

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION

The Malayan Emergency in the manner it unfolded has all the characteristic hallmarks of internal war brought about by a social guerrilla force represented by the CPM Insurgents. It was warlike in nature that deviated from previously shared values involving serious disruption to establish social and economic activity as well as lost of lives and damage to property with the view of unseating the British in a political competition to assume leadership of the Malay Peninsular.

The British forces successfully defeated the CPM guerrillas in what is widely considered the model of how to win an Internal War against rebel forces. It is acknowledge that a noteworthy component that won the day for the British was the Psychological Operations. It was not public visibility of large number of soldiers that made the population feel more secure; was its widespread use rather the deployment of high levels of patrolling by small numbers of soldiers in the jungle hideouts of the CPM.

All the counterinsurgency campaigns contained a social motivational operation to win the hearts and minds of the native inhabitants, and that accounts for the considerable success of the British. The Social Operation included providing better services, such as medical care and education, to address and correct past wrongs with the expressed goal of gaining the loyalty of the indigenous Malayan population. Compared to the non visible 'hard' tactics employed by a large number of small patrols in an effort to hunt down insurgents, the Social Operation ranked as low coercion where little or no force was involved since its emphasis was on winning the support of the local population by improving their standard of living and granting them more rights (Nagh 2002:66).

The Military initiative was next on the continuum. Although it was forced to employ force in some situations, in most circumstances it was much less overwhelming; the military enforce the laws and normally try to arrest people, not kill them (Stewart 2004:32) . Retrained or rehabilitated military constituted the middle of the continuum because the soldiers were taught to interact in a friendly manner with the civilians with the view to avoid civilian casualties as much as possible (Nagh 2002:59). The defensive line ranks next on the scale because it was designed to stop insurgents from infiltrating the country at border points as well as deny and cut off insurgents inside the country from gaining or receiving outside support. To accomplish this, what essentially is a wall is built and garrisoned by a number of soldiers (Stewart 2004:32). Ironically but fortunately for the British, the most coercive heavy patrolling with the goal of hunting down and killing the insurgents all took place away from the glare of the public eye.

ANALYSIS - VARIABLES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Another dimension to the equation lies is the attitude, cooperation and participation of the affected people towards the Psychological Operations. To some, it produces an image of government controlled communications or muzzled mass media, telling the people only what the authorities wants them to hear. It is viewed as a necessary 'evil' for the maintenance of law and order. It should be clear that modern Psychological Operations is none of those things.

The motivational impact of the Psychological Operations during the Malayan Emergency netted the desired results because it was steeped in the principles of genuinely seeking to understand the situation on the ground from an honest humane perspective. It was in fact at the heart and soul of all the initiatives orchestrated by the British during 1948-60.

1. ANALYSIS - PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSONALITY OF THE CPM

In spite of the very clear emphasis on the part of the military and the other agencies of government on the importance of winning the hearts of the people as being the pre-requisite in this campaign, there has not been sufficient documentation in understanding the basic psychology of the people from whom the CPM find it vital to carry out their activities.

In this respect, it is fundamentally important to first psychologically understand the psychological perspective of the CPM mindset as an essential prerequisite to determine that personal, political and social psychological operations be it to engage with the view of motivating them to support the incumbent power or the other extreme of hunting and destroying them.

It was for this reason that C.C.Too believed it was a very erroneous and highly fallacious concept among some circles who wants to combat the CPM policy by the revival of the abuse of the Confucian ethic, and he believed it would be no greater error than this that could be committed, especially with the younger generation. Hence, the concept of authority at best is some sort of benevolent paternalism which is very rare. More often than not, they hate authority in any sense because it mocks of oppression; it either exacts taxes from them or it tells them not to do this or not to do that.

It is for this detest against authority that made the soldering profession to be looked down upon; and the common adage in China then was “No good son will become a soldier”. The prevailing sentiment, especially in China, in particular it was sometimes very difficult to distinguish between a soldier and a bandit: they were sort of interchangeable! They all wore uniform of one kind or another. They all claim to be some sort of authority. All this contributed towards the image of authority, be it in the central government, the local government or the military authority.

The image of authority among the people in Asia in general and in China in particular was very unfortunate partly through the gross abuse through the centuries, from the parental and governmental authority based on the Confucian ethic as well as partly because of lack of administration.

Given a scenario where the absence of basic administration at the grassroots compounded by the abuse practiced by whatever semblance of administration that is left at a higher level. It creates a complete vacuum and a state of mind which draw in any system of philosophy and any sort of organisation which are similar of those to the CPM. This in essence created the basic problem in fighting against CPM insurgency in the whole area.

