not widely distributed, Kissinger was angry that word might leak about how “Kissinger overruled his pristine bureaucrats and violated the law.” The secretary told his staff that he “took care of it with the administrative thing by ordering Carlyle (29) not to make any new sales.” If Congress asked about the policy, Kissinger said, “We cut it off while we are studying it. We intend to start again in January.”(30)

Six months later, and exactly one month before the formal annexation of East Timor by Indonesia, the subject of East Timor again came up during a staff meeting between Secretary Kissinger and his State Department bureau chiefs. The question was raised as to whether or not the U.S. should send a representative to accompany an Indonesian parliamentary delegation to East Timor—an invitation declined by most other countries. Robert H. Miller, an adviser from the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, recommended against accepting the invitation, suggesting that “broader objectives with respect to Indonesia – including overall support to Timor,” would be better served “if we don’t have high-profile participation.” Miller hoped to prevent “Congressional [sic] sentiment with regard to Indonesia from being rekindled.” Philip Habib, under secretary of state for political affairs, agreed: “There’s no need to take this action . . . Let them go ahead and do what they’ve been doing. We have no objection . . . They’re quite happy with the position we’ve taken. We’ve resumed, as you know, all of our normal relations with them; and there isn’t any problem involved.” In apparent reference to the continuing arms sales, his deception of Congress, or possibly to Indonesia’s bloody invasion and occupation, Kissinger responded: “Not very willingly. Illegally and beautifully.”

## Notes

1. Benedict R. Andersen, "East Timor and Indonesia: Some Implications," in Peter Carey and G. Carter Bentley, eds., *East Timor at the Crossroads: The Forging of a Nation* (Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1995), 138-40.

2. At a 1995 press conference Kissinger told former East Timorese resistance leader Constancio Pinto, "Timor was never discussed with us when we were in Indonesia" and then qualified this remark by stating that he learned about the invasion plans at the airport as the presidential party was about to leave. See "Ask Kissinger about East Timor: Confronting Henry Kissinger," East Timor Action Network, August 1995 <<http://etan.org/news/kissinger/ask.htm>>. During a radio interview in 1999, Kissinger continued to treat the discussion with Suharto on East Timor as incidental and nonsubstantive: "We were told at the airport as we left Jakarta that either that day or the next day they intended to take East Timor." See <[http://www.etan.org/\\_vti\\_bin/shtml.exe/news/kissinger/radio.htm/map](http://www.etan.org/_vti_bin/shtml.exe/news/kissinger/radio.htm/map)>.

3. Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000) 198-204, for a fine overview of the East Timor issue.

4. Indonesian foreign minister Adam Malik said in June 1974 that "the independence of every country is the right of every nation, with no exception for the people in Timor." See Center for International Policy, *Human Rights and the U.S. Foreign Assistance Program, Fiscal Year 1978, Part 2 – East Asia* (Washington, D.C., Center for International Policy, 1978), 18.

5. John G. Taylor, "East Timor: Contemporary History, A Chronology of the Main Events since 1974," Carey and Bentley, eds., *East Timor at the Crossroads*, 239.

6. Hamish McDonald, *Suharto's Indonesia* (Blackburn, Australia: Fontana, 1980), 202-203.

7. Ibid. 204.

8. Ibid., 203.

9. Schwarz, *A Nation*, 202.

10. Taylor, "East Timor: Contemporary History," Carey and Bentley, eds., *East Timor at the Crossroads*, 239.

11. John G. Taylor, "Emergence of a Nationalist Movement," Carey and Bentley, eds., *East Timor at the Crossroads*, 35; James Dunn, "Timor in International Perspective," *ibid.*, 63-64.

12. Center for International Policy, *Human Rights and the U.S. Foreign Assistance Program, Fiscal Year 1978*, Part 2, 19.

13. McDonald, *Suharto's Indonesia*, 207.

14. *Ibid.*, 210-11.

15. *Ibid.*, 211.

16. Center for International Policy, *Human Rights and the U.S. Foreign Assistance Program, Fiscal Year 1978*, Part 2, 19.

17. James Dunn cites a study by the Catholic Church suggesting that as many as 60,000 Timorese had been killed by the end of 1976. This figure does not appear to include those killed in the period between the start of the civil war in August 1975 and the invasion on December 7. See James Dunn, "The Timor Affair in International Perspective," in Carey and Bentley, eds., *East Timor at the Crossroads*, 66; The 100,000 figure is cited in McDonald, 215, and also in Taylor's chronology, "East Timor: Contemporary History," in Carey and Bentley, *East Timor at the Crossroads*, 239. McDonald's figure includes the pre-invasion period while Taylor's does not.

18. Schwarz, 205; Estimates vary widely. On November 12, 1979, Indonesia's foreign minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, estimated that 120,000 people had died in East Timor since 1975. See Taylor's chronology, "East Timor: Contemporary History," in Carey and Bentley, *East Timor at the Crossroads*, 240; Amnesty International estimates that 200,000 died from military action, starvation or disease from 1975-1999. See Amnesty International, "200,000 Dead. Enough is Enough." *New York Times* (advertisement), September 23, 1999.

