

CHAPTER 3

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

On the surface Psychological Operations might appear as a complement to the Military, Police and Administrative initiative that worked in tandem to combat and defeat the CPM during the Malayan Emergency. Yet its significance assumes a greater force of dimension when it is used as the cardinal principle and barometer in all motivations, be it in the Police, Military or Administrative initiatives.

Psychological Operations is in essence a sincere striving to end an internal war based on the premise of seeking the right formula of action to initiate and effect based on a genuine human understanding of the problem without resorting to generalisations, victimisation or intimidations. It becomes only a propaganda tool if what is communicated as intent is verbalised but not actualised or realised. But when the motivation of communication, the manner it is communicated, the message in the communication is sincere, it is human nature to gravitate in that direction. (Stubbs 1989:11).

The Psychological Operations during the Malayan Emergency had all the hallmark traits of sincere communication to the majority of Malaysians as well not interested in Communism as well as sincere in keeping their promises to the CPM that they would not be victimised when they 'surrender'. That the authorities kept their word was to their credit and to the further discredit and breaking of ranks among hard-core CPM to return to the shared values of mainstream life of the majority.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Psychological Operations may be defined broadly as the planned use of communications to influence and mould attitude, behaviour and emotions in target groups that support the attainment of national objectives (Stubbs 1989:12). The form of communication can be as simple as spreading information covertly by word of mouth or through any means of multimedia. A Psychological Operations campaign is in essence a war of the mind (Dennis & Grey 1996:30). Thus, primary weapons are sight and sound. Therefore, Psychological Operations can be disseminated by face-to-face communication, audio visual means (television), audio media (radio or loudspeaker), visual media (leaflets, newsthesiss, books, magazines and/or posters) (Dennis & Grey 1996:31). The weapon is not how it is sent; rather the message it carries and how that message affects the recipient.

Psychological Operations are planned Operations to convey selected information to target audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behaviour of organizations, groups, and individuals (Stubbs 1989:8). Used in all aspects of war, it is a weapon whose effectiveness is limited only by the ingenuity of the commander using it. It is a proven effective tool in combat and peacetime; it is one of the oldest weapons in the arsenal of man. It is an ingenious mechanism in effecting a non-lethal weapons system for both protection and combat purposes. Psychological Operations is simply learning everything about the target enemy, their beliefs, likes, dislikes, strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities (Stubbs 1989:11). It is imperative to know what motivates the target enemy before any Psychological Operations can commence.

Figure 13: The struggle for the hearts and minds was another plank of government policy. Here, a Home Guard inspector reassures the local villagers days after they had been visited by terrorists.



For Psychological Operations to be effective, an organisation must carefully plan its propaganda. It must make sure that everything about its enemy is known. It must target the beliefs and value system of the target group. Intelligence reports, area studies, country research, information from defectors, native help, and even enemy prisoners of war are all sources of information to assist in the Operation. (Stubbs 1989:9). Used during peacetime, contingencies and declared war, these activities do not take the form of force, but are force multipliers that use non-violent means in often violent environments. Persuading rather than compelling physically, they rely on logic, fear, desire or other mental factors to promote specific emotions, attitudes or behaviours. Historically, the application of Psychological Operations in one form or another has proven to be almost as essential to the successful waging of war as the use of manpower and weaponry. However, in spite of its long history of successful employment, the potential for using the power of persuasion through Psychological Operations as a force multiplier to achieve national objectives with a minimum of destruction, has been recognized by only the most perceptive of military leaders and statesmen. Furthermore, Psychological Operations has come into its own as an effective non-violent and proactive weapon system since World War II (Chew 1962:57-61).

The major developments made in the area of behavioural sciences today enable us to know and understand why people behave as they do. Combined with the development and sophistication of mass media communications, it has greatly multiplied the capability and value of Psychological Operations as a means of achieving national objectives without needless bloodshed. In essence, Psychological Operations consist of three distinct types: Tactical Psychological Operations, Strategic Psychological Operations and Consolidation Psychological Operations (Stubbs 1989:59). These three types too are classified as Strategic, Tactical and Consolidation¹. Tactical Psychological Operations is addressed to a specific enemy combat group, to induce them to perform a specific action that will affect the current or short-range combat situation. Aimed at a larger audience, Strategic Psychological Operations is put into effect by a carefully planned campaign against a larger target audience than that toward which Tactical Psychological Operations is directed. The mission of consolidation Psychological Operations is to assist the civil and military authorities in consolidating their gains, by establishing and maintaining law and order, and by re-establishing civil government in an occupied or liberated area (Stubbs 1989:60-62).