Basically, there was a vacuum, and the CPM made use of the vacuum; and also basically a revolutionary situation – to borrow a CPM phrase in the socio-economic sense which we bound to explode whether with or without the help of the CPM. So, the basic problem for any psychological operations initiative would seem is to address the abuse on the part of the administrators as well as attend to the complete lack of administration at the grassroots.

Its emphasis is important as evident in the Malayan experience where squalid Chinese squatters were the primary nests of CPM activity and where they operated from; whose relatives and friends contributed recruits towards the CPM cause. These squatters were neglected almost completely before the CPM insurgency and whatever semblance of authority that reached them was in the form of taxation or oppression. Hence, in the course of the campaign against CPM insurrection in Malaya the basic problem was first and foremost the need to put down some sort of effective administration to the masses of the people at the grassroots level became a paramount psychological consideration.

“A person who is infected with a disease is the same as the person or a country that is contaminated with CPM insurgency. For obvious reason you got to cure him of that disease. First you got to suppress the insurgency. But during the course of this cure, as well as after the cure, you have to build up his strength of resistance or immunity. Without building this up, no amount medicine can help you cure him of the disease or rid the country of CPM insurgency. Having cured him, it is even more important to build up his health and his natural immunity so that a relapse, which could be worse than his previous attack, shall not take place.

On the other hand, there are numbers and members of people who have not yet been contaminated, and it is among these people that we have to carry out certain prophylactic measures, preventive measures, by building their strength of resistance. In order to build up other strength – economic, social and otherwise, you must have the machinery to carry out these measures, and that is why it is so important that some sort of effective administrative machinery is put into such areas.” (C.C. Too 1962:Speech).

The analogy articulately observes the psychological importance to effect a system of administration at the grassroots level.

2. ANALYSIS - PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT ON INITIATING AN ADMINISTRATION TO CONNECT WITH THE GRASSROOTS

So although Malaya had a civil administration of sorts, a police force of sorts, but as a result of their having to work for the Japanese and getting into the bad books of the civil, it was psychologically exploited by the CPM resistance movement even after the Japanese surrender. The psychological need of the hour was to try to restore public confidence in authority which had been discredited in the persons of those who had to represent such authority, and also to retrieve the morale of these persons and to retrain them.

“It took us something like five years to reorganise the police, retrain its personnel and restore public confidence in them. In the field of psychological warfare, I had the task during the early days of the emergency, of trying to rebuild the public image of our police personnel, of our civil administrators, so that they themselves would feel proud to belong to government service and the people would regard them with respect as the proper accredited representatives of law and order. That is pretty basic.”, observed C.C.Toos.

Without a fairly effective police system and civil service, it is difficult to carry out policies and implement measures like civil action, food denial, resettlement of the people, or even for that matter to gain public confidence that the government is a good one which is working for the benefit of the people, and not as the CPM say, oppressors and the like.

3. ANALYSIS - PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSION IN INTELLIGENCE GATHERING ON CPM MINDSET

Before they went into a new area, the CPM in Malaya would send a couple of their Min Yuen agents, comrades from the branch level, to the local villages in civilian dress and circulate among the local population in the coffee shops, tea houses, markets, and they would get into conversation with the local population to find out what were the susceptibilities, idiosyncrasies, grievances real and fancied, points on attitude of the people towards the government, and the local relationships, which they could exploit, and then they returned to their jungle camp and made out detailed situation reports.

In this respect, the very research constituted a psychological operation in understanding the enemy better. It provided the authorities the benefit of effecting pro-active

psychological initiatives in seeking to prevent more people joining the CPM struggle.

By and large a great chunk of the psychological war tactics in dealing with the 12-year campaign was taken page by page from the enemy themselves. They attached so much importance to public reaction to what the public would do if you did this, if you did that, if the government should do this, is they do that, without that they would not plan. They would start planning not only after they had acquired a very accurate picture of the local conditions, and so the authorities repeated the same process. Not only to find out about the local population but also about the enemy themselves. It proved effective because it led to a lot of surrenders and captured a large amount of documents. Again the very tactic falls under the ambit of psychological operation.

Figure 14: General Sir Gerald Templer arrival in Malaya in 1951 transformed the strategic and political situation in Malaya. He enthusiastically started the resettling of half a million Chinese squatters to deprive the CPM terrorists of local support.