19. For "pancasila," see Schwarz, *A Nation*, 10, 24, 41-42, 45-46, 292-93.

20. Andersen, "East Timor and Indonesia: Some Implications," Carey and Bentley, eds., *East Timor at the Crossroads*, 138-39.

21. The comment is cited in a telegram written by Australian Ambassador Richard Woolcott on August 17, 1975 (Cited in Munster, G.J. and Walsh, R. (eds), *Documents on Australian Defence and Foreign Policy, 1968-75* (Sydney, 1980), 200.

22. The memo was drafted by Edward C. Ingraham, director of the Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore office at the State Department's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

23. See Document 2.

24. "Nodis" means "no distribution" without the permission of the State Department's Executive Secretary.

25. The cable, entitled "Plans for Indonesian Invasion of East Timor," remains classified but is cited by title and cable number in a list of cables that Kissinger received while traveling in East Asia. The list may be found in National Archives, Record Group 59, Executive Secretariat Briefing Books, 1958-1976, Box 227, President Ford's Trip to the Far East (Follow-Up) Nov.Dec. 1975. The National Security Archive has submitted a request to the State Department for declassification of this and other cables on East Timor cited on the list.

26. Indeed, later that month Kissinger asked his advisers whether “We can’t construe a Communist government in the middle of Indonesia as self-defense?” See Mark Hertsgaard, “The Secret Life of Henry Kissinger; minutes of a 1975 meeting with Lawrence Eagleburger,” *The Nation*, October 29, 1990, at [http://etan.org/\\_vti\\_bin/shtml.exe/news/kissinger/secret.htm](http://etan.org/_vti_bin/shtml.exe/news/kissinger/secret.htm).

27. Andersen, "East Timor and Indonesia: Some Implications," Carey and Bentley, eds., *East Timor at the Crossroads*, 137.

28. Center for International Policy, *Human Rights and the U.S. Foreign Assistance Program, Fiscal Year 1978*, Part 2, 19-20. Max Holland, who co-wrote the Center's report, discovered the State Department's administrative delay and the continued offers of security assistance. The editors thank him for bringing this report to our attention.

29. Carlyle Maw, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance.

30. Mark Hertsgaard, “The Secret Life of Henry Kissinger; minutes of a 1975 meeting with Lawrence Eagleburger,” *The Nation*, October 29, 1990.

ที่มา : The National Security Archive, “East Timor revisited: Ford, Kissinger and the Indonesia invasion, 1975-1976,” [http://etan.org/\\_vti\\_bin/shtml.exe/news/kissinger/secret.htm](http://etan.org/_vti_bin/shtml.exe/news/kissinger/secret.htm), 6 December 2001.

## ผนวก ค

ข้อมูลเกี่ยวกับคณะกรรมการแห่งความจริงและมิตรภาพ (CTF)  
ระหว่างประเทศอินโดนีเซียและติมอร์ตะวันออก

A Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF)  
Indonesia-Timor Leste

## About Commission

*Saturday, 05 August 2006*

Underscoring the importance of resolving matters pertaining to the events of 1999, the leaders of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia as represented by H.E. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and H.E. Vice-President Jusuf Kalla and the leaders of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste as represented by H.E. President Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao and H.E. Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri met in Tampaksiring, Bali On 14 December 2004 to establish a Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF).

This Commission is tasked to establish the conclusive truth in regard to the events prior to and immediately after the popular consultation in 1999, with a view to promote reconciliation and friendship, and ensuring the non-recurrence of similar events.

The Commission comprises of ten members and six alternate members (eight from Indonesia and eight from Timor-Leste) chosen among persons of high standing and competence drawn mainly from legal and human rights fields, academia, religious and community leaders, namely:

Indonesia	Timor-Leste
Mr. Benjamin Mangkudilaga (Chairperson)	Mr. Dionisio da Costa Babo Soares

	(Chairperson)
Mr. Wisber Loeis	Mr. Jacinto das Neves Raimundo Alves
Mr. Petrus Turang	Mr. Cirilo Jose Jacob Valadares Cristovao
Mr. Agus Widjojo	Mr. Aniceto Longuinhos Guterres Lopes
Mr. Achmad Ali	Ms. Felicidade de Sousa Guterres
<i>Alternates</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
Ms. Sjamsiah Achmad	Ms. Maria Olandina Isabel Caeiro Alves
Mr. Antonius Sujata	Mr. Rui Pereira dos Santos
	Ms. Isabel Ferreira

The Commission is assisted by the Joint Secretariat of the CTF, which is based out of Denpasar, Bali, Indonesia. The Joint Secretariat, whose staff is comprised of Indonesian and Timor-Leste nationals, is tasked to provide administrative, substantive and PR support to the Commission.

As stated in its terms of reference, the CTF constitutes a new and unique experience whereby two countries, with a recent shared history, agree with courage and vision to look at the past as a lesson and embrace the future with optimism. Despite the challenges that lie ahead, the Commission is committed to work in the service of everlasting peace between the two nations.