All three types of Psychological Operations i.e. Tactical, Strategic and Consolidation can be employed to produce the following desired effects (Stubbs 1989:69):

- Reduce moral and combat efficiency within enemy ranks.
- Promote mass dissension within and defections from enemy combat units and/or revolutionary cadre.
- Support for incumbent's own and allied forces cover as well as deception Operation to promote cooperation, unity and morale within one's own and allied units, as well as within resistance forces behind enemy lines.

¹ **Strategic.** They are activities exploiting the economic, military, psychological and political vulnerabilities directed against a friendly, neutral or hostile group within the country or against a foreign country. The aim is to reduce the effectiveness of the target audience carried out on a long term basis out-lined at the highest level. **Tactical.** Tactical Psychological Operations are prepared and executed in combat areas in direct support of tactical Operation. This type of operation is based on short-range objectives directed at the enemy or the civilian population or both. **Consolidation.** Consolidation Psychological Operations is purely directed at the civil population in controlled or occupied areas to facilitate military Operation and promote maximum co-operation among the civilian population (ATM Reference Source PBB (Mal) 25)

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS DURING THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY

At the start of the Malayan Emergency, information and directives to the population were disseminated through the Emergency Publicity Committee of the Department of Public Relations. But in June 1950, this task, as well as that of issuing anti-terrorist propaganda, was assumed by the Emergency Information Services at Federal Police Headquarters in Kuala Lumpur, with representatives at state or settlement and district levels (Stenson 1969:78). This was a logical step, because the main sources of information about terrorist locations and activities were police agents, usually former CPM supporters who still had contact with the terrorists and members of the public, who were known to be trustworthy in reporting suspicious movements to the police. Also, at an early stage in the campaign, the Police Special Branch knew the identities of all active CPM and their approximate areas of operation.

In October 1952, with the Psychological Operations campaign expanding, the Emergency Information Service was placed under the authority of the Director General of Information Services, and in March 1954 responsibility for the psychological offensive against the terrorists was placed under the control of the Psychological Operations Section of the Director of Operation Staff; the Director of Information Services becoming responsible to the Home Affairs Department of the Government for disseminating Emergency propaganda and information to the public (Stenson 1969:80).

This inevitably empowered better sustained coordinated in the flow of information and the facility of penetrating greater, reach and mileage. It made for better and more intensive usage of Government communications resources to reach a wider segment of the audience at all time.

Information, propaganda and directives to the general public were disseminated by means of the whole media machinery: newsthesiss, posters, leaflets, press releases, touring loudspeaker vans, Radio Malaya broadcasts, films and voice broadcasts from loudspeaker-equipped aircraft. The fact that the number of leaflets distributed by all methods rose from 30 million in 1948 to 43 million in 1950, to 77 million in 1953 and to an annual figure of over 100 million from 1954 to 1957 showed that the effort of the Psychological Operations were huge and staggering (Stenson 1969:81). In addition, the twelve mobile public address and cinema units

that addressed one and a quarter million people in 1948 were expanded to a fleet of ninety-one units by 1953, and these addressed a monthly total of over one million people.

Some of the information passed to the general public by these means was relayed to terrorists groups in the jungle through CPM sympathizers, but for direct contact with the enemy, the Psychological Operations Department relied heavily on leaflet-dropping and voice-broadcast sorties by aircraft. In the beginning leaflet-dropping was the only method used, as voice-broadcast techniques from aircraft had yet to be developed (Stenson 1969:83-84). Some 100 leaflet-dropping sorties were flown during the first nine months of the campaign, mainly over Perak, Southern Selangor and southern Johore. The leaflets dropped on these missions were primary intended to advise the civilian population that a 'State of Emergency' was in force. The aircraft used were mostly Dakotas of the medium-range transport force; these carried up to 800,000 leaflets which were dispatched from the aircraft in bundles of 5,000 by personnel of No 55 Air Despatch Company of the RASC (Stenson 1969:90). Using this method, a good distribution of leaflets over an area 1,000 square yards could be achieved. Drops of smaller numbers of leaflets to pinpoint targets were usually made by the observation aircraft of No 656 Squadron, which were under the operational control of the Army formations to which the various flights were attached.