ANALYSIS - THE CAUSE OF THE CPM INSURGENCE

In such cases, it is not the absence of institutional patterns but the very fact that social force is highly institutionalized (and probably not exercised in a warlike manner but with a nice observance of clearly understood norms, as in most feudal warfare) that is the decisive point.

Certainly it is not reasonable on the face of it to expect a theory about the causes of internal war in previous societies to fit as well as all cases where political violence endangers and is expected (Eckstein, 1964:14). The formulation of the subject internal war can only be treated as provisional and tentative; found upon inquiry or it may be constructed for the formulation and testing of theories or still varies for the kinds of theory one seeks.

In 1948 the world was in the grip of CPM fever. In Europe the Western Allies grappled with the Soviet Union; its aggression was tampered only because America had nuclear weapons waiting in the bomb bays of its newly formed air force. In Greece, CPM guerrilla fighters held four-fifths of the country, and China was in the midst of a civil war. In Indo-China, Ho Chi Minh and General Giap were forming and training a guerrilla army that was keeping the French Expeditionary Force at bay. Throughout China and the Pacific-Asian region the Chinese CPM Party and the Chinese Nationalist Party waged the same war that had been going on since the early 1920s in China. Militant Communism seemed to be on the ascendant, and the Malayan CPM Party saw no reason why it should not be successful in riding the CPM wave opposing the British backed regime in Malaya and Singapore.

The CPM came into being when the Chinese-led Nanyang CPM Party dissolved in April 1930. Its stated intention was to work for a Soviet Republic of Malaya, and at the same time sponsor Communism in both Thailand and the Dutch East Indies. Differences in opinion existed between the CPM agents and the Chinese CPM leaders. The former wanted membership to be open to anyone and the latter wanted to retain its original personality and character form: a Chinese CPM movement that simply happened to be sited in Malaya and Singapore amongst the transient Chinese population. Most of this transient population were in Malaya to amass a fortune

before returning to China to live in comfort. The Comintern agents had their way, but only a few hundred Indians and virtually a miniscule fraction of Malays opted to join the party. Due to the relative ability of the British to empower, promote and harness prosperity in Malaya, the Malayan population was indifferent to the CPM cause.

The new CPM was almost wiped out before it started. In June 1931 a senior Comintern agent was sent to Singapore to discipline the CPM and ensure it adhered faithfully to Moscow-directed doctrinal lines. The agent was arrested by the police. Thesis in his possession disclosed almost full details of both the CPM organisation and the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern. The arrested agent was also believed to have made a confession which supplemented this information, enabling police to arrest all the prominent members of the CPM in Malaya and Singapore as well as many CPM in Hong Kong and Shanghai. Ho Chi Minh was one of those arrested and sentenced to a term of imprisonment.

The information gained from this agent put the CPM membership at about 15 000, with an additional 10 000 active sympathisers in local organisations and trade unions. It was a full twelve months before the CPM recovered enough to operate again. Contact with the Comintern was lost - along with the small amount of financial aid it had supplied. The Comintern Far Eastern Bureau in Shanghai was also broken up, leaving most of the CPM groups in the Pacific regions to fend for themselves. After weeding out its weaker members, the CPM conducted a show of strength by organising industrial subversion and a large strike at the Batu Arang coal mine in Selangor. A prompt dispatch of soldiers and police brought the situation under control. During this period the CPM remained completely illegal and unregistered.

In 1935 CPM policies turned their attention toward Fascist regimes (such as Germany) at the expense of their actions against Western democracies, such as Britain and France. This respite gave the CPM time and breathing space to build up its resources and to form a sound organisation. Throughout this period, Britain did not interfere directly with the control of its regimes. Britain's policy was biased towards the native Malaysians. This created very little opportunity for CPM sentiments, aspirations or feelings to grow among the Malayan population. Most of the CPM members were people of Chinese stock, brought in as labour to work at the tin mines and rubber estates. The native Malaysians were, in general, content as small farmers and fishermen. They had sufficient for their needs and had no inclination to take on this sort of heavy

work. Many of the Chinese and Indian labourers regarded their stay in Singapore and Malaya as temporary stints for work purposes.

The Japanese invasion of China in 1937 saw the CPM rally in a surge of patriotic feeling, to raise funds for a joint CPM/Nationalist defence of their homeland. In reality, the CPM did little, and allowed the Nationalists take the losses. During this time, the Comintern turned its attention back towards the Western democracies. In 1941 Germany attacked the Soviet Union. CPM everywhere were ordered to ease subversive activities against the Western democracies and turn their attention and resources solely against the Axis powers. Although the CPM did finally comply with this instruction, it remained committed to working for a Soviet republic of Malaya as soon as the war was over.