Terms of Reference for the Commission of Truth and Friendship Established by the Republic of Indonesia and the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste

### Preamble

1. Inspired by human solidarity and our peoples' aspiration to freedom and dignity, the Republic of Indonesia and the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, both being developing countries, one with the largest Muslim population in the world and the other with a predominantly Catholic population, have embarked on the path towards full democracy. This path is full of challenges and perils; and it needs to be carefully nurtured and strengthened.
2. The peoples of Indonesia and Timor-Leste have come a long way in overcoming the sometimes painful chapter of their shared past. As close neighbors we are determined to work together to promote peace and friendship.
3. In today's era of globalization, taking full advantage of the freedom that we have attained, our peoples endeavor to build a solid foundation for a future of peace; a future where human dignity and social justice are the guiding force of transformation. Peace, however, is a process and has to be built. The pillars of peace are democracy, sustainable development and respect for human rights.
4. The democratic transition in Indonesia since 1998 and the international recognition of the independence of Timor-Leste in 2002 have provided the momentum for both countries to strive for those objectives. The prompt recognition of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, the participation of Indonesia at the highest level during the celebration of the 20th May 2002 and the establishment of diplomatic relations signify the spirit of reconciliation and the magnanimity of our peoples.
5. It is important, however, not to lose sight of the fact that the process of political reform in Indonesia began only at the end of 1998. In the history of countries and peoples, all and any change of an old political system requiring a radical transformation, entails as an almost inevitable consequence different challenges

of multi-dimensions. The fact remains that in Indonesia, an archipelagic nation with a great diversity, the process of political transformation has been even more complex than in any other country. It imposes upon Indonesia tremendous efforts to preserve the unity of the country without hindering the goals of reform and democratization.

6. Despite our respective domestic preoccupation and priorities, the Republic of Indonesia and the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste have spared no effort in developing a stable, friendly, and mutually beneficial neighborly relationship between the two countries and peoples.
7. The two governments are committed to resolve residual problems of the past and to deepen and expand bilateral relations both at the government and people-to-people levels. Based on the forward-looking and reconciliatory approach, the progress made in all areas of cooperation over the last three years has been satisfactory. Hence, reconciliation has actually taken place.
8. One of the important residual issues relates to the reported violations of human rights in 1999 in Timor-Leste. In regard to these events, the two countries have made serious efforts, namely:
  - a. In Indonesia, the National Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights Violations in East Timor, known as KPP-HAM, established in September 1999 conducted a credible investigation in 1999. It was followed with the establishment of the Ad-Hoc Human Rights Court and the subsequent judicial process against a number of suspected perpetrators. This unprecedented judicial process has not yet come to its completion.

- b. In Timor-Leste, a judicial process has been conducted by the Special Panels for Serious Crimes. Moreover, a truth and reconciliation process has also taken place and it has been universally commended as innovative, credible and effective.

Based on and benefiting from our shared experience, and motivated by our strong desire to move forward, we are determined to bring to a closure a chapter of our recent past through joint efforts. A definitive closure of the issues of the past would further promote bilateral relations.

9. Consistent with the spirit described above, the Leaders of Indonesia and Timor-Leste, met in Bali on 14 December 2004, have decided to establish the Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF), fully owned and operated by the two countries with a mutually agreed terms of reference.
10. Different countries with their respective experiences have chosen different means in confronting their past. The leaders and people of South Africa, where apartheid was defined as a crime against humanity, opted to seek truth and reconciliation. Indonesia and Timor-Leste have opted to seek truth and promote friendship as a new and unique approach rather than the prosecutorial process. True justice can be served with truth and acknowledgement of responsibility. The prosecutorial system of justice can certainly achieve one objective, which is to punish the perpetrators; but it might not necessarily lead to the truth and promote reconciliation.
11. The CTF constitutes a new and unique experience whereby two countries, with a recent shared history, agree with courage and vision to look at the past as a lesson and embrace the future with optimism.

#### Objective

12. To establish the conclusive truth in regard to the events prior to and immediately after the popular consultation in 1999, with a view to further promoting reconciliation and friendship, and ensuring the non-recurrence of similar events

#### Principles

13. The Commission shall work under the following principles:
  - a. The relevant principles contained in the Indonesian Law no.27/2004 on the Commission of Truth and Reconciliation and the Timor-Leste Law no.10/2001 on the Commission of Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR), in accordance with the mandate of the CTF
  - b. In the exercise of its mandate, the CTF shall bear in mind the complexity of the transitional situation in 1999, aiming at further strengthening of reconciliation and friendship between the two countries and peoples.
  - c. Based on the spirit of a forward looking and reconciliatory approach, the CTF process will not lead to prosecution and will emphasize institutional responsibilities.
  - d. Further promoting friendship and cooperation between governments and peoples of the two countries, and promoting intra and inter-communal reconciliation to heal the wounds of the past.
  - e. Does not prejudice against the ongoing judicial process with regard to reported cases of human rights violations in Timor-Leste in 1999, nor does it recommend the establishment of any other judicial body.