1. Leaflets Dropping

Leaflet-dropping Operation intensified after April 1949, with an average of ten monthly sorties being flown until December 1950. In the course of 229 sorties during this period more than 12.5 million leaflets were dropped, one million of them on known terrorist concentrations to announce the terms of surrender which were promulgated in September 1949. The effort was stepped up further in 1951, with many leaflets carrying information on rewards for informers. The peak month was in June 1951, when 2.25 million leaflets were dropped on 106 sorties, mostly on support of anti-terrorist Operation in Johore. To meet the enhanced requirement, the Dakotas and Valettas of the medium-range transport force were assisted by bombers of the offensive support force, which dropped leaflets after air strikes (Thomson 1966:84). During 1952, majority of the leaflet-dropping effort was done by the Valettas of No 52 Squadron. During one period of the year, there was considerable evidence from surrendered terrorists that the propaganda campaign was having a major effect (Thomson 1966:86). In 1953 the leaflet-dropping effort was stepped up from an average of eleven sorties a month in the first

half of the year to twenty-three in the second half. Over 60 million leaflets were dropped in the course of the year, with the maximum effort in October, when 19,536,000 leaflets were dropped. Fifteen million of these contained a message from a high-ranking terrorist officer who had surrendered; these were dropped by the Lincoln bombers of No 1 Squadron RAAF and No 83 Squadron RAF, the latter on temporary deployment from Hemswell in the United Kingdom.

The Psychological Operations campaign reached its peak in 1955, when 141 million leaflets were dropped on 365 sorties (Thomson 1966:87). The week following 9 September 1955, when an amnesty was declared, saw the biggest leaflet-dropping Operation of the entire Emergency. In seven days, Valettas dropped 21 million leaflets over the jungle, setting out the surrender terms, while a further 6 million leaflets carried information on surrender terms, while a further 6 million leaflets carried information on surrender points and 'safe-areas'. Following this short period of intense activity, and with peace talks appearing to be a valid prospect, all forms of anti-terrorist propaganda were curtailed and the number of leaflets dropped fell from 29 million in September 1955 to less than 5 million in each of the last three months of the year (Thomson 1966:90).

The leaflet-dropping Operation were once again stepped up in 1956, when it became clear that the peace talks were not achieving its objectives, and 100 million leaflets were dropped in the course of the year by the Valettas of No 48, 52 and 110 Squadron, the Bristol Freighters of No 41 (RNZAF) Squadron and the Austers of No 656 Squadron (Thomson 1966:92). In the following year the number of leaflet-dropping sorties showed a steady decrease, for the reason that the number of terrorists remaining in the jungle was dwindling. The most intensive flying period of the year occurred between 7 and 9 September, when Valettas of the air-transport support force at Kuala Lumpur dropped 8,320,000 leaflets and the Austers of No 656 Squadron a further 3.6 million, the leaflets setting out the terms of a new surrender agreement which was to remain in force until the end of the year. This operation, GREENLAND I, was followed by a second, GREENLAND II, when nearly 13 million leaflets were dropped between 17 and 21 December 1957, the latest peace offer having now been extended to 30 April 1958 (Thomson 1966:96).

In the early months of 1958 terrorists were surrendering in growing numbers, and the success of the Psychological Operations campaign led to the extension of the surrender deadline until 31 July, a further 8.5 million leaflets being dropped in GREENLAND III. At the same time, 2.5 million leaflets were dropped regularly each month as part of the general anti-CPM propaganda offensive. Leaflet-dropping

continued for some time after the Emergency had been officially declared over, and nearly one and a half million leaflets were still being delivered from the air each month at the end of 1960. The total number of leaflets dropped during the entire Malayan Emergency campaign reached 500 million, in the course of 2,500 sorties. (Thomson 1966:98).