The CPM was led by Chin Peng who took over leadership from Loi Tak @ Wright (Chin 1994:26-27)¹ after the World War II. Chin Peng was born in Sitiawan, Perak. Early movement of CPM was to get rid of the British Government and set up the CPM Republic of Malaya. In CPM attempt to capture power, they had used terrorism and committed widespread atrocities especially toward estate managers, tin mine operators, security forces personnel and general publics. The CPM was later disbanded and considered illegal on 20 July 1948, with the declaration of Emergency in the Federation of Malaya following the armed rebellion launched by the CPM Terrorists (Chin 1994:29)² However the CPM was replaced with a number of CPM front organizations. One of the CPM's key post-war strategies was gaining political control through the control of labour. The CPM founded a multitude of trade unions, infiltrated older unions, formed

¹ Loi Tak was the CPM Secretary General was arrested by the Japanese during the Japanese occupation and later recruited by Major Onishi of the Kempetai Special Branch to work for the Japanese. Before the British reoccupation in September 1945, Loi Tak concluded an agreement with the British in secret. In March 1947, Loi Tak disappeared for good with party fund. In March 1947, Chin Peng was appointed as the Secretary General by the Central Committee. See also Micheal Leifer, Dictionary of The Modern Politics of Southeast Asia, 3rd Edition, Routledge, London, 2001, p. 87.

² The CPM was formerly the Malayan People Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) to resist the Japanese occupation and later renamed as the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA) in James Robert Mallette Jr, Operational Art in the Success of the Malayan Counterinsurgency Campaign, Naval War College, Newport, 1997, p. 3.

federations of unions in each of the nine Malay States, and a General Labour Union embracing the whole of Malaya (Coates 1992:7). The trade unions thus became the CPM's main instruments in its efforts to control the masses. However no mass urban uprising occurred and from thereon, the CPM switched its attention and strategy to mobilizing rural populace.

The CPM aim was to establish a United Front in the political, social, economic, labour and educational fabric of the country through which it hoped to form somehow a CPM Republic of Malaya including Singapore (Coates 1992:70). Chin Ping was the man behind the infiltration of CPM Terrorists remnants into Peninsular Malaysia which had withdrawn to south Thailand. He reorganized the CPM by deploying MNLA 8th Regiment to the Sadao area, MNLA 10th Regiment in Weang and MNLA 12th collocated with the Central Committee Group at the Betong Complex. The cause for CPM's First Emergency in Malaya was to establish self government and independent for Malaya. The focus of the struggle was largely to fight the British Imperialism and the reunification with Singapore, which was then governed separately (Miller 1972:203).

Based on the successful tide of Communism in China, Russia and Vietnam, the CPM in Malaya got carried away to believe that the success achieved elsewhere could be achieved in the Malay Peninsular.

THE MILITARY AND PEOPLE'S WAR

The primary role of the Military is to prepare for war. It may from time to time be called to assist the civil authorities in times of natural disasters. That notwithstanding the Military exist is to deter external aggression. Any insurgency within the country is largely considered an internal security situation and it is then the responsibility of the Police to play a predominant role. In the case of Malaysia, it was apparent that the CPM were better trained and equipped besides employing tactics which were far. They had it seems acquired new knowledge from the Viet Cong in the Vietnam War. It appeared that the CPM were back with revenge. Operations along the borders areas revealed that large numbers of places which the CPM had used ranging from staging posts to large training camps. The discovery was not confined to the border areas but to the states that used to be former haunts of the CPM.

Figure 15: A terrorist is interrogated by an interpreter on behalf of the British soldiers



Over the years the Malaysian Government was constantly under pressure to recruit more non-malay into the Military and the Royal Malaysia Police. Amongst the races, it was the Chinese who were less responsive to join the uniformed services. The spate of CPM incidents provided an opportunity to encourage wider participation from all races. There were numerous organizations related to defence and security including those that were to provide local defence for villages. In the Chinese villages which used to be the haunts of the CPM guerrillas the need was even more pressing. There was then no alternative but to have an ethnic Chinese to undertake such a responsibility. The organizations were largely voluntarily such as Vigilante Corps, the Area Security Units and the Rukun Tetangga. Only the Vigilante Corps and the Area Security Units were equipped with arms.