#### Mandate

14. The Commission shall have the mandate to:
  - a. Reveal the factual truth of the nature, causes, and the extent of reported

violations of human rights, that occurred in the period leading up to and immediately following the popular consultation in Timor-Leste in August 1999:

- i. review all the existing materials documented by the Indonesian National Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights Violations in East Timor in 1999 (KPP HAM) and the Ad-hoc Human Rights Court on East Timor, as well as the Special Panels for Serious Crimes, and the Commission of Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste;
  - ii. examine and establish the truth concerning reported human rights violations including patterns of behavior, documented by the relevant Indonesian institutions and the Special Panels for Serious Crimes (as contained in its indictment letters) with a view to recommending follow-up measures in the context of promoting reconciliation and friendship among peoples of the two countries.
- b. Issue a report, to be made available to the public, in Bahasa Indonesia, Tetum and English, and translated into Portuguese, establishing the shared historical record of the reported human rights violations that took place in the period leading up to and immediately following the popular consultation in Timor-Leste in August 1999.
- c. Devise ways and means as well as recommend appropriate measures to heal the wounds of the past, to rehabilitate and restore human dignity, *inter alia*:
- i. recommend amnesty for those involved in human rights violations who cooperate fully in revealing the truth;

- ii. recommend rehabilitation measures for those wrongly accused of human rights violations;
- iii. recommend ways to promote reconciliation between peoples based on customs and religious values;
- iv. recommend innovative people-to-people contacts and cooperation to further enhance peace and stability.

#### Time Frame

15. The Commission shall commence its work as soon as possible, but no later than August 2005 for the period of one year, with the possibility of an extension of a maximum of one year.

#### Composition

16. The Commission shall comprise of 10 members (five from Indonesia and five from Timor-Leste) chosen among persons of high standing and competence drawn mainly from legal and human rights fields, academia, religious and community leaders.
  - a. Following consultations, and in accordance with the domestic requirements or the constitutional provisions of each country, the President of the Republic of Indonesia and the President of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste shall jointly appoint the ten members of the Commission.
  - b. Members of the Commission, in the exercise of their mandate, shall enjoy immunity from prosecution and civil liability for actions arising from their mandate.
  - c. Members of the Commission shall enjoy the necessary facilities to exercise their mandate.

- d. The Commission shall be co-chaired by two members, one from Indonesia and one from Timor-Leste, chosen by all members.
  - e. The joint secretariat of the Commission shall be in Denpasar, Bali.
17. The Commission shall adopt its working procedures, and consider the possibility of establishing sub-commissions as necessary, as well as technical support offices in the respective capitals.
18. The two Presidents, in accordance with the domestic requirements or the constitutional provisions of each country, may appoint individual(s) of international standing as patron of the Commission.

#### Right to Free Access

19. In the conduct of its work, the Commission shall be guaranteed:
- a. Freedom of movement throughout Indonesia and Timor-Leste.
  - b. Free access, in accordance with the law, to all documents of the Indonesian National Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights Violations in East Timor in 1999 (KPP-HAM), the Ad-hoc Human Rights Court in Jakarta and the Special Panels for Serious Crime in Dili, and the CAVR final report.
  - c. The right to interview all persons in possession of information considered relevant by the Commission, guaranteeing privacy and confidentiality if necessary.
  - d. Appropriate security arrangements both by the Governments of Indonesia and Timor-Leste to the Commission members and persons interviewed by the Commission and persons who provide information and documents to the Commission, and for documents obtained and retained by the Commission, without restricting their freedom of movement.

#### Financing

20. The Governments of Indonesia and Timor-Leste shall bear the costs of the Commission.
21. Both governments shall allocate start-up funds.

#### International Assistance

22. The two governments welcome any assistance from the international community, based on joint request.


#### Working Languages

23. Working languages of the Commission shall be Bahasa Indonesia, Tetum and English.

#### Report

24. The Commission shall submit progress reports of its work to the respective Heads of State and Government on a periodical basis through their respective Foreign Ministers. The two Foreign Ministers shall observe the work of the Commission and act in an advisory role.
25. The final report shall be presented to the Heads of State and Government of Indonesia and Timor-Leste, who shall forward it to the respective National Parliaments and make it available to the public. The final report shall contain the findings of the Commission and recommendations focusing on revealing the truth, ensuring the non-recurrence of similar events, fostering reconciliation and promoting friendship.

## Organization Chart



พื้มา : Jalan Ir., Juanda, "Commission Truth And Friendship Indonesia - Timor Leste, 1975-1976," <[www.ctf-ri-tl.org](http://www.ctf-ri-tl.org)>, 2008.

## ผนวก ง

ประวัติของผู้นำประเทศอินโดนีเซียคนปัจจุบัน: ซูซีโล บัมบัง ยูโตโยโน

### Biography of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono

General TNI (Ret) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, popularly known as SBY, was born in Pacitan, East Java, on 9 September 1949. He graduated from the Military Academy in 1973-top in his class. He received his fourth star in 2000. In the first-ever direct presidential election in Indonesia in 2004, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, running on a platform for *"more just, more peaceful, more prosperous, and more democratic Indonesia"*, was elected as the 6th President of the Republic of Indonesia, gaining a landslide 60% of the popular vote over the incumbent President Megawati Soekarnoputri.