2. Voice Broadcast

Leaflet-dropping Operation were closely linked with voice broadcasts from early 1953, trials having been carried out in airborne loud hailing techniques from October 1952 with a loudspeaker-equipped C-47 borrowed from the USAF at the request of General Templer, the Director of Operation (Tilman 1967:29). Two Valettas of Headquarters FEAF were initially equipped with voice-broadcasting systems, but their engine noise was found to be excessive and they were replaced by Dakotas. The first of these, borrowed from the RAAF and fitted with broadcasting equipment from one of the Valettas, operated alongside the other Valette until 23 February 1954, when the Valetta crashed on Mount Ophir (4,187 feet high) in Johore with the total loss of the aircraft and all on board. Demands for so-called 'Voice' aircraft were increasing, and it was decided to form a Voice Aircraft Flight. This became 'C' Flight of No 267 Squadron, which was based at Kuala Lumpur. The flight was established with three Dakotas and two Auster aircraft (broadcast trials by an Auster had been made in January 1954, and had proved very satisfactory, the loudhailing being carried out from a height of 1,500 feet at 42 knots) (Tilman 1967:34-35).

The Voice Aircraft Flight's first RAF Dakota, flown out from the United Kingdom, arrived on 12 June 1954 and was made ready for Operation by the 23rd, when the RAAF Dakota returned to Australia. A second Dakota arrived on 13 July 1954, followed by a third in January 1955, when the Voice Flight attained its maximum establishment of three Dakotas and two Austers. In November 1958, No 267 Squadron changed its number to No 209. The Voice Flight continued to operate from Kuala Lumpur until January 1959 when, because of the elimination of CPM and the declaration of 'White Areas' in the southern part of Malaya, it was decided that the Voice Flight would move to Penang in order to be nearer to the remaining 'Black Areas' of northern Malaya (Tilman 1967:38). Due to the often dangerous flying conditions in this area, and the hazards of the mountainous terrain, the two Austers were withdrawn at this point. On 26 January 1959, the flight suffered a serious loss when one of the Dakotas crashed on take-off from Kuala Lumpur and was totally destroyed. In November 1959, with the move of No 209 Squadron

to Seletar, on Singapore Island, the Voice Flight was transferred to No 52 Squadron at Kuala Lumpur, the flight remaining as a detachment at Penang.

To achieve the maximum psychological effect on the CPM, following an encounter with the Security Forces, Voice Aircraft were used with the minimum amount of delay, in order to take advantage of low CT morale and exploit any setbacks the terrorists may have suffered, with promises of fair treatment to all who decided to 'self-renew' (the term 'surrender' was never used, as this would have meant unacceptable loss of face) (Tilman 1967:39). The text of the broadcast was of primary importance, and certain strict rules had to be followed. Most importantly, all statements by voice broadcast had to be true. This principle was rigidly adhered to in Malaya, and it was noticeable in statements by surrendered terrorists that they never doubted the information delivered by Voice Aircraft. Threats were not used unless the authorities intended to carry out the threats and were capable of doing so. The messages had to be brief and clear, with words and phrases carefully chosen. Six or seven short sentences were first drafted in English, translated into the required language, and finally recorded in the correct dialect. The recordings were usually made in the studios of Radio Malaya under ideal conditions, although recordings were sometimes made in emergency fashion on board the Dakota itself.

The Voice Dakotas were equipped with a large diesel generator, installed in the fuselage, which produced 230 volts. The tape-recorder used a special cassette carrying 19 feet of tapes, the two ends being spliced together to form an endless repeatable tape. On operational tapes the recorded message ran for twenty-seven seconds, followed by a three-second pause before being repeated. The message was amplified by four amplifiers, each of which delivered an output of 500 watts to the speakers. The latter were mounted under the aircraft at an angle of 45 degrees to the vertical, and directed towards the port side. The quality of the broadcast and the correct functioning of the equipment were constantly monitored by the sound operator, seated at a control station by the main door; he was also responsible for changing tapes into different languages and dialect at the request of the aircraft captain.