The Hearts and Minds approach has been most effectively carried out in the CPM revolutionary war in Malaysia. Not only were Malaysian Government agencies sensitive to the needs of the population, but so too was the military. The programmes that were carried out were enjoyed by even the more remote of the Malaysian populations. The various projects which were implemented in adherence to the 'Defence and Development' criteria benefited the population in more ways than one. As an example, because of the strategic requirements of countering the insurgents, large sums of money went towards improving the country's infrastructure. The opening of the East-West Highways just south of the Malaysia-Thai border proved to be an

effective barrier to the CPM infiltration into the Malaysian territory.³ At the same time it opened areas adjacent to the highway for further economic activities. Rubber, oil palm, timber and other products could be transported to the nearest ports and industrial areas.

The CPM insurgency opened up more opportunities for improving the social needs of the population. Besides establishing an administrative machinery to cope with the expansion, better educational, medical and social needs came about. It was as if the insurgency provided the impetus for the economic development of the country. For a country which belonged to the Third World, its social and economic development surpassed some developing countries. The education, training, economic infrastructure and communication facilities were factors that paved the way from an agro based economy to one of industrialization. The stability and incentives that prevail within the country has attracted large amounts of foreign investments within the country. These were to further contribute to a more vibrant economy which in the final analysis benefited the Malaysian society.

A further social and economic change to the country was in the rapid rise of urbanization. This came about following the resettlement of Chinese into 'New Villages'. The accessibility of these villages and its proximity to town centres changed the employment pattern of the Chinese from mainly agricultural to that of industrial labourers. The advent of new villages during the Emergency meant that they had to turn to vegetable and poultry farming, rubber tapping and tin mining when there were these mines nearby. As the country shifted from an agro based economy to one of industrialization, the Chinese similarly were quick adapting to the change. The economic base of the Chinese was thereby transformed. The proximity of these villages to the rapidly growing industrial areas provided these areas with the work force required.

³ The East-West Highway stretches from the northern states of Perak and Kelantan and aCPM as a link for the East and West coasts of Peninsular Malaysia. It has opened up large areas of jungle for further agricultural development and links these areas to the port of Penang on the West coast.

ANALYSIS - MALAYAN SUCCESS

The concept of People's War was to mobilize the people to resist the CPM insurgents and to commit them in efforts towards nation building to include politics, social, economic, security and defence. As during the Malayan Emergency, it was the government all out efforts at winning the war against the CPM. The 'hearts and minds' approaches was successful in denying the support of the people to the CPM. The Government was determined to fight the CPM and winning the people's minds, emotions and loyalty by providing justice, human rights, equality of opportunity and a higher living standard. The extension about Psychological Operations during Malayan Emergency now is that part of each of the five subjects mentioned that overlaps with all others as a kind of social force that is exerted in the process of political competition, deviating from previously shared social norms, "warlike" in character and involving the serious disruption of settled institutional patterns (*Eckstein 1964 : 12*).

1. THE HEARTS AND MINDS' APPROACH

The hearts and minds were conceived by General Templer and also made it known that he planned to make the campaign against the CPM insurgents was the responsibility of every Malayan citizen. This was done by conducting civil-military operations to isolate the guerrillas from the population both physically and psychologically and military operations in eliminating the guerrillas. The support from the people could be obtained by addressing their discontentment as a means of winning them over and brought them under the administrative control of government. It was this strategy which contributed to the success of the counterinsurgency campaign by the British under General Sir Gerald Templer..

2. POLITICAL DIMENSION

An understanding and conviction on the political process and confidence in the government machinery provides the people to support the government's effort to promote and strengthen national security. As was the case during the Emergency, there was significant number of soldiers from the British Commonwealth who fought in the jungle of Malaya. Malaya must take a lead in fighting the CPM insurgency. The CPM was unable to project an effective platform to win over the sympathy of the people to their cause.

The vigorous measures undertaken by the political leaders to mobilize masses support in their outlook and thinking went a long way towards winning the population to the government side. A major feature used by the government machinery was ideology. Communism was portrayed as a foreign ideology which was totally unacceptable to the cultural practices, values and religious beliefs of Malaysians. Religion in itself poses a barrier to CPM ideology. The futility of their struggle was further undermined when their terrorist activities were denounced not only by Malay politicians but also by Malaysian ethnic Chinese politicians as well. If the CPM had hope for a moral alienation of the masses from the existing government, it was gradually becoming harder to achieve.

3. SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS

British Government had geared towards providing benefits to the masses in the economic, social and political spheres and to uplift their living standards as a means of gaining their support. A free enterprise society like Malaya would certainly benefit those with good business acumen. The ethnic Chinese in this respect was well ahead of the other communities in Malaya. Though Malaya was predominantly Malay, it was the Chinese who had larger share of economic. During the Malayan Insurgency there was similar arrangement though the term for area free from CPM Insurgents was called 'white area'. It was effective means of motivating society towards getting their areas declared as 'white area' instead remaining in the 'black area'. Several restrictions such as random checks, road blocks and movements that imposed were lifted once black areas were declared as white areas. Military operations and curfews were discontinued and life in white areas will going as normal.

The hearts and minds has always been the approach towards fighting the insurgent. This has been the features during the First Emergency as well as during the CPM insurgency of the sixties. Admittedly the various projects for the public were indeed costly. The improved economy meant better standards of living which the CPM can never hope to provide. Indeed the threat is persistent when times are hard and less when the economy is strong. People war advocates the total support of the population in any campaign. As for measures undertaken to address the political, social, economic and cultural sphere of the population; it went long way towards mobilizing their support for the government. Their outlook changed for the better as the future ahead was more promising for them and their future generations. Given the choice as to

which side to lend their support it was clear that the majority would align themselves to the government.

4. THE ROLE OF MILITARY AND POLICE

The continued function of the military and police forces in an insurgency situation goes a long way to prevent anarchy. It helps to project that the forces of law and order still prevails which helps to promote public confidence. Intelligence in an insurgency situation can be pressing. It will also continue to erode public trust and confidence in the government. In so far as playing a significant role towards eliminating the CPM it was the special branch of the Royal Malaya Police and Military Intelligent who deserved special mentioned. Again at all times they were operating under the law underlining Robert Thompson's other principle of 'Functioning in accordance with the law'. The Police Special Branch and Military Intelligent had played a significant efficient role in fighting the CPM. The main task of the Special Branch and Military Intelligent were to penetrate the CPM organizations and collect all intelligence.

SUMMARY

What becomes evident is that Psychological Operations was at the root of all decisions undertaken to overpower and overcome the CPM to total defeat in the Malay Peninsular. As much as the CPM represented the social guerrilla force in direct political competition based on warlike confrontation with the British for political competition in the Malay Peninsular, Psychological Operations can be viewed as the soul force that broke and defeated the physical body and spirit of the CPM.

Essentially, it can be argued that the concept of "Psychological Operations" embraces not merely "words" in the form of film, radio and leaflets but also "deeds" such as the behaviour of Government representatives and certain official policies. It argues that for propaganda to be effective, the message transmitted by the propagandist's words must be coherent and correlate with that suggested by their actual deeds. Despite the existence of numerous reviews of the eventual British success in the Malayan Emergency, the contribution of Psychological Operations to the defeat of the CPM has never been exhaustively researched.

New information has shed new light on the neglected years of the Emergency - 1955 to 1958 - demonstrating how it was Psychological Operations, which decisively ended the shooting war in December 1958. The Psychological Operations campaign that was waged in Malaya throughout the years of the Emergency had two main aims: to persuade the terrorists to surrender, disrupting their organization and spreading disaffection in the process, as well as to motivate and encourage the civilian population to oppose them. The campaign scored well on all three aspects of the Psychological Operations i.e. tactical, strategic and consolidation. One of the most important lessons learnt during the Emergency in Malaya was that the firepower of Government forces needs judicious handling of skill and care, a lesson that has often been ignored in subsequent campaigns in different countries.

Overall, the Psychological Operations campaign was very successful and a key factor in bringing the Emergency to an end. The statement from surrendered terrorists alone bears testimony to the effectiveness of the leaflet-dropping and loud hailing campaign in encouraging defection from the CPM cause.

Therefore, during the Malayan Emergency, the fight for the 'hearts and minds' was truly fought with words and deeds. The role of Psychological Operations was by no means an attempt to diminish the efforts of those involved in the jungle Operation but remains an important complementary Operation that required the cooperation from all parties. Other drastic measures taken by the British eventually cut off supplies and support to the CPM, who were trapped in the jungle and constantly hunted by British Special Forces. The CPM failed largely because of lack of support from the majority Malay community, who opposed the CPM due to its predominantly Chinese-based support. Eventually, the CPM tried to negotiate for peace at the Baling Talks of 1955, but Chin Peng refused to dissolve the CPM. The CPM finally lost its struggle when Malaya was granted independence in 1957. The CPM surrendered on 2 December 1959 to the Malaysian government and agreed to terminate all activities. The newly formed Malayan government declared the end of the emergency on 31 July 1960.