President Yudhoyono is also an accomplished scholar. He was educated in the United States, where he received his Masters degree in Management from Webster University in 1991. He continued his study and earned a Doctorate Degree in Agricultural Economics from Bogor Institute of Agriculture, West Java, Indonesia, in 2004. President Yudhoyono was awarded with two honorary doctorates in 2005, respectively in the field of law from his alma mater, Webster University, and in political science from Thammasat University in Thailand.

During his 27-year distinguished military service, President Yudhoyono took an extensive range of training, education and courses, both in Indonesia and overseas. President Yudhoyono also held numerous important posts and positions as troop and

territorial commander, staff officer, trainer and lecturer. He served both in the field and at headquarters, as well as missions overseas. He was the Commander of the United Nations Military Observers and Commander of the Indonesian Military Contingent in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1995-1996.

For his outstanding service, President Yudhoyono was decorated with 24 medals and awards, including the UNPKF Medal, the *Bintang Dharma*, the *Bintang Mahaputera Adipurna* and the *Bintang Republik Indonesia Adipurna*, the highest national medal for excellent service beyond the calls of duty.

Prior to being elected, President Yudhoyono held various important government positions, including Minister of Mining and Energy and Co-ordinating Minister for Political, Social, and Security Affairs in the National Unity Cabinet under President Abdurrahman Wahid. He again served as Co-ordinating Minister for Political, Social, and Security Affairs in the *Gotong Royong* Cabinet under President Megawati Soekarnoputri. It was in his capacity as Coordinating Minister that he became internationally recognized for leading Indonesia's counter-terrorism efforts. President Yudhoyono is also known for his activities in various civil society organizations. He served as Co-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Partnership for the Governance Reform, a joint Indonesian-international organization focused on the improvement of governance in Indonesia. He also served as Chairman of the Advisory Board of the Brighten Institute, an institution devoted to studying the theory and practice of national development policy.

President Yudhoyono is a keen reader and has authored a number of books and articles including: *Transforming Indonesia: Selected International Speeches* (2005), *Peace deal with Aceh is just a beginning* (2005), *The Making of a Hero* (2005), *Revitalization of the*

*Indonesian Economy: Business, Politics and Good Governance* (2002), and *Coping with the Crisis - Securing the Reform* (1999). *Taman Kehidupan* (Garden of Life) is his anthology published in 2004. President Yudhoyono speaks English fluently.

President Yudhoyono is a devoted Moslem. He is married to Madam Ani Herrawati. The first couple is blessed with two sons. The oldest is First Lieutenant Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono, who graduated top in his class from the Military Academy in 2000 and is now serving at the elite 305th Airborne Battalion of the Army Strategic Reserves Command (KOSTRAD). The youngest, Edhie Baskoro Yudhoyono, earned his degree in Economics from Curtin University, Australia.

ที่มา : “Biography of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono,” <

<http://www.presidentri.go.id/index.php/eng/profile/>>, 8 February 2006

## ผนวก ๑

ประวัติของผู้นำประเทศติมอร์ตะวันออกคนปัจจุบัน: ซานานา กุสเมา

### Biography of President José Alexandre “Xanana” Gusmão

Born José Alexandre Gusmao in Laleia, Manatuto, East Timor on June 20th, 1946.

He studied in a Catholic school before attending a Jesuit seminary in Soibade, the famous Catholic school in East Timor.

Later he attended a seminary in Dare, a suburb of Dili, East Timor. During Portuguese rule in East Timor,

Gusmao was a civil servant in the Department of Forestry & Agriculture.

Then, in 1974, when the Portuguese government decolonized East Timor, Xanana became a member of ASDT or the Social Democratic Party of East Timor; this party later changed to FRETILIN or the Revolutionary Front for Independence in East Timor. Xanana became a member of the Central Committee of FRETILIN and part of the Information Department. On 7th December 1975, Indonesia invaded East Timor and Xanana with all the members of FRETILIN and most of the population of East Timor escaped to the mountains to resist the invading troops.

Between 1978 and '79 when the majority of the FRETILIN leaders and the leaders of FALINTIL (the military wing of FRETILIN) were killed by Indonesian troops, particularly FRETILIN's President Nicolau Lobato (who was killed on 31 December '78) Xanana became the leader of FALINTIL. In 1981, when FRETILIN organised the resistance against Indonesia, the Congress asked Xanana to become their new President.

In March 1983 (23 March-8 August 1983) the Indonesian commander in East Timor, Colonel Purwanto negotiated with Xanana to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in East Timor. However, the new Indonesian Minister of Defence & Security General L. B. Murdani ended these negotiations because Xanana requested that a UN Mediator be involved in the talks.

In 1986, Xanana and his colleagues in the mountains created the National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM) which is the umbrella organisation against Indonesian rule in East Timor. (This includes FRETILIN, FALINTIL, the Catholic Church, and UDT) Xanana became the Chairman of CNRM and Commander-in-chief of FALINTIL.