Loud hailing Operation required very precise flying and were sometimes dangerous, since the Dakota had to be held at a speed of 70 knots, which was very close to stalling and a hazardous operation in the turbulent Malayan mountains. Straight-line flying in squares, with all turns to the left and working towards the centre at 2,000-yard intervals produced the best results,

since the speakers covered an area of 2,000 yards to the left of the aircraft and 500 yards to the right, from an optimum height of 2,500 feet above the ground. For a broadcast to a small target, or village, an orbiting technique would be used to give continuous ground reception (Tilman 1967:40). By the end of 1956 the Voice Flight aircraft were flying an average of seventy-five sorties a month. Much of the loud hailing was concerned with the tactical exploitation of specific terrorists' eliminations, such as the killing of Ah Hoi, the South Malayan Bureau Representative and State Committee Secretary of the CPM in Negeri Sembilan, on 11 October 1956 (Tilman 1967:41). From 1957, however, the number of loud hailing sorties flown by the Dakotas was gradually reduced in order to conserve the limited flying time that was left to the ageing aircraft.

3. PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSONALITY OF THE CPM

“The people we are dealing with in this particular area are generally living in the village with very low standard of living. Most of them are barely subsisting. They have a very unfortunate concept of all governmental agencies, soldiers, persons dressed in uniform and authorities of any kind, and you cannot blame them, because in the several centuries in the past if not for a longer period of time, they were completely in an administrative vacuum.

Either the governmental agencies in their own respective countries had failed for various reasons to reach right down to the grassroots, or during the very rare occasions when government authorities made their presence felt, it was felt in the sense of oppression: the people could not do this, they had to pay this tax, they had to pay that tax. So generally speaking, the most happy impression they have had of government, military and authority would be a sort of benevolent paternalism.” (C.C.TOO 1962: Speech)²

C.C.Too postulated that it was largely engendered by their own interpretation of the Confucian philosophical concept of the paterfamilias or the head of the nation where the emperor owns everything in that country or in a family where the male parent is the absolute boss of the family. Taken to its extreme interpretation, it means that every hair, every bit of fingernail that is growing on the body of the child belongs entirely to the progenitor. It explains why some of the more literal minded Confucian scholars refuse to cut off their hair because that is destroying the

² Speech by C.C.Too at US Army Command & General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, USA on 15 October 1962.

property which rightly belongs to the parent. They even refuse to cut their finger-nail so that it curls round and round like the tusks of a wild elephant.

It is the abuse of this system of philosophy which originated in China and spread throughout the whole Asian area including Japan and the areas in Indochina, which contributes towards the phenomenon that the philosophic concept and ethic of Confucius have been ambushed by the head of the family and by the emperor during the different dynasties and throughout the history of the land.

The situation reached a boil during the early 20th century under the impact of the liberalism of the western civilisation which had the effect of creating tremendous hostility between the older generation and the younger generation. It was not confined to China but all countries where Chinese cultural influence was felt was the considered opinion of C.C.Toou.

“I have lived through part of this myself in Malaya. I mean I live in a Chinese family and I have experienced all this although admittedly not to the same extent as it had been experienced in China Proper. But even so it was bad enough, and I would say that by the early 20th century a situation had been reached among all areas where the people were ethnically or culturally, directly or indirectly, connected with the Chinese, in which a great conflict was building up between the older generation and the younger generation, and I would say quite categorically that even without the advent of communism there must be of necessity a tremendous social revolution in China itself between the older generation and the young ones, because the old men refuse to loosen their grip.

Sometimes they reach right through their graves to maintain their grasps upon the younger generation, and this is the reason among other things you find a Chinese parent having a great liking for a larger family, because to him all his male children in particular (the female children are just slaves, you don't consider them at all – they are born slaves), but even the male children are merely so many units of slave labour.

The parents obligation is to feed the children, clothe them and give them some sort of shelter, in exchange for which unconditionally at the whim, not only the wish, of the parent they render absolute service.” (C.C.TOO 1962:Speech).

4.PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT ON INITIATING AN ADMINISTRATION TO CONNECT WITH THE GRASSROOTS

Viewed in this light the very setting up of the initial administration system to engage and connect with the grassroots was born, nurtured and effected based on a psychological motivation of understanding the situation.

Malaya was fortunate, because before she achieved independence on 31 August 1957, the British had an enlightened policy where they helped to educate and bring up local officers into their administration. But even so, when the British decided around 1955 that Malaya should achieve independence two years later, there was the problem of retrenchment when Malaya achieved independence there was a large exodus of British administrators and the vacuum had to be filled.

Normally it would take between five to ten years to educate persons to become efficient civil administrators. But Malaya did not have the luxury of time. Together with the British experts, they worked out a crash program under which candidates were recruited in the usual manner into the civil service. They were given three to four months of intensive training to prepare them for the basic requirements which they were to carry out in the first phase, and then to administer at district and state levels. The enlisted civil servants lived and worked among the existing British officers to fight the CPM as well as improve local administration at the grassroots level.

After a year of such field service they were returned to the training schools to another three or four months of intensive training which equipped them for their next phase; and so it went on; training in the field and back to training in the schools. During the course of this it was much simpler to weed out those who proved themselves unsuitable.

“By this method, in two years Malaya managed to train up sufficiently effective and experienced junior civil administrators to fill the vacuum left by the exodus of experienced British civil administrators at the time she achieved independence. It seems to me that this is the basic thing that the nations of the free world should help the underdeveloped countries to do. I am speaking in particular reference to countries in Southeast Asia, but i personally feel that the same system applies to the newly independent countries in Africa and even to the very old countries in South America, in order to create a new image among the people in regard to authority.” , in the words of C.C.Toos.

In this respect the psychological understanding of effecting an administration at the grassroots level become the first psychological operations initiative to combat the CPM. It had to be regarded as a prime requisite in Malaya as well as to countries which had been occupied by the Japanese during the last war, when a lot of civil administrators and practically all the Police and Secret Service personnel who could not run away, had to work for the Japanese administration whether they like it or not.

Having worked for the Japanese, they were scorned and ridiculed by the CPM – usually a CPM controlled resistant group – and were completely discredited in the eyes of the people after the Japanese surrender.

5. PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSION IN INTELLIGENCE GATHERING ON CPM MINDSET

The man entrusted to understand the CPM mindset in Malaya was C.C.Too. He went through life in an average Chinese family with abuse of the Confucian ethic by the paterfamilies, and who had the benefit of six years of Chinese education in a Kuala Lumpur Chinese school.

“The chap who sat beside me in class for two years,” C.C.Too restated, “later I found out to have become a central committee member. So with this sort of background I at first thought I was quite equipped to have a good idea of the method of thinking and behaviour of the CPM leaders. But when I got into this job and started to look into their documents – we have tremendous amount of captured documents from diaries to directives, sometimes booklets about that size with Chinese character of an inch square to the number of 120 pages – there was a tremendous amount of documents they produced and we thank them very much for it; when I started working on their documents and speaking to surrendered terrorists, I encountered within their clandestine organisation and within the jungle organisation, their pattern of behaviour and their mental process, their emotional response, in fact the complete psychology of these people is quite different from the psychology of those who have not gone underground or have never belong to any CPM organisation. This evoked great interest, personal interest, in me. It is much more than a mere job to me. I carried out a considerable amount of research on their documents and conversation with these people, and I found a very interesting aspect.

“Normally one associates such research as part of the work of the intelligence section, but it goes very much deeper than that. You see: what happened was this. For example, our troops or police went into a jungle camp and they killed some CPM and usually they found large bundles of thesis, and they said: “This is mostly propaganda. We sort it out. What is hand-written we keep. All the pages and pages of cyclostyled documents we burn.” They burned all the thesis at the beginning, and the result was during the first three years we had no intelligence, no material upon which to study the enemy’s mentality and to study his future policies and intention.

It was only when I came into the picture in 1951 and realised this importance, that we insisted that every lit bit of thesis recovered in a live or dead body or recovered in any CPM dump or camp, must be brought back, and what the local intelligence officers regarded as of no importance to them, must be sent back to headquarters in Kuala Lumpur where I personally conducted the research.

It was fascinating but extremely monotonous and tedious work. The whole process was like mining for diamond; sorting through thousand of cubic yards of dirt and earth in order to find one little grain of diamond. If the process is not followed through, the diamond is not found. This creates a bottle-neck.