In November 1991 the Santa Cruz massacre took place in Dili, East Timor and Indonesian troops killed more than 200 young people. The Indonesian Commander-in-chief of the armed forces General Try Sutrisno (now Vice-President of the Republic of Indonesia) accused Xanana of being responsible for the Santa Cruz massacre, claiming that Xanana instructed the students to start a demonstration in the cemetery.

In November 1992, Xanana was arrested in Dili by Indonesian military for subversion and in April of the following year the Indonesian courts in Dili sentenced him to life imprisonment.

A few months later the Indonesian government sent Xanana to a political prison in Semarang in Central Java and at the end of 1993 they sent him to another political prison, Cipinang Prison, in Jakarta where he remains still.

In early 1994 after much international pressure, President Suharto of Indonesia reduced Xanana's sentence from life to 20 years imprisonment.

The East Timorese Resistance still recognise Xanana as leader of the Resistance although he is imprisoned.

Xanana is married with one daughter and one son. They all went to Australia in 1989 with the help of the International Red Cross Committee.

ที่มา : “Biography of Xanana Gusmao – Leader of East Timorese Resistance,”

< <http://www.freedom.tp/people/xanana.htm>>, 2000.

## ผนวก จ

## ลำดับเหตุการณ์สำคัญที่เกิดขึ้นในประเทศอินโดนีเซีย

**Timeline: Indonesia****A chronology of key events:**

**1670-1900** - Dutch colonists bring the whole of Indonesia under one government as the Dutch East Indies.

**1928** - A youth conference pledges to work for "one nation, one language, one people" for Indonesia.

**1942** - Japan invades Dutch East Indies.

**1945** - The Japanese help independence leader Sukarno return from internal exile and declare independence.

**1949** - The Dutch recognise Indonesian independence after four years of guerrilla warfare.

**1950s** - Maluku (Moluccas) declares independence from Indonesia and fights an unsuccessful separatist war.

**1962** - The Dutch agree to transfer West Papua to Indonesia after a period of UN administration.

**Suharto comes to power**

**1965** - Failed coup: In the aftermath, hundreds of thousands of suspected Communists are killed in a purge of leftists which descends into vigilantism.

**1966** - Sukarno hands over emergency powers to General Suharto, who becomes president in March 1967.

1969 - West Papua formally incorporated into Indonesia, becoming Irian Jaya Province.

1975 - Portugal grants East Timor independence.

1976 - Indonesia invades East Timor and incorporates it as a province.

1997 - Asian economic crisis: Indonesian rupiah plummets in value.

1998 - Protests and rioting topple Suharto; B J Habibie becomes president.

#### **East Timor independence vote**

1999 - Ethnic violence breaks out in Maluku. Free elections are held in Indonesia. East Timor votes for independence in UN-sponsored referendum, after which anti-independence militia go on the rampage. East Timor comes under UN administration. Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) becomes president.

2000 - Two financial scandals dog the Wahid administration: Buloggate (embezzled funds from the state logistics agency), and Bruneigate (missing humanitarian aid funds from the Sultan of Brunei). The corruption case against former President Suharto collapses. Irian Jaya separatists become more vocal in demanding a referendum.

2001 - Ethnic violence in Kalimantan as indigenous Dayaks force out Madurese transmigrants. Mass political demonstrations by Wahid's supporters and opponents. IMF stops further loans citing lack of progress in tackling corruption.

#### **Megawati sworn in**

2001 July - Parliament dismisses President Wahid over allegations of corruption and incompetence. Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri is sworn in as his replacement, even as Wahid refuses to leave the presidential palace.

2002 January - Indonesia inaugurates human rights court which is expected to test government's willingness to hold the military accountable for atrocities in East Timor after the 1999 independence vote.

Irian Jaya province granted greater autonomy by Jakarta, allowed to adopt locally-preferred name of Papua.

2002 May - East Timor becomes independent.

2002 August - Constitutional changes are seen as a step towards democracy. For the first time, voters will be able to elect a president and vice president.

### **Bali attacks**

2002 October - Bomb attack on the Kuta Beach nightclub district on Bali kills 202 people, most of them tourists. Another bomb explodes near the US consulate in Sanur near Kuta, without causing any injury.

Muslim Cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir is arrested shortly after the bombings. He is accused of plotting to overthrow the government as the alleged spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiah (JI), the group thought to be behind the Bali bombing.

2002 December - Government and separatist Free Aceh Movement (Gam) sign peace deal in Geneva, aimed at ending 26 years of violence. The accord provides for autonomy and free elections in the Muslim oil-rich province of Aceh; in return the Gam must disarm.

2003 May - Peace talks between government and Gam separatists break down; government mounts military offensive against Gam rebels. Martial law is imposed.

2003 August - Car bomb explodes outside the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, killing 14 people.

**2003** August-October - Three Bali bombing suspects are found guilty and sentenced to death for their roles in the 2002 attacks. A fourth suspect is given life imprisonment.

Abu Bakar Ba'asyir is cleared of treason but jailed for subversion and immigration offences. The subversion charge is later overturned.

**2004** April - Parliamentary and local elections: Golkar party of former President Suharto wins greatest share of vote, with Megawati Sukarnoputri's PDI-P coming second.