It is important that in this research into the mentality of the enemy, into his state of mind, into his pattern of behaviour and into the ways he would react to new stimuli or changes in policy, which goes much further than normal intelligence research, has provided us, me particularly and the whole campaign in Malay generally, with so much understanding of the enemy that we were in a position to give very accurate prediction of the order of 75-85% accuracy as to exactly what the enemy would do in the next so many months. This is most invaluable. Apart from this, it is also very important to conduct this research in order to find out the state of mind of the people in the areas in which the enemy operated.” (C.C.Too 1962:Speech)

6. IMPACT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

By and large, the Psychological Operations initiative of the British was neither intrusive nor disruptive to the welfare of the majority of the people in respect to bread and butter issues as well as the security of the people.

This was a direct contrast to the violent, intimidative, destructive and disruptive tactics employed by the CPM. Whilst employing the desired 'hard' tactics necessitated in on Internal War, by and large, the British also employed 'soft' tactics to win the heart and minds of the people as opposed to the exclusive 'hard' gambit of the CPM.

Given the incumbency of Government, the British had immense resources compared to the limited resources of the CPM. Whilst the British had the benefit of backing and funding from Britain and other commonwealth nations, the CPM had no external source of help or funding in any sustained manner from the CPM super power regimes. That the CPM had zero aerial capability compared to the variety of aerial resources of the British was also an important factor. It empowered better penetrative mobility to flush out the insurgents in deep rugged mountainous jungle terrain. It was clearly evident that the British were far more superior masters of persuasive communication compared to the pervasive coercive terror-like tactics of the CPM.

The CPM were further at a disadvantaged position given that they did not have the people skills to enlist the support of the Muslim Malays and Indians. Their support base was largely from the Chinese community. The sensitive people skills of the British did not allow them to vent their anger and frustration on the Chinese by branding all Chinese as CPM. Rather they were astute and far-sighted in creating New Villages complete with all desired community facilities for the Chinese who were non-CPM. Although there was initial resentment among the Chinese to be relocated, the facilities coupled with the security won their hearts and minds.

In the final analysis, the British were better masters of human psychology compared to the CPM and that is why their Psychological Operations was successful in slaying the CPM threat in the Internal war of insurgency during the Malayan Emergency.

SUMMARY

Overall, the Psychological Operations campaign met its desired target objectives as it proved to be a vital and key factor in bringing the Emergency to an end. The early sign of its effectiveness were the advent of voluntary CPM surrenders as early as the first two months of Voice Flight Operation in 1953. By 1955, 70 percent of all surrendered terrorists who had heard

an aerial broadcast stated that it had influenced their decision to give themselves up, and in many cases it had been the major factor involved. Statements by surrendered terrorist further bear testimony to the effectiveness of the leaflet-dropping and loud hailing campaign in encouraging defection from the CPM cause.

One of the most important lessons learnt during the Emergency in Malaya was that the firepower of Government forces needs handling with skill and care, a lesson that has often been ignored in subsequent campaigns in different countries. Guerrilla forces are seldom destroyed by large concentrations of firepower and body counts do not win counter-insurgency campaigns because bombs and shells showered down without regard for innocent lives may destroy several villages and kill dozens of terrorists but in the long term the explosives will aid terrorists and alienate many more members of the civilian population. Eleven thousand people died during the Malayan Emergency, including 2,500 civilians, but if unrestrained firepower had been used that total would have been ten-fold and subsequently, the anti-CPM campaign lost. CPM leader, Chin Peng failed to win enough support from the other main Malay and communities in Malaya. In short, he was faced with a large part of the population which was indifferent to his cause and in time the people's apathy turned to open hostility. The intensive and extensive Psychological Operations manoeuvres affected by the Government further alienated the CPM ideology from the majority of the Malayan population.

While it is right to state that Malaya remains a classic example of how a counter-revolutionary campaign was waged against CPM insurgency, it must be remembered that Chin Peng had no safe sanctuary, no open border, and by the very nature of Malaya's multi-racial society; his appeal for help met with little response from the Malays and Indians, especially after the initial wave of terror failed to win the day. The *Psychological Operations* campaign that was waged in Malaya throughout the years of the Emergency had multiple aims. It persuaded the terrorists to surrender, disrupted their organization and spread disaffection in the process, as well as motivated and encouraged the civilian population to oppose them.