**2004** July - First-ever direct presidential elections; first round narrows field to Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and incumbent Megawati Sukarnoputri.

**2004** September - Car bomb attack outside Australian embassy in Jakarta kills nine, injures more than 180.

Former general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono wins second round of presidential elections, unseating incumbent Megawati Sukarnoputri.

**2004** November - End of two-year process under which 18 people were tried by Indonesian court for human rights abuses in East Timor during 1999 crisis. Only one conviction - that of militia leader Eurico Guterres - is left standing.

#### **Tsunami; Aceh deal**

**2004** December - More than 220,000 people are dead or missing in Indonesia alone after a powerful undersea earthquake off Sumatra generates massive tidal waves. The waves devastate Indian Ocean communities as far afield as Thailand, India, Sri Lanka and Somalia.

**2005** March - Court finds Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir guilty of conspiracy over 2002 Bali bombings, sentences him to two-and-a-half years in jail. He is freed in June 2006.

A powerful earthquake off Sumatra kills at least 1,000 people, many of them on the island of Nias. The quake triggers tsunami alerts around the Indian Ocean.

**2005 August** - Government and Free Aceh Movement separatists sign a peace deal providing for rebel disarmament and the withdrawal of government soldiers from the province. Rebels begin handing in weapons in September; government completes troop pull-out in December.

**2005 September** - Airliner crashes on take-off from Sumatran city of Medan, killing more than 100 passengers and around 50 people on the ground.

**2005 October** - Three suicide bombings on the resort island of Bali kill 23 people, including the bombers.

**2006 January** - East Timorese report accuses Indonesia of widespread atrocities during its 24-year occupation, holding it responsible for the deaths of more than 100,000 people.

**2006 February-March** - Deadly protests at a major US-owned gold and copper mine in Papua province follow attempts to remove illegal prospectors from the site.

**2006 May** - A powerful earthquake kills thousands of people on Java.

**2006 July** - A tsunami, triggered by a large undersea earthquake, kills more than 500 people on Java.

**2006 December** - First direct elections held in Aceh province, consolidating the August 2005 peace accord. Former separatist rebel leader Irwandi Yusuf elected governor.

**2007 February** - Floods in Jakarta kill more than 20, leave hundreds of thousands homeless.

2007 June - Police capture the alleged head of the militant group Jemaah Islamiah (JI), Zarkasih, and the leader of the group's military wing, Abu Dujana.

2007 August - Islamist group Hizb ut-Tahrir holds international conference in Jakarta calling for creation of single state or caliphate across Muslim world.

2007 December - Alleged Jemaah Islamiah leader Zarkasih goes on trial in Jakarta.

2008 January - Former President Suharto dies.

ที่มา : BBC News, "Timeline: Indonesia," < [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/country\\_profiles/1260546.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/country_profiles/1260546.stm)>, 29 January 2008.

ผนวก ข

ลำดับเหตุการณ์สำคัญที่เกิดขึ้นในประเทศประเทศติมอร์ตะวันออก

**Timeline: East Timor**

**A chronology of key events:**

**1600s** - Portuguese invade Timor, set up trading post and use island as source of sandalwood.

**1749** - Timor split following battle between Portuguese and Dutch. Portuguese take the eastern half.

**1942** - Japanese invade, fighting battles with Australian troops. Up to 60,000 East Timorese are killed. Japan in control until 1945.

**1974** - Anti-Fascist revolution in Portugal leads to promise to free colonies, encouraging parties to prepare for new future.

**1975 August** - Portuguese administration withdraws to offshore island of Atauro.

**1975 October** - Five foreign journalists killed along border with West Timor, allegedly by Indonesian troops.

**1975 November** - After brief civil war, Fretilin (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor) declares East Timor independent.

**1975 December** - Indonesia invades, using its fight against communism as a pretext. It annexes territory as its 27th province, a move not recognised by the UN.

Strong resistance to Indonesian rule followed by repression and famine in which 200,000 people are thought to have died.

**1981** - Xanana Gusmao becomes leader of Falintil (Armed Forces of National Liberation of East Timor), the armed wing of Fretilin.

**1991** - Santa Cruz cemetery massacre in which troops fire on mourners at a funeral in Dili of Fretilin supporter, killing more than 100 people.

**1992** - Setback for the resistance as Gusmao is captured near Dili. In 1993 he is convicted of subversion and given a life sentence which is later reduced.

**1993** - Groups of East Timorese enter foreign embassies in Jakarta over the next few years seeking political asylum.

**1995** - 20th anniversary of the Indonesian invasion marked by protest by 112 East Timorese and sympathisers who enter Russian and Dutch embassies in Jakarta.

**1996** - Acting Bishop of Dili, Carlos Belo, and resistance leader Jose Ramos Horta jointly awarded Nobel Peace Prize, raising international awareness of the East Timorese independence struggle.

**1998** - Indonesian President Suharto resigns. Replaced by Habibie who suggests territory may be given special status within Indonesia.

### **Indonesia's grip loosens**

**1999** January - Indonesia says it will consider independence for East Timor if people reject autonomy.

Exiled resistance leader Jose Ramos-Horta returned in 1999

Born in 1949

1975-99: Exiled in US, Australia

1996: Awarded Nobel Peace Prize jointly with Bishop Belo

2006: Named as prime minister

2007: Elected president

2008: Seriously wounded in shooting

**1999** February-April - Gusmao moved from Jakarta prison to house arrest. In response to increasing violence by anti-independence activists, Gusmao orders guerrillas to resume independence struggle.

**1999** May - Indonesia, Portugal sign agreement to allow East Timorese to vote on their future. Deal endorsed by UN.

**1999** August 30 - Almost 99% of 450,000-strong electorate votes in UN-organised referendum.

**1999** September - Result of referendum shows 78% voters favoured independence.

Violence erupts as anti-independence militia helped by the Indonesian military resume campaign of terror, leaving up to 1,000 dead. A quarter of the population flees, mainly to West Timor. Martial law imposed. Gusmao freed.

Australian-led peacekeeping force arrives, gradually restores order. Many militia members flee to West Timor to avoid arrest. Indonesian parliament recognises outcome of referendum.

**1999** October - Gusmao released. UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) established.

**1999** December - International donors at a Tokyo conference agree to provide US \$520 million in aid to help rebuild East Timor.

**2000** September - UN evacuates staff from West Timor after murder of three refugee agency workers by pro-Indonesian militia gangs. An Indonesian court jails six men for up to 20 months for the killings, earning international outrage for being too lenient.

2001 July - East Timor, Australia sign memorandum of understanding over future revenues from oil, gas fields in Timor Sea under which East Timor would get 90% of revenues.

2001 August - Election of 88-member Constituent Assembly; Fretilin party wins, taking 55 seats.

2002 - January - Truth and reconciliation commission opens to try and heal wounds of past.

2002 January - Indonesia inaugurates human rights court to hold military accountable for atrocities in East Timor after 1999 independence vote.

2002 February - East Timor assembly approves draft constitution envisaging government run along parliamentary lines.

2002 February - East Timor and Indonesia sign two agreements aimed at easing relations.

2002 April - Xanana Gusmao wins presidential elections.

2002 20 May - UN Security Council sets up UN Mission of Support in East Timor (Unmiset) to help East Timorese authorities.

### **Independence**

2002 20 May - Independence: VIP guests including former US president Bill Clinton and Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri join celebrations in Dili.

2002 September - East Timor becomes 191st member of UN.

2004 January - Portugal announces \$63m (50m euros) aid package.

2004 February - Production at offshore gasfield begins; Bayu Undan project is expected to earn \$100m a year.

2004 November - End of two-year process under which 18 people were tried by Indonesian court for human rights abuses in East Timor during 1999 independence drive. Only one conviction - that of militia leader Eurico Guterres - is left standing.

2005 April - East Timor, Indonesia sign landmark border agreement during Indonesian President Yudhoyono's first visit to Dili since coming to power.

2005 June - Remaining Australian peacekeepers leave.

2005 August - Truth commission, set up by East Timor and Indonesia, holds its first meeting. The body, which has no power to prosecute, will examine the violence that accompanied East Timor's independence in 1999.

### Energy deal

2006 January - East Timor, Australia sign a deal to divide billions of dollars in expected revenues from oil and gas deposits in the Timor Sea. Under the agreement, talks on a disputed maritime boundary are postponed.

Report on alleged atrocities during Indonesia's 24-year rule is presented to the UN. It finds that the occupation was directly responsible for the deaths of more than 100,000 East Timorese.

2006 May - Foreign troops arrive in Dili to try to restore order as clashes involving former soldiers, who were sacked in March, descend into wider factional violence as well as looting and arson. At least 25 people are killed and about 150,000 take refuge in makeshift camps.

2006 June-July - Prime Minister Alkatiri resigns over his handling of the violence. Jose Ramos-Horta is named as premier.

**2006** August - Non-military peacekeeping mission, the UN Integrated Mission in East Timor, or Unmit, is set up.

**2007** January - Former interior minister, Rogerio Lobato, goes on trial on charges of arming civilians during 2006 unrest.

**2007** May - Prime Minister Jose Ramos-Horta wins presidential election.

**2007** June - Fretilin, led by former prime minister Mari Alkatiri, wins the highest number of votes in parliamentary polls but not the majority needed to govern alone.

**2007** August - Xanana Gusmao is named prime minister, prompting violent protests.

**2007** November - An Australian court rules that five Australian-based journalists were deliberately killed by Indonesian troops in 1975 to stop them exposing the invasion of East Timor.

**2008** February - President Jose Ramos-Horta is shot in the stomach by renegade soldiers in an attack on his Dili residence. Rebel leader Alfredo Reinado is killed in the attack.

ที่มา : BBC News, "Timeline: East Timor ," < [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/country\\_profiles/1504243.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/country_profiles/1504243.stm) >, 15 February 2008.

ผนวก ข

แผนภาพเขตการปกครอง 13 เขต ของประเทศติมอร์ตะวันออก



ที่มา : ASEAN Development Bank (ADB), Asian Development Outlook, 2006.